Documentos de Académico
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Documentos de Cultura
China Bad
The alternative is Chinese imperialism
Horner and Leiken 6
the
Chinese have a certain thing going for themselves. Theyre not European, theyre
not American, theyre not white. They have another advantage in the fact that they call their
system socialism and that they call their ruling party communist. And this, as Jaime suggests, with
respect to their actual conduct, you see, allows them to say or allows them to claim, allows them
to think that what they do that their economic expansion in the world is somehow different in
kind from the Western economic expansion of the 19th and 20th century, and that
Chinas multinational banks and corporations, who are very active in Latin America is
something different, and so on, even as, analytically speaking, Hobson or Lenin would recognize
China as a kind of economic imperialist power. It imports primary products; its a creditor; it
exports finished goods; it exploits its own and other countries cheap labor, is what it does do; it invests in
and wants to control critical infrastructure like ports, airports, highways, telecommunications; and it uses its
political influence that is to say corrupts local political systems to protect its economic interests. But there
of this argument the Chinese now. It used to be the Japanese had a certain purchase in their model. So
may for all of this now, I think were already beginning to see the signs of the certain self-limiting aspect of it. As
Chair Mao himself once wrote, you see, Wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance. And we cant be
wherever they are, tend to seek balance. In this case the so-called stronger parties are China and the United States,
and presumably it is in the space between them that one finds ones own opportunities as countries in this situation
always have ever since 1945.
there are
several rather negative impacts or even potential impacts of Chinas involvement in Latin America
for Latin America. First of all, right now, although Latin America has benefited tremendously by Chinas huge
imports from the region, 2006 may turn out to be the first year where the terms of trade switch because
Chinas exports, manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing very, very
rapidly. I thought I had the numbers here but I dont. But anyway, this year may be the year where Latin America
more to Latin America than it imports. This clearly is changing. Argentina is a key example
where the imports of Chinese goods into Argentina have been growing very, very rapidly
sells
compared to the exports to China. The other way in which the involvement in China will work against
Latin America, and maybe already has, is that China managed when it was promising all these great trade
benefits and agreements managed to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it a to label it a
give it market economy status , which meant that anti-dumping legislation under the WTO
rules would be the impact of them would be substantially diminished . They couldnt bring Latin
American countries couldnt bring those kinds of charges. So as a result, this gave China much more
access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods . Even the
United States and Europe didnt give China the market economy status, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile did. And I
with the exception of Chile everything is always with the exception of Chile. But with the exception of Chile, which
is setting aside some of the revenues from the commodities boom for times when the commodities boom is not with
us, most of Latin America is just spending the money, taking it in but not thinking ahead, not planning, not using it
to make Latin America more economically competitive globally. So these are chickens hat are going to come home
And, of course, Im someone who grew up went to graduate school during the days of dependency theory, where
scholars were claiming that coming from the left that the relationship with
U.S. and multinational corporations, et cetera, was bad for Latin America. The terms of trade were bad;
the Latin American
that Latin America was being reinforced as a producer of commodities, whereas the United States was selling
manufacturers to Latin America. Well, guess what? I mean, thats China and Latin America now . I
mean, you could make the argument that the economic relationship with China is reinforcing Latin Americas
traditional role as a commodities producer, and is favoring Chinese efforts to sell manufacturers, which supposedly
have, in general, better terms of trade. Finally the issue of, is it good or bad for the United States, Chinas
relationship with Latin America? I mean, some of this is already obvious, that it helps the United States interests in
the region to the extent that China helps Latin America grow and stabilize. China is not interested in having a
chaotic, unstable Latin America for reasons of its own, and that of course is good for the United States, too. But on
the other hand, if you look at the pillars I mean, a lot of people say that the United States has no policy toward
Latin America so there is no way we can even identify what the pillars of the policy are, but I do think we do have a
policy toward Latin America. Whether or not its the right one or whether or not were doing enough is another
actual context, I mean, China has been growing about 9.5 percent for the last decade or two, actually two decades,
to sustain this rate of growth for a population the size of China they need
commodities and food. And if you look at the situation today it was interesting when Charles mentioned
and so obviously
that at a certain point China accounted for what was it? 30 percent of the GNP, you said. Today I think its only
about 4 or 5 percent of the world GNP. But today well, I have it here: China, 4.4 percent of the worlds GNP, but it
consumes, as of today, 7.4 percent of the worlds oil, 31 percent of the worlds coal, 30 percent of the worlds iron,
27 percent of world steel and 40 percent of cement. So clearly China is on a tear economically and needs these
kinds of inputs into its economy to continue growth and its economic development effort. But of course its economic
development effort isnt only about economic development; its also about political stability. There is an argument
to be made that I dont know what percentage of economic growth China needs to sustain annually, but if it has
been growing at 9.5 percent, obviously to suddenly go down to 2 percent or 3 percent will not keep China stable.
