Case No.

1 Jay Mark Balbosa

Tolentino vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Senator Guingona was nominated by former President Arroyo during the latters
succession in presidency in January 2001 and was confirmed by the Congress. A resolution
(Resolution No. 84) was passed certifying the existence of a vacant seat and should be filled
through a special election and well be simultaneously held by a general election on May 14,
2001. The said resolution then provide that the senator garnering the 13th highest vote shall
serve the unexpired seat vacated.
After the canvassing, Resolution 01-005 proclaimed the senators respondents as 12th and
13th in rank respectively and was declared final and official pursuant to Resolution No. 01-006 on
July 20, 2001. A petition was then filed contending that COMELEC failed to comply the following;
(1) failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled pursuant to Section 2, RA 6645, (2)
require the senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificate of candidacy required under
Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Bng. 881, and (3) failure to provide Voters Information Sheet
required under Section 4, paragrapgh 4 of RA 6646, thus the petitioner sought for the issuance
of temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition nullifying Resoliutions No. 5
and 6, Furthermore, ther shoul be separate canvassing of the special and regular election.

ISSUE: WON the special election simultaneously held together with the regular election valid.

RULING: No. The COMELEC failure to give notice of the time of the special election did not
negate the calling of such eelection/ in a special election, to fill a vacancy the rule is that the
statute expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general
election, fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding the special
eletion but empower some authority to fix the time and place after happening of a condition
precedent, the statutory provision on giving of notice is considered mandatory and failure to do
so will render the election a nullity.
In the instant case, Section 2 of RA 6645, itself provides that in case of vacancy in the
senate, the special election to fill thee vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill a vacancy in the senate
arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be
held in any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next proceeding regular

election on May 14, 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice
and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
Case No. 2 Rosa Fabiola Calog
Villavicencio vs. Lukban
FACTS:
Manila City Mayor Justo Lukban and the Chief of Police Anton Hohmann took custody of
170 women (prostitutes) against their will in order to clean the city from prostitution. The
women were sent to Davao as laborers. Some of these women and families filed petition for
habeas corpus in the court of Manila to bring back the women left in Davao. According to
respondent, the women were out from the jurisdiction of court because they were in Davao.
Hence, the case should be filed in Davao.
ISSUE:
WON the writ of habeas corpus was proper
RULING:
Yes. The essential object and purpose of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint was illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by Lukban and Chief of Police deprived these women of
freedom of locomotion just as if they had been imprisoned. Thus, tne writ of habeas of corpus
was proper.

Case No. 3 Mary Tweetie Antonette Semprun

Kuroda vs Jalandoni

Facts:
Petitioner was a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines from 1943-1944 who is

now charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the AFP for crimes
committed against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war. Petitioner seeks to establish the illegality of Executive
Order No. 68, prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the
prosecution and permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with this case.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the creation of Executive Order No. 68 is legal and applicable in the case at
bar?
2. Whether or not the absence of the Philippines as a signatory to the first Hague Convention
renders it unable to obtain jurisdiction with the case at bar?
Ruling:
1. The creation of Executive Order No. 68 speaks of the establishment of a National War
Crimes Office and is responsible for the trial of accused war criminals. The Court holds that this
order is valid and constitutional since it is clearly stated in Sec. 3, Article 2 of our Constitution
that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of law of the nation.
2. As mentioned above, it is clear that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. Even if the Philippines was not a
signatory of the first Hague Convention, the said convention laid rules and regulations that were
wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. Since this was accepted
by two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan and the Philippines was at that time
under the sovereignty of the US when the crimes were committed, we were equally bound
together with the US and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties
between two belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty, and thus, war crimes committed against our people and our
government while we were a Commonwealth, are triable and punishable by our present
Republic.

Case No. 4- Doreena Pauline Aranal

Agustin vs Edu

FACTS:
The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2,
1974, shows that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is
the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any
appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence. It has been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety during the Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization. The said convention which was
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 2077, recommended the enactment of
local legislation on the installation of road safety signs and devices to every motor vehicles, in
the interest of safety on all streets and highways.
The said Letter of Instruction requires all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall
have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device. It is on this
note, that the Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car,
Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking
lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land
transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended,
"clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power." For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of
Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in
the meanwhile.

Hence, this petition was issued to the court by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether the Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479
and 716 as well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal
protection of law and undue delegation of police power
RULING:
NO. The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229, as amended as well as the
implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure and exercise
of police power. Since the identified police power is compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety and general
welfare of the people. Also, the Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United
Nations Organization that was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of
road safety signs and devices cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in
the Constitution possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in
applying the rules for the interest of safety on all streets and highways.

Case No. 5- Legine Remayla

Inchong vs. Hernandez
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Chinese business man engaged in retail business sought to obtain a judicial
declaration that R.A. No. 1180 An Act to Regulate the Retail Business is unconstitutional, and
to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;

(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle
it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Petitioner claimed that the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Treaty of Amity
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China are violated by the law in
question on the ground of pacta sunt servanda.
ISSUE: WON R.A. 1180 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.
RULING:
Supreme Court found no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principles and with
R.A. 1180. Even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Notes:
Pacta sun servanda a latin term which means agreements must be kept based upon the
principle of good faith. The only limit to pacta sunt servanda is the peremptory norms of general
international law known as jus cogens which means compelling law.
Link
to
the
Treaty
of
Amity
between
RP
http://www.gov.ph/downloads/1955/02feb/19550203-PROC-0109-RM.pdf

and

RC

Case No. 6- Krizza Mae Dizon

IBP vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Joseph ejercito
Estrada ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime

prevention and suspension. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through
Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated letter of instruction 02/2000 which
detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan would be
conducted. On January 24, 2000, the president issued a memorandum to confirm his previous
directive on the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
Whether or not the presidentials factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and civilian character of the PHP.

RULING:
Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily
anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by
the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, interests that is shared by other groups & the
whole citizenry. IBPs fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession &
improve the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to

assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to
an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),
Article XVI of the Constitution.

Case No. 7- Paul Acasio

People vs. Lagman
Facts: Lagman and de Sosa reached 20 years of age in the year 1938. Lagman and de Sosa are
charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National
Defense Law. Both Lagman and de Sosa refused willfully and unlawfully to register in the military
service even when they were required to do so instead they only gave excuses. Each of these
appellants was sentenced by the court of first instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.
Issue: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does
not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein.

Case No. 8 Rianne Miranda

Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, a television program of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo (INC.), a duly
organized religious organization, is being aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13
every Sunday. The program airs INC's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions.

Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television VTR tapes of its TV program series no. 115, 119, 121, and 128. The board classified the
series as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Petitioner filed against the respondent Civil Case alleging that the respondent Board
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the
VTR tapes of its TV programs and in x-rating them. Respondent Board invoked its power under
PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court held a hearing on petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The parties submitted documentary evidence as exhibits. After evaluating the evidence of both
parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioners bond of P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs
which showed that the parties evidence was basically the evidence they submitted in the
hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The parties tried to reach an amicable accord. The
trial court rendered a judgment ordering respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary
permit for all the series of their program. INC, however, is directed to refrain from offending and
attacking other existing religions in showing the program.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration praying for the deletion of the second paragraph
of the dispositive portion of the Decision; and for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from
requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board
opposed the motion. The trial court granted petitioners motion for reconsideration. It ruled that
the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program; and that it did not act
with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against
another religion. It also found the series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program.
Whether or not, assuming it has the power, it gravely abused its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioners program.

RULING:
Under PD No. 1986, Section 3, the law gives the Board the power to screen, review, and
examine all television programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to
approve, delete prohibit theexhibition and television broadcast oftelevision programs

Further, the law directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to
determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or
good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with
a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.
Petitioner then contends that the term television program should not include religious
programs like its program for it contravenes Section 5, Article III of the Constitution which
guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
The Court iterates that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State
when it will bring about clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent.
Respondent Board disallowed the program series because of petitioners controversial
biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent
appellate court agreed and even held that the said attacks are indecent, contrary to law and
good customs.
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed
insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the
action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.
No costs.

