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AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

209

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS: A STUDY OF

ROMAN FRIENDSHIP PROCESSES
PAUL J. BURTON

Abstract. This article argues that a close reading of friendship practices in the
plays of Plautus, in light of the relevant social science and anthropological literature
on friendship, can help us establish the parameters, discourse, and behaviors
associated with Roman friendship. Application of a new analytical framework
for studying such relationships in ancient literature (a processual model of
friendship interaction) to the plays of Plautus increases our understanding of
Roman amicitia in that it marks the relationship as a precious and all too rare
social bond, fraught with paradox and ambivalence, and generative of tensions,
anxieties, and asymmetries.

EXCEPTING SERVILE RELATIONSHIPS, friendship is by far the most frequently represented relationship in the plays of Plautus.1 Thus it comes
as somewhat of a surprise that not a single monograph, chapter, or article
exists in English that deals with the subject of amicitia in Plautus.2 It is an
especially odd omission in view of the integral part amicitia plays in the
plot conventions of New Comedy and given the increasing attention
being paid to amicitia in Republican Roman social and political life.3 The
present paper is designed to fill the void by adopting a useful socioanthropological frameworka processual modelwithin which to
analyze the relationship.4 The model concentrates attention on the

1
By my count, there are approximately thirty friendships, explicitly characterized as
such, in the corpus.
2
Only one monograph (in Italian) has appeared on the topic (Raccanelli 1998); all
that was available before this was the article-length treatment of Zucker 1950 (in German),
but the author was more interested in impugning Plautus originality than in exploring
Plautine amicitia for its own sake. Brief discussions also appear in Leo 1912, 12729, and
Anderson 1993, 3441 (on the comic type of the sodalis opitulator).
3
Cf. especially Konstan 1997, 12248 (with bibliography at 17798) and Burton
2000.
4
Raccanelli 1998 also employs anthropological methodology, but her study is more
focused on friendship topoi and typologies in the plays than on the friendship process itself.

American Journal of Philology 125 (2004) 209243 2004 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

210

PAUL J. BURTON

practices and processesthe narrative trajectoriesof friendship in the

comedies with a view to eliciting popular attitudes and perceptions of
friendship amongst the Romans of the day, who, I would argue, saw
aspects of themselves reflected in the representations of the Plautine
stage.5
It is appropriate to begin with a few words about the methodology
adopted here. My approach takes its cue from the social anthropology of
the late Pierre Bourdieu, who argued in several important works that the
logic of human social practices is time-bound and time-sensitive. Considerations of time are especially important in relationships that are strongly
dependent on the similarly time-bound mechanism of gift-exchange: the
mutual, reciprocal exchange of favors and services both material and
intangible.6 Bourdieu explains: if it is not to constitute an insult, the
counter-gift must be deferred and different, because the immediate return of an exactly identical object clearly amounts to a refusal (i.e., the
return of the same object).7 So, in addition to the nature of the countergift (difference), the timing of it (deferral) is a strategic choice that
actually helps construct gift exchange-based relationships. Here is Bourdieu again:

5
I assume throughout that the plays were, above all, popular entertainments, designed to resonate with the broadest possible cross-section of Roman society (one thinks,
for example, of public demonstrations of approval or dissent for politicians and policies at
performances mentioned by Cicero: Pro Sestio 115 and 11823; Cic. Ad Att. 2.19.3; cf. 2.18.1,
with Gruen 1992, 184 [although he is reluctant to retroject this late Republican phenomenon back into Plautus time; cf. also 208, n. 120]). The comments of Duckworth 1952, 272,
remain salutary: the plays, to achieve the popularity which they are known to have had,
necessarily presented social and economic views which the spectators could understand
and the humorous or farcical treatment which they could appreciate and enjoy. This also
means that the vexed question of Plautine originality is beside the point: whether one
agrees with Leo 1912 (followed by Jachmann 1931) that Plautus simply copied his (superior) Greek originals or with Leos student Fraenkel 1922/1960 that Plautus Romanized
his Greek material, it cannot be doubted that the playsand their themescannot have
been so obscurely Hellenic that a Roman audience would not have understood them (cf.
Gruen 1996, 152: Plautus employed the Hellenic setting and characters partly to elucidate
his countrymens perception of an alien people and partly to reflect back on the characteristics of his own society and contemporaries).
6
The classic statement on the gift is Mauss 1967.
7
Bourdieu 1977, 56 (cf. 171)=Bourdieu 1990, 105 (my emphasis). Cf. Sen. De Ben.
4.40.5: qui festinat utique reddere, non habet animum grati hominis, sed debitoris; et, ut
breviter, qui nimis cupit solvere, invitus debet; qui invitus debet, ingratus est (He who
hastens to repay at all costs does not have the mindset of a grateful man, but of a debtor;
in short, he who excessively desires to discharge his debt is unwilling to owe; and he who is
unwilling to owe is ungrateful; cf. discussion at Raccanelli 1998, 34).

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

211

[The] temporal structure [of relationship practice], that is, its rhythm, its
tempo, and above all its directionality, is constitutive of meaning. As with
music, any manipulation of this structure, even a simple change in tempo,
either acceleration or slowing down, subjects it to a destructuration that is
irreducible to a simple change in an axis of reference. In short, because it
is entirely immersed in the current of time, practice is inseparable from
temporality, not only because it is played out in time, but also because it
plays strategically with time and especially with tempo.8

Friendship qua gift exchange-based relationship is thus inherently temporal, not only because the relationship has a lifespana beginning,
middle, and an endbut also more importantly because time and its
strategic manipulation are as much determinative and constitutive of
friendship and its trajectory as the nature of gifts exchanged.
This temporality of friendship raises an important methodological
issue for historians studying the topic. Because practice unfolds in time
and it has all the correlative properties, such as irreversibility, that synchronization [of analysis] destroys, the key here is to avoid, so far as
analytical discourse can, the fictitious totalization of synchronic historical analysis; otherwise, we will condemn [ourselves] either to wring
incoherences out of [practice] or to thrust a forced coherence upon it.9
A processual approach would thus seem to be indicated. To this end, I
have developed a general analytical and interpretative processual framework for the purposes of this study, a dynamic model of friendship
interaction. The model comprises four stages of friendship practice: the
beginning of friendship, the development of trust (Roman des), the
mutual, reciprocal performance of favors (gift exchange proper: Roman
benecia, ofcia, merita), and the breakdown/termination of friendship.
It must be borne in mind that modular analysis tends to distort
reality, for the simplifying logic of the logician cannot help but distort the
intricate logic of practice.10 It must also be remembered, however, that
models can be useful and coherent signifiers of an overwhelmingly complex and contingent reality. The processual model adopted here, I think,
is a useful compromise in that it seems to be the most effective means of
bringing some structure to a complex relationship, without impeding
8
Bourdieu 1990, 81; cf. Bourdieu 1977, 8: To restore to practice its practical truth,
we must . . . reintroduce time into the theoretical representation of a practice which, being
temporally structured, is intrinsically defined by its tempo.
9
Bourdieu 1990, 81 and 86.
10
Thus, for example, a single friendly exchange can theoretically encompass as many
as three discrete stages of the proposed model.

212

PAUL J. BURTON

unduly a dynamic understanding of friendship practices. Another point

of method: in the interest of methodological consistency, I have chosen
to let the modular categories determine the order of presentation of the
material, so the plays are analyzed synthetically rather than discussed
seriatim. This way, the subtle dynamics of amicitia are kept in focus, and
the various textual representations of friendship processes can illuminate one another by comparison and contrast.
It is also necessary to preface the detailed analysis with some
general observations about the sort of relationship under scrutiny here.11
I am most concerned with what most modern researchers of friendship
as well as the Romans themselves to a significant degreeconsider to be
technically authentic friendships: non-sexual voluntary and achieved relationships (as opposed to the ascribed type, such as kinship), bonded
solely by trust and based on a rough similarity of age, status, level of
affect, character, and morals, as well as a utilitarian complementarity of
needs. Qualification of the term similarity (or better, symmetry) is
necessary due to the nature of the dynamics of the friendship process
itself: although inequality is not normally considered typical of friendship, asymmetries naturally result across time due to the dynamics of
reciprocity and gift exchange. Exchanges are ideally spontaneous and
voluntary but in practice constrained and self-interested: we give to get,
and normative social sanctions (in anthropological terms, the habitus)
mandate reciprocation. But because reciprocation must be deferred and
different, as has been noted, asymmetries can never be smoothed out of
friendship: at any given moment in the relationship, one friend is always
in the position of having (over)benefited the other, while the other is
always in the subordinate position of having to reciprocate his, or her,
partner at some future point.12
All of this is not to say, of course, that the Romans were just like
us in their friendship practices, but merely that the parallels are striking
and significant enough to make the comparison profitable. Roman soci-

11
For a far more detailed analysis of what follows, see especially Burton 2000, 2467,
and 2003, 33442; Raccanelli 1998, 2140, and Konstan 1997, 118, are also extremely
helpful.
12
On asymmetrical friendship, cf. Cic. De Am. 6973; Sen. De Ben. 6.34.14; Konstan
1997, 13537; Burton 2000, 183200; Burton 2003, 3742. I cannot agree with Raccanelli
1998, passim (esp. 5156), that in Plautus, friendship exists only between equals, that is, all
asymmetrical friendships are either terminated or the asymmetries themselves are somehow ironed out over the course of the plays; we will see here several practical demonstrations to the contrary.

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

213

ety was obviously very different from the modern (predominantly Western) societies that contemporary researchers of friendship have studied,
and close comparisons do indeed yield particular differences. Most of
these seem to stem from the fact that Rome was a highly socially differentiated and overtly status-conscious society. In such hierarchical shame
cultures, where competition for honor and status resembles a zero-sum
game, social relationships, such as friendship, are rarely stable and almost
never in a state of equilibrium. Further, Roman amicitia, at least insofar
as it finds expression in our elite source material, seems rather more
paternalistic than we are used to. Thus, for example, Laelius can say in
Ciceros De Amicitia that the goodwill that forms the basis of friendship
is a virtuous quality that can both protect others and determine what is
best for them (Cic. De Am. 50).
For the Romans, friendship, as with so much else, was an arena for
competition, an opportunity to display magnanimity, generate status, and
incur obligation.13 Thus, one source indicates that at certain times, such
as during an election campaign, one can apply the term amicus more
widelypresumably to mere acquaintances as well as intimatesfor the
sake of political advantage (hoc nomen amicorum in petitione latius
patet quam in cetera vita: Q. Cicero, Comm. Pet. 16). This is not to say,
however, that Roman amicitia lacked an affective dimensionquite the
opposite, in fact.14 Indeed the language of Latin treatises such as Ciceros
De Amicitia reveals an intensely passionate emotionalism that surrounds
the relationship. Thus, Laelius at one point in the De Amicitia speaks of
love and affection between friends blazing forth (eforescit, Cic. De
Am. 100) in intensity. The natural corollary of this is that in circumstances where friendships failed, the Romans did not simply have a
falling-out (a disagreement and subsequent de-escalation of contact)
as we do (or at least, prefer) but experienced sudden breakups, which
were intense, sometimes violent, and very public. Because of the zerosum nature of the competition for dignitas, any iniuria (or perceived
iniuria) inflicted on a friend was grounds for anger and enmity, and close
friendship could turn into intense hatred in no time at all (cf. Sen. De Ira
2.32.1).15 Such passionate feelings are perhaps best explained by the
much greater role that friendship played in Roman life than it does in
13

On this, see generally Dixon 1993.

Cf. Brunt 1965, 3: it is implausible to suppose that the Romans whose word for
friendship . . . derives from amo [to love], had no native acquaintance with genuine
affection of a non-sexual kind. Full discussion at Hellegouarch 1963, 14251.
15
On this, see Epstein 1987.
14

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PAUL J. BURTON

our own: in the absence of the complex network of the institutional and
informal relationships that permeate our own lives, individual Romans
were heavily reliant on friends and family for self-fulfillment and selfsufficiency.
All this, of course, reflects elite practices and ideologies of amicitia.
What of the non-elites that are represented in Plautus plays and sitting
in his audience? The value of the plays is, precisely, that they provide the
rarest of opportunities to access popular Roman attitudes and perceptions about such issues as amicitia.16 Although the stage could be used
as a setting for the articulation and propagation of aristocratic values,
as in the plays of Terence, this was clearly not the case with Plautus,
whose buffoonery and slapstick were designed to appeal to the lower
reaches of the social hierarchy.17 This suggests that the picture of amicitia
we see in Plautus may be somewhat different from that drawn by transmitters of elite culture such as Cicero and Seneca. But as will be seen
here, there are significant correspondences as well.18
16
Contra Earl 1984, 1112: the [view of the] majority [sc. the Roman non-elite] has
disappeared silently and their thoughts must remain forever obscure. Given the popular
nature of the comedies (see n. 5), this is surely too minimalist and bleak.
17
Gruen 1992, 221 (whence the first quotation) and 222 (whence the second) (cf.
21819).
18
The similarities and differences between Ciceronian/Senecan and Plautine amicitia
are noted throughout this paper, although it might be helpful to summarize here some of
the more striking examples. Notable similarities include the notion, just discussed, that the
breakdown of Roman amicitia was typically violent and rancorous (De Ira 2.32.1; cf. Cic.
De Am. 76; cf. Plaut. Bacch. and Merc.), while the process of beginning amicitia was most
commonly characterized by hesitation and anxiety (Cic. De Am. 63 and Sen. Ep. 1.3.2; cf.
Plaut. Stich.). Note too that Cicero, Seneca, and Plautus all recognize unequal friendship
and explore its dynamics (Cic. De Am. 6973, and Sen. De Ben. 6.34.14; cf. Plaut. Trin.).
Cicero and Plautus are aware of the inestimable importance of des in friendship (Cic. De
Am. 65; cf. Plaut. Stich. and Capt.) and, along with Seneca, regard candor as one of the most
significant manifestations of des (Cic. De Off. 1.23, and Sen. Ep. 1.3.23; cf. Plaut. Mil. 1369:
discussed below, n. 42); in addition, both Cicero and Plautus are sensitive to the risks of
candid speech and the care with which it should be deployed (Cic. De Am. 5253, and 88
92; cf. Plaut. Trin.). Significant differences are no less apparent and seem to emerge chiefly
from the relative weight the authors assign to the utilitarian and altruistic dimensions of
the relationship. Thus Cicero clearly privileges the altruistic ideal of the true friendship of
virtuous men over the common and mediocre (vulgaris et mediocris: De Am. 22)
utilitarian or pleasurable sort (cf. also De Am. 27: friendship arises from nature rather than
from need [a natura . . . potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia]). Contrast Plautus:
wealth is where your friends are (ubi amici ibidem sunt opes: Truc. 885); indeed,
Plautus seems completely indifferent to (or perhaps unaware of [see below, n. 27]) the
friendship of virtue that Cicero makes so much of (De Am. 18 and passim; De Off. 1.55
56). Finally, note that Cicero endorses gradual disengagement as the ideal way to end a

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

215

It thus seems perfectly reasonable to analyze Romanspecifically

Plautineamicitia within a framework generated from modern research
on friendship. The plays of Plautus, of course, are not (nor were they
designed to be) sociological case studies, and their usefulness is attenuated in particular by two factors: the rigid plot conventions of New
Comedy and the conservative tendency of comedy generally towards
tidy resolutions and unproblematic closure.19 Thus, for example, the plays
tend to generate situations in which adulescentes are generally only
friends with other adulescentes, senes with other senes, women with other
women, slaves with other slaves,20 and so on. Exceptions do exist, of
course, because friendship is inherently fluid and transgressive of some
normative boundaries, as indeed is comedy itself. Thus, to cite but one
example, in the Miles Gloriosus, the senex Periplectomenus is characterized as an amicus of the adulescens Pleusicles.21 Status barriers, however, are regularly not transgressed: thus nowhere are slaves constructed
as amici of their masters and vice-versa;22 nor does the discursive
friendship (one should pick apart the seam rather than tear it asunder [dissuendae
magis quam discindendae: De Am. 76; cf. 78; Cic. De Off. 1.120]), whereas, as will be seen,
Plautus seems concerned only with the sudden and expolsive form of breakup (Epid.,
Bacch., Merc.).
19
On this last point, cf. McCarthy 2000, 124: the subversion of Plautus plays
coexists with a countervailing conservative impulse, which knits back together the familial
and civic bonds that have been strained in the course of the play. These comedies create the
sense of alls well that ends well either positively, by referring to the imminent reestablishment of the fathers power or the reunion of a family through recognition of citizen
identity, or negatively, by emphasizing the removal of a threat to the community. On
Plautus recuperative strategies (which, in the cross-dressing play Casina, allow him to
resolve the situation at the end in favor of the normative heterosexual, male-dominant
model), see Gold 1998.
20
Contra Raccanelli 1998, 156, who argues that true amicitia between servi does not
exist in Plautus; but cf. the unambiguous examples Milphio and Syncerastus in the Poenulus,
Tyndarus and Philocrates in the Captivi, Stichus and Sangarinus in the Stichus, and Sagaristio
and Toxilus in the Persa. This last example is particularly overt, but Raccanelli (16975)
explains it away by suggesting that these slaves are constructed according to the conventions of comic liberi adulescentes rather than servi per se and so can usefully be interpreted
as free youths; but surely what matters here is what they are, not what they resemble.
21
Again, because she refuses to countenance asymmetrical amicitia in the plays
(above, n. 12), Raccanelli 1998, 14044, insists that Periplectomenus self-identifies as an
adulescentulus (cf. Mil. 634: adulescentula) and so functionally is an adulescens. But again,
as in the case of the slaves Sagaristio and Toxilus (see n. 20), surely what matters is what
Periplectomenus is (a senex), not what he resembles.
22
Contra Raccanelli 1998, 14460, in reference to the Captivi; but in that case, when
the captives Tyndarus and Philocrates, formerly slave and master, acknowledge their amicitia
(perpetuom amicum: Capt. 441), it is in a condition of conservitium (246; cf. 243: conservom),

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PAUL J. BURTON

representation of patrons and their clientes ever shade off into the realm
of amicitia.23 Thus, excepting a few pairs of women and some servi amici,24
the term amicitia is generally reserved in Plautus for pairs of free-born
men who, while not necessarily strict social equals in terms of status,
wealth, or influence, inhabit the lower and middle ranks of Roman (or,
because these are Greek plays, Graeco-Roman) society, the sphere of
bankers, moneylenders and pimps, traders and businessmen, mercenary
soldiers and bourgeois urbanites.
Turning now to our theoretical model and its initial stage (beginning friendship), it is unfortunate that the analysis must begin with the
one instance where the evidence of Plautus fails us almost entirely.
Although it is true that the plays often represent individuals meeting and
becoming involved with each other for the first time, these encounters
never develop into full-fledged friendships but instead result either in
fleeting business partnerships, recognitions of kinship, or hostile confrontations.25 This is in part attributable to the standardized plot devices of

not as master and slave, that they do so. The audiences knowledge at the start of the play
that these two will both have free status by the end is also irrelevant to this temporally
specific internal construction of the relationship (see further below).
23
On clientela in the plays, see Damon 1996, who reads Plautus parasites as a
negative reflection of Roman clientes (8). This may not work in all cases, however, since
in the Captivi, the parasite Ergasilus styles himself an amicus of Hegios son Philopolemus
(Capt. 141), an assertion Hegio himself does not deny. Damon confronts the issue (7879)
but ends up explaining Ergasilus words away as mere pretense, that is, that his use of
amicus is simply a polite euphemism for cliens. This argument, however, is illegitimate: Cic.
De Off. 2.69 with Burton 2000, 191200, and 2003, 34142; cf. Konstan 1995, 341 (the idea
of a friend was never reduced to that of patron and client).
24
On the servi amici, see above, n. 20; on women (Myrrhina and Cleostrata in the
Casina, and Selenium, Gymnasium, and her mother in the Cistellaria [explicit]), see Raccanelli
1998, 17587; cf. Amatucci 1950 (although there is no explicit mention of the amicitia
between Palaestra and Ampelisca in the Rudens, let alone between these courtesans and
the priestess Ptolemocratia: cf. n. 25).
25
Business partnerships: Bacch. IV.8 (the slave Chrysalus buys a courtesan from the
soldier Cleomachus); Curc. III (Curculio tricks the banker Lyco and the pimp Cappadox
into making a business deal); Epid. III.4 (Periphanes sells a music girl to a miles); Persa
IV.34 (Saturio tricks the pimp Dordalus into buying a parasites daughter masquerading
as a Persian captive); Poen. II.1 and III.3 (Antamonides and Collabiscus buy a night in
Lycus brothel); Pseud. IV.12 and 7 (Pseudolus enlists Simia to trick Ballio; Simia gives
cash to Ballio for purchase of a courtesan; Harpax later does the same); Rudens V.3
(Daemones offers the pimp Labrax cash to free the courtesan Ampelisca); recognitions of
kinship: Men.V.9 (the brothers Menaechmi); Poen. V.12 (Hanno is revealed to be the
uncle of Agorastocles and father of Adelphasium and Anterastilis); Curc. V.2
(Therapontigonus is revealed to be the brother of Planesium); hostility: Asin. II.34 (slaves

