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QUINTOv.

COMELEC(MotionforReconsideration2010)
Facts:
COMELECfiledamotionforreconsiderationwithrespecttothedecisionrenderedin
favorofQuintowhichruledtheunconstitutionalityofsecondprovisointhethirdparagraphof
Section13ofRepublicActNo.9369,Section66oftheOmnibusElectionCodeandSection4(a)
ofCOMELECResolutionNo.8678,mainlyonthegroundthattheyviolatetheequalprotection
clauseoftheConstitutionandsufferfromoverbreadth.Thesaiddecisionpavedthewayfor
publicappointiveofficialstocontinuedischargingthepowers,prerogativesandfunctionsof
theirofficenotwithstandingtheirentryintothepoliticalarena.
COMELECcontendsthat:
(1)Theassailedprovisionsdonotviolatetheequalprotectionclausewhentheyaccord
differential treatmenttoelectiveandappointiveofficials,becausesuchdifferentialtreatment
restson
materialandsubstantialdistinctionsandisgermanetothe purposesofthelaw;
(2)Theassailedprovisionsdonotsufferfromtheinfirmityofoverbreadth
Issues:
1.Whetherornottherewasaviolationofequalprotectionclause
2.Whetherornottheprovisionsinquestionsufferfromoverbreath?
Ruling:
1.No.TheintentofbothCongressandtheframersofourConstitutiontolimitthe
participationofcivilserviceofficersandemployeesinpartisanpoliticalactivitiesistooplainto
bemistaken.TheequalprotectionofthelawclauseintheConstitutionisnotabsolute,butis
subjecttoreasonableclassification.Substantialdistinctionsclearlyexistbetweenelective
officialsandappointiveofficials.Theformeroccupytheirofficebyvirtueofthemandateofthe
electorate.Theyareelectedtoanofficeforadefinitetermandmayberemovedtherefromonly
uponstringentconditions.Ontheotherhand,appointiveofficialsholdtheirofficebyvirtueof
theirdesignationtheretobyanappointingauthority.Someappointiveofficialsholdtheiroffice
inapermanentcapacityandareentitledtosecurityoftenurewhileothersserveatthepleasureof
theappointingauthority.
AnothersubstantialdistinctionbetweenthetwosetsofofficialsisthatunderSection55,
Chapter8,TitleI,SubsectionA.CivilServiceCommission,BookVoftheAdministrativeCode
of1987(ExecutiveOrderNo.292),appointiveofficials,asofficersandemployeesinthecivil
service,arestrictlyprohibitedfromengaginginanypartisanpoliticalactivityortake(sic)partin
anyelectionexcepttovote.Underthesameprovision,electiveofficials,orofficersoremployees
holdingpoliticaloffices,areobviouslyexpresslyallowedtotakepartinpoliticalandelectoral
activities.
SincetheclassificationjustifyingSection14ofRep.ActNo.9006,i.e.,electedofficials
visvisappointiveofficials,isanchoreduponmaterialandsignificantdistinctionsandallthe
personsbelongingunderthesameclassificationaresimilarlytreated,theequalprotectionclause
oftheConstitutionis,thus,notinfringed.
Consideringthatelectedofficialsareputinofficebytheirconstituentsforadefiniteterm,
itmayjustifiablybesaidthattheywereexcludedfromtheambitofthedeemedresigned
provisionsinutmostrespectforthemandateofthesovereignwill.Inotherwords,complete

deferenceisaccordedtothewilloftheelectoratethattheybeservedbysuchofficialsuntilthe
endofthetermforwhichtheywereelected.Incontrast,thereisnosuchexpectationinsofaras
appointedofficialsareconcerned.Thedichotomizedtreatmentofappointiveandelective
officialsisthereforegermanetothepurposesofthelaw.
2.No.Theviewthattheassailedprovisionsareoverlybroadbecausetheyapply
indiscriminatelytoallappointivecivilservantsregardlessofpositionobviouslyfailstoconsider
adifferent,yetequallyplausible,threattothegovernmentposedbythepartisanpotentialofa
largeandgrowingbureaucracy:thedangerofsystematicabuseperpetuatedbya"powerful
politicalmachine"thathasamassed"thescatteredpowersofgovernmentworkers"soastogive
itselfanditsincumbentworkersan"unbreakablegrasponthereinsofpower."