Its hard to predict in that kind of political system what the consequences of a drastic or even a gradual slowing of
economic growth would be, but I think that we could all speculate, and its not going to be very great, very good. So
there is that issue too, the political stability issue. And so both of these things the desire to modernize the
economy and become a great economic power, and also to maintain political stability are really behind Chinas
growth Chinas search for commodities and food. The other motivating factor is that
living in a unipolar world, or at least in a world where there is only one superpower. And although we think
of China as a big country, basically its still developing, and it actually shouldnt be so surprising to think
that China feels itself vulnerable in this kind of situation. And we get all excited when we see
China is moving into the Western hemisphere, but were all over Asia . I mean, its not
exactly as if China has control over the whole Asia-Pacific region. It doesnt. It would like to increase its power and
control there obviously. So this sense of Chinese vulnerability and the idea that the United States wants to stay the
invade China I mean, we have enough trouble with Iraq; were certainly not going to invade China its not clear
countries, both economically and politically: economically diversified sources for what it needs to feed its economy,
diplomatically work in multilateral institutions to try and create strategic alliances throughout the world, diversify
of what disturbs the United States, and Ill talk about it later is that it has been you know,
should come as no surprise that these countries are particularly receptive to any kinds of Chinese overtures, and
China obviously sees that it has a comparative advantage in those kinds of countries.
Democracy Good
Democracy promotion and foreign aid are key to sustainability
Bitar 11 (Sergio, Director of the Inter-American Dialogue, "Latin America and the United States: Looking
Towards 2020," September 2011, www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/LAtheUS2020.pdf slim_)
Which policies and international agreements could be most fruitful in helping countries both
specialize in high-tech natural resource production while at the same time diversify into more
sophisticated sectors? Education and infrastructure are two priority areas for development
and Latin America can avail itself of foreign assistance in both. In education, some countries
need to guarantee K-12 coverage, and all of them need to improve quality. These are domestic tasks, but
foreign support can help narrow the gap in areas such as graduate studies and technological
research. President Obamas proposal to increase the number of US graduate students in Latin America to
100,000and also increase the number of Latin Americans studying in the United States by the same numbercan
play a key role in launching ambitious initiatives of cooperation. Infrastructure is the second major challenge. It is
become an even more relevant actor in the region should it decide to complement its search for commodities and
pursue technology transfers and joint research initiatives. The intense relationship with Asia will increase the
importance of the South Pacific and will demand better infrastructure and services. The Trans-Pacific partnership
should provide Latin American APEC members with new opportunities for coordination with the rest of the region
those that make a big bet on changing production structures to achieve the green economy of the future and that
forge Korean-style public-private partnerships. The task ahead is complex. Neither good macroeconomic policies nor
growth alone are sufficient. Absent greater equality, protection, and social inclusion, success will remain elusive.
power and that lack national unity and self-confidence. Greater social mobility, an emphasis on merit, and equal
opportunity are preconditions for tackling ambitious challenges and avoiding the middle-income trap. This task will
demand tax reforms that generate resources to provide public goods that will increase national well-being and
productivity, which go hand-in-hand. In the new stage of Latin Americas development, strengthening institutions
and broadening citizen participation are other prerequisites for success. Although our democracies are marked by
democratically elected executives bent on staying in power have attempted to subordinate independent
institutions. In Central America and Mexico, organized crime undermines the governments and the democratic
Installing a democracy
and living in peace is considerably harder than implementing sound economic
policy. And without democratic institutions, economic policy is not
sustainable. Active involvement in global governance should also be a priority for Latin American countries,
especially medium-sized and smaller ones. In a multipolar world, it makes sense for Latin America to
support multilateralism and participate more actively in global governance . In the
coming years, Latin America should seek a larger presence in the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the United Nations. Unlike larger countries, each of the small and medium-sized countries
system. This scourge is draining national energies; defeating it is a collective task.
will not be able on their own to influence the international issues that concern them. Joint action to reform
multilateral agencies is, therefore, crucial to the defense of their national interests . Each country
will have to reinforce its strategic thinking and look at the medium term to identify the vital reforms that improve
the well-being of its citizens.
The region
should also offer support to help facilitate a transition to democracy in Cuba . Despite
initiatives. b) South American nations should get more involved in providing assistance to Haiti. c)
the steps taken by the Obama administration regarding visits and remittances, the ineffective US embargo
continues with no end in sight. For Latin Americans, it will be important to have conditions in place for a peaceful
transition when Cuban leadership changes. It is helpful to encourage some processes underway in Cuba, such as
the release of political prisoners, improved freedom of expression, and economic reforms, which could pave the way
for a democratic opening. Energy and Climate Change Although President Obama has spoken about an Energy and
Climate Partnership of the Americas, its content, priorities, goals, and resources remain unclear. a) There are
Development Good
Development good alleviates poverty and inequality
Worstall 12
(Tim, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute, "So What is this Neoliberal Globalisation Free Trade
Thing About Anyway?", 3/1/12, www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/01/so-what-is-this-neoliberalglobalisation-free-trade-thing-about-anyway/ slim_)
Its easy enough to find people with opinions, strong opinions, on what this neoliberal globalisation and free trade
thing is all about. Sadly, youll find
most of those strong opinions are that its about grinding the noses of
the poor into the dust, breaking the unions, stiffing the working classes and in general feeding as
much money as is humanly possible up to the 1%. You might find a few references to Wall St v. Main St, shipping all
the good jobs off to China and even, among the more perceptive, the idea that its all about creating a global
economy rather than a series of national ones. All would agree though that its something that started in the late
70s, was driven along by both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, has included the lowering of trade barriers, a
lifting of regulations and in general a move to a more free market stance on how the economy should be managed
and regulated. The what we agree on: the result we obviously dont. For here is the point, the purpose, the aim and
this very neoliberal revolution. Thats what it was all about. We wanted to make the
poor rich. The data released by the World Banks Development Research Group show
that 22% of the developing worlds population or 1.29 billion people lived on $1.25 or
less a day in 2008, down from 43% in 1990 and 52% in 1981 (see top chart above). Nothing
the outcome of
Machiavellian about it, nothing to do with trying to make the rich richer, nothing at all to do with shafting the
Its difficult to get over quite how large these figures are: were talking about more people than the entire
population of Europe, or of North America, leaving absolute poverty in fewer years than I have been alive. In fact,
huge effort, by a substantial movement of resources from the rich world to the poor. That huge effort hasnt
the target has already been met, years early. Purely through that very
neoliberal globalisation. Nothing particularly odd or strange about the process either: allow people
happened but
economic freedom, allow them to trade with whom they will and wealth just gets created all on its ownsome. I like it
when a plan comes together, dont you? We wanted to aid the poor in getting rich. We have done, by trading with
them. A useful conclusion would be that if we want to continue the process of making the poor rich we should
expand economic freedom and trade more with them.
