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ABriefHistoryof
ISIS
ISIS emerged out of the dashed hopes of the
Arab Spring.
by Adam Hanieh
Members loyal to ISIS wave their flag during a parade in June 2014. Reuters
InthewakeoftheNovember13attacksinParis,muchoftheLeft
haslinkedtheriseoftheIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS)tothe
deepeningimperialistviolenceintheMiddleEast.
Warandimperialism,ononeside,andthegrowingreachofjihadist
terrorism,ontheother,aresaidtobelockedtogetherinamutually
reinforcingembraceofviolenceanddestruction.Imperialist
crueltyandIslamistcrueltyfeedeachother,theFrenchNouveau
PartiAnticapitaliste(NPA)arguedshortlyaftertheParisattacks.In
ordertobreakthisnihilisticdeathgrip,weneedtoopposeforeign
intervention,putanendtoimperialistviolence,andhaltthe
ongoingplunderofwealthfromcountriesintheMiddleEast,
Africa,andelsewhere.
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Thebasiclogicofthisargumentisundoubtedlysound.Butinterms
ofexplanatoryvalue,thiskindofanalysisdoesnotgofarenough.It
suersfromtoomuchgeneralityandabstractnesstellinguslittle
aboutthespeci cityofthisparticularmoment,orthenatureofISIS
asamovement.Byattributingakindofautomaticityornatural
mirrorbetweenISISandimperialism,wecanmisstheall-important
contextandhistorythathasshapedtheremarkablyrapidriseofthe
organization.
WhydoestheresponsetoWesternaggressionandthecalamitous
situationsinIraq,Syria,andelsewhereacrosstheregiontakethis
particularideologicalandpoliticalform?Whatexplainsthesupport
thatISIS ndsonthegroundinboththeArabworldandEurope?In
short:whynow?Andwhylikethis?
TherealgenesisoftheIslamicStatesriseneedstobeseeninthe
trajectoryoftheArabuprisingsthateruptedthroughout2011and
2012.Theseuprisingsrepresentedenormoushope,ahopethat
mustcontinuetobedefended.Theyweremetwithrepressionand
reversal,unabletomoveforwardinanyfundamentalsense.Itwas
intothisbreachthatIslamistgroupsstepped,theirriseclosely
calibratedtothepushbackagainsttherevoltsandthepopular
democraticaspirationsthattheyembodied.
Therewasnoinevitabilitytothis.Rather,thedi cultiesthe
uprisingsfacedcreatedavacuumthatwasnecessarily lledby
somethingelse.
ISISsworldviewisanideologicalexpressionofthisnewreality.To
beclear,ISISsrisecannotbeexplainedassimplyanoutcomeof
ideologyorreligion,asmanyWesterncommentatorsappearto
believe.Thereareveryrealsocialandpoliticalrootsthatexplainthe
organizationsgrowth.
Buttakingtheideologicalexpressionseriouslyhelpsusunderstand
howvariousintersectingfactorsthedestructivespreadof
sectarianism,thedevastatingrepressioninSyriaandIraq,andthe
interestsofdierentregionalandinternationalpowersinthe
MiddleEasthaveactedtoincubatetheriseofISIS.
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Itisadialecticofretreat:thegrowthofISIShasreinforced,andhas
simultaneouslyfedo,aninabilitytoachievetheaspirationsof
2011astheregionhasbecomemiredinmultiple,deepeningcrises.
WhileISISsideologicalframingofthesecrisesisobviouslyfalse,it
isnonethelessonethatappearsforsometoresonatewithlived
experience,acomprehensionoftheworldthatmakessenseofthe
apparentchaosanddestruction.Themutuallyreinforcingaspectsof
thisprocessarewhatmakethecurrentsituationsodangerous.
TheGhostsof2011
TheupheavalsthatbeganwiththeprotestsinTunisiaandEgyptin
2010and2011,andsubsequentlyreverberatedthroughtheentire
region,werethemostsigni cantrevoltstheMiddleEasthadseenin
over vedecades.Itisimportanttoremembertheinitialpromise
embodiedinthesemovementsatatimewhentoomanyarequickto
dismissthemasdoomedfromtheoutsetorworse,somekindof
plotstirredbyexternalconspirators.
Theseprotestsdrewmillionsintomasspoliticalactionforthe rst
timeingenerations,seriouslyshakingestablishedstatestructures
andthegripofrepressive,Western-alliedregimes.Most
signi cantly,thatthesemovementswereregionalinscopepointed
tothecommonalitiesandsharedexperiencesofpeoplethroughout
theMiddleEast.Theirimpactonpoliticalconsciousnessandforms
oforganizationcontinuetobefeltacrosstheworld.