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

217

New Comedy and to the narrative economy of the dramatic form. But
rather than jettison the first stage of the processual model entirely, here
we will content ourselves with the next best thing: the renewal, after an
unspecified (and undramatized) interval, of pre-existing amicitiae.
A good example of this occurs in the Stichus, a play that begins with
two sisters, the daughters of the senex Antipho, lamenting the long absence of their husbands, the brothers Epignomus and Pamphilippus, who
have been away for three years trying to rebuild their shattered fortunes.26 In their long absence, Antipho tries to persuade his daughters
unsuccessfully, as it turns outto choose new husbands (Stich. 1117; cf.
7980). The issue is resolved when Epignomus returns, meets Antipho at
the harbor, and reports to the audience that he has reverted from
enmity to favor with his father-in-law (cum . . . eo reveni ex inimicitia
in gratiam: 409) and that he and Antipho have returned to a state of
friendship and favor (in amicitiam atque in gratiam convortimus:
414). Epignomus uncertainty over Antiphos attitude and his perceived
transition from enmity to friendship point to the destabilizing effects of
long absences on friendship.
This same tension is also shown when Pamphilippus first appears in
the play in conversation with Antipho: after the senex registers his delight with the success of his sons-in-law, Pamphilippus cynically remarks,
I should want security from you were it not clear that you are a friend,
Antipho; but now because I find you are friendly to me, Ill believe you

Leonida and Libanus meet the Mercator); Bacch. IV.2 (Pistoclerus encounters his rival
Cleomachus parasite); Curc. IV.2 (Curculio excoriates Lyco and Cappadox); Poen. V.2
(Hanno meets Antamonides and Lycus); Pseud. II.2 (Pseudolus tries to trick Harpax);
Rudens III.4 and IV.3 (the first meeting of Labrax and Daemones; the slaves Trachalio and
Gripus have a tug of war over a trunk); Truc. V (Stratophanes meets his rival Strabax). The
only play containing affectionate first encounters is the Rudens, but the assistance of the
senex Daemones for Plesidippus (I.2) and of the priestess Ptolemocratia for the courtesans
Ampelisca and Palaestra (I.5) are instances of hospitium and are both assimilated to
parent-child relationships (cf. 103: pater; 26364: mater . . . puellae) rather than amicitiae
(contra Raccanelli [1998], 18487 [on Ptolemocratia]).
26
Despite the familial relationship on display here, the protagonists use the language of amicitia, and so the play deserves consideration in this context (Raccanelli 1998
does not discuss it, not so much because it is not an instance of true amicitia but because the
relationship between Antipho and his sons-in-law violates the condition of symmetry: see
above, n. 12). The characterization of this relationship as amicitia does not violate the
definition adopted here that friendships are voluntary and achieved, in contrast to those
based on (blood) kinship. Apparently the Romans had as little trouble as we do in conceptualizing some in-law relationships as friendships at certain times and for certain purposes.

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PAUL J. BURTON

[when you say you are delighted] (satis abs te accipiam, nisi videam
mihi te amicum esse, Antipho; / nunc quia te amicum mihi experior esse,
credetur tibi: 5089). This same ambivalence is also highlighted in
Antiphos cynical comment that a man is of use to his friends so long as
his business is in order and friends are secure when finances are secure,
but when these slip into laxity, so too friends slip away; success in business finds friends (ut cuique homini res paratast, perinde amicis utitur: /
si res firma, item firmi amici sunt; sin res laxe labat, / itidem amici
conlabascunt: res amicos invenit: 52022).27
What these interactions reveal, I think, is the notion that friendships can easily lapse if taken for granted, since by nature friendships
require (particularly at the beginning) constant nurturing by frequent
contact and intimacy between the partners.28 Thus the reason Antiphos
friendship with his sons-in-law is in doubt at the outset of the play is that
the latter have been absent for three long years, and in that time they
have made no attempt to contact their father-in-law or their wives.29
Ideally, the brothers should have been at home taking care of Antiphos

27
Such cynical remarks are clearly aimed at pious moralizing about amicitia, such as
Ciceros friendship arises from nature rather than from need (a natura . . . potius quam
ab indigentia orta amicitia: Cic. De Am. 27, noted above, n. 18). The contrast with Cicero,
however, need not mean that the playwright was taking specific aim at the Ciceronian
(Aristotelian) ideal of the friendship of virtue (cf. Cic. De Am. 18 and passim; De Off.
1.5556, cited above, n. 18; the classic statement is at Arist. EE 1235a; EN 1157a16). Rather,
Plautus was lampooning conventional morality, no doubt familiar to his audience: thus the
epitaph of an auctioneer, ca. 50 B.C.E., who lived according to the principle that one should
always be generous with ones friends ([fructus recte es]t rebus cu ameiceis sueis: CIL
1.2.2.1702; cf. Cic. De Am. 31: enim benefici liberalesque sumus non ut exigamus gratiam
. . . sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest [we are obliging and generous not to
extract a reward . . . but because all its rewards are contained in love itself]). As Gruen
notes, Plautus, in his satirical vein, avoided the specific and pointed beyond the specific
(Gruen 1996, 138 and 141).
28
Sometimes, in the Roman context, to such a degree that the partners even lived
together: cf. Laelius at Cic. De Am. 15 (beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim
[I would seem to have lived happily because I lived with Scipio]), as well as the famous
friendship between Polybius and Scipio Aemilianus, who, at the outset of his relationship
with the historian, said he looked forward to the time when Polybius would live with him
(met emou sumbioseis: Pol. 31.24.10). On prolonged absence harming friendship, cf. also
Plaut. Persa 20: mihi quidem tu iam eras mortuos, quia non te visitabam (indeed to me
you were as good as dead, since I didnt see you). Regardless of whether the relationship
in the Stichus is read as one of in-laws or friends (or both, which is surely the case), the
same principle applies.
29
Surely this is der Grund der Feindschaft zwischen Antipho und den Brdern,
although Petersmann 1973, 158 does not seem to recognize it.

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daughters, or at least sending money or word of their fortunes abroad.

The tentativeness of the resumption of friendly relations is particularly
noteworthy because it seems to mirror the initial hesitation with which
potential new friends instinctively sound each other out and perform a
reconnaissance dance before committing themselves completely to
someone else.30 Plautus here suggests that Antiphos reunion with his
sons-in-law was difficult and awkward at first with perhaps even a touch
of hostility: the young men, functionally strangers to their father-in-law
when they first reunited, were unsure whether they would be perceived
as friends or foes. In the event, once assured of Antiphos favor, Epignomus
and Pamphilippus have their friendship with him symbolically renewed
through a typically friendly act: Antipho invites his sons-in-law to his
house for dinner on the next day (515).
The reunion of Antipho and his sons-in-law in the Stichus seems to
provide a useful analogy for the process of beginning friendship in Roman social life. It is useful to stay with this play for a moment, for it links
the first stage of our theoretical model to the second, the development of
des. For Cicero, des in its primary, moral senses of trust, trustworthiness, and loyalty, is self-evidently the foundation of that stability and
constancy which we seek in friendship (firmamentum autem stabilitatis
constantiaeque est, eius quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides: De Am. 65).31

30
For the term, see Rodin 1984, 38; on the first, tentative steps towards engagement,
cf. Cic. De Am. 63: est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo
utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum
(Therefore it is a wise mans duty to hold back the first rush of goodwill, as he would hold
in the reins of a chariot, in order that one may test the characters of ones friends, as one
tries out a team of horses, before pursuing friendship [trans. Powell 1990]); and Sen.
Ep.1.3.2: tu vero omnia cum amico delibera, sed de ipso prius: post amicitiam credendum
est, ante amicitiam iudicandum. Isti vero praepostero officia permiscent qui, contra praecepta
Theophrasti, cum amaverunt iudicant, et non amant cum iudicaverunt. Diu cogita an tibi in
amicitiam aliquis recipiendus sit (Certainly you should discuss everything with a friend,
but contemplate the man himself beforehand: after friendship is formed you must trust, but
before that you must judge. Those who, contrary to the teachings of Theophrastus, judge
after they have loved, instead of loving after they have judged, have truly got their duties
in the wrong order. Ponder for a long time whether someone should be received into
friendship by you). I am not suggesting here that the resumption of good relations
between Antipho and his sons-in-law is a friendship reconnaissance dance, or that they
are circumspect towards each other for anything other than specifically familial reasons,
merely that what is going on here resembles the reconnaissance dance in its hesitancy and
circumspectness.
31
The bibliography on des is immense: cf., among others, Boyanc 1964, who
stresses the primacy of the moral and sacral aspects of des (contra Fraenkel 1916, who sees

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Ciceros use of three consecutive nouns that mean essentially the same
thing prompts suspicion that he is protesting a bit too much here, and for
good reason: as friendships sole regulator, binding sanction, and necessary conditionto the extent that it is virtually synonymous with friendshiptrust is inevitably overdetermined in the relationship. This overdetermination is clearly manifest in the numerous contradictory valences
of trust: it is stable yet malleable, resilient yet ephemeral, socially mandated but internally constructed, normatively bounded but completely
arbitrary, and so on. Because of its contingent nature, trust is always
potentially ambivalent, simultaneously the source of and solution to the
primeval human security dilemma. To trust in another, in other words, is
in effect to subject oneself to anothers influence, to sacrifice personal
security for dependence, to exchange self-sufficiency for vulnerability.32
This is precisely why Antiphos sons-in-law in the Stichus are so hesitant
to impose on their father-in-law; but by ultimately doing so, they alleviate their distress and attempt to achieve relational stability. Note, however, that traces of this ambivalence remain in the cynical remarks of
Pamphilippus at Stich. 5089.
Plautus fascination with des and its contingent, ambivalent nature is perhaps most graphically illustrated in the Captivi, a play whose
very theme is des.33 The plot centers on a pair of Elean captives, Tyndarus
and Philocrates, who were formerly slave and master, but having been

the term as morally colorless); Heinze 1929; Hellegouarch 1963, 2362; Freyburger 1982
and 1986; for a recent synthesis of the relevant scholarship, see Burton 2000, 16475.
Although des is the defining element (and binding link) in many different Roman informal relationships (including amicitia, clientela, and international amicitia), as well as in
kinship and relationships between humans and the divine, the essential moral quality of
des seems fairly constant, whether it expresses trust, loyalty, trustworthiness, good
faith, credit, promise, reliability, or credibility. There is no indication that des
took on different connotations in different relationships: thus in both clientela (a regularly
asymmetrical tie) and amicitia (a potentially asymmetrical tie), the term refers to the
sacred binding oath (in the absence of formal sanctions, such as laws or contracts), symbolized by the shaking of the right hand (dextra), that cements partners together in social
relationships (for a general comparison of clientela and amicitia, see Burton 2003, 34348).
As shown below, there is no indication in the Plautine evidence that the Roman aristocratic
ideal of des differed from popular understanding.
32
Cf. the practice of deditio in dem, or the absolute surrender of a foreign community to the good faith of the Roman people. The literature is extensive, but the most useful
discussions are Heuss 1933, 60113, and Dahlheim 1968, 582; cf. also now Freyburger 1982
and 1986, 35149, Gruen 1982, and Eckstein 1995.
33
Franko 1995, esp. 15556; discussion also at Raccanelli 1998, 14460 (with reservations [see above, n. 20]).