[T]heavoidanceofsucha"politicallyactivepublicworkforce"whichcouldgivean
emergingpoliticalmachinean"unbreakablegrasponthereinsofpower"isreasonenoughto
imposearestrictiononthecandidaciesofallappointivepublicofficialswithoutfurther
distinctionastothetypeofpositionsbeingheldbysuchemployeesorthedegreeofinfluence
thatmaybeattendantthereto.
Obviously,theserulesandguidelines,includingtherestrictioninSection4(a)of
Resolution8678,wereissuedspecificallyforpurposesoftheMay10,2010NationalandLocal
Elections,which,itmustbenoted,aredecidedlypartisanincharacter.Thus,itisclearthatthe
restrictioninSection4(a)ofRA8678appliesonlytothecandidaciesofappointiveofficials
vyingforpartisanelectivepostsintheMay10,2010NationalandLocalElections.
SOCRATESvCOMELEC(G.R.No.154512.November12,2002)
Facts:
Outofthe528membersofthethenincumbentbarangayofficialsofPuertoPrincesa,312
convenedthemselvesintoaPreparatoryRecallAssembly(PRA)toinitiatetherecallofthen
PuertoPrincesaMayorVictorinoDennisSocrates.ThePRApassedaresolutionwhichdeclared
theirlossofconfidenceinSocratesandcalledforhisrecall.Thereafter,theCOMELEC
scheduledthecampaignperiodandtherecallelection.Mr.EdwardM.Hagedornfiledhis
certificateofcandidacy.PetitionerswerethenfiledbeforetheCOMELECtodisqualify
Hagedornfromrunningintherecallelectionandtocancelhiscertificateofcandidacyonthe
groundthat"Hagedornisdisqualifiedfromrunningforafourthconsecutiveterm,havingbeen
electedandhavingservedasmayorofthecityforthree(3)consecutivefulltermsimmediately
priortotheinstantrecallelectionforthesamepost."Howecver,theCOMELECdeclared
Hagedornqualifiedtorunintherecallelectionandeventuallywontherecallelection.
Issue:

Whetherornotapersonwhohasbeenelectedandservedfor3consecutivefulltermsis
qualifiedtorunformayorintherecallelection
Ruling:
Yes.ThethreetermlimitruleforelectivelocalofficialsisfoundinSection8,ArticleX
oftheConstitution.ThisthreetermlimitruleisreiteratedinSection43(b)ofRANo.7160,
otherwiseknownastheLGC,whichstates:

Section8.Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials,which
shall
bedeterminedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshall
serveformorethanthree
consecutiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationofthe
officeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredas
aninterruptioninthe
continuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.
ThisthreetermlimitruleisreiteratedinSection43(b)ofRANo.7160,otherwiseknownasthe
LocalGovernmentCode,whichprovides:
Section43.TermofOffice.(a)xxx
(b)Nolocalelectiveofficialshallserveformorethanthree(3)consecutivetermsinthe
same
position.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshall
notbeconsideredasan
interruptioninthecontinuityofserviceforthefull
termforwhichtheelectiveofficialwaselected.
Theseconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisionshavetwoparts.Thefirstpartprovidesthat
anelectivelocalofficialcannotserveformorethanthreeconsecutiveterms.Theclearintentis
thatonlyconsecutivetermscountindeterminingthethreetermlimitrule.Thesecondpartstates
thatvoluntaryrenunciationofofficeforanylengthoftimedoesnotinterruptthecontinuityof
service.Theclearintentisthatinvoluntaryseverancefromofficeforanylengthoftime
interruptscontinuityofserviceandpreventstheservicebeforeandaftertheinterruptionfrom
beingjoinedtogethertoformacontinuousserviceorconsecutiveterms.Afterthreeconsecutive
terms,anelectivelocalofficialcannotseekimmediatereelectionforafourthterm.The
prohibitedelectionreferstothenextregularelectionforthesameofficefollowingtheendofthe
thirdconsecutiveterm.Anysubsequentelection,likearecallelection,isnolongercoveredby
theprohibitionfortworeasons.First,asubsequentelectionlikearecallelectionisnolongeran
immediatereelectionafterthreeconsecutiveterms.Second,theinterveningperiodconstitutesan
involuntaryinterruptioninthecontinuityofservice.Clearly,whattheConstitutionprohibitsis
animmediatereelectionforafourthtermfollowingthreeconsecutivetermsTheConstitution,
however,doesnotprohibitasubsequentreelectionforafourthtermaslongasthereelectionis
notimmediatelyaftertheendofthethirdconsecutiveterm.Arecallelectionmidwayinthe
termfollowingthethirdconsecutivetermisasubsequentelectionbutnotanimmediate
reelectionafterthethirdterm.NeitherdoestheConstitutionprohibitonebarredfromseeking
immediatereelectiontoruninanyothersubsequentelectioninvolvingthesametermofoffice.
