In the Case they Say China

Says No To The Plan

1) Extend our Inherency card from the 1AC Ali and
Rajagopalan 16. It Proves China wants this reduction
now and views it as a bigger threat
2) Ending Missions key concession
RT 16
US provocations may force China to declare air defense zone in S. China Sea
report
Published by RT.Com; 1 Jun, 2016 (https://www.rt.com/news/345026-airdefense-china-sea/)

Beijing has called the US involvement in the dispute the greatest threat to
the region. Chinese dredging vessels are purportedly seen in the waters
around Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea
in this still image from video taken by a P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft
provided by the United States Navy May 21, 2015. U.S. NavyChina
scrambles fighter jets, warships after US destroyer sails near disputed reef
We urge them to stop stirring up a storm in a teacup and stop sowing seeds
of discord so as to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, which
conforms to the common interests of all parties, Yang Yujun, spokesman for
the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said at a briefing, China Military
Online reported. Last month Beijing asked the US to stop its surveillance
activities near China after two of its fighter jets carried out what the Pentagon
labeled an "unsafe" intercept of a US military reconnaissance aircraft over the
South China Sea. The incident added fuel to the fire in the already tense
relations between the two countries. What needs to be pointed out is that
the US always likes to distort facts and draw media attention to the distance
between the military aircraft of the two sides. But in essence, the root cause
for security hazards and potential accidents in the air and at sea between
China and the US is the long term, large-scale and frequent close-in
reconnaissance activities against China by the US military vessels and
aircraft, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman said.

3) Their card generic, our evidence is specific

3) China accepting US Hegemony now Theyll cooperate

with us if we return the favor
Sisci, 15
China's New International Mindset? by Francesco Sisci January 4, 2015 at 5:00
am (http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5004/china-us-leadership)

China's political mindset about international politics is at a turning point , one

that could mark the beginning of a new role for China in global affairs. On
December 27, 2014, the Chinese press reported a speech by Vice Premier
Wang Yang, entitled, "The United States is the guide of the world; China is
willing to join this system." In the text, Wang Yang reportedly said, "China and
United States are global economic partners, but America is the guide of the
world. America already has the leading system and its rules; China is willing
to join the system and respect those rules and hopes to play a constructive
role." These statements mark a stark contrast from the times when China
seemed extremely suspicious of America's hegemonic role in the world.
Implicitly, China now appears to admit that America has the leading role in
the world and to be willing to work with it . It is a change, it may have many
implications; at least for now it is in a positive direction. The speech does not
give any explanation for the dramatic change of heart by the Chinese
leadership; it is not clear, in fact, what brought it about. However, it is clear
that, after the recent successful meeting between presidents Barack Obama
and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in Beijing, this is the next step. At the
APEC meeting, the two sides agreed on a number of issues that had been
pretty irksome in previous years. In many ways, after many years of strong
distrust, the meeting between might have succeeded in turning a new leaf in
bilateral relations. This change goes beyond the idea floated some years ago
of a "G2" (a US-China special relationship). The G2 idea was based on faulty
thinking: of U.S.-Chinese ties as isolated from the rest of the world. This time,
the concept is more comprehensive, and in many ways reassuring, because it
accepts US leadership for both the U.S. and for the many countries that
feared being left out of the new strong bond between Washington and Beijing.

Advantage A2s
US Presence not working now
Klinger 15
Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot? By Bruce D. Klingner, Senior
Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for
two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency. Published by the Heritage Foundation
(http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essaysanalysis/rebalancing-pacific-asia-pivot-divot/)

Asian allies, initially heartened by the renewed U.S. focus on the region,
continue to express concern about Chinas unrelenting assertiveness in
pushing extralegal sovereignty claims on their territories. The weak U.S.
response to Beijings bullying led the Philippines, one of just a handful of
American treaty allies, effectively to cede its claims to the Scarborough
Shoals. Consequently, an increasingly nervous Tokyo has called repeatedly for
stronger U.S. support to deter similar Chinese intimidation against the
Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. South Korea and Japan watched with
growing dismay as Washington first cut $480 billion from the long-term
military budget only to warn then of the catastrophic consequences that
sequestration would have for U.S. armed forces. Yet when the sequester hit,
slicing an additional $500 billion, Washington claimed that it could still fulfill
American security commitments, though admittedly with additional but
acceptable risk.40 Seoul and Tokyo were flummoxed when Syrian President
Assad crossed the U.S. redline against using chemical weapons against
civilians and President Obama refused to implement the pledged military
response. These allies have privately expressed fears that Washington might
similarly abandon its defense commitments to them if North Korea or China
attacked. In early 2013, North Korea ratcheted up tensions by threatening nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea, abrogating
the armistice ending the Korean War and nullifying all inter-Korean nonaggression pacts. Initially, the United States demonstrated resolve,
augmenting forces committed to an annual bilateral military exercise with South Korea. However, Secretary of State Kerry soon revealed that
as the crisis continued, the Obama Administration had elected to change course in the face of North Korean threats. Kerry stated during a
press conference in Seoul that President Obama [had] ordered a number of exercises not to be undertaken. We have lowered our rhetoric
significantly.41 Rather than standing up to blatant belligerence, the United States stepped back, citing the potential for conflict escalation on
the Korean peninsula as its primary concern. Secretary Kerry explained, Lets face it. Everyone here knows this, weve got enough problems
to deal with around the world.42 One can only imagine the glee in Pyongyang and the trepidation in Seoul at the U.S.s prioritizing other
regions over defending our Korean ally, in addition to the pall cast over the initial optimism accompanying announcement of the United States
return to Pacific affairs. Finally, Russias military incursion into Crimea and subsequent U.S. affirmation of support to European NATO nations
triggered yet more concerns of a reverse Asia Pivot. U.S. officials were dispatched to provide reassurance once again to both European and
Asian allies. But the ease with which Putin annexed Crimea and the U.S. inability to prevent it from happening heightened anxiety that China
could be emboldened to try a similar seizure in the Pacific. Opponents Have Not Moderated Behavior. Despite an uptick in meetings in Asiaa

the United States has failed to temper Chinese

and North Korean belligerence. In recent years, Beijing has used military and
economic threats, bombastic language, and military bullying to extend its
extralegal claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In
November 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
over the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, and threatened to
case of substituting wingtip shoes for soldiers boots

use its military to enforce it. Washington condemned the declaration as a

provocative act that exacerbated tensions in the region and increased the
risks of a military clash. However, U.S. protests and those of other countries
in the region have had marginal effect as China continues to maintain the
ADIZ.

China will adjust their rise to cooperate

Ikenberry 15
JOHN IKENBERRY is a professor at Princeton University. Between the Eagle
and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia, in
Political Science Quarterly 2015,
http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/between_the_eagle_an
d_the_dragon.pdf
The second source of restraint on balance of power dynamics involves
Chinas strategic dilemma. If Chinas foreign policy toward the region gets too
aggressive and belligerent, it will generate a backlash. This is the classic
problem of a rising great power. Through economic growth and military modernization, China is
getting more powerful. Because it is such a large country, it is becoming more powerful simply by growing

The strategic dilemma is that this growing power makes

countries in the region nervous. Chinalike rising great powers in the past
faces the problem of self-encirclement. This is the strategic dilemma that faced postBismarck Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. It could not grow powerful
without triggering a counterreaction. For a time, Bismarck was able to reassure Germanys
and modernizing.

neighbors through regional diplomacy. But subsequent Germany leaders were not as skillful or resolute in

China seems to understand this problem, and

its proclamations of peaceful rise are in part an effort by China to signal its
peaceful intentions. But it has also seen what the backlash might look like. In
recent years, China has made a series of actions that countries in the region
saw as aggressive. These included pronouncements about Chinese claims in
the South China Sea as well as clashes with Vietnam and the Philippines over
disputed areas, a harsh response to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with
Japan, and supportive policies toward North Korea after the latter sunk a
Republic of Korea navy vessel and shelled a South Korean island in 2010. The
response to each of these crises was a reaffirmation and tightening of
alliance ties between the frontline states and the United States. So China has
incentives to moderate its ambitions and look for ways to signal restraint and
reassurance.
their efforts to reassure and signal restraint.