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captured in war, they are now the property of the senex Hegio. Enslavement is the great leveler here, for it is only in the condition of conservitium
(246; cf. 243: conservom) that slave and master acknowledge that they
have become amici (cf. amicum: 441). Philocrates has come up with a
plan to secure their freedom: the two will exchange identities, and
Philocrates (now Tyndarus) will convince Hegio to send him back to
Elis to retrieve Hegios long lost son Philopolemus, in exchange for
whom Hegio will set Philocrates and Tyndarus free. Tyndarus (now
Philocrates) is to be Hegios insurance for Philocrates return and
makes no secret of his anxiety over this: thus his gentle reminder to
Philocrates, after protesting his willingness to go along with his plan (ero
ut me voles esse: Capt. 228) and his love for him (pro tuo caro: 229), that
men generally are good when they are asking for something they want;
but once they get it, they change from good men to the worst and most
untrustworthy sort (quod sibi [homines] volunt, / dum id impetrant,
boni sunt; / sed id ubi iam penes sese habent, / ex bonis pessimi et
fraudulentissimi fiunt: 23337). Even though he is reassured by Philocrates that now, because of their conservitium, he can only beg (oro) of
Tyndarus what he could once demand of him as his masterthat is,
obedience to his plan (24048)Tyndarus still requires further reassurance that Philocrates will act in good faith and return. A few scenes later
(II.3), and in Hegios presence, Tyndarus reminds Philocrates that he has
never failed him in deed or in loyalty (neque factis neque de: 405) and
asks him not to forget that he is being left behind as his surety. He further
pleads with him to make sure you are faithful to a faithful man, and
dont let your good faith waver (fac fidelis sis fideli, cave fidem fluxam
geras: 439). Finally, desperately, Tyndarus grasps Philocrates by his right
hand and begs him not to be less faithful to me than I am to you (per
dexteram tuam . . . / opsecro, infidelior mihi ne fuas quam ego sum tibi:
44243).
Scene II.3 adds further complexity to an already complicated plot
since Tyndarus comments must be read on two very different levels at
once, one comic and the other completely serious. On the level of comic
performance, Tyndarus/Philocrates is speaking primarily for Hegios
benefit, reassuring the old man that Philocrates/Tyndarus will return
out of fidelity to himself; on this same level, Tyndarus also humorously
flatters himself in his role of Philocrates by putting words into his
former masters mouth that describe the great loyalty and affection he
has (or should have) for Tyndarus. But on a more serious internalrelational level, the words of Tyndarus, particularly the long speech at
42945, are in deadly earnest, and they are laced with the very real fear

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that Philocrates will not return and that he himself, as his surety, will be
forfeit.34 Tyndarus protestations of his friends loyalty and its importance increase in intensity over the course of the scene and are clearly
designed to shame Philocrates into living up to his end of their bargain.
Of course, Philocrates discourse is taking place on these same two levels
as well, and in fact it is his morbidly ironic joke at Tyndarus expense that
he will never be unfaithful to Philocrates or act any differently to him
than I would to my own self (me infidelem non futurum Philocrati . . . /
nec me secus umquam ei facturum quicquam quam memet mihi: 427
28) that provokes Tyndarus desperate entreaties at 42945: what the
latter has just been told, in essence, is that Philocrates will look after
Philocrates, while perhaps leaving Tyndarus in the lurch. The emphasis
here on des and on its attendant ambivalence and fears belies a crucial
anxiety not just over the contingent quality of des; it also points to a
problem at the heart of amicitia itself: its inherent instability.35
The comedy continues to unfold, paradoxically enough, with the
serious internal-relational discussion of des transcending and displacing
the register of comic performance. After Hegio discovers the identityexchange ruse, Tyndarus is condemned to the mines, but he continues to
have faith that Philocrates will return (si ille huc rebitet, sicut confido
affore . . .: 696) and proudly emphasizes that he will have died saving his
friends life (cf. 68288; 7069). Fending off Hegios criticism that he has
been more faithful (delior: 716) to Philocrates than to Hegio himself,
Tyndarus argues that it was only natural for him to look out for the
interests of the one he has grown up with from boyhood (a puero: 720).
The depth of Tyndarus affection for Philocrates and his conviction that
his former master will return are extremely moving sentiments, but they
strike a rather incongruously somber note in a comedyan indication,
surely, that Plautus intended his audience to pause and reflect seriously
on the issue of des.36 In the event, Tyndarus trust of Philocrates and the
latters trustworthiness are wholly vindicated: Philocrates returns with
Hegios son Philopolemus and demands the release of Tyndarus, a man
who was always better to me than to himself, so he can return the favor

34
On Tyndarus fear, see Franko 1995, 16366. There is also a third metatheatrical
level here in the sense the audience knows from the outset that Tyndarus will turn out to be
another missing son of Hegio and set free.
35
On the instability of amicitia, see Raccanelli 1998, 4349.
36
Raccanelli 1998, 14647, notes a striking parallel here with the heroic friendship of
Orestes and Pylades as depicted in Pacuvius tragedy Chryses and discussed in Cic. De Am.
24.

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

223

(qui mihi melior quam sibi semper fuit, / pro bene factis eius ut ei
pretium possim reddere: 93940).
The play ends with the captives reunion and, in an interesting
twist, the slave who abducted Philopolemus identifies Tyndarus as Hegios
other long-lost son, so Tyndarus and Philocrates can now enjoy the
amicitia of liberi. This matters less, however, than the extraordinary lengths
to which Plautus has gone to illustrate the development of des in all its
subtle psychological and emotional aspects. The formerly slave-master
relationship between Tyndarus and Philocrates has been transformed
into an amicitia between conservii, as indeed Philocrates notes at 24048.
But the des that once bound master and slave remains constant and
becomes the basis of the new relationship. The playwright tracks the
development of their des in the context of the new relationship by
dramatizing a trial and demonstration of des, which by the end of the
play has deepened and enriched the bond of friendship between Tyndarus
and Philocrates.
The discussion of des has anticipated somewhat the next stage of
our processual model, reciprocal gift exchange, with which des is closely
linked in Roman thought: just as benecia (or ofcia)37 demonstrate to
the world (and to the partners) that amicitia exists, so they are also the
concrete manifestations of the des holding the relationship together.
The Plautine corpus is a particularly rich source of information on benecia since more than half of the extant plays involve some variation on
the stock New Comedy theme of the lover enlisting a helpful companion (sodalis opitulator) to assist him in his affair. The plots then typically
proceed in one of two directions: the helpful friend either succeeds in his
assignment and the friendship is affirmed, or he fails and jeopardizes the
relationship.38 It is perhaps best to delay discussion of the latter situation

37
For discussion of benecium and ofcium, see Hellegouarch 1963, 15270. I assume throughout that these terms are roughly interchangeable. Raccanelli 1998, 2631,
argues that ofcia are typical of necessarii, and benecia of amici, although her conclusions
(3031) would suggest the opposite. Similarly, Ferrary 1988, 124, fails to make the case that
ofcia only referred to those duties clients owed their patrons, and benecia to the more
egalitarian exchanges between friends (for a refutation of this view, cf. Saller 1982, 18 and
2122). Again, as with des (cf. above, n. 31), there is no indication that the absolute quality
of the terms benecium and ofcium resonated differently within different social and kin
relationships or that the popular perceptions of the terms differed from those of the
aristocracy. Plautine usage seems no different than the Ciceronian or Senecan, except
perhaps that the plays reflect a more mercantilist view of benecia (see below).
38
Examples of the former in Asin. (in this case the sodalis opitulator figure is
actually the young mans father); Bacch. (albeit with a temporary misunderstanding that

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until the analysis of the final stage of the theoretical model (friendship
breakdown and dissolution). The immediate concern here will be to
examine the favors amici perform for one another in the plays of Plautus,
and in particular the two most common: the provision of candid advice
and the performance of material favors.39
The ancients recognized that candor (Latin libertas, Greek parrhe\sia:
the right to speak freely and openly) was essential to a healthy friendship
but also a potential minefield of misunderstanding and wounded feelings.40 Thus, according to Cicero, while friends must resist abject flattery,
which is appropriate only in rigorously asymmetrical relationships (master and slave, king and subject, and so on), they must also be tactful in
giving advice and avoid excessively harsh criticism (Cic. De Am. 5253
and 8892).41 Friends, in other words, need to walk a fine line of admonition. One further point: because candor is intimately related to des, it
generates similar anxieties. As was noted earlier, des is potentially destabilizing of amicitia because of its contingent and overdetermined nature. For the same reason, excessive frankness, telling a friend what he, or
she, does not want to hear, easily risks being misconstrued as perdia.42

jeopardizes the relationship); Cas. and Merc. (where the lover and his helper are senes);
Curc. (in which a parasite is the helpful friend); Mil. (where a senex helps the young lover);
Most. (where a slave is the helper); Persa (where both the lover and the helper are slaves);
Poen. (where the lover is a miles gloriosus and relies on the help of an anonymous group of
friends); Pseud. (where both a slave and a free youth help the lover). Examples of failure
in Curc. (although this does not jeopardize the relationship); Epid.; Most. (although the
helper comes through in the end); Merc.; Cas. (a temporary failure).
39
Also common (but not given separate treatment here since it is conceptually so
closely related to giving advice: cf. Nadjo 1971, 103) is consolation: cf. Aul. II.2 (Euclio
consoles Megadorus); Capt. I.2 (Hegio consoles Ergasilus); Cas. II.2 (Myrrhina consoles
Cleostrata); Cist. I.1 (Gymnasium and her mother console Selenium); Epid. I.2 (Chaeribulus
consoles Stratippocles); Mil. III.1 (Periplectomenus consoles Pleusicles); Bacch. IV.3
(Pistoclerus consoles Mnesilochus). Other benecia include inviting a friend to a meal
(Cist. I.1; Persa I.1; Stich. IV.1 and V.2), providing important information (Poen. IV.2),
arranging a sexual encounter (Stich. IV.1), and interceding on behalf of a friend (Most. V.2).
40
On this topic generally, see Habinek 1990, and Konstan 1997, 15, 1035, and 14142.
41
Cf. the cynical remark of Terence: complaisance makes friends, the truth enemies (obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit: Andr. 68).
42
On the close connection between candor and des, see Nadjo 1971, 1023 (on
Merc. 3012 and 48182), and Freyburger 1986, 134, citing Cic. De Off. 1.23 (fides, id est
dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas. . . [des, that is, truth and constancy of
words and agreements . . .]), and Plaut. Mil. 1369 (dicent te mendacem nec verum esse,
fide nulla esse te [they will say that you are deceptive and a liar, that there is no des in
you]). Add Sen. Ep. 1.3 (esp. 1.3.23: cum placuerit [recipere aliquem in amicitiam], toto

