Aguinaldo vs.

Santos
G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992
Facts:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the
December 1989 coup dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram &
letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint
was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for
acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of
the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was
sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the
outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision
finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. ViceGovernor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent
Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of
respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government official under Section
60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since
respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the
former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged
act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an
act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for
disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed
from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the
decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with
the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution
paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issues:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered
the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government
officials as alter ego of the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be
removed from office.

Held:
1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered
the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the
canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official cannot
be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts
he may have committed during the failed coup.
2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored
on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The
constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution
which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It
is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively
the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be
said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to
enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local
government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court
had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity
of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code
of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective
government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

Conducto v. Monzon
A.M. MTJ-98-1147; July 2, 1998

FACTS: An administrative complaint filed by petitioner Conducto against respondent

Judge Iluminado C. Monzon of Municipal Trial Court, San Pablo City with ignorance of
law when he deliberately refused to suspend a barangay chairman who was charged
with the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Aug 30, 1993, Jesus Conducto (complainant) filed a complaint against Barangay
Chairman Benjamin Maghirang with violation of Section 394 of the Local
Government Code and Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code for appointing his
sister-in-law as barangay secretary in May 17, 1989. Section 394 of the LGC
prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. The City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint, stating that the appointment was made before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991. In October, Complainant
Conducto obtained an opinion form DILG Director Opinion declaring that the
appointment violated par(2), Section 95 of BP 337, the Local Government Code prior
to the Local Government Code of 1991.In Feb 1994, the Ombudsman recommended
and approved the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang. The City Prosecutor filed a criminal
case againg Maghirang together with a motion for his suspension pursuant to Sec.
13 of RA 3019 or the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (which provides that any
incumbent public officer or official under criminal prosecution under Title 7, Book II
of the RPC shall be suspended).
Judge Monzon denied the motion for suspension. The judge opined that that the
suspension sought by the prosecution is premised upon the act charged allegedly
committed during the previous term of the accused as Barangay Chairman, who
was subsequently re-elected during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994. He
opined that preventive suspension is applicable only if there is an administrative
case filed against a local official who is at the same time criminally charged in
Court. At present, the records of the Court show that there is no pending
administrative case existing or filed against the accused.

The OCA recommended that this Court hold respondent liable for ignorance of the
law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: WON the Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: No. Judge Monzon fined for Php 5,000

The findings and conclusions of the OCA are in order. However, the penalty
recommended, is too light. The Judge failed to recall that as early as 18 December
1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez, this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public
official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred
by him during his previous term of office. There is also a misplaced reliance by the
judge in the case of Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. The doctrine of
forgiveness or condonation finds no application in criminal liability. The claim of
respondent Judge that a local official who is criminally charged can be preventively
suspended only if there is an administrative case filed against him is without basis.
Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) states that:
Suspension and loss of benefits Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in court. The
court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive
suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate
witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office.
All that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused stands
charged under a valid information for any of the above-described crimes for the
purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension.