OffshoreProjectSafeForum

Offshore
Project Safe Forum
HumanFactorsandBehaviours
Tuesday1May,2012

Agenda
AGENDA
HUMANFACTORSANDBEHAVIOURS
PERTHCONVENTIONANDEXHIBITIONCENTRE
RIVERVIEWROOM5,LEVEL2

08.30

Arrival|TeaandCoffee

09.00 Welcome,SafetyBriefingandObjective
09.10

MessagefromtheContractorProjectSafe
Committee

09.20 AllsafeSafetyBehaviourProgram
09.50

ClaudeCahuzac|INPEXAustralia 10mins
KevinShannon|Chevron

10mins

PieterKambier|Allseas

30mins

CoffeeBreak|MorningTea

10.30 ARegulatoryPerspectiveonHumanFactors

30mins

40mins
JoelleMitchell|NOPSEMA

45mins

11.15

SSafetyCultureandOtherHumanFactorsWork
f t C lt
d Oth H
F t W k
EmilyNovatsis|Woodside
atWoodside

45mins

12.00

Lunch

60mins

13.00

AWiderLookatHumanandOrganisational
FactorsinHealthandSafetyy

14.30

CoffeeBreak|AfternoonTea

RonnyLardner|TheKeilCentre

90mins
30mins

15.00 FeedbackfromSSCP

SteveWilliams|AnMe

40mins

15.40 ClosingRemarksandForumClosure

SimonBingham|ApacheEnergy

20mins

16.00

Networking|DrinksandNibbles

OffshoreProjectSafeForum|Friday10June2011

Welcome and Objective

WelcomeandObjective
ClaudeCahuzac
OffshoreProjectDirector,INPEX
j
,

MessagefromtheContractorProjectSafe
Committee
KevinShannon
Upstream Development Manager GorgonProject,
UpstreamDevelopmentManager
Gorgon Project
ChevronAustraliaPtyLimited

Offshore Project Safe Steering Committee

OffshoreProjectSafeSteeringCommittee

SSeniorbusinessleadersfromOffshoreOil&GasOperatorsandContractors
i b i
l d f
Off h
Oil & G O
dC
Vision:TodrivesafetyimprovementsinoffshoreprojectsinAustraliathrough
industrycooperationandcollaboration
Recentfocus:DevelopmentandimplementationoftheSafeSupervisor
CompetenceProgram(SSCP)foroffshoreconstructionsupervisors
p
Forwardplansandfocus:
ExpandthemembershipoftheSteeringCommitteetomatchtheexpanding
NWAustraliaoffshoreconstructionfuture
AmplifiedindustryacceptanceandtrainingrequirementsforSSCP
Amplified industry acceptance and training requirements for SSCP
APPEAacceptanceandsupportoftheSSCPasarequirement
ContinuousimprovementofSSCPasanessentialtoolforsupervisorstoolkit
ImprovesafetyperformanceacrossAustralianupstreammarineconstruction

OffshoreProjectSafeForum|Friday10June2011

Source:APPEA2010HSEReport

Totalcontractorhours
havedoubled inthelast
5 years
5years
Threefold increasein
hours in last 10 years
hoursinlast10years
Howisoursafety
p
performancetrending?
g
Howareweproviding
ourpersonnelthe
propertrainingand
toolstoworksafely?
OffshoreProjectSafeForum|Friday10June2011

 Australian
Australiantrendnot
trend not
keepingupwithindustry
Whatisyourvisionofa
y
safeconstructionsite?
Whatisyour
commitmenttoachieve
thevision?
Isyourvisionand
commitmentsharedby
the team?
theteam?
Howcanyourteam
achieve the vision?
achievethevision?
OffshoreProjectSafeForum|Friday10June2011

 Morethanjustminorinjuries.
More than just minor injuries.

