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or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.
Here, the
copies of the assailed court issuances were attested by Mr. Leon Barrera, the then
Cavite CFI Deputy Clerk of Court. The only reason the CA regarded those court
orders as private was that they were not reconstituted after the original court
records had been destroyed in a fire.
Same; Same; Reconstitution of judicial records under Act 3110 are
undertaken after they have been lost only with respect to pending proceedings where
the subject case had not yet been decided.But reconstitution cannot apply where,
as in the land registration action in question, the trial had already ended and the
court had indeed already decided. Reconstitution of judicial records under Act
3110 are undertaken after they have been lost only with respect to pending
proceedings where the subject case had not yet been decided. It does not apply to
closed and decided cases.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Conclusions and findings of fact of a trial
judge are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless
strong and compelling evidence to the contrary exists.It is settled that the
conclusions and findings of fact of a trial judge are entitled to great weight and
should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and compelling evidence to the
378
G.R. No. 177392.November 26, 2012.*

PAZ DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. FELIX H. LIMCAOCO, Z. ROJAS AND
BROS., REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TAGAYTAY CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 177421.November 26, 2012.*
LUDIVINA LANTIN-ROJAS, LEANDRITO L. ROJAS, ROSEMARIE T. ROJAS,
LEURENCIO L. ROJAS, MA. STELLA ROJAS, TERESITA ROJAS, JOCELYN
ROJAS, VIRGINIA SALCEDO ROJAS, BAILIA ROJAS-FOJAS, EULOGIA
ROJAS-CORPUS, VIRGILIO ROJAS, ELIZABETH ROJAS, THERESA V. ROJASPERALTA, MANUELITA V. ROJAS, HONORIO V. ROJAS, SYLVIA ROJAS, and
MARIA R. JOCO-SHIRANI, in substitution of Z. ROJAS AND BROS.,
petitioners, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PAZ DEL ROSARIO, and FELIX LIMCAOCO,
respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Tenancy; Elements of Tenancy; Tenancy cannot be simply
presumed.Tenancy cannot be simply presumed. To
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
377
VOL.686,NOVEMBER26,2012
DelRosariovs.Limcaoco
exist, it must have the following elements: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant. Here,
it appears from the records that the Amulongs did not enter into an agricultural
lease with the owner. They cultivated the land at their own expense and for their
own benefit and never shared the produce of the land with anyone.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Public Documents; As public documents, the due
execution and authenticity of court decisions and orders need not be proved to make
them admissible in evidence.Notably, the contested documents are court
decisions and orders, which are undoubtedly public in character. As public
documents, their due execution and authenticity need not be proved to make them
admissible in evidence. Their existence may be evidenced by an official publication
3
377
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
78
contrary exists. In comparison, appellate magistrates merely read and rely
on the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of stenographic notes and the
original records brought before them. This places the trial judge in a better
position to examine the real evidence and calibrate the testimonies of the
witnesses at the stand.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Capacillo Law Office for petitioner Paz del Rosario.
Ignacio, Ignacio & Associates Law Offices for Eulogia Rojas Corpus.
Orioste, Lim & Calderon Law Offices for L. Rojas, et al.
San Pedro, San Pedro, San Pedro & Associates for respondent Felix
Limcaoco.
ABAD,J.:
These cases refer to various claims over a vast parcel of land in Tagaytay, the
ownership of which had been previously awarded in a land registration proceeding
but no decree of registration has as yet been issued pursuant to such award.
complaint-in-intervention. Civil Cases TG-411 and TG-796 were eventually

consolidated and jointly tried.
On October 17, 1997 the RTC rendered a decision, declaring Z. Rojas and
Bros. as the true and lawful owner of the subject land, annulling Limcaocos Free
Patent and OCT, and ruling that Del Rosario merely acquired a possessory right of
tenancy over the land. Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000 Z. Rojas and Bros. was
dissolved and was substituted by the Rojas
380
The Facts and the Case

Three different claims on a 12.5-hectare of land in Maitim II, Tagaytay City,
Cavite, brought about these cases. Paz Del Rosario (Del Rosario) contends that in
1976 she bought the land from the Amulong family which had been in peaceful
and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial. Del Rosario
presented a copy of the February 27, 1976 Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan that
evidences the sale. Felix H. Limcaoco (Limcaoco), the other claimant, alleges that
he bought the same land from one Eugenio Flores as shown by a Febru379
ary 13, 1976 Deed of Absolute Sale. Finally, Z. Rojas and Bros., the third claimant,
claims that the spouses Honorio and Maria Rojas bought the land as early as 1932
from the spouses Petrona Amulong and Agapito Acosta.
Upon learning that the government issued a free patent in Limcaocos favor,
on June 7, 1977 Del Rosario filed a complaint for reconveyance against him before
the Tagaytay Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case TG-411. Later, Z. Rojas and
Bros., a partnership, filed a complaint-in-intervention in the case, pointing out
that the spouses Rojas had donated the subject land to their children, who in turn
had applied for the registration of the property in their names with the then Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite which rendered a Decision on April 17, 1941,
granting the application. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the CFI Decision on
December 29, 1942.
On September 15, 1981 Z. Rojas and Bros. also filed a petition with the
Bureau of Lands for the cancellation of Limcaocos Free Patent 578173 and
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) OP-165. After hearing, the Director of Lands
recommended the cancellation of the subject Free Patent and OCT, which
recommendation the Ministry of Natural Resources approved. On February 27,
1984 the Republic of the Philippines filed, through the Bureau of Lands, a
complaint for the cancellation of Free Patent 578173 and OCT OP-165 before the
Tagaytay RTC in Civil Case TG-796 in which Z. Rojas and Bros. again filed a
380
379
heirs.1 The court granted the motion for substitution on July 19, 2000. The appeals
brought before the CA were joined and docketed as CA-G.R. CV 76599.
On April 28, 2006 the CA rendered a decision holding that, while the Rojas
heirs appear to have a just title over the property, the partnership of Z. Rojas and
Bros., which had a separate and distinct personality, did not. The CA further held
that its determination is without prejudice to the claim of the individual Rojas
heirs over the property and to pending or future proceedings leading to the grant
of such claim. The appellate court, however, affirmed the rest of the RTC Decision.
Del Rosario and the Rojas heirs appealed to this Court in G.R. 177392 and G.R.
177421, respectively.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue in these cases is whether or not the CA committed error in
declaring the Rojas heirs, rather than Del Rosario or Z. Rojas and Bros.,
substituted by the same heirs, the true and lawful owner of the subject Tagaytay
City land.
The Ruling of the Court
Del Rosario mainly claims that she was a purchaser for value and in good
faith, having bought the land from the Amulong sisters and their husbands as
evidenced by theKasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan dated February 27, 1976.
But, when Miguela Amulong, one of Josefas daughters, took the witness
stand, she testified as follows:
_______________
1 Consisting of Ludivina Lantin-Rojas, Leandrito L. Rojas, Rosemarie T.

