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LIM V CA 214 SCRA 237 SEPTEMBER 25, 1992

FACTS: Petition for review on the rule of confidentiality the patient-doctor
relationship
November 25, 1987 Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for
annulment based on Art 36, alleging that Nelly Lim (petitioner) is suffering
from schizophrenia before, during and after marriage and until the present
January 11, 989 Sim announced he will present Dr Lydia Acampado
(psychiatrist) as a witness on January 25, 1989
Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited
from the witness is privileged since Dr Acampado had examined Lim in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her with schizophrenia.
Subpoena was issued on January 12, 1989
January 24, 1989 petitioner filed urgent motion to quash subpoena and
suspend proceedings. Overruled
Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness
and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the
petitioner as doctor.
March 3, 1989 petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari and
prohibition but was denied on September 18, 1989 on the ground that
petitioner failed to establish the confidential nature of the testimony
obtained from Dr Acampado
ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying
schizophrenia in case where petitioner is her client
HELD: In order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
1. Privilege claimed is in a civil case
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine
3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity
4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that
capacity
These requisites must concur with the 4 fundamental conditions necessary for
invoking doctor-patient confidentiality:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed
2. Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties
3. The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must greater than the benefit thereby gain for correct
disposal of litigation
Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose
anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of
the petitioner. There is nothing specific or concrete offered to show that the
information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken the petitioners
reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her proceedings that
her counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground
that it elicited an answer that would violate the confidentiality privilege.

SALITA V MAGTOLIS 233 SCRA 100 JUNE 13, 1994

FACTS: Erwin Espinosa (32) and Joselita Salita (22) were married on January 25,
1986. Separated in 1988 and Erwin sued for annulment on the basis of
psychological incapacity
January 7, 1992 petitioner filed annulment on the grounds that Erwin is
psychologically incapacitated; also moved for bill of particulars
ISSUE: Whether bill of particulars submitted by Erwin is of sufficient definiteness
to enable petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading
HELD: YES. SC held that the bill of particulars filed by Erwin is sufficient to state
a cause of action. Private respondent already alleged that petitioner is unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession (upon his time and
efforts). To demand more detail would be asking for information on evidentiary
facts.
SC sees no need to define or limit the scope of Art. 36 of the Family Code since
the actual issue is with the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. AFFIRMED CA
DECISION.
KROHN V CA 233 SCRA 146 JUNE 14, 1994
FACTS:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in
evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded
on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband
who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the
report. Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking doctor-patient confidentiality, seeks
to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the psychiatric evaluation
report.
June 14, 1964 Edgar Krohn Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in
San Marcelino Manila. In 1971, Paz underwent psychological testing in an
effort to ease marital strain; 1973 both separated
1975 Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric
report signed by Dr Cornelio Banaag and Baltazar Reyes.
November 2, 1978 Edgar obtained a decree from family court nullifying
his marriage with Paz. On June 10, 1979, decree was confirmed and
pronounced final
July 30, 1982 Pasig CFI granted voluntary dissolution of conjugal
partnership
October 23, 1990 Edgar filed petition for annulment, citing the
confidential psychiatric evaluation report
May 8, 1991 Edgar testified on the contents of the psych report but was
objected due to patient-doctor confidentiality. Petitioner asserted that
there is no factual or legal basis for Edgars claims since reports were
fabricated.
June 4, 1991 RTC admitted confidential psychiatric report as evidence
Petitioner argued pursuant to Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 ROC<, prohibits a
physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in
attending to a patient in a professional capacity, more so a third person

testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from

submitting any medical report prepared by a physician which the latter
has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with the
patient
May 29, 1991 Edgar opposed Paz motion to disallow the introduction of
the confidential psych report as evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not the confidential psychiatric report obtained by Edgar