Case No. 9 Sherwin Lingating

Aglipay vs Ruiz
FACTS:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. The statutory rule, in
the jurisdiction of this case is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or
tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an
officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section
23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty,
not mere religious toleration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
shall be issued.
RULING:
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE
STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES..
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. On
the contrary, it appears that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the

Philippines and its people. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government.
Upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, a conclusion has been made that there has been no constitutional infraction in
the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that
these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question
still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to
justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional
inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

Mao daw ni ang rason nga advantageous to the government ang stamps.
Note: It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.

Case No. 10 Eric Barrios

Taruc vs. Dela Cruz
Facts:
The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao City. Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano
for the reason that Fr. Floranos wifes family belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner
Tarucs. Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so he did not give in to the request.
Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr.
Ambong who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao.
Petitioners were then expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1)
disobedience to duly constituted authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in division of the

Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church
causing anxiety among the General Membership.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la
Cruz and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They
said that their rights to due process were violated because they were not heard before the order
of expulsion was made.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.
Ruling:
No.
It is stated in Article III, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
A form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority
is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical in nature. In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one
area, which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. To the power of
excluding form the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters, which are outside the province of civil courts.

Case No. 11- Teonilo Bagalanon

Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
This case was instituted when the other faction of Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), lead
by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca and thereafter Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, sued with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila Bishop Santiago A. Fonacier, the then acting Obispo

Maximo of IFI. The former sought to require Bishop Fonacier to render an accounting of his
administration of all the temporal properties in his possession belonging to the church and to
recover the properties from him since according to them, Mons. Fonacier was no longer the
Obispo Maximo.
In the instant case, Fonacier claimed his defenses that:

he has not been properly removed as Supreme Bishop;

his legal successor was Juan Jamias who had been elected in accordance with the church
constitution;

Bishop De los Reyes, Jr. formally joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of America and
for this reason ceased to be a member of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente;

Bishops De los Reyes and Bayaca having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and
practices of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, ceased to be members and consequently,
have no personality in filing the complaint.

On May 17, 1950, the lower court declared Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and
legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI, thereafter ordering Mons. Fonacier to render an accounting of
his administration of the properties and funds of the church.
When the suit was raised to the Court of Appeals, it affirmed the decision of the lower
court which convinces Fonacier to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Won the Supreme court have jurisdiction to review regarding the ouster bearing in mind
that in involves officials of a church sect?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the following cases:

(A) Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer,
or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the civil courts.
(B) Expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon
the civil courts when a property right is involved.

(C) Since it is claimed that the ouster was made by an unauthorized person, or in a manner

contrary to the constitution of the church, and that the ousted bishops were not given notice of
the charges against them nor were they afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts,
have jurisdiction to review the action regarding the ouster.
Furthermore, if the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then
the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. The court
concluded to affirm in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, any matter pertaining
to ecclesiastical customs, rule and law belongs exclusively to IFI.

Case No. 12 Meriam Wong

Taada vs Angara
Facts:
Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of Trade and Industry, represented the
Philippines in signing the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act) at Marrakesh, Morocco which agrees to the following: (1) to submit WTO
agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to
seeking the approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (2) to adopt
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. The Senate then received two letters from the President
of the Philippines regarding the agreement stated in the Final Act pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution.
Upon the adoption of the Senate to the Presidents resolution entitled Concurring in the
Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the President signed an Instrument of
Ratification for the ratification and confirmation of the Final Act. A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus was then filed, alleging that the WTO agreement violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipino (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. (Section
19, Article II, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII)
Issue:
W/N the WTO Agreement is in violation of the 1987 Constitution specifically the flagship
provisions, Section 19 of Article II, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII

Rulings:
By its very title, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. The principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for the
enforcement of courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. The principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II and some sections in Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. The do not embody
judicially constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
The Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprise, at the same time; it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry to foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only to foreign competition that is unfair.
Therefore, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