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225

Useful examples of candor between friends and its attendant anxieties appear in the Trinummus, a moralizing play whose major theme
happens to be amicitia.43 The play opens with a decidedly perturbed
senex, Megaronides, contemplating an unpleasant duty he must perform
for his amicus Callicles:
To castigate a friend because of an offence deserving of it is a thankless
task, but in this life useful and profitable. For I shall castigate my friend
today for an offence deserving of it, unwilling though I am, did not loyalty
[des] demand that I do this.44

The passage strikingly confirms the close connection between candorin

this case, castigatioand des, as well as the anxiety caused by the prospect of criticizing a friends behavior. Megaronides has heard a rumor that
his friend is guilty of sharp business practice since Callicles has just purchased his neighbor Charmides house, which Charmides spendthrift son
Lesbonicus had put up for sale in order to pay for his excesses during his
fathers absence. Megaronides deplores the situation, and so he considers
it his solemn duty to chastise Callicles for immoral behavior (cf. mores
mali: 30, 33); it also pains him deeply that Callicles public reputation is
suffering (haec cum audio in te dici, discrucior miser: 103).
When Callicles enters, Megaronides is brutally honest about his
feelings: [Mine is the voice of] a well wisher, if you are as I wish you to
be, but if youre otherwise, [this is the voice of] an enemy to youand an
angry one ([sc. vox] tui benevolentis, si ita es ut ego te volo, / sin aliter
es, inimici atque irati tibi: 4647). He then explains that he has come to
chastise his friend (nam ego dedita opera huc ad te advenio . . . malis te
ut verbis multis multum obiurigem: 6768) for inflicting an illness on his
amici (omnibus amicis morbum tu incuties gravem: 73) and asks if
Callicles even knows what a true friend is. Callicles response is significant:

illum pectore admitte; tam audaciter cum illo loquere quam tecum . . . cum amico omnes
curas, omnes cogitationes tuas misce. Fidelem si putaveris, facies [When you have decided to receive someone into your friendship, throw open your heart to him completely
and boldly speak with him as you would with yourself . . . With a friend share all your cares
and all your thoughts. If you judge him faithful, you will make him so.]).
43
Cf. Segal 1974, 259 (other themes enumerated in Stein 1970, 10); good general
studies of the play include Anderson 1979, Hunter 1980, and Raccanelli 1998, 10728.
44
Amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam / immoene est facinus, verum in aetate
utile / et conducibile. nam ego amicum hodie meum / concastigabo pro commerita noxia, /
invitus, ni id me invitet ut faciam fides (Trin. 2327).

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There are some I know to be friends, others I suspect of being so, and still
others whose natures and hearts I cannot know enough to say whether
they come to be included on the side of friends or foes; but you of all my
sure friends are the surest. If youre aware that Ive done anything unwise
or wicked, if you dont take me to task, then assuredly youre the one who
should be chastised.45

Clearly, Callicles is open toand indeed encouragescandor, however

unpleasant, as a good friend should. Needing no further encouragement,
Megaronides begins his difficult task: people are calling Callicles Mr.
Graspingatfilthylucre and the Vulture (turpilucricupidum . . . volturium:
100101) because of his wicked behavior. Entrusted by Charmides with
the job of keeping an eye on his affairsand his sonin his absence, he
has become a party to Lesbonicus excesses and has indeed encouraged
them for the sake of his own sordid gain. Callicles, on the defensive, is
then forced to reveal a secret, entrusted to my silence, on my good faith
and trustworthiness (meae concreditumst / taciturnitati clam, fide et
fiduciae: 14142): the reason he bought Charmides house was to protect a treasure hidden there, about which Charmides told Callicles alone
and begged him in the name of friendship and good faith (per amicitiam
et per dem: 153) to protect it in his absence. This revelation naturally
deflates Megaronides criticism, and the two revert to friendly language.
Plautus thus externalizes and articulates here a complicated process
whereby Callicles friendly act of des on behalf of Charmides serves to
defuse a potentially difficult test of the des between Callicles and
Megaronides.46
The Trinummus contains yet another scene of admonition, this
time between the spendthrift lover Lesbonicus and his friend Lysiteles,
but in this case the friendly advice is clearly unwelcome, and the encounter does not end happily. Lysiteles father Philto, on his sons recommen-

45
Sunt quos scio esse amicos, sunt quos suspicor, / sunt quorum ingenia atque
animos nequeo noscere, / ad amici partem an ad inimici pervenant; / sed tu ex amicis mi es
certis certissimus. / si quid scis me fecisse inscite aut improbe, / si id me non accusas, tute
ipse obiurgandus es (9196).
46
Here is a good example of Plautine satire that reinforces, and yet at the same time
subverts conventional morality: by revealing Charmides secret, Callicles in fact betrays his
confidence (cf. Stein 1970, and Anderson 1979). As Gruen 1996, 146, notes, the comic
writer delights in the incongruity of rhetoric and reality and enjoys puncturing fatuous
moralism (157). As was noted earlier (n. 27), Plautus likely target is popular, conventional
morality (whose ideals are expressed by Megaronides and Callicles at length here), not the
aristocratic ideology of amicitia specifically.

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

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dation, has just offered Lesbonicus a way out of his financial troubles:
Lysiteles will marry Lesbonicus sister without a dowry. Lesbonicus reluctantly accepts the marriage alliance but insists on dowering his sister.
Lysiteles will not hear of this, of course, and begs Lesbonicus to accept
the arrangement on his terms, but Lesbonicus accuses him of giving bad
advice (male consulis: 633). Lysiteles insists that he only has his friends
best interests at heart (tuae rei bene consulere cupio: 635) and with brutal
honesty proceeds to enumerate the impoverished condition of Lesbonicus
house, the dishonor he has heaped upon his relatives and ancestors
through his profligate behavior, and the bad reputation he has incurred
because of his indolence and depravity (64154). Dejected, Lesbonicus
admits that all his friend has said is true and wanly thanks Lysiteles for
his honesty (omnia ego istaec quae tu dixti scio . . . summas habeo
gratias: 65559). His seeming indifference and resignation to the destruction of his familys fortunes and reputation only provoke Lysiteles
further: angry that Lesbonicus sets so little store by his advice (te haec
dicta corde spernere: 660), he warns him repeatedly (te moneo hoc
etiam atque etiam: 674) that if he fails to take his offer, he will burn his
familys reputation down (facis incendio incendes genus: 675).
Lesbonicus, growing increasingly defensive, claims that Lysiteles excoriation only drives him down a worse path (tu obiurgans me a peccatis
rapis deteriorem in viam: 680) since it will in fact be a source of shame
to betroth his sister without a dowry. Lesbonicus will not be moved, and
the scene descends into rancor and abuse, with Lysiteles declaring, I will
never be your friend on any other terms than those he has just offered
(ego amicus numquam tibi ero alio pacto: 716).
The Trinummus thus contains two very detailed and revealing examples of admonitory dialogue, as well as thoughtful discussions of the
role of candor in amicitia. Plautus permits us to trace from moment to
moment the dialectical developments of the conversations, the shifts in
attitudes of the partners, as well as the escalation of advice and dissent
until the moment of crisis arrives, sending the plot in a new direction. In
this, Plautus mimics the internal and external dynamics of friendship
exchanges with great realism, despite the absurdity of the comic context.
Additional cases are not hard to find,47 but none of these approach the
47
Cf. Bacch. V.2 (Philoxenus advises Nicobulus to allow his sons affair with Bacchis);
Cas. II.2 (Myrrhina advises Cleostrata to allow her husbands affair with Casina); Cist. I.1
(Seleniums mother advises Gymnasium that it is more profitable to have many lovers
instead of one); Epid. II.12 (Apoecides advises Periphanes to marry his son to a poor
woman of good family); Merc. V.4 (Lysimachus admonishes Demipho to act his age and

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depth and level of detail of those contained in the Trinummus. The

evidence of that play speaks for itself about the role of candor in friendship, the anxieties of giving frank advice, as well as the divergent pathwaysharmonious or entropicthe friendship process can travel under
the stresses of giving and accepting advice and criticism.
Although the issue of candor was clearly important to Plautus, it is
with the material benecia of friendship that the plays are most concerned; this is not terribly surprising given the plot conventions of New
Comedy. The commerciality, for lack of a better word, of friendly transactions is predominant in the plays, for, as was seen at the outset, this is a
world of traders, bankers and businessmen, pimps and courtesans and
the men who love them, slaves on the make, and parasites on the take.
The mercantilist subject matter of the plays no doubt appealed to the
Roman spectators, who probably liked to see themselves as practical,
business-minded persons. The Romans, in fact, had a reputation for
being a bit money-obsessed.48 This is not to say, however, that the moral
dimension of performing a friendly ofcium is lost sight of. After all, as
was seen in the case of Antipho and his sons-in-law in the Stichus discussed above, to the Romans the financial stability of ones friends was a
measure of their moral fiber, their reliability, and their ability to help out
a friend in a pinch. Clearly, then, accounts of friendship, both ancient and
modern, which attempt to segregate altruism and utility in friendship
and to denigrate the latter in favor of the former, have an air of inauthenticity about them. Plautus certainly seems to have had little patience
for such pretension.49 His primary focus on the practical, utilitarian as-

give up his love for Pasicompsa); Persa IV.34 (the slave Toxilus, pretending to be an
amicus of the pimp Dordalus, advises him to buy the captive Persian girl); Pseud. I.5
(Callipho advises Simo to tolerate his sons love affair and to agree to Pseudolus plan).
48
Cf. Duckworth 1952, 278 (whence the quotation), and the comments of Polybius,
who noted that the Romans of his day never gave anything away for free (31.26.9), nor did
they ever pay off their debts before the exact moment they fell due (31.27.1011). But cf.
also Segal 1968, 69: pound-foolishness in Plautus is as common as penny-pinching was in
the Rome of his day, so his audience could probably identify as much with a spendthrift
adulescens as with a grasping miser or pimp.
49
Modern accounts that segregate and denigrate utility in friendship: DuBois 1974,
18 and 27, and Werking 1997, 17 (who denies any utilitarian dimension of friendship);
ancient accounts: cf. Aristotles famous privileging of friendships of virtue over those of
utility (EE 1235a; EN 1157a16), and Ciceros stigmatizing of utilitarian and pleasurable
friendships as common and mediocre (vulgaris et mediocris: De Am. 22) and his insistence that friendship does not originate in inopia or indigentia (29) (Ciceros comments are
part of a larger attack on Epicurean views of friendship: cf. De Am. 20 and 32, with

