G.R. No.

L-13315

April 27, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BUENAVENTURA BULING, defendant-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, presiding,
finding the accused Buenaventura Buling guilty of serious physical injuries and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to indemnify the offended party.
The following uncontroverted facts appear in the record: On December 7, 1956, the accused was
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious physical
injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the
complaint would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will incapacitate the
said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary labors for the game period of time." The
accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay damages to the offended
party in the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On the same day he
began to serve his sentence and has fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
charging him of serious physical injuries. The information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the
accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him for a period of from 1
months to 2 months. After trial the accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries and
sentenced in the manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This is the decision now sough to be set
aside and reversed in this appeal.
The only question for resolution by this Court whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for
less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been enunciated by this Court, one in the cases of
People vs.Tarok, 73 Phil., 260 and People vs. Villasis, 81 Phil., 881, and the other, in the cases of
Melo vs. People, 85 Phil., 766, People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil., 829 and People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil.,
395. But in Melo vs. People, supra, we expressly repealed our ruling in the case of
People vs. Tarok, supra, and followed in the case of People vs.Villasis, supra. In the Melo vs. People
case, we stated the ruling to be that:
. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense
and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15
Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new
offense. (85 Phil., 769-770).
Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new ruling? In other words, has a new fact
supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People, which changes the character of the offense into
one which was not in existence at the time the case for less serious physical injuries was filed? We do
not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. What happened
is that the first physician that examined the wounds of the offended party certified on December 10,

1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that
the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same
period of time from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on December 8,
1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the offended party, taking an X-ray picture of
the arm of the offended party which had been wounded. The examination discloses, according to the
physician, the following injuries:
Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end arm, right. X-ray plate finding after
one month and 12 days Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end, radius right, with slight
calus. (Exh. "E").
and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from 1 months to 2 months barring
complications.
Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a result of which
another offense had been ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof was the same
when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on
January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in the latter examination failure of this
new fact to be disclosed in the previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence on the
part of the examining physician. We find much reason in this argument. What happened is no X-ray
examination of the wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was merely
superficial. The physician who made the first examination could not have seen the fracture at the distal
end of the right arm, and this could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography.
Under the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to agree with the contention made on behalf
of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the offense
from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong, supra, and argues that our ruling in
said case should apply to the case at bar, for the reason that in the said case the first crime with which
the accused was charged was less serious physical injuries and the second one was serious physical
injuries and yet we held that there was no jeopardy. We have carefully examined this case and have
found that the first examination made of the offended party showed injuries which would take from 20
to 30 days to heal, whereas the subsequent examination disclosed that the wound of the offended
party would require medical attendance and incapacitate him for labor for a period of 90 days, "causing
deformity and the loss of the use of said member". No finding was made in the first examination that
the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned
in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume
that such fact was not apparent or could not have been discernible at the time the first examination
was made. The course (not the length), of the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand;
it can only be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court
considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original information.
But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X-ray examination discloses the existence
of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was
made on December 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no now or supervening fact that could be said to
have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of
the ruling enunciated by us in the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, supra. We
attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to

the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray
examination taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing
the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was
caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no
supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs.
People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of
double jeopardy.
We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting officers that before filing informations
for physical injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the injuries should first be made
to avoid instances, like the present, where by reason of the important Constitutional provision of double
jeopardy, the accused can not be held to answer for the graver offense committed.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of conviction is set aside and the
defendant-appellant acquitted of the charge of serious physical injuries. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-29270 November 23, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RODRIGO YORAC, defendant-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense 1 was the basis for a motion
to quash filed by the accused, now appellee, Rodrigo Yorac. He was prosecuted for frustrated murder
arising allegedly from having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, for which
he had been previously tried and sentenced for slight physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt. The later
information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week
from the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more thorough the
second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower
court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no, supervening
fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash in an order of June
21, 1968. The People appealed. As the order complained of is, fully supported by the latest authoritative
ruling of this Tribunal, People v. Buling, 2we have to affirm.

In the brief for the People of the Philippines, it was shown that the accused Yorac was charged with
slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being a certain Lam Hock
who, according to the medical certificate issued in April 10, 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident
physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since April 8, 1968 up to the
present time for head injury." 3 Then came a plea of guilty by the accused on April 16, 1968 resulting in
his being penalized to suffer ten days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On April
18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the
aforesaid victim Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968 issued by the same Dr.
Zulueta. In the medical certificate of April 17, 1968, it was made to appear that the confinement of the
offended party in the hospital was the result of: "1. Contusion with lacerated wound 4 inches parieto-occipital region
scalp mid portion. 2. Cerebral concussion, moderately severe, secondary." 4 Moreover, it further contained a statement that
the X-ray finding did not yield any "radiographic evidence of fracture." The healing period barring
complications, was declared to be from eighteen to twenty-one days. 5

Afterwards, a motion to quash was filed by the accused on June 10, 1968 on the ground that, having
been previously convicted of slight physical injuries by the City Court of Bacolod and having already
served the penalty imposed on him for the very same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder
arising out of the same act committed against the same offended party, the crime of slight physical
injuries necessarily being included in that of frustrated murder, he would be placed in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense. 6 In its well-reasoned resolution of June 21, 1968 granting the motion to
quash and ordering the dismissal of a criminal case for frustrated murder against the accused, Judge
Alampay relied on People v. Buling which, in his opinion, was squarely applicable as "nothing in the later
medical certificate [indicated] that a new or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the time of the
filing of the original action" against the accused. A motion for reconsideration being unavailing, an appeal
was elevated to us.

As succinctly set forth in the brief of the People of the Philippines: "The sole issue in this case is
whether the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries before the City Court
of Bacolod for injuries inflicted upon Lam Hock, and had served sentence therefore, may be
prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person." 7 The
position taken by the appellant is in the affirmative but, as indicated at the outset, the controlling force
of People v. Buling would preclude us from reversing the resolution of Judge Alampay.

1. The Constitution, to repeat, is quite explicit: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. As Justice Laurel made clear in an address as delegate before the Constitutional
Convention, such a provision finds its origin" from the days when sanguinary punishments were
frequently resorted to by despots." 9A defendant in a criminal case should therefore, according to him, be
adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being
precluded from taking an appeal. 10 It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is
considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused
is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his, future accordingly, protecting him
from continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to
redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize
the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in
a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit.

Then, as a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Laurel had the first opportunity to give meaning to
what, under the Constitution, should be considered "the same offense." In the case of People v. Tarok,
decided in 1941, 11 the then comparatively new Rules of Court in its Section 9 of Rule 113 speaks of a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged after a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, "or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof or for, any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." 12

In the Tarok case, the conviction for parricide of the accused was sought to be set aside, as previously
he had been indicted for the crime of serious physical injuries, to which he had pleaded guilty. He was
sentenced and was actually incarcerated by virtue of such penalty imposed. The offended party was
his wife whom he hacked with bolo, his ire being aroused by certain, remarks made her. While he was
thus serving sentence, the victim died resulting in the new prosecution for parricide of which he was
convicted. On appeal to this Court, it was decided over the dissents of the then Justice Moran and
Justice Diaz that the offense of serious physical injury of which he was found guilty being included in
parricide his previous conviction was a bar to such subsequent prosecution for the more serious crime.
The lower court judgement of conviction was thus reversed. According to Justice Laurel who spoke
for the Court: "To our mind, the principle embodied in the New Rules of Court is a clear expression of
selection of rule amidst conflicting theories. We take the position that when we amended section 26
of General Orders No. 58 by providing that the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense not only necessarily therein included
but which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information, we meant
what we have, in plain language, stated. We certainly did not mean to engage in the simple, play of
words." 13
2. Such a ruling was however re-examined and set aside in Melo v. People,

14 where it was held that

an accused who pleaded guilty to the offense of frustrated homicide, the offended party thereafter dying in
the evening of the same day, could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy if, as a result thereof, the
information was amended to charge him with homicide.15 As was clarified in the opinion of this Court through
the then Chief Justice Moran, one of the dissenters in the Tarok case: "This rule of identity does not apply,
however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple
reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted
for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy."16 Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and
distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." 17 It
is noteworthy, however, that in the Melo ruling, there was a reiteration of what was so emphatically asserted
by Justice Laurel in the Tarok case in these words: "As the Government cannot begin with the highest, and
then down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it
begin the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result." 18

3. There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together
with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. The conclusion reached
in People v. Buling, 19 the latest case in point relied upon by Judge Alampay in the resolution no appeal,
was thus, predictable. As set forth in the opinion of Justice Labrador in the case, there was a medical
certification that the wounds for which the accused Buenaventura as first prosecuted for less serious
physical injuries would require medical attendance from a period of from ten days to fifteen days. He
pleaded guilty and on December 8, 1956, sentenced by the Justice of the Peace of Cabalian Leyte, to one
month and one day of arresto mayor. He started serving his sentence on the same day. On January 18,
1957, however, another physician examined the offended party and with the use of an X-ray apparatus,
certified that he did suffer a fracture requiring a treatment of from one and one-half months to two and one
half months, barring complications. As a result, on February 20, 1957, an information was filed against the
same accused, this time before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him with serious physical
injuries. He stood trial and was found guilty of such an offense and sentenced to imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one year of prision correccional as maximum. On appeal to this
Court, his invocation of the defense of double jeopardy struck a responsive chord, and he was acquitted.

4. The opinion of Justice Labrador explained with clarity why the constitutional right against being put
twice in jeopardy was a bar to the second prosecution. Thus: "If the X-ray examination discloses the
existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination
was made on December 10, 1956. There is therefore, no view or supervening fact that could be said
to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of
the ruling enunciated by us in the cases if Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong ... . We attribute
the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very
superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination
been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay
in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was, caused by
the very superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no supervening
fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People
vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy." 20 It
is quite apparent, in the light of the foregoing, why the lower court, submitting to the compulsion of the
Buling decision, had to sustain the motion to quash and to dismiss the information against appellee Yorac.
No error could therefore be rightfully imputed to it.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of June 21, 1968 of Judge Nestor B. Alampay granting the motion to
quash, ordering the dismissal of the case and the immediate release of the appellee Rodrigo Yorac,
is affirmed. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV'L FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch
II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR., respondents.
BARREDO, J:
Petition for certiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge dated September 22, 1975 and
October 14, 1975 dismissing Criminal Case No. 5241 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against
private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr., said dismissal being predicated on the ground of double
jeopardy, in view of the dismissal of a previous charge of slight physical injuries against the same
respondent for the same incident by the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 3335,
notwithstanding that in the information in the first-mentioned case, it was alleged that the injuries
sustained by the offended party, aside from possibly requiring medical attendance from 6 to 9 days
barring complications", as was alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 3335, had left "a
permanent sear and deform(ed) the right face of (said offended party) Miguel Viajar."
The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was
as follows:
That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino Nobleza St.,
Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal
violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said
Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have
required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring
complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)
Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious
physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for serious
physical injuries as follows:
That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, and without any justifiable motive, armed with pieces of stone did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw pieces of stone at Miguel
Viajar, hitting him on the lower right eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days
barring complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face of
said Miguel Viajar.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)

On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241,
claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he
would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This motion was opposed by
the Fiscal and the Court required both parties to file their respective memorandum on the issue of
double jeopardy.
In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the
Municipal Court did not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view of the
postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await the resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in
Case No. 5241, on September 11, 1975, the following order was entered:
Under our democratic and constituted system of government litigants before our courts
of justice, plaintiffs and defendants, complainants and accused are entitled to the equal
protection of our laws. More is an accused, the trial of his case has been repeatedly
postponed for several times by this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion at the
instance of the prosecution. So, when this case was called for hearing on the afternoon
of September 1, 1975 the accused through counsel vigorously objected to another
postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case against him. To grant another
postponement as sought by the Fiscal against the vehement, strong and vigorous
objection of the accused is to the mind of the Court, no longer an exercise of sound
discretion consistent with justice and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of
discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a grave violation of, the right of the
accused to a speedy trial to which he is rightfully entitled to under Section 16 of Article
IV, (Bill of Rights) of the Philippine Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Cash Bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and released (Pp.
96-97, Record.)
Whereupon, on even date, Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in Case No. 5241 inviting
attention to the above dismissal order and reiterating his theory of double jeopardy. On September 22,
1975, respondent court issued the impugned order sustaining the contention of double jeopardy and
dismissing Case No. 5241. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied in the other
assailed order of October 14, 1975, respondent judge relying on the ruling laid down in Peo. vs. Silva,
4 SCRA 95.
In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January,
the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the
certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require
medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint was filed
on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained
took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said
offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound
on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent.
Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would be
left by a wound on the face of a person cannot be pre-determined. On the other hand, whether or not
there is actually a deformity on the face of Viajar is a question of fact that has to be determined by the
trial court. The only issue We are to resolve here is whether or not the additional allegation of deformity
in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this case
out of the ruling in People vs. Silva cited by respondent court.