CASE NO. 14- STEPHANIE CASTILLO

G.R. No. 151445

April 11, 2002

Lim vs Executive Secreary

FACTS:
Personnel from the US Armed Forces started arriving in Mindanao to take part in Balikatan 021 in conjunction with the Philippine Military in the beginning of January 2002. In theory, they
are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. In the
meantime, the respective governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a
reduced scale. The lack of consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the
Visiting Forces Agreement (V FA) in 1999.
.On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
The petitioners argued that the(MDT) in 1951 provides mutual military assistance in accordance
with the 'constitutional processes' of each country only in the case of an armed attack by an
external aggressor. They also argued that neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American

soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory, not even to fire back "if fired
upon".
ISSUE: W/N the "Balikatan 02-1" is illegal and a violation of the constitution.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED.
MDT has been described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and
its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological
capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the
"Balikatan" is the largest of such training exercise directly supporting the MDT's objectives. It is
this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.
-It is clearly stated in the Terms of reference of the Balikatan that the US forces are prohibited in
engaging in war in Philippine territory

Case #15 - Imbong vs. Ochoa TUANDA AND LABIANO

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-inintervention.
A study of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to
health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal
protection clause, and involuntary servitude, among others. It is also contended that the RH Law
threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on
reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. While the petitioners
recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law
fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind
of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance
with
their
own
discretion
and
judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for
the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory
relief
over
which
the
Court
has
no
original
jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect. On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued
the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the
very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which
the
State
is
mandated
to
protect
and
promote.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy;
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule

2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
Ruling:
1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy;
a) Judicial Review:
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
b) Actual Controversy:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners
or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for

vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must,
at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
b) Facial Challenge:
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure.The Court is not persuaded. Consequently, considering that the
foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated
by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only
when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.
c) Locus Standi:
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi. In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one
can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

d) Declaratory Relief:
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
e) One Subject-One Title:

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph
of Section 2 of the RH Law.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be
"so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced
in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act."
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

a) Right to life
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. This has
resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and
the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.
Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were
legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of noabortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the

constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee

religious freedom.

b) Right to Health
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health in
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution. A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides
for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted
to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to
ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground
is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to
the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents
itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first
sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the
expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine
device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the
EDL supports this construction.

c) Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section
6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable. Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and

discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to
protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down
the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution.

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and
can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

d) The Family
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues
that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its
solidarity and total development. The Court cannot but agree. The 1987 Constitution is
replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the
The Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable
her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section
12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother
as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access
to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded
because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
e) Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education
has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other
interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6] Due Process
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of private
health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution
cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service
provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods
(as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23
(a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health.

7] Equal Protection
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7
of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8] Involuntary Servitude
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under
the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products." In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711
states To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be
called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH).
The functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures
the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended

that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, nonabortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards.
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be
equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH
Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the
regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate
the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner,
be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM,
the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion
of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments. Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest

CASE NO. 17- RAD ADASA

Oposa (petitioner) vs Fulgencio Factoran Jr. , Sec DENR (respondent)
Facts:

Petitioners are all minors duly represented by their parents against, Hon. Fulgencio
Factoran. Petitioners complaint, that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the National Resources Treasure, that is the Countrys virgin tropical forest, and ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons in his behalf to, cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country, and Cease and desist from receiving, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreement.
June 22, 1990, Sec. Factoran file a motion to dismiss the complaint based on grounds that
plaintiff has no cause of action against him and the case is a political question. On July 18, 1991,
the Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned complaint.
Plaintiff filed the instant civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of the Philippine Rainforest and the unabated hemorrhage of the Countrys vital life
support system and continued rape of Mother Earth.
Ruling:
Yes, Petitioners assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Thus
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under EO 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 Article 2 section
16 - To protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Section 15 - The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them
(The "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.)

CASE NO. 18 NIKKI EBILIO

MARCAPI vs. Reyes
FACTS:
Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines, INC., the petitioners, are
self-described Filipino entrepreneurs deeply involved in the business of marine radio
communications in the country; who operates shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore public marine
coastal radio stations, holds public convenience certificates duly issued by the National
Telecommunications Commission, and handles correspondence between vessel passengers or
crew and the public.
In July 1988, the Department of Transportation and Communications unveiled an P880million maritime coastal communications system project providing free of charge public
corresponding, designed to "ensure safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of

efficient communication facilities between coast stations and ship stations and the improvement
of safety in navigational routes at sea.
The petitioners brought the instant suit alleging that Secretary Reyes of DOTC had been
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. They argued that DOTC cannot compete in the business of
public correspondence by citing the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution
which states that the State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments. The Solicitor General
submitted that in spite of the said provision, the Government "cannot abandon its ministerial
functions of rendering public services to the citizenry which private capital would not ordinarily
undertake, or which by its very nature is better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than by any private individual or entity.
ISSUES:

Whether or not MARCAPIs petition was meritorious.