WhattheConstitutionprohibitsisaconsecutivefourthterm.ThedebatesintheConstitutional
Commissionevidentlyshowthattheprohibitedelectionreferredtobytheframersofthe
Constitutionistheimmediatereelectionafterthethirdterm,notanyothersubsequentelection.
DHTECc
InLonzanidav.Comelec,theCourthadoccasiontoexplaininterruptionofcontinuityof
serviceinthismanner:"...Thesecondsentenceoftheconstitutionalprovisionunderscrutiny
states,"Voluntaryrenunciationofofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasan
interruptioninthecontinuityofserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected."Theclear
intentoftheframersoftheconstitutiontobaranyattempttocircumventthethreetermlimitbya
voluntaryrenunciationofofficeandatthesametimerespectthepeople'schoiceandgranttheir

electedofficialfullserviceofatermisevidentinthisprovision.Voluntaryrenunciationofa
termdoesnotcanceltherenouncedterminthecomputationofthethreetermlimit;conversely,
involuntaryseverancefromofficeforanylengthoftimeshortofthefulltermprovidedbylaw
amountstoaninterruptionofcontinuityofservice....."InHagedorn'scase,thenearly15
monthperiodhewasoutofoffice,althoughshortofafulltermofthreeyears,constitutedan
interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceasmayor.TheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethe
interruptionorhiatustobeafulltermofthreeyears.Theclearintentisthatinterruption"forany
lengthoftime,"aslongasthecauseisinvoluntary,issufficienttobreakanelectivelocal
official'scontinuityofservice.
WeheldinAdormeothattheperiodanelectivelocalofficialisoutofofficeinterruptsthe
continuityofhisserviceandpreventshisrecalltermfrombeingstitchedtogetherasaseamless
continuationofhisprevioustwoconsecutiveterms.Intheinstantcase,welikewiseholdthatthe
nearly15monthsHagedornwasoutofofficeinterruptedhiscontinuityofserviceandprevents
hisrecalltermfrombeingstitchedtogetherasaseamlesscontinuationofhispreviousthree
consecutiveterms.TheonlydifferencebetweenAdormeoandtheinstantcaseisthetimeofthe
interruption.InAdormeo,theinterruptionoccurredafterthefirsttwoconsecutiveterms.Inthe
instantcase,theinterruptionhappenedafterthefirstthreeconsecutiveterms.Inbothcases,the
respondentswereseekingelectionforafourthterm.InAdormeo,therecalltermofTalagabegan
onlyfromthedateheassumedofficeafterwinningtherecallelection.Talaga'srecalltermdid
notretroacttoincludethetenureinofficeofhispredecessor.IfTalaga'srecalltermwasmadeto
soretroact,thenhewouldhavebeendisqualifiedtoruninthe2001electionsbecausehewould
alreadyhaveservedthreeconsecutivetermspriortothe2001elections.Onewhowinsand
servesarecalltermdoesnotservethefulltermofhispredecessorbutonlytheunexpiredterm.
Theperiodoftimepriortotherecallterm,whenanotherelectiveofficialholdsoffice,constitutes
aninterruptionincontinuityofservice.Clearly,Adormeoestablishedtherulethatthewinnerin
therecallelectioncannotbechargedorcreditedwiththefulltermofthreeyearsforpurposesof
countingtheconsecutivenessofanelectiveofficial'stermsinoffice.
Theconceptoftermlimitsisinderogationofthesovereignwillofthepeopletoelectthe
leadersoftheirownchoosing.Termlimitsmustbeconstruedstrictlytogivethefullestpossible
effecttothesovereignwillofthepeople.AsthisCourtaptlystatedinBorja,Jr.v.Comelec:
"Thus,aconsiderationofthehistoricalbackgroundofArt.X,8oftheConstitutionrevealsthat
themembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionwereasmuchconcernedwithpreservingthe
freedomofchoiceofthepeopleastheywerewithpreventingthemonopolizationofpolitical
power.Indeed,theyrejectedaproposalputforthbyCommissionerEdmundoF.Garciathatafter
servingthreeconsecutivetermsornineyearsthereshouldbenofurtherreelectionforlocaland
legislativeofficials.Instead,theyadoptedthealternativeproposalofCommissionerChristian
Monsodthatsuchofficialsbesimplybarredfromrunningforthesamepositioninthe
succeedingelectionfollowingtheexpirationofthethirdconsecutiveterm.Monsodwarned
against'prescreeningcandidates[from]whomthepeoplewillchoose'asaresultoftheproposed,
absolutedisqualification,consideringthatthedraftconstitutioncontainedprovisions
'recognizingpeople'spower.'"Anecessaryconsequenceoftheinterruptionofcontinuityof
serviceisthestartofanewtermfollowingtheinterruption.Anofficialelectedinrecallelection
servestheunexpiredtermoftherecalledofficial.Thisunexpiredtermisinitselfonetermfor

purposesofcountingthethreetermlimit.
1UTAKTRANSPORTKOALISYONvCOMELEC(G.R.No.206020.April14,2015)
Facts:
TheCOMELECissuedaresolutionwhichprovidesfortherulesimplementingtheFair
ElectionsLawinconnectionwithMay2013nationalandlocalelectionsandsubsequent
elections.Oneoftheprovisionsofthesaidresolutionprovidethatthepostingofanyelection
propagandaormaterialsduringthecampaignperiodshallbeprohibitedinpublicutilityvehicles
(PUV)andwithinthepremisesofpublictransportterminals.1UTAK,apartylistorganization,
questionedtheprohibitionasitimpedestherighttofreespeechoftheprivateownersofPUVs
andtransportterminalsandthattheprohibitioncurtailstheirideasofwhoshouldbevotedbythe
public.Petitioner1UTAKalsoclaimsthatthereisnosubstantialpublicinterestthreatenedby
thepostingofpoliticaladvertisementsonPUVsandtransportterminalstowarrantthe
prohibitionimposedbytheCOMELEC.
COMELEC,ontheotherhand,contendsthatprivatelyownedPUVsandtransport
terminalsarepublicspacesthataresubjecttoitsregulation.COMELECpointsoutthatPUVs
andprivatetransportterminalsholdacaptiveaudiencethecommuters,whohavenochoice
butbesubjectedtotheblareofpoliticalpropaganda.Thus,theCOMELECavers,itiswithinits
constitutionalauthoritytopreventprivatelyownedPUVsandtransportterminalsfrom
concurrentlyservingcampaignmaterialstothecaptiveaudiencethattheytransport.The
COMELECfurtherclaimsthattheresolutionisavalidcontentneutralregulationand,thus,does
notimpingeontheconstitutionalrighttofreedomofspeech.Itaversthattheassailedregulation
iswithintheconstitutionalpoweroftheCOMELECpursuanttoSection4,ArticleIXCofthe
Constitution.TheCOMELECallegesthattheregulationsimplyaimstoensureequalcampaign
opportunity,time,andspaceforallcandidatesanimportantandsubstantialgovernmental
interest,whichistotallyunrelatedtothesuppressionoffreeexpression;thatanyrestrictionon
freespeechismerelyincidentalandisnogreaterthanisessentialtothefurtheranceofthesaid
governmentalinterest.
Issues:

1.WhetherornottheCOMELECmayimposetheprohibitiononPUVsandpublic
transportterminalsduringtheelectionpursuanttoitsregulatorypowers
delegatedunderArtIXC,Sec4
oftheConstitution
2.Whetherornottheregulationisajustifiedbythecaptiveaudiencedoctrine
3.Whetherornottheregulationconstitutespriorrestraintsonfreespeech
4.Whetherornottheregulationisavalidcontentneutralregulation
5.Whetherornottherewasaviolationoftheequalprotectionclause
Ruling:
1.No.COMELEChasthepowertosuperviseorregulatetheenjoymentorutilizationof
allfranchisesorpermitsfortheoperationoftransportationutilitiesduringanelectionperiod.
