Apo Fruits Corporation v.

Land Bank
Philippines [G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011]

of

the

FACTS:
Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the
government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners properties

at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest plus attorneys fees.
Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the Supreme
Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the award of
interest and attorneys fees and entry of judgment was
issued. The just compensation of which was only settled on
May 9, 2008.

Government took petitioners lands on Dec 9, 1996.

Land Bank valued the properties atP165,484.47 per hectare,
but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount.
Consequently, on instruction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), Land Bank deposited for AFC and
HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, respectively, or a
total of P71,891,256.62.
Upon revaluation of the expropriated properties, Land Bank
eventually made additional deposits, placing the total
amount
paid
at P411,769,168.32
(P71,891,256.62
+ P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly five times. Both
petitioners withdrew the amounts.

Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration with

respect to denial of award of legal interest and attorneys
fees and a motion to refer the second motion to the Court
En Banc and was granted accordingly, restoring in toto the
ruling of the RTC.
Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration as
well for holding of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration inIntervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Political Law (Constitutional Law)

Still, they filed separate complaints for just compensation

with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was
dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a case with the RTC for the proper
determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in favor

(1) Whether or not the transcendental importance does

not apply to the present case.
(2) Whether or not the standard of transcendental
importance cannot justify the negation of the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a

vested right in favor of the Government that respondent LBP

represents.
(3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
showing that just compensation for expropriated agricultural
property must be viewed in the context of social justice.
Civil Law:
Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration of
respondent deleting interest and attorneys fees amount to
unjust enrichment in its favor.

(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests
involved; it involves a matter of public interest the proper
application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right,
namely, the right of a landowner to receive just
compensation when the government exercises the power of
eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the
constitutional rule on eminent domain Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
While confirming the States inherent power and right to
take private property for public use, this provision at the
same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this
power.

Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not the rules on second motion for
reconsideration by the Supreme Court should be strictly
complied with by a vote of two-thirds of its actual
membership.
(2) Whether or not the holding of oral arguments would still
serve its purpose.
(3) Whether or not the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention from the Office of
the Solicitor General may still be granted.
RULINGS:
Political Law (Constitutional Law)

When it takes property pursuant to its inherent right and

power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay the
owner just compensation for the property taken. For
compensation to be considered just, it must not only be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must
also be paid to the landowner without delay.
(2) No. The doctrine transcendental importance, contrary
to the assertion it is applicable only to legal standing
questions, is justified in negating the doctrine of
immutability of judgment. It will be a very myopic reading of
the ruling as the context clearly shows that the phrase
transcendental importance was used only to emphasize
the overriding public interest involved in this case. The
Supreme Court said in their resolution:

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental

importance is not hard to discern from these discussions. A
constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the
all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain case be just when
the payment for the compensation for property already
taken has been unreasonably delayed?
To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private
interest is involved in this case is to forget that an
expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor.
It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the
constitutional limits or standards apply to government who
carries the burden of showing that these standards have
been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private
interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this
Court should not leave uncorrected.
xxxx
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter
before us is of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the subject matter involved agrarian reform, a
societal objective of that the government has unceasingly
sought to achieve in the past half century.
From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the
higher interests of justice are duly served.
(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to give

a lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of

land, the Commission never intended to give agricultural
landowners less than just compensation in the expropriation
of property for agrarian reform purposes.
[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of
land reform and the right of landowners to receive just
compensation for the expropriation by the State of their
properties. That the petitioners are corporations that used to
own large tracts of land should not be taken against them.
As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice or any justice for that matter is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable
doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the
poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer
the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be
served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of
the law.
Civil Law
Yes. In the present case, it is undisputed that the
government took the petitioners lands on December 9,
1996; the petitioners only received full payment of the just
compensation due on May 9, 2008. This circumstance, by
itself, already confirms the unconscionable delay in the
payment of just compensation.

An added dimension is the impact of the delay. One impact

as pointed out above is the loss of income the landowners
suffered.
Another impact that the LBP now glosses over is the income
that the LBP earned from the sizeable sum it withheld for
twelve long years. From this perspective, the unaccountedfor LBP income is unjust enrichment in its favor and an
inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was what
the Court essentially addressed when it awarded the
petitioners 12% interest.

Viewed in this light, the Court cannot even be claimed to

have suspended the effectiveness of its rule on 2nd motions
for reconsideration; it simply complied with this rule in a
form other than by express and separate voting.
(2) No. The submissions of the parties, as well as the
records of the case, have already provided this Court with
enough arguments and particulars to rule on the issues
involved. Oral arguments at this point would be superfluous
and would serve no useful purpose.

Remedial Law
(1) No. When the Court ruled on the petitioners motion for
reconsideration by a vote of 12 Members (8 for the grant of
the motion and 4 against), the Court ruled on the merits of
the petitioners motion. This ruling complied in all respects
with the Constitution requirement for the votes that should
support a ruling of the Court.
Admittedly, the Court did not make any express prior ruling
accepting or disallowing the petitioners motion as required
by Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. The Court,
however, did not thereby contravene its own rule on 2nd
motions for reconsideration; since 12 Members of the Court
opted to entertain the motion by voting for and against it,
the Court simply did not register an express vote, but
instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule through
the participation by no less than 12 of its 15 Members.