Krohn constitutes as evidence in filing an annulment complaint on the account of
psychological incapacity
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed
is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by
medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the
testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
Such testimony then is considered nothing but hearsay. PETITION DENIED FOR
LACK OF MERIT.
SANTOS V CA 240 SCRA 20 JANUARY 4, 1995
FACTS: Leouel Santos (petitioner) and Julia Rosario Bedia were married on
September 20, 1986 in Iloilo City
May 18, 1988 Julia left for the US as a nurse. She did not disclose where
she lived; petitioner tried to locate her in the US but was unsuccessful. He
then filed with RTC a complaint for nullity of marriage
May 31, 1991 Julia opposed complaint and alleged that the petitioner
was the one who had been irresponsible and incompetent
No collusion proven by the provincial prosecutor
November 6, 1991 court dismissed the case for lack of merit. Petitioner
appealed on the basis that Julias failure to return and lack of
communication proves she is psychologically incapacitated
ISSUE: Whether Julias behavior (failure to return home and lack of intention of
communicating with Leouel) constitutes as psychological incapacity
HELD: Psychological incapacity is characterized by: 1. Gravity; 2. Juridical
antedence and; 3. Incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Psychological incapacity does not cover all psychoses (extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, etc) Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to

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live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. PETITION
DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
J. PADILLA Julia appears to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband. While it is true that vagueness of psychological incapacity may allow
easy escape for couples out of their marriage, there are enough safeguards in
this contingency, i.e. intervention of the State through public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion.
The fact that Julia did not attempt to communicate with Santos for some time
and did not even divulge her address is a clear indication of psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations although these
indications were manifest AFTER the celebration of the marriage. The court is
limiting the interpretation of Art. 36 too much. VOTE TO NULLIFY MARRIAGE
CHI MING TSOI V CA G.R. NO. 119190 JANUARY 16, 1997
FACTS: Petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity
May 22, 1988 Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao Tsoi (respondent).
Petitioner refuses to copulate with respondent. Gina claims that petitioner
is impotent, a closet homosexual and marriage should be annulled due to
psychological incapacity
According to the petitioner, he loves his wife very much and does not want
the marriage to be annulled. Upon physical examination, petitioners
penis has a soft erection
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners refusal to copulate constitutes psychological
incapacity
HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-

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fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT

REPUBLIC V OLAVIANO MOLINA G.R. NO. 108763 FEBRUARY 13, 1997

FACTS: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January
25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in
toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
April 14, 1985 Roridel Olaviano and Reynaldo Molina were married and
after a year, had a son. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility: dependent on parents, squandered money, quarrelsome
1987 Separated after Roridel became the breadwinner; Reynaldo
abandoned them after a few weeks
August 28, 1989 Reynaldo admitted they can longer live as husband and
wife due to: 1. Roridels strange behavior on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; 2. Roridels refusal to perform her
marital duties and; 3. Roridels failure to run the household and run their
finances
Olavianos allegations were corroborated by her friends, Ruth Salas (social
worker) and Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison (psychiatrist); submitted documents
confirming such while Reynaldo did not present any evidence during pretrial
May 14, 1991 Family court declared marriage null and void. CA affirmed
the same
ISSUE:
Whether opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent to
psychological incapacity; Guidelines of proving psychological incapacity
HELD: In Santos v CA, psychological incapacity refers to not just mental or
physical incapacity but should be characterized by: a. gravity; b. juridical
antecedence; c. incurability. In the present case, there is no clear indication that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity but more of a difficulty or
neglect in performing marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities but they must show that they are
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
Guidelines for Psychological Incapacity:
1. Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
2. Root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or
clinically identified; b. alleged in the complaint; c. sufficiently
proven by experts and; d. clearly explained in the decision

