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TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS CASES

People vs. Casio | GR 211465


FACTS: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a
nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to
entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI
George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert
Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police
operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending
to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM
provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police
blotter. The team went to Queensland Motel and rented adjacent
Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while
Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan,
Cebu Citys red light district where the accused noticed them and
called their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the signal, the
accused was arrested and the two minors were taken into custody by
the DSWD officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
RULING: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of
trafficking in persons have been met. Based on the definition of
trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in
persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the
offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to
decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The
offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
The Court found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when
their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA
was a child at the time that accused peddled her services to work as a
prostitute because she needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed
Accused took advantage of AAAs vulnerability as a child and as one
who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under RA 9208.

People vs. Lalli et. al. | GR 195419


FACTS: Lolita was a 23 years old single woman who was recruited by
the accused Hadja Jarma Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to work to
Malaysia as Restaurant waitress. She was convinced and decided to
use the passport of her sister to travel to Malaysia with the
employment opportunity. But she was forced to be a prostitute in her
new employment which she has no choice but to be a prostitute from
June 14 to July 8, 2005. She was rescued b the husband of her sister
who pretended to be a costumer. Upon arrival to Zamboanga she filed
a case against the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment and
Trafficking in person. Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the
crime of Trafficking in Persons because he was not part of the group
that transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the
ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as
witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in
bars.
ISSUE: WON this case involves trafficking of persons or merely illegal
recruitment?
RULING: Trafficking of Persons is not only limited to transportation of
victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally
recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they
are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA
9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes
trafficking.

VAWC - CASES
People vs. Genosa |GR 135981
FACTS: Marivic Genosa, appellant, attacked and wounded his
husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant
she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night, it was
her husband began the provocation. The appellant said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her to the point that it would
prejudice the safety of her pregnancy and she wanted to make sure
that she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, the appellant had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Center as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension. Appellant testified that during her
marriage she tried to leave her husband five (5) times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said
that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that
night because Ben was crazy about his girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos, which
left her. The appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been
shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant
with a plea of self-defense admitted to the killing of her husband, she
was then guilty of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUE: WON appellant can validly invoke the battered woman
syndrome as constituting self-defense?
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove
that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. A battered
woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her
rights. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. The Court,
however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle
of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed

to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable, not necessarily immediate and
actual but grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. The defense fell short of
proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that
in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through
a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in
regard to the third phase of the cycle.

Dinamling vs. People of the Phil. | GR 199522


FACTS: Petitioner and his friend came home from a drinking session
and went to the boarding house of AAA. At that time, petitioner and
AAA were in an ongoing 5-year relationship and they have 2 common
children. While AAA was putting their children to sleep, petitioner
suddenly started to evict AAA and the children ordering them to pack
their things and leave. AAA refused, but was convinced when petitioner
began to pull her hair and kick her. AAA went to the police to file a
complaint, unfortunately, the police merely told her that it was just a
family problem that could be talked over. Petitioner was also a
policeman at that time. Few days later, petitioner arrived at the place
where AAA is staying. Petitioner shouted and counted down for AAA to
come out. When AAA came out, petitioner suddenly punched her and
kicked her, pushing her to the middle of the road while petitioner kept
on shouting her surname. On the road, petitioner pulled down AAAs
pants and panty while people looked on. After petitioner left, AAA
charged him for violation of RA 9262.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of violating RA 9262?
RULING: Yes, petitioner is found guilty of violating RA 9262. The
Court finds sufficient evidences to establish the elements of the crime
as defined in Section 5 (i) of RA 9262.
The elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a
woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or


emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts
or omissions.
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation
to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody
of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
In this case filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been
proven and duly established. All such acts were committed while in full
view and hearing of the public, highlighting the public ridicule and
humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain.
AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's
motorcycle would put fear in her. All the above, as established during
trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the crime as
prescribed in the law. It matters not that no other eyewitness
corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The testimony of
the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the act,
as long as it is credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused
because evidence is weighed and not counted.