In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to property and physical injuries suffered
by the offended parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor case was
prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, in which it
was held:
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case
there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against
the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:
Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving
rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense.
In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be considered as a
supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We held:
No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused deformity
and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical
certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presumed
that such fact was not apparent or could have been discernible at the time the first
examination was made. The course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not
be determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of healing
has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there was a supervening
fact occuring since the filing of the original information.
In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private
respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 herein complained of are
hereby set aside and respondent court is ordered to proceed with the trial and judgment thereof
according to law. Costs against private respondent Fama Jr.

G.R. No. 172608

February 6, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNARD MAPALO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In its Decision1 dated 27 October 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union,
in Criminal Case No. A-2871, found appellant Bernard Mapalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision2 dated 21 November 2005, modifying the Decision of the RTC, and
finding Bernard Mapalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder.
The Indictments
Appellant, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Peter Doe, Jr., was charged before the RTC of
Agoo, La Union with the crime of Murder, said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill and being then armed with lead pipes and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and with evident premeditation
and taking advantage of their superior strength, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence on one Manuel Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipes and
stabbing him several times with the said bladed weapons, and thereby inflicting on the aforenamed
victim fatal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to law.3
The RTC ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of the appellant. No bail
was recommended.4 When the case was called, appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and Bail,
which was granted.
On 27 March 1995, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Manuel S. Oliva filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information and for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest for the Apprehension of the Other
Accused,5 alleging that a reinvestigation was conducted and a prima facie case was found against the
other accused. It was prayed that an amended information be admitted and a warrant of arrest be
issued for the apprehension of Alejandro Fajardo, Jr., Jimmy Frigillana, and Rolando Mapalo alias
"Lando." Finding the Motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued an Order,6 dated 27 April 1995, admitting
the Amended Information, viz:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses BERNARD MAPALO, ALEJANDRO
FAJARDO, JR.,JIMMY FRIGILLANA and ROLANDO MAPALO alias Lando of the crime of MURDER,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent

to kill and being then armed with lead pipe and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and with evident premeditation
and taking advantage of their superior strength, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence on one Manuel Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipe and
stabbing him several times with the said bladed weapons, and thereby inflicting on the aforenamed
victim fatal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.7
Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued for the apprehension of Alejandro Fajardo, Jr., Jimmy
Frigillana, and Rolando Mapalo alias "Lando." Only Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. was apprehended; the other
two remain at large.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits commenced.
After the prosecution had rested its case, Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. filed a Demurrer to Evidence which
was granted by the RTC, in its Order9 dated 5 November 1998, on the ground that the prosecution did
not present any evidence against him. Thus, only accused Bernard Mapalo proceeded to present his
evidence. He was eventually found guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Calixto Garcia (Garcia) as its lone eyewitness.
Garcia testified that on 12 February 1994, a pre-Valentine dance was held in Sitio Baracbac, Brgy.
Sta. Cecilia in Aringay, La Union. He watched the dance, along with the appellant and Jimmy
Frigillana.10 In the early morning of 13 February 1994, at around 3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between
Manuel Piamonte (Piamonte) and the group of Lando Mapalo,11 Jimmy Frigillana, and the appellant.12
Garcia further testified that he witnessed the fight from a distance of more or less five (5) meters. He
claimed that he could see the incident very clearly because of the light at the dancing hall.13 He saw
the appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe from behind, hitting him on the right side of the head.14 The
pipe was one and a half (1 and ) feet in length, and one and a half (1 and ) inches in diameter.15 At
that time when the appellant struck Piamonte with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy Frigillana and Lando
Mapalo standing in front of Piamonte. Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had suffered
multiple stab wounds.16 He saw stab wounds on the left and right parts of the abdomen, and below the
left breast, as well as small wounds on the front part of his left hip.17Garcia disclosed that he neither
witnessed how Piamonte was stabbed, nor did he see the act of stabbing Piamonte.18 He does not
know who stabbed the latter.19 It was only when Piamontes shirt was removed when he saw stab
wounds on the formers dead body.20
The Case for the Defense
Appellant testified that in the evening of 13 February 1994,21 at around 9:00 p.m., he, along with his
wife, Caridad Mapalo, entertained several guests at their residence, namely, Crispin Calderon, Noel
Cordero, Ruel Mercado, and Rolando Mapalo.22 They drank wine.23 Appellant knew that there was a
Valentines Day dance celebration at the dance hall, located northeast of his house at a distance of
about 20-30 meters.24 At 12:30 a.m., after his guests had left the house, he went to sleep.25 At 3:00
a.m., his wife woke him up and was informed that somebody had been stabbed. He said he came to
know that Piamonte was the person who was stabbed.26 He added that he planned to go out of the
house, but his wife prevented him from doing so.27 He, thereafter, returned to his room, and went back
to sleep.28

Corroborating the appellants defense of denial and alibi, his wife, Caridad Mapalo, narrated that on
13 February 199429 at 8:00 p.m., she served brandy to her husband and their guests at their residence.
The celebration finished at around 12:00 midnight.30 Thereafter, she and her husband went to sleep,
while their guests proceeded to the dance hall. At 3:00 a.m., she awoke because of a commotion from
the dance hall.31 She described that the dance hall is around 60 to 70 meters, southwest of their
residence.32 She went outside of their house, and along with her sister-in-law, Marissa Dapit,
proceeded to the edge of the dancing hall.33 She claimed that her husband did not go out and just
stayed at their house.34 She explained that she and Marissa Dapit went out to see or to know the name
of the person who died at the commotion.35 At the dancing hall, she saw the body of Piamonte, lying
face down.36
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, dated 27 October 2004, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
It ruled that appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the lone
eyewitness. As emphasized by the RTC, per admission of appellant, the distance between his house
and the dancing hall is only 20 to 30 meters, more or less. There was no physical impossibility for the
appellant to be present at the scene of the crime. Moreover, it found Garcias testimony to be
consistent and uncontradicted. On the other hand, the RTC considered the testimony of Caridad
Mapalo as defying the natural course of human reaction and experience. The RTC found it strange
that it was only Caridad Mapalo who was awakened by the commotion, while the appellant remained
asleep. Learning of the same, Caridad Mapalo exposed herself to danger by proceeding to the dance
hall to see what the commotion was all about without even informing her husband. The RTC
conjectured that Caridad Mapalo proceeded to the dance hall not to see what the commotion was all
about, but because she was informed that her husband was involved in a fight.37
Further, the RTC ruled that conspiracy was established by the prosecution. According to the RTC, the
appellant was clearly identified by Garcia as the one who struck Piamonte on the head with a lead
pipe, which alone is "sufficient manifestation of a concerted, common and united design with the other
accused to commit an unlawful and felonious act." The fact that the medical certificate shows the
cause of death as stab wounds was deemed by the RTC as immaterial, in view of the presence of
conspiracy. The RTC also appreciated the attendance of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance, on the rationalization that the perpetrators were armed with bladed weapons and a lead
pipe that were out of proportion to the unarmed Piamonte.
The decretal portion of the RTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the accused BERNARD MAPALO is hereby found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Further, the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel Piamonte the amount of Twelve Thousand
Seven Hundred Pesos (P12,700.00) as actual damages. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity for the death of Piamonte and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.38
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, appellant challenged the credibility of the prosecutions lone eyewitness.
Appellant similarly assailed the ruling of the RTC on the ground that it erred in convicting him despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.39

The Court of Appeals found no adequate reason to disturb the findings of the RTC in weighing the
testimony of Garcia. It did not find significant the alleged inconsistencies in Garcias affidavits as
executed before the investigating police and the prosecutor.40 The appellate court did not accept the
appellants defense of alibi. The positive identification of the prosecution witness which was consistent
and categorical, and shown to be without ill-motive, has discredited appellants defense.
The Court of Appeals, however, found reason to modify the findings of the RTC. It convicted the
appellant of frustrated murder only. It was not convinced that the evidence on record established
conspiracy among the appellant and his co-accused. The appellate court rationalized that while the
evidence shows that Piamonte sustained stab wounds which caused his death,41 the appellant was
never identified as the one who inflicted the stab wounds on the deceased. According to the appellate
court, the prosecutions evidence only established that the appellant clubbed Piamonte with a lead
pipe. However, the prosecutions witness did not see the stabbing. He was not able to describe the
particular acts which caused Piamontes death. Hence, it cannot be inferred from the account of the
witness that the appellant and his co-accused came to an agreement to commit a felony, or that they
decided to commit the same, by concerted acts.42 The Court of Appeals made the following
observations:
In the first place, the killing was the result of a fight that erupted suddenly during the Valentine dance,
which discourages the conclusion that the killing was planned. Also, the witness did not see any
stabbing. He did not see anyone else perform any act of stabbing or hitting, other than the appellant
delivering blows with a lead pipe on the victim. There is no proof, therefore, of any concerted action or
common design to kill the victim that could be the basis for a finding of conspiracy among several
malefactors. Because of this, it could not be said that conspiracy was proven attendant beyond
reasonable doubt.43
In the absence of a conspiracy, the Court of Appeals said that the appellant could only be held liable
for the consequences of his own criminal act. It ruled that when the appellant hit Piamonte in the head
with the lead pipe, he performed all the acts that would have brought about the death of the
victim.44 Piamontes death however was due to some other supervening cause, independent of the
appellants will.45
The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower courts Decision is hereby MODIFIED, in that the
accused-appellant Bernard Mapalo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Further, the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel Piamonte[,] the amount of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil
indemnity and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence. (People v. Pacana, 345 SCRA 72 [2000]; People v. Givera, 349 SCRA 513 [2001]).46
The Issues
Appellant contends that:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT IN OPEN COURT; and
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF FRUSTRATED MURDER INSTEAD OF
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.47
The Ruling of the Court
In support of the first assignment of error, appellant raises, for the first time, the defense that the
witness for the prosecution failed to positively identify him during the trial proceedings. Citing People
v. Galera48 and People v. Hatton,49 appellant submits that the prosecution failed to discharge its first
duty, which is the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged.50 Witness Garcia
did not identify the appellant in open court.
Appellant further posits that Garcia did not deny drinking gin at around 9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994
until 3:00 a.m. of the following day. Garcia was then intoxicated if he had been drinking hard liquor
continuously for six hours. At such point, he can no longer positively determine a persons identity. It
is argued that the foregoing circumstances create doubts as to the identity of the appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime.
We first tackle the issue on the lack of in-court identification.
True that on the matter of identification, the Court in Hatton said:
More importantly, the accused-appellant was not positively identified in court. True, his name was
referred to by both Basierto and Ongue in their respective direct testimonies. However, he was not
identified in Court. The failure of the prosecution witness to positively identify the assailant in court is
fatal to the prosecutions cause. Pre-trial identification is not sufficient.51
Verily, the records are bereft of proof that there was in-court identification by the witness Garcia of the
appellant. Indeed, Garcia did not point to the appellant in the courtroom. Such fact can be gleaned
from the pertinent portion of the transcript of stenographic notes of the trial, reproduced hereunder, as
follows:
Direct-examination by Prosecutor Rudio of the witness Calixto Garcia
Q Do you know the accused Bernard Mapalo?
A I know, sir.
Q If that accused is inside the courtroom now will you please stand up and point to him if he is inside
the courtroom?
A No, he is not around.
COURT:

Q Was he notified for (sic) todays hearing?

