Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
1|P a g e
Torts 3
DECISION
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for damages
PEREZ, J.:
[1]
figured in a vehicular
the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-
[2]
[7]
on the jitney's lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it
passengers.
[3]
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the
for damages.
[8]
where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still
hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few
meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.
[4]
Pomasin to settle the case amicably for P200,000.00; and that the
the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and
proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or
driver.
[9]
[5]
[6]
Torts 3
not as focused as that of the driver. The trial court concluded that
Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The
[10]
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that
[11]
dated
19 July 2006.
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact and law
which lead back to the very issue litigated by the trial court: Who
downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney. Based
on the gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jitney
[12]
the accident. Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his
respondents and that she was so confused at the time when she
making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such
signed the affidavit that she did not read its content.
following:
record.
[13]
Pomasin;
The exceptions to the rule underscore the substance and weight of
b) Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of each victim, to be
principle:
[A]ppellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with
regard to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The
Narcisa Pomasin
P37,200.00
Laarni Pomasin
P37,200.00
Andrea P. Pagunsan
P37,200.00
Dionisio Perol
P37,200.00
reason for this is that trial courts have the `unique opportunity to
observe the witneses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination.
The exceptions to this rule are when the trial court's findings of
facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on
Torts 3
[14]
on the matter testified to which is the precise point of inquiry --- the
driver. This being so, this Court is more inclined to believe the
[15]
[16]
The claimants,
opposition to it.
[17]
jeep hitting the left fender of the truck all the way to the fuel tank,
the violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being
The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give
[18]
"sweeping conjecture"
[19]
occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view
One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon
considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly
The trial court did just that in the instant case. Contrary to the
vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court also
their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to reach a
the truck was actually ascending the highway when it collided with
4|P a g e
Torts 3
During the direct examination, Jabon narrated that the tractortrailer was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour
Q:
A:
Q:
correct?
Albay at about 5:00 of August 12, 1994, could you tell the
A:
Yes sir.
Q:
And practically, your jitney was the only car running at that
A:
time?
Q:
A:
A:
Yes sir.
[22]
(Emphasis supplied).
my way a vehicle going on a zigzag direction and it even fell Significantly, this is a confirmation of the testimony of Jabon.
on the shoulder and proceeded going on its way on a
Q:
zigzag direction.
A:
Q:
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Could you please tell the Court what was your speed at the
Q:
zigzag manner?
A:
Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer truck that collided
[20]
A:
In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed that he was
ascending, viz:
our lane so our driver swerved our vehicle to the right but
Q:
A:
[23]
supplied).
(Emphasis
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
A:
None sir.
Q:
A:
Yes sir.
Q:
You said you were ascending towards the direction of undebated fact, supports the trial court's conclusion that the jitney
A:
[24]
The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an
incident happened?
Yes sir.
[21]
downward."
[25]
[26]
5|P a g e
Torts 3
fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of
is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact
that:
[30]
trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney
which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon
uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.
[31]
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident,
Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction
[27]
[32]
The subject
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
cause of the injury.
[28]
[29]
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 94-3418 lodged before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Torts 3
BERNABE, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AND AS HEIRS passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, died.
OF JASON BERNABE, JOHN JOSEPH BERNABE, VICTOR
IGNACIO, JULIETA ENRIQUEZ AND RAMON ENRIQUEZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
as follows:
Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati found petitioners driver to be responsible for
a. Charito Estolano
P35,813.87 (Exh. J)
20,024.94
45,830.45 (Exh. QQ)
f. Rene Tablante
a. Charito Estolano
b. Julieta P. Enriquez
c. Ailyn C. Enriquez
d. Josefina R. Enriquez
on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion
e. Josefina P. Valerio
by petitioners panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was
f. Nenita Salonoy
traveling in the opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way
h. Josephine Bernabe
2,000.00 (Exh. R)
10,000.00
j. Manilyn G. Salonoy
k. Jack Salonoy
jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and
l. Leonor C. Macaspac
m. Victor Ignacio
n. Rene Tablanta
P10,000.00 (Exh. F)
7|P a g e
Torts 3
Appeals,
and finally the heirs of Jason Bernabe should be awarded the sum
[1]
of P50,000.00 for the latters death. The heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy negligence per se. Petitioner further claims that even if petitioners
should be given the sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages and
unearned income.
costs.
Appellate Court,
[2]
and caused a collision between his car and a truck coming from
SO ORDERED.
clear chance, which states that a person who has the last clear
the trial court was appealed, affirmed the decision on January 26,
First. Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty
of contributory negligence and, therefore, its liability should be
panel truck was initially negligent, the driver of the Cimarron had
the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the
Petitioner cites Art. III, 2 of R.A. No. 4136, known as the Land
or cargo in his vehicle than its registered carry capacity" and Art.
IV, 3(e) which states that "Every motor vehicle of more than one
bear two headlights... which not later than one-half hour after
and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
[3]
[5]
However, mere
portion of the lane of the Cimarron does not show that its driver
was negligent. Petitioner cites the case of Bayasen v. Court of
Torts 3
way either driver could have avoided the collision. The panel truck
driver testified:
[6]
Laundry, Inc.
....
You said that the lights were going towards you. Now, at
highway in Imus, Cavite, what happened afterwards, Q:
what pace did these lights come toward you?
if any?
A:
Fast pace."
The passenger jeepney I was following made a
Charito Estolano, another passenger who was seated in front of
sudden stop so I stepped on the brakes.
Q.
A.
Q.
the Cimarron, similarly testified that they just saw the panel truck
hurtling toward them. She said:
any?
The Mercedes Benz (panel) suddenly swerved to
A.
Q.
A.
GONZALES:
A little more, 1 1/2 feet.
Coming from?
ATTY.
A
ALILING:
Q
Can we stipulate that it is 1 foot, Your Honor.
ATTY.
[8]
1 1/4 feet.
Q
ATTY.
GONZALES:
A
Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2 feet.
The panel truck drivers testimony is consistent with the
[7]
Yes, sir.
All right. Will you tell the Court which bumped which?
Q:
A:
I just saw a glare of light. That is all and then the impact.
Q:
A:
The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck
Q:
lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. Hence, even
A:
Towards us.
....
Q:
A:
bumped just the same because the driver of the panel truck could
not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes. Petitioners
contention that because of "decreased visibility," caused by the
fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on, its
9|P a g e
Torts 3
driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in fact. Only
hour, the fact remains that the panel truck was overspeeding
its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. The because the maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses on
police investigator did not state in his report or in his testimony that open country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,
[13]
this case. There was no swerving of the vehicle in that case but
skidding, and it was caused by the fact that the road was wet and
slippery. In this case, the road was dry and safe. There was no
was seated in front, which suggest that the driver had no elbow
Petitioners reliance on the McKee case is also misplaced. In that
[9]
to avoid the collision but he ignored the signals from the other
vehicle, a car, to slow down and allow it to safely pass the bridge.
opposite direction he was not able to fully move his Cimarron away In this case, there was no such opportunity given the Cimarron on
from the path of the oncoming vehicle. We are convinced that no
before the passengers of the Cimarron knew it, the vehicle had
and police clearance of its driver does not mean that it failed to
mean not only that petitioners driver was running the vehicle at a
very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney
ahead of it as well.
of these documents does not mean that it did not exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. On the
If this was so, he would have had no difficulty bringing his panel
truck to a stop. It is very probable that the driver did not really
apply his brakes (which is why there were no skid marks) but that
testified that his vehicle was running at the speed of 60 miles per
hour.
[11]
muddled.
Torts 3
employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have at least and necessary in view of the circumstances of this case. Moral
two (2) years experience as driver prior to employment was not
enough to prove the exercise of due diligence and that even this
[17]
In this case,
some of them lost their loved ones, while others lost their future.
With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and
Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, they suffered
[14]
However, the
road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done. There
were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to how to react those awarded moral damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to
in cases of emergency nor what to do after an emergency occurs.
concerned employees 204 file. All these could only mean failure
cases
employees.
[19]
the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased).
Since Salunoy was 46 years of age at the time of his death, as
Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
[15]
stated in his death certificate, then his life expectancy was 22.6
years, or up to 68 years old.
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the time of his death,
submit clearances from the police and the NBI. In the case of
seems his wife occasionally finds work and thus helps in the
household expenses.
computed as follows:
net earning
[20]
life
less
[16]
[2 (80-46)]
22.6
[P11,000 - P5,500]
x
=
5,500
P124,300.00
11 | P a g e
Torts 3
[21]
12 | P a g e
Torts 3
[2]
RTC.
[3]
Trial on the
TINGA, J,:
Appeals.
[4]
the part of the user and has become the subject of regulation, if
not by the government, then by parental proscription.
[5]
In a Decision
damages from the driver of the car which had struck him. The
dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo filed their
on his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist
himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are
[9]
[8]
Libertad;
[1]
[12]
[11]
[10]
that
that as testified by
avoided.
on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC
opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ
359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
trier of facts,
[15]
against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the
vehicles.
[17]
Torts 3
[18]
transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and
1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code
[19]
negligence.
[20]
[21]
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction
[22]
Its applicability
[23]
travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the
number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than
the Code, the legislators must have seen that only motor vehicles
nature has inescapably become matter of public concern so as to posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v.
expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the
times.
[24]
Juanillo
[25]
country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the
beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not
[26]
In the same
Torts 3
and let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner
to account for his acts. An automobile driver must at all times use
[30]
[31]
all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would
have exercised under the circumstances.
[27]
with bicyclists.
[28]
[29]
[32]
[33]
inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision
of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree
types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply by law, failure to conform to such standard is negligence,
to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and
legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply
matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from
Torts 3
Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the
If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to
avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended
the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has
because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse
on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the
result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in
v. Court of Appeals,
[34]
[39]
[40]
the time of the accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by
four adults, including the driver; and the van had only one
invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron
ordinance.
[35]
[36]
, the
[38]
[37]
In
holding him liable for the damages for the destruction by fire of a
of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that
it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole
there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that the vehicle
Torts 3
[42]
[41]
[50]
[51]
or if the
motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it had
[52]
[53]
then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or
such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracias negligence
dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
require.
[43]
sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed
[54]
thereto.
citing:
1990 p. 30). This earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to
compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have Villagracia to proceed but Aonuevo at an unexpected motion
been invaded owing to the conduct of others.
[44]
of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto
a bicycle.
[45]
[46]
but is
a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played
a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist.
[47]
The
[56]
[57]
[48]
[49]
Torts 3
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
18 | P a g e
Torts 3
about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence
of the surgical operation performed upon her. Dr. Ampil
recommended that Natividad consult an oncologist to treat the
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
that she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to
the Philippines.
2007, finding PSI and Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No.
inches in width. Dr. Ampil then assured Natividad that the pains
measuring 1.5 inches in width. The gauze had badly infected her
[1]
of Medical City,
damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Natividad.
Fuentes.
19 | P a g e
Torts 3
between the Medical City and Dr. Ampil. Consequently, both are
spouses Agana finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes jointly and
was dismissed.
PSI, Dr. Ampil and the Aganas filed with this Court separate
jointly and severally liable with Dr. Ampil for the following reasons:
Appeals,
[2]
the lobby of the Medical City the names and specializations of its
Ampil and its resident physicians and nurses and to take an active
In its motion for reconsideration, PSI contends that the Court erred
in finding it liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, there being
Dr. Ampil. PSI stressed that the Courts Decision in Ramos holding feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A
that an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
subsequent Resolution.
[3]
terminated.
In other words, private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control
engaging the services of Dr. Ampil. And lastly, PSI maintains that
Torts 3
rd
xxx
Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own
851 (2006) citing Hylton v. Koontz, 138 N.C. App. 629 (2000). In
factors. One such factor is the control test wherein the hospital
Actually, contrary to PSIs contention, the Court did not reverse its
Medical Clinic did not exercise control over its consultant, hence,
employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
consultants.
par. A, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. See also King v. Mitchell,
rd
xxx
Aganas.