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3. Psychological incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
(during) celebration of marriage need not be perceivable at such
time but must be existing at the time thereof or prior to it
4. Incurability clinically permanent or incurable. Such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marital obligations, not necessarily those
related to marriage.
5. Gravity must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume essential marital obligations.
Mild character biological
peculiarities, e.g. mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot
be accepted as such. There is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person that effectively incapacitates the person from fulfilling his/her
essential marital obligations
6. The essential marital obligations must be those mentioned in Art
68-71 of the Family Code as well as Art 220, 221, And 225 relating
to parents and children
7. Interpretations given by the court should be given respect
8. Participation of the State Fiscal or Solicitor General must appear as
counsel for the State
PETITION IS GRANTED. MARRIAGE IS VALID AND SUBSISTING
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
J. PADILLA Maintained position in Santos v CA. Each case must be judged
based on its own facts. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
milieu and CA must avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trail court.
J. ROMERO Psychological incapacity should not be the result of mental illness.
For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties (imbecility), there
is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage voidable
under Art 45 of Family Code. Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage
HERNANDEZ V COURT OF APPEALS 320 SCRA 76 DECEMBER 8, 1999
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA dated January
30, 1996 affirming RTC decision dated April 10, 1993 which dismissed the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner
Lucita Estrella (petitioner) and Mario Hernandez were married on January
1, 1981 in Silang, Cavite with three children
July 10, 1992 petitioner filed before Tagaytay RTC a petition for
annulment on the grounds of psychological incapacity; from the time of
the marriage up to present, cohabited with another woman, immature and
irresponsible, had STD, alcoholic
October 8, 1992 Mario did not answer Lucitas allegations. Assistant
provincial prosecutor found no evidence of collusion
April 10, 1993 RTC dismissed petition for annulment. January 30, 1996,
CA affirmed RTC decision

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ISSUE: Whether alcoholism constitutes as psychological incapacity; Whether CA
erred in holding that the petitioner failed to show that Marios psychological
incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of marriage
HELD:
Respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to perform essential marital
obligations.
As in Republic v CA, expert testimony should be presented to establish the
precise cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity in order to show
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage rests on the petitioner. CA DECISION AFFIRMED
MARCOS V MARCOS 343 SCRA 755 OCTOBER 19, 2000
FACTS: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring nullity of marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no
requirement that the respondent should be examined a physician or psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration
September 6, 1982 Brenda Marcos (petitioner) and WilsonMarcos
(respondent) married before Pasig MTC and May 8, 1983 married again
before Rev. Eduardo Ealeazar (command chaplain); had 5 children
Husband has no work, often quarrel and beat her and the children. He
would even force her to have sex with him. In 1992, they were living
separately
October 17, 1994 petitioner left with her children because respondent
turned violent; underwent medical exam contusions due to physical
violence
August 1995 petitioner went back to get missing child but was chased by
respondent with samurai
Social worker Sonia Millans study indicated that their children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive
Dr Natividad Dayan (psychologist) evaluated the appellee while appellant
did not
RTC found respondent to be psychologically incapacitated but CA reversed
the decision because psychological incapacity has not been established
sufficiently by the evidences presented
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences presented in the said case are substantive
and sufficient in ruling nullity of marriage; Whether the testimony of expert
witness is required
HELD: Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family,
became abusive and abandoned them, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already present at the time of the marriage or
that it is incurable. His alleged psychological illness was only traced to the time
he lost his job and not at the inception of the marriage.

8
Art 36 of Family Code is not to be confused with divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a part at the time of the marriage and is so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond provided in Art 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of Family
Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds

need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court
laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner,
however, has not faithfully observed them. PETITION DENIED.
REPUBLIC V DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425 FEBRUARY 9, 2001
FACTS: For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of
Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
September 7, 1975 Erlinda Matias herein respondent (16 yrs old) married
Avelino Parangan Dagdag (20) at INC Cuyapo Nueva Ecija. With two
children. After marriage, habitual disappearance of Avelino, alcoholic,
forced her to have sex with him, physically abusive
1993 Avelino abandoned his family. Respondent found that he was
imprisoned and he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985
July 3, 1990 Erlinda filed with Olongapo RTC declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino was at
large, summons were served by publication. During trial, she presented
her sister-in-law as a witness
Investigating officer found no collusion between said parties
December 17, 1990 RTC declared marriage null and void
August 21, 1991 motion for reconsideration from OSG that alcoholism,
physical violence and abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity.
April 22, 1983 CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and
void under Art. 36 on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological
incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic
and fugitive from justice
HELD: Respondent failed to comply with guideline #2 of Molina case which
requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. No psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of the husband. The
allegation that he is a fugitive was also not sufficiently proven. The Investigating
prosecutor also was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since RTC rendered decision prematurely.

MALCAMPOS-SIN V SIN 355 SCRA 285 MARCH 26, 2001

FACTS: Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity
June 4, 1987 Florence Malcampo (petitioner) and Philipp Sin
(respondent), a Portuguese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic
Parish, Manila
September 20, 1994 Florence filed with Pasig RTC a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage
June 16, 1995 RTC dismissed Florences petition
December 19, 1995 Florence filed a notice of appeal to CA
April 30, 1998 CA dismissed Florences petition and affirmed RTC
decision
June 23, 1998 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with CA but
was denied on January 19, 1999
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration in declaring the nullity of her marriage with the respondent
HELD: The SC reversed the decision and remanded it to the RTC for proper retrial, providing guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family CodE (based on Molina case):
1. The burden of proving the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio). This is rooted in
the fact that both the Constitution and the Law cherish the validity of the
marriage and the unity of the family.
2. The root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or
clinically identified; b. alleged in the complaint; c. sufficiently proven by
experts and; d. clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
3. The incapacity was be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and is still existing
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really

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accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts."
There is no state participation in the instant case other than the manifestation
filed with the RTC on November 16, 1994. The state did not file any pleading,
motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
PESCA V PESCA 356 SCRA 588 APRIL 17, 2001
FACTS:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
March 3, 1975 Lorna Pesca (petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca (respondent)
were in Bacolod and had 3 children. As a seaman, he did not often stay
with petitioner.
In 1988 respondent showed signs of immaturity, cruelty, was a habitual
drinker
November 19, 1992 petitioner left with her children due to his cruel
behavior but returned and gave Zosimo a second chance.
March 22, 1994 respondent assaulted petitioner so petitioner decidedly
to leave Zosimo. Petitioner filed for annulment, invoking psychological
incapacity as grounds
April 25, 1994 summons were served on respondent but he failed to file
an answer within reglamentary period.
August 3, 1994 prosecutor submitted report that no collusion exists
between both parties
January 11, 1995 respondent filed an answer denying psychological
incapacity
November 15, 1995 RTC granted nullity of marriage but CA reversed the
decision on the basis that petitioner has not sufficiently established the
grounds for psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability

ISSUE: Whether Zosimo Pescas actions constitute psychological incapacity

HELD: DENIED. Petitioner failed to establish proof that respondent showed signs
of mental incapacity that would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenant provided in Art. 68 of the Family Code.

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The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and
a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely
novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of
the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in
Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that
followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and
the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

CHOA V CHOA 392 SCRA 641 NOVEMBER 26, 2002

FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision and the May 22, 2000 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100
March 15, 1981 Petitioner Leni Choa married respondent Alfonso Choa
and had 2 children
October 27, 1993 respondent filed before RTC complaint for annulment
based on psychological incapacity of petitioner
February 20, 1998 respondent filed a formal offer of exhibit; petitioner
did not object but instead, filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence)
on May 11, 1998
December 2, 1998 RTC denied petitioners demurrer of evidence; filed
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Elevated to CA through a
petition for certiorari
CA held that demurrer was not the correct procedure; proper remedy was
for the defense to present evidence and appeal there from. Petitioner also
failed to show that the issues in the court had been resolved arbitrarily
without basis

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ISSUES: Is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to
evidence? In its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating
or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
HELD: In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to
certiorari proceedings. However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, 21
this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the
proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority. In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of
the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when
the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an
interlocutory order.
The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to
support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration
of nullity of the parties marriage. The documents presented by respondent
during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because
she filed cases against him. Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that
the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that
"mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity.
Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the
incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did
he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
BARCELONA V CA 412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
FACTS: Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision as well as
the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The
Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for
Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
March 29, 1995 Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against
Diana Barcelona (petitioner). On May 9, 1995, Tadeo filed a motion to
withdraw petition which the RTC granted on June 7, 1995
July 21, 1995 Tadeo filed annulment again but petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on two grounds: no cause of action and violates SC administrative
circular 04-94 on forum shopping
Ground for dismissal of the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner
(against deferring resolution) was the complainants failure to state a
cause of action but according to Judge Pison, petitioner was shown to have
violated the complainants right so there is cause of action.
RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence
that the [petitioner] must controvert."
After her Motion for
Reconsideration11 was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner

13
elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, 13 docketed
as CA-GR No. 53100.
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological
incapacity in annulling said marriage
HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of
the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make
out his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt.
The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to
support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration
of nullity of the parties marriage.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he
and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no
showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify
and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his
testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish
the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by
respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination. PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED
DEDEL V CA G.R. NO. 151867 JANUARY 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner David Dedel married Sharon Corpuz on September 28, 1966
(civil rites) and church wedding on May 20, 1967. they had four children
Petitioner claims that during the marriage Sharon turned out to be
irresponsible and immature wife and mother; had several affairs with other
men.
Sharon was treated by clinical psychiatrist Dr. Lourdes Lapuz but affairs
continued. She even married the Jordanian national and had 2 children
and left with him.
April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a petition for annulment on the grounds of
psychological incapacity. Summons were severed but no response from
respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan who conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner who found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
perfectionist
Dayan noted that Sharon was suffering from anti-social personality
disorder evidenced by her promiscuity and lack of remorse; these are
indications amounting to psychological incapacity
RTC rendered said marriage null and void

14

ISSUE: Whether anti-social personality disorder constitutes as psychological

incapacity
HELD: Respondents sexual infidelity and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which makes the respondent
completely unable to perform her essential marital obligations.
At best, the circumstances described are grounds for legal separation under Art
55 of Family Code. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void. PETITION DENIED
REPUBLIC V QUINTERO-HAMANO G.R. NO 149498 MAY 20, 2004
FACTS: Petition for review of the decision dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
January 14, 1988 Lolita Quintero and Japanese national Toshio Hamano
were married in Bacoor Cavite. Respondent did not know that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated. After the marriage, Toshio left for Japan but
never returned. No financial support received from him
Summons were served by publication but the respondent failed to answer
November 20, 1996 prosecutor reported that no collusion exists. During
trial petitioner testified how Toshio abandoned his family and offered
documentary evidence to support her claims
August 28, 1997 RTC declared marriage null and void on the grounds
that Toshio failed to perform his essential marital obligations
ISSUE: Whether Toshios abandonment constitutes as psychological incapacity
(mixed marriage)
HELD: The totality of evidence presented are insufficient to prove that Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated following Santos and Mo.ina guidelines Mere
abandonment is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. No other evidence
was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although as a general rule, there is no need for medical exam, it would have
helped the petitioner to prove her case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness.
In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between a Filipino
spouse and a foreign spouse. Guidelines set cannot be bended on the account of
nationality. The norms used for determining psychological incapacity should
apply to any person regardless of nationality. PETITION GRANTED, RTC DECISION
REVERSED.

15

SIAYNGCO V SIAYNGCO 441 SCRA 422 OCTOBER 27, 2004

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco
August 11, 1973 Juanita Carating (petitioner) married Manuel Siayngco
(respondent) civil rites and church on June 27, 1973. Adopted baby boy
September 25, 1997 respondent filed for declaration of nullity based on
Art 36; petitioner was over domineering, selfish, volatile, nagger and
trivial. No respect for his position as judge. This is rooted in her deepseated resentment from lack of love and appreciation from her parents
According to petitioner, respondent is lying because he wants to be with
his paramour
Respondent presented Dr Valentina Garcia (psychiatrist); from her
psychiatric evaluation, both had narcissistic psychological repertoire
(along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize
(or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings
Based on the psychiatric report of Dr Eduardo Maaba, petitioner is
psychologically capacitated to comply with essential marital obligations
January 31, 2001 RTC denied petition for nullity based on insufficient
evidence
July 1, 2003 CA reversed RTC decision based on psychiatric report of Dr
Garcia that both are psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi
Ming Tsoi v CA
ISSUE: Whether root cause of psychological incapacity was identified based on
Molina guideline #2
HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent
Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which
makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood.
Respondent failed to prove that his wifes behavior and actions are grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In
fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with
the basic and essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Garcias report does not even

