1 Maquerra vs Borra

FACTS: Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent tothe one-year
salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate,
ISSUE: whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional
HELD:Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the
natureand essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and
the principle of social justice underlying the same. The court reasoned out
thatSovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates fromthem,
and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be votedshall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal
opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason
of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to publicoffice.

claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom
the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.
3 Antonio Villegas vs Abelardo Subido

2 Villavicencio vs Lukban
Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's
Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the
latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in
Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the
case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be
filed in the city of Davao instead.

FACTS: Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women
street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved
by the Office of Civil Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido
refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to
manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out
that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and
placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes
a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas
however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the
President hence the same is no longer in effect.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by
the Civil Service Commissioner.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the
writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity
those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right
to be present.

HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law
or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in
accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably
convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers
would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to point to a
particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.

Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao.
Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in
deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights.
The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is
expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the
responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or
implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded
that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.
Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an
acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we
must take all pains to avoid.

Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400
pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning
further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality,
and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and

4 Macaga-an vs People

supporters of the MNLF and the Bangsa Moro Army and other anti-government
groups with similar motivations and aims.
-

FACTS
In a decision on July 15, 1981, the 22 petitioners were charged and convicted in 33 cases
for estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. The total amount of
Government funds (treasury warrants) involved was over P2.7 million.
Petitioners moved to close their cases on ground that they had been given amnesty by
former President Marcos on January 28 1986. The Sandiganbayan required them to
submit originals or authenticated copies of their amnesty papers, which they were unable
to produce. Petition was denied.
According to the petitioners, they were given conditional amnesty on Feb 2, 1985,
through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City,
subject to the approval or final action of the President of the Philippines, pursuant to PD
1082.
The Amnesty Commission recommended the approval of their amnesty or grant of
executive clemency.

January 22, 1986: Former Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo made written
representations with Marcos concerning the applications during a political rally of the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. Marcos apparently wrote the following on the upper right hand
corner of Dimaporo's letter: "Approved" and signed the same with a partly illegible date.
Petitioners also state that the original copies of the amnesty papers were lost or
destroyed at Malacanang "during the February 1986 bloodless military revolution" and
could not be located.
In a MR, petitioners sought to present secondary evidence of the amnesty, but the
Sandiganbayan did not allow it. Court also held that amnesty benefits under PD 1082
were never available to them. Petitioners seek certiorari in SC, claiming that amnesty
statute PD 1082 is applicable to them, NOT PD 1182. and that they should be allowed to
present secondary evidence of the amnesty given by Marcos.

Resistance = offenses of rebellion/ insurrection/ sedition under Crimes Against

Public Order

There is nothing in the case to indicate that the acts petitioners were convicted were "in
the furtherance of resistance to the duly constituted authorities of the Republic
of the Philippines." On the contrary, the acts of which the accused were convicted were
ordinary crimes (albeit carefully plotted and systematically carried out by numerous
accused) without any political complexion and consisting simply of diversion of public
funds to private profit.
2.

Petitioners fall under persons expressly disqualified from amnesty, stated in

Sec 2(a) of PD 1182, which repealed PD 1082. Petitioners applications for
amnesty were also filed beyond the time limit provided in PD 1182

PD 1182 SEC. 2 (a) Persons Disqualified:

Those who have promoted, maintained or headed a rebellion or insurrection or who,
while holding public office or employment took part therein, engaged in war against the
forces of the Government, destroyed property or committed serious violence, exacted
contributions or diverted public funds from the lawful purpose for which they
had been appropriated
Although PD 1182 covers the same subject matter as PD 1082, PD 1182 makes no
mention of the MNLF nor of the Bangsa Moro Army but rather relates to all groups
fighting the government of the Republic. PD 1182, unlike PD 1082, covers the entire
territory of the Republic of the Philippines, while P.D. 1082 covers only some of
the provinces in Mindanao and Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and some of the cities there
located.
In addition, P.D. 1182 included a repealing clause, which rescinded and/or modified all
laws, decrees, instructions, rules and regulations inconsistent with that decree.
3.

The supposed approval of the former President done in 1985, in clear conflict with
the restrictions in the very decrees he promulgated, cannot be given any legal
effect.

ISSUES
1.