[4]
through Mr.
Health, Inc.)
physician.
is its employee.
Torts 3
[7]
medical care.
[8]
Unfortunately, PSI had been remiss in its duty. It did not conduct
the great prejudice and agony of its patient. Dr. Jocson, a member
Atty. Agcaoili
[5]
Ampil. Its act of displaying his name and those of the other
[6]
22 | P a g e
Torts 3
of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence
Moreover, there is merit in the trial courts finding that the failure of
PSI to conduct an investigation established PSIs part in the
dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the
gauzes. The following testimony of Atty. Agana supports such
findings, thus:
Q
xxx
xxx
Q
[10]
Court
By that answer, would you mean to tell
SO ORDERED.
[9]
Torts 3
COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
[11]
but soon dropped him as a party defendant in the case for failure
DECISION
BRION, J.:
[12]
[1]
filed by petitioner
Vicente Josefa, doing business under the name and style of 747
2008 decision
[2]
[3]
of the Court of
Pasig City.
[4]
He thus
and talked to SPO2 Alexander Galang who informed him that the
electricity post, three 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line owner of the offending vehicle was Josefa.[14] Fernandez also
[5]
attachments were damaged. Upon investigation, respondent
identified and authenticated the investigation report dated April 21,
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) discovered that it was the truck 1991[15] (Exhibit A) summarizing the result of his investigation. [16]
with plate number PAK-874 and registered in Josefas name that
hit the electricity post.
[6]
Elmer Albio identified himself as the driver of the jeepney that was
involved in the accident. He testified that a truck suddenly hit the
Pasig City; he thus lost control of the jeepney and hit a Nissan car
[7]
Thus, on September
28, 1993, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck
on the other lane of the road. Thereafter, the truck hit the electricity
post.
driver, for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City.
[8]
[17]
However, he could
[9]
[19]
Meralco personnel.
complaint.
[20]
[10]
Torts 3
Meralco incurred actual damages totaling P384,846.00. To support was Josefas employee when the accident occurred since Josefa
his finding, he identified and authenticated two pieces of evidence,
document dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit D). Exhibit C is a letter Bautista was under Josefas employ until 1993.
from Meralcos legal department requesting the accounting
department for a computation of actual damages.
[21]
On the other
[22]
On cross-
The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the electricity post
was sufficient to hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of
whether Bautista was negligent in driving the truck. In the same
[23]
chief during trial. Even assuming that Bautista was not Josefas
of testimonial evidence.
[24]
damages since the law presumes that the registered owner has
control of his vehicle and its driver at the time of the accident. It
[25]
[26]
[27]
Thereafter, Josefa
[31]
his motion
[32]
before the Court. After we denied the motion for its procedural
[28]
infirmities,
factual findings. He insists that the finding that it was the truck that
evidence.
[29]
[33]
failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post.
The Respondents Position
The RTC ruled that SPO2 Galangs account of the accident was
merely hearsay since he did not personally witness the incident. It
also did not give probative value to the police blotter entry dated
In its Comment, Meralco takes the opposite view that it is the RTC
January 7, 1994 since the accident had long occurred in 1991. The ruling that is unsupported by evidence. Meralco maintains that the
RTC likewise denied Meralcos claim for actual damages for lack
of evidentiary support.
[30]
RTC erroneously ruled in favor of Josefa who did not present his
evidence-in-chief during trial. Meralco also posits that Josefas
vicariously liability finds support in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
The CA Ruling
Civil Code which hold the employer primarily liable for damages
caused by the employee who acted within the scope of his
The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in
pay its just and valid claim for actual damages warrants the award
truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista
of attorneys fees.
[34]
25 | P a g e
Torts 3
The Issues
[36]
Thus, for a
(1) Whether the truck with plate number PAK-874 hit the electricity
must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and
post;
[37]
With
truck hit the electricity post. The pre-trial order shows that the
pre-trial conference.
[38]
[39]
truck hit the electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the
[35]
We see
[40]
We thus
property.
A.
pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. In a motion to dismiss
dated March 17, 1997, Josefa stated:
Torts 3
from the vehicular mishap which occurred on April 21, 1991 along
negligence and the damage was not shown. Neither was it proved
defendants dump truck with plate No. PAK 874 hit and
underlines ours)
[41]
[43]
(Emphases and
(emphasis and
These statements constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal
underline ours)
[T]he manner who and why the accident occurred was not
[44]
Manojo Bautista simply because the truck he was then driving a fact cannot later challenge this fact for the reason that judicial
bumped to electric post. The causal connection between the
controversy.
[45]
B.
following:
so sudden;
negligent act or omission that creates the vinculum juris in extracontractual obligations.
[46]
It may be asked: Who was that somebody that bumped the back
of Abio What was the reason why the truck bumped the
Was the bumping of the back of Abio and the bumping of the car
the proximate cause why the truck hit the Meralco post?
[42]
[48]
Nowhere in the records was it shown how and why the accident
accident itself.
[49]
[50]
Torts 3
Civil Code which holds the employer vicariously liable for damages
For
this doctrine to apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the
truck was used without authorization or that it was stolen when the
person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident occurred.
law.
[54]
[53]
third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven
had the exclusive management and control of the truck, acted with
owner.
[55]
[52]
B.
negligence of the jeepney and/or the car drivers may have been
established that it was the truck that hit the electricity post.
procedures.
that there is a direct and proximate causal link between the truck
conclusion other than to rule that Josefa is primarily liable for all
[56]
[57]
A.
A.
There is an employer-employee
point out the specific facts that afford a basis for its claim for actual
damages.
[58]
Torts 3
D.
[59]
Frames.
[65]
[64]
competent evidence to corroborate them. Consequently, we delete temperate damages has been determined with certainty.
the CAs award of actual damages for lack of evidentiary support.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the
B.
petition. The January 31, 2008 decision and the April 29, 2008
negligence
[60]
SO ORDERED.
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, the court
may award temperate damages in the exercise of its sound
discretion.
[61]
[62]
[63]
There is also no
29 | P a g e
Torts 3
PETITIONER, VS. NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO, and burial expenses; (c) P559,786.00 representing the unearned
JANET E. LANUZO, JOAN BERNABE E. LANUZO, AND RYAN
JOSE E. LANUZO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
incidental expenses.
In its answer,
[2]
along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the
time of the incident, the lights were working and switched on; that
and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili
Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a
The company further alleged that since the start of the project in
blocking work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the September 1997, it installed several warning signs, namely: (a) big
accident happened because the construction company did not
overhead streamers containing the words SLOW DOWN ROAD
provide adequate lighting on the site, but the latter countered that
company, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision and containing the words SLOW DOWN ROAD UNDER REPAIR 100
ruled for the plaintiffs.
METERS AHEAD placed on the road shoulders below the
streamers; (c) road signs with the words SLOW DOWN ROAD
Hence, this appeal.
the highway, and a series of 50-watt light bulbs were installed and
switched on daily from 6:00 p.m. until the following morning; (e) big
[1]
from two 50-watt bulbs from 6:00 p.m. until the following morning;
of one lane of the national highway at San Agustin, Pili, Camarines widened in the adjacent road shoulder to allow two-way vehicular
Sur from September 1997to November 1997.
traffic.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident
Los Baos Lanuzo (Balbino) who figured in the accident that
brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police
transpired at the site of the re-blocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on
the road had a light. Thus, it sought the dismissal of the complaint
on the site of the project, especially during night time, was the
Torts 3
Decision of the CA
company, as follows:
Plaintiffs are the survivors of Balbino Los Baos Lanuzo who met
road between San Agustin and San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur;
SO ORDERED.
Defendant DENIED the claim of plaintiffs; both parties offered
testimonial and documentary evidence, from which this Court,
The CA ruled that the following elements for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident
FINDS
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
swerving, to avoid the barricade, hit it, instead, breaking the lighted of the person injured.
electric bulb on top of the barricade, resulting in the fall of the
decedent about 18 paces from where his motorcycle fell on the
reblocking project.
they had passed by the area immediately before the accident and
had seen the road to be dark and lit only by a gas lamp. It noted
OPINION
From the foregoing findings, it is the opinion of this Court that the
barricade.
preponderance of evidence.
The CA ruled that the placing of road signs and streamers alone
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, DISMISSING the
complaint.
[3]
did not prove that the electric bulbs were in fact switched on at the
time of the accident as to sufficiently light up the newly re-blocked
31 | P a g e
Torts 3
portion of the highway. It opined that [t]he trial court gave undue
rider before hitting the barricade. On the other hand, it insists that
Pedro Corporal. SPO1 Corporal arrived at the scene only after the
accident occurred, and thus the electric bulbs could have already
The company maintains that Balbino was familiar with the re-
damages.
had been passing the area at least four times a day during
weekdays in going to and from his place of work in the morning
[6]
but the CA
and in the afternoon; and that he could have avoided the accident
had he exercised reasonable care and prudence.
2003.
The company assails the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
Issues
loquitur, positing that the Lanuzo heirs did not establish all the
requisites for the doctrine to apply.
contrary to the finding, among others, by the trial court that the
accident. It cites the fact that Balbino was familiar with the road
not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of the
passing there daily; and that Balbino had been driving too fast and
not wearing the required helmet for motorcycle drivers, which were
immediately evident because he had been thrown from his
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals, by substituting its own findings motorcycle and had landed 18 paces away from the barricade
of fact and conclusion with those of the trial court despite the lack
safety requirements.
Supreme Court.
[7]
The company reiterates the categorical finding of the RTC that the
the latter was believed by the trial judge who had the first-hand
Torts 3
Balbino?
Court,
Ruling of the Court
[17]
fact on who was the negligent party, the Court holds that an
Cooley defines it, (t)he failure to observe for the protection of the
[8]
or as Judge
The Court must ascertain whose vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
[19]
of Court mandates that in civil cases, like this one, the party having liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence
the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.
[9]
of another, the claimant must prove that the negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause is
defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
[10]
[12]
[11]
[20]
[21]
as follows:
[13]
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
[14]
[15]
x x x is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value prudence and determines liability by that.
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered
to be synonymous with the term greater weight of evidence or
[16]
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the
RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate
Torts 3
site, viz:
First of all, we note that the Lanuzo heirs argued in the trial and
appellate courts that there was a total omission on the part of the
xxxx
the project. They claim that the omission was the proximate cause
of the death of Balbino.
[22]
the project, abandoning their previous argument of a total omission 2. To determine the vehicle involved.
to illuminate the project site.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE:
During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of
illumination instead of the total omission of illumination. Their first
3.
witness was Cesar Palmero, who recalled that lights had been
actually installed in the site of the project. The next witness was
Ernesto Alto, who stated that he had seen three light bulbs
installed in the site, placed at intervals along the stretch of the road
covered by the project. Alto further stated that he had passed the
site on board his tricycle on October 30, 1997 prior to the accident,
and had seen only a gas lamp, not light bulbs, on his approach.
she had also passed the site on board a bus on the night just prior
to the accident, and had seen the site to be dark, with only one
site had been illuminated by light bulbs and gas lamps, and that
rider at a fast speed when he hit the barricade placed on the newly
30, 1997, recalled that there were light bulbs on the other side of
the barricade on the lane coming from Naga City; and that the light
bulb on the lane where the accident had occurred was broken
Torts 3
4.
5.
(Emphasis ours.)
[23]
6.
In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies
of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal than to those of the witnesses for
xxxx
the Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for doing so, because the
greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial
7.
sudden brake.
[24]
IV. FINDINGS/DISCUSSION:
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
8.
oclock in the evening a time wherein dark of the conclusive and binding on this Court - since the trial judge had the
night is approaching the vision of the driver is
the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious
worthy of belief.
9.
[25]
officer detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station,
official duties.