Source:IntlAssociationofOil&GasProducers

OffshoreProjectSafeForum|Friday10June2011

Allsafe
Allsafe SafetyBehaviourProgram
Safety Behaviour Program
PieterKambier
ProjectDirector,Allseas
j
,

Safety Journey

The Value of Safety Behavior Programs

Existing
i i
Safety tools
Safety
S
f t
Behavior
Program

Regulations
R
l ti
HAZID
JSA
Audits
PPE

Where is our Safety focus

Engineering phase

Design

Training
Installation
P
Procedures
d
HAZIDs
Equipment
selection

Operational phase

Buckle Initiator Incident

Some Questions

Is the safety awareness fully developed within the

design team?
Does
D
th
the procurementt d
department
t
t understand
d t d th
their
i
influence?
Does the tender department think about the risk profile?
Does the schedule allow for sufficient time?
Are the operational people engaged into the engineering
process?

Allsafe Behavior Program

Develop a positive, open and respectful culture whereby

people care about each other and are encouraged to
intervene.
intervene
1.
1
2.
3
3.
4.

Induction Program
Supervisor Program
Allseas Safety Awareness Program (positive recognition)
Coaching and monitoring

Induction Program
Tailor made for the Audience:

In-house development
Differentiation engineering and operational personnel
Small g
groups
p of people
p p
Keep it simple and practical:

Ownership
Communication
Recognise Risk

Intervention

Relationship &
Teamwork

Supervisor Program

The Key for the implementation and continuation of the

program.

Selection of the right supervisors

Safe
f Supervisor Competence Program
Allsafe Supervisor program
Onboard coaching and training

Fully support your supervisors

ASAP

Allseas Safety Awareness Program:

Recognition of Positive behavior
Intervene in a positive manner

Overcoming cultural differences

Further roll out to subcontractors

Summarized

Start the safety behavior journey as soon as possible

(University).
Increase
I
th
the safety
f t awareness within
ithi our engineering
i
i
teams.
Align safety behavior programs with the audience.
audience
Continuation via the supervisors.
And .

Believe

If You can dream it

You can do it

Zero Incidents & Injuries

If you can work one day Incident free

You can work all your life incident free

Morning Tea Break

MorningTeaBreak
0950 1030hrs

A Regulatory Perspective of Human Factors

ARegulatoryPerspectiveofHumanFactors
JoelleMitchell
TechnicalOfficer HumanFactors,NOPSEMA
,

ARegulatoryPerspective
onHumanFactors
Joelle Mitchell
JoelleMitchell
TechnicalOfficer HumanFactors

Outline

1May2012

WhatisNOPSEMAsrole?
H d
HowdowedefineHumanFactors?
d fi H
F
?
WhatisNOPSEMAsapproach?
Whatcandutyholdersexpect?

A216253

29

NOPSEMA sroleinSafety
NOPSEMA's
role in Safety
PerformanceImprovement

AHistoryofHumanError

1May2012

CostaConcordia
DeepwaterHorizon
p
Montara
T
TexasCity
Cit
Columbia
GlenbrookTrain
Longford
PiperAlpha

A216253

KingsCrossFire
Chernobyl
Challenger
g
ExxonValdez
Th
ThreeMileIsland
Mil I l d
WestGateBridge
Titanic
31

HumanErrorinAustralianOffshorePetroleum
HumanFactorsidentifiedasacausalfactor:
Human Factors identified as a causal factor:
innineoutoftennotifiedaccidentsanddangerous
occurrences
in100%ofactualorpotentialdeathsandserious
injuries
j

Possibleinterpretations:
P ibl i t
t ti
inaccuratereporting
blamefocusedinvestigations
humanfactorsarecriticaltosafeoperations
1May2012

A216253

32

SoWhat?
If
IfHumanFactorscontributetoaccidentsand
Human Factors contribute to accidents and
dangerousoccurrences

thenregulatoractivitymustaddresshumanas
wellastechnicalfactors
1May2012

A216253

33

Regulators
NOPSEMAsfunctions :
1

Compliance
Improvement
Governance

1.OffshorePetroleumandGreenhouseGasStorageAct2006
1May2012

A216253

34

DutyHolders OperatorsandEmployers

1May2012

A216253

OffshorePetroleumandGreenhouseGasStorageAct2006

35

Defining Human Factors

DefiningHumanFactors

HumanError

1May2012

A216253

37

Fail re of a Planned Action to Achie e a Desired O tcome

FailureofaPlannedActiontoAchieveaDesiredOutcome

Plan

Action

Adequate

Unintentional

Inadequate

Intentional

Desire

1May2012

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38

HumanReliability

Humansareinherentlyunreliable
Humans are inherently unreliable
1errorper100stepsforprocedurebasedtasks
1errorper10stepsforcriticalalarmdiagnosisand
response

