1. GOVERNMENT v.

SPRINGER
FACTS:
- National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress through Act No. 2822, and the
government eventually became the owner of 99% of its stocks.
- Subsequently, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting
rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting
right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at
that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs).
- A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
- A meeting was held and there the Government-General asserted that he has the sole power to
represent the government. The Senate President and Speaker of the House however disagreed.
Notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General they still elected Milton Springer
and four others as Board of Directors of NCC that gave the new directors power to vote.
ISSUE:
Whether the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.
HELD:
NO.
The court ruled that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions, to
the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive
function; that the National Coal Company and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the
Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government property belongs to the
executive department.
-

Thus the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an
invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive Department (Usurpation by
legislature of the privileges of the Executive department).

The legislative department under the Organic law is only authorized to create office, which in this case
is Act No. 2822 or the NCC itself, and provide for the qualifications of those officers who may hold the
office.

Since the power to appoint persons in a public office is an executive function, given that NCC is a
GOCC under the government, it is the executive who has the authority to appoint positions to them
including its directors.

The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature
may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the
legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it
does not weaken the executive branch.

2. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
- Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
- RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
- RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001.
- RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
As such, petitions assailing the constitutionality of RA 10153 were filed. Petitioners, among others,
contend that it is unconstitutional for the law to grant to the president the power to appoint OICs who
will assume office as ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. They contend that this grant of power to appoint gives the President the
power of control over the ARMM, which is in complete violation of Sec. 16 Article 10 of the Consti which
provides that the president shall supervise the autonomous region and shall ensure that its laws are
faithfully executed.

ISSUE:
WON the grant to the president of the power to appoint OIC s is constitutionals
HELD:
YES.
- During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options which Congress can adopt in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials:
(1) Allow the incumbent elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until
those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
(2) Hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected
in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office; or
(3) Authorize the President to appoint OICs, their respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.
- 1st option is unconstitutional because the Constitution is clear in stating that elective local officials shall
have a term of only three years. Hence, they are bound by this limit and they cannot extend their term
through a holdover.
o Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
- 2nd option unconstitutional Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own,
has no authority to order special elections. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature. Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections
3rd option valid Art VII, Sec 16 classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint:
o First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
o Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;
o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
- Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

3. VELICARIA-GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:
4. PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
FACTS:
- While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria MacapagalArroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments.
- They were appointed in an acting capacity only.
- After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to Yap et al as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity
- Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of
Yap et al.
- Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only
the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not
anyone else.
- On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered
by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress
is in session.
ISSUE:
WON the appointments made by GMA are valid.
HELD:
YES.
-

- The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress
is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an
officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse.
Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent

abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

5. SARMIENTO III v MISON

FACTS:
-

In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then
president Corazon Aquino.
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of
constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Misons appointment
was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that
under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.
They also sought to prohibit Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.

ISSUE:
WON the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD:
NO.

In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
o First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
o Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;
o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation
by the COA.
The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as
the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group, hence he does not need to be
confirmed by the COA.

6. BAUTISTA v. SALONGA
FACTS:
- President Corazon Aquino designated Bautista as the acting chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights.
- Later she decided to make the appointment permanent, but this time she forwarded the appointment to
the Commission on Appointments (COA) for confirmation.
- Bautista had completed her oath and started the discharge of her appointed duty.
- COA later on sent Bautista a letter requiring her to send information and documents in connection with
confirmation of her appointment.
- Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA and explained that her position as chairwoman of CHR does not
require confirmation by COA as laid down in case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
- Pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the
acting chairman of the CHR but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's
refusal to surrender her post.
- Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the
CHR should be at the pleasure of the President, hence Bautista should be removed.
- COA later sent its letter disapproving Bautistas appointment due to her refusal to submit herself to the
jurisdiction of the Commision.
ISSUE:
WON Bautistas appointment requires the confirmation of the COA
HELD:
NO.
- The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and
Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the
confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of government whom he (the President)
may be authorized by law to appoint.
- The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
- The act of Cory submitting Bautistas appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in
nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without

the participation of the COA. Thus, Corys act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is
done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latters
approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the
chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and
was the incumbent CHR chairperson. Hence, she cannot be removed therein without a just cause.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautistas appointment as ad interim. Since the
position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation. Under the
Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to
make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

7. QUINTOS-DELES v. CA (ad interim)

FACTS:
- Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for
women in 1988.
- Their appointment was done while Congress was in recess.
- They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments
(COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence
of the COA.
- Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the
concurrence of the COA.
ISSUE:
WON the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
YES.
- The seats reserved for sectoral representatives may be filled by appointment by the President pursuant
to Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, which provides that:
o Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of
Article VI of this Constitution.
- Since the foregoing is explicitly provided in the Constitution, it follows that the confirmation of the COA
is necessary for the appointment to be valid, since under Art. VII, Sec. 16, confirmation by the COA is
required for the appointment of officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution.
- Appointment during recess is likewise valid pursuant to paragraph 2 of Art. VII, Sec 16.
- Furthermore, considering that Congress had adjourned without COA acting on Deless appointment, the
said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of
respondent Commission.
8. POBRE v. MENDIETA
FACTS:
- The term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC1 Commissioner/Chairman expired.