People vs. Jumawan | GR 187495


FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

CHILD ABUSE CASES

People vs. Sales | GR 177218


FACTS: In the night of September 2002 in Camarines Sur, appellant
Noel T. Sales beaten his two sons Noel Jr. and Noelmar because they
failed to return home after joining the fluvial procession of Our Lady of
Penafracia. Sales whipped his son with a piece of wood approximately
one meter in lenght and one and a half inches in diameter. After he
was finished beating his sons, his wife, Maria, noticed that there was a
crack in the head of Noemar so they brought him to a quack doctor,
who said that Noemar was already dead. Appellant denied that his son
died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact,
he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant
recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year
before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart. On
the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy.
Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes
out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures
normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight
physical injuries.
ISSUE: WON appellant was responsible for the death of Neomar?

RULING: Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in


this case. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused. In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to
prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. There is likewise
no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant
killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive
testimonies of Maria and Junior. As to the third element, appellant
himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
Rosaldes vs. People | GR 173988

FACTS: The petitioner Felina Rosaldes, a public schoolteacher, was


charged and found guilty of child abuse punished under RA 7610. It
appears from the records that seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales,
then a Grade 1 pupil, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he
accidentally bumped the knew of his teacher, herein petitioner, who
was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Petitioner asked Michael to
apologize, the latter, however, proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner
then pinched Michael on his thigh, held him up by his armpits and
pushed him to the floor causing him to hit a desk and, consequently,
losing his consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his
ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Petitioner
contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by Michael to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would
debase, demean or degrade his dignity and avers that her
maltreatment is only an act of discipline that she as a schoolteacher
could reasonably do towards the development of the child.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of the crime of child abuse?
RULING: YES, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610.
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him
was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the
violence suffered at her hands.
Under RA 7610, Section 3, par. B:
Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the
child
which
includes
any
of
the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse
and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such
as
food
and
shelter;
or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or
in his permanent incapacity or death.
In the crime charged against the petitioner, the maltreatment may
consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
The act need not be habitual. The physical pain experienced by the

victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him


to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner,
compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had
to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds
that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael
Ryan as a human being. Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the
crime of child abuse punished under RA 7610.
Caballo vs. People of the Phil. | GR 198732
FACTS: Christian, 23 years of age, met AAA, his choreographers
niece, in her uncles place. When she stayed in her uncles place, she
and Christian became sweethearts. He succeeded in convincing her to
have repeated sexual intercourse because of his promise to marry and
an assurance that they will use the withdrawal method so she will not
get pregnant. She, however, became pregnant, and Christian, shocked
with the development, proposed that she had an abortion. She
acceded to the request but failed, hence, a child was born out of the
relationship. When confronted by Christians mother, he promised to
marry AAA. The mother later filed a case for violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act 7610. In his defense, Christian contended that they
were sweethearts; AAA was not a virgin anymore when they had
sexual intercourse; eventually they broke up because of the
intervention of AAAs mother. Christian was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610.The issue
presented before the Supreme Court was whether or not Christian may
be convicted for violation of Republic Act 7610. He argues that his
promise to marry and use of the withdrawal method are not
inducement or persuasion as to make the case within the purview of
the offense. The phrase due to the coercion or influence of any adult
is the relevant phrase for interpretation. According to him, it must be
accompanied by some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute
child abuse.
ISSUE: WON Christian may be convicted for violating RA 7610?
RULING: Court finds that Christian is guilty of violating RA 7610.
Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 reads:
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in

sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children


exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Christians actuations
may be classified as coercion and influence within the purview of
Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA 7610.
First, the most crucial element is AAAs minority. It is undisputed that
AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime
and is hence, considered a child under the law. In this respect, AAA
was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her
actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and
deception of adults, as in this case.
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), the elements of
the foregoing offense are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains
undisputed. Records disclose that Christian had succeeded in
repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all those
instances, was still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in
the presence of the second element. On this note, the defense submits
that AAA could not be considered as a child exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse since the incidents to do not point to any form
of coercion or influence on Christians part.