Engagement controls uniqueness of war scenarios

Eisenman 2016

Joshua Eisenman is a fellow at the Carnegie Council. This piece is titled

Global Ethics Network, An Ethical Dialogue between Asia and the West,
Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China." Available online @:
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756,

How can the U.S. improve its policy towards China to avoid , and yet be prepared for,
conflict? Since the Nixon Administration, the U.S. strategy towards China has been predicated on the
assumption that if the bilateral relationship is properly managed conflict can be
avoided. Many contend that through engagement the U.S. can shape China's
choices in ways that reduce the chances the U.S. and China will come into
conflict. Whether a conflict occurs, the argument goes, depends on whether China
is dissatisfied with the prevailing international order , because as James Steinberg and
Michael O'Hanlon have written: "only if it believes that it is disadvantaged will China necessarily choose to
use its newfound power to create a world more to its own liking in potentially disruptive ways.1 Jeffery
Bader, who served as a top White House official in the first Obama administration, agrees that China

could play a more constructive role than it would by sitting outside of that
system.2 So the prevailing wisdom holds and the thinking behind engagement goes, if
China participates extensively in the international system, then it will help
create a system it likes and not become revisionist . According to Evan Medeiros, who
stepped down in June 2015 after six years as a top White House official on China, the U.S. and China

we would develop our relationship defined by cooperation on

regional and global challenges while affectively managing our differences .3
Medeiros explained in an interview with China's official CCTV how this policy sought to avoid
what IR theorists call the Thucydides Trap: Beginning when President Obama met President Xi for
the first time formally at Sunnylands... we agreed that we did not believe conflict was
inevitable between China and the United States, a rising power and an
established power, and we agreed that we would work to make sure that
rivalry didn't become inevitable. So that's the basic framework for our relationship, and we
"agreed that

think we've succeeded in accomplishing that in recent years.

Engagement k2 Heg
Brooks et al. 13
Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, Stephen,
Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is
the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel
Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College,
Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement, Foreign Affairs, January
2013, http://www.mcfr.wildapricot.org/Resources/Documents/2013-0520%20Brooks%20Ikenberry%20FA%20Stay%20Engaged%201301.pdf

the United States might be tempted to pull back from the

world. That would be a mistake, since an engaged grand strategy has served
the country exceptionally well for the past six decades -- helping prevent the
outbreak of conflict in the worlds most important regions , keeping the global
economy humming, and facilitating international cooperation. Since the end
of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep
engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country
has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties
with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases
cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of
thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany,
Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from
administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on
democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every
president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged
in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the
Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and
the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the
world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet
Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and
thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security
partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open
international order.
Now, more than ever,

JAPAN DA ANSWERS
1) Link Turn Japan hates Chinese involvement in the
South China Sea. The plan is perceived as massive win for
them, even without consultation. It improves Japan-China
relations
2) No Link There is no tangible way that the plan would
affect trade between Japan and China, thus it cant
change their relations which you claim are predicated on
trade

IMPACT

Good Relations = Sino-Japanese War

Strong US-Japan relations increase the

probability of Sino-Japanese war
Wu 5( Xinbo, IR professor at the center for American studies and dean of the school of international relations and public affairs at Fundan University in
Shanghai, the end of the silver lining: a Chinese view of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, 2005, Washington quarterly page 119-130,
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/34235886/Wu-Xinbo-2005-The-End-of-the-Silver-Lining-A-Chinese-View-of-the-US-Japanese-Alliance-The-Washington-Quarterly%5BWinter-2005-2006%5D-Volume-29-Number-1-pp-119%EF%BF%BD130/

Japan has embraced the idea that a rising

China is a strategic rival. In December 2004, Japans new National Defense Program Guidelines named China as a possible
As the U.S.-Japanese alliance has strengthened,

threat to

its national security for the first time.10 Beyond discussions of the North Ko- rean threat, the guidelines turned to China, expressing
strong concern over Chinas modernization of nuclear and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces
and the expansion of its area of operation at sea. The new guidelines, which set out Japans defense policies for the next decade, sug- gested
that Japan should be attentive to Chinas future course. Prior to this, Japans Ground Self-Defense Force developed a defense plan to prepare for a possible
Chinese attack. 11 Furthermore, in February 2005 the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee released a joint statement laying out a set of common strategic
goals for the alliance. Noteworthy was its inclusion of China-related issues, including Taiwan. Although the wording was subtle, the fact that

Japan

and the United States officially recognized confronting these issues as one of their
common strategic goals suggests that China will increasingly
drive security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington and
underscores Japans increased focus on China as a priority
concern on its na- tional security agenda. From Tokyos and Washingtons perspectives, Japans
return to normalcy means greater military might and a more active and assertive security policy. Beijing, however, is very concerned with the orientation of Japans
security policy, viewing it as one of the key factors affecting stability in Northeast Asia as well as Chinas security environment.12 Given Japans well-equipped
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and particularly its advanced naval and air forces,

Japan is already a major military

power in Asia. Moreover, its military strength continues to grow as Tokyo seeks to develop its power projection, intelligence collection, and
ballistic missile capabilities. The Chinese also wonder whether Japan will continue to lower the threshold for its overseas military activities. In the late 1990s, the
revised U.S.-Japanese defense guide- lines and the Laws Regarding Contingencies in the Surrounding Areas of Japan made it possible for Japanese troops to be
involved in a conflict outside of Japanese territory.

This leads to nuclear war

Zbigniew

Brzezinski, Former Sect. Of State, the choice: global domination or global leadership, 2004, page 226 google books

United
States should seek to translate the emerging equilibrium among itself,
Japan, and China into a more structured security relationship.
How the power dynamics in the Far East are shaped by the interrelationship among America, Japan, and China will also affect global stability. The

Geopolitically, Asia roughly resembles Europe prior to World War I. America has stabilized Europe but it still faces a potential structural crisis in Asia, where several
major powers still contend, though checked by Americas peripheral strategic presence. That presence is anchored by the American-Japanese connection, hut the
rise of a regionally dominant China and the unpredictability of North Korea signal the need for a more active U.S. policy to promote, at a minimum, a triangular
security relationship. As argued earlier, such a triangular equilibrium, to be enduring, will require a more internationally engaged Japan that will have gradually
assumed a wider range of military responsibilities. Creating this equilibrium might entail, in turn, fostering a transEurasian multilateral security structure for coping

Failure to engage China and Japan in at least a

de facto security structure could eventually trigger a dangerous
tectonic shift, perhaps involving the unilateral remilitarization of
Japan, which already has the potential to very quickly become a
nuclear power, in addition to the already grave challenge posed
by North Koreas quest for a nuclear arsenal of its own , The need for a
with the novel dimensions of global security.

collective regional response to North Korea reinforces the more general point that only a co-optive American hegemony can cope effectively with the increasingly
pervasive spread of weaponry of mass destruction, whether among states or extremist organizations. [P. 226-227]

LINK

The US-Japan alliance is the strongest it has

ever been
Hwang

5 (The Heritage Foundation,

Balbina Y.
, policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation, July 7, 200
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1865.cfm, accessed 8/05)

Bush
and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi seem to have forged a closer personal relationship
than have previous leaders of the two countries. The conventional wisdom among
observers of U.S.Japan relations on both sides of the Pacific is that the
bilateral relationship today is the best that it has been since the
alliance was created in 1954.
Major disputes over trade and economic issues no longer dominate the bilateral discourse as they have in the past, and President George W.