Rojas, Leurencio L. Rojas, Ma. Stella Rojas, Teresita Rojas, Jocelyn Rojas, Virginia
Salcedo-Rojas, Basilia Rojas-Fojas, Eulogia Rojas-Corpus, Virgilio Rojas, Elizabeth
Rojas, Theresa V. Rojas-Peralta, Manuelita V. Rojas, Honorio V. Rojas, Sylvia
Rojas, and Maria R. Joco-Shirani; id., at pp. 238-241.
381
Q:Your father or mother, Josefa Garcia and Luis Amulong, had no tax
declaration over this property, is it not?
A:I do not know, sir.
x x x x
Q:Do you know that properties owned by people in Tagaytay or
anywhere else has the so-called tax declaration in order to pay
realty taxes to the city or in any place where it is situated?
A:I do not know because we have no property, sir.
Q:And what did you sell in that exhibit A if you have no right?
A:Only our right to farm, our tenancy right, sir .2 (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on the above testimony, the RTC ruled that Del Rosario merely
acquired the Amulongs tenancy rights. But, as the CA noted, this ruling
contradicts the RTCs order in the dispositive portion of its decision that ordered
Del Rosario to surrender the possession of the property to Z. Rojas and Bros. As
the appellate court pointed out, if tenancy really existed, then the surrender of the
property to the alleged rightful owner would not be proper because tenants are
entitled to security of tenure.3
Tenancy cannot be simply presumed. To exist, it must have the following
elements: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter
of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant.4 Here, it appears from the records that the
_______________
2 Rollo (G.R. 177392), pp. 91-92.
3 Galope v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 733, 740.
4 Granada v. Bormaheco, Inc., G.R. No. 154481, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 259,
268.
382
382
381
Amulongs did not enter into an agricultural lease with the owner. They cultivated
the land at their own expense and for their own benefit and never shared the
produce of the land with anyone.
What Del Rosario actually bought from the Amulongs was, therefore, merely
the right of possession, consistent with the facts claimed by the Rojas heirs. In a
letter dated February 2, 1982 the Bureau of Lands directed an investigation on the
different claims on that vast land in Tagaytay. The Director of Lands found that
before the Japanese occupation, the Rojas children appointed Remigio Garcia as
caretaker of the subject property. When he died, his daughter, Josefa Garcia, wife
of Luis Amulong, took over the property. Josefa then employed her daughters and
their husbands to work in the farm. On February 27, 1976 the Amulongs sold the
property to Del Rosario for P100,000.00, without the consent and knowledge of the
Rojases.5
The Director of Lands investigation further revealed that the spouses Honorio
Rojas and Maria Sipriaso bought the property in controversy from the Amulong
family on July 16, 1932. On that same day, they transferred the property to their
six children by way of donation. On August 14, 1939 the Rojas children filed a
petition for registration and confirmation of title over the property before the CFI
of Cavite in Land Registration Case 309, G.L.R.O. Record 51353. On April 17,
1941 the land registration court rendered a decision, declaring the registration of
the parcel of land in favor of the Rojases. The CA thereafter affirmed the
registration on December 29, 1942 in G.R. 9120, and from there, no more appeal
was ever made.
Consequently, on February 10, 1943 the land registration court issued an
Order, directing the Judicial Land Title Division of the Department of Justice to
cause the preparation and issuance of the appropriate decree over the subject
prop_______________
5 Rollo (G.R. 177421), pp. 197-198.
383
383
erty for the Rojas children. When Manuel Rojas, however, was incarcerated by the
Japanese during World War II, the documents pertaining to the Tagaytay land
were confiscated from him. Still, the Rojases continued paying the real estate
taxes on the property which they had been doing since 1940. Sometime in
December 1949 they formed a partnership named Z. Rojas and Brothers and
contributed the subject parcel of land to constitute the partnerships capital.
It is indubitable that the April 17, 1941 CFI Decision in the land registration
case granting the Rojases application, the December 29, 1942 CA Decision
affirming that grant, and the February 10, 1943 CFI Order in the land registration
case all prove the Rojases ownership of the land. Still, the CA regarded these
documents as private and that their due execution and authenticity need first be
established before they can be admitted in evidence.
Notably, the contested documents are court decisions and orders, which are
undoubtedly public in character.6 As public documents, their due execution and
authenticity need not be proved to make them admissible in evidence. 7Their
existence may be evidenced by an official publication or by a copy at_______________
6 Rule 132, Section19.Classes of documents.For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts
of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills
and testaments; and
(c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis ours)
7 Evidence (A Restatement for the Bar), Willard B. Riano, 2006, p. 119.
384
384
tested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.8Here, the copies of the
assailed court issuances were attested by Mr. Leon Barrera, the then Cavite CFI
Deputy Clerk of Court. The only reason the CA regarded those court orders as
private was that they were not reconstituted after the original court records had
been destroyed in a fire.9
But reconstitution cannot apply where, as in the land registration action in
question, the trial had already ended and the court had indeed already
decided.10 Reconstitution of judicial records under Act 3110 11 are undertaken after
they have been lost only with respect to pending proceedings where the subject
case had not yet been decided. It does not apply to closed and decided cases.12
And even assuming that the subject documents may be regarded as private in
character,13 the Rojases presented Mr. Barrera, the retired Cavite CFI Deputy
Clerk of Court, who established by his testimony and various supporting papers,
_______________
8 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 24.
9 Supra note 2, at p. 96.
10 Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 257 Phil. 433, 442; 176 SCRA 420, 429
(1989).
11 ENTITLED AN ACT TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE
RECONSTITUTION OF THE RECORDS OF PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND
BOOKS, DOCUMENTS, AND FILES OF THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
DESTROYED BY FIRE OR OTHER PUBLIC CALAMITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
12 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 195 Phil. 9, 17; 108 SCRA 109, 114
(1981).
13 Rule 132, Section20.Proof of private document.Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
a.By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b.By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be. (Emphasis ours)
385
the due execution and authenticity of the documents in question.14 Thus:
Q:Do you know if a decision was ever rendered in the case by the Court
of First Instance of Cavite?
385
A:There was a decision rendered in year 1941.