Empirics
Empirics first discourse focus is epistemologically flawed and paralyzes action
Rodwell 5 (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to
Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm slim_)
something. Moreover if the word is tied to and altered by an historical event or social impact, would it not be a
without
clear causal links between materially identifiable events and factors any assessment
within the argument actually becomes nonsensical. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no
traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how
the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world
killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is how do we know
this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much Jackson himself quoting to Dr
David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that
discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that Kings argument would just
be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own
reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is
case of assessing the effect of original event itself as well as the language? The larger problem is that
the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I dont personally believe global terrorism is the worlds primary
threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But
about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearly ridiculous and
many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there are empirically more persuasive
explanations.[xi] The phrase empirically
Language or culture then does not wholy constitute reality. How do we know in the end that the
world not threatened by the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast cereal? Because
empirically persuasive evidence tells us this is the case. The question must then be asked, is
our
Imperialism Good
Imperialism prevents war interdependence, institutionbuilding, and democracy promotion
Ikenberry 4
(G. John Ikenberry, Prof. of Geopolitics, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004)
Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's
Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term.
threat
the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately,
the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States.
Liberalization Good
US-led reforms are key solves economic and social distortions
Mesa-Lago 2 (Carmelo, PhD in Labor Economics and Social Security from Cornell University, "Models of
Development, Social Policy and Reform in Latin America," unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/
(httpAuxPages)/7E4B8522A609EC67C1256C7C0039C99D/$file/mesalong.pdf slim_)
Costa Rica. One of the best representatives of the mixed model , which combined a
market economy with a considerable state role, and achieved a fair balance between
social and economic goals with good results in both (1953-1981). But the debt crisis of the 1980s and the
exhaustion of that model (excessive state intervention and fiscal imbalances) led to structural adjustment reforms
in that decade and in the 1990s, albeit so far successful in maintaining the most important social gains (see also
adjustments have been occurring in the three countries: toward social goals and more state regulatory powers in
Chile since the 1990s; toward economic goals and a timid move to the market in Cuba since the 1990s (still with
overwhelming state ownership and control); and toward economic goals and the market in Costa Rica since the
2000d). The three countries selected are also important examples in Latin America of a relatively early emphasis on
social policies, thus ratifying Pierson's observation that "late starters (in industrialization) tended to develop welfare
institutions earlier in their own individual development and under more comprehensive terms of coverage" (cited in
Mkandawire 2000: 11). Chile and Cuba were two of five regional "pioneers" in the development of social insurance
(respectively in the 1920s and 1930s), while Costa Rica's program started later (in 1943 but this country was less
developed that the other two) and yet it was expanded in 1960-1970s and reached the level of the other two
counterparts. By the 1980s, the three countries had basically accomplished universal coverage of their populations
a UNRISD
comparative study that analyzed the unique experience of seven countries that achieved
although with diverse schemes (Mesa-Lago 1998). The three countries were selected for
levels of social performance considerably higher than their per capita income (Ghai 2000). The socioeconomic
performance of the three models is summarized in the next section. Socioeconomic Performance of the Three
half of the indicators dealt with economic variables, both internal and
GDP growth, GDP per capita, investment, inflation, fiscal balance , composition of
GDP by economic sector, export concentration/ diversification , import composition, trade partner
concentration/diversification, trade balance per capita, and foreign debt per capita. The other half of the
indicators dealt with social variables: real wages, composition of the labour force by
sector, open unemployment, illiteracy, educational enrolment at three levels, infant
mortality, rates of contagious diseases, life expectancy, and housing . Five important social
period started in 1973). About
external:
indicators had to be discarded in the final evaluation because of two reasons: lack of data from Cuba (income
distribution, poverty incidence) or significant differences in the way those indicators were calculated (womens
Two types
of ranking were used in each of the indicators: (1) absolute, measuring the starting and
ending years in the period, for instance, the infant mortality rate in 1960 (or 1973 for Chile) and 1993; and
(2) relative improvement, the change in one indicator through time, for instance, the reduction in
participation in the labour force, access to water and sewerage/sanitation, social security coverage).
infant mortality between 1960/73 and 1993. The indicators were merged in each of the two clusters (economic and
social), and the two clusters then combined into an index of economic and social development (using various
The results of these comparisons in the absolute rankings among the three countries were as
follows: Chile ranked best (first) in economic indicators but worse (third) on social indicators; Costa Rica
ranked best in social indicators and second in the economic indicators . Cuba ranked
weights).
second in social indicators (in the 1990s, but first in the 1980s) and worst in economic indicators.1 In the relative
Costa Rica managed to close the gap with Cuba, despite a worse
stand at the starting point, for instance, in 1960 life expectancy was 61.6 years in Costa Rica and 64.0 in
improvement indicators,
Cuba but in 1995-2000 they were 76.5 and 76.0 respectively. Finally, a comparison was done with international
deficit, but social consequences were adverse: poverty incidence worsened, real wages shrank, educational
enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels declined, social security coverage decreased, unemployment jumped to
the cost of significant overstaffing and very low labour productivity, and egalitarianism probably led to the least
income inequality in the region but generated perverse incentives for labour absenteeism.
recent years, it continues to haunt economies like those of Venezuela, Bolivia and most of those in Central America.