Nevertheless,theconstitutionalgrantofsupervisoryandregulatorypowerstotheCOMELEC
overfranchisesandpermitstooperate,thoughseeminglyunrestrained,hasitslimits.InAdiong,
theCourt,whilerecognizingthattheCOMELEChassupervisorypowervisvistheconduct

andmannerofelectionsunderSection4,ArticleIXCoftheConstitution,neverthelessheldthat
suchsupervisorypowerdoesnotextendtotheveryfreedomofanindividualtoexpresshis
preferenceofcandidatesinanelectionbyplacingelectioncampaignstickersonhisvehicle.
Intheinstantcase,theCourtfurtherdelineatestheconstitutionalgrantofsupervisoryand
regulatorypowerstotheCOMELECduringanelectionperiod.Asworded,Section4,Article
IXCoftheConstitutiononlygrantsCOMELECsupervisoryandregulatorypowersoverthe
enjoymentorutilization"ofallfranchisesorpermitsfortheoperation,"interalia,of
transportationandotherpublicutilities.TheCOMELEC'sconstitutionallydelegatedpowersof
supervisionandregulationdonotextendtotheownershipperseofPUVsandtransport
terminals,butonlytothefranchiseorpermittooperatethesame.
TheexpressionofideasoropinionofanownerofaPUV,throughthepostingofelection
campaignmaterialsonthevehicle,doesnotaffectconsiderationspertinenttotheoperationofthe
PUV.Surely,postingadecalexpressingsupportforacertaincandidateinanelectionwillnotin
anymanneraffecttheoperationofthePUVassuch.Regulatingtheexpressionofideasor
opinioninaPUV,throughthepostingofanelectioncampaignmaterialthereon,isnota
regulationofthefranchiseorpermittooperate,butaregulationontheveryownershipofthe
vehicle.
2.No.Thecaptiveaudiencedoctrinestatesthatwhenalistenercannot,asapractical
matter,escapefromintrusivespeech,thespeechcanberestricted.The"captiveaudience"
doctrinerecognizesthatalistenerhasarightnottobeexposedtoanunwantedmessagein
circumstancesinwhichthecommunicationcannotbeavoided.
Aregulationbasedonthecaptiveaudiencedoctrineisintheguiseofcensorship,which
undertakesselectivelytoshieldthepublicfromsomekindsofspeechonthegroundthattheyare
moreoffensivethanothers.Suchselectiverestrictionshavebeenupheldonlywhenthespeaker
intrudesontheprivacyofthehomeorthedegreeofcaptivitymakesiteitherimpossibleor
impracticalfortheunwillingviewerorauditortoavoidexposure.
Thus,agovernmentregulationbasedonthecaptiveaudiencedoctrinemaynotbe
justifiedifthesupposed"captiveaudience"mayavoidexposuretotheotherwiseintrusive
speech.TheprohibitionunderSection7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615isnot
justifiedunderthecaptiveaudiencedoctrine;thecommutersarenotforcedorcompelledtoread
theelectioncampaignmaterialspostedonPUVsandtransportterminals.Noraretheyincapable
ofdecliningtoreceivethemessagescontainedinthepostedelectioncampaignmaterialssince
theymaysimplyaverttheireyesiftheyfindthesameunbearablyintrusive.
3.Yes.Section7(g)items(5)and(6),inrelationtoSection7(f)ofResolutionNo.9615
undulyinfringeonthefundamentalrightofthepeopletofreedomofspeech.Centraltothe
prohibitionisthefreedomofindividuals,i.e.,theownersofPUVsandprivatetransport
terminals,toexpresstheirpreference,throughthepostingofelectioncampaignmaterialintheir
property,andconvinceotherstoagreewiththem.
PursuanttotheassailedprovisionsofResolutionNo.9615,postinganelectioncampaign
materialduringanelectionperiodinPUVsandtransportterminalscarrieswithitthepenaltyof
revocationofthepublicutilityfranchiseandshallmaketheownerthereofliableforanelection
offense.Theprohibitionconstitutesaclearpriorrestraintontherighttofreeexpressionofthe
ownersofPUVsandtransportterminals.Asaresultoftheprohibition,ownersofPUVsand
transportterminalsareforcefullyandeffectivelyinhibitedfromexpressingtheirpreferences

underthepainofindictmentforanelectionoffenseandtherevocationoftheirfranchiseor
permittooperate.