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229

pects of the friendship process no doubt reflects Roman social realities

and speaks to the chief concerns of his audience.
A good place to begin the discussion of the exchange of material
benecia in Plautus is the Persa, which contains a fairly typical Plautine
example of a friendly service successfully rendered. In a slight variation
on the traditional pair of adulescentes, Plautus introduces the audience to
a pair of servi, one of whom, Toxilus, is in love with a courtesan and enlists
his servus amicus, Sagaristio, to help him obtain money to purchase her.
Sagaristios eagerness to help is apparent almost as soon as he speaks:
you use your friends foolishly [for] you should be giving us orders
(nimis stulte amicis utere . . . imperare oportet: Persa 19). Seizing on this
willingness, Toxilus then explains how Sagaristio now has a chance to
become his friend for life (facere amicum tibi me potis es sempiternum:
35): lend him some cash so he can buy his girl and set her free. Sagaristio,
of course, has no money himself, but pressed by Toxilus, promises he will
get it somehow. To show his goodwill, Toxilus insists that successful or not,
his friend is to come to his house for a banquet later on. Before Sagaristio
leaves, Toxilus entreats him to play his part like a faithful friend and
perform the service (obsecro te resecroque, operam da hanc mihi fidelem:
48). Although Toxilus hits upon another scheme to secure the needed
funds during his friends absence, he is nevertheless grateful to Sagaristio
when he returns with the money. In return, Sagaristio is overjoyed to have
been able to bestow on my friend in friendly fashion this bountiful
benefit (meo amico amiciter hanc commoditatis copiam: 255), while
Toxilus, for his part, promises to pay him back soon. Continuing the cycle
of reciprocity, Toxilus now asks Sagaristio for further help in a new scheme
he has planned, and his friend is only too happy to oblige (TOX: ad eam
rem usus est tua mihi opera. SAG: Utere ut vis: 328).
In a sense, this is boilerplate New Comedy: the standard sequence

discussion at Grzesiowski 1967 [in Polish with resum in French], Powell 1990, 20, and Fiore
1996, 6061, and 63). The inappropriateness of the distinction is revealed when Aristotle
argues himself into a corner and is forced to admit that even friendships of virtue have a
utilitarian dimension since the virtuous man needs other good men upon whom to confer
benefits (EN 1169b1013; EE 1244b1721; cf Ciceros notion that the friendship originates
in virtue but can take on a utilitarian dimension afterward: De Am. 51, 100). Again, it
should be stressed here that Plautus is not taking specic aim at these aristocratic ideals but
rather at conventional wisdom that, it would seem, was more often credited than actually
practiced (cf. above, n. 27). For a frank and realistic assessment of the role of utilitarian
exchange in friendship (and the discomfort it causes researchers and philosophers), see
Konstan 1997, 1214.

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of solicitation of a favor, followed by a protest of inability to perform,

and successful performance, followed by reciprocation and gratitude.
But a processual reading elicits more of the subtle nuances of friendly
exchanges and behaviors: the almost petulant insistence by the person
requesting the benecium that his friend perform it, despite his patent
inability to do so, the momentary atmosphere of emotional tension and
anxiety this produces, the sense of obligation to reciprocate the successfully executed favor, and the almost automatic escalation of exchanges
that grow out of the initial prestation. The Persa, in sum, is paradigmatic
of Plautine gift exchange not only in its economy of description but also
in its implication of deeper emotional complexity. It is thus a useful
frame of reference for analyzing the more extensive and elaborate Plautine
examples of friendly exchanges and their processes that occupy the
remainder of this section of the paper.
The lengthy Pseudolus furnishes a particularly good example of the
specific aspect of the escalation of gift exchange. The plot is, again, a
familiar one: a youth (Calidorus) needs money to buy a beloved courtesan from a pimp before he sells her to someone else. In this case, however, there are two helper figures, the chief being Calidorus wily slave
Pseudolus, and secondarily his amicus Charinus. When we first meet
Charinus in the middle of the second act, Calidorus has just finished
acquainting him with his woes, and Charinus, in addition to having just
performed the friendly ofcium of listening patiently and sympathetically to his friends problems, now announces his readiness to do anything his friend wishes (id tu modo me quid vis facere, fac sciam:
Pseud. 696). After being introduced to Pseudolus, Charinus puts himself
entirely at the slaves disposal (quin tu, si quid opust, mi audacter
imperas?: 713), and before the scene is over, eagerly repeats his offer of
help several more times. The result is a string of favors, each building on
the last, that Charinus will perform for Callicles: to find a suitably wily
slave to take part in Pseudolus plan, to provide the necessary funds to
pay off the pimp, and finally to obtain a soldiers sword, cloak, and hat as
a disguise for the slave whom Charinus will enlist. By the end of the
scene, Charinus has indeed shown himself to be the sort of vigorous and
benevolent friend (hominem strenuom benevolentem . . . et amicum et
benevolentem: 69799) necessary for Pseudolus plan.
Friendly transactions in Plautus, however, are rarely this unproblematic. In one important case, the Epidicus, Plautus provides a good
example of a somewhat different processual development in which the
escalation of favors at the beneficiarys request leads to the benefactor
growing weary and resentful. The slave Epidicus has a perfect plan for

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stopping his master Periphanes son Stratippocles from throwing his money
away on a courtesan: Periphanes should buy the girl himself and set her
free. Meanwhile, in accordance with Periphanes friend Apoecides advice,
the youth should be married immediately (continuo ut maritus at: 189).
Apoecides part in the plan is to convey the cash for the girl to her owner
(287). Apoecides carries out his duty, but when he reunites with Periphanes
and hands over the girl at III.3, Periphanes has not a single word of thanks
for him and is content to exult in his triumph over his son. It is only after
Apoecides takes his leave (to help a friend in a legal case: res magna
amici apud forum agitur, ei volo ire advocatus: 422) that Periphanes
expresses his satisfaction with his assistance: nothing is more friendly to
a man than a friend ready to lend a hand. Without any effort on your part
what you desire is carried out just the same (nihil homini amicost
opportuno amicius. / sine tuo labore quod velis actumst tamen: 42526).50
Periphanes failure, a distinctly moral failure, to show gratitude to
Apoecides, as well as his apparently narrowly utilitarian view of amicitia,
certainly affects the trajectory of the relationship, for when the senes are
next presented on stage together (V.2), the tension between them is
palpable. Periphanes is upset because he has discovered that he has been
duped by Epidicus: the slave has not had Periphanes sons courtesan
purchased but rather an anonymous dicina; meanwhile, his son has
successfully purchased the girl. The old men now reappear on stage after
Periphanes has been dragging his long-suffering friend Apoecides around
the city all day searching for Epidicus. The exhausted Apoecides now
reaches his breaking point:
Youre making me miserable with these miserable matters. . . . Find yourself another companion to follow you around. While Ive been following
you around, the swelling in my ankles has reached my knees in my miserable

50
Note that Apoecides helping a friend out in a lawsuit is the only specific parallel
in Plautus for an activity most often associated with Roman aristocratic amici (it also
appears at Trin. 651: in foro operam amicis da, and Mil. 663: opusne erit tibi advocato
tristi, iracundo? ecce me): cf. Earl 1960, 236, and 1984, 26, for the famous parallel with
Scipio Aemilianus (at Pol. 31.23). But Earl goes too far in extrapolating from this single
piece of evidence that Plautine amicitia reflects an exclusively aristocratic ideal of amicitia.
Thus the same cannot also be said of Periphanes general comment at 425 quoted here (and
which has a significant parallel at Epid. 113: is est amicus, qui in re dubia re iuvat, ubi rest
opus). After all, a very similar idea appears in that great purveyor of Roman popular
wisdom, Ennius: amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. This sounds strikingly like a common piece of folk wisdom, and Ciceros citation of it (at De Am. 64) more likely reflects its
conventionality than its exclusivity as a specifically aristocratic ideal.

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exhaustion . . . Look for him without me; look for him in the middle of the
sea for all I care.51

Fortunately, at this moment Epidicus appears, fending off any further

unpleasantness between the two amici; however, a palpable tension and
hostility still hang in the air.
If the interaction of Apoecides and Periphanes shows one possible
trajectory of the escalation of favors requested, that is, the benefactors
descent into resentment and hostility, the Miles Gloriosus provides a
good example of an alternative vector of development, one in which the
tension is generated by the beneficiary and for a considerably different
reason. In the Miles Plautus constructs an uncharacteristically congenial
and youthful lepidus senex, Periplectomenus, who is eager to facilitate
the love affair of the adulescens Pleusicles, to such an extent that he not
only lets the youth use his house as a trysting place but has a hole cut in
the party wall with the adjoining house, where the miles Pyrgopolyneices
is holding Pleusicles girl captive. Periplectomenus has also financed the
young couples revels, as is revealed in III.1 when the old man tells
Pleusicles he is on his way to the market to get provisions for a feast in
their honor. Pleusicles is quite overwhelmed by Periplectomenus generosity and reveals his anxiety over it at length:
This matter worries me miserably, and it tortures my heart and mind . . . that
I am imposing on you, a man of your age, my childish business, which is so
unsuitable to you and your virtues. That I ask you to help me with your
greatest resources out of regard for me, that you go out of your way to assist
me in my love affair, and that you do these things that men of your age
usually flee rather than pursue: it shames me to inflict this burden on you in
your old age . . . [I wish] I could repay gratitude equal to what you deserve . . .
to whom I am now proved to be the source of such worry. Its distressing to
me that Im a source of such great expense to you . . . Nothing now pains me
more than how much of an expense Ive been to you, for no guest can spend
so much time in the hospitality of a friend before he becomes hateful after
three days continuous stay; indeed after ten continuous days stay, he becomes
an Iliad of trouble . . . If youre certain you must buy provisions for me,
please dont go to great expense: whatever you wish is good enough for me.52
51
Tu quidem miserum med habes miseris modis / . . . alium tibi te comitem meliust
quaerere. Ita, dum te sequor, / lassitudine invaserunt misero in genua flemina . . . / dum sine
me quaeras, quaeras mea causa vel medio in mari (667, 66970, 679).
52
At hoc me facinus miserum macerat meumque cor corpusque cruciat . . . / me tibi
istuc aetatis homini facinora puerilia / obicere, neque te decora neque tuis virtutibus; / ea te
expetere ex opibus summis mei honoris gratia / mihique amanti ire opitulatum atque ea te