When local savers become antsy, as Peruvians were after the presidential victory of Ollanta Humala in 2011, there
is a small army of private bankers, located in Miami, ready to move the monies of these Latin Americans off-shore in
Latin Americas banking system is chronically undercapitalized. Governments and companies turn to international bond markets to raise
funds, ostensibly at cheaper rates than they can source at home. Only Chile, with three decades of pension-fund
a matter of hours. As a result,
growth, can begin to claim financial independence. Everyone else must convince international bond markets of their
development bank communities about proven policies that they plan to preserve and/or reforms they plan to
implement. Those promises, covered widely by the press at home and abroad, become a policy straitjacket that
tends to restrain any populist instincts that these new presidents developed during their election campaigns. Even
Hugo Chvez, who was first elected president of Venezuela when crude prices per barrel barely reached double
digits, made the rounds as president-elect, wooing investors with promises of an open investment climate. His tune
changed radically as oil prices climbed and he developed an economic model that could be sustained (for a while)
Americans may be creative and entrepreneurial, but the region is the worst performer in the world when it comes to
bringing innovation to market. Latin America, home to 9% of the worlds population and 8% of its gross domestic
product (GDP), produces only 0.3% of the worlds patents.5 Among Latin American universities, government and
the private sector, only 6,000 patents per year are registered. In comparison, there are at least five U.S. universities
Caribbean shore before deep water American oil rigs outside the 200km limit figure out how to poach them.
Despite strong political opposition, the Caldern administration was obliged to reform its
highly nationalistic energy laws in order to invite third-party service companies into the energy sector.
Additional reforms may be required to save Pemex from financial ruin as its output
declines. Latin American governments must learn that taxing imported technology makes about as much sense as
Japanstaxing imported energy.
Perm
Perm solves Latin America is a unique site for convergence of political
and critical projects
Escobar 10 (Arturo, Ph.D. in Development Policy and Philosophy from UC Berkeley and Professor of
Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "Latin America at a Crossroads," Cultural Studies, 24: 1, pp. 1-65, 12 January
2010, slim_)
crisis of the neo-liberal model of the past three decades; and the crisis of the project of bringing about modernity in
the continent since the Conquest.
the notion of post-development (Escobar 1995) that it pointed at a pristine future where development
intuited the possibility of
visualizing an era where development ceased to be the central organizing principle
of social life and which, even more, visualized such a displacement as already happening in the
present. The same with post-liberalism, as a space/ time when social life is no longer seen as
so thoroughly determined by the constructs of economy, individual, instrumental
rationality, private property, and so forth as characteristic of liberalism modernity. It is not a state to be
arrived at in the future but something that is always under construction. Postcapitalist similarly means
looking at the economy as made up of a diversity of capitalist, alternative capitalist,
of
would no longer exist. Nothing of the sort was intended with the notion, which
and non-capitalist practices ; it signals a state of affairs when capitalism is no longer the
hegemonic form of economy (as in the capitalocentric frameworks of most political economies), where
the domain of the economy is not fully and naturally occupied by capitalism but by an array of economies
solidarity, cooperative, social, communal, even criminal economies that cannot be reduced to capitalism (Gibson-
the post signals the notions that the economy is not essentially
or naturally capitalist, societies are not naturally liberal , and the state is not the only
way of instituting social power as we have imagined it to be . The post, succinctly, means a
decentering of capitalism in the definition of the economy , of liberalism in the definition of
society and the polity, and of state forms of power as the defining matrix of social
organization. This does not mean that capitalism, liberalism, and state forms cease to
exist; it means that their discursive and social centrality have been displaced somewhat, so
that the range of existing social experiences that are considered valid and credible
alternatives to what exist is significantly enlarged (Santos 2007a). Taken together,
postliberalism, post-capitalism, and post-statist forms point at alternatives to the dominant
forms of Euro-centered modernity what might be called alternatives to modernity , or transmodernity
Graham 2006). In other words,
(Dussel 2000). Operating in the cracks of modernity/coloniality, this expression gives content to the World Social
Sustainable/Inevitable
Globalization is inevitable and sustainable key to economic
stability
Price 11 (John, Graduate in Commerce from Queen's University in Canada, has taught international business at
Universidad de las Americas in Mexico City, Globalization Is Here to Stay: Why Latin America Must Accept Its
Globalized Destiny and Ready Itself to Compete," 8/19/11,
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task_Force_Papers/Price-GlobalizationTFPaper.pdf slim_)
a sizeable industry of academics , pundits, policy makers and journalists that debates
the virtues and risks of globalization in Latin America, as if the region has a choice in the
matter. It does not. Latin America is the most globalized region in the world and it became
that way out of economic survival . And as globalized as Latin Americas trade and investment flows are
today, the region would stand to gain from an even deeper embrace of open borders .
Only competitive pressure will rekindle the spirit of reform that has sadly gone dormant in Latin
There exists
America in todays benign economic conditions of high commodity prices and cheap capital. Little Choice but to
the head of agricultural promotion at PromPeru (Perus export promotion agency) once remarked, when asked why
the countrys yields were so impressive, God is almighty and benevolent, and also happens to be Peruvian. The
To attract strategic investors to the mining and energy sectors, where it can take over 10 years to recapture initial
investments, nations must build and maintain a sound business climate. When they
to do so (e.g., Venezuelan and Mexican oil industries currently; Colombian mining industry during the 1990s),
fail
Imperialism Good
Imperialism does more good than bad
Boot 03 (Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies,
U.S. Imperialism: A Force for Good May 13, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/usimperialism-force-good/p5959)
While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, the United States set out on another bout
of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans
are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building"
experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this
is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there
have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism"
their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.
politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century
ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German
historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant
struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of
economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival
In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University
historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and
Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their
place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of
China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial
military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago
powers.
political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and
after surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of
new rivals. "[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first
century," contends Mearsheimer. "[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth
slow considerably in the years ahead." China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU)
too has the potential to become "a formidable rival." Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the
when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation
is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements
of great powers -- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states -- they have not wholly overlooked eras when
power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you will) is hardly
United States imperialism began in the late 1800s and since its inception Americans have been debating the moral
validity behind the idea. Through the tenacious leadership of American presidents, the United States has been
originally went into Panama because they wanted to build the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal would benefit the
United States in trade because it was a good passageway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans - it could save
Americans time and money. However, Columbia owned Panama at the time, and would not let the United States
build and use a canal in Panama; Panama, displeased with Columbias rule in their country, turned to the United
one example; America has also maintained freedom and democracy in Puerto Rico. The United States originally
While some say that cultural imperialism does not affect other
countries positively, it is clear that there many benefits linked to cultural
imperialism. Those who don't support imperialism believe that America needs to listen to Gandhi, who said
in other nations.
that I want the culture of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off
my feet by any. While the quote has its truths, this is indeed and opinion that can easily be argued. Gandhi is
saying that he is open to learning about other cultures, but doesnt want to be forced to take part in one.
However, America is not forcing anyone to take part in their culture and
has not in the past; countries like France and China have limited American
cultural programming through satellites and the Internet. With six billion
people in the world, one culture taking over would be impossible. And
even if it were possible, what constitutes American culture? It is my belief
that our culture is just a homogenized cluster of all the cultures in the
world, so in part, nations are scared to accepted a "tainted" version of
their original culture? Cultural imperialism is spreading though American culture to those who want it,
just as the most successful imperialism in the twentieth century resulted when countries were happy overall with
democracy made their government democratic. Puerto Rico also has a democratic government, and the United
States economically supports them. Americans spread the ideal of democracy, and as a result these two countries
are democratic. American cultural imperialism exists today for those countries who want to learn about American
culture. Thus, the United States has positively affected other countries with the ideal of democracy, and continues
to spread their culture to other countries today, justifying the validity of imperialism.
the spread
of democracy is the political outcome of the spread of European values and traditions
via colonialism (for a discussion, see Huntington, 1984 ). This is because, theoretically, the
colonial power may have transmitted some of its culture and language to
the colony, which in turn may have led to the emergence of a cooperative
political culture, or may have left institutions that were conducive to democracy in place when the colonizing
powers exited (Weiner, 1989 ). However, some scholars (Barro, 1999 ; Quainoo, 2000 ) have found no relationship
between colonial heritage and democracy, while others (Lipset et al ., 1993; Clague et al. , 2001 ) fi nd that being a
former British colony increases the probability that a country becomes democratic. In particular, several scholars
have argued that the type of colonizer was important in explaining whether a country was able to develop into a
democracy after the end of colonial rule. Myron Weiner (1989) , for instance, noted that by 1983 every country in
the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since World War II with a population of at least one million (and
almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience was a former British colony. This
would suggest that there was something about British colonial rule that made it different from the colonial
administration of other European states, such as France and Belgium. Khapoya (1998) , for instance, distinguishes
between two main types of colonial rule in Africa: indirect rule and direct rule. The British generally used a system
indirect rule, where the emphasis was not on the assimilation of Africans to become black Britishers,
empower the Africans with the ability to run
their own communities. Thus, instead of assimilating the Africans as British citizens, society was
of
segregated between the natives and the whites living in the colony. The British also employed an indirect system of
administrative rule. Generally this meant that the colonial authorities would co - opt the local power structure (the
kings, chiefs, or headman) and via invitations, coercion, or bribery, incorporate them into the colonial
administrative structure. In return, these local elites were expected to enforce laws, collect taxes, and serve as the
2001 ). Given this level of preparedness, then following World War II, Britain was much more willing than other
colonial powers to grant independence, which in turn made the newly independent states more willing to retain the
institutions the British had put into place. Thus, from this perspective, Britain seems to have left its colonies in a
better situation to develop democracy later than non - British colonies.
