NATURAL RESOURCES AND

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(FIRST SET OF CASE DIGESTS)

Submitted By:
Mary Grace E. Esguerra
2C

Submitted To:
Atty. Cleo D. Sabado-Andrada

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994
FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady
of Lourdes Parish filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to
its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. The City of
Government of Caloocan will dispose off a 350 tons of garbage that it
collects daily. On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site
investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from
said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River.
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
On December 4, 1991, the LLDA found that the leachate and the
receiving streams indicates the presence of bacteria. On the next day, the
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order to stop and desist. Then, the City
Government of Caloocan filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the
cease and desist order. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan
sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health
and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing the cease
and desist order
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss
on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control
Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the
Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority can issue a
cease and desist order.
HELD: Yes, the Laguna Lake Development Authority can issue a cease and
desist order.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be

stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By

its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make,
alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Section 4,
par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The Laguna Lake Development Authority is specially mandated by
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balance growth of the Laguna Lake area and surrounding
provinces. it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it
may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. The Intermediate Appellate

Court
G.R. No. L-65935, September 30,1988
FACTS: Nestor Sunga acquired a passenger Mazda minibus from
Motorcenter Incorporation. The Mazda minibus was used as chattel
mortgage for a promissory note to Filinvest Credit Corporation. Two
employees of the Filinvest Credit Corporation confiscated the minibus upon
allegedly Sunga delinquency on payment. It was later found out that he was
not in default in paying his obligations. The minibus was returned. The court
awarded damages to Mr. Sunga.
The Filinvest questioned the amount for moral damages which
further increased to P50,000.00. The Filinvest contention is that it is a patent
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and a bare denial
of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law, when the respondent
Court completely ignored the assigned errors in the petitioner's Brief upon
which private respondent had joined issues with petitioner.
Mr. Sunga defense is that the award of moral damages, impeached as
exaggerated and unconscionable, is justified by the prayer in the appellee's
(respondent Sunga's brief, to wit: FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS
DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE
PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion in increasing
extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation
expenses.
HELD: Yes, there is grave abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly
the award of moral damages and in granting litigation expenses.
It behooves the Supreme Court therefore to reiterate the caveat to
lower courts "to guard against the award of exorbitant damages that are way
out of proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case and which
time and again, this Court has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion
granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be exercised
with balanced restraints and measured objectivity.
Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of
a defendant. Moral damages though not incapable of pecuniary estimations
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for an
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

Juan Antonio, Anna Rosario Oposa et.al. vs. The Honorable

Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
FACTS: This case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(Branch 66). The principal plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. The additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) which is engaged in concerted action
geared for the protection of the environment and natural resources.
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is the original defendant but he was
substituted by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."The plaintiffs prayed for that
judgment be rendered: ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements and
granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."
Honorable Factoran, Jr. , on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question. The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss,
further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs
thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the
unabated haemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.

HELD: Yes, the plaintiffs have a cause of action to prevent the

misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.
This case has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The
Supreme Court find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Agapito Magbanua, Inenias Martizano, et.al. vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court
G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 , June 29, 1985
FACTS: Agapito Magbanua with five more plaintiffs are share tenants of
the Perez's. Perez's diverted the free flow of water from the lots of the five
plaintiffs which caused the portions of their landholdings to dry up. A
manifestation was submitted by the plaintiffs on June 3, 1982 wherein they
have attached photographs of their dried-up landholdings and wilted palay
crops. The allegations in this pleading and the accompanying pictures were
never rebutted by the defendants. Then, the PC Team on February 24, 1982
and June 13, 1982 inspected the land. It was found out that here has been
complete closure of water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings which resulted
to the drying up of the same that greatly hampered the healthy growth of the
palay crop. This Court does not believe that the disruption of the water
supply which led to the very poor harvest is due to the fault/negligence of
the plaintiffs.
The Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
The case was appealed to the Intermediate appellate court where the
court deleted the moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a diversion of the free flow of water.
Whether or not the moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
fees shall be reinstated.
HELD: Yes, there has been a diversion of the free flow of water. Yes, the
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees shall be given but
the amount shall be reduced.
It was found out by the PC Team that there has been diversion. It
appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in
order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the

plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified

diversion of the water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the
defendants acted in an oppressive manner. It follows from the foregoing that
the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's fees but the size of the fees as
well as the damages is subject to the sound discretion of the court.

Technology Developers, Inc., vs The Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 94759, January 21, 1991
FACTS: The Technology Developers Incorporation is a domestic private
corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette. It
received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting
mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the
petitioner's plant located at Guyong., Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring
with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a)
Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
The petitioner complied with the respondent's request for the
production of the required documents. But still, on April 6, 1989, without
previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor
ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of
petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
The
petitioner
instituted
an
action
for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent . The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on
April 28, 1989. Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration
dated May 3, 1989. Said motion for reconsideration was heard on May 30,
1989. The Provincial Prosecutor presented evidences which " Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming
from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the
health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such
a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational."
Then, the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the case
was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not an authority of the local executive ordered a
cessation in order to protect the community from pollution.

HELD: Yes, an authority of the local executive ordered a cessation in order

to protect the community from pollution.
No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power.
Eduardo F. Hernandez et. al. vs. National Power Corporation
G.R. No. 145328 , March 23, 2006
FACTS: In 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through
the Sergio Osmena, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter
of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmarias Village proximate to Tamarind Road,
where petitioners homes are. Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel
towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible adverse effects that
such a structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got
hold of published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of
illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from
cancer to leukemia.
Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint for Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous
effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to
themselves and their families.
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order
which temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (1981).
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of
the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR,
notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.

HELD: Yes, the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818. In the case at bar, petitioners sought the
issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR
Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section
15 of the 1987 Constitution. From the foregoing, whether there is a violation
of petitioners constitutionally protected right to health and whether
respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code
provision on prior consultation with the affected communities are veritable
questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law
divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Valentin L. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
FACTS: Civil Service Commission denied Legaspi's request for information
on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution,
and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving
due course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue
upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be
informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show
his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues
that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the
petitioner with the information he seeks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission shall give information
about the civil service eligibility of the sanitarians.
HELD: Yes, the Civil Service Commission shall give information about the
civil service eligibility of the sanitarians.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

Ernesto R. Rodriguez et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987
FACTS: On December 16, 1980, Ernesto R. Rodriguez et.al. filed an action
for abatement of a public nuisance with damages against Daytona
Construction and Development Corporation.
The Daytona Construction and Development Corporation was granted
four extensions of time to file an answer, but, they moved to dismiss the
complaint alleging that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant
case and for lack of cause of action.
The court a quo rendered judgment for the plaintiffs against
defendant. In an order dated July 9, 1982, the trial court upon motion of
plaintiffs granted execution pending appeal it indeed appearing as alleged in
the motion that the continued operation of the cement batching plant of the
defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health
and property."
ISSUE: Whether or not default order is appealable.
HELD: No, the default order is not appealable.
Being interlocutory order it has been established that a default order is
not appealable but an order denying a motion or petition to set aside an order
of default is not merely interlocutory but final and therefore immediately
appealable.
From the case above, the respondent Court committed a grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding the finality of the default order. Considering the
trial court's order denying respondent's motion to set aside the order of
default was appealable but was not appealed by respondent, the necessary
conclusion is that the default order become final.