(3) No. The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG
speaks, has been amply protected through the direct action
of petitioner LBP the government instrumentality created
by law to provide timely and adequate financial support in
all phases involved in the execution of needed agrarian
reform.
The OSG had every opportunity to intervene through the
long years that this case had been pending but it chose to
show its hand only at this very late stage when its presence
can only serve to delay the final disposition of this case.
The arguments the OSG presents, furthermore, are issues
that this Court has considered in the course of resolving this
case. Thus, every reason exists to deny the intervention
prayed for.

UMBAY V. ALECHA 135 SCRA 427 (1985)

FACTS: Natalio Enanoria owned a parcel of land (Lot no.

5280) with OCT 10933 issued in 1922.
1. He died in 1924. In 1963, the heirs of Enanoria asked
a surveyor to relocate the lot; they discovered that
the said property was occupied by Placido Alecha,
the owner of the adjoining lot. Despite demands to
vacate the subject property, spouses Alecha refused
to do so.
2. As a result, the heirs of Enanoria filed a complaint
against Alecha, alleging that the latter had usurped
their property.
3. The trial court held in favor of the Enannorias
however upon appeal, CA reversed the decision and
dismission the complaint of the Enanoria heirs.

ISSUE: Is the complaint of the heirs of Enanoria barred by

prescription ?

HELD: The SC held that Enanorias complaint does not

prescribe nor is it barred by laches. Sec 46 of the Land
Registration Law (now Sec 47 of the Property Registration
Decree PD 1529 effective June 11, 1978) provides that no
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.

Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered

owner but also his hereditary successors because the latter
merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of
law and are merely the continuation of the personality of
their predecessor-in-interest.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet

title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, and avoid the possibility of losing his
land.

Title to land can no longer be acquired by

prescription after a Torrens title has been issued for
it. The right to recover possession of registered
lands is imprescriptible because possession is merely
a consequence of ownership.

In the present case, the petitioners action to recover the

subject property cannot be barred by the equitable defense
of laches or delay because they became aware of the
encroachment only after they hired a surveyor in 1963 to
ascertain the true boundaries of the subject property.

FACTS: Petitioner Golloy has been, for more than 20 years,

the registered owner and in possession of a parcel of land
covered by TCT 45764. The southwest boundary is owned by
private respondents covered by certificate of title 8565.
Sometime in 1966, private respondents subdivided their
land among themselves and in the course of doing so,
private respondents had placed 2 monuments in the
southwest portion of the petitioners land. As a result,
petitioner Golloy filed an action to quiet title (claim
ownership over a real property) before the CFI Tarlac.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss with

counterclaim, denying Golloys allegation and maintained
that they merely subdivided their own property and as such,
Golloy had no cause of action.

During the pre-trial both parties agreed that the question of

the boundaries of their respective properties could be
resolved by appointing a surveyor to relocate the disputed
area.

In May 1968, Jovino Dauz, the surveyor of the Bureau of

Lands, reported the following:

GOLLOY V. CA 173 SCRA 26 (1989)

1. Petitioners land is Lot A of the subdivision plan, Psd1413, being a portion of the land described in OCT
126 in the name of Augustin Golloy. The land under

OCT 126 was surveyed

subsequently titled in 1919

on

Mar

1918

and

2. Private respondents land is Lot no. 1, 11-8218 in the

name of Domingo Balanga, which was surveyed on
Mar 1913 and originally titled and registered on Mar
1918
3. There is overlapping on the boundaries which was
due to the defect in the survey on petitioners since it
did not duly conform with the previously approved of
survey of Lot 1, 11-3218 under OCT 8565
4. Private respondents land, TCT 8565, prevails over
petitioners land since the former was surveyed and
titled ahead.

Trial court held in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed

the same.

ISSUE: Between the two title holders, who is entitled to the

land in question?

HELD: Petitioner Golloy is entitled to the disputed portion of

land. It is undisputed that that Balangas property was
surveyed and titled earlier than Golloys. Having been

surveyed and thereafter registered, monuments were placed

therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly
persuasive that the private respondents predecessor
Balanga, believing that she has a rightful claim to the
overlapped portions, did not make any move to question the
placement of the monuments.
She could have easily
objected to the placement and point out that the
placements of the monuments excluded the overlapped
portions from her property. However, no such objections
were made. As such, it may be construed that Balanga
never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion.

Considering that the petitioner and his predecessors have in

continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for
almost 50 years (from 1919 when it was registered to 1966
when the dispute ensued), the private respondents are
guilty of laches.

Mere possession of certificate of title under Torrens

System is not conclusive as to the holders true
ownership of all the property described therein for he
does by virtue of said c certificate alone become the
owner of the land illegally included.