US-Japan relations are resilient, despite

conflicts overwhelming security motivations
Cossa

Ralph A.
, Prof and Pres. Pacific Forum @ CSIS, 11-8-200
http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_cossa.pdf

4, U.S. Security Strategy in Asia, IIPS Intl Conf.,

U.S. security strategy in Asia today is built today, as it has been for the
past half century, upon the foundation of a solid U.S.-Japan
alliance relationship. This foundation, which has seen its fair
share of cracks and quakes, appears remarkably resilient at present. In
fact, the depth and breadth of defense cooperation between
Washington and Tokyo in recent years have been unprecedented. While Japan may not
yet be the U.K. of Asia, as once envisioned by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, it is not too far a stretch to call Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi

Koizumi is one of a small, select group of Asia-Pacific leaders who have won
Washingtons utmost trust and confidence (and sincere gratitude), given his unyielding support for
Junichiro Asias answer to Tony Blair. Prime Minister

the U.S. war on terrorism in all its manifestations and his willingness to buck domestic public opinion to provide support to the two major campaigns in
Washingtons ongoing war Afghanistan and Iraq.

This has paid handsome dividend

5) No War Japan has almost no military. They are

covered under our nuclear umbrella and a formal military
is prohibited under article 9 of the Japanese constitution.
They spend less than 1% of their GDP on the little defense
that they have, incredibly low compared to any other
nation. They would NEVER escalate to war with America
considering how we are basically their military and they
would have nothing without us.

China DA Answers

Non-unique Reforms have been bad and have

led to questioning of Xi
Magnier and Page, 15 (Mark Magnier, Reporter & Jeremy Page, Reporter, 7/9/15, The Wall Street Journal, Chinas President
Faces Rare Backlash, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-president-faces-rare-backlash-1436467976)

President Xi Jinping got the credit as Chinas stock markets revved up. Now their unraveling is inviting rare finger-pointing at his forceful rule and putting his farreaching economic goals at risk. Vibrant stock markets are at the center of Mr. Xis plans
for an economic makeover, intended to help companies offload
huge debts, reinvigorate state enterprises and entice more
foreign investment. Some economists called reviving the moribund markets among his most consequential reforms in the more than
two years since coming to power. Investors talked of the Uncle Xi bull market. But with the markets having lost
around a third of their value in the past month, and the
government appearing to panic in its response to the drop , some people
are starting to voice doubts about Mr. Xis autocratic leadership style. Sun Liping, a sociologist at Tsinghua University, took to his socialmedia account to say the stock-market crash has exposed crucial flaws in
Mr. Xis highly centralized approach to government, including a
lack of financial expertise and a pervasive instinct among
subordinates to obey superiors. Power has limits, he wrote. Mr. Xi, who arrived in Russia on Wednesday for a
summit, hasnt commented publicly on the market moves or the criticism. The criticism amounts to a rare backlash for a leader with an eye for publicity and who so
commandingly put his stamp on the Communist Party, the military, economic policy and other areas.

Non-unique Xi is facing resistance to reforms

that thrown reforms out the window.
Magnier and Page, 15 (Mark Magnier, Reporter & Jeremy Page, Reporter, 7/9/15, The Wall Street Journal, Chinas President
Faces Rare Backlash, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-president-faces-rare-backlash-1436467976)

At the same time, Mr. Xi is facing resistance from officials and the business
community upset with the slowing economy and how he has
tried to concentrate power in his hands, among other policies. Although Mr. Xi faces no immediate
challenge to his authority, there is a risk that the stock market crisis could trigger social
unrest and hamper his efforts to promote key allies at the next
big leadership reshuffle in 2017. His government has placed a priority on quashing dissent and unrest,
and recently passed a law that broadly defines national security
threats to preserve the partys leadership. The sudden doubt in
Chinas leadership threatens to undermine Mr. Xis broadranging agenda to keep raising standards of living and transition
to consumer economy. The market selloff is definitely the largest challenge that the new administration has faced, said Victor
Shih, a China expert at the University of California, San Diego. Chief among the weaknesses exposed, Mr. Shih said, was the ineffectiveness of Mr. Xis pledge to

Hes trumpeted reform for the past

couple of years but a lot of so-called reforms have gone out the
window with this dramaticgovernment intervention in recent
days, Mr. Shih said.
limit bureaucratic interference and give markets greater scope.

NO LINK

Turn Xi will use US engagement to show

parity with US, thus increases Xis political
capital through nationalism
Li, 14 (Cheng Li, director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the New Type of
Great Power Relations", Brookings Institute, 12/2/14, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-greatpower-li-xu)

It has been widely noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly promoted the framework first at
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama in mid-November. After the summit, Chinas official news

Xi and Obama pledged to push forward a new type of

major-country relations, and that [Obama] is willing to lift
the new type of major-country relationship between China and
the U.S. to a higher level. Xinhua implied that Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the New Type concept.
agency reported that

In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously staying away from it. Why is China so keen on a New Type of Great Power Relations and on creating
perceptions of endorsement by Obama? And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it? What are the reasons behind such contrasting views Chinese enthusiasm

Xi Jinping defined the New Type of Great Power Relations in his meeting with
Obama at Sunnylands last year, he described it in three points: 1) no conflict or confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and
treating each others strategic intentions objectively ; 2) mutual
respect, including for each others core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial
cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest. Embedded in the New Type of Great Power
and American cynicism towards this seemingly benign concept? When

Relations is a nations hope for an international environment more conducive to its development. From the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening
up to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen itself as a civilization deeply entangled and affected by history. Recognizing the historically
recurring clashes between an existing great power and an emerging power, China looks to the New Type framework to avoid historical determinism and to seek a

less-disruptive rise in an increasingly integrated world. At the same time,

China wants to be viewed as an

equal. By using the term Great Power to primarily, if not solely, refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself to a level playing field.
Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would imply Uncle Sams recognition of
Chinas strength and power. This is what Chinas official media sought to show when it
suggested Obamas support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries. Furthermore, Chinese leaders
believe that the New Type of Great Power Relations enables the two powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with Chinas interests. By emphasizing the
respect of core interests as an element of the concept, China pushes its territorial claims to the forefront. This is Chinas attempt at more clearly demarking where
the United States and other neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would imply that the United

States recognizes Chinas core interests. This mutual respect of each others national interests is at the core of
Chinas aspirations. The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xis joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there are also domestic
reasons driving the New Type of Great Power Relations. Although the Chinese concept is an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a

From a Chinese perspective, the United States is

the only superpower in todays world that has the capacity to contain Chinas rise. By
concept should not be overlooked.

strengthening Chinas view of itself as a recognized and respected power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain
political capital to consolidate his own power at home.

Turn Xi working with the US increases Xi

credibility
Xiangwei, 16 (Xiangwei Wang, Editorial Advisor, 6/16/16, South China Morning Post, www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article)

Mr. Xi, who starts his visit in Seattle on Tuesday, played down differences that have unsteadied relations with the U.S.,
including cybersecurity and Chinas island-building in the South China Sea , saying China isnt
militarily adventurous and wants to work with Washington to
address world challenges. Added to the agenda in recent weeks for Mr. Xis summit with President Barack Obama are
concerns about Chinas wobbly economyand whether thats dented the leaderships appetite for economic liberalization. So far, with Chinas manufacturingdriven growth model flagging, the shift to consumer spending and services that the government is trying to engineer hasnt picked up the slack. Mr.