INTERPRETER:
Yes, he signed, sir.
COURT: O R D E R:
It appears that the accused Bernard Mapalo was being notified for (sic) todays hearing and his wife
came to Court and informed the Honorable Court that her husband could not come to Court because
he is sick.52
The same testimony, however, conspicuously reveals that there was no identification in open court of
the appellant because said appellant was not present at the time, despite notice, as according to his
wife, he was sick.
In a later case, this Court clarified that a physical courtroom identification is essential only when there
is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person
who is charged in the information and subject of the trial. In People v. Quezada,53 this Court
expounded, thus:
We do not see the absolute need for complainant to point to appellant in open court as her attacker.
While positive identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an accused, it need not
always be by means of a physical courtroom identification. As the court held in People v. Paglinawan:
"x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point out the accused in open court by way of
identification, the fact that the witness x x x did not do so in this case was because the public prosecutor
failed to ask her to point out appellant, hence such omission does not in any way affect or diminish the
truth or weight of her testimony."
In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a question or doubt on whether
the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person who is charged in the information
and subject of the trial. This is especially true in cases wherein the identity of the accused, who is a
stranger to the prosecution witnesses, is dubitable. In the present case, however, there is no doubt at
all that the rapist is the same individual mentioned in the Informations and described by the victim
during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)54
We do not find herein a case where there is a question or doubt as to whether the one alleged to have
committed the crime is the same person charged in the information and subject of the trial. In fact,
appellant never denied that he is the person indicted in the Information, and subject of the proceedings.
His denial is that he did not participate in the commission of the crime. Hence, in-court identification is
not indispensable in the case at bar.
We are convinced that the identity of the appellant was sufficiently established by the evidence on
record.
The appellant is not a stranger to the witness Garcia. The identity of the appellant to Garcia does not
appear to be controvertible. In fact, appellant himself admits that he and Garcia are friends. Thus:
Cross-examination by Prosecutor Lachica of [appellant] Bernard Mapalo

Q Mr. Witness you said that you were informed by your counsel a while ago that a certain Calixto
Garcia testified against you in this case did I get you right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this Calixto Garica is a resident of the same Barangay as you are?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact this Calixto Garcia is an acquaintance of yours?
A Yes, sir.
Q He is considered a friend?
A Yes, sir I consider him as such.
Q Prior to the incident which happened sometime on February 13, 1994, you have never quarreled
with this Calixto Garcia?
A No, sir.
Q Even after that incident that happened on February 13, 1994 you never quarreled with Calixto
Garcia?
A No, sir.
Q You know that this Calixto Garcia is not a relative of Piamonte the victim in this case?
A I do not know whether he is a relative of the victim or not.
Q You know for a fact that Calixto Garcia executed a statement before the police pointing to you or
pointing to you as the assailant of Paimonte did you come to know that?
A No, sir.
Q You said that you know Calixto Garcia your friend according to you, did you confront him when he
testified against you in court?
A No, sir.
Q You did not tell your friend that he was mistaken in identifying you as the assailant of Piamonte,
correct?
A No, sir. 55
The proper identification of the appellant is further bolstered by the fact that appellants wife, Caridad
Mapalo corroborated the testimony that the witness Garcia is a family friend of the spouses. Thus:
Cross examination of Caridad Mapalo by Prosecutor Lachica

Q Do you know a certain Calixto Garcia?

A Yes, sir.
Q He is your Barangay mate?
A Yes, sir.
Q His house is closed to your house, correct?
A Far, sir.
Q But he is staying within your barangay which is Sta. Cecilia?
A Yes, sir.
Q This Calixto Garcia whom you know is a friend of your family, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, your family have (sic) never quarreled with Calixto Garcia?
A None, sir.
Q Prior to the filing of this case, you know that Calixto Garcia being a friend will not falsify his testimony
regarding your husband?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. RIMANDO:
Objection, your honor.
COURT:
Objection overruled.
PROSECUTOR LACHICA:
Q Until now, this Calixto Garcia is your friend?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR LACHICA:
That would be all for the witness.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. RIMANDO:

Q This Calixto Garcia was your guest in that evening in your residence?
A No, sir.
Q Is your family close with (sic) this Calixto Garcia?
A Yes, sir.56
Moreover, we do not find herein the presence of factors57 that could cause the witness Garcia to
misidentify the appellant. In People v. Limpangog,58 this Court enumerated several other known
causes of misidentification, viz:
x x x Known causes of misidentification have been identified as follows:
"Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim
or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize
details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers
of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people
attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences."59
There is no question that the witness Garcia was at a close range of merely five meters more or less
from the scene of the incident.60 Neither can it be said that the illumination was poor. The dancing hall
was lighted.61 No improper motive was attributed to the witness Garcia for testifying against the
appellant. Moreover, witness Garcia is familiar not only to appellant. Garcia was also familiar with the
deceased, Piamonte. Witness Garcia, in his testimony, referred to Piamonte as his third cousin.62
On appellants submission that it is doubtful if witness Garcia can still have positively identified him as
one of the perpetrators of the crime considering that the former admitted to drinking hard liquor from
9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994 until 3:00 a.m. of the following day, we are not convinced that the same
can overthrow the trial courts evaluation of Garcias testimony. Beyond appellants bare allegations,
no evidence whatsoever was produced to show that Garcia suffered from such a level of intoxication
as to impair his facility and disable him to identify appellant. In the case of People v. Dee, 63 the
credibility of the surviving victim therein as witness was disputed because he was under the influence
of liquor at the time of the incident. In Dee, the witness was even found positive for alcoholic breath,
but the Court ruled that such fact does not necessarily prevent him from making a positive identification
of his attackers, especially since his level of intoxication was not shown to impair his faculties. The
credibility of the witness therein was not made to suffer on that score alone.64
The foregoing material considerations, taken together with the fact that witness Garcia and the
appellant are not strangers to each other, satisfy us that the danger of Garcia misidentifying the
appellant does not exist. Where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both victim and accused,
and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed
to the witness for testifying against the accused, his version of the story deserves much weight.65
Hence, we do not find any reason to depart from the general rule that the conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses deserve great respect, viz:
The assessment of the credibility of witness and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the
trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand; and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under examination. Its findings on such matters are binding and

conclusive on appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.66
Appellants defense of alibi and denial cannot stand in the face of the positive identification of the
accused. We have unfailingly held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.67 It is facile to fabricate and difficult
to disprove, and is generally rejected.68
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown with clear and convincing evidence that at the
time of the commission of the crime charged, the accused is in a place other than the situs of the crime
such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the situs criminis when the crime was
committed.69
In the case at bar, appellant was not successful in invoking the defense of alibi. Appellant insists that
he was sleeping at his residence at the time when the incident occurred. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals consistently found that the distance between appellants residence and the dance hall, or the
situs criminis, is 20 to 30 meters, more or less.70 Such a distance is negligible. In fact, appellants wife
testified that from their residence, she could see the people dancing at the hall.71 It was not highly
impossible for the appellant to be physically present at the dancing hall at the time of the occurrence
of the incident. We, therefore, reject appellants defense of alibi.
We shall now determine the criminal liability of the appellant.
To reiterate, the RTC, in convicting the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, proceeded from a rationalization that there was conspiracy among appellant and his coaccused. It also appreciated the attendance of abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime to
Murder.
The Court of Appeals was unable to agree with the RTC. It found that the conspiracy was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that the witness Garcia admitted to not being able to see the
stabbing. He could only attest to the clubbing of the victim by appellant with a lead pipe. No proof was
shown as to the concerted action of the malefactors of their common design to kill. It, thus, modified
the RTCs conviction, and, instead, found appellant guilty of frustrated murder.
The Amended Information charged the appellant and his co-accused with conspiracy in killing
Piamonte.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.72 Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty.73Considering the far-reaching consequences of criminal conspiracy, the same degree
of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to support the attendance thereof, i.e., it must
be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.74 Thus, it has
been held that neither joint nor simultaneous actions is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.75
We are, further, guided by the following pronouncement of the Court:
For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the felony and decide to
commit it, which agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the
offense or inferred from the acts that point to joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of intent. x x x.76

While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, it is, nonetheless, required that it be
proved by clear and convincing evidence by showing a series of acts done by each of the accused in
concert and in pursuance of the common unlawful purpose.77
There is a want of evidence to show the concerted acts of the appellant and his co-accused in pursuing
a common design - to kill the deceased, Piamonte. The sole eyewitness for the prosecution, Garcia,
was categorical and precise in declaring that he did not see the act of stabbing Piamonte, nor the
manner in which Piamonte was stabbed. He later learned that Piamonte died from stab wounds when
he saw the latters dead body covered with stab wounds. The cause of death of Piamonte, as found
by the RTC and the Court of Appeals,78 and as borne by the records, is multiple stab wounds.79 It was,
thus, incumbent on the part of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
and his co-accused acted in concert with a unity of purpose to kill Piamonte. They must show to the
satisfaction of this Court the appellants overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.80 They
must show that appellants act of striking Piamonte with a pipe was an intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.81
The prosecution was unable to show, either by direct or indirect evidence, proof of the agreement
among the appellant and his co-accused to warrant conspiracy as a basis for appellants conviction.
No evidence was even adduced to show implied conspiracy. Nothing has been shown that the
appellant and his co-accused were "aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each
other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment."82
This complete absence of evidence on the part of the prosecution to show the conduct of the appellant
and his co-accused, disclosing a common understanding among them relative to the commission of
the offense,83 is fatal to the prosecution. The prosecutions witness could not testify on the manner by
which the deceased Piamonte was stabbed, precisely because by his own admission, he did not see
the stabbing. No account of the stabbing which caused the death of the deceased Piamonte was ever
given nor shown. Unfortunately, no account of how Piamonte died was ever given, except for the
established fact that he died due to stabbing. The appellants act of holding a lead pipe and hitting the
deceased in the head was not shown to be in furtherance of the common design of killing the
deceased. What transpired during the stabbing of the victim, which is material to proving the fact of
conspiracy, is, regrettably, left merely to speculation. This Court must neither conjecture nor surmise
that a conspiracy existed. The rule is clear that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral
certainty.84 All doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, the time honored principle in
criminal law that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, the Court should adopt that which is more
favorable to the accused for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.85
Liability of the Accused Bernard Mapalo
There being no conspiracy, the liability of the appellant will revolve around his individual participation
in the event.86
In the case of Li v. People,87 a street fight ensued resulting in the death of the victim therein. No
conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The liability of the accused Li who was shown to
have struck the victims right arm with a baseball bat, resulting in a contusion was, thus, determined
by the Court in the following manner:
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking
[the victim] Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from injuries which

cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not
mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity
of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries, penalized as follows:
xxxx
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty days. The felony of slight physical
injuries is necessarily included in the homicide charges. Since the Information against Li states that
among the means employed to commit the felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction
on the lesser offense or slight physical injuries is proper. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances established, the imposition of the penalty in its medium period is warranted. Li was
convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having long served more than the imposable penalty, Li is
entitled to immediate release unless, of course, he is being lawfully detained for another cause.88
In the case at bar, no injury was shown to be attributable to the appellant. The only medical evidence
that appears on records is the deceased Piamontes death certificate,89 which indicates that the cause
of death is massive hypovolemia90 secondary to multiple stab wounds. The factual findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals coincide to show that the cause of death of Piamonte is multiple stab wounds.
Nothing has been shown otherwise. Other than the presence of multiple stab wounds, no other type
of injury on the deceased was established. No contusions or injury on the head of the victim or
anywhere else in his body caused by a lead pipe was shown. The witness Garcia, in his testimony,
merely pointed to stab wounds on the different parts of the body of the deceased.91 No proof on the
injury that was sustained by the deceased that can be attributable to appellants act was demonstrated.
No other physical evidence was proffered.92
We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal and
essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailants intent to take the life
of the person attacked.93Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude
reasonable doubt thereof.94 Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or
number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted
on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the
time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.95
In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either prior or
subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears reiterating that
no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellants act of hitting the victim with a
lead pipe. On the nature of the weapon used, the lead pipe was described by Garcia as one and a half
feet in length, and one and a half inches in diameter. The relevant testimony of Garcia on the incident
follows:
Q Now you said that Bernard Mapalo clubbed this Manuel Piamonte. He clubbed him from behind?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did he use in clubbing the victim, is it lead pipe?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long is that lead pipe?