Whatinfluenceshumanreliability?
1May2012

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39

HumanFactors
Individual

Organisational

Personality
Competence and skill
Competenceandskill
Mood
Attitude
Health

Culture
ResourceAvailability
Resource Availability
Communication
Systems
Supervisor
Commitment

Job

1May2012

Humanmachineinterface
Workload
Procedures
Taskrequirements
A216253

40

AnInteraction
Organisational

Individual
1May2012

Job
A216253

41

ModelofHumanFactors
Organisation

I di id l
Individual

J b
Job

HumanReliability

SafePerformance

HumanError

Event

NearMiss
1May2012

A216253

42

NOPSEMAsHumanFactorsDefinition

Th
Thewaysinwhichtheorganisation,thejob,
i hi h h
i i
h j b
andtheindividualinteract toinfluencehuman
reliabilityinmajoraccidenteventcausationin
theoffshorepetroleumindustry.

1May2012

A216253

43

ASeriesofNational
A
Series of National
Programs

NOPSEMAsFunctions
Compliance

Monitor&Enforce

Investigate

Promote

Advise

Improvement

Coordinate

Report

Governance

1May2012

A216253

45

NOPSEMAsApproachtoHumanFactors
Compliance

Improvement

Governance

Inspection Tools
InspectionTools

Industry Research

InterAgency
Reporting

Inspection Reports
InspectionReports

Guidance and Advice

GuidanceandAdvice

1May2012

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46

PromotingHumanFactors
HumanFactorsModules,e.g.:
SafetyCulture
S f t C lt
HumanReliabilityinRiskAssessments
PsychosocialRiskManagement

SuccessiveNationalPrograms
Inspections
p
IndustryResearch
Guidance
1May2012

A216253

47

Module1 SafetyCulture
ProjectOutline:
Project Outline:

DefiningSafetyCulture
Tool development
Tooldevelopment
Toolvalidation
Implementation
Results

ProjectLaunch
j
Comingsoon

1May2012

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48

WhatcanDutyHolders
What
can Duty Holders
Expect?

DutyHolders OperatorsandEmployers

1May2012

A216253

OffshorePetroleumandGreenhouseGasStorageAct2006

50

NOPSEMAsActivities
Duringinspections:
During inspections:
Increasedfocusonhumanfactors
Participationinresearch
Participation in research
HumanFactorsspecialists

GuidanceandAdvice
Accesstoresearchfindings
Publishedmaterials
Forums,conferences,etc.

1May2012

A216253

51

Outline

1May2012

WhatisNOPSEMAsrole?
H d
HowdowedefineHumanFactors?
d fi H
F
?
WhatisNOPSEMAsapproach?
Whatcandutyholdersexpect?

A216253

52

KeyMessages
HumanFactorsareimportant
Individual,Job,andOrganisationalinteraction
NOPSEMA
NOPSEMAwillbefocusingonHumanFactorsin
will be focusing on Human Factors in
MajorAccidentEventprevention

1May2012

A216253

53

Questions?

Thank You!
ThankYou!
Joelle.Mitchell@nopsema.gov.au

SafetyCultureandOtherHumanFactors
WorkatWoodsideEnergyLimited
EmilyNovatsis
SeniorHumanFactorsAdvisor,WoodsideEnergy
,
gy
Limited