Xi

sought to dispel any concern that China is faltering in its

transition toward more sustainable growth: Like an arrow shot that cannot be
brought back, we will forge ahead against all odds to meet our goals of reform. On another move that surprised global markets
a nearly 2% devaluation of Chinas currency that fueled concerns about capital flightMr. Xi said the reduction in foreign reserves that followed is normal and
theres no need to overreact to it. The lead-up to summits between the U.S. and China have become fraught in recent years, as have overall relations, as Beijing,

Xi, has vigorously sought to use the countrys

economic, military and diplomatic clout to further its
increasingly global interests. Calls are rising for the Obama administration to develop better strategies to neutralize a
particularly under Mr.

more assertive China. Still, Messrs. Xi and Obama have used their past summits to project a workmanlike relationship in public, despite friction in their behind-the-

Xi

scenes discussions. In the interview, Mr.

cited cooperation on pressing global issues, from agreements to reduce emissions linked to climate change and
common efforts in negotiating limits to Irans nuclear program; rather than supplanting the U.S., he said, China wants to work with Washington on improving global

said. He later added:

Facts have shown that the interests of China and the U.S. are
increasingly intertwined.
order, he said. I dont believe any country is capable of rearranging the architecture of global governance toward itself, he

Turn Xis image improves with people in

China by working and talking with the US
Xiangwei, 16 (Xiangwei Wang, Editorial Advisor, 6/16/16, South China Morning Post, www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article)

Mr. Xi tried to counter allegations about the cybertheft of trade secrets to benefit Chinese companiesa problem the Obama administration is considering using
sanctions to deterand welcomed greater engagement. The Chinese government does not engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it

Xi said. We are ready to

strengthen cooperation with the U.S. side on this issue. Mr. Xi seldom engages with the
encourage or support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way, Mr.

international media. For the written interview, the Journal submitted a dozen questions to Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mr. Xi. While the ministry
acknowledged that officials pulled together facts and research for the answers, it said Mr. Xi revised and reviewed them. The answers at times glint with the

Xi from his immediate predecessors and made him popular among many
Chinese. His policies having met resistance from vested interests , he vows
to crack hard nuts and ford dangerous rapids in pursuit of reforms that would rely more on market-based solutions. Overall, though, he made it
clear that the government will maintain firm regulatory hold as it
allows markets broader sway in allocating resources . That means we need to
rhetorical flair that has differentiated President

make good use of both the invisible hand and the visible hand, he said. His current trip to Americahis first formal visit since taking office nearly three years ago

Xi will see top

executives of Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp., Boeing Co. and other U.S. business giants on Tuesday and Wednesday. Mr.
Xi will address U.N. sessions over the weekend, presiding at a
panel on empowering women. In between are his discussions at the White House and with members of Congress
the optics of which, Chinese and U.S. officials say, are important for
his image back home.
showcases Chinas wider sway in the world as visits by previous Chinese leaders didnt. In Seattle, Mr.

Turn Winners win bilateral cooperation

improves political capital for US and China
Shuli and Ling, 15 (Hu and Wang, Reporters, Caixin Online, Kevin Rudd: Answering the Peaceful Rise Question, 5/15/15,
http://english.caixin.com/2015-05-15/100809611.html)

We are dealing with a culture here in China which has a long tradition of yin and yang. So you are able to make things which appear to be conflicting actually
work together as a whole. The truth is this: There are things where the United States and China disagree fundamentally, for example, arms sales to Taiwan.
Everyone knows who's got what position. Can I foresee that that is capable of being solved anytime soon? No. That's just the truth. I just take it as a reality. But at

there's a whole series of things that

America and China can do together, bilaterally, regionally, globally. What I argue about common purpose is
this: If you are able to accumulate enough political capital and
diplomatic capital through one form of cooperation after
another, suddenly your box of political capital gets bigger and
you can use some of that capital to solve some of these really
difficult problems in the future. Common purpose is: Let's find a way to resolve these
fundamental differences in the future when there is more trust.
the same time, on the constructive side of this relationship,

Turn Xis reforms hurt the economy and

causes global jitters and anxiety
The Economist, 16 (Chairman of everything, 4/2/16, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-exercise-power-home-xijinping-often-ruthless-there-are-limits-his)

Mr Xi has been even more hesitant in his handling of the

economy. Months after taking power, he proclaimed that under his leadership markets would play a decisive role. Since last
year he has begun to talk of a need for supply-side reforms,
implying that inefficient, debt-laden and overstaffed state-owned enterprises (SOEs)ie, most of them
need shaking up. But his approach has been marked by uncertainty, U-turns and, occasionally, incompetence. It is true that some prices
have been liberalised. In the second half of 2015, more market-friendly systems were introduced for setting exchange and interest rates. But the reform
of SOEs has barely begun, stymied by the vested interests of SOE managers and their political friends, by fear of
increasing unemployment, and perhaps by Mr Xis own oft-stated belief that the party should keep its hold on the main economic levers. There are few signs yet

Xis lack of clear focus on

the economy, and his unwillingness to let people more expert in such
matters (namely, the prime minister, Mr Li) handle it, have caused a series of errors.
Policymakers, including Mr Xi, talked up the stockmarket a year ago and then engaged in a doomed attempt to prevent its fall in the summer.
They introduced and then hurriedly scrapped ill-designed circuit-breakers to calm market jitters. They caused global anxiety
when they failed to explain what they were doing when they began
tinkering with the exchange-rate regime. Markets are
unpredictable and no Chinese leader (including Mr Xi) has any experience
of the way they work in Western economies.s in helping to achieve what both sides
that loss-making SOEs will be shut down or that any will be subjected to real competition. Mr

generally agree are the best relations ever.

APPEASMENT DA ANSWERS

No link- plan would discourage china if

anything
South China Morning Post, 13

[China, US to benefit Chinese leader's nationalism, 6/6/13, pg. L/N]

What about Xi's nationalism? If it seems at odds with these grand goals, it is not.
power.

Xi was not selected by Deng

Here are six reasons why. Consolidate

Neither

Xiaoping , the architect of reform, as were his predecessors - Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao .

was Xi elected by the people. Conventional wisdom had it that he would be a weak leader. In order to
realise his Chinese Dream, Xi needs to assert strength and assure control . So far, he has
exceeded expectations. Enable reform. ,Xi and Premier Li Keqiang are determined to enact far-reaching economic reforms
the most extensive in 15 years, but there is stiff resistance from those whose dominance would be diminished and benefits cut. This
resistance appeals to nationalistic aspirations by accusing reformers of
"worshipping Western ways", "glorifying Western models", "caving in to Western pressures".
Xi's proactive nationalism is a strategy of "offence is the best defence" - an inoculation, as it were, against the
political virus of being labelled "soft" or "pro-Western". Reformers in China are generally associated with proAmerican attitudes and thus subject to fierce public criticism, even ridicule. By establishing himself as a strongwilled nationalist, operating independently of the US, Xi secures economic reforms by distinguishing them from
serving Western/American interests.

Non-unique

US appeasement high now China will test the US,

shatter credibility and hurt US alliances Leads to
possible nuclear war
Ilman, University of Indonesia Global Civil Society Research Center,
2016
[Zidny, July 3, 2016, The National Interest, Is the South China Sea the Stage for
the Next World War? http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-thestage-the-next-world-war-16833?page=2, Accessed 6 July 2016, LAR]
China seems to believe that the U.S.-led regional order is based on the
U.S.-led political security regional order. This political security order in turn is based on the U.S. regional
alliance system, which is known as hub-and-spoke system, encompassing Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand . This
alliance system grants the United States access to forward bases that
ensures her ability to rapidly project her power throughout the region
whenever crisis erupts. Without such bases, the United States wont be able to effectively project
forces and, therefore, will have only marginal influence in a crisis. Thus, curtailing the United States capability to
respond to a regional crisis means much less U.S. influence upon regional order. So, as the logic goes, breaking
this alliance system will lead to a breakup of the U.S.-led regional order. Thus, the question now becomes: how
can China break up the U.S. alliance system? Alliance, by its nature, means an insurant. By inking an alliance, the
United States has assured her allies that she will help defend them in times of crisis. Just like a commercial insurance
company, the success of the business rests on the insurers credibility. As long as U.S. allies believe that Washington will fulfill her
words, the alliance system will hold up. However, if U.S. allies do not believe her wordsthereby doubting the
credibility of her wordsthe alliance

system will unravel. A new question emerges as a

consequence: how can China damage U.S. credibility so much that it will lead to the unraveling of its
regional alliance system? For sure, there is no better way to damage ones credibility than proving that one is
unable to fulfill ones words. Put it another way, China must show U.S. allies that the United States will not come
by their side when they need her. That means instigating a conflict with U.S. allies, making sure they will call for
U.S. assistance and, at the same time, making sure that the United States will not fulfill her insurance policy. It is
a dangerous game to play for sure. Beijing must do its best to make sure the United States will not come by her
allies side or else it will face a war with the United Statesa grim possibility given both sides possession of
nuclear weapons.