A Around this length. (Witness demonstrated 1 1/2 feet).

Q And how wide is the diameter?
A 1 inches.
Q What part of his body was hit?
A Right side of the head, sir. (Witness showing the right side of his head.)96
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their execution, are unmistakably
calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate means.97 We cannot infer intent to kill from
the appellants act of hitting Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In the first place, wounds were not
shown to have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent proof of circumstances to show the
intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court cannot declare that the same was attendant.
When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury, and without causing
dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under Article 266,98 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. It was
beyond reasonable doubt that by hitting Piamonte, appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any
injury. As we have earlier stated, no proof of injury was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included
in Murder, which is the offense charged in the Information. Thus:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
xxxx
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the offender shall
ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period is 1 day to 10 days.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 November 2005, in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00408 is MODIFIED. Appellant Bernard Mapalo is ACQUITTED of the charge of MURDER for
lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. He is found GUILTY of the crime of MALTREATMENT, as
defined and punished by Article 266, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. He is accordingly sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto menor of 10 days. Considering that appellant has been
incarcerated since 2004, which is well-beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause appellants IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless appellant is
being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision, of the compliance therewith.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172834

February 6, 2008

JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioners Jun and Gil1 Mupas were found guilty of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 2314 in
the Decision2 dated 22 November 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Malaoan, La Union,
Branch 34. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring both
accused JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS @ "Banjo" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Art. 249 in relation with Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, and thereby sentenced EACH of the accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) years PRISION MAYOR as maximum and the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnify jointly the private complainant the
reasonable amount of P5,000.00 for hospital expenses and other miscellaneous expenses.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused is counted in his favor.
SO ORDERED.3
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
The Information4 for frustrated homicide alleged:
That on or about the 18th day of February 1993, in the Municipality of Bangar, Province of La
Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul with fist and stones and stab
with a knife Rogelio Murao y Sibayan hitting the latter and inflicting injuries on his face and
head thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that was the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the offended party which saved his life to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During the arraignment, petitioners, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.6 Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Rogelio Murao (Rogelio), Flaviano Murao
(Flaviano) and Dr. Arsenio B. Martinez (Dr. Martinez).
Rogelio testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18 February 1993, he was walking to school
with his companion Eduardo Murao, Jr. when Jun suddenly stopped and stabbed him using a 29-inch

Batangas knife. Meantime, Banjo bodily restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to avoid the blow.
Next, Banjo and Jun hurled stones at him and hit him on the leg while Rogelio was running eastward.
Rogelio then flagged down a motorized tricycle but the two assailants continued to pursue him. While
inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his neck and punched him while Jun stabbed him several
times. Then, Rogelio alighted from the tricycle and ran home. Afterwards, his father and mother
accompanied him to the hospital.7 There, Dr. Martinez attended to Rogelio and issued a medical
certificate containing the following findings:
Cut
wound,
Abrasion,
Contusion,
Abrasion, lumbar area, (L)

2-3
maxiliary
maxiliary

cm.

parietal
area,
area,

area
(L)
(L)

HEALING PERIOD: It may take two weeks to heal.8

Prior to the incident, Rogelio recalled that in January of the same year, he had a misunderstanding
with Jun where he and the latter hurled invectives at each other. Rogelio suspected that this event
gave rise to the subject incident.9
Flaviano, Rogelios father, testified that on 18 February 1993, Rogelio came home bleeding from head
injuries. Immediately, he brought Rogelio to the Martinez Clinic in Bangar, La Union. Flaviano reported
that he has spentP2,000.00 for Rogelios medical treatment and P3,000.00 for attorneys fees and
transportation.10
For the defense, Jun testified that on 18 February 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, he was watering
the plants in front of Gils house when he accidentally sprayed water on Rogelio who was passing by.
Rogelio scolded him and Jun immediately apologized. Rogelio then challenged Jun to a fistfight which
Jun accepted. After that, Rogelio ran away, picked up big stones and threw them at Gils house. Jun
gave chase and was able to catch up with Rogelio. They both boarded a tricycle and continued their
fighting inside. One of the passengers of the tricycle, Josefina Mendoza, pacified the two men. Banjo
arrived only when the fighting ceased.11
Afterwards, Jun went home. Then, Rogelio and Flaviano, each armed with a bolo, arrived and
challenged Jun to a fight. However, the two could not enter the house as the gate was locked.12
Gil testified that in the morning of 18 February 1993, at around 7:00, somebody threw a stone at their
house. He went outside the house and saw Jun chasing Rogelio. He went near them and saw that
they had already been pacified by one Ms. Monis. Afterward, he sent the two men home. Gil also went
home and thereat, Rogelio, who had a stone with him, arrived with his father Flaviano who was carrying
a bolo. Rogelio then challenged Gil and Jun to a fight.13
Danilo Olpindo testified that between 7:00 and 8:00 in the morning of 18 February 1993, he was buying
soap from Banjos store when a fistfight transpired between Rogelio and Jun. Rogelio then ran away,
picked up a stone and threw it at Jun. After Rogelio threw another stone at Banjos house, Jun chased
him and had a fistfight with him again. Banjo then came out of the house and asked the two to go
home. Danilo also saw Teresita Monis at the scene trying to pacify the two.14
Teresita Monis testified that on that fateful day, she was riding a tricycle when suddenly, somebody
from outside punched one of her co-passengers. She saw an arm reach inside the tricycle and hit the
passenger. Blood started to ooze from the fellows forehead. Shortly, she had to alight from the tricycle
to attend the flag ceremony at her school.15

Josefina Mendoza testified that on said day, she saw Jun box Rogelio. Subsequently, Banjo went near
the two and dispersed them.16
Jun and Gil were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court of
Appeals.
Before the Court of Appeals, Jun and Gil argued that the trial court erred in: (1) finding Gil guilty of the
crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
finding Jun guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide instead of physical injuries only.17
Jun and Gil contended that Rogelio had failed to identify with moral certainty that Gil had been one of
those who inflicted the injury on him. They pointed out that Rogelio had failed to categorically state
that Gil and Banjo Mupas are one and the same person. Moreover, they asserted that in Juns case,
the prosecution had failed to prove intent to kill and as such, he should be convicted only of the crime
of physical injuries.18
The Court of Appeals in a Decision19 dated 23 January 2006, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 27768, affirmed with
modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from convicting accused-appellants JUN
MUPAS and GIL MUPAS alias BANJO MUPAS of the crime of Frustrated Homicide
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellants are ordered to pay ROGELIO
MURAO in the amount of P4,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.20
After a review of the records of the case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Banjo Mupas and Gil
Mupas are one and the same person. The Court of Appeals observed that when Banjo posted a bail
bond in the case entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jun Mupas and Banjo Mupas," he had made no
objection to the caption of the case and he had even signed his name as Gil Mupas. Secondly, when
the Information was amended to include Gils alias, Banjo did not interpose any objection to the
correction. Lastly, Rogelio had not been able to identify Banjo in court due to the latters absence at
the time of his testimony.21
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Jun already performed all the acts of execution necessary to
bring about the death of Rogelio which would have transpired had it not been for the timely medical
intervention. As such, the trial court correctly found him liable for the crime of frustrated homicide.22
Jun and Gil are now before the Court reiterating their assertion that the prosecution failed to establish
Gils identity as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that his defense of denial was duly supported
by clear and convincing evidence.23 They also contend that on the assumption that Jun is guilty of
having committed a crime, he should only be convicted of the crime of physical injuries.24
There is merit in the petition.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In addition, the prosecution must rest on
its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. In fact, if the prosecution fails to
meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its
own behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and hence, the accused shall

be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden
of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the
mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense.25
The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the victim Rogelios lone and uncorroborated
testimony. While it is true that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if such
testimony establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court rules that the
testimony of one witness in this case is not sufficient for this purpose.26 Apart from Rogelios testimony,
the Court observes that the prosecutions version of events has no leg to stand on.
In his Sworn Statement27 dated 23 February 1993, Rogelio admitted that he had a companion with him
on that fateful incident named Eduardo Murao, Jr. He also stated that there were other persons who
may have witnessed the assault namely, "Josephine Mendoza, Terisita Mico and one Mario Olpindo,
the driver of the tricycle." On the witness stand, Rogelio likewise testified that there had been others
who may have witnessed the incident including Eduardo Murao, Jr. and Teresita Monis.28 Interestingly,
Josephine Mendoza testified for the defense that she had only witnessed a fistfight between Jun and
Rogelio while Teresita Monis, also for the defense, testified that she had only seen a hand reach inside
the tricycle to hit Rogelio.
It appears then that Rogelio had at his disposal many witnesses who could have supported his
allegations but curiously and without any explanation, none of these so-called witnesses were
presented. It is thus Rogelios word against the attestations of others. Such omission already raises a
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioners.
In contrast, the defense was able to present three (3) other witnesses than the petitioners themselves.
In the Courts view, Danilo Olpindo, one of the defense witnesses, could hardly be called a biased
witness contrary to the appellate courts opinion. He may indeed be Juns second cousin but the
appellate court failed to consider that Danilo is likewise Rogelios third cousin 29 which fact, in the
Courts estimation, cancels the supposed partiality based on kinship.
Danilo Olpindo, Josefina Mendoza together with Jun and Gil are in agreement that a fistfight occurred
between Jun and Rogelio. In addition, Jun admitted that the fighting continued inside a tricycle.
Teresita Monis attested that this latter detail did occur but was not able to identify whose hand it was
that reached in the tricycle and hit Rogelio.
Juxtaposing the testimonies of the witnesses, it can be safely deduced that a fistfight occurred only
between Jun and Rogelio which continued inside a tricycle. Rogelios allegations of Banjos
participation in the incident and that Jun carried with him a bolo are uncorroborated and bereft of any
proof. Absent proof of Gil alias Banjos involvement in the incident, his acquittal is in order.
Assuming that Gil alias Banjo had any participation, there is likewise no evidence that he or Jun had
intent to kill Rogelio. Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of
commission. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.30
Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were sustained during the
fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun in fact had
been carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no
small wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more mild than grave. That

Rogelio was able to go home shortly after the tricycle incident without being pursued by his aggressor
also shows that Jun and Banjo were not intent on beating him to death or even leaving him for dead.31 It
is thus wrong to infer that the intent to kill was present in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.32 Moreover, Rogelios suggested motive for killing him, i.e.,
his previous altercation with Jun, was too weak and shallow a reason to kill under the circumstances.33
Notably, Dr. Martinez, Rogelios attending physician, opined that if Rogelios wound was left untreated
it could lead to his death, but at the same time he also testified that such wound merely required
suturing. He also testified that the wound, which was only 2-3 cm long and whose depth he did not
indicate, could have been caused by a rough or sharp object not necessarily a knife. And in the medical
certificate he issued, he reported that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to
heal.34 Dr. Martinez stated as follows:
Q

And what did you do when you noticed the wounds on the patient Rogelio Murao?

A
I gave the necessary injections and medicines preliminary in suturing the wound and
treating the wound, sir.
Q

What particular kind of injections did you make on the patient?

A Regularly a patient who will undergo the kind of operation [sic] we gave novaine injection[.]
[T]hen after ten minutes we gave the local anesthesia for suturing, sir.
Q

You said that you conducted surgery, what exactly did you do?

A After rushing and preparing the operative area and after giving the novaine injection [sic]
and I will now examine the kind of wound, it was a two to three cms. long on the parietal area
and partially cut and after cleaning the wound, we put anesthesia and suture the wound, sir.
xxx
Q Particularly this cut wound which you mentioned as the wound on the parietal area of the
patient, what particularly [sic] did you do when you said you applied surgery, did you do surgery
only on the cut wound?
A

I referred to injuries, damages tissues, we removed unnecessary tissues, sir.

After removing the unnecessary tissues, and cut wound, what did you do?

I have to suture, sir.

And in laymans language, what is meant by suture?

We used the chromic sutures and followed by the skin suture which is made of silk, sir.

Q Now, this cut would as you have said doctor, what would be the result of this cut wound
if it was not treated by you?
A

Death, sir.