[26]
because the Lanuzo heirs did not adduce evidence to show any
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Torts 3
[31]
the police investigator of the accident. They also did not show that
[27]
[28]
But court
the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused
declarations are not self-serving considering that the adverse party by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company.
is accorded the opportunity to test the veracity of the declarations
the process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing
him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road.
[29]
thusly:
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the
was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could
the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not
night time to see the condition of the road ahead. That the
According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal
depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay
shown that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or
that respect. Had he worn the protective head gear or helmet, his
untimely death would not have occurred.
The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the
[32]
36 | P a g e
Torts 3
37 | P a g e
Torts 3
RESPONDENTS.
being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane
towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the
DECISION
proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the
parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the driver
SARMIENTO, J.:
[2]
in AC-G.R.
the decision
[3]
P30,000.00.
The findings of fact by the trial court which were adopted by the
appellate court are as follows:
[5]
tire of their cargo truck with Plate No. SU-730 which was parked
along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck
defined under the terms and conditions stated therein; that the
1980. The decision on behalf of the plaintiff was set aside to give a of the cargo truck they were repairing at Baretbet, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya by the driver of the defendant. He used to earn
chance to the defendant to file his answer and later on, a thirdparty complaint.
(P100.00) per trip. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated
so he had to use crutches to walk. Prior to the incident, he
38 | P a g e
Torts 3
supported his family sufficiently, but after getting injured, his family
third-party liability, under vehicle policy no. 11723 (Exh. '1') dated
May 30,1978; that after he filed the insurance claim the insurance
company paid him the sum of P18,000.00 for the damages
sustained by this truck but not the third party liability.
[7]
[8]
1.
position.
APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT.
2.
[6]
[10]
For if
[11]
[12]
--
when the Court should review and rectify the findings of fact of the
lower court, such as:
39 | P a g e
Torts 3
lawyer for the petitioner before the Supreme Court" with motion
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case if the findings are
for 20 days extension "to file the Petition for Review on Certiorari."
1, 1986. On the other hand, the instant petition for review was filed
of the trial court; 7) the said findings of fact are conclusions without on April 17, 1986
[22]
[21]
[20]
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
before due course was given. In any event, to exact its "a pound of
[13]
weight the truck could not have been driven to the shoulder of the
road and concluded that the same was parked on a portion of the
road
[14]
court inferred that the mishap was due to the negligence of the
driver of the parked truck.
[15]
[24]
or as Judge Cooley
could have reversed the finding of the trial court that a warning
[16]
[25]
lamp, was installed by the driver of the parked truck three to four
[17]
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
positive finding of the trial court that an early warning device was
in proper place when the accident happened and that the driver of
the private respondent was the one negligent. On the other hand,
bumped the parked truck", did not cite specific evidence to support
[18]
filed out of time. It must be noted that there was a motion for
since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and
extension,
[19]
dated March 19, 1986, requesting for 30 days from March 20,
limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the
petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise
40 | P a g e
Torts 3
that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and
shifted to the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his (Isidro's)
Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road, while the immobile cargo
[32]
was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the cargo truck:
cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was
fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
[27]
placed.
[28]
[29]
mind that the driver and he himself did employ early warning
device such as that required by law or by some other adequate
"Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco) - Will you narrate means or device that would properly forewarn vehicles of the
to me in brief how the accident happens (sic) if you can still
remember?
Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, will evoke the pre-
That on or about 10:40 p.m., 15 May 1979 while driving Isuzu truck sumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, on
at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at KM 285, I met
the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as plaintiff
another vehicle who (sic) did not dim his (sic) lights which cause
who was fixing the flat tire of said truck. (pp. 14-17, Appellant's
(sic) me to be blinded with intense glare of the light that's why I did
not notice a parked truck who (sic) was repairing a front flat tire.
When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded
with round logs. I step (sic) on my foot brakes but it did not
function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that
the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the brakes did not
function." (Italics in the text).
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the right side of the road would be no moment taking
into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck
[30]
But
This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury
[31]
[34]
[33]
Or as
puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon
proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
41 | P a g e
Torts 3
belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 113, 115. Under doctrine
[45]
[46]
[35]
and the
[36]
earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
[38]
procedural convenience.
[37]
[39]
Moreover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to
instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver, was
[40]
It merely
[47]
inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the
[41]
[42]
[43]
of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof
injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the
[44]
as in this case.
Torts 3
43 | P a g e
Torts 3
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
This is a petition for review on certiorari
[1]
[2]
dated June
[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna
ropes, and egg dealership based [in] Santa Cruz, Laguna. She
supplies her products to her customers [in] San Pablo and Lucena.
husband that one of their jeepneys, which was loaded with eggs,
DKF-168. On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the said jitney
was bumped by a JAM Transit bus when the latter overtook the
DVG-557 and body number 8030. The bus was driven by Eddie
Dimayuga (Dimayuga).
At the time of the collision, Tan's jitney was loaded with quail eggs
and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs). It was driven by Alexander
regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was
the accident occurred, was under her employ since 1993 and is
On redirect, the plaintiff testified that prior to March 13, 1997, the
eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his helper were injured and
day the accident happened, Ramirez has not met any vehicular
premises.
ALEXANDER RAMIREZ, 35 years old, married, resident of Sta.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc.
Cruz, Laguna, and a driver testified that: He knows the plaintiff Luz
truck.
Torts 3
road, per his approximation, was about 10 meters wide, with the
salted eggs, "balot" and quail eggs for delivery to Lucena City
painted crosswalk. It also has a yellow line without any cut which
showed in the sketch the spot where the jitney and the bus were at
Laguna because it is better than the road along Brgy. Dayap of the the time of the incident. Shown the photographs (Exhibits "E" to
same municipality. However, while at the Maharlika Road, he met
"E-6"), he stated that they are truly reflective of the scene of the
On cross, he stated that what he saw was the situation after the
about a kilometer away from their police station. He can recall the
investigation. Upon reaching the place, as a rule followed by police investigated were the jitney driver, his "pahinante" (helper) and
officers, he inquired from some of the residents about the incident.
As relayed to him, the jeepney with Plate No. 168 was going
13, 1997. He came to know of the accident when the said vehicle
incident happened.
to P450,000.00.
[4]
with other police officers during the investigation of the incident but Exhibit "C" - PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the jitney
he can recall having interviewed a certain Mercy Ponteiros and
shipment;
Exhibit "E" - Six (6) photographs depicting the site of the vehicular
accident;
Exhibit "F" - Four (4) pages of receipts representing hospital and
still fresh in his mind and he drew a sketch (Exhibit "F" to "F-7") of
Torts 3
driver;
[5]
amount of [P543,537.00];
2.
3.
4.
Costs of suit[.]
[7]
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Laguna and bus driver of JAM Transit Inc., testified that: He
has been a passenger bus driver since 1983. He was previously
and dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was nothing
jitney he was driving to turn turtle. The CA also observed that the
the bus from the right side going to Calauan. He was not able to
evade the vehicle as there was no way for him to do so. The front
evade the jitney as there was no way for him to avoid the situation, been testified to by Ramirez or by the latter's companion. The CA
causing the jitney to be dragged to the side. Nothing else
concluded that res ipsa loquitur could not apply in this case
happened after the bus hit the jeepney. He and other persons took because the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
the driver from the jeepney and brought him to a hospital.
Hence, this petition, with petitioner positing that the doctrine of res
[6]
Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found the JAM
regulation when the collision took place. Thus, the RTC ruled in
defendants who are hereby adjudged to pay the plaintiff jointly and
1.
Torts 3
We cannot agree with the CA when it said that how the incident
Certification
[8]
[11]
duty, it was not conclusive proof of the truth of its entries, since
hearsay.
[12]
physical evidence
[13]
When duly
1.
2.
3.
[15]
The photographs
negligence;
defendants; and
lines at the center, separating the right lane from the left. Based on
evidence, the JAM passenger bus was moving along the highway
eliminated.
[10]
towards Manila, and the jitney was going along the same route,
until it was about to turn left to the barangay road towards the
Poblacion. After the incident, the photographs would show that
both vehicles were found on the opposite lane of the highway. The
front right portion of the bus was shown to have collided with or hit
the left portion of the jitney with such an impact, causing the latter
accident, but since she failed to present it, the doctrine would not
to turn turtle with extensive damage, injuring its driver and his
[17]
Although the person who took the pictures was not able to testify
jitney loaded with salted eggs, balot and quail eggs for delivery at
accident.
circumstances thereof, including the width of the road and the road
[18]
[19]
[20]
47 | P a g e
Torts 3
From the said exhibits, the plaintiff postulates that her jitney then
As regards police blotters, it should be remembered that although
and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the Manila, but when the jitney was about to negotiate the left side
facts stated therein. Entries in police records made by a police
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and their probative oncoming/overtaking bus driven by Dimayuga, that caused the
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.
[21]
[22]
[23]
taken together would prove that the jitney and the bus were going
along the same way; that the jitney was about to negotiate the
intersection going to the left towards the feeder road in the
On the other hand, the bus driver who is the lone witness/evidence
direction of the Poblacion; and that the bus hit the left-turning jitney for the defendant testified he was driving at the Maharlika Highway
causing the smaller vehicle to turn turtle.
at 40 km/hr when the jitney "overtook" from the right and that there
was no way for him to evade the latter so it was dragged to the
overtook the bus from the right which is not proper. Plaintiff
allegedly could not claim damages for its failure to prove the bus
position of the bus and the jitney at the time of the collision such
that the same can only be inferred from the pictures of the colliding
As both parties are asserting claim for the damages each has
portion of the bus. This is consistent with the plaintiff's theory that
the jitney was then negotiating the left portion of the road when it
either driver of the bus or of the jitney must be shown, and the
was hit by the oncoming bus causing the jitney to have a 90-
degree turn around. The bus and the jitney were almost
perpendicular to each other when the collision took place, with the
The statement of the bus driver that the jitney "overtook" from the
right only presumes that at the point of collision, the bus was at the
left lane of the road overtaking the vehicle/s at the right. This
the site [Exhibit "I"] and the pictures taken as reflective of the
overtaking the bus from the right came from the right shoulder of
the road, a rough road merely 5 meters in width [Exhibit "F"] and
plaintiff's memorandum] the application of the doctrine of "res ipsa even diminished by two (2) meters because of the encroachment
loquitor."
at the sides [TSN, 11-6-02]. No evidence was shown that the jitney
came from the right shoulder. The jitney then loaded with eggs for
48 | P a g e
Torts 3
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
a situation that the jitney driver would take the right shoulder. The
business or industry.
foregoing suggest the fact that the bus overtook the passing
vehicles at the right lane and in the course thereof, the jitney in
front that was about to negotiate the left lane, was hit.
xxxx
[24]
passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running along the right
lane of the highway from the left lane, the available evidence
readily points to such fact. There were two continuous yellow lines
said area should overtake another on either side of the road. The
employees.
[27]
finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
and Traffic Code), Section 41(e).
[25]
Furthermore, it is observed
[26]
[28]
of
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not
Dimayuga was not only violating the "double yellow center lines"
Dimayuga's employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the
2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, document submitted by petitioner to support the claim of
which provides--
[29]
as the information
pieces of the different eggs and the corresponding price per piece.
[30]
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
and that the cargo of eggs was indeed destroyed, but the actual
xxxx
[31]
Torts 3
[32]
[33]
50 | P a g e
Torts 3
P2 million.
[7]
vacate the same; hence, their lease on said units is deemed still
[8]
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
pointing out that the fire was a fortuitous event for which they could
Decision
[1]
[9]
[2]
[10]
Court (Branch 221), Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-95-
23118.
[3]
1)
2)
the Belfranlt building for the period from October 1994 until
the end of the two year lease contract on May 10, 1996 by
way of Actual and Compensatory damages;
0.5
0.6
3)
[4]
until the end of the two year lease contract on May 10,
[5]
period from October 1994 until the time the vacated leased
areas were occupied by new tenants;
5)
6)
7)
[6]
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent wrote petitioners another letter, reiterating its claim for
reparation, this time estimated by professionals to be no less than
51 | P a g e
Torts 3
[16]
[17]
or an act of man,
to
[12]
[13]
[18]
[19]
In the present case, it was fire that caused the damage to the units
The honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the fire
II
[20]
The RTC saw differently, holding that the proximate cause of the
III
the fire was not due to a fortuitous event but rather was due to an
damage as alleged.
[14]
[15]
Torts 3
2 and Exh. P-3 and the testimony of Fireman Sitchon that are
flawed, there is virtually no evidence left that the cause of the fire
burned premises but the object evidence itself. Defendants did not
[23]
making him
[24]
[21]
CA.
(Citations omitted)
The records disclose that the metal base of a heating device which purely factual matter which we cannot pass upon,
[25]
lest we
retrieved from the stockroom where the fire originated. The metal
[26]
and utensils.
[27]
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
reasons, however, they did not present the airpot to disprove the
existence of the coffee percolator. The fire did not raze the entire
third floor and the objects therein. Even the stack of highly
combustible paper on the third floor was not totally gutted by the
[28]
xxxx
The exceptions do not obtain in the present case. In fact, the
The defense that the fire was a fortuitous event is untenable. It is
identify and testify on Exh. P-2 and Exh. P-3 because, although
[22]
[29]
[30]
Petitioners impugn both findings. They claim that the BFP field
guard on duty at the time of fire; and Dr. Zenaida Arcilla, manager
the testimony of Fireman Gerardo Sitchon (Fireman Sitchon) of the of CAPP, before he prepared Exh. P-2 and Exh. P-3.
[31]
Hence,
53 | P a g e
Torts 3
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
the fire incident, Exh. P-2 and Exh. P-3, which he prepared
is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be
[39]
that of Ronald Estanislao whose official duty it was to report on the reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be
incident, are exceptions to the hearsay rule because these are
[32]
[33]
[40]
Without a
[41]
[34]
SO ORDERED.
[35]
to sustain an allegation
[36]
[37]
It was all up to
[38]
Torts 3
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to
AND MARIA J. JUEGO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
SO ORDERED.
the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating
that:
D.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in
following grounds:
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while
victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso
wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain
block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing
the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the
construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2)
[3]
the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an
the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose exception to the hearsay rule.
of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of
the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.
[1]
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are
[4]
learned.
[5]
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general
Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well
55 | P a g e
Torts 3
as oral statements.
[6]
[7]
[9]
among
stated.
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,
[10]
that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was
effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section
the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official
record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites.
The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in
question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The
of Appeals,
[11]
officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial
court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and
Torts 3
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of
very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for
with negligence.
record.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not
PO3 Villanueva.
that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 defendant's want of care.
Villanueva had seen Juego's remains at the morgue,
[12]
[21]
making the
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e.,
ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
[13]
incident
[15]
[14]
[22]
He observed that
[16]
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that
PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
the chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
bolt.
[17]
testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such
exceptions,
admissible.
[18]
[19]
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect
is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
[20]
Torts 3
[25]
presumed or inferred
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then
of the accident.
[23]
[26]
[27]
It is not
of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for
the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent failed
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.
testify thereon.
by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in
that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than
present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
[29]
Petitioner, therefore,
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
appellant's negligence arises. x x x.
[24]
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or
inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and
husband."
Torts 3
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but
[Underscoring supplied.]
case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having
motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said
injury x x x.
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in
full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion
the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
[30]
to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they
which involved set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's
of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x
in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining,
x.
the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
sought relief from this Court.
[31]
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
Torts 3
investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may
[34]
[33]
[32]
Vda. Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a
claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained
death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke
additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We
a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen's
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code
received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will
make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca
ruling.
[35]
Here, the CA held that private respondent's case came under the
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner's
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the
elementary school for her educational attainment; that she did not
husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover
[36]
that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the
exception in Floresca:
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been
knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for
said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor's
Torts 3
contentions.
available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the
benefits from the ECC.
the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election
acts as a bar.
[37]
[41]
otherwise,
now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue
trial court.
[38]
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts
that led to her husband's death and the rights pertaining to a
choice of remedies?
a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for
the other.
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds
no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that
misapprehension of fact.
1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC.
The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
evidence.
[40]
61 | P a g e
Torts 3
[42]
[43]
62 | P a g e
Torts 3
[7]
prompting
the petitioner to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
[8]
[2]
In this
[3]
and in
[4]
impliedly instituted. It is via the latter type of action that the heirs
of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged
1991.
of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day
noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor
were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to
her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed
[11]
[13]
operation."
[5]
Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded
as scheduled.
[15]
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister
and two aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia
follows:
underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not
passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to
buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St.
under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby
Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant
into the operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the
[6]
Torts 3
snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the
clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was (sic) said
surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it
as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
was open (sic) and surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality
thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a public document was not
condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed
oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with
the operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to
Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen proceed with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died
as soon as it arrived.
[16]
the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the
reason why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo
further examined.
[17]
City District Hospital. As such, the surgeon should answer for such
Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other
relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only
be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the
operation."
[18]
[23]
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was
wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo
abdominal incision.
[19]
[24]
And likewise
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the
her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help room? Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the
save the patient.
[20]
[21]
to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has
cause.
[22]
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood
blood for the patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked
to procure more type "A" blood, but such was not anymore
during the operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was
available from the source; that the oxygen given to the patient was
empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver
that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz
of the petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital
Torts 3
[28]
Further,
before going into the first surgery, which was not emergency in
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was
in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of
showing that these were done. The petitioner just appears to have
possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court
exercised.
[29]
prepare the patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the
operation. Moreover, she did not prepare a medical chart with
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the
instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these, proof thereof
should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are
[25]
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or
[30]
[26]
In the recent
[27]
this
[31]
Expert
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.
[32]
This
has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
Torts 3
A.
sir.
There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel,
read: Uterus, pear-shaped and pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0 cm,
imprudence.
the raw surfaces patched with clotted blood. Surgical sutures were
noted on the operative site.
[34]
[33]
In Chan Lugay v.
stomach empty.
ordinary
[35]
(Underscoring supplied.)
A.
structures namely ovaries which were not present and also sign of
previous surgical operation and there were (sic) clotted blood, sir.
Atty. Cachero:
Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?
Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been
A.
A.
A.
A.
Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place
Yes, sir.
A.
Torts 3
blood.
Atty. Cachero:
Yes, sir."
[37]
(Underscoring supplied.)
A.
Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic
Atty. Pascual:
shock?
A.
[36]
(Underscoring supplied.)
Yes, sir.
A.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped
later on?
A.
Yes, sir.
A.
May be (sic)."
[38]
(Underscoring supplied).
A.
died of non-replacement of blood and so the victim before she died (sic)?
there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation. She died
A.
and this is the reason for the bleeding, sir, which cannot be
(sic) operation?
A.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the
A.
A.
Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any
Torts 3
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could
occurs.
operations (sic)?
anyone, anytime."
A.
He testified further:
possible that the ligature in the suture was (sic) become (sic)
A.
untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or any suture that become (sic)
A.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
loose the cause of the bleeding could not be attributed to the fault
of the subject?
A.
Definitely, sir."
[39]
(Underscoring supplied.)
A.
Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you
According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage
A.
suture a cut blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out
of control; (3) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the
to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect known as DIC.
deceased Lydia Umali looking for the chart, the operated (sic)
by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or
unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie more or less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could have
or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing
the hemorrhage.
[40]
Arizala's testimony:
Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures
were tied by first suturing it and then tying a knot or the tie was
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just
read the chart as well as the other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the
cut structures were not sutured or tied neither were you able to
ATTY. MALVEDA:
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude
COURT:
Torts 3
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A.
[44]
[45]
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and
limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to
render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless
and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her
duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading
thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the
deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the
present time
[46]
69 | P a g e
Torts 3
[6]
examinations and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo
CORTEJO, RESPONDENT.
[7]
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her
Fortune Care card and was referred to an accredited Fortune Care
[8]
CORTEJO, RESPONDENT.
At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the
DECISION
[1]
[2]
[10]
but Dr.
being active,"
and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about
illness is bronchopneumonia.
[15]
[14]
[4]
for one day; a few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to
[5]
After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs,
Torts 3
[17]
Her medical
findings state:
the patient's rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and
has low grade fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the
patient's skin were not "Herman's Rash" and not typical of dengue
fever.
[18]
[19]
His Death
with dengue, she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the
liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and
gave an instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any
oral medication.
[20]
[21]
In a decision
[25]
[22]
Upon being
In ruling that the petitioning doctors were negligent, the RTC found
symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It faulted them for heavily
relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the other
manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed. It held that in
Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results
and he recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), petitioning doctors gathered from his family members, dengue
fever was a reasonably foreseeable illness; yet, the petitioning
to which the respondent consented. Since the ICU was then full,
Dr. Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire a
indicators of dengue.
the last time, checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood
[23]
The RTC also held SJDH solidarity liable with the petitioning
71 | P a g e
Torts 3
the petitioning doctors should not have solely relied on the chest-x-
is based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA opined that the
hospital's power to hire and terminate their services, all fulfill the
The Petitions
SO ORDERED.
RTC's ruling, finding that SJDH and its attending physicians failed
[26]
that: (1)
reasonably ruled out; and (2) dengue fever could have been
detected earlier than 7:30 in the evening of April 23, 1988 because Dr. Miranda also alleged that she exercised prudence in
the symptoms were already evident; and agreed with the RTC that
Torts 3
SJDH cannot still be held solidarity liable under Article 2180 of the
nature.
of pediatrics.
[27]
SJDH likewise faults the CA for ruling that the petitioning doctors
Hemorrhagic Fever."
are its agents, claiming that this theory, aside from being
inconsistent with the CA's finding of employment relationship, is
day fever,
[28]
bacterial infection,
[30]
[29]
manifestations
part.
The Case for the Respondent
the hospital through accreditation; (2) SJDH does not pay the
allow.
patients; SJDH does not fire or terminate their services; and (4)
SJDH does not control or interfere with the manner and the means
payment.
bronchopneumonia.
the: (i) end result; and the (ii) manner and means to be used to
reach this end, and not any kind of control, however significant, in
Torts 3
of its patients. He also pointed out that out of the seven resident
The Issues
Medical Malpractice Suit as a Specialized Area of Tort Law
The case presents to us the following issues:
The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors'
1.
2.
patient.
4.
[33]
an expert witness.
done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient.
[34]
Our Ruling
action.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3)
[35]
[31]
[32]
[37]
[38]
relationship is consensual,
[39]
[40]
Torts 3
[41]
The usual
illustration would be the case of a patient who goes to a hospital or supervision over the latter. As second year resident doctor tasked
a clinic, and is examined and treated by the doctor. In this case,
twice (at around 12:00 and 3:30 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988),
similar circumstances.
and incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with it.
[42]
[46]
patient, and later assured the mother that everything was fine.
to damages.
[43]
[47]
the Court
connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any relationship. It ruled that the relationship was formed because of
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must
be the proximate cause of the injury.
[44]
proximately caused by the physician's negligence when it appears, Likewise, in Wax v. Johnson,
based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the
[48]
negligence played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, "contracts, agrees, undertakes, or otherwise assumes" the
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a
and the patient with whom the doctor had no direct or indirect
negligence.
[45]
contract.
Torts 3
[49]
It is in
[55]
He testified that he
essential to establish not only the professional standards observed because the patient's history showed that Edmer had low breath
in the medical community, but also that the physician's conduct in
the treatment of care falls below such standard.
[50]
basketball.
[57]
and considered.
