The Daily Star, Dhaka, February 19, 2006

Strategic implications of Bangladesh-China relations

Ruksana Kibria
Since establishing diplomatic relations three decades ago, Bangladesh-China friendship
has come a long way, and, despite the radical changes that have occurred during this
period in the domestic politics of both the countries as well as in the international arena,
the cooperation between them has endured and intensified. China has proved to be a
time-tested and reliable partner of Bangladesh, and has extended it economic and military
assistance, as well as diplomatic support.
During his visit to Bangladesh in April 2005, the Year of Friendship, Premier Wen
Jiabao said that China and Bangladesh were committed to establishing a comprehensive
and cooperative partnership of long-term friendship, equality and mutual benefits. From
the Bangladesh side too, it was reiterated in a similar spirit that Premier Wen's visit
constituted a renewal, a revival and a reaffirmation of a time-honoured friendship
between the two countries.
China currently plays a role in the maintenance of Bangladesh's security that no other
country does, it being the largest and most important provider of military hardware and
training to the latter's armed forces. Apart from that, it also has contributed much for the
improvement of Bangladesh's infrastructure, having already funded the construction of 6
'Friendship Bridges'. There is considerable scope for China, a country with an enormous
need for energy, to conduct oil and gas exploration in Bangladesh in a manner that would
be profitable for both. It's already playing an important role in the mining of coal in the
northern part of the country, and has also offered Bangladesh assistance in the peaceful
development of nuclear energy. In fact, energy has become a key factor in shaping
China's geopolitical and diplomatic strategy in parts of the world with energy resources.
During Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's visit to China in 1995, important accords were
signed concerning Chinese assistance in the development of gas and energy resources,
and management of water resources.
Despite robust trade links between the two countries, there is currently much to be
desired in this regard, with a huge trade gap prevailing in China's favour. It does
encourage a greater volume of imports from Bangladesh, but it remains up to the latter to
take appropriate steps to address this problem. There is also a nagging issue concerning
the garments sector where China could turn into Bangladesh's competitor, but given the
overall political climate, it is not something that cannot be settled amicably. China has not
only shown great interest about making investments in Bangladesh, but is also keen about
its investments in China, though Bangladesh is yet to make big strides in this matter. The
recently established direct air link between Kunming and Chittagong is another milestone
in their bi-lateral relations. Extending port facilities to China would also be valuable since
China is at present making efforts to ensure access to naval/port facilities in the Indian
Ocean region in order to protect the sea lanes of communication through which a huge

volume of oil is expected to flow. In return, Bangladesh could earn economic benefits as
well as enhance its strategic value. There is also scope for China to construct a deepwater port in Chittagong that could serve the strategic and commercial interests of both
the countries.
While an important aspect of Bangladesh-China relations is economic, it is not the sole
basis on which the edifice of bilateral cooperation has been constructed. The fact is that
this relationship is primarily politico-military in nature, which derives its significance
when studied in the context of Sino-Indian competition in South Asia. What is apparently
seen as purely economic and commercial also has profound political and strategic
implications for both China and Bangladesh which this article seeks to highlight Before
discussing the future prospects of this relationship, a brief survey of China is in order.
China, as is widely known, is an emerging major power, whose GDP is expected to
overtake that of the United States by 2025. For the last two decades China has managed
to maintain an average annual growth rate of about 9%, which has become not only a
source of envy but also apprehension among other countries, particularly Western, where
there is a serious concern as to how this economic power would be wielded in the future.
China has consistently adopted a diplomatic strategy with two basic goals: to maintain a
peaceful environment conducive to its economic development, and to minimise the scope
for the United States and its allies to thwart China's rise, and its foreign policy goals. In
other words, at present its priority is stability, and avoiding moves that could be perceived
as threatening by other major powers. It nevertheless, does seek to restrain the unbridled
exercise of American power, but in a muted and non-confrontational manner. The latter,
however regards China as a potential adversary, and is therefore exploring ways to subtly
contain it, including mobilising India's support to check the increasing Chinese influence
in the Indian Ocean area.
This, in broad terms sets the tenor of China's foreign policy goals. In specific terms, it has
its own set of strategic interests to promote in South Asia. The principal Chinese goal is
to prevent the rise of any peer competitor or rival in Asia, capable of challenging China's
role in the Asia-Pacific region. It particularly seeks to keep India's power and influence
confined within its borders, and to enhance China's influence in South Asia which India
regards as its near abroad. In this regard the smaller South Asian countries, including
Bangladesh, could play an important role in promoting Chinese interests in the emerging
regional order.
As it is, China does regard Bangladesh as having the potentials to facilitate its security
interests in the region, it being viewed as the doorway to the volatile Northeast region of
India. Bangladesh could play a crucial role in connecting southwestern China with South
Asia by a land route. Construction of road links between Bangladesh and China via
Myanmar is therefore necessary for fostering closer bonds between them, since that may
enable the creation of a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh growth triangle with the potentials
to draw Northeast India into its de facto sphere of influence. Such links could also serve
military purposes in future. Besides, Bangladesh, along with Myanmar, is also in a
position to provide it access to the Bay of Bengal, and through it, the much-coveted

access to the Indian Ocean. The question, however, remains as to what extent Bangladesh
can accommodate Chinese strategic interests without jeopardizing its own. To answer this
vital question, one needs to take into account both short/medium and longer term views.
Currently the Bangladesh-China relations are regarded to be within acceptable bounds
by both India and the United States, two countries whose security sensitivities in the
region Bangladesh is at present not in a position to disregard, since doing so would elicit
adverse reactions from both. For the short/medium term, say for the next decade or so,
Bangladesh, as a matter of policy would need to reassure that it is not siding with
China against India, or for that matter, any third country. Under the present circumstances
Bangladesh faces considerable geo-political limitations concerning the endorsement of
China's security agenda in the region -- nor can Bangladesh overlook these. There are
thus compelling reasons for it to act very deftly by balancing all the factors that are
involved here, and move in a measured, restrained and non-provocative manner. As it is,
the signing in December 2002 (during Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's visit to China), of
the Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement raised suspicion in India as to its
actual scope and intent. The terms of this Agreement have been deliberately left
unarticulated, flexible and ambiguous, so as to allow Bangladesh to reap the benefits of a
strategic partnership with a nuclear power without involving itself in any formal defence
arrangement, which would pose problems for it. Nor would China want any such formal
arrangement since that, in turn would create tension in the region, which would be
counter-productive for it at this point. The Agreement would nevertheless create
uncertainties, and complicate defence planning/calculations in India, and elsewhere.
Under the prevailing circumstances, Bangladesh's China policy should be like Goldilock's
porridge neither too warm, nor too cool, but just the right temperature. Whether
Bangladesh has the capacity and political acumen to pull the trick and produce the rabbit
of its strategic interests out of the hat of diplomatic legerdemain is however, another
question. A prudent policy for Bangladesh in the short to medium term would be to
pursue a slow but steady expansion of military and strategic cooperation with China, thus
retaining scope for making adjustments so that the relationship can move in the right
direction.
While no dramatic changes are expected in Bangladesh-China relations during this
period, in the longer term, that is beyond 2020 (perhaps even earlier), there is likely to be
a significantly different scenario. If by then China maintains internal peace and order,
national leadership, high economic growth rate, massive inflow of foreign investment and
regional stability, it would be in a position to emerge as a major power. Its military power
is also expected to grow commensurate with the economic, with a true blue water navy
capable of projecting its power in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In actual terms it
would mean that not only the balance of influence be in its favour (which it already
enjoys), but the overall balance of power too would be, and thus enabling China to shape
the regional security environment and assert its dominance. In that case, it would be
problematic for Bangladesh to be reluctant about moving beyond the rhetoric of
friendship and avoid the compulsions of a strategic alignment with China, and at the
same time benefit from the latter's economic prosperity. It would have to be more
attentive to China's political goals, and show deference to its geo-political interests, views

and values. Once South Asia comes within China's sphere of influence (and become its
backyard), and its strategic dominance is firmly established (with the Bay of Bengal
virtually turning into a Chinese lake), India, lagging behind in economic and military
terms, is likely to buy peace by acquiescing in China's political-economic-military
preeminence. It would also become difficult for it to deter Bangladesh from forging
closer strategic links with China. The logic of the situation would render China a South
Asian power and make its participation in any regional forum, security or otherwise,
inevitable. If by then the United States allows its resources to be drained by continuing to
prosecute its unproductive, indefinite and costly war on terrorism, its economic power as
well as its capacity for leadership may attenuate, resulting in the erosion of US political
and military role in the Asia-Pacific. Under such a scenario the American predicament in
the region would involve making efforts at challenging China's preeminence in South
Asia, and at the same time preventing India from raising questions about the wisdom of
toeing the US line at the cost of sacrificing its national interests and improving relations
with China. With Bangladesh firmly in the security orbit of China, US ability to contain
the latter may become complicated, which is expected to become a much more
formidable adversary than the former Soviet Union ever was.
It could therefore be postulated that in the next 15 years or so, Bangladesh and China will
hopefully have overcome the existing constraints in their relationship, and have achieved
a true strategic and defence partnership, conducive to the establishment of a peaceful and
prosperous South Asia. It would be in the interest of Bangladesh to promote China's geopolitical goals in South Asia, since a convergence of their strategic interests would augur
well for the regional balance of power. At the same time it would be instrumental in
redressing the vulnerabilities that Bangladesh faces at present, and facilitate its
transformation into a politically, economically and geo-strategically more secure country.
For this to occur, Bangladesh needs dynamic, pragmatic and effective political leadership
capable of correctly assessing national interests and setting national priorities, identifying
the main challenges and creatively engaging them through an appropriate mix of policy
tools. It is also necessary to ensure that its foreign policy is informed by a strategic vision
as well by economic considerations, that realistically gauges the direction of regional and
international changes. The Chinese Premier has affirmed in unequivocal terms that,
"Developing a comprehensive and cooperative partnership with Bangladesh is an
important component part of China's good-neighbourly policy." It's important for
Bangladesh to articulate and sustain a similar policy, since upholding its security and
viability as an independent state would necessitate it. The rise of China may be perceived
as a threat by some countries, but for Bangladesh it's an opportunity that it can hardly
afford to forgo.