How come it would result to death, if you did not treat the cut wound?

A
In the first place according to the legal ethics made by Dr. Solis even if there is slight
wound on the head, it is considered serious because the wound on the head is proximal to the
brain, sir. Meaning, usually, it gets in when the injuries were on the head, sir.35
xxx
Q You also stated that it is a cut wound which must have been caused by a sharp instrument
or bladed edge?
A

Sharp edge, sir.

xxx
Q

Because it is a cut wound, the tendency was not penetrating wound?

No, not penetrating wound, sir.

Q The wound is possible to have been caused by a knife or it might have been caused by
any sharp object not necessarily a knife or by any rough or sharp object?
A

Yes, sir.36

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to sustain the claim that petitioners
had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is
not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries
considering the attending physicians opinion that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two
(2) weeks to heal.37
Although the Information charged petitioners with frustrated homicide, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of less serious physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former, and since the essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part
of those constituting the offense of homicide.38
In sum, absent competent proof, Jun should be held liable only for the crime of less serious physical
injuries under Article 26539 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Gil, alias Banjo, must be absolved
from any liability for failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that he had conspired with Jun in
the commission of the crime or that he had any participation in it.
The Court sustains the appellate courts award of P4,000.00 as temperate damages. Having suffered
actual injuries, Rogelio is likewise entitled to moral damages.40 The award of P5,000.00 as moral
damages is sufficient under the circumstances.41
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART and the Decision dated 23 January 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR. No. 27768 is MODIFIED. Petitioner Jun Mupas is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, and sentenced to suffer a
straight prison term of four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor in its maximum period, and
to pay Rogelio Murao the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) as temperate damages, and
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages.

Petitioner Gil Mupas is ACQUITTED and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled
and released.

G.R. No. 170723

March 3, 2008

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ,
PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, petitioner
Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21 July 2005 Decision2 and 5
December 2005 Resolution,3 both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled "Gloria
Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido
Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does."
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February 20044 and 12 November
2004,5 respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8 January 2003 Resolution6 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City recommended the dismissal of the criminal
complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172 (Falsification by Private
Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262 (Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as "Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act," for insufficiency of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre against respondents Pedro B.
Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr.
Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child
abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre7 used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child caring agency run by
the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Work and Development
(DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre
(Lourdes Aguirre); and their four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent
Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend
a few days at their home and then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then
two years and nine months of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre and his
spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianshipexecuted in their
favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the
Aguirre spouses' guardianship of Larry was legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3
of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that his developmental
milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did not appear normal in that
"at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on his tummy like a frog x x x;"8 he did not utter his first
word until he was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only learned
to stand up and walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry

at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced significant learning
difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and
psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation9 done on Larry revealed the latter to be
suffering from a mild mental deficiency.10 Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred Larry
to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the
intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the
intended patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to
confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give his consent to the medical procedure
on account of his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to respondent Dr. Pascual, a
psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual
made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.11
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate of St. John [Marie Vianney],
was referred for psychiatric evaluation to determine competency to give consent for
vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history is not known to the
adoptive family except that abortion was attempted. Developmental milestones were noted to
be delayed. He started to walk and speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled in
Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant learning difficulties that he had
to repeat 1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was 11 years old.
Neurological findings and EEG results were not normal and he was given Tecretol and
Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental
retardation, special education training was advised and thus, he was transferred to St. John
Marie Vianney. He finished his elementary and secondary education in the said school. He
was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco which he was unable to continue. There
has been no reported behavioral problems in school and he gets along relatively well with his
teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the youngest in the family of four
sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are already old and have medical problem and thus,
they could no longer monitor and take care of him like before. His adoptive mother has Bipolar
Mood Disorder and used to physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of
dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was done
in Makati Medical Center and several tests were done, results of which were consistent with

his developmental problem. There was no evidence of acute insults. The family subsequently
decided that he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident and the possibility
that he would retaliate although he has never hurt anybody. There has been no episode of
violent outburst or aggressive behavior. He would often keep to himself when sad, angry or
frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given assignment to do some
photocopying, usually in the mornings. He enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his
nephews and, he spends most of his leisure time watching TV and listening to music. He could
perform activities of daily living without assistance except that he still needs supervision in
taking a bath. He cannot prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out and run errands
alone. He does not have friends and it is only his adoptive family whom he has significant
relationships. He claims that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high school who was
more like a best friend to him. He never had sexual relations. He has learned to smoke and
drink alcohol few years ago through his cousins and the drivers. There is no history of abuse
of alcohol or any prohibited substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and he had intermittent eye
contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and relevant. He responded to questions in single
words or simple sentences. He was anxious specially at the start of the interview, with full
affect appropriate to mood and thought content. There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to time, place and
person. He has intact remote and recent memory. He could do simple calculation. He could
write his name and read simple words. His human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year old.
He demonstrated fair judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma) and on August 4, 2000
(Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep parietal subcortical malacia.
No localized mass lesion in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x volume loss, encephalomalacia,
gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela of postnatal or neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo
dilatation of the atria of lateral ventricles associated thinned posterior half of the corpus
callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None

Axis IV None at present

Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal insults, which is
consistent with the neuroimaging findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological
problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is very much dependent on his family for his
needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life decisions. At his capacity, he
may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits, and consequences of
the procedure (vasectomy) that his family wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa
Psychiatrist12

B.

Pascual,

M.D.

Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written consent was deemed
sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002,
respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirre's eldest child, instituted a
criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262, both
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr.
Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,13 docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, contained the following allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical practitioners specializing in urology
and psychiatry respectively; while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim Laureano "Larry" Aguirre xxx is my common law
brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the persons who, acting upon the apparent instructions
of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually scouted,
prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dra.
Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of my
common law brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of the Good Shepherd Sisters
was furnished a copy of respondent Dra. Pascual's Psychiatry Report dated 21 January 2004
by the "DSWD," in which my common law brother "Larry" was falsely and maliciously declared
incompetent and incapable of purportedly giving his own consent to the MUTILATION VIA
BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to be performed on him by all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably committed by all of the
respondents in conspiracy with each other, on 31 January 2002, my common law brother Larry
Aguirre, although of legal age but conspiratorially caused to be declared by respondents to be
"mentally deficient" and incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was
then intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally placed thereafter under
surgery for MUTILATION VIA "BILATERAL VASECTOMY" x x x, EVEN WITHOUT ANY

AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor personal consent of Larry
Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional interview of nor verification and
consultation with my mother, Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame and malign her reputation and honor, and
worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry
Report, that my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from "BIPOLAR MOOD
DISORDER" x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz,
Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,14 respondent Olondriz denied that she "prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited
and/or procured any false statement, mutilated or abused" her common-law brother, Larry Aguirre.
Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a vasectomy procedure, there is
nothing in the Complaint which explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with complete confidence that I
did not participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who performed the vasectomy,
Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father, Pedro Aguirre, Larry's guardian, who obtained his
services. I merely acted upon his instructions and accompanied my brother to the physician,
respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the Complainant is authorized or has
any standing to declare that Larry's consent was not obtained. Complainant is not the guardian
or relative of Larry. While she argues that Larry's consent should have been obtained the
Complaint does not dispute the psychiatrist's findings about Larry's inability to give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged participation was falsified or the
portion of the psychiatric report that allegedly states that someone participated when in fact
that person did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx

17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally deficient or incompetent to
give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was explained to him (Larry) by
both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief that my father continues to
be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of no one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x x
x.15
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre argues against his
complicity in the crime of mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with complete confidence that I
did not participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.16
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any way amount to
mutilation, as the latter's reproductive organ is still completely intact.17 In any case, respondent Pedro
Aguirre explains that the procedure performed is reversible through another procedure called
Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure called Vasovasostomy. I can
also state with confidence that the procedure enables men who have undergone a vasectomy
to sire a child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the complaint, to wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in any act or proceeding when
that person did not in fact participate x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dra. Pascual. She arrived at
her report independently, using her own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how Larry is argued to be legally a
child under the definition of one law but nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be
capacitated to give his consent as fully as an adult.18
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry had been granted to himself
and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends that being one of the legal guardians,
consequently, parental authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for the sake of argument
that Larry does have the capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent Pedro
Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal personality to institute the subject criminal
complaint, for only Larry would have the right to do so.

Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep also disputed the allegations of
facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as they were
material to the charges against him, he vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended
procedure. In his counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x wherein I painstakingly explained
what vasectomy is and the consequences thereof; but finding signs of mental deficiency, x x x
I advised his relatives and his nurse who accompanied him to have Larry examined by a
psychiatrist who could properly determine whether or not Larry x x x can really give his consent,
thus I required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and clearance prior to the
contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric report prepared by Dr. Marissa
Pascual x x x. In her said report, Dr. Pascual found Larry to suffer from "mental retardation,
mild to moderate type" and further stated that "at his capacity, he may never understand the
nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x
x x, thus the responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian x x x."
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed by Pedro Aguirre stating that
he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry
x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was performed with utmost care and
diligence.19
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr. Agatep argued that subject
complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As mentioned above, she is only
a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of
the herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the condition of complainant's
mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the degree of
participation of herein respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not apply to me since it clearly gives
reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa Pascual's Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002,
in relation with her field of profession, an expert opinion. I do not have any participation in the
preparation of said report, x x x neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the
damage to another. x x x I also deny using a falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to castration and what is touched
in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote
from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in specifying the applicability of said
law. It merely avers that Laureano "Larry" Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro
Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x.20

Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of falsification and mutilation imputed
to her. She stands by the contents of the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirre's mental status was based on my own personal observations,
his responses during my interview of him, the results of the two (2) psychological tests
conducted by clinical psychologists, the results of laboratory tests, including a CT Scan and
MRI, and his personal and family history which I obtained from his sister, Michelina AguirreOlondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre is not a statement of my
opinion of Mrs. Aguirre's mental status, x x x. Rather, it is part of the patient's personal and
family history as conveyed to me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert opinion, cannot give rise to a
charge for falsification. A contrary opinion by another expert only means that the experts differ,
and does not necessarily reflect on the truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry Aguirre except to render an opinion
on his capacity to give informed consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that complainants are not the proper
persons to subscribe to the same as they are not the offended party, peace officer or other
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated x x x.21
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to the
crime of falsification. He held that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was falsified, because consent was
not given by Larry Aguirre to the vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said operation
does not constitute falsification. It would have been different if it was stated in the report that
consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it was written therein that he was consulted
on the vasectomy, because that would mean that it was made to appear in the report that Larry
Aguirre participated in the act or proceeding by giving his consent or was consulted on the
matter when in truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the entry would have been an
untruthful statement. But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report was made to determine
whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to his intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the
matter of Larry's consent having obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because
complainant's (sic) herself alleged that Larry's mental condition is that of a child, who can not
give consent. Based on the foregoing consideration, no falsification can be established under
the circumstances.22
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr. Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre had
Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally interviewed by respondent
Dr. Pascual and that the latter concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The
report merely quoted other sources of information with respect to the condition of Lourdes
Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was physically abusing Larry
Aguirre was also not of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the fact that Dra. Pascual cited
finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she

committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect the veracity
of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed
Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she cannot be charged of
falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then
with more reason the other respondents are not liable.23
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor also held that the facts alleged did
not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ,
which is still very much part of his physical self." He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the operation is reversible and
therefore, cannot be the permanent damage contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code.24
The Assistant City Prosecutor,25 in a Resolution26 dated 8 January 2003, found no probable cause to
hold respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of
falsification and mutilation, more specifically, the violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of petitioner Gloria Aguirre's complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.27
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing resolution to the Secretary of
the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review.28
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary
of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In resolving said appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing
of any reversible error in the questioned resolution or finds the same to be patently without
merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no error that would justify a
reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on the
matter.29
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in
another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner Gloria Aguirre's
recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated
February 11, 2004 and November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466
are hereby AFFIRMED.30
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved futile as it was denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, premised on the
following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS
OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED, BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH
RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING TO MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.31
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this Court's consideration is, given
the facts of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public
prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep
and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization as a result of a vasectomy
operation, and the chances of restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy performed on Larry does not
constitute mutilation even if intentionally and purposely done to prevent him from siring a child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act the reproductive capacity is
permanently removed or damaged.32
It then concluded that:

The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private respondents may have incurred
for the alleged absence of a valid consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly
beyond the province of this certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the issue of whether or
not the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed
grave abuse of discretion in their determining the existence or absence of probable cause for
filing criminal cases for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of
the Revised Penal Code.33
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of Appeals and the DOJ failed to appreciate
several important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's brother, Larry Aguirre,
was admitted34; 2) that the procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs
of generation or conception;353) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and deliberate to deprive
Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4) that respondents, "in
conspiracy with one another, made not only one but two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere
inaccuracies when they made it appear in the psychiatry report"36that a) Larry's consent was obtained
or at the very least that the latter was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes Aguirre
was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically, however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in
any way state that she, instead of respondent Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of
Larry. She only insists that respondents should have obtained Larry's consent prior to the conduct of
the bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent DOJ, argues that "the
conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable cause for the purpose of
filing (an) information is the function of the public prosecutor."37 More importantly, "the element[s] of
castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is completely absent as he was not
deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ."38
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz
assert that, fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file the complaint, as she has
not shown any injury to her person or asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his
"common law sister"; further, that she cannot prosecute the present case, as she has not been
authorized by law to file said complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit
that they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be charged with,
prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of: 1) "mutilation x x x since the bilateral vasectomy conducted
on Larry does not involve castration or amputation of an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin
elements of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent"39; and 2) "falsification x x x since the acts allegedly
constituting falsification involve matters of medical opinion and not matters of fact,"40 and that petitioner
Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to any other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is not mutilation. He elucidates
that vasectomy is merely the "excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis which transport semen"41;
that it is the penis and the testis that make up the male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens;
and additionally argues that for the crime of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation of some essential organ
for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic urethra not being organs, respondent
Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent Dr. Agatep asseverates that he
never took part in disclosing any information, data or facts as contained in the contentious Psychiatric
Report.

For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed Psychiatry Report was the result of her
independent exercise of professional judgment. "Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry Aguirre to
be incapable of giving consent, based on interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and
persons who interacted with him."42And supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous
medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.43 The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.44 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief;45 that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.46
The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal
obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component of the power to
execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators,47 the responsibility of which is thrust upon the
DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in
court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced
that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion, the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which
are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors.48 And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy
of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against the supposed offender.49
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It
is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in
him by law. This, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.50
Prescinding from the above, the court's duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive determination of probable cause was done without or
in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists
probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not
enough.51 Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended
the same or acted without authority.52
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor
in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is

determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant
City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes complained of as defined and
punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document, the Assistant
City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to the crime
complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact
that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do not in any way
amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that
said consent was obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that
the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same token
amount to falsification because said report does not put forward that such finding arose after an
examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned that though the
vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under
the pertinent provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ
and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual are charged
with violating Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, defines the crime of falsification of a private
document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a private document for conspiring
with one another in keeping Larry "in the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the same was
concealed from him by the respondents x x x,"53 as well as for falsely concluding and diagnosing
Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which defines the acts constitutive of
falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements

other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts complained of do not in any
manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination, fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that we
discuss the elements of the crime of falsification of private document under the Revised Penal Code,
a crime which all the respondents have been accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime
under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any
acts of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at
least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. Under Article 171, paragraph
2, a person may commit falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document that
a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact
so participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the same article
is perpetrated by a person or persons who, participating in an act or proceeding, made statements in
that act or proceeding and the offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or persons
statements other than those in fact made by such person or persons. And the crime defined under
paragraph 4 thereof is committed when 1) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration
of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in order that respondent Dr.
Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy with her, to have committed the crime of falsification under
par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential that that there be prima
facie evidence to show that she had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be
vasectomized or at the very least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But in
the assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having Larry
psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain whether or not he can validly consent with impunity
to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it or to oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to
explain to him what the import of the medical procedure was. Further, that Larry's consent to be
vasectomized was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it stated
in said report that such assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her very
own allegations when she persists in the contention that Larry has the mental age of a child; hence,
he was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.

In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with regard to paragraph 2 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, we quote with approval the succinct statements of the Assistant
City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in her
report does not mean that she committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein
that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the author of the
report is not guilty, then with more reason the other respondents are not liable.54
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements55 of mutilation under the first
paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation
of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately,
that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public
prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized
above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self." Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want
this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our
penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia,56 in which this Court had the
occasion to shed light on the implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the crime committed is that
defined and penalized by article 414 of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article
reads: "Any person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging from
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the
word "castrare," inadequately translated into English as "castrate." The word "capar," which is
synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the
organs of generation or conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person
who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ necessary for reproduction. An
applicable construction is that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the
name of 'castration' which consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for
generation. The law could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which,
although not destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind
that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the
'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but also to the intention
of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs

of generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it would not come
under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol.
3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some essential organ of
reproduction? We answer in the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas deferens, through
which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with the
seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied.57 That part, which is cut,
that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ,i.e., a highly organized unit of structure, having
a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a range of tissues.58 Be that as it may,
even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of the vas
deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason
that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. The cut
ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision.59
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not
deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction." Notably, the ordinary
usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body),60 with the
operative expression being "deprivation." In the same manner, the word "castration" is defined as the
removal of the testies or ovaries.61Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy
done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under
Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on
to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other
respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the
DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is
unavailing; hence, should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of non-interference in the conduct
of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution
of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case.62 The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.63 The possible exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial
intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed 21
July 2005Decision and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88370 are herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167766

April 7, 2010

ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 18, 2005, in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 27458, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. VI-984, finding petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes,
Jr. guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries instead of attempted murder, and the
Resolution3 dated April 19, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his brother-in-law. After consuming bottle of
gin, he left and went to the house of a certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar. He was accompanied
by his four- year-old son. On their way there, a gray automobile coming from the opposite direction
passed by them. After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving backward towards them. When
the car was about two arms length from where they were, it stopped and he heard the driver of the
vehicle call him by his nickname Parrod. Rudy came closer, but after taking one step, the driver, which
he identified as the petitioner, opened the door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot him once,
hitting him just below the left armpit. Rudy immediately ran at the back of the car, while petitioner sped
away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back to the place
where he was shot and shouted for help.4
The people who assisted him initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan, where
he was interrogated by a policeman who asked him to identify his assailant. He informed the policeman
that petitioner was the one who shot him. After he was interrogated, he was later brought to the Don
Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following day, he was discharged from
the hospital.5
On June 1, 1999, an Information6 was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Aparri, Cagayan, charging
the petitioner of frustrated murder, the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on or about September 2, 1998, in the [M]unicipality of Gonzaga, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rudy Baclig, inflicting upon the latter gunshot injuries.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of
Murder as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his own will.
That the same was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.7

During the trial, it was established that at the time the incident occurred, petitioner was employed by
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) as Irrigation Superintendent assigned at the Baua River
Irrigation System (BRIS). Petitioner vehemently denied any involvement in the incident, alleging that
he was in Quezon City at the time the crime was being committed. He contended that he was followingup the funding for one of the projects of NIA in Gonzaga, Cagayan. He insisted that he reported at the
NIA Central Office on September 1, 1998 and stayed in Manila until the afternoon of September 4,
1998. To buttress his allegations, the petitioner presented a Certificate of Appearance8 issued by Engr.
Orlando C. Hondrade, then NIA Deputy Administrator, who testified thru a deposition that he indeed
signed the document. Engr. Hondrade testified that he specifically remembered that petitioner
personally appeared before him on the 1st and 4th days of September for a duration of 10 to 15
minutes. Petitioner also submitted his daily time record to prove that he was not at their office in
Cagayan from the afternoon of August 31, 1998, claiming that he traveled to Quezon City pursuant to
a travel authority issued by his superior.9
On February 27, 2003, after presentation of the parties respective evidence, the RTC rendered a
Decision10finding petitioner guilty of the crime of attempted murder. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime of Attempted Murder and sentences him the penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. Further, the accused is ordered to pay private complainant Rudy Baclig the amount of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC concluded that Rudy positively identified the petitioner as the one who shot him there was
sufficient lighting for Rudy to identify the perpetrator and he knew petitioner ever since he attained the
age of reason. As to petitioners defense of alibi, the RTC ratiocinated that when petitioner personally
appeared before Engr. Hondrade on September 1, 1998, it would not be impossible for him to
immediately return to Gonzaga, Cagayan that afternoon and commit the crime in the evening of
September 2, 1998.12
Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, arguing that the RTC committed serious errors in
finding that he was guilty of attempted murder and that the RTC failed to consider the testimonies of
his witnesses and the documentary evidence presented in his favor.13
On February 18, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the decision of the RTC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 27 February 2003 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Pentecostes is only found GUILTY OF LESS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, there being one aggravating and no mitigating circumstance to offset it.
SO ORDERED.14
In convicting the petitioner to a lesser offence, the CA opined that it was not established that petitioner
intended to kill Rudy when he shot him. Petitioners act of shooting Rudy once was not followed by
any other assault or any act which would ensure his death. Considering that petitioner was driving a
car, he could have chased Rudy if he really intended to kill the latter, or run him over since Rudy went
to the rear of the car. Petitioners desistance displayed his nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy.

Moreover, Rudy only sustained a gunshot wound on the arm, which required only 10 days of medical
attendance.15
Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 but was denied in a Resolution dated April
9, 2005.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
The honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
gives credence to the statement of the private complainant presuming that the petitioner-appellant is
the assailant allegedly due to his voice and his alleged ownership of the vehicle, and considering that
the private complainant was then intoxicated, and the crime was committed at nighttime, such
conclusion is entirely grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures.
The honorable fourteenth division committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to give weight,
discuss and consider the arguments and defenses made the petitioner-appellant in our brief, vis--vis
the manifestation and motion of the solicitor general.
The honorable fourteenth division committed an error when it relied heavily on an unfounded, baseless
and alleged motive of petitioner, being a crusader of illegal drugs in their own town, to be the basis
that he is the assailant.17
Petitioner questions the conclusion of the CA when it found him guilty of the crime of less serious
physical injuries. He argues that Rudy failed to positively identify him as the assailant, since Rudy
never admitted that he was able to identify the petitioner through his physical appearance, but only
through his voice, despite the fact that it was the first time Rudy heard petitioners voice when he
allegedly shot him. Petitioner also insists that when the incident occurred, Rudys vision was impaired
as he just drank half a bottle of gin and the place was not properly lit. Rudy also failed to identify the
type of gun used during the shooting. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that the car used
by the perpetrator was owned by the petitioner.
Further, petitioner maintains that it was impossible for him to have shot the victim on the night of
September 2, 1998, since he was not in the Province of Cagayan Valley from September 1, 1998 to
September 4, 1998.
The petition is bereft merit.
In sum, petitioner submits before this Court two issues for resolution. First, whether or not the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who shot the victim;
Second, whether or not petitioners defense of alibi would prosper.
As regards the first issue, this Court finds that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner was the one who shot Rudy that fateful night of September 2, 1998. Both the RTC and
the CA found that petitioner indeed shot Rudy. In arriving at this conclusion, the RTC ratiocinated in
this wise:
Private complainant Rudy Baclig averred that he personally knew the accused since he was of the
age of reason. Rudy knew accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. to be working with the NIA at Sta.
Cruz, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Both private complainant Rudy Baclig and accused Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes Jr. were residents of Gonzaga, Cagayan, although they reside in different barangays.
Rudy was residing at Brgy. Batangan, while the accused was living two-and-a-half kilometers away at