1 Professional Regulation Commission

At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre
was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.
- On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Pobre, the second Associate
Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.
- As such, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory
relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice
Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or recommending the appointment
of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223,
he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as
Chairman of the PRC. He cites the following provision of Section 2, P.D. No. 223 which provides that:
o any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior
of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal.
ISSUE:
WON the President can appoint another Associate Commissioner as PRC Chairman.
HELD:
YES.
- Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides that the Commissioner and Associate
Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years,
without reappointment, to start from the time they assume office.
- The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of
"junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that would
deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners
under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his
appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes
vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his
prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and
appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency.
Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to avoid it.
There is thus no excuse to construe the clause: "at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal"
as pointing to a moment that the President can exercise his power only when the Chairman or
Commissioner still has an unexpired term that was not finished due to resignation or removal. Such
interpretation cannot be possible since the clause does not refer to the Chairman/Commissioner. Such
interpretation would contradict the first clause providing that he will be succeeded by the senior
Associate Commissioner "for the unexpired portion of his term only." There can be no more "unexpired
term" to speak of if the Chairman stepped down "at the expiration of his term."
9. FLORES v. DRILON
FACTS:
- RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) was enacted. Sec 13(d) thereof provides
that:
o (d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of the Board
and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the
City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority.
- Petitioners claim that it violates Art. VII, Sec 16 of the Constitution, specifically:

the President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint

ISSUE:
WON the said provision is an encroachment by Congress of the appointing powers of the President.
HELD:
YES.
-

Although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he
really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion
of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year
of operations of SBMA2, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his
incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.
Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA post as automatically attached to the Office of the
Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent
to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.

10. RUFINO v. ENDRIGA

FACTS:
- Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines (CCP) as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members. Its goal
is to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
- Soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCPs charter, which
converted the CCP into a non-municipal public corporation, and it increased the members of CCPs
Board from seven to nine trustees.
- Later, EO. 1058 was enacted and it increased the trustees to 11.
- After the People Power Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy
resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board.
- Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included: Endriga, Lagdameo,
Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (Cabili), and Manuel T. Maosa (Maosa).
- On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP
Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. =
Rufino Group
- They took their oath and assumed office
- The Endriga group filed a petition questioning Estradas appointment of the seven new members to the
CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board
shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting, and
that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such

2 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one
seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosas term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent
trustees.
CA ruled in favor of the Endriga group.
Rufino group filed a MFR averring that the law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority
to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower
rank. Hence, Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
the appointment only of officers lower in rank than the appointing power.

ISSUE:
1. WON PD 15, Sec 6 which allows trustees to appoint their fellow members is constitutional.
2. Are the appointments made by the President valid
HELD:
1. NO, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, such power is limited in
scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority.
- In the case at bar, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Art VII, Sec
16(1) since both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy as an exemption from the
limitation of appointing power because it puts CCP outside the control of the President.
2. YES, VALID.
- Remember the classification of appointments under Art. VII, Sec 16. If Sec 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 are
found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees
fall under the 3rd group of officers.
11. CALDERON v. CARALE
FACTS:
- RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) was enacted, amending the Labor Code (PD 442).
- Section 13 thereof provides that the Chairman and the Commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed
by the President, subject to the confirmation by the COA
- Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Cory Aquino appointed Carale et al as the Chairman and
Commissioners of the NLRC.
- Calderon thereafter questioned the constitutionality of the said appointments since RA 6715
transgresses Section 16, Article VII of the Consti when it expanded the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
- They contend that had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose
appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have
said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end of the first sentence, or the
phrase, "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence of
the said Article. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
ISSUE:
WON RA 6715 is unconstitutional, insofar as it expanded the list of officers whose appointments must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD:
YES.

It is unconstitutional for RA 6715 to require the confirmation of the CA for the appointments of Carale et
al as Chairman and Members of the NLRC because:
o

1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments which require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments; and

2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.

Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers to be a departure from the system embodied in
the 1935 Constitution where the CA exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential
appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

12. TARROSA v. SINGSON

FACTS:
- Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) by then
president Fidel Ramos.
- Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said appointment on the ground that there was no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653
which provides that the Governor of the BSP, if appointed, is subject to the confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE:
WON the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD:
NO.
- The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by
the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP.
- An appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the
COA cited in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of
other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution.
13. PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
FACTS:
- While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria MacapagalArroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments.
- They were appointed in an acting capacity only.
- After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to Yap et al as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity
- Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of
Yap et al.
- Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only
the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not
anyone else.
- On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered
by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to

department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress
is in session.
ISSUE:
WON the appointments made by GMA are valid.
HELD:
YES.
-

- The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress
is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an
officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse.
Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent
abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Velicaria-Grafel vs OP
This is a case regarding the appointments of Velicaria and several others who were appointed by PGMA who
took their oath from a span as early as March 13- April 13 2010. In which they immediately took their oath
following days later.
Then their appointments were questioned because the dates they were appointed falls under the prohibition on
midnight appointment of the President in which they admitted.
Then, President PNOY issued EO 02 to recall or to withdraw and revoke the several appointments thereof
because they content that it is in violation of sec 15 art 7 of the consti.
ISSUE: WON the appointments of Velicaria and others are violative of the constitutional prohibition on midnight
appointments?
YES. It is clear from the law that the SC noted that no appointments shall be made by a president or acting
president within 2 months prior to the next presidential elections. Because it will run counter to the mandate of
the constitution to allow such.

Section 1 of EO 2, meanwhile, said the following appointments would be

considered as midnight appointments: "Those made on or after March 11,
2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 when
the appointee has accepted, or taken his path, or assumed public office on or
after March 11, 2010

Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a
forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LacsonMagallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands
denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to
the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of
the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain
any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person.
However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The
president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally.
The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President
has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until
reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the
decision granting the land to Pao cannot be reversed.