SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132592. January 23, 2002]

AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002]
AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
These two petitions stem from the decision [1] dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The first[2] seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision dated March
21, 1997, setting aside the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court. The
second[3] prays for the reversal of the resolution dated February 10, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
CV-56265, denying the motion to dismiss.
The antecedent facts, as gathered from the parties pleadings, are as follows:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765,
decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the
ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net
conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common
children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners
share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and
the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children
within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996
by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the
equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys fees
chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4]
In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as
litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez
filed a consolidated written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1,
1996 order.
On November 22, 1996, the trial court denied Aidas motion for moral and exemplary damages and litigation
expenses but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the petitioners motion to modify decision is hereby ordered
denied. But, petitioners motion for execution of decision pending appeal is hereby granted. Consequently, let a writ
of execution be issued in this case to enforce the decision for (1) respondent to vacate the premises of the small
residential house situated in Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City and for (2) respondent to
surrender the use and possession of said Mazda motor vehicle together with its keys and accessories thereof to
petitioner.
Atty. Edgar Gica, the Special Administrator, appointed in this case, is hereby ordered to make the necessary
computation of the value of the one-half (1/2) share of petitioner in the net remaining conjugal assets of the spouses
within 10 days from receipt of this order.
The petitioner is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 to answer for all the damages that
respondent may suffer arising from the issuance of said writ of execution pending appeal and to further answer for

all the advances that petitioner may have received from the Special Administrator in this case pending final
termination of this present case.[5]
In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On March 21, 1997,
the appellate court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 1, 1996 and the Omnibus Order dated November 22, 1996, insofar as (1) it
authorized the release of the sum of P100,000.00 to private respondents counsel as the advanced share of private
respondent [Aida Baez] in the net remaining conjugal assets, and (2) granted the motion for execution pending
appeal by ordering petitioner [Gabriel Baez] to vacate the premises of the small residential house situated in Maria
Luisa Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, and to surrender the use and possession of the Mazda Motor
vehicle to private respondent are hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of execution dated December 2, 1996 and the Order
dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion filed by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the subject house and
motor vehicle to the administrator of the partnership are also SET ASIDE.
As prayed for by petitioner, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership is hereby ordered to cause the
reimbursement by counsel for the private respondent [Aida Baez] of the amount of P100,000.00 released to him as
advance payment of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On February 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied Aidas motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition in G.R.
No. 132592, filed by herein petitioner.
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15, 1997 the
entire case records to the Court of Appeals. Aida filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that Gabriel had failed to file with the appellate court a Record on Appeal. On February 10, 1998, the
Court of Appeals decided the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitionerappellants motion to dismiss filed on November 3, 1997 is
hereby DENIED. The appointment of the petitioner-appellee as administratix of the conjugal properties is hereby
AFFIRMED.
In view of petitioners Motion to Withdraw her own appeal filed on November 27, 1997, and for failing to pay the
required docket fee within the prescribed period under Rule 41, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
appeal instituted by the petitioner Aida P. Baez is hereby DISMISSED.
In continuance of the appeal of respondent-appellant [Gabriel Baez], he is hereby ordered to file his brief with the
court within 45 days from receipt of this resolution. The petitioner-appellee [Aida Baez] shall file her own brief with
the court within 45 days from receipt of the petitioner-appellants [Gabriel Baez] brief.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The appellate court also denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the petition in G.R. No.
133628.
On January 19, 2000, we consolidated the two petitions. Petitioner Aida Baez now avers that the Court of
Appeals erred:
I. G.R. No. 132592
... IN SETTING ASIDE THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE
PORTIONS OF ITS DECISION ORDERING RESPONDENT TO VACATE THE SMALLER RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE LOCATED AT THE MARIA LUISA ESTATE PARK SUBDIVISION, CEBU CITY, AND TO PAY
P100,000.00 TO PETITIONERS COUNSEL AS ATTORNEYS FEES TO BE TAKEN FROM HER SHARE IN
THE NET CONJUGAL ASSETS.[8]
II. G.R. No. 133628:
... IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS ORDINARY APPEAL
AND/OR NOT RETURNING THE RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-16765 TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CEBU.[9]

In G.R. No. 132592, petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the Court of Appeals decision on the
Mazda vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential house, she claimed that being conjugal in
nature, justice requires that she and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during
the entire proceedings before the trial court, she did not have the chance to occupy it. Further, she posted a bond
of P1,500,000 for the damages which respondent may suffer.[10] For these reasons, she asked for execution pending
appeal. The amount of P100,000 as advance payment to her counsel was a drop in the bucket compared to the
bond she posted, according to her. She also suggested as an alternative that she simply be required to put up an
additional bond. She also agreed to submit to an accounting as regular administratrix and the advance attorneys
fees be charged to her share in the net conjugal assets.
In his comment, respondent denied petitioners allegation that she did not have the chance to occupy the
residential house. He averred that she could have, had she chosen to. According to him, as the inventory of the
couples properties showed, petitioner owned two houses and lots and two motor vehicles in the United States,
where she is a permanent resident. Respondent contended that there was no compelling reason for petitioner to
have the judgment executed pending appeal.
Essentially, the core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed when
superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ.
Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression
and inequity.[11]
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent
circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We
note that petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has
two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make
execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.[12]
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was properly
granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said amount
of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was already on appeal.
In G.R. No. 133628, petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where
multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in this case. She concludes that respondents appeal should have been
dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.[14]
Petitioner likewise prays that, in the event that we do not dismiss Gabriel Baez appeal, we should direct the
appellate court to return the records of the case to the RTC of Cebu.Thereafter, according to her, respondent should
file his record on appeal for approval and transmittal to the Court of Appeals. In the alternative, she prays that the
appellate court retain only the pleadings and evidence necessary to resolve respondents appeal pursuant to Section
6, Rule 44[15] and Section 6, Rule 135[16] of the Rules of Court, and return the rest of the case records to the RTC.
In turn, respondent argues that Section 39 of B.P. 129 [17] expressly abolished the requirement of a record on
appeal, except in appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109, [18] and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed. An action for legal separation, he avers, is neither a special proceeding nor one where multiple
appeals are allowed.
Now, is an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are allowed? We do not think so.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court held:
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in
actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals
arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship

between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of
appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to
the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal separation. [19] They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved
by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents
of legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court
and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial court and retain only the
pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the
instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by
analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support
therefor in law or jurisprudence.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42663 and CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED, so that the
Order dated October 1, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the release of P100,000 to petitioners counsel;
the Omnibus Order dated November 22, 1996 granting the motion pending appeal; the writ of execution dated
December 2, 1996; and the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion by the sheriff to make symbolic
delivery of the house and vehicle are SET ASIDE. Further, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership is
ORDERED to cause the reimbursement by petitioners counsel of the released amount of P100,000. The Court of
Appeals is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to respondents appeal, and the Division Clerk of Court of this
Court is likewise DIRECTED to promptly remand the record of these cases to the Court of Appeals.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and
Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on
April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with
Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her
and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the
court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file
an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default,
which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15,
20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to
file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed
the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for
legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to
provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails
to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted
is not fabricated.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court pending resolution of a case
on appeal. We deal only with this matter and not the merits of the case.
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties,
petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration
of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children.
Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he
was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the
sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She
alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending
for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease
to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his
legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City,
with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the
petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or
encumbering any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on
October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate

residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. 1
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their
properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park
property by informing him that his lease would not be renewed. She also complained that the petitioner had
disposed of one of their valuable conjugal properties in the United States in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of
his legitimate wife and children.
The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new contract of
lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his consent.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by
his wife. 2
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will
be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code, reading as follows:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of the administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or the authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated by
Art. 61 of the Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them
or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The
administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian
under the Rules of Court.
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petition has no
merit.
We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of
conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was
also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with
his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in the
above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for
legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple,
appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him
as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of
the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the
action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during
the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which
the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards
in favor of the plaintiff. 3
As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief against future
acts which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo, rather than
to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs
although no right has yet been violated." 4
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now,
apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the
Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on which they depend for their
subsistence. She also testified the numerous . . . including various dollar accounts, two houses in Quezon City and
Cebu City, and a Mercedes Benz. The private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner
executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of
Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the
interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation. 5Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and
the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share
(if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that
entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the
conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the
whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime
without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

By Edison Balagtas
TITLE:
ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, vs LUCITA ONG,
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union wasblessed with 3 children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed
a complaint for legalseparation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats,intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legalseparation. CA upheld RTCs decision when
herein petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration (MR). The climax of the couples drama was on December 14,
1995when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back fromBacolod which turned into a violent
quarrel with the petitioner hitting therespondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing
agun at respondents head asking her to leave the conjugal house.
ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legalseparation to Lucita when she herself has
given ground for legal separation whenabandoned her family.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:

It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted whenboth parties have given ground for legal
separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, theabandonment referred to in the Familu Code is abandonment without
justifiablecause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due tohis abusive conduct
which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated inthe said provision.
DISPOSITION:
Petition denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 165546
February 27, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS,
represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablos
surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna
indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29,
1991. Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997. However, Pablos sister contested
Rosannas claim alleging that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than six years before Pablos death and
lived with another man, Romeo. She also presented a marriage certificate between Romeo and Rosanna showing
that the two were married in 1990. As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly
pension. SSS denied Rosannas request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the
SSS within 30 days the amount of P10,350 representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from
December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month. The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as
primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pea during the subsistence of
her marriage to Pablo. The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his
death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by
Pablo as her father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced
from the records that Jeylnn was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the SSS. The CA relied on the birth certificate of Jeylnn showing that she was the child of the deceased.
According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, this record was binding upon the parties, including the SSS.
The entries made in public documents may only be challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and
may not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to
show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosannas alleged affair with Romeo dela Pea
was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Pea during her marriage to Pablo, the
same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent for support upon
Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband.
ISSUE:
W/N Rosanna and Jeylnn are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo
HELD:
Only the child, Jeylnn, is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was
able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The
records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the
latters death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos
marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she
was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore
establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the
member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that
is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not
Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be
resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but whether one is actually dependent

for support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be
said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is
proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that
she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary
since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him
for support even if they were already living separately.
------------------------------Dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member defined:
Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed,
and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support
physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate
parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.
Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the
absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.