No link
Analytics- The U.S. has already been appeasing china for some time now and
nothing bad has happened so there is no risk of any wars breaking out in the
future.

We meet: Our engagement with China does benefit both nations, China asked
us to stop in the first place, so if we follow the plan, China benefits, and so do
we

Random Topicality
Counter Interp:

Diplomatic Engagement in China includes strengthening

regional security cooperation including the South China
Sea, advancing trade, promoting democratic
development, strengthening regional institutions, and
addressing war legacies.
Daniel R. Russel Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific Washington, DC April 19, 2016
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2016/04/255968.htm
As the region builds a more mature economic architecture in the shadow of
maritime security concerns, sustained U.S. commitment is essential to
furthering stability and prosperity. The Asia-Pacific is vital to unlocking shared
strategic and economic opportunities in this dynamic region. The Presidents
FY2017 budget request includes $1.5 billion overall in diplomatic engagement
and foreign assistance funds. The $873 million foreign assistance request
supports five key priorities: (1) strengthening regional security cooperation,
with a strategic focus on maritime security around the South China Sea; (2)
advancing inclusive economic growth and trade; (3) promoting democratic
development; (4) strengthening regional institutions and fora; and (5)
addressing war legacies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Mr. Chairman, let
me now share with you some examples of how our FY 2017 budget request
supports these five priorities.

We meet our counter interp: We are advancing trade, promoting democratic

development, and strengthening regional institutions through the plan

1) Field Context
a) . Russel is the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific Washington
b) This means that our definition is to be trusted and held in high reguard
because Russell could not possibly be more qualified.
c) We terminally control the predictability debate, which is the key internal
link to clash and pre-round preparation education

On Voters:
Prefer reasonability: competing interpretations incentives running t every round
and wed get no topic specific education

Reps only Topicality Answer

1- We meet: we use representatives to make the offer to China
2- Counter Interpretation: Diplomatic Engagement in China includes
strengthening regional security cooperation including the South China Sea,
advancing trade, promoting democratic development, strengthening regional
institutions, and addressing war legacies.
Daniel R. Russel 16(Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific Washington, DC April 19, 2016 http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2016/04/255968.htm )
As the region builds a more mature economic architecture in the shadow of maritime security concerns, sustained U.S. commitment is essential to furthering

region. The
Presidents FY2017 budget request includes $1.5 billion overall in diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance funds. The
$873 million foreign assistance request supports five key priorities: (1) strengthening regional security
cooperation, with a strategic focus on maritime security around the South China
Sea; (2) advancing inclusive economic growth and trade; (3) promoting
democratic development; (4) strengthening regional institutions and fora; and (5)
addressing war legacies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Mr. Chairman, let me now share with you
stability and prosperity. The Asia-Pacific is vital to unlocking shared strategic and economic opportunities in this dynamic

some examples of how our FY 2017 budget request supports these five priorities.

3- We meet our Counter Interpretation: we aim to strengthen regional security

cooperation in the South China Sea
Counter Standards:
1. Education
a. The south china sea is one of the biggest issues of modern day
b. Learning about security cooperation is key to allow future policy makers to
avoid conflicts
2. Predictability
a. The south china sea is a major hot button issue which dominates most
discussions about China
3. Field context
a. Russel works with the bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and is
defining exactly the types of diplomatic engagement we do with China
b. This means he is the most qualified to determine what diplomatic
engagement with China includes
On Voters:
Prefer reasonability: competing interpretations incentives running t every round
and wed get no topic specific education

Engagement Cant Be
Pressure
1) We Meet: We dont pressure China to do anything, they
have every right to say no.
2) Counter Interpretation: Engagement must be quid pro
quo
James Shinn Book Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China
published by Council on Foreign Relations 1996
https://books.google.com/books/about/Weaving_the_Net.html?id=ks8OV6I2qMC
8. Conditional engagement's recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are
equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by
China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-fortat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response
is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner,
an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and
perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington
to counter a Chinese tariff of two percent on imports for the United States
with a tariff of two percent on imports from China . An asymmetric tit-for-tat
would be for the United States to counter a Chinese shipment of missiles to
Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam ( John Lewis Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Security Policy, New York Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in
Famed Zakaria, The Reagan Strategy of Containment," Political Science
Quarterly 105, no. 3 (199o), pp. 383- )

3) We meet our counter interpretation: demanding a

concession from China for our concession is quid pro quo
4) Counter Standards
1) Fairness
a) We control limits. Demanding quid pro quo actions massively limits the
case list
b) We give neg key say-no arguments that would otherwise go unexplored

2) Field Context

a) Shinn, our interpretation author, is an expert in the field of economic

engagement with China that works with the US Council on Foreign Relations.
b) This means they are the most qualified to define what economic
engagement with China is in a context specific to China
c) We terminally control the predictability debate, which is the key internal
link to clash and pre-round preparation education

3) Education
a) Learning about international bargaining is key policy maker education

On the Voters
Prefer reasonability: if we have one good standard left at the end of the
debate dont vote on T. Competing interpretations always encourages a race
to the bottom where wed be incentivized to run T every round

Substantial 10 Billion Block

We meet: Failure to follow the plan could result in major
economic downfall. The trade that would be stopped as a
result of this regional shutdown easily amounts to 10
billion dollars

Counter interpretation:
Substantial
Cambridge Dictionary
large in size, value, or importance.

We meet our counter interpretation: Our engagement

with China is certainly of large importance
Counter standards
1) Field Context
a) Cambridge university dictionary, is a highly regarded and widely accepted
prestigious dictionary.
b) This means that their definition is to be trusted and held with high reguard.
c) We terminally control the predictability debate, which is the key internal
link to clash and pre-round preparation education

2) Education
a) Thinning out the meaning of such a broad term is extremely bad for
education. Every time, we eat a substantial amount of food, does it have to
be 10 billion dollars worth?

On the Voters
Prefer reasonability: if we have one good standard left at the end of the
debate dont vote on T. Competing interpretations always encourages a race
to the bottom where wed be incentivized to run T every round

T Rant
I absolutely hate topicality with a burning passion and Ill tell you why. All
topicality does is divert the attention from the debate and the task at hand,
and instead direct it towards nothing but the meaning of a word. All the
interest in the topic that I actually came here to debate for is all the sudden
LOST. And instead, we spend excessive amounts of time going back and forth
about whose definition of whatever word is superior. This totally destroys
most if not all education that we would take away from that debate, because
were not focusing on the topic at hand. Also, running a topicality that the
other team isnt ready for is terribly unfair because if the other team doesnt
have a counter definition then they are completely screwed over. This is
because it is against the rules to access the internet during a debate. So
basically, its a checkmate. If you dont have a definition, then you lose. If you
try to find one, then you lose. This is why Topicality is just my absolute least
favorite thing in debate. And judge, even if you still buy their topicality, then
refer to my voters saying that winning on topicality will just incentivizes the
neg to run topicality every single round because if they always win with T,
then theyll just always continue to use it. This is just awful for education and
fairness like Ive said before. Prefer reasonability. If we have one standard or
point left standing at the end of this debate, then dont vote on Topicality, it
just enables the neg team further to run topicality.

Fairness ALWAYS comes first,

without it debate literally
ceases to exist
Speice and Lyle 3 Patrick Speice, Debater at Wake Forest University, and
Jim Lyle, Director of Debate at Clarion University, 2003 (Traditional Policy
Debate: Now More Than Ever, Debaters Research Guide, Available Online at
http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/ MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm,
Accessed 09-11-2005)
As with any game or sport, creating a level playing field that affords each
competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence
of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted toward one particular
competitor, the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and
go home, as they dont have a realistic shot of winning such a rigged
game. Debate simply wouldnt be fun if the outcome was pre-determined
and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to
work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent
because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular
team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field
that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants.