Safety culture and other human factors

work at Woodside
Emily Novatsis
Senior Human Factors Adviser

Project Safe, 1 May 2012

Signals that a human factors focus was needed

2006

Safety culture

2008

H
Human ffactors
t
iin iincident
id t iinvestigation
ti ti

2011

Strengthening post incident learning

Human factors in design

2012

Stress management and resilience

Human factors in p
procedure design
g
Shift handover

Hum
man fa
actors in
ntegrattion

2006

Human fa
actors ccapabiility

Overview of Woodsides focus on human factors

Slide 57

Safety culture

Slide 58

Safety culture
What works

Present focus

Ongoing part of plans

Reinforcing Our Safety

C lt
Culture
f h
refresh

Links to other things we do

Safety culture survey

Led by our people

We
W stick
ti k att it

Slide 59

Human factors in incident investigation

Human Factors Analysis Tools
Better understanding of the human and organisational factors
Implementation
Structured introduction
Participant selection
Refreshers and support for users
Proactive use
Analysis of behaviours we want people to display
Education on human factors issues; error management
Central control room case study
Slide 60

Strengthening post incident learning

Large amount of upcoming
commissioning - many
isolations and de-isolations
Recurring theme of
incidents
Generic lessons from
previous
p
e ous isolation
so at o e
events
e ts
Devise a novel method of
l
learning
i

Slide 61

The scenario
Realistic scenario
Designed to address the general
lessons in previous isolation events
Developed with subject matter experts
and tested before use
Events unfold

Picture of
Page 1 here

Scenario asked participants to

assume particular roles
What would you think and do at
this stage?
Discuss in pairs
Review answers as a group

Slide 62

The scenario workshops

Introduction
I t d ti
Scenario
Discussion
Quiz
Key
K learning
l
i

Slide 63

Evaluation and feedback

All enjoyed the scenario
Majority thought this method of
learning offers additional benefits
to more traditional methods
All learned something new or
confirmed knowledge
g which can
be used to improve the reliability
of isolations
Strong support to use this
approach further
Used more widely than the target
audience

Comments included that it was

different to normal and a good
change, not boring, realistic and
close to home, good process and
team discussion, good to focus on
a specific issue, better way to
discuss an incident.

Comments mentioned the

interactive nature of the scenario
exercise, sharing examples and
experience helps learning,
learning value
of group discussion, better than
the noise of emailed notices, you
have to engage and think about
the issues involved

The most common learning was

re-emphasising the increased
likelihood of error under certain
circumstances such as time
pressure, and the importance of
independent checks and peer
review

Slide 64

Broadening to other focus areas

Stress management and resilience
Human factors in procedure design
Shift handover
Place topics covered in a broader framework

Slide 65

Building and organising human factors capability

Human factors
steering group
Preferred
human factors
tools/methods
Intranet
Human factors
networking
forums

Many human
M
h
factors spotters
Wide network of
focal points

Part of health and

safety strategy
and plans

Human factors
competencies

Multiple
human factors
advisers
External
E
t
l consultant
lt t
help when needed

Slide 66

Challenges
Keeping out noise and maintaining focus on selected tools
and methods
Keeping
p g some topics
p fresh and interesting
g
Education on human factors and influencing behaviour can
take time
Maintaining enough and depth of capability
Building a shared understanding across occupational groups
Using
g a pull
p
approach
pp
contributes to varied understanding
g
Ensuring interfaces with other disciplines are clear

Slide 67

Positive outcomes
Better understanding of safety culture
Improvement in safety culture in some areas
Safety culture work provided a foundation for discussion of
other human factors topics
Positive evaluations of other projects
Demand and enthusiasm for using human factors tools
and
d methods
th d tto iimprove performance
f
Preferred set of research based human factors tools
Provided practical ways for people to get involved in
health and safety
Slide 68

Thank you!
y
Q
Questions?

Slide 69

Disclaimer and Important Notice

This presentation contains forward looking statements that are subject to risk
factors associated with oil and gas businesses
businesses. It is believed that the
expectations reflected in these statements are reasonable but they may be
affected by a variety of variables and changes in underlying assumptions
which could cause actual results or trends to differ materially,
y, including
g but not
limited to: price fluctuations, actual demand, currency fluctuations, drilling and
production results, reserve estimates, loss of market, industry competition,
environmental risks, p
physical
y
risks, legislative,
g
fiscal and regulatory
g
y
developments, economic and financial market conditions in various countries
and regions, political risks, project delay or advancement, approvals and cost
estimates.
All references to dollars, cents or $ in this presentation are to Australian
currency, unless otherwise stated.
References to Woodside may be references to Woodside Petroleum Ltd. or
its applicable subsidiaries

Slide 70

Lunch Break
LunchBreak
1200 1300hrs

AWiderLookatHumanandOrganisational
FactorsinHealthandSafety
RonnyLardner
FounderandOccupationalPsychologist,
p
y
g ,
TheKeilCentreLimited

A wider look at human and

g
factors in health and
organisational
safety
Ronny Lardner, AFIChemE
Chartered Occupational Psychologist
The Keil Centre Ltd, Edinburgh, UK

The Keil Centre

About your speaker

Ronny Lardner
20 years experience as applied
psychologist in high
high-hazard
hazard
industries
Founder of The Keil Centre
Associate Fellow of British
Psychological Society &
Institution of Chemical
Engineers

One interesting fact.

The Keil Centre

Overview
Top-ten "human and
organisational
g
factors" most
relevant to high-hazard
industries

Relationship to safety culture,

and their influence on human
performance

UK oil and gas industry

experience of making
improvements on these topics

Practical examples - interactive

exercises and group-work

The Keil Centre

Have you ever done the following.?

Daydreamed when you should

Knowingly
g y broken the speed
p

be paying attention

limit

Failed to pay your train fare

Gone
G
into
i t a room, and
d forgotten
f
tt
why you went there?

Bumped
u ped into
to tthings
gs o
or peop
people?
e
Stolen something
Told a white lie
Not seen something you want in
the supermarket, even though
its right
g in front of yyou

Put the right thing in the wrong

Done home improvement work,

without
ith t ffullll PPE
The Keil Centre

place (e
(e.g.
g milk into oven)

Which work behaviours are a problem.?

Driving over speed limit on

Confusing two similar pieces of

company business

equipment, or products

Forgetting an important step in

a procedure

Deliberately taking banned

items onto site

Not wearing seatbelts on fork-lift

truck

Misunderstanding a work
instruction

Mis-reading a manual or
drawing

Using a mobile phone whilst

driving

Not using the PPE provided

Opening the wrong valve by
mistake
The Keil Centre

Why
y human factors?
UK Health and Safety
Executive

General guidance on human factors

HS(G)48
10 key human factors topics for
hazardous sites / installations

BP Texas City

Lost balance between process &

occupational safety
Many human factors causes
behavioural safety not enough

Client
Cli t / partner
t
expectations
t ti

Developing their own expertise

e.g. Woodside, Shell

The Keil Centre

Human factors
R d i
Reducing
error and
d influencing
i fl
i
behaviour
b h i

The Keil Centre

What do we mean by human

factors in hazardous industries?
10
0 Key
ey U
UK HSE
S human
u a &o
organisational
ga sat o a factors
acto s issues
ssues
Managing human
failure
Procedures
Training and
competence
t
Staffing, including
supervision
p
Organisational change

Safety-critical
communication
Human factors in
design
Fatigue
F ti
& shiftwork
hift
k
Organisational
((safety)
y) culture
Maintenance,
inspection and testing

The Keil Centre

HSEs HOF Topic Areas

Core

Competence
assurance

Human factors
in accident
investigation

Identifying
human failure

Common

Emergency
response

Maintenance
error

Safety critical
communications

Specific

Alarm handling
and control
room design

Managing
f ti
fatigue
risks
i k

Organisational
change and
t
transition
iti
management

The Keil Centre

Reliability and
usability of
procedures

Safety culture

Human Factors Analysis Tools

Gather Evidence

Assemble
Timeline

Traditional
analysis

Identify Critical Factors

& Causes; Write
recommendations
CF 1

CF 2

Specify behaviour(s) to be understood

Human
factors
analysis

Intentional

ABC Analysis

Behaviour
intentional or
unintentional?