16
mention that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated. PETITION GRANTED. CA
DECISION WAS REVERSED
ANTONIO V REYES G.R. NO. 155800 MARCH 10, 2005
FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court
of Appeals had reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F.
Reyes (respondent), null and void
Decembher 6, 1990 petitioner and respondent were married in Pasig and
had a child who died 5 months after birth
March 8, 1993 petitioner filed for declaration of nullity based on Art. 36,
alleging that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations, incapacity existed at the time of the
marriage and exists up to the present
Petitioner alleged that respondent is a pathological liar who lied about
everything
Petitioner presented Dr Dante Abcede (psychiatrist) and Dr Arnulfo Lopez
(clinical psychologist); based on their tests, respondents constant lying
was pathological or abnormal. This undermined the basic relationship of
the marriage.
Respondent denied all allegations; presented Dr Antonio Efren Reyes
(psychiatrist) who tested respondent and found her to be psychologically
capacitated to perform marital duties
Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted
by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted
respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test
Church annulled marriage due to lack of discretion on both parties but CA
reversed decision on the insufficiency of evidence provided
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented by petitioner are sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity of respondent

HELD: In understanding Art 36, the preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law."
Each case must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. Petitioner was able to
sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of his spouse (witnesses, experts,
etc).
The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, etc.

17

Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at

the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends
and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner.
Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage. Also, The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient
to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations
as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular,
enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
However, although Dr Abcede did not comment on the incurability of
respondents illness, the SC ruled that each case is to be tried based on the
merits of the facts presented and not just juridical precedence. PETITION
GRANTED, MARRIAGED NULL AND VOID
REPUBLIC V IYOY 470 SCRA SEPTEMBER 21, 2005
FACTS: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998, declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L.
Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines
December 16, 1961 Crasus and Fely married in Cebu City; both had 5
children.
After the marriage, Fely was hot-tempered, nagger and
extravagant
1984 Fely went to the US; after a year, Crasus received divorce papers
from Fely and eventually found out that Fely married an American.
Respondent filed complaint after 13 years of marriage
Fely denied claims that it was respondent who was a drunkard, lazy etc.
No deposition submitted from Philippine Consul in US to RTC; RTC declared
marriage void ab initio on October 30, 1998
State intervened but CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE:
Whether abandonment
psychological incapacity

and

sexual

infidelity

per

se

constitute

HELD: Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. He submitted only two other
pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such
marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in

18
her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is
not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. MARRIAGE IS VALID AND SUBSISTING
YU V YU 484 SCRA 485 MARCH 10, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA on
January 11, 2002 alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu
(respondent) unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child
March 3, 2002 respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and dissolution of ACP before Pasig RTC
March 21, 2002 while habeas corpus was pending, CA awarded petitioner
of full custody over their child with full visitation rights to respondent

Petitioner and respondent later filed on April 5, 2002 before the appellate court a
Joint Motion to Approve Interim Visitation Agreement which was, by Resolution of
April 24, 2002, approved.
On April 18, 2002, respondent filed before the appellate court a Motion for the
Modification of her visiting rights under the Interim Visitation Agreement. To the
Motion, petitioner filed an Opposition with Motion to Cite Respondent for
Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he contended, constituted forum
shopping.
By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appellate court ordered respondent and her
counsel to make the necessary amendment in her petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody aspect is
concerned, under pain of contempt.
In compliance with the appellate courts Resolution of July 5, 2002, respondent
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Petition before the Pasig RTC. She, however,
later filed in December 2002 a Motion to Dismiss her petition, without prejudice,
on the ground that since she started residing and conducting business at her
new address at Pasay City, constraints on resources and her very busy schedule

19
rendered her unable to devote the necessary time and attention to the petition.
The Pasig RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly dismissed the
petition without prejudice, by Order of March 28, 2003.
On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig
RTC, docketed as JDRC Case No. 6190, with prayer for the award to him of the
sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the appellate court of his
petition for habeas corpus.
The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by
Resolution of July 3, 2003, for having become moot and academic, "the restraint
on the liberty of the person alleged to be in restraint [having been] lifted."
FERRARIS V FERRARIS G.R. NO. 162368 JULY 17, 2006
FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma.
Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.
February 20, 2001 Pasig RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by the petitioner on the grounds that epilepsy does not
amount to psychological incapacity and evidence on record was
insufficient to prove infidelity. Motion for reconsideration was denied on
April 20, 2001
CA affirmed in toto the judgment of RTC; it held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already
present at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she
arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality
disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting
and complying with the essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred affirming RTC decision in denying petition for
annulment on the account of insufficient evidence
HELD: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the
most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation
of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