4.No.Acontentneutralregulation,i.e.,whichismerelyconcernedwiththeincidentsof
thespeech,oronethatmerelycontrolsthetime,placeormanner,andunderwelldefined
standards,isconstitutionallypermissible,evenifitrestrictstherighttofreespeech,providedthat
thefollowingrequisitesconcur:first,thegovernmentregulationiswithintheconstitutional
poweroftheGovernment;second,itfurthersanimportantorsubstantialgovernmentalinterest;
third,thegovernmentalinterestisunrelatedtothesuppressionoffreeexpression;andfourth,the
incidentalrestrictiononfreedomofexpressionisnogreaterthanisessentialtothefurtheranceof
thatinterest.
Section7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615arecontentneutralregulations
sincetheymerelycontroltheplacewhereelectioncampaignmaterialsmaybeposted.However,
theprohibitionisstillrepugnanttothefreespeechclauseasitfailstosatisfyalloftherequisites
foravalidcontentneutralregulation.
5.Yes.Section7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615donotonlyrunafoulof
thefreespeechclause,butalsooftheequalprotectionclause.Oneofthebasicprincipleson
whichthisgovernmentwasfoundedisthatoftheequalityofright,whichisembodiedinSection
1,ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution."Equalprotectionrequiresthatallpersonsorthings
similarlysituatedshouldbetreatedalike,bothastorightsconferredandresponsibilities
imposed.Similarsubjects,inotherwords,shouldnotbetreateddifferently,soastogiveundue
favortosomeandunjustlydiscriminateagainstothers."
Inorderthattherecanbevalidclassificationsothatadiscriminatorygovernmentalact
maypasstheconstitutionalnormofequalprotection,itisnecessarythatthefourrequisitesof
validclassificationbecompliedwith,namely:(1)itmustbebaseduponsubstantialdistinctions;
(2)itmustbegermanetothepurposesofthelaw;(3)itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditions
only;and(4)itmustapplyequallytoallmembersoftheclass.Itisconcededthatthe
classificationunderSection7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615isnotlimitedto
existingconditionsandappliesequallytothemembersofthepurportedclass.However,the
classificationremainsconstitutionallyimpermissiblesinceitisnotbasedonsubstantial
distinctionandisnotgermanetothepurposeofthelaw.
AdistinctionexistsbetweenPUVsandtransportterminalsandprivatevehiclesandother
propertiesinthattheformer,tobeconsideredassuch,needstosecurefromthegovernment
eitherafranchiseorapermittooperate.Nevertheless,aspointedoutearlier,theprohibition
imposedunderSection7(g)items(5)and(6)ofResolutionNo.9615regulatestheownership
perseofthePUVandtransportterminals;theprohibitiondoesnotinanymanneraffectthe
franchiseorpermittooperateofthePUVandtransportterminals.
Asregardsownership,thereisnosubstantialdistinctionbetweenownersofPUVsand
transportterminalsandownersofprivatevehiclesandotherproperties.Asalreadyexplained,the
ownershipofPUVsandtransportterminals,thoughmadeavailableforusebythepublic,
remainsprivate.Ifownersofprivatevehiclesandotherpropertiesareallowedtoexpresstheir
politicalideasandopinionbypostingelectioncampaignmaterialsontheirproperties,thereisno
cogentreasontodenythesamepreferredrighttoownersofPUVsandtransportterminals.
ThefactthatPUVsandtransportterminalsaremadeavailableforusebythepublicis
likewisenotsubstantialjustificationtosetthemapartfromprivatevehiclesandotherproperties.

Admittedly,anyelectioncampaignmaterialthatwouldbepostedonPUVsandtransport
terminalswouldbeseenbymanypeople.However,electioncampaignmaterialspostedon
privatevehiclesandotherplacesfrequentedbythepublic,e.g.,commercialestablishments,
wouldalsobeseenbymanypeople.Thus,thereisnoreasontosingleoutownersofPUVsand
transportterminalsintheprohibitionagainstpostingofelectioncampaignmaterials.