The Keil Centre

Unintentional

Human Error
Analysis

CF 3

Human Factors Analysis Tools

Gather Evidence

Assemble
Timeline

Traditional
analysis

Identify Critical Factors

& Causes; Write
recommendations
CF 1

CF 2

Specify behaviour(s) to be understood

Human
factors
analysis

Intentional

ABC Analysis

Behaviour
intentional or
unintentional?

The Keil Centre

Unintentional

Human Error
Analysis

CF 3

Step-Change human factors guidance

How to take the first steps
12 case studies, based on the
top-ten

Read the case study(s) below

2 The best people do make

mistakes

Ask the question could

something
thi similar
i il h
happen
where I work?

Identify
Id tif what
h t iis needed
d d tto
strengthen defences

The Keil Centre

Human factors analysis of five isolation

incidents
Three human errors, two violations
of the control of work / isolation
procedures

This incident involved a very

experienced electrical technician a
classic maintenance error

The investigations identified a

number of performance-shaping
factors, which increased the
likelihood of errors

Control of work system was

analysed to establish if it was errortolerant
tolerant
The Keil Centre

Human reliability assessment

- a proactive
ti technique
t h i
f critical
for
iti l tasks
t k Task

Probability
y of failure

Task of similar nature to

process isolation, with some
independent checking of output

?? in 1000

Above, without independent

checking of output

?? in 1000

Above, plus time shortage for

error detection and correction

?? in 1000

The Keil Centre

Human reliability assessment

- a proactive
ti technique
t h i
f critical
for
iti l tasks
t k Task

Probability
y of failure

Task of similar nature to

process isolation, with some
independent checking of output

3 in 1000

Above, without independent

checking of output

9 in 1000

Above, plus time shortage for

error detection and correction

81 in 1000

Performancep g
shaping
factors
The Keil Centre

Recommendations
Reducingg isolation error rate
Early detection of isolation errors
Educate personnel on human error, and performance-shaping
ffactors
t
Share learning with other platforms, and other organizations
using
g same control of work software
Reducing isolation violations

Result: 66% reduction in errors, and remaining errors are of

lower potential consequence

The Keil Centre

Safety culture and human factors

Strong safet
safety c
culture:
lt re Cannot eliminate
error; ATC = 98% error; 2% intentional

Key points

Decreasing
D
i
number of
unsafe acts

Many process industries

need more management
focus, tools & techniques
for identifying
identif ing and
reducing error, and
performance-shaping
factors
Human error includes
management error

Maturing
safety
culture

More traditional
behavioural safety wont
help

Capability
improvement
po e e t
needed here?

Intentional Unintentional
(Violation)
(Error)

Strong Link to Just & Fair

Culture

Weak safety culture:

Error obscured by focus
on more obvious
violations, and blame

A
developing
safety
culture:
55%
violations;
45% error

The Keil Centre

What do we mean by human

factorsin hazardous industries?
10 Key UK HSE human factors issues
Managing human failure
Procedures
Training and
competence
Staffing
Organisational change

Thi session
This
i

Safety
Safety-critical
critical
communication
handover & control of work

Human factors
f
in
design
Fatigue & shiftwork
Organisational culture
Maintenance,
inspection and testing

The Keil Centre

 The Keil Centre

Importance of communication
Onshore

Sellafield incidents
Buncefield

Offshore

Piper Alpha
Other fatalities/ serious injuries

Aviation

Tenerife disaster

Many unpublished & unreported

incidents

The Keil Centre

Effective shift handover

- a human factors approach -

Ergonomics
Accidents
P h l
Psychology
Safety
Linguistics
HSE reports
Organisational
Behaviour

Multiple
p methods
Management
The Keil Centre

Nursing

Group exercise
Shift handover worksheet
Based on actual incidents
Designed to involve
involve, and
make people think about
effectiveness

Results in specification
p
of
good handover what and
how
The Keil Centre

What does the research say?

What to
communicate

Outgoing Incoming
Update of
mental model

Potentially
problematic
handovers

Specify information
requirements
The Keil Centre

What does the research say?