20
Respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. PETITION
DENIED WITH FINALITY
MALLION V ALACANTARA G.R. NO. 141528 OCTOBER 31, 2006
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition
for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license?
October 24, 1995 Oscar Mallion filed a petition before RTC seeking
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara under Art. 36 of
Family Code
November 11, 1997 RTC denied petition on the ground that the petitioner
failed to provide sufficient evidence to warrant the relief he is seeking.
June 11, 1998 Appeal filed with CA was dismissed for failure to pay
docket and other lawful fees with reglamentary period
July 12, 1999 petitioner filed another petition seeking nullity of marriage,
alleging that marriage was void ab initio due to absence of marriage
license. Respondent filed a motion to dimiss on August 13, 1999, on the
grounds of res judicata and forum shopping
October 8, 1999 RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss
According to Mallion, relief prayed for is the same but the cause of action
is different; res judicata1 does not apply
ISSUE: should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an
essential requisite prescribed by article 4 of the family code be raised in the
same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a
partys psychological incapacity under article 36 of the family code
HELD: The SC held that in civil case no. Sp 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their
claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged
in that case
1 A matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and
common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and
is no longer subject to appeal

21
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits;
and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action. All three requisites are present in the
instant case. If same facts or evidence would sustain both petitions, the two
actions are considered the same and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action.
Petitioner has the same cause of actionnullity of said marriagethe grounds or
basis are just different. Petition denied due to lack of merit
CATALAN V CA 514 SCRA 607 514 SCRA 607 FEBRUARY 6, 2007
FACTS: This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636,
declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E.
Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January
27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
June 4, 1950 petitioner Felicitas Amor married Orlando Catalan in
Pangasinan and migrated to the US soon after (became US citizens). April
1988, both divorced
June 16, 1988 Orlando married Merope but since the latter had a prior
subsisting marriage, petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Orlando and Merope with damages
Respondents (Orlando and Merope) filed motion to dismiss due to lack of
action as petitioner was not a real party-in-interest but was denied
October 10, 2000 marriage between Orlando and Merope was declared
void ab initio by RTC
CA reversed RTC decision and declared marriage was still subsisting
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the required standing in court to question the
nullity of the marriage between Orlando and Merope
HELD: Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and
respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a
divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we
note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony during
the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce. It was not sufficiently established that Felicitas and
Orlando were already US citizens at the time they secured divorce decree in April
1988.
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot
rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file
the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the
marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between
Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope, 24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.
Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who

22
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality
to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father
to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
REPUBLIC V TANYAG-SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 FEBRUARY 6, 2007
FACTS: Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (19 yrs 4 mos) and Manolito San Jose
(20 yrs 10 mos) were married on June 12, 988 and had 3 children
9 years couple stayed with Manolitos parents. Manolito was jobless,
gambler and addict.
August 20, 1998 Laila left Manilito and moved back to her parents house
March 9, 1999 Laila filed for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
citing Art 36
Laila presented Dr Nedy Tayag (clinical psychologist) and declared that
from the psych tests and interviews on Laila that Manolito (whom she did
not personally examine) was psychologically incapacitated. His anti-social
personality disorder appears to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within
the system. It continues to influence the individual until the later stage of
life.
ISSUE: Whether Manolitos behavior characterized as anti-social personality
disorder constitutes psychological incapacity
HELD: Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not
enough. As the Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any
of his relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data
upon which the finding or conclusion was based is inadequate. If being jobless
(since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the present
petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically
ill what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal manners of a
married man?
Dr. Tayag had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had
merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently,
his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. Dr. Tayags
Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality
disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that
it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder nor identify its root cause.
The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained (Santos case)
ZAMORA V CA G.R. 141917 FEBRUARY 7, 2007