W/N PD 1082 applies to the petitioners. NO

HELD/RATIO
1. PD 1082 does not apply to the petitioners because their acts were not offenses of
rebellion.
The offenses for which amnesty may be granted under the provisions of PD 1082 are acts
which were done in furtherance of resistance to the Republic by members and

It may be supposed that Marcos could have validly amended PD #s 1082 and 1182 so as
to wipe away the restrictions and limitations found in the decrees. But Marcos did not
amend his own decrees and he must be held to the terms and conditions that he himself
had promulgated in the exercise of legislative power.
Petition DENIED.

5. People of the Philippines vs Lorenzo Veneracion

In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide committed against a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo
Veneracion.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner correct in maintaining that P.D. 1638, as amended applies
prospectively and should apply only to those who joined the military service after its
effectivity?

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to
impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion
perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty
of death be imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.

HELD: Yes, petitioner is correct in saying that P.D. 1638 applies prospectively. There is no
question that P.D. 1638 as amended applies prospectively and it does not provide for its
retroactive application. But in petitioners contention that it should only apply to those
who joined the military service after its effectivity, he is wrong because P.D. 1638 as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval.
Sec. 2 of P.D. 1638, as amended provides that, the decree shall apply to all military
personnel in the service of the AFP. P.D. 1638 as amended was signed into law on
September 10, 1979 while petitioner retired in 1982, which is long after the approval of
P.D. 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of P.D. 1638, as amended, apply to
petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty
than that imposed by law.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of
guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused
regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose the
death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof)
which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

6 SALVADOR PARREO REPRESENTED BY HIS DAUGHTER MYRNA P. CAINTIC,

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
Facts: Salvador Parreno served in the AFP for 32 years and was retired on January 1982.
He received payment of his lump sum pension and started receiving his monthly pension
in 1985. Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In
January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in accordance with sec. 27 of
P.D. 1638 which provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino
citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but AFP JAGO denied his request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension but on
January 9, 2003, COA denied his claim for lack of jurisdiction. COA ruled that the issue at
hand requires the courts as mandated by the constitution to determine the validity of the
law re: P.D. 1638 sec. 27.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but on January 13, 2004, in its resolution
COA denied the motion further ruling that even if assumed jurisdiction over the claim,
petitioners entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must
necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in accordance with sec. 27 of
P.D. 1638 as amended.
Petitioner argued that P.D. 1638, as amended applies prospectively and should apply only
to those who joined the military service after its effectivity.

7 Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to
the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a
fee, halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the
actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request.
Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to
oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among
others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded
preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed
this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By
giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating
to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to
accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Issue: Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State.

Held: No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was
accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently
affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic
beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal,
Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State
has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on
halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise
reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no
compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that
the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market
are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not
encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

8 Calalang vs Williams
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption
of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions
of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from t
he
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government,
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be
made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the

competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the
greatest number.

9 PLDT vs. NLRC

Facts:
Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, was accused by two complainants of having
demanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her
promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated
and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service.
She went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally
removed. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the company
was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Nevertheless, the
dispositive portion of labor arbiters decision declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.
Considering that Dr. Bangayan and Mrs. Martinez are not totally blameless in the light of
the fact that the deal happened outhide the premises of respondent company and that
their act of giving P3,800.00 without any receipt is tantamount to corruption of public
officers, complainant must be given one month pay for every year of service as financial
assistance.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations
Board, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. The private
respondent took no further action, thereby impliedly accepting the validity of her
dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us to question the affirmance of the
above- quoted award as having been made with grave abuse of discretion.
The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an employee illegally
dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws.
However, an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor
backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with
law. In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded financial assistance
equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10 year service in the company
despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded rather than punished
for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification. The award is made

on the ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover,
such award puts a premium on dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring
corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with
her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense
but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after working faithfully with the
company for ten years. In support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases of
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile
Corporation of Davao, where the employees were dismissed for cause but were
nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social and compassionate justice.
Issue: WON Separation pay is proper.
Held: We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other
than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the
wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that
he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect
a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to
do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who
do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it
is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly
will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane
society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be
an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so
only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of
those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the
cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at
bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by
the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted.
The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be
considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty
that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of

service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social
justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.
Petition granted

10 IMBONG VS OCHOA
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1.

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.

3.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7.

The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution.

8.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1.

Right to life

2.