Q:Now, I would like to show to you a document which appears to be a
decision in Case Number 309, Zosimo Rojas, et al. versus
Hammon Buch, et al. Will you inform the Court what relation has
this to the decision that you have mentioned a while ago?
A:This is a copy of that decision, sir.
Q:Now, I noticed that at the last page thereof, there is a signature
appearing above the printed name Leon Barrera, who is described
or identified as Deputy Clerk of Court. Could you tell us whose
signature is that?
A:That is my signature, sir.
_______________
14 (1) A photocopy of the Notice of Original Hearing issued by Cavite CFI
Judge Francisco Zulueta, and attested by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office on August 19, 1936; (2) A Certification dated
August 3, 1979 issued by the Librarian for Technical Services of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, to the effect that Land
Registration Case 309, G.L.R.O. 51353 was published in the Official
Gazette, Vol. XXXIV No. 122, pp. 1979-1980; (3) A true copy of the
Decision of the Court of First Instance in Land Registration Case 309
made in the Spanish language issued and signed by Leon Barrera,
Deputy Clerk of Court; and a copy of its English translation; (4) A
copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Second Division in G.R.
9120 made in Spanish, and a copy of its English translation; (5) A
Certification by the Assistant Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals
relative to a certified photocopy of the entire page 277 of Official List
of Decisions Promulgated from 1936 to 1942 of the Court of
Appeals; and (6) An unsigned copy of an Order of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Land Registration Case 309, G.L.R.O. 51353 for
the issuance of the decree; Rollo (G.R. 177421), pp. 199-200.
386
386
Q:I also noticed, Mr. Barrera, that there is a phrase here which states a
true copy. Now, could you tell the Court where is the original of
this decision?
A:I believe it was burned when the Provincial Capitol Building was
razed by fire in Cavite City.
x x x x
Q:Mr. Witness, could you tell us who prepared a copy of this decision
which you have identified a while ago?
A:Well, as far as my memory wont fail me, I think this is a carbon
copy of the original.
Q:Now, where is the original, as you have said?
A:It was burned, sir.
Q:Now, I also noticed at the last page of this decision initials appearing
as EG/MF. Is there any significance on these initials?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:Now, could you tell what is the significance of these initials?
A:EG pertains to Judge Eulalio Garcia, and the MF, is the initial of the
stenographer, Manuel Flores.
Q:Now, you said that this is a carbon original. However, I noticed that
there is a signature above the printed name of the Judge Eulalio
Garcia. Would you explain or do you know the reason why?
A:Well, usually, Judge Eulalio Garcia does not sign the copy, the carbon
copy. It is only the original, sir.
Court:Are you trying to say that while the judge would sign the first
original copy, the duplicate original, the triplicate original or the
fourth original are no longer signed by the judge, as that was his
practice?
A:Yes, sir.
x x x x
Court:Mr. Witness, the question is, after the decision has been rendered by
the Court of First Instance, you said the case was appealed?
A:Yes, your Honor.387
387
Court:Do you know to what particular office it was appealed, the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals because these are the two higher
courts?
A:To the Honorable Court of Appeals, your Honor.
Court:Now, what happened after this appeal took place, if any decision or
resolution came out and was furnished your court?
A:There was a decision of the Court of Appeals we received
personally from a messenger or employee of the Court of
Appeals.
x x x x
Q:Before you submitted the decision to the Judge, to the then Judge
Eulalio Garcia, what did you do before submitting the same to the
judge? Before submitting to the judge, what did you do with the
decision?
A:I attached the decision of the Court of Appeals with the records of the
Court, together with all the exhibits, sir.
x x x x
Q:x x x When you submitted the decision to the judge, what else did you
do?
A:The judge after reading the decision told me to prepare the
order for the issuance of the decree for his signature.
Q:Were you able to prepare the order from the issuance of the decree as
ordered by the Court?
A:Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q:I am going to show to you a document purported to be an order
for the issuance of the decree, will you please tell us if it has any
connection with the order you mentioned a while ago?
A:This is a copy of the order of the issuance of the decree, and original of
which was signed by the judge. Judge Eulalio Garcia.
Q:What made you say that this a copy?
A:I was the one who prepared this.388
388
Q:What is your indication appearing in the recording or document
which would show that you were the one who prepared the
document?
A:My initials appear on this duplicate.
Q:Will you please point the same?
A:L.B., Leon Barrera.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court also held that the fact that no decree has as yet been issued
cannot divest the Rojases of their title to and ownership of the land in question.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may issue
a decree. The reason is that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be enforced against the adverse party. 16 The Court does not find
any cogent reason to deviate from the rulings of the Tagaytay RTC.
It is settled that the conclusions and findings of fact of a trial judge are
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and
compelling evidence to the contrary exists. 17 In comparison, appellate magistrates
merely read and rely on the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of
stenographic notes and the original records brought before them. This places the
trial judge in a better position to examine the real evidence and calibrate the
testimonies of the witnesses at the stand.18
Finally, the CA held that although the Rojases might indeed have a just title
to the property, they do not necessarily share it with Z. Rojas and Bros. the
partnership.19 The appellate court even indirectly suggests that, since Z. Rojas and
_______________
15 Supra note 2, at pp. 99-101.
16 Republic v. Nillas, 541 Phil. 277, 285; 512 SCRA 286, 295 (2007).
17 Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Juan Valdez, G.R. No. 159101, July 27, 2011, 654
SCRA 467, 487.
18 Bastian v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160811, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 43,
53.
19 Rollo (G.R. 177421), pp. 86-87.
389
Bros. had no legal interest in the land, the Rojas heirs should just institute a new
action to claim ownership of the same.
Upon review of the records, however, it would appear that sometime in
December 1949 the Rojas heirs transferred the ownership of the property to Z.
Rojas and Bros. when they contributed it as the partnerships capital. And when
the partnership was dissolved on May 25, 2000, Z. Rojas and Bros. filed a motion
for its substitution by the Rojas heirs, which the trial court granted on July 14,
2000. No one has challenged that substitution.
389
In any case, the rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. A strict and rigid application of such rules would but tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. If this Court were to follow the
CA ruling, the Rojases would be forced to go through another calvary, presenting
the same set of evidence and again proving the fact of their ownership,
notwithstanding that they already did so against stiff oppositions offered by other
determined claimants. The Rojases have already waited for over three decades. It
is highly unjust to make them wait for several decades more.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 177421, REVERSES
and SETS ASIDE the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV 76599 dated April 28, 2006,
REINSTATES and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytays Decision in
Civil Cases TG-411 and TG-796 dated October 17, 1997, and DISMISSES for lack
of merit the petition in G.R. 177392.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,** Peralta*** (Acting Chairperson), Mendoza and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
_______________
** Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., per Special Order 1361 dated November 19, 2012.
*** Per Special Order 1360 dated November 19, 2012.
390
390
Petition in G.R. No. 177421 granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Judgment of Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay reinstated and affirmed.
Notes.The elements of tenancy must first be proved by substantial evidence
which can be shown through records, documents, and written agreements between
the parties. A principal factor, too, to consider in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists is the intent of the parties. (Stanfilco Employees Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. DOLE Philippines, Inc.
[Stanfilco Division], 606 SCRA 23 [2009])
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public
document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in
evidence. (Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA 135 [2012])
o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
370
HeirsofJuanandInesPanganibanvs.Dayrit
G.R. No. 151235. July 28, 2005.*
HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN & INES PANGANIBAN, namely: ERLINDA B.

PACURSA, ERNESTO P. BACONGA, EVELYN BACONGA, AMY B. BIHAG,
SIEGFREDO BACONGA, IMELDA B. PACALDO, REBECCA B. LI, OFELIA B.
OALIVAR, GEMMA BACONGA, MARIE INES BACONGA, MELANIE
BACONGA, and ANITA FUENTES, petitioners, vs.ANGELINA N. DAYRIT,
respondent.
Land Titles; Reconstitution of Title; If a certificate of title has not been lost
but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and
the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of a new title.The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of
title in petitioners possession is valid and subsisting. This Court had already
ruled in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals that if a certificate of title has not been
lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void
and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for issuance of a new title. Since the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864
earlier issued to Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over respondents petition for reconstitution of title. The duplicate
certificate of title subsequently issued to respondent is therefore void and of no
effect.
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
371
*
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
Civil Law; Property; Laches; Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover
possession of the property by virtue of the equitable defense of laches.Petitioners
ownership of the property having been established, the question now is whether
they are entitled to its possession. On this point, the Court rules in the negative.
Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of
the equitable defense of laches. Thus, petitioners argument that laches is not
applicable to them has no merit.
Same; Same; Same; Even a registered owner of property may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.In our jurisdiction, it is an
enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. Thus, in the case ofLola v.
Court of Appeals, this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned
by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondents
failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v.
Catalino, this Court said that appellants passivity and inaction for more than
thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the
equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia, we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued possession for
thirty-seven (37) years, the original owners right to recover possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latters long period of
possession and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.
371
Same; Same; Same; Elements of Laches.All the four (4) elements of laches
prescribed by this Court in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al. and
reiterated in the cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, Miguel v.
Catalino and Claverias v. Quingcoare present in the case at bar, to wit: (1) conduct
on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or preju372
3
72
dice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or
the suit is not held to be barred.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar and Asuncion Law Officesfor petitioners.
Lagamon, Barba, Lupeba and Associates for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the partial reversal of
the Decision1 and the Resolution2denying the motion for reconsideration rendered
by the Court of Appeals (CA) Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57148.
This case stemmed from a petition for cancellation of owners duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT)No. 7864 of the Registry of Deeds of Misamis
Oriental and recovery of damages filed by the heirs of Juan and Ines Panganiban,
more particularly Erlinda B. Pacursa, Ernesto P. Baconga, Asito P. Baconga and
Anita B. Fuentes, against Angelina N. Dayrit, respondent herein, on 3 April
1992.3 The petition was later amended to add the heirs of Asito P. Baconga as
petitioners upon the latters death and to include a prayer for quieting of title over
the property in dispute.4
The undisputed operative facts follow.
The property subject of controversy is a two thousand twenty-five (2,025)square meter portion of a lot denominated
_______________
sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter subsequently discovered that what

she had bought was registered land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the
back of OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of the
owners copy of said title, docketed as Misc. Case No. 90-018 in March 1990. This
petition of the respondent alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda
_______________
RTC Records, Vol. 2, p. 730.
Id., Vol. 1, p. 359.
7
Ibid. Rollo, p. 95.
8
RTC Records, Vol. 2, pp. 730-731, 805.
9
Rollo, p. 11.
10
Ibid.
374
5
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurred in by Associate

Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Hilarion L.
Aquino (retired); Rollo, pp. 70-80.
2
Rollo, p. 82.
3
RTC Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-7.
4
Id., at pp. 158-165.
373
1
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
373
as Lot 1436, situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City. It constitutes threefourths (3/4) of Lot 1436, one of the three (3) lots covered by OCT No. 7864, the
other two being Lots 1441 and 1485. OCT No. 7864 was registered in the names of
Juan Panganiban (Juan) and Ines Panganiban (Ines), father and daughter
respectively, on 17 April 1940. 5Juan died sometime in June 1942 6 while Ines, his
only child, died in April 1944.7
In the amended complaint filed with the trial court, petitioners alleged that
they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited from the late
Juan and Ines. They acknowledge that Lot 1436 was the only remaining lot
covered by OCT No. 7864, Lots 1485 and 1441 having been sold in 1949 to Galo
Sabanal and Pablo Dagbay respectively, by virtue of a deed denominated
asExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs and Sale.8
The owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost
but upon petition with the trial court in 1977 by Erlinda B. Pacursa (Erlinda), one
of the heirs of Ines and a petitioner herein, the trial court granted the
petition.9 Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners
duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to Erlinda.10
Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo
(Salcedo) asserted ownership over Lot 1436 and believing that it was unregistered,
374
was lost in the fire that razed Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City in 1981. While the
petition mentioned Erlinda as the last one in possession of the alleged lost owners
duplicate copy of the title, she was not notified of the proceedings.11
The petition in Misc. Case No. 90-018 was subsequently granted and the
Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of
OCT No. 7864 to respondent.12 This second duplicate certificate issued to
respondent contained Entry No. 160180, the annotation of a Notice of Adverse
Claim filed by Erlinda.13 The Notice of Adverse Claim14 dated 24 February 1992
alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan and Ines, the
registered owners of the property, and as such, she has a legitimate claim thereto.
Petitioners further alleged that the newly issued owners duplicate certificate
of OCT No. 7864 to respondent was prejudicial to their previously issued title
which is still in existence. Thus, they prayed among others that they be declared
as the rightful owners of the property in question and that the duplicate certificate
of OCT No. 7864 in their possession be deemed valid and subsisting.15
In her answer to the amended complaint, respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint and set up affirmative and special defenses. She
alleged that Lot 1436 was actually sold sometime in 1947 by the petitioners
themselves and their father, Mauricio Baconga. The sale was purportedly covered
by a Deed of Definite Sale. Salcedo then came into ownership, possession and
enjoyment of the prop_______________
The records indicate that Galo Sabanal was the vendee in this Deed of
Definite Sale. However, there is no indication how Salcedo might have acquired the
property from Sabanal.
17
RTC Records, Vol. 1, pp. 51-58.
18
Ibid.
19
Id., at pp. 73-76.
20
Id., at pp. 124-137.
376
16
Ibid.
Ibid.
13
14
Id., Vol. 1, pp. 19-21.
15
Id., at pp. 2-7.
375
11
12
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
erty in question.16 On 14 February 1978, Salcedo sold a portion of Lot 1436 with an
area of two thousand twenty- five (2,025) square meters, more or less, to
respondent. From then on, the property in question has been in her actual and
physical enjoyment, she added.17
Respondent further alleged that the complaint was barred by the principles of
estoppel and laches by virtue of the sales executed by petitioners themselves and
their father. The complaint, according to her, also failed to include as defendants,
the heirs of Salcedo who are indispensable parties.18
On 10 August 1992, upon motion duly granted, respondent filed a third-party
complaint against the heirs of Salcedo alleging that as such heirs, they carry the
burden of warranting that their predecessors in interest were the true, legal and
rightful owners of the property in question at the time of the sale. Hence, she
prayed therein that she be maintained in peaceful and legal ownership, possession
and enjoyment of the questioned property.19
Answering the third-party complaint, the heirs of Salcedo effectively admitted
the existence of the 1978 deed of sale in favor of respondent by their parents and
considered the sale as within the personal and legal right of their parents and an
act outside their control.20
After due trial and consideration of the documentary and testimonial evidence
adduced by both parties, the trial court rendered a decision against petitioners and
in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision provides:
_______________
376
375
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DISMISSING plaintiffs complaint, for lack of merit and cause of action;
2. DECLARING defendant as the true and real owner of the lot in question;
3. DECLARING the owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
7864 (plaintiffs Exh. A) null and void same being obtained by plaintiffs when
they were not owners anymore of Lot 1436;
4. DECLARING the owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
7864 obtained by defendant (Exh. 1) as the one valid to be given like faith and
credit as the one that was lost and declared null and void; and
5. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City to issue a
transfer certificate of title to Angela N. Dayrit, herein defendant, for her 2,025
square meter portion of Lot 1436; to Anita Baconga Fuentes for her 505 square
meter portion of Lot 1436 and to Atty. Isabelo N. Pacursa or his heirs, he being
allegedly dead already, for his 170 square meter portion of Lot 1436 and after they
shall have presented an approved subdivision plan and an agreement to partition,
to issue to each of them, their respective transfer certificate of title with an area
according to the respective technical description corresponding to each of their
land.
Defendants counterclaim and third-party complaint are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.21
The Regional Trial Court Decision was modified by the CA on appeal by
petitioners. The appellate court held that contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
the valid and subsisting duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 was the one issued
to Erlinda, not to respondent, considering that respondent had failed to comply
with the mandatory jurisdictional require_______________
CA Rollo, pp. 55-56.

377
21
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
ments of law for the reconstitution of title under Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 26.22
The CA invoked the doctrine that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction
over a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title if the
original is in fact not lost. Citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,23the CA
held that the reconstituted certificate is itself void once the existence of the
original is unquestionably demonstrated.24
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the ruling of the trial court,
including the critical holding that respondent was the owner of the subject
property. The decretal portion of the CAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
granting partly the instant appeal. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is
MODIFIED so as to order the cancellation of the owners duplicate copy of
OCT No. 7864 issued to defendant Angelina Dayrit and declaringthe owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 (Exh. A and sub-markings with SN No.
014439) to be still valid for all intents and purposes and to be given like
faith and credit as the original. All other aspects are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25 (Emphasis in the original.)
Petitioners now come before this Court seeking the partial reversal of the decision
rendered by the CA. They contend that the CA erred in finding that the tax
declarations and the alleged adverse possession of respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest are conclusive proofs of their ownership of Lot 1436. They
further contend that the CA erred when it found them guilty of laches.26
_______________
378
377
However, it is apparent that in order that the petition may be properly resolved, we
must ascertain first, who between petitioners and respondent is the rightful owner
of the property in dispute and second, whether petitioners right to recover the
property is barred by laches assuming they are the rightful owners thereof as they
claim.
The resolution of the foregoing issues hinges on the question of which owners
duplicate certificate of title is valid and subsisting, the one in petitioners
possession or the one issued to respondent. What appears on the face of the title is
controlling in questions of ownership since the certificate of title is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.27
The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title in petitioners
possession is valid and subsisting. This Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v.
Court of Appeals28 that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court
rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance
of a new title.29 Since the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to
Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
respondents petition for reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title
subsequently issued to respondent is therefore void and of no effect.
The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of the valid and subsisting
duplicate certificate of title are still Juan and Ines, petitioners predecessors in
interest.30Per Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
_______________
Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 815; 288 SCRA
574 (1998).
28
G.R. Nos. 34080 and 34693, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
29
Rollo, pp. 75-77.
30
379
27
Rollo, pp. 70-80.