Brgy. Flourishing. Rudy Baclig categorically stated that when the car of the accused passed by him, it
slowly stopped then moved backward and when the car was at a distance of about two arms length,
which was about three (3) meters, the accused called Rudys nickname Parrod. Hearing his nickname,
Rudy went towards the car, but he was only able to take one step, accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes
Jr. opened the door of the car and shot Rudy once and afterwards the accused hurriedly sped away.
Asked how he was able to identify Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. to be the person who shot him when
it was night time, Rudy said that he was able to identify the accused through the lights of the car and
on cross-examination he said that aside from the lights of the car, there were also lights coming from
a store nearby the place of the incident. The Court believes that with these kinds of lights, Rudy Baclig
was able to identify the accused, considering the distance between the assailant and the victim was
only three (3) meters.
x x x x.
Rudy Baclig was not telling a lie when he declared that he was shot at about two arms length only
because the doctor who treated him, Dr. Mila M. Marantan, declared that Rudy Baclig suffered a
gunshot wound, the entry was with powder burns which is an evidence that Rudy Baclig was shot at
a close range.
The defense harped on the fact that the private complainant smelled liquor. The complainant at first
denied having taken liquor, but he admitted he took one-half bottle of gin before he went to buy coffee
and sugar. On cross-examination, the complainant admitted also that every afternoon, he drank liquor.
He admitted that he could still walk naturally a distance of about one kilometer. He also said that his
vision might be affected. This testimony of Rudy Baclig cannot be considered as evidence that he was
not able to identify the accused. He was categorical in stating that he was able to identify the accused.
The doctor who treated Rudy of his injury declared the patient smelled liquor, but she could not tell
how much liquor the patient took, however, the patient could answer all her questions.
x x x x.
There are other evidences that tend to show that Rudy Baclig was able to identify the assailant.
Immediately after he was shot, Rudy told a police investigator, a certain Torres and Dr. Mila Marantan
that it was Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. who shot him.18
This conclusion was concurred into by the CA, which categorically stated in its decision that "[t]he
prosecution was able to present a witness, in the person of Baclig, who categorically identified
petitioner as his assailant and whose testimony was characterized by frankness."19 Contrary to
petitioners contention, Rudy saw him and positively identified him as his shooter, viz:
Q: When you heard the driver of the car calling you by your nickname Parrod, what was your
reaction?
A: I went near because I thought he was telling me something.
Q: And what made you decide to go near the driver of the vehicle?
A: Because he called me by my name, Sir.
Q: When the driver of the car called you by your [nickname], were you able to recognize the
driver of the car who called you?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And who was that person who called you by your name Parrod?
A: It was Engr. Pentecostes, Sir.
Q: The same person you identified a while ago?
A: Yes, Sir.20
Corollarilly, petitioner already raised these arguments in his motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the court a quo, which the CA addressed point by point in the assailed resolution denying the motion.
We quote with approval the following discussion of the CA:
On the first allegation, accused-appellant wrongly read the decision. The Court upheld the trial courts
finding that it was indeed accused-appellant who attacked the private complainant, not because the
latter heard accused-appellants voice but that he was able to see him through the lights of the car
when he opened the window and the door. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, it was not merely hearing the assailants voice, but that he was able to see him, that privatecomplainant was able to identify the accused-appellant. It was admittedly a fact that private
complainant had a drink but it does not mean that he was intoxicated, especially since he admitted
that he drinks everyday. Thus, his bodys tolerance to alcohol is probably heightened. There was also
no proof that his vision had been affected by the alcohol intake, and that he would have mistaken
someone else for the accused.
Again, positive declaration is given more weight than the denial of the accused-appellant. In addition,
the same findings were previously reached by the trial court which had the opportunity to observe firsthand the demeanor of the witnesses, and assess their credibility.
Regarding the Solicitor Generals recommendation, the Court is not bound to follow it although in some
cases, we are persuaded by the same. However, in this case, it was not able to persuade Us as it only
adopted the same arguments advanced by accused- appellants counsel.
Some of these arguments include the failure to present any document or evidence showing that the
car used was owned by the accused-appellant. The ownership of the car, however, is immaterial in
the light of the positive identification of the accused. In addition, the statement of the prosecutions
witnesses that the car was often used by accused-appellants father does not remove the possibility
that he may also use it.
On the third allegation of error, again, accused-appellant has misread the decision and exaggerated
by accusing us of relying heavily on the existence of a probable motive on the part of accusedappellant to commit the act complained of. This is clear in the decision that the same was meant to
assess whether there was a probable motive for the private complainant to lie.21
It is clear that the arguments advanced by the petitioner in the case at bar, questioning the conclusion
of the RTC and the CA that petitioner shot the victim, are trivial. The fact remains that Rudy has been
shot with a gun and he positively identified his shooter as the petitioner. Petitioner faulted the RTC
and the CA for giving credence to the testimony of Rudy. However, it is to be noted that even the lone

declaration of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to convict if that testimony is found to be credible.

Credibility of witnesses is to be weighed and should not be based on numbers. The matter of assigning
values to declaration on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge
who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by
various indicia available but not reflected on the record.22
This Court has meticulously scrutinized the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and finds
that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no error in giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution. The Court has long adhered to the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts and
circumstances, which if considered, would materially affect the result of the case. This deference to
the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the
principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to
convict the accused.23 This is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by
the appellate court.24
As regards petitioners defense of alibi, well settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense
which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim.25 Moreover, in order
for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the petitioner was somewhere else
when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it
was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.26 In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner personally
appeared before Engr. Hondrade only on September 1 and 4, 1998. His whereabouts for the two days
in between the said dates are unaccounted for. There was no showing that he could not have gone
back to Cagayan, committed the crime, and went back to Quezon City during those two days.
Petitioners defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail as against the positive, straightforward and
consistent testimony of Rudy that it was petitioner who shot him on the night of September 2, 1998.
As to the crime committed by petitioner, this Court also concurs with the conclusion of the CA that
petitioner is guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder.
The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the
assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident
manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.27 In the present
case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only
shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner
could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the
inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.28 When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon
the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal
Certificate29 issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10)
days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is
less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts upon another
physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall
be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."
1avv phi1

As to the aggravating circumstance of treachery, this Court finds that the CA erroneously concluded
that treachery attended the commission of the crime. To establish treachery, the following must be
proven: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means

of execution.30 The circumstances attending the commission of the crime negate the existence of
treachery in its execution. Although petitioner deliberately assaulted Rudy and there was suddenness
in his attack, he did not logically plan to assault the latter when he chanced upon him while he was
driving. In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally and purposely employs ways and means to commit
the crime. There was no evidence, however, to show that petitioner employed such means of
execution that would ensure the commission of the crime without harm to his person. Thus, treachery
did not attend the commission of the crime.
There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty for the crime of less serious
physical injuries should be taken from the medium period of arresto mayor, which is from two (2)
months and one (1) day to four (4) months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in
the case at bar, since it does not apply to those whose maximum term of imprisonment is less than
one year.31
As regards the awards for damages, moral damages may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting
in physical injuries, but there must be a factual basis for the award.32 We have studied the records and
find no factual basis for the award of moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 18,
2005, and the Resolution dated April 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27458, are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of three (3) months of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151258

February 1, 2012

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, Jr.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa the victim in this case on 10 February
1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to the brave efforts of his
mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death.
This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage members from making
hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.3 Moreover, the
law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the
conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.4

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.5 Within a year of his
death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the
University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng
Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga
of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines
in Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our
criminal justice system "[N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law."7 Nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or
injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters
of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public
sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R.
No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057
and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)8 and the trial court,9 are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to
the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs;
the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the "Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical
pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila

Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of
which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.12
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.14
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,
De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum
of P 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
9015318 reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January
2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt.20
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death
of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011.

Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not
survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision dated
10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.21 Petitioner sets forth
two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the
CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused."22
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present evidence
during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused,
Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right
should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement.
He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he
was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing
date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the
other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by
evil motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the
fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation
rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling."24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual
blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death."25 The Solicitor General
purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of
the victim."26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lennys
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car,
and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space
was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking
space were only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lennys coneophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it
up."27
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for
Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned
that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent
the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is
contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino
et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no

conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time
Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch
as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the
victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime
of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.29 The said article provides: "Criminal
liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the
accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CAs
Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and
90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case
No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the
nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of
the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine
accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be
faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but
were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
Issues
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Discussion
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took
note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the
service of personal or imprisonment penalties,31 while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,32 including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto).33 However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict
survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal
and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accusedpetitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.35 The
Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have
not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be
construed as waiver to present evidence."36
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client
Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.37 Because of this development
and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the
trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his
originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8
September 1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated
date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates
originally assigned to his clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and
treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under
the Rules of Court.40 Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence
amounted to a waiver of that right.41

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court
forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993
hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not
supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that
he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask
for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present
evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating
the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to
present evidence in ones defense,43 as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person
at every stage of the proceedings.44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses presentation
of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of
quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement
of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel
failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of
a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further
declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at
"yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos nonappearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on
such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxx

xxx

xxx

Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must
be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called
upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the
right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the
consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the
accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was
not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to
present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995
hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the
court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993
as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of

counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute
adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not
scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates
for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done
was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all
his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to
enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where
facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity
has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a
guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by
the evidence on record.48
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either
the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead,
what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and
the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his
Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged
extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."49He even argues
that "Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned."50
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the
reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case
has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts
necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have
been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time.
She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case
against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against
their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the
prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records
and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."51
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or
oppressive delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried
and for no cause or justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.55 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also

to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right,
and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.57
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of
the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, an appeal or a
reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.59 As
we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari
lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held
thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed
to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxx

xxx

xxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the
same.
xxx

xxx

xxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of
the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been
utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact
that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive
was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance
on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however,
that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because
the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion x x x.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by
both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon,

the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.64 On
29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman
in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the
delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before
him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory
complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So
it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a
decade already.68 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would
show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera,
the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in
any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the
same or an identical offense.69 This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England
and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the
Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the
citizen,72 viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides
as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient

in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse
the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same
Rules.74 The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or
information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the defendants express consent.75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction,
from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."76 We further stressed that
"an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal."77
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to
a deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.80
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.81 Here, the party asking for the review must show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent
and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.83 In such an event,
the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal
of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries,
both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were
denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x
b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x."85 Allegedly, the
CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.86 The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as
well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.87

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of
discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the
rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19
acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the
state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.91 We have also recognized,
however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that
the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.92 The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA
reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by
the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical
punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where
the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity
for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same
manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when
proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical
injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such,
this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and
Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.93 (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94 in finding that the four accused should
be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
required."95 The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither
caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.96 Furthermore, he did not die.97 His
injuries were not even serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable
merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court,
the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during
such initiation rites on the person of Villa."99It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that
the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the
initiation rites.100 Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa
was] serious in nature,"101 it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight
physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found
to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results
in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under Articles 262
to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a
whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According
to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should
be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles
246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries
when actual death occurs.102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of
the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,103 the only logical conclusion
is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body
caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional
infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article
4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.104
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of
hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were
acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2
Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a
felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with,
the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to
join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission
rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply
to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the
underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and
psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.105 The classical theory posits that
a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and
evil.106 It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as
free will appears unimpaired.107 The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are
rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and
pain.108 They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of
possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free
will and moral blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration.111 Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or "malice."113
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.115The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality
of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.116 The last element,
intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.117
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve
with which a person proceeds.119 It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while
intent concerns the result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action
for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.121 On the
other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil
heart or purpose.122 With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony
must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act
or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
aforethought."123 The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the
mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.124 As is required of the other elements
of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.125
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" is to be interpreted to
refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement"
connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design.126 Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed
by means of culpa.128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony of homicide
requires the existence of malice or dolo130 immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.131 Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.132 Furthermore, the victims death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.134