Imperialism Ethical
Imperialism breeds democratic self rule
Kurtz 03 (Stanley, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, A just
empire? Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint, April 1, 2003,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6426)
Even the mildest imperialism will
be experienced by many as a humiliation. Yet imperialism as the midwife
of democratic self-rule is an undeniable good. Liberal imperialism is thus a
moral and logical scandal, a simultaneous denial and affirmation of selfrule that is impossible either to fully accept or repudiate. The counterfactual offers
a way out. If democracy did not depend on colonialism, we could confidently forswear empire. But in
contrast to early modern colonial history, we do know the answer to the
counterfactual in the case of Iraq. After many decades of independence,
there is still no democracy in Iraq. Those who attribute this fact to
American policy are not persuasive, since autocracy is pervasive in the
Arab world, and since America has encouraged and accepted democracies
in many other regions. So the reality of Iraqi dictatorship tilts an admittedly precarious moral balance in
Our commitment to political autonomy sets up a moral paradox.
The heavy burden being imposed on the United States does not require
that the United States remain on hair-trigger alert at every moment. But it
does oblige the United States to evaluate all claims and to make a
determination as to whether it can intervene effectively and in a way that
does more good than harmwith the primary objective of interdiction so
that democratic civil society can be built or rebuilt. This approach is better by far than
those strategies of evasion and denial of the sort visible in Rwanda, in Bosnia, or in the sort of "advice" given to
like this fact, but it is inescapable. As Michael Ignatieff puts it, the "most carefree and confident empire in history
America's
fate is tied inextricably to the fates of states and societies around the
world. If large pockets of the globe start to go badhere, there,
everywhere (the infamous "failed state" syndrome)the drain on
American power and treasure will reach a point where it can no longer be
borne.
now grimly confronts the question of whether it can escape Rome's ultimate fate."9 Furthermore,
community impact product development for the United Way of America, ETHICS
AND INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN GRENADA, 1983 1990, pg 9)
A second major argument in favor of intervention is based on a concern
for human rights. This argument rests on the idea that a country that
values democracy and individual rights should be pre-pared to act when
those values are threatened, not only at home but abroad. According to this
view, it is simply intolerable for a free nation to stand on the sidelines while foreign
tyrants like Idi Amin and Pal Pat enslave and massacre their own unfortunate
subjects. At least in extreme cases like these. unilateral intervention should
be permitted if other means fall. A nation that is not in a position to
intervene Itself should support those governments (like Tanzania in the
case of Idi Amin) that are able to act.
Imperialism Inevitable
Imperialism cant be blamed solely on the imperialist
Said 94 (Edward W., was a professor of English and Comparative Literature at
Columbia University, a literary theorist, and a public intellectual, Culture and
Imperialism May 31, 1994, pg. 19)
Domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society. But in today's global setting
The nations
of contemporary Asia, Latin America, and Africa are politically
independent but in many ways are as dominated and dependent as they
were 'when ruled directly by European powers. On the one hand, this is
the consequence of self-inflicted wounds, critics like V. S. Naipaul are wont
to say: they (everyone knows that "they" means coloreds, wogs, niggers)
are to blame for what "they" are, and it's no use droning on about the
legacy of imperialism. On the other hand, blaming the Europeans
sweepingly for the misfortunes of the present is not much of an
alternative. What we need to do is to look at these Matters as a network
of interdependent histories that it would be inaccurate and senseless to
repress, useful and interesting to understand. The point here is not complicated. If while
they are also interpretable as having something to do with imperialism, its history, its new forms.
sitting in Oxford, Paris, or New York you tell Arabs or Africans that they belong to a basically sick or unregenerate
they needed the West and that the idea of fatal independence was a nationalist fiction designed mainly for what
Fanon calls the "nationalist bourgeoisie," who in turn often ran the new countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny
reminiscent of the departed masters.
Perm
Perm solves Their absolutist rejection of imperialism is too
dualistic
Angus 4 (Ian, Professor of humanities at Simon Fraser University, Empire, Borders, Place: A Critique of Hardt and Negris Concept of
Empire. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.3angus.html)
The two critical points that I have made converge on a central issue: how
concept of abstraction is too dualistic, their concept of border too one-sided, their concept of
history too uni-linear, their concept of place too shallow, to have much long-term resonance in the antineoliberal globalization alliance. I would put my bets on the construction of borders that allow Others to flourish, a politics of place and a
defence of communities against exchange value. This is a very different politics whose difference is perhaps now obscured by the common opposition to
empire. But it is different enough that one may expect it to become generally visible before too long.
Considerable attention has recently been paid to considering hybridization in terms of power inequities. Attention
has also been given to the challenge of marrying macro- and micro-level analysis. This, in an attempt to mold an
approach which captures the strengths of both cultural imperialist and globalization of culture perspectives while
leaving the weaknesses of each behind. In this section, I examine and analyze two comparatively recent articles in
which some of the scholars at the leading edge of theorizing globalization, culture, and media seek to forge new,
interesting and productive methodological and theoretical ground. The articles I select are certainly not the only
ones I could have chosen. However, they are thought-provoking and highly relevant to the focus of this article.
Rogers (2006) searches for a middle ground vis-a`-vis the cultural imperialism and globalization of culture
continuum and, more broadly, with respect to a structure and agency continuum in the article, From Cultural
Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation. In it, he advances an
intriguing proposal to consider globalization, culture and media through the lens of transculturation. According to
Rogers, Neither pure determinism (vulgar Marxism) nor pure agency (neoliberalism) is capable of accounting for
the dynamics of cultural appropriation in the conditions of cultural dominance (2006, 482). Here, Rogers locates
cultural appropriation in the conditions of cultural dominance while also acknowledging inequities in global cultural
flows, most notably the tremendous televisual and film outflow as opposed to inflow with respect to the United
States. This sets Rogers analysis apart from those which stop at the dynamics of cultural appropriation and fail to
get to the question of cultural dominance or unequal flows. Rogers also tips his theoretical hat to globalization of
culture active audience theorists, underscoring the importance of the idea of polysemic media texts which, he
writes, challenge(d) simplistic models of ideological domination (483). Rogers ultimately proposes a typology of
cultural appropriation based on four categories: Exchange, dominance, exploitation, and transculturation. He
devotes the final third of his article to transculturation and to making an argument for its comparative superiority as
a theoretical and analytical instrument by which to engage the intersections among globalization, media, and
culture. Transculturation, he writes, refers not only to a more complex blending of cultures than the previous
categories but also to a set of conditions under which such acts occur: globalization, neocolonialism, and the
increasing dominance of transnational capitalism vis-a`-vis nation states (2006, 491). Rogers makes his primary
appeal to the trans. However, it is worth asking: Does the reality of a growing tendency toward the trans mean
no single national actor, or group of social actors, has more control over
the emergent trans-based system than another? It seems to me that the condition of
transculturlarity is likely to be different sometimes dramatically so for
different people and peoples around the world, all of them positioned
differently sometimes radically so vis-a`-vis this social phenomenon. As a critical scholar, I am especially
that
interested here in the question of power differentials in terms of the condition of transculturalarity how can we
most usefully and effectively understand, theorize, and address such differentials in a transcultural world while
keeping the question of inequality squarely in view? Conclusion: melding the macro and micro, the global and local,
and production and consumption Kraidy and Murphys call for a comparative, empirically grounded translocalism
and Rogers appeal to a transcultural approach represent the leading edge of global communication theory. In
an individual business owners decision to post a store sign in English only rather than in English and French in an
attempt to resist and challenge the regional imposition of French in Quebec might also be understood as
contributing to the hegemony of English on a national, North American, and global scale. If paying attention to
cross-cutting tendencies and paradox, for example, to the ways in which the global growth of MTV or McDonalds is
heavily dependent upon localization strategies that, at a broad level of analysis, are comparatively homogenous, is
crucial and it is it is equally important to engage processes of globalization at multiple levels of analysis. In other
words, while it is crucial to pay attention to the reality of widespread localization of cultural products, in other
words, to undeniable cultural difference, it is equally important to pay close attention to similarities and
comparative homogenization. This means examining the ways in which the macro-sociological processes and forces
of globalization are realized in, and shaped by, the micro-practices of everyday life. What, for example, does it
mean in terms of larger macro-sociological forces such as the global spread of fast food culture and global popular
music when a Nigerian immigrant to Brazil sits down and helps herself to a Big Mac to the strains of a Celine Dion
song in English in Sao Paulo? Alternatively, how do we make sense of, and meaningfully situate against the
backdrop of the increasing global prevalence of English, a decision by Slovenian pop music group such as Siddharta
to re-record its top songs in English? We might read the first example as an instance of increasing cultural
hybridization, or, rather differently, as indicative of the increasing homogeneity of modern life. Alternatively, it
could be read as indicative of both of these tendencies. And we might read the second example primarily as an
instance of a musical group tapping English to realize greater global agency, or, rather differently, primarily as a
micro-act that when added together with thousands of similar micro-acts contributes to the very thing that
necessitates that Siddharta sing in English in the first place, meaning the global hegemony of English. Ultimately,
perhaps the impossibility of putting aside ones assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the
human social whole and the individual is surely one of the primary reasons for the often heated debates that have
swirled around, and which will continue to swirl around, how best to approach theorizing and studying the relation
between the global and local and culture and media. As contentious as these debates have been and as passionate
as they continue to be, it seems clear that, as Fornas (2008), Jansson (2009), and others have noted, global
communication and media studies has generally moved beyond the polarization that once characterized the field.
Thus, there appears to be general agreement that one cannot adequately grasp the nexus between globalization
and culture by looking exclusively at the realm of cultural production or by zeroing in only on local, individual acts
of creative cultural appropriation. This doesnt mean that disagreement and debate have disappeared from global
communication and media studies, or that the disagreement that remains does not revolve around some of the
same issues that it has in the past, most notably, the question of where the balance of power primarily resides in
the global local equation. However, it does mean global communication and media studies is moving toward
building approaches to engaging and understanding the global local-culture media dynamic in more sophisticated
and productive fashion than it has in the past. In short, it shows that the field is not stagnant and that it is not being
held back by entrenched thinking. Indeed, it is, as Rogers (2006) and Kraidy and Murphys (2008) recent work
shows, very definitely moving forward. In the end, this is exactly what ought to be happening with theory, whether
its focused on the interplay between globalization, media and culture, or, more broadly, on the general nature of
human social being in the world.
Alt Fails
The ideology of imperialism is to deeply entrenched in society
that the State has been corrupted and prevents any
alternative
Van Elteren 3 (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, US
Cultural Imperialism Today
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v023/23.2elteren.html)
To the extent that advertising constitutes a pervasive public "art form," however, it has
ongoing interpenetration and crossover between consumption and the aesthetic sphere
led to a [End Page 182] greater
"aestheticization of reality": appearance and image have become of prime importance. Not only have
(traditionally separated off as an artistic counter-world to the everyday aspect of the former) has
commodities become more stylized but style itself has turned into a valuable commodity. The refashioning and reworking of commoditieswhich are
themselves carefully selected according to one's individual tastesachieve a stylistic effect that expresses the individuality of their owner. 48 This
provides the framework for a more nuanced and sometimes contradictory second order of meaning.