Both the RTC and the CA relied largely on Dr. Jaudian's expert
care.
stomach pain, fever, and the presence of blood in his saliva are
classic symptoms of dengue fever. According to him, if the patient
patient's rapid breathing; chest and stomach pain; fever; and the
considered;
[51]
present and known to Dr. Casumpang at the time of his first and
[52]
dextrose.
[53]
[54]
statement?
76 | P a g e
Torts 3
xxxx
a correct diagnosis.
[60]
inconclusive.
[61]
blood transfusion and tourniquet tests. These tests came too late,
as proven by: (1) the blood test results that came at about 6:00 in
A: He just nodded his head but he did not take the initiative of "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever" and (2) Dr. Jaudian's testimony that
looking at the throat of my son.
"dengue fever could have been detected earlier than 7:30 in the
A: I also told Dr. Casumpang about his chest pain and also
evident."
[62]
stomach pain.
Q: So what did Dr. Casumpang do after you have narrated all
these complaints of your son?
[63]
a case involving a
medical malpractice suit, the Court ruled that the petitioner doctors
A: Nothing. He also noticed the rapid breathing of my son and were negligent because they failed to immediately order tests to
my son was almost moving because of rapid breathing and confirm the patient's illness. Despite the doctors' suspicion that the
he is swaying in the bed.
breathing?
The Court also ruled that reasonable prudence would have shown
that diabetes and its complications were foreseeable harm.
Court ruled that they failed to comply with their duty to observe the
standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic patients.
We also find it strange why Dr. Casumpang did not even bother to
[64]
Similarly, in Jarcia,
morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer had blood streaks in his sputum.
[59]
stated:
determine the extent of Roy Jr.'s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that they did not
Torts 3
[67]
fluids or dextrose;
[68]
and the medical management (as reflected in the records) did not
[65]
A: Yes, sir.
[66]
and
in the evening that the blood pressure of the patient went down
to .60 palpatory.
Torts 3
supplied]
residents,
testimonies of Dr. Livelo and Dr. Reyes (the radiologist who read
negligent act.
[76]
In Jenkins v. Clark,
sole reason that they did not testify on the standard of care in
dengue cases.
[69]
On the whole, after examining the totality of the adduced evidence, individualized one but of physicians in general in the community. In
we find that the lower courts correctly did not rely on Dr.
skill, care and diligence would not have done under like or similar
ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done under like or
similar conditions or circumstances, and that the inquiry
[70]
They are usually the front line doctors responsible for the first
program,
[71]
[73]
[72]
function under
or of the hospital's
Although she had greater patient exposure, and was' subject to the
[74]
patients,
[75]
Torts 3
besides the patient did not even show any signs of any
she had been briefed about Edmer's condition, his medical history,
and initial diagnosis;
[79]
[83]
Based on her statements we find that Dr. Miranda was not entirely
faultless. Nevertheless, her failure to discern the import of
Edmer's second bleeding does not necessarily amount to
[80]
dengue fever.
Dr. Jaudian 's Professional Competence and Credibility
We note however, that during Edmer's second episode of
bleeding,
[81]
the cause of the blood specimen. Like Dr. Casumpang, she merely before the lower court and before this Court was Dr. Jaudian's
assumed that the blood in Edmer's phlegm was caused by
xxxx
Q: Now, from you knowledge, what does that indicate if the patient
expels a phlegm and blood streak?
[84]
[82]
[Emphasis supplied]
xxxx
TSN, June 17, 1993:
[85]
Q: Now, in the first meeting you had, when that was relayed to you
by the father that Edmer Cortejo had coughed out blood, what
medical action did you take?
[86]
xxxx
Q: So what examination did you specifically conduct to see that
there was no internal bleeding?
A: At that time I did not do anything to determine the cause of
[87]
Torts 3
formal residency training in pediatrics. Nonetheless, both the lower expressed by plaintiffs' doctors, e.g., the immediate need for a
courts found his knowledge acquired through study and practical
related cases.
omitted)
In another case,
[90]
[88]
In Brown v. Sims,
surgical care. In that case, the court held that since negligence
(Emphasis supplied)
[92]
[89]
qualifications:
court explained that "it is the scope of the witness' knowledge and
xxxx
In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is
Torts 3
[96]
medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50 dengue
related cases.
Liability of SJDH
vicariously liable for the petitioning doctors' negligence but also for
its own negligence. He claims that SJDH fell short of its duty of
Adequately Proven
[93]
[94]
petitioning doctors are not its employees but are mere consultants
Furthermore, as Dr. Jaudian testified, with adequate intensive
care, the mortality rate of dengue fever should fall to less than
2%. Hence, the survival of the patient is directly related to early
and proper management of the illness.
[95]
end.
[97]
82 | P a g e
Torts 3
[101]
and performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their
agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make
[98]
at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors: first, the
apparent authority."
[99]
a. Hospital's manifestations
independent contractor:
Therefore, we hold that, under the doctrine of apparent authority, a representations to the patient that the physician or independent
contractor is an employee of the hospital; representation may be
hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the
[102]
follows:
a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in
that:
Torts 3
contractor.
could properly assume that the treating doctors and staff of the
hospital were acting on its behalf.
In this case, the court considered the act of the hospital of holding
care and treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr.
Casumpang, not only as an accredited member of Fortune
b. Patient's reliance
[104]
determining the patient's reliance is: whether the plaintiff is seeking Care) did not affect SJDH's liability. The only effect of the
care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff is looking to the
hospital merely as a place for his/her personal physician to provide physician is limited only to physicians who are accredited with
medical care.
[105]
Fortune Care. Thus, her use of health care plan in this case only
limited the choice of doctors (or coverage of services, amount etc.)
that he/she relied upon the hospital to provide care and treatment,
rather than upon a specific physician. In this case, we shall limit
Casumpang, in view of our finding that Dr. Miranda is not liable for
negligence.
computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The
Court AFFIRMS the rest of the Decision dated October 29, 2004
SO ORDERED.
testimony during trial showed that he and his wife did not know
any doctors at SJDH; they also did not know that Dr.
Casumpang was an independent contractor. They brought their
son to SJDH for diagnosis because of their family doctor's referral.
The referral did not specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or even to
Dr. Miranda, but to SJDH.
Significantly, the respondent had relied on SJDH's representation
of Dr. Casumpang's authority. To recall, when Mrs. Cortejo
presented her Fortune Care card, she was initially referred to the
Fortune Care coordinator, who was then out of town. She was
thereafter referred to Dr. Casumpang, who is also accredited with
Fortune Care. In both instances, SJDH through its agent failed to
advise Mrs. Cortejo that Dr. Casumpang is an independent
84 | P a g e
Torts 3
lower right side, had also extended to her lower left side. Lilian
abruptly developed an acute surgical abdomen.
On July 15, 1999, Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory
laparotomy on Lilian because of the findings on her abdomen and
BRION, J.:
Carlos Borromeo lost his wife Lillian when she died after
the laparotomy.
[1]
April 10, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil
[2]
medical negligence.
was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her
blood pressure was low. After assessing her condition, he ordered
Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to monitor
Lilian's condition. Subsequently, a nurse informed him that Lilian
On July 13, 1999, the petitioner brought his wife to the Family
the lower stomach area and fever for two days. She was admitted
transfusion.
compensate for the lack of circulating oxygen in her body from the
deteriorate.
Torts 3
the clotting factors in the blood. However, Dr. Inso did not have the that time. There was an opening on that repair site. Meaning it was
luxury to conduct further tests because the immediate need was to
not repaired. There were also at that time clot and unclot blood
resuscitate Lilian.
found adherent thereon. The liver and the rest of the visceral
organs were noted exhibit [sic] some degree of pallor but were
(CPR) on Lilian. Dr. Inso also informed her family that there may
500 ml.
Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Family Care did not have
that the bleeding could have been avoided if the site was repaired
another hospital.
[3]
that he found.
At around 3:30 A.M., Dr. Inso personally called the Perpetual Help
Medical Center to arrange Lilian's transfer, but the latter had no
available bed in its ICU. Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with
against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
and his opinion that Lilian's death could have been avoided if Dr.
Inso had repaired the site with double suture rather than a single
suture.
you call peritoneal cavity there were 3,000 ml of clot and unclot
stitches may loosen during the healing process when the initial
from any adhesion. Then, I opened up the head and the brain
swelling subside.
In their defense, Dr. Inso and Family Care presented Dr. Inso, and
valvular leaflets were soft and pliable, and of course, the normal
expert witnesses Dr. Celso Ramos (Dr. Ramos) and Dr. Herminio
supply the heart were normal and unremarkable. Next, the lungs
appears [sic] hemorrhagic. That was the right lung while the left
throughout the entire lengths of the small and large intestine were
Torts 3
On April 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision awarding the
of General Surgeons.
Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes' theory that the 0.5 x 0.5 cm
The RTC relied on Dr. Avila's opinion and gave more weight to Dr.
0.15 cm, a claim that was not refuted by the petitioner. If the 0.5 x
Dr. Inso was negligent in using a single suture on the repair site
have survived for over 16 hours; she would have died immediately, causing Lilian's death by internal hemorrhage. It applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, holding that a patient's death does not
The respondents elevated the case to the CA and the appeal was
because the basic premise of his testimony was that the doctor
who conducted the autopsy is a pathologist of equal or of greater
Dr. Hernandez testified that Lilian's death could not be attributed to expertise than Dr. Ramos or Dr. Hernandez.
the alleged wrong suturing. He submitted that the presence of
blood in the lungs, in the stomach, and in the entire length of the
alleged omission of Dr. Inso to use a double suture and the cause
of Lilian's death. It also found that Dr. Inso did, in fact, use a
double suture ligation with a third silk reinforcement ligation on the
seen by the naked eye; the red cell is even smaller than the tip of
under the control and management of Dr. Inso and the injury that
Dr. Hernandez further testified that the procedure that Dr. Inso
performed was consistent with the usual surgical procedure and
he would not have done anything differently.
[4]
On March 18, 2010, the petitioner filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
appendectomy and were responsible for her death; and (2) that
Torts 3
justice.
In their Comment, the respondents counter: (1) that the issues
raised by the petitioner are not pure questions of law; (2) that they
Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. This is a basic
under similar circumstances by other members of the profession in legal principle that equally applies to civil and criminal cases. In a
good standing; (4) that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable because
medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its
elements, namely: (1) a duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the
defendant's breach of this duty; (3) injury to the patient; and (4)
are not guarantors of care and cannot be held liable for the death
preponderance of evidence.
OUR RULING
[17]
[18]
[19]
facts and it is not our function to analyze and weigh evidence that
the lower courts had already passed upon.
of medicine.
[20]
[5]
[6]
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, below the acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant's failure
[7]
[21]
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
to observe the industry standard caused injury to his patient.
discretion;
[8]
misapprehension of facts;
conflicting;
[10]
[9]
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
and an autopsy
(7) when expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in infectious
[12]
[23]
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court's; (8)
diseases.
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
[11]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Ramos and Dr. Hernandez. On the other hand, the CA did not
a different conclusion.
[16]
Lilian's death contradict those of the RTC, this case falls under one
of the exceptions. The Court will thus give due course to the
Torts 3
year course.
Atty.
Did you call that what you call a post graduate internship?
Witness:Residency.
Atty.
Witness:I did.
Atty.
[24]
After the post graduate internship that was the time you
Atty.
Castro:
Castro:
Since you call that a post graduate, you were not undergo
[26]
His
Witness:Yes, sir.
Atty.
Castro:
Witness:Yes, sir.
Atty.
Witness:Yes, sir.
Atty.
After you took the board examination, did you pursue any
Castro: study?
Witness:During that time, no sir.
You also testified during the last hearing that "page 6 of
Castro:
Atty.
After having conducted over a thousand traumatic autopsies, Dr.
Castro: plaintiff, when did you finish your medical works, and you
answered the following year of your graduation which was
in 1994?
Witness:Yes, sir.
Atty.
Castro:
Castro:
89 | P a g e
Torts 3
Witness:No, sir.
Atty.
Atty.