Right to health

3.

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4.

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5.

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6.

Due process clause

7.

Equal protection clause

8.

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

1.

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins
is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that
life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins
at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment
of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition,
they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take
action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers
womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be
struck down.

2.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in
place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory

only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient
and effective.
3.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or

participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However,
the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes
the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment
Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3,
Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as
it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical
procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,

which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has
not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents
in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other
interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health
care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health
care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as
provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23
(a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health.

7.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that
it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7
of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8.

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

12 Pierce v. Society of Sisters

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization
conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the
state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction
of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and
guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their
children.

13 New York v. Ferber

11 Meyer v. Nebraska
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the
eighth
grade.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Nebraska
upheld
the
conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Facts. Use of children in pornographic materials has increased over the years causing the
introduction of many state laws prohibiting such activity. The Respondent was a
storeowner who sold material showing children under the age of 16 engaged in sexual
activities.
Issue. Is child pornography a form of obscenity that may be constitutionally restricted?
Held. Yes. The prohibition on the sale and distribution of child pornography is
constitutional even if the material is not obscene.

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty

interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of
the state.

Distribution of these materials is intrinsically related to child abuse.

The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily
restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the
protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a
fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German
language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Concurrence. It is possible for some depictions of child sex acts to have serious literary,
artistic, scientific or medical value.

Advertising and selling these types of materials provide an economic motive to engage in
illegal
activity.
The value of showing children engaged in sex is de minimis.

14 DECS vs San Diego

Facts: Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test)
three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on
the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due
process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The
petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to
the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is
not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education
as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of
his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

15 Oposa vs Factoran
FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to:

1.

Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2.
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent
the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
16 MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)
FACTS: The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila
Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that
ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively
ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for
swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES: (1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of
Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.
Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will
adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet
the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be
the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution

incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or
entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD: (1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident,
as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific
pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a
specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While
the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to
be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under
what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring
that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

17 Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan

FACTS: Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future,
respondentProvince of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan,
Municipality of Malay. Thus,on May 7, 2009, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizingGovernor
Carlito Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority
(PRA)to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the
Province deliberated onthe possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation
area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40)hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its
resources.
After PRAs approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and
NaturalResources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI)
issued to the ProvinceEnvironmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the
questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of theReclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to
be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.On May 17, 2010, the
Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the landuse development
of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional andother
applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a
series ofpublic consultation meetings.On the other hand, the

Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of theMunicipality of Malay

and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some160
businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the
reclamation projecton environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.Despite the
opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to
thecontractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project.
Thus, on June 1,2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for
Environmental Protection Order/Issuanceof the Writ of Continuing Mandamus
Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary EnvironmentalProtection Order (TEPO) and
ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.The Petition was
premised on the following grounds, among others:a) the Province failed to obtain the
favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;b) the Province failed to conduct the
required consultation procedures as required by the LocalGovernment Code (LGC).The
Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENREMBRVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said
government agencies, as wellas the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of
Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the
said project, had categorically addressed all the issues raised by the BFI in its Petition.
It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of actiondue to the failure
of BFI to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial
relief.
ISSUE: WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remediesbefore filing this case?WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public
consultation for the project?
HELD: The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public
consultation for theproject.The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of
national government agencies in themaintenance of ecological balance and requires them
to secure prior public consultations and approvalof local government units. In Province of
Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, underthe Local Government
Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects theenvironmental
and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior
consultationwith the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by
the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of such mandatory requirements will
render the projects implementation as illegal.Here, the Court classified the reclamation
project as a national project since it affects theenvironmental and ecological balance of
local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted that suchnational projects mentioned in
Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause pollution and bringabout climate
change, among others, such as the reclamation project in this case.Also, DENR DAO
2003-30 provides that project proponents should initiate public consultations early in
order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken
intoconsideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan.
Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to reclaim
land inthis case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the
information disseminationconducted months after the ECC had already been issued was
insufficient to comply with therequirements under the LGC.Furthermore, the lack of prior

public consultation and approval is not corrected by thesubsequent endorsement of the

reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang
Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of
theProvince.
18 Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or
are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the
sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the
provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of
legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written,
the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely openended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.

Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long
as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered
by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification
of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine.
The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at
the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of
the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand
of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer
and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school
dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the
following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read
and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.