The dynamics of cultural change therefore entail both processes of "traveling culture," in which the received culture (in this case
globalizing capitalist culture) is appropriated and assigned new meaning locally, and at the same time a "first order" meaning that
dominates and delimits the space for second order meaningsthus retaining something of the
traditional meaning of cultural imperialism. The latter is, ultimately, a negative phenomenon from the
perspective of self-determination by local people under the influence of the imperial culture. Traditional
critiques of cultural globalization have missed the point. The core of the problem lies not in the homogenization of cultures as such, or in the creation of a
"false consciousness" among consumers and the adoption of a version of the dominant ideology thesis. Rather, the
A state-centered
approach blurs the main issue here, which is not whether nationals or foreigners own the carriers of globalization, but whether
their interests are driven by capitalist globalization.
transnational corporations are crucial to any understanding of the concrete activities and local effects of globalization.
Hegel, saw liberal democracy/capitalism as the only embodiment of the world-spirit that now marked the end of history, a phrase
that became the title of his book.3 The long war was over and the restless world-spirit could now relax and buy a condo in Miami.
Fukuyama insisted that there were no longer any available alternatives to the American way of life. The philosophy, politics,
and economics of the Other each and every variety of socialism/Marxism had disappeared under the ocean, a
submerged continent of ideas that could never rise again. The victory of capital was irreversible. It was a
universal triumph. Huntington was unconvinced, and warned against complacency. From his Harvard base, he
challenged Fukuyama with a set of theses first published in Foreign Affairs (The Clash of Civilizations? a phrase originally coined
by Bernard Lewis, another favourite of the current administration). Subsequently these papers became a book, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of the World Order. The question mark had now disappeared. Huntington
reeked of death and destruction and imperialism. Democracy was the dictatorship of money and
money is overthrown and abolished only by blood.5 The advent of Caesarism would drown it in blood and
become the final episode in the history of theWest.Had the Third Reich not been defeated in Europe, principally by the Red Army (the
spinal cord of the Wehrmacht was broken in Stalingrad and Kursk, and the majority of the unfortunate German soldiers who perished are
buried on the Russian steppes, not on the beaches of Normandy or in the Ardennes), Spenglers prediction might have come close to
realization. He was among the first and fiercest critics of Eurocentrism, and his vivid worldview, postmodern in its intensity though not
its language, can be sighted in this lyrical passage: I see, in place of that empty figment of one linear history, the drama of a number of
mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its
whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in its own image; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life, will
and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures,
peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and stonepines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves. Each Culture has
its own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return.6 In contrast to this, he argued, lay the destructive
cycle of civilization:Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed
humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built
petrifying world city following motherearth . . . they are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again. . . .
Imperialism is civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the West is now
irrevocably set. . . . Expansionism is a doom, something daemonic and intense, which grips forces into
service and uses up the late humanity of the world-city stage.7
No Links
They confuse the distinction between hegemony and
imperialism, by simply cooperating we are maintaining peace
and avoiding imperialism
Yilmaz 10
[Sait Yilmaz, State, Power, and Hegemony, December 2010]
According to Cox, theories like Realism and Neo-realism were coined to preserve the status quo serving the
interests of rich dominant Western countries and their elite (Cox, 1981: 16-155). Those theories aimed to make the
international order seem natural and unchangeable. Hegemony enabled the dominant state to spread its moral,
political, and cultural values around the society and sub-communities. This was done through civilian society
institutions. Civilian society consists of the net of institutions and practices that are partly autonomous from the
hegemony implied by conviction, kind but forceful hegemony, and colonialist hegemony based on force (Snidal,
1986: 579-614). Discrimination between hegemony and dominance is another study subject argued by many
scholars including Machiavelli, Gramsci, and Nye. According to those three intellectuals, a major power should not
just rely on dominance, force, and hard power. Machiavelli advocates respect as a source of obedience to a major
power (Wright, 2004). Gramsci says that a major power itself evokes willingness and cooperation instinctively (Cox,
1984: 11). In another definiton, hegemony is the position of having the capability and power to change the rules
and norms of international systems based on ones own motivation and desire (Volgy, 2005: 1-2). If you dont have
enough power to affect global events in line with your own road map, that would be a dangerous illusion. Susan
Strange envisages that hegemony requires two kinds of strength; relational and structural based (Strange, 1989:
165). Relation based power is the strength to persuade and force the other actors one by one or in groups.
Structural power is the essential capacity to realize the desired rules, norms, and operations in the international
FW Evd
In the context of Latin America policy debates that focus on
how to best utilize liberalized trading lead to the best forms of
stability and decrease oppressive regimes - decades of reforms
prove
Korzeniewicz 00
[Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William C. Smith, Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin America: Searching
for the High Road to Globalization, Latin American Research Review, 2000, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692041]
cross-regional comparisons with the then thriving East Asian economies called
attention to the advantages of an alternative model of development based
on a "market-friendly" strategy built on trade liberalization and export orientation
addition,
as engines of growth (Kahler 1990, 1992; World Bank 1993c). According to this new World Bank perspective,
although poverty rates may have recently declined somewhat in some countries, this outcome is due not to trade
and financial reforms but to lower inflation and a return to modest growth. This admission brings the views of the
bank into alignment with the broad consensus previously discussed. Moreover, the authors of these studies agree
that formal and informal unemployment has risen in many countries and that wage differentials between skilled and