Fajardo:
Castro:
Atty.
Witness:No, sir.
Atty.
This was the time the year before you took the board
Castro: examination?
now.
Atty.
Castro:
Atty.
Fajardo:
Witness:No, sir.
Atty.
Atty.
Castro: honor.
Fajardo objected on the ground that Dr. Reyes was not an expert
in the field. His testimony was offered to prove that Dr. Inso was
xxxx
expert witness.
Atty.
Castro:
Witness:No, sir.
Atty.
[30]
Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso's
alleged negligence. His testimony could not have established the
Castro:
[27]
Witness:No, sir.
[28]
dwelling and (2) his internship before taking the medical board
exams. This misled the trial court into believing that he was more
qualified to give his opinion on the matter than he actually was.
Perhaps nothing is more telling about Dr. Reyes' lack of expertise
in the subject matter than the petitioner's counsel's own admission
during Dr. Reyes' cross examination.
Atty.
Atty.
During your studies in the medical school, Mr. Witness, do taking the board exams. After obtaining his professional license,
Torts 3
[31]
The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a
[32]
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive: control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not have been
with 27 years of experience as a General Practitioner and 20 years due to any voluntary action or contribution from the injured
[38]
person.
[33]
a.
[34]
[39]
b.
[35]
[40]
c.
operation; and
[36]
Dr. Hernandez affirmed that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the usual
surgical procedure.
[37]
d.
[41]
The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where
the defendant's alleged failure to observe due care is not
immediately apparent to a layman.
[42]
[43]
Torts 3
(2) the fact that Dr. Inso fell short of this expected standard.
Considering further that the respondents established that the
cause of Lilian's uncontrollable bleeding (and, ultimately, her
death) was a medical disorder - Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation we find no reversible errors in the CA's dismissal of
the complaint on appeal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
92 | P a g e
Torts 3
DECISION
[9]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
[10]
third, petitioner
[11]
[1]
In her Answer,
[12]
the morning of July 28, 1994 during her rounds; on July 29, 1994,
[2]
was then
[4]
showed that
vaginal bleeding and her passing out of some meaty mass in the
[13]
failed to do.
[6]
and as a result,
[7]
Commission (PRC).
[8]
Torts 3
1.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION[S]
later than four (4) months and only attributes to two percent (2%)
performed upon her and the result of the Sonogram Test reveals a
morbid fetus but did not specify where the fetus was located.
3.
[15]
[16]
reversing the
REGULATION[S] COMMISSION;
4.
[17]
[18]
In the Decision dated July 4, 2003, the CA held that the Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was an improper
5.
[19]
to the CA, thus, the petition for review of the PRC Decision, filed at
the CA, was improper. The CA further held that should the petition
VOID;
[20]
6.
1959, the CA held that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
[21]
following grounds:
Torts 3
become final thirty days after the date of its promulgation unless
PROFESSIONALS;
7.
may ask for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition for
Petitioner posits that the reason why the Medical Act of 1959
INJURY;
8.
[24]
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when
9.
[25]
nature. The Court has already held that double jeopardy does not
[26]
[22]
resolution or the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from
appeal to the PRC from the decision of the Board. She invokes
Sec. 35. The respondent may appeal the decision of the Board
(Emphasis supplied)
law.
[28]
[27]
[23]
Torts 3
resolution of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse
(Emphasis supplied)
enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from
[35]
serving upon the adverse party a notice of appeal together with the or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
appellant's brief or memorandum on appeal, and paying the
appeal and legal research fees. x x x
[29]
[36]
[37]
ruled that
The law has since been changed, however, at least in the matter
interpretation.
[30]
Words and phrases used in the statute should be should be taken. On August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang
[31]
129 became effective and in its Section 29, conferred on the Court
of Appeals "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
Petitioner also submits that appeals from the decisions of the PRC
should be with the CA, as Rule 43
[32]
[33]
Petitioner
[34]
[39]
(Emphasis supplied)
[40]
injury.
[41]
[42]
In order to
96 | P a g e
Torts 3
[43]
[44]
[45]
Q:
months after the patient was discharged, after the D&C was
[46]
As to this aspect of
[47]
[48]
earlier.
[52]
(Emphases supplied)
Clearly, from the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert
given by him, it is evident that the D&C procedure was not the
Q:
curettage procedure?
A:
[49]
stops bleeding, she feels well, I think you should still have
[50]
[51]
removed?
A:
Atty. Hidalgo:
Q:
There was [sic] some portions of the fetal parts that were
removed?
A:
Torts 3
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
[54]
rightscanty.
And you would not mind checking those scant or those little
Well, the fact that it was described means, I assume that Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
it was checked, `no. It was described as scanty and the
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
are right there before your eyes. It's in front of you. You
produces injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
[55]
Yes, yes, we do that, especially here in Manila because you about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury
know, sometimes a doctor can also be tied-up somewhere
[56]
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of
Medicine:
interpret that comes with practice. And, I see no reason for When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein
not allowing telephone orders unless it is the first time
Q:
But, doctor, do you discharge patients without seeing them? being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
A:
not saying that that is the idle [sic] thing to do, but I think
discharge them the following day. So, I just call and ask our
have seen that patient and I think I have full grasp of her
And, of course before giving that order I ask about how she
feels.
[53]
(Emphases supplied)
[57]
xxx
(Emphases supplied)
there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with
Editha.
[58]
Torts 3
able to satisfy the burden of proving that they had in fact informed
standard medical practice, it is clear that Editha's omission was the Commission,
[67]
copy of the Appeal Memorandum, the Court held that said failure
deprived the petitioner of procedural due process guaranteed by
concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause in the case at bar. The Court finds that the failure of the
of the injury.
[59]
[60]
[61]
Again,
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not
unusual consequences
[68]
Editha's injury was her own omission when she did not return
for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner's orders.
The immediate cause of Editha's injury was her own act; thus, of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2003 in CA-GR SP No.
she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Lastly, petitioner asserts that her right to due process was violated
[62]
Petitioner
SO ORDERED.
[63]
[64]
Also, the
[65]
[66]
respondents did not present any proof that petitioner was served a
copy of the Memorandum on Appeal. Thus, respondents were not
99 | P a g e
Torts 3
[6]
prescribed Spersacet-C
ABBEYGAIL LUCAS AND GILLIAN LUCAS, PETITIONERS, VS. return for follow-up after one week.
DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO, RESPONDENT.
As instructed, Peter went back to Dr. Tuao on 9 September 1988.
DECISION
Upon examination, Dr. Tuao told Peter that the "sore eyes" in the
latter's right eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
[3]
[2]
problem with Peter's right eye, Dr. Tuao prescribed to the former
a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol,
drops per day.
[9]
[8]
[10]
because the EKC in his right eye had already resolved. Dr. Tuao
[11]
[12]
Maxitrol, to be used three (3) times a day for five (5) days; two (2)
times a day for five (5) days; and then just once a day.
[13]
Tuao at his clinic, alleging severe eye pain, feeling as if his eyes
an eye consult.
Upon consultation with Dr. Tuao, Peter narrated that it had been
nine (9) days since the problem with his right eye began; and that
periphery of Peter's right eye was positive for EKC; hence, Dr.
were taken; (3) Peter's eyes were palpated to check the intraocular Tuao prescribed a lower dosage of Blephamide.
pressure of each; (4) the motility of Peter's eyes was observed;
and (5) the ophthalmoscopy
[4]
It was also about this time that Fatima Gladys Lucas (Fatima),
Peter's spouse, read the accompanying literature of Maxitrol and
Torts 3
such steroids:
that Peter already made mention to Dr. Tuao during said visit of
WARNING:
paranoia, even assuring him that the former was taking care of him
(Peter).
visit to Dr. Tuao, Peter continued to suffer pain in his right eye,
vision in his right eye. Fatima observed that Peter's right eye
uncooperative patients.
[15]
xxxx
ADVERSE REACTIONS:
[17]
[16]
tension in Peter's right eye was 39.0 Hg, while that of his left was
[18]
17.0 Hg.
Since the tension in Peter's right eye was way over the
Tuao ordered
instead.
[22]
[19]
Dr.
and Normoglaucon,
in order for the former to closely monitor the pressure of the latter's
Reactions occurring most often from the presence of the anti-
eyes.
yielded a high normal level, i.e., 21.0 Hg. Hence, Dr. Tuao told
fingers,"
[24]
O.D.
[26]
[27]
[25]
for Peter's
right eye.
Secondary bacterial ocular infection following suppression of host
[28]
[14]
spread to the whole of Peter's right eye yet again. Thus, Dr. Tuao
the
[29]
Torts 3
most of the time and was not able to celebrate the season with his
[30]
[37]
[38]
BID
OD in lieu of
[39]
[40]
trabeculoplasty.
Peter's right eye was still quite high at 41.0 Hg, Dr. Tuao was at a
loss as to how to balance the treatment of Peter's EKC vis--vis
I trust that this approach will prove reasonable for you and
Peter.
[31]
Dr.
[41]
then had normal IOP of 21.0 Hg and 17.0 Hg, respectively, Dr.
Tuao still gave him a prescription for Timolol B.I.D. so Peter could
Just two days later, on 2 January 1989, the IOP of Peter's right
sake of the EKC. A month ago, I noted iris atrophy, so I took the
[42]
[43]
of
[44]
in
It seems that the IOP can be controlled only with oral Diamox, and
Peter's eyes, which revealed that the latter had tubular vision
at the moment, the EKC has recurred and I'm in a fix whether to
his right eye, while that of his left eye remained normal. Dr. Tuao
uncontrolled.
[32]
as the tension of the latter's right eye went up even further to 41.0
B.I.D. and D'epifrin were still not available in the market. Again, Dr.
could be monitored.
th
th
[33]
th
Funduscopy
[34]
Zeiss gonioscopy
occasional PAS,
[35]
[36]
OD.
Torts 3
eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told Peter that
ups.
amounts:
In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2) procedures
1.
right eye.
impaired vision.
[45]
Tuao for the same, Peter, joined by: (1) Fatima, his spouse
Abbeygail, his natural child
child
[48]
[47]
2.
; (2)
trial.
complaint for damages against Dr. Tuao, before the RTC, Branch
150, Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-
3.
2482.
In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the
4.
5.
[54]
vision which impairment is not curable and may even lead to total
blindness."
[49]
Dr.
Peter's right eye caused him and his family so much grief.
Because of his present condition, Peter now needed close medical curable, steroids have the side effect of increasing intraocular
pressure. Steroids are prescribed to treat Epidemic Kerato
supervision forever; he had already undergone two (2) laser
surgeries, with the possibility that more surgeries were still needed
in the future; his career in sports casting had suffered and was
continuing to suffer;
[50]
[56]
reduced as a result of his "limited" capacity; he continually suffered continually prescribe the drug Maxitrol which contained steroids for
[57]
any prolonged period" and "[t]he truth was the Maxitrol was
from "headaches, nausea, dizziness, heart palpitations, rashes,
chronic rhinitis, sinusitis,"
[51]
made him highly irritable and sensitive; his mobility and social life
family;
[52]
opportunity for a better life and educational prospects. Collectively, meant that there was no increase in the tension or IOP, a possible
side reaction to the use of steroid medications; and (3) it was only
petitioners lived in constant fear of Peter becoming completely
blind.
[53]
eye, it was determined for the first time that the IOP of the right
But granting for the sake of argument that the "steroid treatment of
103 | P a g e
Torts 3
[59]
Dr. Tuao
argued that:
the contrary, this court cannot accept [petitioners'] claim that the
[Peter's] eye."
[65]
that "Peter Paul must have been suffering from normal tension
x.
to support them."
[60]
No. 68666.