Whether or not there was taking within the constitutional sense

(or WON DOTC violated Art.2 Sec 20 of the Constitution)

RULING:

No. There is no merit in the petition. The petitioners cannot legitimately rely on the
provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution, to defeat the act complained of.
The mandate "recognizing the indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than
an acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation.
However, it is not a call for official abdication of duty to citizenry. The Constitution does
not bar the Government from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in the domain of
public service, and neither does it repudiate its primacy as chief economic caretaker of
the nation. The State aims to serve the people a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, [etc].. a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced
by the nation for the benefit of the people . With respect in particular to property, the
Constitution decreed
Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the
right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of
the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good
so demands.

No. The Court held that Department of Transportation and Communication, by providing
for free public correspondence, is not guilty of an uncompensated taking. The Court is
not of the thinking that the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just
compensation. Certainly, the Government has all the right to build the bridge hence, the
owner of the boat cannot charge the builder of the bridge for lost income.

NOTE:
*Exercise of Police Power for the general welfare

*Principle of laissez faire has long been denied validity in this jurisdiction. ^economic system is
free from government intervention
* Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and office [citations ]
~Kin Ebillo

CASE NO. 20
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO
SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
Angelo Lapinig

Facts:
A brief history of PAGCOR is that it was created by virtue of PD 1067 dated January 1, 1977 to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos over the Philippines. The operation was proved

success and later on thus the PD 1869 passed to enable the government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the
declared policy.
This case started when a TV ad proudly pronounces that the new PAGCOR is responding through
responsible gambling which the petitioners Humberto Basco, Balce, Maranan and Sanchez think
otherwise so they filed an instant petition to annul PAGCOR charter which otherwise known as
PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioner also added
up some reasons which are:
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, under
Sec 13 par (2) of PD 1869.
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has
intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p.
7, Rollo)
Issue:
Whether or not the petition will prosper against PAGCOR.
Whether or not the city of manila can impose taxes and legal fees to PAGCOR
Ruling:
No, The SC ruled that the petition is dismissed due to lack of merit because of the following
reason: that the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose also The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress so it is subject by its
control while the PD 1896 or PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government so
the local government cannot exercise their power to tax against it.

Case 21. Jhazeel Zhan Jebone

Guido v Rural Progress Administration

Facts:
This is a petition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Juan G.
Guidos land, which is composed of two adjoining lands with 22,655 total land area, situated in
Rizal, just outside the North Manila Boundary. The North Assembly approved this enactment on
the authority of Section 4 of article XIII of the Constitution, stating that, the congress may

authorize upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.

Issue: WON Act 539s provisions includes the expropriation of commercial lands.

Ruling:
No. Act 539 is no longer construed in consonant with the intention. Without Sec 5 of Art XIII as
basis, the right of eminent domain may be exercised with regard to appropriations done in
accordance with reason to solve serious economic and social problems. The expropriation of the
said land at bar is instituted for economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of
public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is
to take plaintiff's property, which she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's
security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the
premises. The petition is granted without special finding as to costs.

CASE NO. 22 Pamatong vs Comelec- Lowel Manuel

FACTS: On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. The
COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by
other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus
Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency. In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for

public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner likewise attacks
the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner
claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the
qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of
government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has violated the constitutional right of Rev. Pamatong of
the equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution.

RULING: The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to
opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002
outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Moreover, the Constitution
guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the
statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

CASE NO. 23- LESTER TRIAMBULO

VALENTIN
L.
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

LEGASPI, petitioner,

Fact:
The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.

These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said

Issue:
Can Legaspi invoked in this special civil action for mandamus to the Civil Service
Commission to disclose the said information?

Ruling:
Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 ConstitutionThe right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be
provided by law.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of
any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for
the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position

(24) COTABATO vs. GRP PEACE PANEL- Barrera and Ebal

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and to
prohibit the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining
the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)
RULING:
Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991).
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision
on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.