VIOLETA BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010

Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
Acting on a complaint filed by a Concerned Citizen of Sarangani
Province with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against
Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the
Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan,
from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged
participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and
donations using funds of the provincial government, a special
audit was conducted in Sarangani province. The Special Audit
Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation from
June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the list of alleged fictitious
associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to
certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples
Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was
Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount
of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad,
as the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings, the Special Audit
Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation through
falsification of public documents against the officials involved.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation of public funds?
Ruling: NO. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of
conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission
of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification
of Public Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the
act of one is the act of all. It is necessary that a conspirator
should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt
act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in
the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime
not adequately proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner,
as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing

or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look

at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals the
following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz
certifying that the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred
under his direct supervision; signature of Provincial Accountant
Camanay certifying to the completeness and propriety of the
supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash
advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of
Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is
available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta
adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved
for payment, and with petitioners signature as the payee.
The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately
encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the
check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The
check was issued in petitioners name and, as payee, she had the
authority to encash it.
All told, there is reasonable doubt as
to petitioners guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused
must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been
fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty,
exoneration must be granted as a matter of right.

SB: Guilty Malversation of Public Funds Through

Falsification of Public Documents
SC: Acquitted

After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislation

history of RA 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17
of RA 7659 has fixed the duration of Reclusion Perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no
clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.

PEOPLE V. LUCAS
Thus, consistent with the rule mentioned, the Supreme Court, by
its First Division, applied Article 65 of the Code in imposing the
penalty for rape in People v. Conrado Lucas, GR No. 10817273,May 25, 1994. It divided the time included in the penalty of
reclusion perpetua into three equal portions composing a period
as follows:
Minimum20 years and one day to 26 years and eight months;
Medium26 years, eight months and one day to 33 years and four
months;
Maximum34 years, four months and one day to 40 years.
Considering the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the
Court sentenced the accused to imprisonment of 34 years, four
months and one day of reclusion perpetua, instead of the straight
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court. The
appellee seasonably filed a motion for clarification to correct the
duration of the sentence, because instead of beginning with 33
years, four months and one day, it began with 34 years, four
months and one day. The issue of whether the amendment of
Article 27 made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty was raised,
and because the issue is one of first impression and momentous
importance, the First Division referred the motion to the Court en
banc.
In a resolution promulgated on January 5, 1995, the Supreme
Court en banc held that reclusion perpetua shall remain as an
indivisible penalty. To this end, the resolution states:

Verily, if reclusion perpetua was classified as a divisible penalty,

then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason
and basis of existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section
20 of the amended RA No. 6425 provides for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs
involved are of any of the quantities stated herein. If Article 63 of
the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is
supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no
statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua or
death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no
occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug
cases, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.
Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion
perpetua as divisible penalty, then it should have amended Article
63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law
on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code and
what should be the duration of the periods thereof. There are, as
well, other provisions of the RPC involving reclusion perpetua,
such as Art 41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs
2 and 3 of Art 61, which has not been touched by the
corresponding amendment.
Ultimately, the question arises: What then may be the reason for
the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua? This
question was answered in the same case of People v. Lucas by
quoting pertinent portion of the decision in People v. Reyes, 212
SCRA 402, thus:
The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua,
thereof, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convicts
eligibility for pardon or the application of the three-fold rule in the
service of penalties. Since, however, in all the graduated scales of
penalties in the Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and 21, reclusion
perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion
temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of
reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a
maximum duration thereafter to last for the rest of the convicts
natural life, although pursuant to Article 70 , it appears that the
maximum period for the service of the penalties shall not exceed
forty (40) years. It would be legally absurd and violative of the

scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of

Reclusion Perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby
be a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum
twenty (20) years of Reclusion Temporal but is less than thirty (30)
years.

allegedly committed to the filing of the information on June 5,

1953.
RTC:
DISMISSED: Prescription
-

terms of the chattel mortgage contract between the Bank

and the defendant, Basalo, on the standing crop for the
agricultural year 1947-1948 planted by the defendant
sometime before July 14, 1947, when the mortgage was
executed, he was given a loan of P320.00
Due and demandable ten months from said date. It is
highly improbable that the Bank was not aware of the said
sale, as the loan was already due for collection

SC:
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, under the title "Chattel
Mortgage",
"ART. 319. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property. The
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine amounting to twice the value
of the property shall be imposed
The value of the property mortgaged in this case is P320. Double
that amount would be P640. Under Article 319, above
reproduced, the penalty for the offense is arresto mayor or a fine
double the value of the property involved. In other words, the fine
is an alternative penalty. The question now to determine is,
when does an offense penalized with an alternative penalty of a
fine of P640 prescribe?
PEOPLE V. BASALO
The Government, through the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, is
appealing the order of the trial court of August 30, 1955,
dismissing the case against the defendant-appellee Francisco
Basalo for alleged violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the ground of prescription.
Francisco Basalo sold eighty cavans of palay, he had mortgaged to
the Philippine National Bank, without the knowledge and consent
of the mortgagee, to the damage and prejudice of the said bank in
the sum of at least P280. Upon arraignment, the accused
interposed the defense of prescription on the ground that more
than five years had elapsed from the time the offense was

"ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. . . .

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in
ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. . . ." (Italics ours.)
THE OFFENSE PRESCRIBED IN FIVE YEARS.

The Solicitor General in his brief disagrees with this ruling of the
lower court and contends that said ruling was erroneous. He cites
Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

"ART. 26. Fine When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.

A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty,
shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos;
a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but
is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty, if it be less than
200 pesos." ;
Contends that the fine of P640 comes under the category of a
correctional penalty, and that under Article 9, Paragraph 3,
already reproduced, the offense herein charged prescribes in ten
years, instead of five years. We agree with the Solicitor General
that there is no legal justification for converting or reducing the
fine of P640.00 into a prison term in case of insolvency.
True, the offense under Article 319 in so far as it is penalized with
arresto mayor prescribes in five years. At the same time, the
fine equivalent to double the amount of the property involved,
may also be imposed as a penalty, and when said imposable
penalty is either correctional or afflictive, it should be made the
basis for determining the period of prescription.
In conclusion, we hold that to determine the prescriptibility of an
offense penalized with a fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, such fine should not be reduced or
converted into a prison term, but rather it should be considered
as such fine under Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code; and that
for purposes of prescription of the offense, defined and penalized
in Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, the fine imposable
therein if correctional or afflictive under the terms of Article 26,
same Code, should be made the basis rather than that of arresto
mayor, also imposable in said Article 319.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed order is hereby set aside
and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

PEOPLE V. CRISOSTOMO
September 3, 1959: Jesus L. Crisostomo was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, with the crime of estafa.
September, 1945 : Sold by way of absolute sale a parcel of land
containing an area of three (3) hectares to the spouses Teodoro
Faustino and Regina Pangan for P15,000.00, by executing a public
instrument duly recorded with the Register of Deeds.
Stating in the said deed of sale that the said property was free
from all liens and encumbrances of whatever nature, knowing that
said statement was false, as the property was (already) previously
encumbered by way of mortgage, to one Antonio Villarama, said
mortgage still valid and subsisting at the time of the sale
aforementioned, and which fact came to the knowledge of the said
spouses only in 1953, thereby defrauding and damaging said
spouses in the sum of P15,000.00.
Defense:
Moved to quash the information on the ground that the offense
had already prescribed; offense charged prescribes in 5 years, it
being punishable with arresto mayor (Art. 90, paragraph 3,
Revised Penal Code).
Prosecution:
The offense charged prescribes in 15 years because aside from the
penalty of arresto mayor, the law imposes a fine of not less than
the value of the damage caused and not more than three times
such value, which in this case would be a minimum of
P15,000.00.
SC:
In the instant case the offense charged is also punishable with a
fine which is afflictive in nature (Article 26, Revise Penal Code),
but such fine is not imposed either as a single as an alternative
penalty, but is imposed in conjunction with arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods. For the reason, the court is of
the opinion that the afflictive fine imposable should not be
taken as the basis for computing the prescriptive period,

but that such computation can be based only upon the

penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods.
The foregoing conclusion of the court finds support in very text of
Article 26 of the Code itself. Thus, the Code say 'A fine, whether
imposed as a single or as alternative penalty, shall be
considered ....' (Article 26). In other words, the classification
of fine into afflictive, correctional or light, under Article 26,
should be made only when a fine is imposed either as a
single or as alternative penalty; and that no such classification
should be made where the fine is imposed in conjunction with
another penalty (See Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, 1956, Vol. I,
p. 293).

Article 90, which provides that, "When the penalty fixed by law is
a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of
the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third
paragraphs of this article" (See also Peo. vs. Rufo Cruz, G.R. No. L15132, May 25, 1960). Under the facts alleged in the present
information, the fine is a higher penalty than arresto mayor,

because by virtue of its amount (P15,000.00 to P45,000.00), it is

afflictive; while arresto mayor is merely correctional. Certainly,
article 26 provides the classification, while article 90 indicates
when such classification should be applied.
The period of prescription of offense charged in the case at
bar, is, therefore, fifteen (15) years. And from whatever date
the computation may start, whether from September 16, 1945, the
date of the fraudulent transaction, or from 1953, the year the
offended parties gained actual knowledge of the fraud, the fifteen
years had not prescribed when the information was filed on
September 3, 1959.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed
from should be, as it is hereby reversed and another entered,
remanding the case for appropriate proceedings. No costs.
Basalo Case: "arresto mayor or fine (Art. 319, par. 2, Rev. Penal
Code)
Crisostomo Case: "arresto mayor and fine" (Art. 316, par. 2, same
Code)