[61]
[62]
[66]
[D]id not present any medical expert to testify that Dr. Tuano's
on Peter's right eye was not proper and that his palpation of
steroid. Peter testified that Dr. Manuel Agulto told him that he
should not have used steroid for the treatment of EKC or that he
[63]
should have used it only for two (2) weeks, as EKC is only a viral
infection which will cure by itself. However, Dr. Agulto was not
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
even a medical doctor to convince and expertly explain to the court personal knowledge, x x x. Familiar and fundamental is the rule
[67]
Like the RTC, the Court of Appeals gave great weight to Dr.
not the latter would react adversely to the use of steroids, that it
was only on December 13, 1989, when Peter complained for the
first time of headache and blurred vision that he observed that the
pressure of the eye of Peter was elevated, and it was only then
[68]
[64]
104 | P a g e
Torts 3
Procedure, as amended.
errors:
[70]
[71]
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE;
II.
III.
[72]
simple eye ailment is a simple case of cause and effect. With mere
[69]
contrary to the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
damage. Therefore, it could be said that the sole issue for our
[Emphasis supplied.]
[73]
[74]
sufficient basis to establish Dr. Tuao's negligence in his treatment and the RTC are in accord with the evidence on record, and we
of Peter's eye condition. This question clearly involves a factual
Torts 3
the drug Maxitrol; "thus, [the latter] should be liable for all the
[75]
Clearly,
actionable malpractice.
professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care,
in order to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance of
for an injury, it must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is
causes";
[81]
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and
[82]
the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four
essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation,
[76]
Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order
to establish the proximate cause [of the injury] by a preponderance
the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician
physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training,
[77]
[83]
Thus, in treating
[78]
Stated
otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same
stems from the former's realization that the latter possess unusual
[84]
testimonies.
[79]
Torts 3
went to see the doctor on 2 September 1988, seeking a consult for unerringly follow prior to prescribing steroid medications.
the treatment of his sore eyes. Admittedly, Dr. Tuao, an
ophthalmologist, prescribed Maxitrol when Peter developed and
In contrast, Dr. Tuao was able to clearly explain that what is only
examination,"
application.
[85]
Peter's glaucoma.
[88]
onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court
all those tests/procedures every time Peter went to see him for
[86]
Unfortunately, in this
We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuao's assertion that when a doctor
sees a patient, he cannot determine immediately whether the latter
would react adversely to the use of steroids; all the doctor can do
mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result
[89]
[90]
eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as
prescribed by Dr. Tuao. Petitioners' failure to prove the first
was justified by the fact that the latter was already using the same
medication when he first came to see Dr. Tuao on 2 September
the required procedure for the prolonged use of Maxitrol. But what
particular drug.
[91]
never monitored the tension of Peter's eyes while the latter was on
whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis and
the contrary.
pecuniary reparation.
Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuao committed negligent acts
Petitioners assert that prior to prescribing Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao
responder."
[87]
Torts 3
plaintiff's injuries.
[92]
that he has been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also
[93]
proof that Peter's glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr.
established.
[98]
Tuao's supposed negligent conduct. Once more, petitioners failed with Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao took the necessary precaution by
in this regard.
palpating Peter's eyes to monitor their IOP every time the latter
went for a check-up, and he employed the best of his knowledge
Dr. Tuao does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk
intraocular vision.
[95]
[96]
C:D
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the
That Dr. Tuao has the necessary training and skill to practice his
[99]
[100]
The
chosen field is beyond cavil. Petitioners do not dispute Dr. Tuao's concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which
qualifications - that he has been a physician for close to a decade
and a half at the time Peter first came to see him; that he has had
in opposition to it;
[101]
the field of ophthalmology, here and abroad; that he is a Diplomate worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. [102]
of the Philippine Board of Ophthalmology; that he occupies various Rule 133, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
teaching posts (at the time of the filing of the present complaint, he guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
was the Chair of the Department of Ophthalmology and an
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
involved lies the court may consider all the facts and
Torts 3
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number.
Herein, the burden of proof was clearly upon petitioners, as
plaintiffs in the lower court, to establish their case by a
preponderance of evidence showing a reasonable connection
between Dr. Tuao's alleged breach of duty and the damage
sustained by Peter's right eye. This, they did not do. In reality,
petitioners' complaint for damages is merely anchored on a
statement in the literature of Maxitrol identifying the risks of its use,
and the purported comment of Dr. Agulto - another doctor not
presented as witness before the RTC - concerning the prolonged
use of Maxitrol for the treatment of EKC.
It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical treatment is a
medical question that should have been presented to experts. If no
standard is established through expert medical witnesses, then
courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of
breach thereof by the physician or surgeon. The RTC and Court of
Appeals, and even this Court, could not be expected to determine
on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a
certain disease or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts
would be dangerously engaging in speculations.
All told, we are hard pressed to find Dr. Tuao liable for any
medical negligence or malpractice where there is no evidence, in
the nature of expert testimony, to establish that in treating Peter,
Dr. Tuao failed to exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill
generally required in medical practice. Dr. Tuao's testimony, that
his treatment of Peter conformed in all respects to standard
medical practice in this locality, stands unrefuted. Consequently,
the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that they had no
basis at all to rule that petitioners were deserving of the various
damages prayed for in their Complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 27
September 2006 and Resolution dated 3 July 2007, both of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
109 | P a g e
Torts 3
petitioner Rogelio already wanted to pull out his wife from the
also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at
RAYMOND RAMOS, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or more than three
DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA
Hosakas arrival. While she held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr.
Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez
KAPUNAN, J.:
Erlindas nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr.
management.
where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her
feet. At this point, Cruz went out of the operating room to express
going well.
She was released from the hospital only four months later or on
1999.
[1]
case for damages against private respondents. After due trial, the
the trial court found that private respondents were negligent in the
operating room.
to private respondents.
At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived so
due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. In the meantime, the patient,
By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not around,
Torts 3
suit.
SPECIALIZATION.
[2]
I
B.2 RESPONDENT DOCTOR PERFECTA GUTIERREZ HAS
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED
SHIP DOCTRINE.
C.
II
D.
III
E.
[3]
DRA. CALDERON
[4]
PETITION;
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE
B.
II
111 | P a g e
Torts 3
3.
GUTIERREZ
[8]
III
We shall first resolve the issue pertaining to private respondent Dr.
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING
negligent and in holding that it was the faulty intubation which was
IV
patient and not a dead one; 2) That the patient had a cardiac
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN INCREASING
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS.
arrest; and 3) That the patient was revived from that cardiac
[9]
[5]
arrest.
successful.
and Gutierrez. They then filed their respective second motions for
Unfortunately, Dr. Gutierrez claim of lack of negligence on her part
Petition-in-Intervention contending in the main that this Court erred is belied by the records of the case. It has been sufficiently
in holding private respondent Dr. Hosaka liable under the captain
[6]
The
[7]
On March 19, 2001, the Court heard the oral arguments of the
were the amicii curiae: Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., Consultant of the anesthesia plan and acquainting the patient or the responsible
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, former Director of the Philippine
patient who may not have, who may have some mental handicaps
Camagay, President of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists, of the proposed plans. We do pre-operative evaluation because
Inc. and Professor and Vice-Chair for Research, Department of
University of the Philippines; and Dr. Lydia M. Egay, Professor and opportunity to alleviate anxiety, explain techniques and risks to the
Vice-Chair for Academics, Department of Anesthesiology, College
proceed with the plan. And lastly, once this has been agreed upon
Philippines.
follows:
2.
GUTIERREZ (ANESTHESIOLOGIST) IS
patient. There are needs for special care after surgery and if it so
Torts 3
Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
we ask for a cardio-pulmonary clearance it is not in fact to tell them before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
if this patient is going to be fit for anesthesia, the decision to give
anesthesiologist.
[10]
[16]
finding that it was the faulty intubation on Erlinda that caused her
with.
[11]
her. Even the counsel of Dr. Gutierrez admitted to this fact during
CHIEF JUSTICE:
[12]
ATTY. GANA:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
[13]
saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, one
hour before the scheduled operation. She auscultated
[14]
the
ATTY. GANA:
patients heart and lungs and checked the latters blood pressure
to determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation.
[15]
However,
she did not proceed to examine the patients airway. Had she
procedure.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or preoperative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of
the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the
ATTY. GANA:
Torts 3
CHIEF JUSTICE:
the particular cell, the mass cell, and the mass cell secretes this
histamine. In a way it is some form of response to take away that
which is not mine, which is not part of the body. So, histamine has
multiple effects on the body. So, one of the effects as you will see
you will have redness, if you have an allergy you will have tearing
of the eyes, you will have swelling, very crucial swelling sometimes
ATTY. GANA:
of the larynges which is your voice box main airway, that swelling
may be enough to obstruct the entry of air to the trachea and you
It was a consequence of the well, (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
projector. And then you have the smaller airways, the bronchi and
An acts performed by her, is that not correct?
then eventually into the mass of the lungs you have the bronchus.
The difference is that these tubes have also in their walls muscles
and this particular kind of muscles is smooth muscle so, when
ATTY. GANA:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
have decrease blood supply to the brain and may collapse so, you
may have people who have this.
Thank you.
[17]
[20]
Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda) was under the latters care. Dr.
court.
[21]
[18]
suffering from cardiac arrest. Dr. Gutierrez faults the Court for
their complications.
[19]
12:15 Patient was inducted with sodium pentothal 2.5% (250 mg)
p.m.
Torts 3
DR. GUTIERREZ
Yes.
inserted?
There were two attempts. In the first attempt was the tube
did a first attempt and the question was did you withdraw
the tube? And you said you never withdrew the tube, is
that right?
Yes.
Yes. And so if you never withdrew the tube then there was
chart).
Patient was transferred to ICU for further management.
cyanosis occur?
withdrawal (extubation) of the tube. And the fact that the cyanosis
allegedly disappeared after pure oxygen was supplied through the
tube proved that it was properly placed.
The Court has reservations on giving evidentiary weight to the
(sic)
that you probably get the patient out of the operating room
was made only after Erlinda was taken out of the operating room.
anesthesia record?
DR. ESTRELLA
Q.
115 | P a g e
Torts 3
not keeping him relax. So, my first attempt when I put the
laryngoscope on I saw the trachea was deeply interiorly.
So, what I did ask mahirap ata ito ah. So, I removed the
The first medication, no, first the patient was oxygenated for
Yes.
the pentothal very slowly and that was around one minute.
Yes.
And at that point, you made a remark, what remark did you
make?
12:18?
I said mahirap ata ito when the first attempt I did not see
the trachea right away. That was when I (interrupted)
Yes.
manipulation?
After that relaxant, how long do you wait before you do any
Maybe.
12:19. And at that time, what would have been done to this
I did not say mali ata ang pinasukan I never said that.
patient?
116 | P a g e
Torts 3
Well, just for the information of the group here the remarks I
am making is based on the documents that were forwarded
Not yet.
Ah, you did not have time, why did you not have time?
At what point?
So, when you claim that at the first attempt you inserted the
Yes, Sir.
laryngoscope, right?
Yes.
Yes.
And that is after induction 12:15 that is 12:25 that was the
first cyanosis?
Yes.
We cannot (interrupted)
117 | P a g e
Torts 3
[23]
that the injury to the patient therein was one which does not
light of her admission that it does not fully reflect the events that
the absence of oxygen supply for four (4) to five (5) minutes that
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
[29]
been exercised.
For his part, Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in
appearances and manifest conditions which are observable by any finding him negligent as a surgeon by applying the Captain-of-the[30]
[24]
Ship doctrine. Dr. Hosaka argues that the trend in United States
one. Cruz, Erlindas sister-in-law, was with her inside the
operating room. Moreover, being a nurse and Dean of the Capitol
[25]
[26]
[31]
do not always have the right to control all personnel within the
operating room,
[32]
[33]
surgeon could not be held liable for the loss of the patients voice,
considering that the surgeon did not have a hand in the intubation
the-Ship Doctrine, citing the fact that the field of medicine has
[28]
[27]
In Voss vs.
inserted the endotracheal tube into the patients throat was held
[35]
Torts 3
the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will
ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual
circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the
more than three (3) hours late for the scheduled operation. The
cholecystectomy was set for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 a.m., but he
performed on Erlinda.
on the same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at
the Sta. Teresita Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda was
[36]
[40]
Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the anxiety
that she must have been feeling at the time. It could be safely said
Erlinda.