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233

Interspersed amongst Pleusicles protests are brief paeans to friendship

and expressions of wonder at the old mans sympathetic attitude, while
Periplectomenus, for his part, basks in the glow of Pleusicles compliments and somewhat pompously dissertates on his carefree lifestyle and
the nobility of his generous disposition.53 The old man will not tolerate
Pleusicles objections to his being so helpful (will you please leave off
that old and hackneyed speech of yours? [quin tu istanc orationem
hinc veterem atque antiquam amoves?: 751]) and protests that what is
spent on a good guest and friend is profit (in bono hospite atque amico
quaestus est quod sumitur: 674).
This last statement of Periplectomenus is really the crux of the
matter and the essential key to Pleusicles anxiety. The adulescens is
obviously uncomfortable with the old man showering him with benecia
because this unremitting and unilateral escalation of favors is exacerbating the latent asymmetries in the relationship; in other words, Pleusicles
already inferior status in the friendship is sinking fast while Periplectomenus is inexorably rising. Periplectomenus is winning what Cicero calls
the honesta certatio, the competition in kindness (De Am. 32) and is
creating an increasingly large obligation in his amicus who is growing
less confident in his ability to reciprocate. Periplectomenus statement
that expenditures on a friend are actually a source of profit must sound
every bit as menacing to Pleusicles as a mafia dons promise to his client
that someday Ill ask you to do a favor for me. A processual analysis of
this transaction indicates that friendship, qua gift exchange-based relationship, readily tends towards status asymmetries between the partners
over time because the gift is a test of honor, a provocation to reply
indeed, like the mafia dons favor, an act of symbolic violence.54
facere facinora, / quae istaec aetas fugere facta magis quam sectari solet: / eam pudet me
tibi in senecta obicere sollicitudinem . . . / huius pro meritis ut referri pariter possit gratia, /
. . . [cui] nunc me esse experior summae sollicitudini. / at tibi tanto sumptui esse mihi
molestumst . . . / nihil me paenitet iam quanto sumptui fuerim tibi; / nam hospes nullus tam
in amici hospitium devorti potest, / quin, ubi triduom continuom fuerit, iam odiosus siet; /
verum ubi dies decem continuos sit, east odiorum Ilias . . . / si certumst tibi, / commodulum
obsona, ne magno sumptu: mihi quidvis sat est (61623, 67072, 74043, 74950).
53
Pleusicles on Periplectomenus friendship: at quidem illuc aetatis qui sit non
invenies alterum / lepidiorem ad omnis res nec qui amicus amico sit magis (65960; but
no other man of his age will you find who is more delightful in all things or who is more a
friend to a friend); Pleusicles on Periplectomenus sympathetic attitude: quodne [vobis]
placeat, displiceat mihi? / quis homo sit magis meus quam tu es? (61415; can what
pleases you displease me? What man is more mine than you are?); for Periplectomenus
dissertations, cf. 63848; 65156; 66168; 67281.
54
Bourdieu 1977, 191=Bourdieu 1990, 126.

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Pleusicles is given no opportunity to reciprocate under Periplectomenus

barrage of benecia except to express his gratitude and to register his
meek protests at the old mans generosity; Periplectomenus, who begins
the transaction in a superior position (it is his house, after all, that he
throws open to the displaced youth), perpetuates that asymmetry by
continually escalating his benecia.
The Trinummus develops these ideas even further and shows what
happens when the overbenefitted amicus allows his fear of losing status
to outstrip his gratitude for a generous benecium. As was noted earlier,
Lysiteles and his father Philto offer the impoverished youth Lesbonicus
a marriage alliance with their house without a dowry. The offer is certainly magnanimous, but, like all gifts, it is inherently self-interested, as
indeed Lysiteles openly admits: the arrangement, he tells his father, will
gain them Lesbonicus highest gratitude (summam gratiam: Trin. 376) as
well as add to the reputation of their family (addideris nostrae lepidam
famam familiae: 379). But Lesbonicus spurns the offer as stated, accusing Lysiteles of doing harm to a friend (facis . . . amico iniuriam: 630),
because, if Lysiteles gives his sister in matrimony without a dowry, the
girl will be more concubine than wife (me germanam meam sororem in
concubinatum tibi . . . dedisse magis quam in matrimonium: 69091) and
their familys public reputation will suffer (infamis . . . famam: 689).
In other words, in terms of the zero-sum competition for status,
Lesbonicus is afraid that his own dignitas will decrease in the eyes of
others whereas Lysiteles will increase proportionally (haec famigeratio
te honestet, me conlutulentet . . . tibi sit emolumentum honoris, mihi
quod obiectent siet: 69294), that he will appear to be his friends
subordinate rather than his peer. This would aggravate a pre-existing
asymmetry in the relationship: as Lesbonicus says at an early point in the
play, the two families are of unequal status (nostra non est aequa
factio: 452).55 Both Philto and Lysiteles confirm this fact, rather tactlessly, to Lesbonicus face. Philto tells him it is best that you try to be of
the best sort; but, if you cant do this, at least try to be nearest to the best
(id optumum esse, tute uti sis optumus; / si id nequeas, saltem ut optumis
sis proxumus: 48687). In this case, the best is, obviously, Philto himself and his family. Lysiteles adds that Lesbonicus will linger in obscurity (in occulto iacebis: 664) if he does not accept the offer. Of course,
Lesbonicus is from a good family (64244; cf. 373), but, in his own words,
his poverty has destroyed the reputation his family once enjoyed (rem

55

For the translation of factio here, see Gray 1934, 11314; cf. OLD, s.v. factio (2).

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patriam et gloriam maiorum foedarim meum: 656), a sentiment prompted

by a similar observation from Lysiteles.56 This makes Philtos and Lysiteles
condescension all the more galling to Lesbonicus, as does their presumption to save him from himself by weighting the scales of friendship
strongly in their own favor.
Thus in the Trinummus, Plautus provides a good example of an
asymmetrical friendship, one that is aggravated by the superior partner
attempting to overbenefit his inferior friend for the express purpose of
increasing his own status. One could argue, of course, that the status
asymmetry within the friendship and its related anxiety are dissolved
when Lesbonicus learns of the treasure hidden by his father Charmides
and uses it to dower his sister.57 But this apparently does not change the
fact that the two families are not of equal rank (factio), and it certainly
does not affect the meaning of the initial offer, or its implications: what
continues to matter, even after the discovery of the treasure, is that
Lysiteles consciously performed (and tried to compel Lesbonicus to
accept) a large favor that, so far as they both knew at the time, would
create a status imbalance that would be difficult to redress.
Examples of asymmetrical exchanges in Plautine friendship could
be further multiplied,58 but this discussion has already anticipated the
last stage of the processual model, the breakdown of amicitia. It should
be apparent by now that amicitia and the performance of benecia upon
which the relationship depends are fraught with tension and anxiety. This
is so, I would argue, first, because gift exchange induces status volatility,
and second, because trust, of which exchanges are the concrete manifestations, is ambivalentstrong but informal, and hence, potentially unstable. Plautus seems to recognize this close connection between exchanges and des and their mutually reinforcing anxieties, since failure
to perform benecia is typically construed as perdia and can easily
convert a trusting amicitia into inimicitia in an instant.
56
Itan tandem hanc maiores famam tradiderunt tibi tui, / ut virtute eorum anteperta
per flagitium perderes? (64243; is this ultimately why your ancestors handed down to
you that famous name of yours, so that you might destroy through your vice those things
they earlier won through their virtue?). The attitudes and behaviors of these bourgeois
families indicate that the Roman aristocracy did not have an exclusive claim on such
concerns as living up to ones ancestors and dowering daughters.
57
As does Raccanelli 1998, 125.
58
Cf. Mil. (the example of Periplectomenus and Pleusicles just discussed); Aul.
(Megadorus offers to marry the miser Euclios daughter without a dowry); Poen. (the noble
Agorastocles and his advocati, who are his amici [cf. 504 and 512], but also plebeii et
pauperes [515; cf. 536]).

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As was noted earlier (above and n. 38), a typical New Comedy plot
trajectory involves a request for a favor, followed by the potential
benefactors protest of his inability to help, which then throws the relationship (usually temporarily) into jeopardy. A good representative example occurs in the Epidicus. In this play the young lover Stratippocles
asks his friend Chaeribulus for cash to pay off a creditor, prefacing his
request with a shopworn sententia equivalent to a friend in need needs
a friend in deed (is est amicus, qui in re dubia re iuvat, ubi rest opus:
Epid. 113; cf. above, n. 50). When Chaeribulus protests that he has no
money himself and has his own debt to worry about (116), Stratippocles
rounds on him viciously: what then was the use of that talk about
kindness if your ability to help with a deed is dead? . . . I would prefer to
have friends of your sort baked up rather than bankrupt (nam quid te
igitur retulit / beneficum esse oratione, si ad rem auxilium emortuom
est? . . . malim istius modi mihi amicos furno mersos quam foro: 11617,
119).59 Fortunately, the wily slave Epidicus intervenes with a plan to get
the money, which prevents further erosion of the relationship, and the
scene ends with the two friends going to Chaeribulus house to prepare
for the arrival of Stratippocles girlfriend (15758). But clearly the tension has not disappeared entirely, for in a later scene, as they are waiting
for Epidicus to return with the cash, Stratippocles sarcastically remarks
on Chaeribulus great wealththat he will not use to help out a friend
(is nummum nullum habes neque sodali tuo in te copiast: 330); he also
accuses him of being a faint-hearted friend (muricide: 333), one who is
of no more help to him than a man who was never born at all (nec mihi
plus adiumenti ades, quam ille qui numquam etiam natust: 336). But
once Epidicus returns, mission accomplished, Stratippocles joy alleviates some of the tension between the friends, and they return to
Chaeribulus house, Stratippocles rather more cheerfully than when
[he] came out (atque aliquanto lubentius quam abs te sum egressus
intus: 380).
The Bacchides contains corroborating evidence for this dynamic,
with the additional feature of being one of the few plays in which a gross
misunderstanding, rather than inability or unwillingness to perform a
favor, precipitates a conflict between amici. Pistoclerus is a young man of
Athens who has been asked by his absent friend Mnesilochus to secure
for him an Ephesian courtesan named Bacchis, who has been removed
from her native city to Athens by the miles Cleomachus. In the course of
doing this favor, Pistoclerus falls in love with the Ephesian Bacchis
59

The translation of the pun is Duckworths 1940, 176.