Russia DA Answers

Link Turn
Russia is not supportive of China is SCS
Chunshan 14 ( Mu, writer for The Diplomat, Why Doesnt Russia Support
China in the South China Sea? Strategic and political factors keep Moscow
from backing Beijing on the South China Sea disputes., June 21, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/why-doesnt-russia-support-china-in-thesouth-china-sea/)//LED

Strategic and political factors keep Moscow from backing Beijing on

the South China Sea disputes.Recently, tensions over maritime disputes in the South
China Sea seem to have surpassed even those caused by the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China and Vietnam
are embroiled in their worst political conflict in decades over an oil drilling platform near the Paracel

The resulting anti-China protests in Vietnam brought China-Vietnam

relations to a temporary halt. In addition, the Philippines detention of
Chinese fishermen has increased the discord between China and the
Philippines. With all these frictions occurring at the same time, the situation
in the South China Sea has suddenly become very serious. Against this
background, we have seen the U.S. criticize China, express support for
Vietnam, and shield the Philippine military. But we have not heard Russia, Chinas
Islands.

strategic partner, take a stand on the South China Sea disputes, much less publicly support Chinas
position. This has upset some people in China, who now think that China-Russia relations arent as good as
previously imagined. Even on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between China and Japan, Russia has kept an
ambiguous position. In my eyes, however, this does not mean that Russias is of two minds in its
relationship with China. Instead, there are complicated political and strategic factors, including four main
reasons I will list below. First, the China-Russia relationship is different from U.S.-Philippines relations.
China and Russia are not allies. There is no alliance treaty between them, while there are security treaties
between the U.S. and the Philippines as well as between the U.S. and Japan. In an alliance relationship,
each side has treaty obligations to provide political and even military support to its partner. In international
relations, this is the highest-level type of bilateral relationship .

While the China-Russia

relationship has some characteristics of a comprehensive strategic
partnership, the two parties are not bound by treaty obligations to strive for
each others international space and national interests. For a long time, Chinas state
media has been emphasizing and promoting the positive factors in China-Russia relations, while overseas
media also often over-praise this relationship. Sometimes media outlets even posit that China and Russia

This has led many people to believe that ChinaRussia political cooperation is boundless, causing a great improvement to
Chinas security situation. But the facts of international relations tell us that
no matter how good the China-Russia relationship is, it wont influence
Chinas basic policy in the South and East China Seas . The fact is that ChinaRussia relations are fundamentally based on mutual interests. The South
China Sea is not a place where Russia can expand its interests, nor is it
necessary for Russia to interfere in this region absent a formal alliance with
China. Chinese people cannot misinterpret the character of China-Russia
relations and expect too much from Russia.
are allies without an alliance treaty.

Russia Tolerates china but they oppose them on SCS

Chunshan 14 ( Mu, writer for The Diplomat, Why Doesnt Russia Support
China in the South China Sea? Strategic and political factors keep Moscow
from backing Beijing on the South China Sea disputes., June 21, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/why-doesnt-russia-support-china-in-thesouth-china-sea/)//LED

For a long time, Chinas state media has been emphasizing and promoting the positive factors in ChinaRussia relations, while overseas media also often over-praise this relationship .

Sometimes media
outlets even posit that China and Russia are allies without an alliance
treaty. This has led many people to believe that China-Russia political cooperation is
boundless, causing a great improvement to Chinas security situation . But the
facts of international relations tell us that no matter how good the China-Russia relationship is , it wont
influence Chinas basic policy in the South and East China Seas. The fact is
that China-Russia relations are fundamentally based on mutual interests . The
South China Sea is not a place where Russia can expand its interests, nor is it necessary for Russia to
interfere in this region absent a formal alliance with China. Chinese people
cannot misinterpret the character of China-Russia relations and expect too
much from Russia. Second, Russia enjoys good relations with countries
bordering the South China Sea and does not need to offend Southeast Asia
for the sake of China. As noted above, Russia is not enthusiastic about
publicly backing China on the South China Sea issue. One of the most
important reasons for this is that Russia enjoys good relations with many of
the Southeast Asian countries. For example, Russias predecessor, the Soviet Union, was
historically even closer to Vietnam than it was to China. Because of the USSRs strong support, Vietnam
was able to fight off the United States. Afterward, Vietnam began to undertake anti-China activities, again
with Soviet backing. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited this extraordinary friendship. There

there are no
serious disputes or conflicts on either the historical or the practical level. And
there is one particular area of cooperation between the two countries:
defense, where cooperation has stretched from World War II to today. Many of
Vietnams weapons come from Russia, such as the Kilo-class diesel submarines fueling the
are no major obstacles to the development of the Russia-Vietnam relationship

growth of Vietnams navy. In addition, in the second half of 2014 Russia will deliver four Su-30MK2 fighters
to Vietnam, which could potentially become weapons in a future China-Vietnam confrontation. Russia also
enjoys a good relationship with the Philippines. For example, two years ago, three Russian navy vessels
(including the anti-submarine destroyer Admiral Panteleyev) arrived in Manila for a three-day port visit.
According to Russia, this visit helped improve Russia-Philippine ties. Third, its unnecessary for Russia to

Currently Russias focus is

on Europe, especially the Ukraine crisis that has already solidified the
confrontation between Russia and the West . Such a problem will be difficult to
solve in the short term. Given this, Russia has neither the desire nor the
ability to confront the U.S. in the South China Sea. Besides, the South China
Sea disputes are not really conflicts between China and the United States.
The disputes stem from disagreements between the South China Sea border
countries about the history and the status quo of maritime rights. The U.S. is
only an influencing factor, not a determining factor that will determine the future of the situation.
seek out a direct confrontation with the U.S. over the South China Sea .

In this context, as an outsider and bystander, Russia has even less of a motivation to support China and
criticize the U.S. Fourth, the development of China has actually caused some worries within Russia. To

some people in the West, the discord between China and other South China Sea countries could help
restrict Chinas expansion into other regions. In Russia, there has always been some concern that Chinas
development will lead to the Russian far east being gradually occupied by the Chinese, with this vast
territory, along with its resources, becoming fodder for Chinas development. Although Russian officials are
optimistic about the potential for cooperation in the far east, they have never for a moment relaxed their
guard against Chinas so-called territorial expansion. There is no need for China to feel doubtful and

Dozens of years of
sounding each other out has formed the foundation for tacit agreements and
mutual understanding in the China-Russia relationship . For example, on the
issue Russia currently takes most seriously, the Crimea question, China
refrained from publicly supporting Russia, choosing instead to abstain from
the U.N. Security Council vote. However, this doesnt mean that China
opposes Russias position. By the same logic , Russias neutral stance in the
South China Sea disputes doesnt mean that Russia doesnt support China.
Russia has its own ways of supporting China, such as the recent China-Russia
joint military exercises in the East China Sea. This display of deterrence
caused envy and suspicion in the West. China and Russia leave each other
ample room for ambiguous policies, which is actually proof of an increasingly
deep partnership. This arrangement gives both China and Russia the
maneuvering space they need to maximize their national interests.
disappointed about Russias stance on the South China Sea disputes.

Russia wants China to get out of the SCS

Tsvetov 7/19/16 ( Anton, writer for The Diplomat, Did Russia Just Ask
China to Buzz Off on the South China Sea,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/did-russia-just-ask-china-to-buzz-off-on-thesouth-china-sea/)//LED

No appeasement. No accommodation. On July 12, the Permanent Court of

Arbitration in The Hague smashed Chinas expansive nine-dash line claim in
the South China Sea, as well as its conduct with regards to the environment
and Philippine fishermen, as inconsistent with the Constitution of the Oceans
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing is now in
damage control mode disregarding the courts jurisdiction, denying any compliance with the merits and
making a list of international reactions. On the long list of countries Beijing claims to have support from,

Moscows reaction to the court ruling was

somewhat delayed and was voiced on July 14. It also came in the form of an
answer to a question posed by a Chinese journalist at the weekly press
briefing by the foreign ministrys spokeswoman Maria Zakharova a clear sign
Russia is the largest and most influential state.

that Russia wishes to distance itself from the disputes and does not regard the South China Sea as a first
tier issue. As usual with the Russian stance, Moscow expressed support for a diplomatic solution to the
dispute by the parties involved, called for compliance with international law, including UNCLOS and the
2002 Declaration of Conduct, and an early conclusion of a binding Code of Conduct. Enjoying this article?

The Russian
MFA spokeswoman explicitly said that Russia does not take sides in the
conflict. Though making the case against extra-regional involvement, she did
not mention non-claimants that are using the situation for their own
Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. But there was something else.

geopolitical considerations, the usual euphemism for the United States . Finally,
she mentioned UNCLOS not once but twice, supporting the Conventions role in upholding rule of law in the
oceans and stressing the universal nature of the document. These minor additions made the fresh Russian
statement go a little bit beyond the baseline. Emotionally, it looked like a snap of the teeth toward
extensive pressure. And pressure there has been. There is no doubt that Beijing has utilized bilateral
channels to push Russia toward more support. Just one day before the ruling was announced, the deputy

to Russia visited the Foreign Ministry to discuss

current bilateral and global issues. Zakharova said that Russia will not be
drawn into the disputes and it is rather clear who has been most industrious
in trying to do so. Previously, China has been very liberal with Russias
position, bending the non-internationalization clause as proof of Russian support. If we take the clause
chief of Chinas diplomatic mission

at face value, then it makes perfect sense, as Moscow has been historically against any interventions by
extra-regional states into its own neighborhood and other neighborhoods by extension. However, when put
into context it sounds too much in harmony with Chinas opposition to the internationalization of the South

U.S. involvement and

international arbitration. Beijing, as it has done previously, will still
count Russia on the list of states that support China in its defiance
of any arbitration and this weeks PCA ruling in particular. Moscow is
unlikely to make clarifications, let alone take back words or make
excuses, to avoid irritating its strategic partner. This means that in
this rapidly changing environment, Russias big diplomatic success
will consist in standing ground and withholding pressure from both
sides even if this neutrality is taken as a lack of support .
China Sea disputes, by which Beijing means mainly two things

Russia is encouraging talks and wants a solution.

Zeenews 7/15/16 ( An Indian news group, Resolve South China Sea
dispute through talks: Russia, http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/resolvesouth-china-sea-dispute-through-talks-russia_1907352.html)//LED

The South China Sea dispute should be settled through consultations,

Russia said on Thursday. "We believe that the involved parties must hold
relevant consultations and negotiations in the format determined by
themselves," Xinhua news agency quoted Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova as
Moscow:

saying. She said that Russia's "consistent and invariable" stance is that relevant countries should not
resort to force but continue pushing forward a political-diplomatic settlement on the basis of international
laws, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). "We

support
efforts of China and member states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) towards working out a code of conduct in the South China Sea ,"
Zakharova said. The spokeswoman meanwhile stressed that Russia in principle doesn't take any sides, as
the country is not an interested party and would not be dragged into the dispute. "We highly value the
role of the UNCLOS in ensuring supremacy of law in the Earth's oceans. It is important to have the
provisions of this universal international treaty applied consistently," Zakharova added. On Tuesday, the
arbitral tribunal issued an award over a case unilaterally initiated by the former Philippine government,
denying China's long-standing historical rights over the South China Sea .

China had from the

very beginning refused to participate in the proceedings, insisting that the
tribunal has no jurisdiction over the case, which is in essence related to
territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Chinese President Xi Jinping
on Tuesday said China will not accept any proposition or action based on the

award, and that China's territorial sovereignty and maritime interests in the
South China Sea will under no circumstances be affected by it. Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang said on Thursday during a visit to Mongolia that the South
China Sea issue should be solved through bilateral negotiations by relevant
parties on the basis of historical facts and in accordance with international
law and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC).

No Russia China War

No Russia China war Both leaders prioritize economic
interdependence
RT.Com 13 Jul, 2016 13:24 https://www.rt.com/politics/350906-russianweapons-chief-pledges-further/ Ties with China will strengthen despite
Western pressure, says Russian weapons chief
Economic cooperation between Russia and China will develop regardless of
Western pressure of Moscow, Deputy PM in charge of the defense industry
Dmitry Rogozin says, adding noted that it was wrong to view sanctions as the main reason for this.
The Peoples Republic of China is developing very rapidly today . In many
spheres it has reached the level of development that is very interesting to
Russia. We are building a mutually-beneficial technological and industrial
cooperation between our countries, Rogozin said after the Wednesday meeting with Chinese
Vice-Premier Wang Yang in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Rogozin noted that the relations with
China would have been even more active if not for the Wests restrictive
measures against the Russian Federation. At the same time he emphasized that the
sanctions were neither a hindrance nor the reason behind this cooperation. These relations are
here to stay, they are caused by vital needs of our nations, he said. Last month
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited China on a state visit, holding talks
with President Xi Jinping and signing a number of major deals in various
economic spheres. Among them were agreements on selling of stakes in several Russian
projects to Chinese companies, an oil supply contract, under which Russia could deliver up to
2.4 million tons of crude oil to ChemChina and an intergovernmental agreement
concerning a large-scale aircraft construction project. Putin also welcomed cooperation in
the framework of the so-called Silk Road Economic Belt project, which the two
leaders agreed to in May. The aim of the project launched in 2013 is to create transport, energy and a
trade corridor between Asian and European countries. The nations also agreed to expand mutual payments

During a
press conference in Beijing, Putin said that the Russian-Chinese commission
on investment cooperation had selected nearly 58 business initiatives worth
about $50 billion to be put in the works and added that 12 of these projects
were already being implemented. Putin also told reporters that though
Russia-China bilateral relations mostly concerned economic cooperation, the
two countries also worked together in other spheres, such as international
affairs. He noted that such joint efforts "contribute to the stability of world
affairs," where Russian and Chinese views "are either very similar or
coincide."
in national currencies, to decrease dependency on external factors, Putin told reporters.

No Russia China war Russia relies on China for trade and

makes long term economic calculations based on the
continuation of that trade
Andrey Biryukov May 19, 2016
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-18/russia-gets-flashbackto-oil-s-collapse-as-risks-mount-in-china Russia Suffers Oil Crash Flashback
as New China Threat Looms
China is Russias biggest single trade partner , with its share rising to 12.8 percent from 12
percent in 2015. Even so, the overall turnover of goods fell by 26 percent last year to
$68.1 billion. That means the countries are far off reaching their target of
$100 billion in trade. The Bank of Russia is monitoring the situation in China
and will take measures to maintain financial stability if needed , according to
Yudaeva. Volatility there will have global consequences, she said. We are calculating these risks, but for
ourselves what we consider far more likely is the scenario of a soft landing for the Chinese economy,

Russias central bank has

a 150-billion-yuan ($23 billion) swap agreement with Peoples Bank of China,
signed in 2014 to facilitate direct settlement between the ruble and the yuan,
avoiding use of the dollar. Last year it received 10 million yuan, or 112 million
rubles, as part of the arrangement. Risks in China cant just be waved
away, Oreshkin said. The entire economic policy must be shaped to take
into account the possibility of worse growth than the market expects now or
even effectively a recession in China. Such a risk cant be ruled out.
Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev told reporters on Thursday in Sochi.