How to
communicate
accurately
Face-to-face

Two-way

Repetition

Feedback
The Keil Centre

The Ideal Shift Handover

Outgoing

Incoming
2 - way

Verbal and
Written

F
Face
- to
t - Face
F

Key Information Presented

The Keil Centre

Some results.
Chemical plant

Oil refinery

conducted own evaluation

compared before & after
handovers twice as good
no call-outs since project
events drastically reduced
completely satisfied with
method & p
process

The Keil Centre

Pilot project, then roll-out

Evaluation after 3 months
66% believed there had been
a need to improve standards
76% had observed an
improvement in log book
completion
66% had observed an
improvement in handover
conduct

Seven key audit questions

1 Are shift handover arrangements described or referenced in the
1.
safety case?
2. Does this organisation define a minimum standard for shift
handovers?
3. Is written guidance available to operational personnel on how to
conduct an effective shift handover?
q
for p
periodic monitoring
g or auditing
g of
4. Is there a written requirement
shift handovers?
5. Are communication skills amongst the selection criteria for key post
holders e.g. operations supervisor/superintendent?
6. Is training provided for new or existing staff in how to conduct a shift
handover?
7. Have the information needs of the key post been incorporated into
a common structured
t t d method
th d off shift
hift handover?
h d
?

The Keil Centre

Comparisons between installations

Wide range of good
practice (1 to 7)
Average scores:

Figure 1: Range of good practice

4
Drillers
3

Fixed Installations

2
1

Platform11

Platform10
0

Platform9
9

Platform8
8

Platform7
7

Platform6
6

Platform5
5

Platform4
4

Platform3
3

2
Platform2

Platform1

Driller5
5

Driller4
4

Driller3
3

2
Driller2

0
Driller1

Number of good practices evident

Type of installation

The Keil Centre

Drillers = 3.0
Platforms = 4.3

More emphasis on
monitoring/auditing &
staff selection by
platform operators
Scope to share good
practice across industry

In conclusion
Communication can be
measurably improved

Human
H
ffactors
t
knowledge
k
l d
and tools

Literature review
Short article
Audit methodology
Paper describing
improvement project
Communications model

The Keil Centre

Summary
More sophisticated
understanding of scope of
safety culture, and the many
& varied influences on
behaviour

Increased use of internal

company models, and
development of internal
p
expertise

Integration of human
factors into design
factors
design,
operations, maintenance
and decommissioning

The Keil Centre

Human and organisational factors

Safety Culture & Behaviour
Understanding and developing

Organisational Issues

safety culture
Internal consultancy skills
Process safety culture &
leadership
Behavioural safety principles

Organisational change
Staffing and workload
Training and competence
Effective supervision

Human Reliability & Failure

Human Factors & Design

Human factors integration &

Reducing human error

Managing violations
Managing fatigue
Human factors in incident

workspace design
Safety-critical communication
Design of the human - machine
i t f
interface
Developing useable procedures

investigation

The Keil Centre

Further information & resources

Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour

Download free at

www.hsebooks.co.uk - search for HSG48

The Keil Centre Ltd publications

http://www.keilcentre.co.uk/downloads.aspx

UK Health and Safety Executive HOF web-site

http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/index.htm

US Chemical Safety Board Safety Videos

http://www.csb.gov/videoroom/videorequest.aspx?
p
g
q
p

Energy Institute HOF briefing notes

http://www.energyinst.org.uk/index.cfm?PageID=811
p
gy
g
g

Step-Change in Safety

Human Factors how to take the first steps

p search in Google
g

The Keil Centre

The end
Questions?
Ques o s

Thanks

Good luck

Safe
S f journey
j
h
home!!

The Keil Centre

Afternoon Tea Break

AfternoonTeaBreak
1430 1500hrs

Feedback from SSCP

FeedbackfromSSCP
SteveWilliams
ManagingDirector,AnMe
g g
,

SSCP Implementation
Update and Top Tips
1 May, 2012

SSCP Update

TheMandate
SSCP Development
SSCPDevelopment
WhatisSSCPtoday?
Wherearewenow?
Where are we going?
Wherearewegoing?
Opportunitiesforimplementation
Nextsteps

Program
og a Mandate
a da e

Oil and gas industry leaders require all offshore construction

supervisors to participate in SSCP and to obtain an SSCP
card.
d
Supervisor:
S
i
1
1-up
and
d2
2-up from
f
the
th worker;
k supervising
i i th
the bl
black
k ttrades
d ((scaffolding,
ff ldi
rigging, welding, crane operations etc).
Offshore construction: construction and HUC phases of offshore greenfield and brownfield
projects.

www.safesupervisor.com.au

Development Phase
Industry
Competency
Units

Supervisor
Competence
Standards

AQTF Units of
Competency

MODULE 1

MODULE 2

MODULE 3

MODULE 4

MODULE 5,
etc.