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

237

sister, who also happens to be in Athens and also happens to be called

Bacchis. When Mnesilochus returns and learns of Pistoclerus success in
securing the Ephesian Bacchis for him, he fairly gushes that Pistoclerus is
a friend in the full sense of the word (est amicus ita uti nomen
possidet: Bacc. 386). But later, when Pistoclerus tutor Lydus (mis)informs
Mnesilochus that his master is having an affair with the Ephesian Bacchis
(actually her Athenian sister of the same name), Mnesilochus quickly
goes from disbelief (cf. 47576) to disillusion about Pistoclerus trustworthiness (satin ut quem tu habeas fidelem tibi aut cui credas nescias?:
491).
The misunderstanding carries over into the remarkable confrontation scene (III.6), where Pistoclerus and Mnesilochus meet face to face
for the first time in the play. Mnesilochus resentment over Pistoclerus
perceived betrayal has been festering, and he now regards his former
friend as an avowed enemy (hostis: 534) who stirs his bile (bilem movet:
537), since he is a man whom until now he regarded as his friend (mi
amicum esse arbitratus sum antidhac: 539). Pistoclerus, unaware that
Mnesilochus is talking about him, mistakes his words as an invitation to
a philosophical dialogue and gamely plays along:
Many men exist according to the custom and example you are talking
about; men who, when you think they are friends, turn out to be treacherous in their deceits, busy with their tongues, lazy in the performance of
duties, men of weak loyalty (sublesta de). Theres no one whose good
fortune they dont envy.60

All of this, of course, is based on the confusion caused by the two

Bacchises. More important for our topic, however, is Pistoclerus laundry
list of reasons why friends become enemies: they are discovered to be
treacherous, disloyal, deceitful, and unwilling to perform services for

60
Multi more isto atque exemplo vivont, quos cum censeas / esse amicos, reperiuntur
falsi falsimoniis, / lingua factiosi, inertes opera, sublesta fide. / nullus est quoi non invideant
rem secundam optingere (54043). Note that comparison of this passage with the corresponding section of his model, the Dis Exapato\n of Menander, shows that Plautus significantly
extended the misunderstanding in this scene, giving more space for Mnesilochus and
Pistoclerus to reflect on the violation of friendship (in Menanders version, the Mnesilochus
character, Sostratos, informs the Pistoclerus character, Moschus, almost immediately
after only seven lines of dialoguethat it is Moschus he is accusing of betraying him,
whereas in Plautus, the accusation is delayed until 27 lines after Mnesilochus and Pistoclerus
first meet [53460]). See Anderson 1993, 1320, for the Menandrian fragments and detailed
discussion; cf. also Handley 1975, 122, Barsby 1986, 140, and Goldberg 1990, 191 and 200.

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their friends. Fides, significantly, appears in the rhetorically emphatic last

position on the list: Plautus seems to say that those of weak loyalty
(which here virtually means disloyalty) are guilty of all those things
that precede sublesta de in his list. Thus, weak loyalty sums up and
encompasses those earlier items and confirms the argument that, in the
Roman mind, failure to perform friendly duties was assimilated to a
betrayal of des.
Once the misunderstanding is cleared up, the friendship is restored
and indeed seems to have gained strength from having weathered the
crisis. When it is revealed that Cleomachus is pressing his claim on the
Ephesian Bacchis and demands cash for her from Mnesilochus, the latter
is distraught since he has already run through all of his money. Despite
Pistoclerus valiant effort to cheer him up, Mnesilochus remains inconsolable, not just over his lack of funds but also because he regrets having
accused his friend of betrayal and being angry with him (criminin me
habuisse fidem? immerito tibi iratus fui: 629). Pistoclerus regrets that,
due to his own romantic problems, he would not promise his friend the
money even if he had it (si mihi sit, non pollicear: 634), to which
Mnesilochus, rather surprisingly for a comic character, replies with great
sympathy and understanding:
I know, you would give it to me: I know your way. Unless you were in love,
I would not have such great confidence in you; but because youre in love,
you now have enough troubles of your own. But if you were free, would I
believe you able to help me out when you cant help yourself out? It
cannot be!61

It is appropriate to end this section with the example of the amicitia

between Lysimachus and Demipho in the Mercator. Unlike the other
friendship breakdowns discussed here, all of which are more or less
happily resolved, this seems to be the one instance in Plautus of a permanent break in the relationship and a definitive end of amicitia. The senex
Demipho falls in love with his son Charinus courtesan Pasicompsa and
encourages the young man to sell her to his neighbor Lysimachus so he
may have unfettered access to her. Lysimachus and Demipho are friends
(cf. amico: Merc. 288), and as such, Lysimachus is concerned to hear what
is on his friends evidently troubled mind. When Demipho tells his friend
61
Scio, dares, novi tuom. / sed nisi ames, non habeam tibi fidem tantam; eo quod
amas tamen / nunc agitas sat tute tuarum rerum; sin liber sies / egone ut opem mi ferre
posse putem inopem te? Non potest (63537).

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239

of his lovesickness, an odd and inappropriate condition for a senex,

Lysimachus reacts with shock and disgust, calling Demipho nequissimus
(305) and vetulus decrepitus senex (314). Lysimachus nevertheless agrees
to do the favor his friend seeks and to purchase Pasicompsa for him.62
Lysimachus successfully carries out his task, but the relationship
quickly deteriorates through a series of mishaps and comic misunderstandings: thus when Lysimachus returns from the market irate at
Demiphos extravagance, he discovers that his wife Dorippa has returned home from the family farm only to find Pasicompsa in her house.
Dorippa naturally thinks her husband is having an affair with the girl and
angrily threatens to divorce Lysimachus. Furious that Demipho has now
disrupted his domestic life as well with his shenanigans, Lysimachus
curses his friend (ut te omnes, Demipho, di perduint: 710; cf. 793) and
cites a bit of proverbial wisdom: wicked neighbors make for wicked
luck (aliquid mali esse propter vicinum malum: 772). When Demipho
reappears and promises Lysimachus that he will put things right, the old
men are intercepted by Lysimachus son Eutychus, who informs them
that he now possesses Pasicompsa. At Lysimachus instigation (cf. 978),
father and son then gang up on the lecherous Demipho, and the scene
deteriorates into invective and recrimination: Lysimachus accuses
Demipho of injuring his son (979) and of being an old scarecrow who
does not act his age (larva: 981, 983), while Demipho protests against
Lysimachus arrogance ([tu] superbe invehere) and hopes for revenge on
his former amicus (spero ego mihi quoque / tempus tale eventurum, ut
tibi gratiam referam parem: 99899). The play ends with the two senes
going their separate ways, a tense mood still hanging over the stage.
Modern sociological research suggests that compromised friendships in the modern world generally disintegrate fairly slowly.63 It further
suggests that only a few damaged friendships survive reconciliation and
renegotiation of terms and that most end permanently at some point
after they have been repaired or patched.64 As we have seen, however,
in the playsand in Roman society generallyfriendship breakdowns
are more precipitate. In the plays, this undoubtedly has something to do
with the exigencies of plot structure and narrative economy, both of

62
Raccanelli 1998, 9899, notes that from this point forward, neither of the senes
refers to the other as amicus again, but both revert to the emotionally neutral neighbor
(vicinus) instead.
63
Cf. Duck 1984, 7.
64
Cf. the survey of Davis and Todd 1985, 33 (87% of compromised friendships
dissolved).

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PAUL J. BURTON

which tend towards uncomplicated closure and resolution of tension. On

the other hand, Plautus was in a sense also holding up a mirror to his
audience: as has been noted, the Romans could be rather tetchy when
dealing with their friends and tended to end their friendships in just such
precipitous fashion. I would suggest that Plautus comedy, notwithstanding some exaggeration of course, generates a very realistic picture of
friendship breakdown and (often) reconciliation. So, although friendship
breakdown is presented in miniature, as it were, due to dramaturgical
constraints of the comic plots, Plautus still manages to convey some of
the subtleties in addition to the larger truisms of the process. We thus
detect the subtle shift in Demiphos relationship with Lysimachus from
friendship to the more distant vicinia, the regret of Mnesilochus for
having mistrusted Pistoclerus, and the lingering resentment of Stratippocles for his hapless friend Chaeribulus. Plautus infusion of the process
on stage with all the raw emotional realism of daily life suggests that the
playwright was trying to connect with his audience, to make his fellow
Romans see something of themselves and their human relationships
amidst the chaos and buffoonery of his staged situations.
This last observation can apply to the present study as a whole.
Plautus enduring popularity long after his death attests to his keen ability
to relate to his Roman audience.65 This paper has tried to demonstrate
how an anthropologically informed, processual close reading of amicitia in
the plays can elicit the subtle nuances of Plautus understanding of a
complex human relationship. For Plautus and his audience, amicitia was a
precious social bond, but one fraught with paradox and ambivalence and
generative of tensions, anxieties, and asymmetries. Plautus seems to have
been especially preoccupied with the destructive forces and potential
volatility of the relationship. Grounded in emotion and intangibles (feelings of loyalty, affection, and so on), amicitia often makes its participants
impetuous and excitable, easily prone to fits of temper and even outbursts
of violence. Although this is to be explained, in part, by the comic form
itself, which thrives on histrionics and hyperbole, surely there is some
reflection of Roman realities here. As an ancient culture lacking the great
variety and diversity of todays complex network of institutional and
informal relationships, the Romans were clearly more dependent on friend65
His plays were frequently revived, and his name came to be attached to some 130
plays (cf. Gell. NA 3.3.11). On his popularity generally, see above, n. 5; Duckworth 1952, 52;
Segal 1968, 12; Anderson 1993, 140. Even Parker 1996, 590, whose thesis requires him to
downplay Plautus popularity, cannot deny that he was a popular playwright, probably a
very popular playwright.

AMICITIA IN PLAUTUS

241

ship (and family, of course), more vulnerable to its promises of security,

and more emotionally responsive to its betrayals than we generally tend to
be. Thus Plautine exaggerations actually serve to highlight the realities of
Roman friendship in ways that cannot be appreciated through other forms
of evidence. Once again, Plautus proves himself a particularly rich source
of information for Roman social practice, and he is thus a welcome supplement to the somewhat loftier ruminations of a Cicero or a Seneca.66
UNIVERSTY OF T ASMANIA, AUSTRALIA
e-mail: Paul.Burton@utas.edu.au

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