23
294 SCRA 714, 717 (1998).
24
Supra note 22 at p. 76.
25
Rollo, p. 79.
26
Id., at p. 13.
378
22
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
379
prescription or adverse possession. This rule taken in conjunction with the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of
the property in dispute are petitioners. They are indisputably the heirs of the
registered owners, both of whom are already dead.
These premises considered, it was error on the part of the trial court to rule
that respondent was the owner of the subject property and for the CA to have
affirmed such holding. We rule instead that the successors-in-interest of Juan and
Ines are the legal owners of the subject property, namely petitioners herein.
Petitioners ownership of the property having been established, the question
now is whether they are entitled to its possession. On this point, the Court rules in
the negative. Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of the
property by virtue of the equitable defense of laches. Thus, petitioners argument
that laches is not applicable to them has no merit. By laches is meant:
. . . the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not
concern itself with the character of the defendants title but only with whether or
not by reason of plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be
barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to defendant.31
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property
may be barred from recovering
_______________
Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 18, 27; 311 SCRA 18, 26 (1999)
citing Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339 (1997); Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438 (1996); Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of
Appeals, 264 SCRA 181 (1996).
380
31
380
possession of property by virtue of laches. 32 Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of

Appeals,33 this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned by
respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondents
failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v.
Catalino,34 this Court said that appellants passivity and inaction for more than
thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the
equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia,35 we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued possession for
thirty-seven (37) years, the original owners right to recover possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latters long period of
possession and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.36
In this case, both the lower court and the appellate court found that contrary
to respondents claim of possession, it was Salcedo, respondents predecessor-ininterest who had been in actual possession of the property. In fact, when the lower
court conducted an ocular inspection on the subject premises sometime on 16
March 1993, the court-appointed Commissioner elicited from the people residing
near the subject property, more particularly Celso Velez, Nieto Abecia and Paquito
Nabe, that Salcedo was the owner and the one in possession of the land until 1978
when respondent became the possessor thereof.37
_______________
Vda. De Cabrera, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 335 Phil. 19; 267 SCRA
339 (1997).
33
229 Phil. 436, 446; 145 SCRA 439, 449 (1986).
34
135 Phil. 229; 26 SCRA 234 (1968).
35
100 Phil. 277, 280 (1956).
36
Ibid.
37
Rollo, p. 78.
381
32
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
It was only in 1992 or forty-five (45) years from the time Salcedo took possession of
the property that petitioners made an attempt to claim it as their own. Petitioners
declared the property for tax purposes, registered their adverse claim to
381
respondents title, and filed the instant case all in 1992.38 These actuations of
petitioners point to the fact that for fortyfive (45) years, they did nothing to assert
their right of ownership and possession over the subject property.
Given the circumstances in the case at bar, the application of the equitable
defense of laches is more than justified.
Petitioners claim that prescription and adverse possession can never militate
against the right of a registered owner since a title, once registered cannot be
defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession.39
They are right in that regard. But their cause is defeated not by prescription
and adverse possession, but by laches.
This Court had occasion to distinguish laches from prescription in the case
of Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan.40 It was held therein that:
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a
right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on
some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on
public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a
stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. It is different from and
applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the
fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of
time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties. Prescrip_______________
38
39
Id., at p. 12.
Id., at pp. 14-21.
G.R. No. L-27088, 31 July 1975, 65 SCRA 605, 609-610.

382
Thus, it is the effect of delay in asserting their right of ownership over the
property which militates against petitioners, not merely the fact that they asserted
their right to the property too late in the day.
All the four (4) elements of laches prescribed by this Court in the case of Go
Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al. 42and reiterated in the cases of Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia,43 Miguel v. Catalino44 and Claverias v. Quingco45 are present in the
case at bar, to wit:
1. (1)conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the
complaint seeks a remedy;
2. (2)delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having
had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
3. (3)lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
4. (4)injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.46
Petitioners inaction for forty-five (45) years reduced their right to recover the
subject property into a stale demand.
In Mejia,47 the Court held in essence that the principle of laches is one of
estoppel because it prevents people who have
_______________
40
382
tion is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription
applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not. 41 (Footnotes are
omitted.)
Ibid.
96 Phil. 622, 637 (1954), citing 19 Am. Jur., 343-344.
43
Supra note 35.
44
Supra note 34.
45
G.R. No. 77744, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 66.
46
Supra notes 42-45.
47
Supra note 35.
41
42
383
VOL.464,JULY28,2005
slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed
reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his successors in
interest.48 The following pronouncement in the case of Claverias v. Quingco49 is
therefore apropos to the case at bar:
. . . Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating
the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to
spring from ambush and claim title when the possessors efforts and the rise of the
land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.50
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it ruled that the claim of petitioners is barred by
laches. Nopronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, challenged decision affirmed.
Note.Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier. (Ouano vs. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 525 [2003])
o0o
_______________
Ibid.
Supra note 45 citing Miguel v. Catalino.
50
Ibid.
384
48
49
383
that no delay and prejudice should result. To help ensure that delay does not
result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that
intervention may be allowed only before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
G.R. No. 190810.July 18, 2012.*

LORENZA C.
respondent.
ONGCO,
petitioner, vs. VALERIANA
UNGCO
DALISAY,
Civil Procedure; Intervention; Intervention is a remedy by which a third

party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a
certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings.Intervention is a remedy by which a
third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein
for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or
interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This remedy, however, is not a
right. The rules on intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court.
Civil Law; Land Registration; A land registration proceeding is an action in

rem. Thus, only a general notice to the public is required, and not a personal one.
It must be noted that a land registration proceeding is an action in rem. Thus, only
a general notice to the public is required, and not a personal one. Its publication
already binds the whole world, including those who will be adversely affected.
This, according to this Court, is the only way to give meaning to the finality and
indefeasibility of the Torrens title to be issued as against the argument that the
said rule could result in actual injustice. In the present case, the MTC found that
the required publication was made by respondent Dalisay when she applied for
land registration. That publication was sufficient notice to petitioner Ongco. Thus,
petitioner only had herself to blame when she failed to intervene as soon as she
could before the rendition of judgment.
Same; Same; Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); Under Section 32
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, there is a
remedy available to any person deprived of landor of any estate or interest therein
through an adjudication or a confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud.
Under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree,
Same; Same; Intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial
courts sound discretion.It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter
of right, but is left to the trial courts sound discretion. The trial court must not
only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into
consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that
the intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first
requirement on legal interest is not more important than the second requirement
34
Ongcovs.Dalisay
On 15 October 2007, respondent Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (Dalisay) applied for

registration of a parcel of land desig_______________
there is a remedy available to any person deprived of landor of any estate

or interest thereinthrough an adjudication or a confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud. The person may file, in the proper court, a petition for reopening and
reviewing the decree of registration within one year from the date of entry thereof.
This Court has ruled that actual fraud is committed by a registration applicants
failure or intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of
the premises by the party seeking a review of the decree. It is fraud to knowingly
omit or conceal a fact from which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of a third
person. Thus, if he is so minded, petitioner can still file for a petition to review the
decree of registration.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
1 Rollo, pp. 45-47, 49; in CA-G.R. CV No. 92046, and both penned by Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
235
VOL.677,JULY18,2012
Ongcovs.Dalisay

Leonardo C. Aseoche for respondent.
SERENO,J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure asking the Court to rule whether petitioner may
intervene in a land registration case.
The Petition seeks to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolutions1 dated 30 September 2009 and 11 November 2009 (assailed
Resolutions), which denied petitioners Motion for Leave to Intervene dated 23
June 2009.
Factual Antecedents
nated as Lot 1792, Cad-609-D, by filing an Application for Land Registration

before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan, Branch 2. 2 At the
hearings, no oppositor aside from the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic)
came. Neither was there any written opposition filed in court. Thus, an Order of
General Default was issued against the whole world except the Republic.
Consequently, on 15 October 2008, the court found respondent Dalisay to have
clearly shown a registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a
decree of registration be issued by the Land Registration Authority once the
Decision had become final.3 Herein petitioner Lorenza C. Ongco (Ongco) never
intervened in the proceedings in the trial court.
The Republic filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
92046.4 While the case was pending appeal, petitioner Ongco filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene dated 23 June 2009 with an attached Answer-in-Intervention.5
235
The Answer-in-Intervention sought the dismissal of respondent Dalisays

Application for Land Registration on the ground that, contrary to the allegations
of Dalisay, the subject property was not free from any adverse claim. In fact,
petitioner Ongco had allegedly been previously found to be in actual possession of
the subject land in an earlier case filed before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) when she applied for a free patent on the land. 6
In her Comment/Objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene, Dalisay
contended that Ongco did not have a legal
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 250-253; Application for Land Registration of herein respondent
Dalisay.
3 Id., at pp. 51-54; Decision of the MTC-Branch 2 dated 15 October 2008.
4 Id., at p. 21.
On 30 September 2009, the CA issued its first assailed Resolution 9 denying

the Motion for Intervention for having been filed beyond the period allowed by law.
It said:
Lorenza C. Ongcos prayer to be allowed to intervene in the instant MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE XXX isDENIED[,] said motion having been filed
beyond the period allowed by law.
Manalo vs. Court of Appeals is emphatic:
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by
the courts only when the statutory conditions for the right to
5 Id.
intervene [are] shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
6 Id., at p. 22.
236
236
interest over the property.7 Moreover, the intervention would unduly delay the
registration proceeding, which was now on appeal. Besides, petitioners interest, if
any, may be fully protected in a separate and direct proceeding. Additionally,
Dalisay pointed out that Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court was clear that
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court, but not at any other time. The Republic, on the other hand, said that it was
interposing no objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene. 8
Ongcovs.Dalisay
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining

the propriety of letting a party intervene in a case, the tribunal should not
limit itself to inquiring whether a person (1) has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of either of the parties; (3) or an
interest against both; (4) or when is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. Just as important, as (the Supreme Court
had) stated in Big Country Ranch Corporation v. Court of Appeals [227
SCRA 161 {1993}], is the function to consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties, and whether or not
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 190-195.
Branch 2. As a necessary consequence, the prayed for admission of the instant

ANSWER-IN-INTERVENTION could only be denied, x x x. (Emphases in the
original)
8 Id., at pp. 196-197.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 10 which was also denied in a

Resolution dated 11 November 2009.
9 Id., at pp. 45-47.

237
Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.
VOL.677,JULY18,2012
Ongcovs.Dalisay
the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
237
In her three-page Comment11 on the Petition, respondent Dalisay briefly

argues that the CA did not commit any error, because it properly applied the
technical rules of procedure in denying the Motion for Intervention. She also
argues that the issues being presented are factual and, as such, not reviewable in
a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In her Reply,12 petitioner asserts that the issues to be resolved in her Petition
are questions of law: whether the requisites for intervention are present, and
whether the interven-
The period within which a person may intervene is also
_______________
restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

requires:
10 Id., at pp. 200-205.
SECTION2.Time to intervene.The motion to intervene may be
11 Id., at pp. 300-302.
filed at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial

court, x x x.
After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted
anymore. This is because, basically, intervention is not an
12 Id., at pp. 305-309.

238
independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an

existing litigation.
238
Here, the subject motion was filed only on June 23, 2009, way beyond the
rendition of the Decision dated October 15, 2008 (subject of the instant appeal by
the Office of the Solicitor General) by the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Ongcovs.Dalisay
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
tion she is seeking is an exception to the general rule that intervention must be
filed before judgment is rendered by the trial court.
Issue for Resolution and the Ruling of the Court
The issue for resolution in the instant case is whether the CA committed
reversible error in denying the Motion for Intervention of petitioner.
13 Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation v. Baikal Realty Corporation, 480 Phil.

545; 437 SCRA 121 (2004).
239
VOL.677,JULY18,2012
239
We rule to deny the Petition.

Discussion
Ongcovs.Dalisay
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in

the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the
third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those
proceedings.13 This remedy, however, is not a right. The rules on intervention are
set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to
the trial courts sound discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the
requisite legal interest is present, but also take into consideration thedelay and
Sec.1.Who may intervene.A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
Both requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is not
more important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should
result.14 To help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a motion to
intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only
before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec.2.Time to intervene.The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention will cause.
In Executive Secretary
intervention in this wise:
v.
Northeast
Freight,15
this
Court
explained
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the

court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute
authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or

when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, Ongco may not be allowed
to intervene.
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer

thereof.As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled
that such interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the
judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more
than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect
and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or
collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission
to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is
limited by considering whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she will either
gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. On the contrary, her
interest is indirect and contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the
subject land, as she in fact admits being only in the process of applying for one. 16
Her interest is at best inchoate. In Firestone Ceramics v. CA,17 the Court held that
the petitioner who anchored his motion to intervene on his legal interest arising
from his pending application for a free patent over a portion of the subject land
merely had a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation. His
collateral interest could not have justified intervention.
In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the
_______________
14 Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 748; 180 SCRA 266
(1989).
MTC had rendered judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient

ground for denying the motion. To recall, the motion should be filed any time
before rendition of judgment. The history and rationale of this rule has been
explained thusly:
15 G.R. No. 179516, 17 March 2009, 581 SCRA 736.

240
240
1.The former rule as to when intervention may be allowed was

expressed in Sec. 2, Rule 12 as before or during a trial, and this
ambiguity also gave rise to indecisive doctrines. Thus, inceptively it was
held that a motion for leave to intervene may be filed before or during a trial
even on the day when the case is submitted for decision (Falcasantos vs.
Falcasantos, L-4627, May 13, 1952) as long as it will not unduly delay the
disposition of the case. The term trial was used in its restricted sense, i.e., the
period for the introduction for intervention was filed after the case
Ongcovs.Dalisay
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 22.
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not
the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. (Emphasis
supplied)
17 372 Phil. 401; 313 SCRA 522 (1999).