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups
to indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages,
during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.137 It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,138 where young
men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their
loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.139 Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some
connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.141
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.142 The neophyte
period is usually one to two semesters long.143 During the "program," neophytes are required to
interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand
the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the
organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization,
and its active and alumni members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to
involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.145
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant"
or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in
embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar
tasks or activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or
physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.148 These acts usually involve
physical or psychological suffering or injury.149
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our
national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association
of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity
believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved
by the Catholic Church.151 The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member through the
societys initiation ritual.152 It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point
of illumination, and were asked a series of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty,
courage, and resolve.153 They were made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa
isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It would seem that they were also made to withstand
the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal." 155 As a final
step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the his
own blood.156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in
the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United
States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable
foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.157 In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got

involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West
Point.158
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.159 The ritual
involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."160 It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which
the candidate was required to climb.161 Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses
and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were
seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the
spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi
invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.165 The fraternity members subjected the
pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and
the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy
book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches
to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges
up in the air and dropped them to the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through
a seven-station circle of physical abuse.167
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of
the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.168 The hazing included the following: (1)
having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers,
and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or
into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot
sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its
members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running
errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a
couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit
as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was accepted
to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170 He participated in
initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological
coercion and embarrassment.171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from
hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The pledges efforts
to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together
with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.175 In
these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately
60 canings on his buttocks.176 During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The
pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other
candidates passed out.179

The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the
pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.180 Some organizations even
believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization
to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit dcorp
associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.182
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.183 The hazing
of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of
military hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."185
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt
Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact
legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal
or civil statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor
and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.188 Only a few states with
anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.189
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or
great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall
be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.191 Indiana criminal law provides
that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in serious bodily
injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.193 As an element
of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the
category of "serious bodily injury."194 A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed
term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.195 Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C
felony.196 A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.197
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.198 An individual adjudged guilty
of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years
or not less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is
guilty of a third-degree felony.200 A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides that if the
act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject
to penalties provided therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results
in the death of another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not
to exceed 10 years, or both.204
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.205This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry
Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in
South Carolina until 1994.206
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that
the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background
or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi
or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries
on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been
motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had
been stolen by the victims father.207 As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the
family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals
brother.208 The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with
evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa,
appellants Dizon andVillareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held
liable for the crime of homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence
of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were
made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs
testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were
also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van and we
were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda,
sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka"
and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks uttered
upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
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Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were the
voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the
van which lasted for 5 minutes?
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Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
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Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any
utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others
who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed
looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayangkaya pa niyan."
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not really
pin point who uttered those words, sir.
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Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that
and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of justifying
him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and
then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole the parking
space of my father," sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have his
brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said that
I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering
those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
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Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole the
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
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Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.
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Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villas
father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny Villas
turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and he
kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
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Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that accusations
made byDizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable Court what
exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in
particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who
had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story

that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir.
And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court
and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez,
Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid,
yari ka sa akin," sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around
as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there was
a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect during
the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked at,
sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
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Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises
would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves,
it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body but
that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
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Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is psychological
in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)
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Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning body
contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify
you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was supposed
to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did not
believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was
because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by
all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on
your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on
you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by one
master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another master
on the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified
by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."214
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the
part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be
tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to
kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both
"accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific
threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh"; and who told
witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who
jumped on Villas thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With

the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill
based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness
Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological
pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated.
They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka,"
"Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other
words to that effect.215 While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the
formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space
of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused
Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was through
hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could
"justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing.
Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the
Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on
why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."
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So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte
is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette
extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire
to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a noose on the
neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor
of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times
but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are the
mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The
doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to
prevent.217 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of
the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether
the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the
veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view.
According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up."218 Even the
trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative
acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part
of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and
should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.220 Instead, we

adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity
members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.221
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused
fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code,222the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions
are.223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v.
People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs
and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court
stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she
did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she actually used was moderate and
that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws,
we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping
her pupil." In People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group known as the
Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" plunged the head of
the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling
through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death
of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability for
murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held
criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled
that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.227 What
persons do is the best index of their intention.228 We have also ruled that the method employed, the
kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative
of the intent of the perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background
surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the
whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were

subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the
"Auxies Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles.
Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals
were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to
another "traditional" ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected
the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated
to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or
excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to
tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.231 A few days before the "rites," he asked both his
parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny would go through an
initiation process and would be gone for three days.233 The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the
initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given
briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such
as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that
accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness
Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that
a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious
intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even
if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to
tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of
Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation
rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which
were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict
injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation
of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence
of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of
"traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different

treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common
crimes.235 The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even
after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under
rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime
of hazing?
Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts
or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association
can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held
criminally liable.
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Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of
an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in
death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it
may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

Senator Lina. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit
a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President,
let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit
a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from
the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are
even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute
this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala
talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa
anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte.
So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after
the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong
hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
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Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the
death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the
crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having
to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And
even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a
new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead
to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was
hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context
of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that
their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain.
Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters
or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or
maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.

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Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy or not anymore?
Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include
sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one
of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can
be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase "without
consent" for purposes of this section.
Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going
to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts here.
Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person
joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of
the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate
the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which
may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President.
Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is
none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important
is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity,
so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the
perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from
Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and
practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do
their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing
if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society.
That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of
the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the
neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of
the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this
bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He
accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of
the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none;
the same is approved.237
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal
author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there
it is mala inse or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants
to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.238(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto.

Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma
faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes
cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala
in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have consented239 to his
participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as
mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony.
And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature
of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere
lack of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly
visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on
the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so
constitutes negligence.246
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.247 If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."250The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.251

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries.252The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump
and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.253 In the present case, the victims heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and
oxygen.254 The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory
system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas
of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.255 The multiple hematomas
were wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained
by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated blows to those areas caused
the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly
diminished as to produce death. 258 The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas,
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs,
were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.259 It was concluded
that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac
arrest or disease.260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from repeated
blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death.
These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila
Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked,
elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.261 They
were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were
made to play rough basketball.264 Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya
sa spine."265 The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of defense
counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa
previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the death of
the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these
injuries marked from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all those
injuries in whole and not in part.267
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the
initiation rites.268
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which
made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe
to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we
rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medicolegal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of
physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least
mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves

from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records
would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites having in
mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should be
seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members
were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for
legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and
the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship."
A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the
benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.270 Another initiate did not give up, because
he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.271 Thus,
for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By
giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then,
these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable
by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when
Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA
found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.s individual
participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273As to accused Villareal, his criminal
liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the AntiHazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical
injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and P 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused
Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally
paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
1wphi1

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.274 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount
of P 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred
in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting
them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or
proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for
actual damages.277

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victims
death.278This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we affirm
the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty
of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized
under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are
ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of P 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages
awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. 280 Costs de
oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47448 May 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch VI, Province of
Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and DIOSDADO
MARAPAO, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge dismissing the information for supposed
lack of jurisdiction as null and void. Respondent judge wrongfully dismissed the case before him in
disregard to the elemental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information and
that the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the information had duly vested his court with
jurisdiction. The Court orders the transfer of the case below to another branch of the Bukidnon court
of-first instance, since it is doubtful that the State and offended party may expect a fair and impartial
hearing and determination of the case from respondent judge who with his erroneous pre-conceptions
and predilections has adversely prejudged their case for serious physical injuries as one merely of
slight or less serious physical injuries.
The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation filed an information dated
October 13, 1977 in the court of respondent judge, charging the three private respondents- accused
(Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao and Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries committed
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully unlawfully
and feloneously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Mrs. LOLITA
ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th) day from her child delivery, by
then and there wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with
a fist-size stone at the face thereby inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES:lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in width at the level of the
m arch of the face, with contusion and swelling all around the inflicted area
which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES to suffer
a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her recent child
delivery, which relapse incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more
than thirty days.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held, much less that warrants
for the arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead, after "scanning the records of (the) case" and
noting that the thereto attached medical certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the victim Lolita
Ares would require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and, therefore, 4 "may either be slight or less
serious physical injuries only" contrary to victim's affidavit that she was incapacitated from her
customary labor for more than 30 days and the fiscal's findings as to the prominent sear left on the
victim's face as a result "which considerably deforms her face" (as duly alleged in the information),
respondent judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical

injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order of October 27, 1977, stating as his
reason that
The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is
the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of treatment, and not what
the victim declares because the same is self-serving.
The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge in his Order of November
16, 1977 denying the same, evaluating the case without having heard the parties or their witnesses
(particularly the physician who issued the medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and
ruling against the deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his perception from a reading of
the medical certificate and the fiscal's written resolution finding proper basis for the filing of the
information, that
Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed a big scar at the left
cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita Ares justify the filing of the charge of serious physical injuries,
under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, when the attending physician certified
that what he found was a lacerated wound on the right side of the face? Clearly, the
scar found by the investigating fiscal could not be the result of the acts imputed to the
accused but for some other cause, for how could the scar be found on the left
side when the injury inflicted was on the right side? (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for nullification of respondent judge's orders.
The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is ample legal and factual basis for the
information charging serious physical injuries, stating that "(T)hat the allegations in the Information
that a fist-size stone hit the face of Lolita Ares causing lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the
face which considerably deformed her face (are) not only supported by the medical certificate, but also
by the admission of accused Diosdado Marapao during the pre investigation that he threw a fist-size
stone which hit the face of Lolita Ares and the personal finding of Fiscal Tamin during the preliminary
in. investigation that there is a prominent scar on her face," and that the offense as charged falls under
Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes thereon a penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and is therefore properly cognizable by respondent
judge's court.
The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in precipitately
dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis of his totally wrong notion that
what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the medical certificate regarding the duration of
treatment and "not what the victim declares because the same is self-serving."
It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial,' much
less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the
record of the case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a
proper trial.
It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would indicate that a
lesser offense outside the trial, 1 court's jurisdiction was committed does not deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction which had vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the
jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events,
although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached. 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case had only resulted in
duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of records when respondent trial judge dismissed
the instant case for want of jurisdiction, when it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the
accused and try him. "
Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed with proper study and
circumspection before summarily dismissing cases duly filed within their court's cognizance and
needlessly burdening the appellate courts with cases such as that at bar which should not have
reached us at all in the first instance. Respondent judge's disregard of the established rule that the
information for serious physical injuries properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the
case, and that if from the evidence submitted a lesser offense was established, that he equally had
jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense, is difficult of comprehension. Besides, the
doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably could
corroborate the victim's testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than had at first been
estimated by him as well as clearify the location of he victim's facial scar.
Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the victim's declaration as
to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to whether the State and the
offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since
seemingly with his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their
case as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries. The case below should therefore be
transferred to another court presided by another judge.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null and void. The case
below for serious physical injuries is remanded and ordered transferred to Branch V of the court of
first instance below, and the judge presiding the same is ordered to issue the corresponding warrants
of arrest and to proceed with dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents-accused and the trial
and determination of the case on the merits. Let copy of this decision be attached to the personal
record of respondent judge. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 169533

March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section
10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt
to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the
Revised Penal Code.
The Case
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of
child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutors Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No.
7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking
said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting
his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latters family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para
dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your
father here), which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the childs development and which demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that
when the procession passed in front of the petitioners house, the latters daughter Mary Ann Rose,
also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the
back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers
house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the
house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station
and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training
and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates

attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area,
left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had
told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones at them and about Jaysons burning Cherrylyns
hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told
Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but
only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned
Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She
insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She
described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic
Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight
(8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and
circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the
lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining brothers
to react to the incident, which was unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George
Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision
mayor as the maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount
of P5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11

The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he was
guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the
CAs affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an
appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he
wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when
a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a
scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse
of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course
to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any
rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the
CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the
commission of the crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating
circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence
rather than his guilt for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition
concerned only the CAs appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are
errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still
be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires
the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the
petitioner received a copy of the CAs decision on July 15, 2005,14 but filed the petition only on
September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing
the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on
their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence imposed on him not being
commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the
other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed,
the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give
premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be
rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every
litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond realization here unless the

Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as the noble ends of justice demand.
Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and equity like the
Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our
consideration.
The petitioners right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without
due process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case.
Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule
in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to
correct errors in the appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms.
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any
of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding
that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records
did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to
debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended

to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands
of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential
in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in
favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in
his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention,19 the
petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.
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The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code,21 because the
petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.22 Passion
or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. 23 It is
relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence
and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his
two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day
to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of
passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty
imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases
resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages
is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a)
finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the
amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.