[37]
[41]
DR. CAMAGAY:
[38]
and that one does not exercise control over the other, they were
That they were working as a medical team is evident from the fact
patient by Dr. Gutierrez, and while doing so, he observed that the
patients nails had become dusky and had to call Dr. Gutierrezs
attention thereto. The Court also notes that the counsel for Dr.
[39]
in
[42]
CHIEF JUSTICE:
the course of the treatment. The duties of Dr. Hosaka and those
of Dr. Gutierrez in the treatment of petitioner Erlinda are therefore
119 | P a g e
Torts 3
Two other points. The first, Doctor, you were talking about
anxiety, would you consider a patient's stay on the operating table
DR. CAMAGAY:
And care.
DR. CAMAGAY:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Yes.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
DR. CAMAGAY:
the case, three hours waiting and the patient was already on the
[43]
greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill,
[44]
the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone
his due.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Anent private respondent DLSMCs liability for the resulting injury
Would you therefore conclude that the surgeon contributed to the
DR. CAMAGAY:
[45]
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control
source of anxiety and most operating tables are very narrow and
that patients are usually at risk of falling on the floor so there are
restraints that are placed on them and they are never, never left
exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill
injury.
[46]
time?
It has been consistently held that in determining whether an
DR. CAMAGAY:
of services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire;
and (4) the power to control not only the end to be achieved, but
[47]
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Courtesy.
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the
services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and grants
120 | P a g e
Torts 3
patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such
she possesses the necessary qualifications, such as accreditation
references.
[48]
[49]
DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her
hospital.
[50]
treatment.
[51]
survives.
DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC
[53]
this manner:
of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can
arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
committee's recommendation.
[52]
incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would
patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services cover two distinct phases.
121 | P a g e
Torts 3
(d)
(e)
SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only homebased nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in
that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for
compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at
the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the
interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages
would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one
in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should
not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard
care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less
would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award
of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
[54]
[55]
(b)
Torts 3
waking up at the ICU on May 30, 2003, he found out that the
JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
[2]
[1]
[4]
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who
digesting his food; that he was frequently fed every two hours
because he easily got full; that he had fresh blood stools every
time he moved his bowel; that he had lost his appetite and had
The Antecedents
gastric acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he was in
good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He
[5]
In his Complaint-Affidavit
asserted that at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was still
weak, tired and in pain.
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to
He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he did not
confer with Dr. Cruz and review his medical history which was
Cruz were completely successful considering that the latter did not
the procedures and that his vital signs were normal throughout the
procedure.
[6]
be found; and that his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon
Torts 3
[7]
only the inner lining of the colon is within the view of the
colonoscope (camera).
Aggrieved, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for review with the Department
of Justice (DOJ) but the same was dismissed in its March 2, 2007
a nurse at SLMC, both swearing under oath that Dr. Agas was not
[8]
[9]
Committee which stated that Dr. Cruz was given an adequate and
reasonable standard of care; that Dr. Agas followed all
Not satisfied, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
properly.
accordance with law and that his alleged negligence was not
The CA also declared that Dr. Cruz failed to state in his Complaint- PROCESS.
Affidavit the specific procedures that Dr. Agas failed to do which a
in Preliminary Investigations
suffered by Dr. Cruz was not caused by his negligence or was the
The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the
complainant and not from any negligent act in connection with the
within my control. That the tear in the serosa (the outermost layer
the peritoneal lining of each loop detached from the serosa during
the procedure. It is not possible to detect the presence of marked
Torts 3
In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his purported
cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious
Malpractice.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present
solid proof that the doctor, like in this case, either failed to do
of his sigmoid colon which was beyond his control considering that
something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or the said condition could not be detected before a colonoscopic
that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not
have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
petitioner's injury, i.e., tear in the serosa of sigmoid colon, and the
Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.
[10]
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or
procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that
Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there
the colon.
[13]
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie
case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
[11]
explanation.
[12]
125 | P a g e
Torts 3
P4,500.
Rosit went to Cebu on February 19, 1999, still suffering from pain
and could hardly open his mouth.
DECISION
In Cebu, Dr. Pangan removed the plate and screws thus installed
VELASCO JR., J.:
by Dr. Gestuvo and replaced them with smaller titanium plate and
screws. Dr. Pangan also extracted Rosit's molar that was hit with a
The Case
screw and some bone fragments. Three days after the operation,
Rosit was able to eat and speak well and could open and close his
This is a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing mouth normally.[7]
[1]
the Decision and Resolution dated January 22, 2013 and
November 7, 2013,
[2]
[3]
reimburse him for the cost of the operation and the expenses he
of incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as for the
P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the removal of the
plate and screws that Dr. Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to
pay.
[8]
Gestuvo).
Thus, Rosit filed a civil case for damages and attorney's fees with
Factual Antecedents
the RTC against Dr. Gestuvo and DDH, the suit docketed as Civil
Case No. 27,354-99.
(DDH) showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then referred to
Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries,
[4]
who, on January
The RTC freed DDH from liability on the ground that it exercised
the proper diligence in the selection and supervision of Dr.
Gestuvo, but adjudged Dr. Gestuvo negligent and ruled, thus:
the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that
there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not
[5]
his mouth and was in pain. X-rays done on Rosit two (2) days after
the operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was aligned but
the screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray
[6]
Alleging that the dentist told him that the operation conducted on
his mandible was improperly done, Rosit went back to Dr. Gestuvo
to demand a loan to defray the cost of the additional operation as
well as the expenses of the trip to Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo gave Rosit
Torts 3
[9]
negligence case and the elements required for its prosecution, viz:
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court applied the res ipsa loquitur principle
holding that "the need for expert, medical testimony may be
negligence."
doctrine is applicable
Unlike the RTC, the CA ruled that the res ipsa loquitur principle is
[10]
gave credence to Dr. Pangan's letter stating the opinion that Dr.
provides an exception.
The ultimate issue for our resolution is whether the appellate court
within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified
Torts 3
Clearly, had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of
screws and placed the same in the proper locations, these would
not have struck Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring him to
removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was
Dr. Gestuvo knew that the screws he used on Rosit were too large
trial that common sense dictated that the smallest screws available
We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
not avail of such items and went ahead with the larger screws and
merely sawed them off. Even assuming that the screws were
that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
already at the proper length after Dr. Gestuvo cut the same, it is
exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered
[14]
[15]
Yet, he did
[12]
In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit's molar because it was
too long or improperly placed, both facts are the product of Dr.
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine on the ground that the
would know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less
and that there is no proof that the molar Dr. Pangan removed is
the same molar that was hit by the screw installed by Dr. Gestuvo
Anent the second element for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
having Dr. Pangan operate on him during the healing period of his
[13]
that the screw that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar.
Lastly, the third element that the injury suffered must not have
that one of the screws installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. It
was for this issue that Dr. Gestuvo himself referred Rosit to Dr.
eventually operated on by Dr. Pangan. Dr. Gestuvo cannot now go establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
back and say that Dr. Pangan treated a molar different from that
which was affected by the first operation.
Torts 3
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by
higher price.
[16]
Court
First, Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit the
risks of using the larger screws for the operation. This was his
obligation as the physician undertaking the operation.
screws are not appropriate for the operation and that an additional
operation replacing the screws might be required to replace the
Li v. Soliman
Third, had Rosit been informed that there was a risk that the larger
Dr. Gestuvo.
who stated the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross
negligence in his emergency management of Mr. Rosit's fractured
mandible.
[18]
Torts 3
[19]
the Court reiterated the oft-repeated To recall, from the time he was negligently operated upon by Dr.
Gestuvo until three (3) days from the corrective surgery performed
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand." Here, Dr. Pangan
never took the witness stand to affirm the contents of his affidavit.
pain and could not properly use his jaw to speak or eat.
The trial court also properly awarded attorney's fees and costs of
[23]
damages.
[20]
affirmed. In Mendoza,
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the example or correction only in addition, among others, to
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and
his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any
other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
of an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the
The three (3) requisites are met. Dr. Gestuvo's actions are clearly
negligence or not will not bind the Court. The Court must weigh
and examine such testimony and decide for itself the merits
the doctrine of informed consent. Dr. Gestuvo had the duty to fully
thereof.
explain to Rosit the risks of using large screws for the operation.
More importantly, he concealed the correct medical procedure of
consent.
Damages
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision
For the foregoing, the trial court properly awarded Rosit actual
Spouses Gomez,
[21]
SO ORDERED.
[22]
Torts 3
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said
pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and
physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court
anus.
[1]
Contrary to law.
[2]
with
[14]
[3]
[15]
where it
[4]
[5]
Dr. Leandro
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr.
Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
[16]
decreeing:
[8]
[10]
[9]
[7]
[6]
During the
but he regained
[11]
[12]
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional
[13]
an information solely against Dr. Solidum, alleging:
liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
[17]
SO ORDERED.
[18]
Torts 3
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10)
suffered by him.
[19]
act complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the
hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a
trial court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of
Decision of the CA
[20]
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal
cases. Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it need
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit
to undergo a major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused
court is affirmed.
that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his
imperforate anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other
[21]
SO ORDERED.
was not a hint that the nature of the operation itself was a
[22]
to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court
teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient
if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR
drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When
Torts 3
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
[24]
[25]
III.
[27]
[28]
[23]
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a)
herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal
negligence.
Applicability of the
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the
injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
transaction speaks for itself. The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to
that where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not
133 | P a g e
Torts 3
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and
was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
[29]
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while
exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient,
being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur
all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the
of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the
supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate,
Torts 3
operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the
patient.
[30]
[31]
being as follows:
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall
Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham
examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's air passage
the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a
second time to advise the doctor that the patient was not
[32]
[33]
the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient
died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient
died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a
sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the
minutes prior to death. He did not know what caused the air
xxxx
Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself
Torts 3
administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational concentration of the agent during the operation.
agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated with 100%
oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was given. However,
the patient did not respond until no cardiac rate can be auscultated anesthesia record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so to
and the surgeons were immediately told to stop the operation.
speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the
The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
proceed to the closure and the childs vital signs throughout and
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that
the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of
xxxx
testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described the
agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100%
[34]
happened.
assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never
leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the
call of nature but leaving behind the other members of his team
[35]
that:
Torts 3
or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered
by the patient.
[36]
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as
has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with
of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in
xxxx
[37]
must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must
experts.
[38]
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In
injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create court on what standard of care was applicable. It would
a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty
[39]
patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum,
[40]
to wit:
137 | P a g e
Torts 3
doctor?
patient, at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto- A
FISCAL
CABARON
of a person?
WITNESS
xxxx
Q
FISCAL
CABARON
Agent?
WITNESS
[41]
WITNESS
correct?
CABARON
A
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3,
WITNESS
100%?
Torts 3
WITNESS
correct?
A
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100,
1-0-0 and if there is, you just call me and even the
Yes, sir.
is that correct?
A
[42]
WITNESS
no?
there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may
we request also temporarily, because this is just a
[43]
[44]
anesthetic medications.
taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr.
1-A.
[45]
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you
WITNESS
Yes, sir.
occur.
[46]
that correct?
WITNESS
Youthsey:
[47]
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted
Torts 3
weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be
the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead
you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability
immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now find
and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have
been established here do not present the factual and legal bases
for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant
was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the
work.
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest
[50]
[49]
However, Ospital ng
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil
liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
to that arising from the offense charged.
[48]
It is puzzling, therefore,
how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila
SO ORDERED.
jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages
despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial
entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered
their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns
that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then,
to express the following observations for the instruction of the
Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been
140 | P a g e