241
VOL.677,JULY18,2012
SECTION2.Time to intervene.The motion to intervene may be filed

at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court x x x.
241
After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This
is because, basically, intervention is not an inde-
Ongcovs.Dalisay
_______________
had already been submitted for decision, the denial thereof is proper (Vigan
Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Arciaga, L-29207 and L-29222, July 31, 1974). However,
it has also been held that intervention may be allowed at any time before the
rendition of final judgment (Linchauco vs. CA, et al., L-23842, Mar. 13, 1975).
Further, in the exceptional case of Director of Lands vs. CA, et al.(L-45168, Sept.
25, 1979), the Supreme Court permitted intervention in a case pending before it on
appeal in order to avoid injustice and in consideration of the number of parties
who may be affected by the dispute involving overlapping of numerous land titles.
2.The uncertainty in these ruling has been eliminated by the
18 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. I, 319-320 (9th

rev. ed. 2005).
19 419 Phil. 215; 366 SCRA 752 (2001).
242
242
present Sec. 2 of this amended Rule which permits the filing of the
motion to intervene at any time before therendition of the judgment in
the case, in line with the doctrine in Lichauco above cited. The justification
Ongcovs.Dalisay
advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court, for good
cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and
that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no
judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention
may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of
all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of
said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been
rendered.18 (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, in Manalo v. CA,19 the Court said:
The
period
within
which
person
may
intervene
is
restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:
also
pendent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing

litigation. (Emphases supplied)
There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court for the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay would
result from many belated filings of motions for intervention after judgment has
already been rendered, because a reassessment of claims would have to be done.
Thus, those who slept on their lawfully granted privilege to intervene will be
rewarded, while the original parties will be unduly prejudiced. This rule should
apply more strictly to land registration cases, in which there is a possibility that a
great number of claimant-oppositors may cause a delay in the proceedings by filing
motions to intervene after the trial courtsitting as a land registration court

has rendered judgment.
Aware of her fatal shortcoming, petitioner Ongco would now like the Court to
exceptionally allow intervention even after judgment has been rendered by the
MTC in the land registration case. She cites instances in which this Court allowed
intervention on appeal. However, the cases she cited are inapplicable to the
present case, because the movants therein who wanted to intervene were found by
Also, it must be noted that a land registration proceeding is an action in rem.

Thus, only a general notice to the public is required, and not a personal one. Its
publication already binds the whole world, including those who will be adversely
affected. This, according to this Court, is the only way to give meaning to the
finality and indefeasibility of the Torrens title to be issued as against the
argument that the said rule could result in actual injustice. 20 In the present case,
the MTC found that the required publication was made by respondent Dalisay
when she applied for land registration. That publication was sufficient notice to
petitioner Ongco. Thus, petitioner only had herself to blame when she failed to
intervene as soon as she could before the rendition of judgment.
the Court to be indispensable parties. Thus, under Section 7, Rule 3 of the

Rules of Court, they had to be joined because, without them, there could be no
final determination of the actions. Indeed, if indispensable parties are not
impleaded, any judgment would have no effect.
In Galicia v. Manliquez,23 the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found
that the defendant-intervenors were indispensable parties, being the indisputable
compulsory co-heirs of the original defendants in the case for recovery of
possession and ownership, and annulment of title. Thus, without them, there
could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they certainly stood to be
affected by any judgment in the case, considering their ostensible ownership of
the property.
We also note that, had petitioner learned of the trial court proceedings in
time, and had she wanted to oppose the application, the proper procedure would
have been to ask for the
In Mago v. CA,24 the intervenor was the rightful awardee of a piece of land
that was mistakenly awarded by the NHA to another awardee. Thus, the latter
was given title to land with an area that was more than that intended to be
awarded to him. The NHA then cancelled the title mistakenly awarded
_______________
20 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 186 Phil. 9; 97 SCRA 22 (1980).
243
_______________
VOL.677,JULY18,2012
243
21 NARCISO PEA ET AL., REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 84 (rev.

ed. 2008).
22 Id.
Ongcovs.Dalisay
23 G.R. No. 155785, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 85.
lifting of the order of default and then to file the opposition. 21 It would be an
error of procedure to file a motion to intervene. This is because, as discussed
above, proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam.22
24 363 Phil. 225; 303 SCRA 600 (1999).

244
244
the claim of respondent that she has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject parcel of land. In fact, this same evidence must
have been the
245
Ongcovs.Dalisay
and ordered the subdivision of the lot into two. The recipient of the mistakenly
awarded title filed a Petition for injunction to enjoin the NHA from cancelling the
title awarded. The Petition was granted and the judgment became final. The other
awardee filed a Motion to Intervene, as well as a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, which were both denied by the trial court. The CA affirmed the
Decision of the court a quo. This Court, however, found that the intervention
should have been granted, considering the indisputable admission of the NHA, the
grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the rightful awardee of half of the
lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor stood to be deprived of his rightful
award when the trial court enjoined the cancellation of the mistakenly awarded
title and the subdivision of the lot covered by the title. The intervenors legal
interest, in other words, was directly affected.
In the present case, petitioner Ongco is not an indispensable party. As already
noted, her interests are inchoate and merely collateral, as she is only in the
process of applying for a free patent. Also, the action for land registration may
proceed and be carried to judgment without joining her. This is because the issues
to be threshed out in a land registration proceedingsuch as whether the subject
land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and whether the
applicant or her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the said land under abona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945, or earliercan be threshed out without joining petitioner.
True, the evidence to be adduced by petitioner Ongcoto prove that she, not
Dalisay, has been in possession of the land subject of the application for
registration of respondenthas a bearing on the determination of the latters
right to register her title to the land. In particular, this evidence will help debunk
VOL.677,JULY18,2012
Ongcovs.Dalisay
reason why the Republic did not interpose any objection to the Motion for
Intervention. None of these facts, however, makes petitioner an indispensable
party; for there are many other ways of establishing the fact of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcel of land or the lack thereof.
If any, the only indispensable party to a land registration case is the Republic.
Against it, no order of default would be effective, because the Regalian doctrine
presumes that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.25
In any case, we note that petitioner is not left without any remedy in case
respondent succeeds in getting a decree of registration. Under Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, there is a
remedy available to any person deprived of landor of any estate or interest
thereinthrough an adjudication or a confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud. The person may file, in the proper court, a petition for reopening and
reviewing the decree of registration within one year from the date of entry thereof.
This Court has ruled that actual fraud is committed by a registration applicants
failure or intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of
the premises by the party seeking a review of the decree. It is fraud to knowingly
omit or conceal a fact from which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of a third
245
person.26 Thus, if he is so minded, petitioner can still file for a petition to review
the decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 30 September 2009 and 11 November 2009,
which denied peti_______________
25 AMADO D. AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS , 62
(4th. ed. 2007) citing Republic v. Sayo, G.R. No. 60413, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA
71 (1990).
26 Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 119 Phil. 258; 9 SCRA 934 (1963).
246
246
Ongcovs.Dalisay
tioners Motion for Leave to Intervene in CA-G.R. CV No. 92046, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under

Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claimthe definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims. (Hilado vs. Court of Appeals, 587 SCRA 464
[2009])
A courts power to allow or deny intervention is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or
proceeding may be allowed to intervene. (Aonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo
G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA 420 [2010])
o0o
232
Republicvs.Castuera
G.R. No. 203384.January 14, 2015.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPS. JOSE CASTUERA and
PERLA CASTUERA, respondents.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Applicants
for registration of title must present a certified true copy of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretarys declaration or
classification of the land as alienable and disposable.The advance plan and the
CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable
character of the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
232
property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must

present a certified true copy of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, 575 SCRA 51
(2008), citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 555 SCRA 477 (2008), the Court
held that: In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation
must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bactad Law Office for respondents.
CARPIO,J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition challenges the 26 March 2012
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 7-26.
233
VOL.746,JANUARY14,2015
Republicvs.Castuera
Decision2 and 14 August 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 85015, affirming the 31 January 2005 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 70, Iba, Zambales, in Land Registration Case No. RTC-N-92I and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts
Andres Valiente owned a 3,135-square-meter land inBarangay Siminublan,
San Narciso, Zambales. In 1978, he sold the property to respondents Jose and
Perla Castuera (Spouses Castuera). On 21 May 2003, the Spouses Castuera filed
with the RTC an application5 for original registration of title over the property.
The Spouses Castuera presented three witnesses to support their application.
The three witnesses were (1) former barangay captain and Councilman Alfredo
Dadural, (2) Senior Police Officer 2 Teodorico Cudal, and (3) Perla Castuera. All
witnesses testified that the Spouses Castuera owned the property.
The Spouses Castuera also presented documentary evidence to support their
application. The documents included tax receipts and an advance plan 6 with a
notation, Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office
and is for registration purposes. This survey is within the Alienable and
Disposable land proj. No. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927
per LC Map No. 669 Sheet 1.
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with
Associate Justices Vicente S. E. Veloso and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 35-36.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 35-38. Penned by Judge Clodualdo M. Monta.
5 Records, pp. 2-5.
6 Id., at p. 6.
234
234
Republicvs.Castuera
233
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the

Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for original registration.
The RTCs Ruling
In its 31 January 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the application for original
registration of title over the property. The RTC held:
From the evidence submitted by the applicants, they have shown
preponderantly that they are the lawful owners in fee simple and the actual
possessors of Lot 6553 of the San Narciso Cadastre. They are entitled therefore to
a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the said land pursuant to the
provisions of the new Property Registration Decree (PD 1529).7
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Spouses
Castuera attached to their appellees brief a certification 8 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), stating:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan,
San Narciso, Zambales containing an area of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN (1847.00) SQUARE METERS as shown and described
in this sketch as verified by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and
Perla Castuera was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable, Project No. 3H, certified by then Director of Forestry, manila [sic] on June 20, 1927 per LC Map
No. 669, sheet No. 1.9
_______________
7 CA Rollo, pp. 37-38.
8 Id., at p. 57.
9 Id.
235
Republicvs.Castuera
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its 26 March 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
Decision. The Court of Appeals held that:
235
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration

Decree, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for
registration of title over a parcel of land:
Section14.Who May Apply.The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Accordingly, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section
14(1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, We find and so rule that the trial
court is correct in granting appellees application for original registration of the
subject land. A scrutiny of the records shows that there is substantial compliance
with the requirement that the subject land is alienable and disposable land. It
bears to emphasize that the Advance Plan has the following notations:
236
236
Republicvs.Castuera
Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office and is
for registration purposes.[]
This survey is within the alienable and disposable land proj. no. 3-H certified
by Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669, Sheet 1.
In Republic v. Serrano, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the trial
court and this Court that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable
and disposable. It held that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification,
which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes
substantial compliance with the legal requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest
to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification
by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the

subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial
compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been
verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,
1925.[]
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any
evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered
by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents
applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable.
There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the
Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
While in the case of Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court
overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration
237
Republicvs.Castuera
over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not
enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
[]Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do
not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Carlos R. Vega, et al., as an
exception to the strict application of the stringent rule imposed in the above
pronouncement that the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of an
application for registration, the Supreme Court, in its sound discretion, and based
solely on the evidence on record, may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the
ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of
government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of
237
effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to
applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this
Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the trial court only on
January 31, 2005, prior to the above pronouncement[.] We believe that the same
rule
238
applicants for registration of title, must present a certified true copy of the
Department
_______________
238
Republicvs.Castuera
of Environment and Natural Resources Secretarys declaration or
classification of the land as alienable and disposable. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,11 citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,12 the
Court held that:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation
must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. 13
Republicvs.Castuera
shall apply to the present case allowing the registration of the subject
property as there is substantial compliance with the requirement that the land
subject of registration is an alienable and disposable land. Besides, appellees had
attached to their appellees brief a Certification from the DENR-CENR Office
issued on December 2, 1999, which states the following:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan,
San Narciso, Zambales containing an area of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN (1,847) SQUARE METERS as shown and described in
this sketch as verified by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla
Castuera was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable, Project No. 3-H,
certified by then Director of Forestry, Manila on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No
669, Sheet No. 1.10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 14 August 2012 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Petitioner raises as issue that the advance plan and the CENRO certification
are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as
10 Rollo, pp. 30-33.

239
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition andSETS ASIDE the 26

March 2012 Decision and 14 August 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 85015. Respondents Jose and Perla Castueras application for
registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,** Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
_______________
11 595 Phil. 664; 575 SCRA 51 (2008).
12 578 Phil. 441; 555 SCRA 477 (2008).
13 Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio supra at p. 687; p. 77.
239
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1910 dated 12 January
2015.
240
240
Republicvs.Castuera
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.
Notes.Applicants in a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may register
their titles upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs.
Ramos,709 SCRA 576 [2013])
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, does not
necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. (Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 717 SCRA 171
[2014])
o0o

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or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.

G.R. No. 177392.November 26, 2012.*

complaint-in-intervention. Civil Cases TG-411 and TG-796 were eventually

The Facts and the Case

1 Consisting of Ludivina Lantin-Rojas, Leandrito L. Rojas, Rosemarie T.

A:There was a decision rendered in year 1941.

A:L.B., Leon Barrera.15 (Emphasis supplied)

HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN & INES PANGANIBAN, namely: ERLINDA B.

sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter subsequently discovered that what

Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurred in by Associate

CA Rollo, pp. 55-56.

Rollo, pp. 70-80.

possession of property by virtue of laches. 32 Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of

G.R. No. L-27088, 31 July 1975, 65 SCRA 605, 609-610.

G.R. No. 190810.July 18, 2012.*

petitioner, vs. VALERIANA

Civil Procedure; Intervention; Intervention is a remedy by which a third

Civil Law; Land Registration; A land registration proceeding is an action in

On 15 October 2007, respondent Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (Dalisay) applied for

there is a remedy available to any person deprived of landor of any estate

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

nated as Lot 1792, Cad-609-D, by filing an Application for Land Registration

The Answer-in-Intervention sought the dismissal of respondent Dalisays

On 30 September 2009, the CA issued its first assailed Resolution 9 denying

intervene [are] shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to

intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining

7 Id., at pp. 190-195.

Branch 2. As a necessary consequence, the prayed for admission of the instant

8 Id., at pp. 196-197.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 10 which was also denied in a

9 Id., at pp. 45-47.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.

the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

In her three-page Comment11 on the Petition, respondent Dalisay briefly

The period within which a person may intervene is also

restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

10 Id., at pp. 200-205.

SECTION2.Time to intervene.The motion to intervene may be

11 Id., at pp. 300-302.

filed at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial

12 Id., at pp. 305-309.

independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an

13 Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation v. Baikal Realty Corporation, 480 Phil.

We rule to deny the Petition.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the

in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or

other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer

MTC had rendered judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient

15 G.R. No. 179516, 17 March 2009, 581 SCRA 736.

1.The former rule as to when intervention may be allowed was

17 372 Phil. 401; 313 SCRA 522 (1999).

SECTION2.Time to intervene.The motion to intervene may be filed

18 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. I, 319-320 (9th

restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:

pendent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing

motions to intervene after the trial courtsitting as a land registration court

Also, it must be noted that a land registration proceeding is an action in rem.

the Court to be indispensable parties. Thus, under Section 7, Rule 3 of the

21 NARCISO PEA ET AL., REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 84 (rev.

24 363 Phil. 225; 303 SCRA 600 (1999).

Notes.Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under

G.R. No. 203384.January 14, 2015.*

property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must