23
FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525, entitled
"Bernardino S. Zamora v. Norma Mercado Zamora," which affirmed the dismissal
of a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
June 4, 1070 Petitioner Bernardino Zamora married Norma Mercado in
City; did not have any child. In 1972, Norma went to the US to work as a
nurse; left in 1974 again. In 1989, she was already a US citizen
Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Norma
was horrified at the mere idea of having children and also abandoned him
when she left for the US
Norma denied that she refused to have a child, alleging that petitioner was
unfaithful and had two affairs with different women and had children with
them.
June 22, 1995 RTC denied Bernardinos petition citing that there is no
evidence of psychological incapacity on Norma (no gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability)
August 5, 1999 CA affirmed RTC decision citing Molina and Santos
guidelines
ISSUE: Whether or not refusal to have children and abandonment constitutes
psychological incapacity; Whether or not the presentation of psychologists
and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in this case already shows the
psychological incapacity of private respondent
HELD:
Molina and Santos cases did not mention the necessity of the
presentation of expert opinion. What is important, as in Marcos v Marcos, is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the condition of
psychological incapacity.
Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which
took effect on March 15, 2003, states:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented,
considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the
psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to
substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
bear a child was strongly disputed. DENIED.
REPUBLIC V CABANTUG-BAGUIO G.R. NO. 171042 JUNE 30, 2008
FACTS: Petition for review on the declaration of the nullity of marriage between
Lynette Cabantug-Baguio and Martini Dico Baguio
August 12, 1997 Lynette and Martini were married after being pen pals
since 1995

24

Initially, the couple stayed with Lynettes parents. Martini only stayed with
his wife during weekends, and on weekdays he was at his parents house.
Lynette soon discovered that Martini was a mamas boy
Upon the insistence of Martinis mother, his allotment was divided equally
between her and Lynette
January 1999 No information about Martini. Lynette also stopped
receiving her share of the allotment and upon inquiry with Martinis
employer, she found out that he was in Alabang, Muntinlupa
October 12, 2000 Lynette filed a complaint for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage on the basis of Martinis psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital duties and obligations as stated in Art.
68-70 of the Family Code
Summons were served upon Martini to which he did not file any response.
No collusion was also established.
October 14, 1999 Lynette learned that Martini declared in his
employment records that he was SINGLE and named his mother as
principal allotee
Respondent presented the letter of clinical psychologist who evaluated the
behavior of Martini. Based on the report, Martini shows immature
personality disorder, dependency patterns and self-centered motives. The
situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period
and incurable. As such, Martini is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations in marriage and family
January 2, 2002 Cebu City RTC declared that marriage void since Martini
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential martial
obligations of marriage and that same incapacity existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage

ISSUE: Whether or not Martinis being a mamas boy constitutes as a

psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code
HELD: Art. 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the material
bond at the time the causes manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people
may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [T]he
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained.
For psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio it must be
characterized by:

25
1.

Gravity must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage
2. Juridical antecedence it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage
3. Incurability must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved
In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proving the
nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against the dissolution and
nullity (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio)
As seen in this case, Lynette failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove
Martinis psychological incapacity.
While the court sympathizes with her
predication, its first and foremost duty is to apply the law.
LIGERALDE V PATALINGHUG G.R. NO. 168796 APRIL 15, 2010
FACTS: Petition to review RTC decision on November 30, 2004 concerning the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Silvino Ligeralde (petitioner) and May
Ascension A. Patlinghug (respondent)
October 3, 1984 Silvino and May got married and had four children.
Respondent displayed signs of immaturity, negligence, infidelity and
irresponsibility soon after
Silvino was reluctant to leave his wife because of his love for her. He gave
her another chance after finding out she was sleeping with another man
but after a few months, May was back to her old ways and it seemed
impossible for her to change
Prior to filing the complaint against Patalinghug, Ligeralde consulted Dr
Tina Nicdao-Basilio (psychologist). Based on the psychological evaluation,
May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential martial
obligations; that the incapacity started when she was young and became
manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable
October 22, 1999 RTC decalared the marriage of Ligeralde and
Patalinghug based on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Basilio
CA reversed the RTC decision on the grounds that respondents alleged
sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause
thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
ISSUE:
Whether Patalinhugs behavior constitutes psychological incapacity
pursuant to Art 36 of the Family Code
HELD: Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage; shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary

26
duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. 7 The Court likewise laid down
the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals. 8 Relevant to this
petition are the following:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
Patalinghugs condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of
her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must
be fully established by the evidences presented