Project
Deliverables

Recognition and Assurance Process

Training
Organisation
Deliverables

Lesson Plans

Development of Competence
Standards and Modules

Training
Environment
Assessment
Workplace
Assessment

= Assurance Component
= Governance Component

Standards, Modules
and Assessment
Checklist

Delegated
Authority Criteria

Industry
Management
Group

Nominated
Assessor Criteria

Independent
Reviewer

Review
Guidelines

RPL Guidelines

External Training
Providers

Experience

Participating
Companies

Training /
Qualifications

Workplace Asses
ssment

Classroom Training and

d Assessment

Review
Guidelines

Offshore
Project Safe

Development of Governance and

Assurance Model

Assessment
Checklist

Workplace
observation

Start

Undergo SSCP
training

Y
Training
environment
outcomes
satisfied?

RPL
guidelines
satisfied?

Results sent to
SSCP
S
Secretariat
t i t

Arrive at
workplace undergo
orientation

Conduct
workplace
assessment

Workplace
outcomes
satisfied?

Y
SSCP card
issued

Results sent to
SSCP
Secretariat

Development of Participant
Completion Pathway

What is SSCP now?

E
Engagement
t Kit
-

Program background, requirements and

g
governance
Standards and Modules
Instructions for Training Organisations and
Participating Workplaces

SSCPENGAGEMENTKIT

Website
-

Program updates (subscriptions, news)

D
Documentation
t ti (FAQ
(FAQ, Glossary)
Gl
)
Feedback (Surveys)
Events

Where are we now?

140
120
100

Supervisors
p
Trained

80
60

Supervisors
Assessed
d

40
20
0

Numberofapprovedtrainingorganisations:2
Number of participating workplaces: 5
Numberofparticipatingworkplaces:5
Numberofpeopletrainedtodate:128
Numberofcardsissued:35

Implementation Progress

OperatorA

OperatorB

OperatorC

OperatorD

No current
projects

OperatorE

No current
projects

ContractorA

ContractorB

MANPOWERPROVIDER

ContractorC

ContractorD

MANPOWERPROVIDER

SSCP in contracts

Implementing SSCP

SSCP not in contracts

Not yet implementing SSCP

Where are we going?

DiscussionsofthefutureofSSCP:
Acceptedthepotentialforreductioninprogram
p
p
p g
momentum
Programneedstobedrivenfullyintooffshore
Program needs to be driven fully into offshore
construction(operators,contractors,subbies)
Elsewhere?Whatisthe
Elsewhere? What is the low
lowhangingfruit
hanging fruit??
Production,Onshoreconstruction,marine?

APPEA??

Opportunities for Implementation

Seewhichofyourexistingtrainingsatisfies
p
q
SSCPcompetencerequirements
HavethisverifiedbytheIndependent
Reviewer
Buildfitforpurposebridgingtraining
RPLexistingsupervisors

SSCP and YOU

Whatmorecanyoudotogetonboard?
MandateSSCPinallfuturecontracts
Mandate SSCP in all future contracts
Putinternalstaff(CompanyMen,onsitecontract
supervisors)throughSSCP
i
) h
h SSCP
PromoteSSCPwithinyourorganisations
y
g
Whatthingsarestoppingyou implementingSSCP?

Closing Remarks and Forum Closure

ClosingRemarksandForumClosure
SimonBingham
OffshoreDevelopmentManager,
p
g ,
ApacheEnergyLimited

Networking | Drinks and Nibbles

Networking|DrinksandNibbles
1600 1700hrs