Miscalc Impact
Miscalculation is the greatest risk of US China war
Kan, 2013 (Kan, Shirley A; Specialist in Asian Security Affairs;
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress;
Congressional report; http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?
verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA585310
)
Chinas rising power with greater assertiveness and aggressiveness (particularly

refusal to discuss nuclear weapons, cyber threats, and

repeated suspensions of visits showed limitations of the results of milto-mil exchanges. Also, a need arose for a review of the U.S. approach of a
greater stress on cooperative contacts than the PLAs antagonistic
attitude and leveraging of military contacts to influence U.S. policies.
The PLA has repeatedly suspended milto- mil contacts while blaming
U.S. obstacles (including U.S. reconnaissance, arms sales to Taiwan,
legislated restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagons annual report
to Congress on PRC Military Power). At a news conference on March 7, 2007 , Defense Secretary
Robert Gates said that he did not see China as a strategic adversary
of the United States, but a partner in some respects and a
competitor in other respects. Gates stressed the importance of engaging the PRC on all
in maritime areas),

facets of our relationship as a way of building mutual confidence. Nonetheless, U.S. officials expressed
concern about inadequate transparency from the PLA, notably when it tested an anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapon in January 2007. At a news conference in China on March 23, 2007, the Chairman of the Joint

the primary concern for the bilateral

relationship is miscalculation and misunderstanding based on
misinformation. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless testified to the House Armed
Services Committee on June 13, 2007, that in the absence of adequate explanation
for capabilities which are growing dynamically, both in terms of pace
and scope, we are put in the position of having to assume the most
dangerous intent a capability offers. He noted a lack of response from
the PLA to an agreement at the U.S.-PRC summit in 2006 to discuss
nuclear arms. response from the PLA to an agreement at the U.S.-PRC
Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace, said

summit in 2006 to discuss nuclear arms.

Counter Plan Blocks:

Sino-Japan relations wont recover Japan wont convince
China over the Senkaku Islands which makes conflict
inevitable in the CP
Choong 14, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security (William William Choong: The
power of dreams (or lack thereof), IISS voices, January 17th 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss
%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/january-7b16/fullerton-yamamoto-07ed

charismatic politicians in Japan have been few and far between . But
the year-old administration of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seems to be cranking
them out. Speaking at an IISSAsia Fullerton Lecture on 16 January, Ichita Yamamoto had an uncanny ability to hold
For a long time,

160 members of the audience in thrall. He answered questions from the floor standing up, striding back and forth across
the stage with confidence. Yamamoto recalled that he had visited Singapore 40 years ago with other colleagues, who have
gone on to become ministers in Japan. As such, Yamamoto said he was happy to visit the Republic, given that Japanese
politicians who have done so have never lost a parliamentary seat in tough elections, he said, to laughter. And if needed,

The light-hearted
tone of Japans Minister for Ocean Policy and Territory, however, belied a serious
approach. At the lecture, he espoused Yamamotos Three Laws the rule of law, Japans desire to
pursue strong bilateral ties with its neighbours and the need to build up a
regional community. An emphasis on the rule of law would enable regional
states to counter what have been perceived as attempts to challenge the
status quo as well as the international order based on the rule of law . No one
he added for good measure, the author of six albums said he was willing to belt out a song.

has an argument with the three laws. After all, it has become increasingly clear that the Abe administration is using such
indisputable principles to pursue a charm offensive across the region. Such diplomatic exertions are being carried out with
two goals in mind. Firstly, Japans ailing economy needs ASEAN a dynamic area of 600 million people. At a lecture in
Singapore in July 2013, Abe spoke about Japan and ASEAN being two engines of a plane that would enable economic

Japan is boosting ties with ASEAN

because its relations with its neighbours in Northeast Asia South Korea and China are
languishing at all-time lows, largely due to Abes approach to historical issues. Whether Abes new
campaign will succeed, however, is doubtful. This is not due to a lack of energy or effort; since
growth to take off. The second goal is related to the first

becoming prime minister in December 2012, Abe has reinvigorated Japans regional diplomacy. He has visited all the
nations in ASEAN, offering trade and aid. In the case of Vietnam and the Philippines two countries contending with China

Abe will continue this charm

offensive when he delivers the keynote at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May. If
Abes intentions foster regional stability, all will be well . The fact, however, is that
his recent efforts will do little to improve Sino-Japanese relations . And if relations
over South China Sea claims Japan has offered coastguard ships. We expect

between the Asia-Pacifics two great powers are not resolved, the possibility for an improvement in regional stability is

perceptions are everything in politics. Many Japan-watchers

but the prime minister has yet to
convince regional publics that Japan will redress the issues of its contentious
history. This was made strikingly clear when he visited the Yasukuni Shrine war memorial in December. The
Economist put it nicely Abe visiting Yasukuni is the moral equivalent of Angela Merkel
visiting a monument that honours the Third Reich. Secondly, Japan stands alone
in denying the fact that there is an actual dispute over the Senkaku /Diaoyu
islands. Asked why Japan has not sent the festering dispute with China to the International Court of Justice,
Yamamoto stuck to the official line, saying that that there remains no doubt
low. Three factors explain this. For one,

accept Abes protestations that Japan will never again wage a war,

that the islands are part of Japanese territory . To rub it in, he added that neither China nor
Taiwan claimed the islands for almost 80 years (Japan claimed the islands in 1895, and China laid claim to the islands in
1971). Understandably, the Chinese do not agree . Taiwan held back from claiming the islands at
the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s due to the exigencies of the Cold War (read: Taiwan and Japan were
American allies arrayed against the Soviet Union and China). After China took over Taiwans United Nations membership in

No wonder the
Chinese have been apoplectic about the state of affairs over the islands . In the
1971, the baton for pressing the Chinese case for the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands passed to Beijing.

nine months prior to Japans nationalisation of the islands in September 2012, there were three Chinese incursions into

Tokyos
charm offensive would amount to little. The number of Chinese incursions
and the fact that the militaries of both countries have few crisis management
measures, such as hotlines means that any hot war would occur not by deliberation, but through a lack of it.
the territorial waters. In the eight months following, it spiked to 41 incursions. This leads us to a third reason

Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen underscored this last week in his keynote speech at the Fullerton Forum:
There

is real concern of miscalculation, if parties lack the trust or political will

to work with each other to defuse tensions.

Permutation: Call Japan 24 hours before the plan happens

to inform them
Empirically, the perm is considered consultation
Wolfowitz 09 (Paul,

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001-2005. A Conversation with Paul

Wolfowitz at the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Part of the two-day
conference, When Walls Came Tumbling Down: Berlin, 9/11, and U.S. Strategy in Uncertain Times.
10/26/09 http://www.c-spanarchives.org/program/id/214425)

If you tell someone youre about to do something 24 Hours before

you do it, its consultation. If you tell them 24 hours after youve done it, which is 36 hours after theyve
Its interesting.

read it in the press, its, as the Japanese call it, a Shocku.

Japan will say no to the counterplan they want to avoid

looking like a lap dog.
Michael J. Green 2010 senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS and is concurrently on the faculty at
Georgetown University. He served on the staff of the National Security Council from 2001 through 2005
and was special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs
from January 2004 to December 2005. Japans Confused Revolution The Washington Quarterly 33:1 pp.
319

The DPJs promise to move closer to Asia also sends confusing signals .
Hatoyama made news after his bilateral summit on the margins of the
September 2009 UN General Assembly with President Hu Jintao of China by
promising to create a new East Asian community that would, by
implication, exclude the United States . This, however, was not a new proposal16 since

LDP governments had already agreed to this vision in regional summit meetings held as far back as
2007.17 Nor is an exclusive East Asia community likely to become a reality any time soon, judging from
polling done by CSIS in late 2008 that demonstrated deep skepticism across the region, especially in
Japan, about whether security and economic prosperity could be sustained over the coming decades
without the United States.18 Indeed, from the perspective of U.S. national interests, more positive ties
between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors would be a welcome development, particularly

The
problem has been that the DPJ has often chosen to articulate its Asianist
vision as a kind of counterbalance to the United States, a theme that
Hatoyamas pledge not to inflame regional emotions about Japans historical aggression.

worked well during the campaign when the party was trying to portray
Koizumi as a U.S. lapdog, but one that now sends confusing signals to Washington.19

P-perm: test of competition

O-offense
S-solvency deficit
T- theory -interp. Consult Cp are illegitimate
Perm: We have obligations to keep Japan in the loop, so we can consult them
before the plan occurs.