Fromthebeginningoftheseuprisingsitwasclearthattheissuesat
stakewentfarbeyondthesimplisticcaricatureofdemocracy
versusdictatorshipthatmanycommentatorsassumed.The
underlyingreasonsdrawingpeopleintothestreetsweredeeply
connectedtoformsofcapitalismintheregion:decadesofneoliberal
economicrestructuring,theimpactofglobalcrises,andthewaysin
whichArabstatesweregovernedbyautocraticpoliceandmilitary
regimeslongbackedbyWesternpowers.
Thesefactorsneedtobeseenintheirtotality,notasseparateor
divisiblecauses.Protestersdidnotnecessarilyexplicitlyarticulate
thistotalityasthereasonfortheiranger,butthisunderlyingreality
meantthattheprofoundissuesfacingtheArabworldwouldnever
besolvedthroughthesimpleremovalofindividualautocrats.
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Itwastopreventanysuchchallengetopoliticalandeconomic
structuresthatelites,supportedbyWesternpowersandtheir
regionalallies,quicklysteppedinandattemptedtoquashthe
possibilityofchange.Thistookplacethroughavarietyofmeans,
witharangeofpoliticalactorscomingtoshapethe
counterrevolutionaryprocessesdierentlyineachcountry.
Atthelevelofeconomicpolicy,therewaslittlealteration,with
Westerndonorsandinternational nancialinstitutionsinsistingon
thecontinuityofneoliberalreformpackagesinplacessuchasEgypt,
Tunisia,Morocco,andJordan.Coupledwiththiseconomic
continuity,indeedaprerequisiteforit,wastherollingoutofnew
lawsandemergencyordersthatbannedprotests,strikes,and
politicalmovements.
Simultaneously,politicalandmilitaryinterventionintheregion
rapidlyexpanded.ThefracturingofLibyafollowingdirectWestern
militaryintervention,andtheSaudi-ledcrushingoftheBahrain
uprisingweretwokeymomentsofthisprocess.Egyptsmilitary
coupinJuly2013alsomarkedacriticalpointinthereconstitution
ofoldstatestructures,andcon rmedtheperniciousroleoftheGulf
StatesinpushingbackEgyptsrevolutionaryprocess.
Perhapsmostsigni cantly,thesocialandphysicaldevastation
wroughtbytheAssadregimeinSyria,includinghundredsof
thousandsofdeathsandthemillionsofpeopledisplacedacrossand
withinborders,furtherreinforcedaregion-widesenseofdespair
thatcametoreplacetheinitialoptimismof2011.
ISISanditsearlierincarnationswerebasicallyirrelevanttothe rst
phasesoftheseuprisings,themassivedemonstrations,strikes,and
creativeprotestmovementsthatrockedallArabcountriesduring
2011.Indeed,theonlycommentISIS(atthattimeknownasthe
IslamicStateofIraq)couldmusterfollowingtheoverthrowof
EgyptiandictatorHosniMubarakwasastatementwarningagainst
secularism,democracy,andnationalism,urgingEgyptiansnotto
replacethatwhichisbetterwiththatwhichisworse.
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Yetastheinitialaspirationsforrealchangeappearedtobe
increasinglythwarted,ISISandotherjihadistgroupsemergedasa
symptomofthisreversal,anexpressionoftheapparentretreatin
therevolutionaryprocessandthegrowingsenseofchaos.Inorder
tobetterunderstandwhythiswasthecase,itisnecessarytotakea
briefdetourthroughISISsideologyandworldview.
Authenticity,Brutality,Utopia
Islamicfundamentalismisoftende nedasthedesiretobringback
thewaysofamagni centpast,supposedlymodeled(intheSunni
account)onthe rstfewgenerationsofIslamicrulersthatcame
afterthedeathoftheProphetMohammed.TheIslamicState
professesthisgoal,andintermsofsocialpracticeandreligiouslaw
thisishowitpurportstorule.
ButtoreduceISIStoasimpleseventh-centuryirredentismwould
beaseriousmistake.Theorganizationtakesseriouslytheprojectof
statebuilding,devotingmucheorttowardtheestablishmentof
various nancial,legal,andadministrativestructuresacrossthe
territoriesitnowcontrols.Althoughthebordersoftheseareasarein
constant uxandtherearedieringassessmentsofwhatismeantby
control,ISIShasanextensiveterritorialreach,bysomeestimates
rulingover10millionpeople.
Aspartofthisverymodernistproject,theorganizationhasplaceda
highpriorityondevelopingasophisticatedmediaandpropaganda
network,settingitqualitativelyapartfromotherexamplesof
IslamicrulesuchasTaliban-controlledAfghanistan,where
television-adornedtreesandtheexecutionofcomputersremain
lastingimagesofthe1990sandearly2000s.
OneresearcherhasestimatedthattheISISmediaunitgeneratesjust
underfortyuniquepiecesofmediaeachday,includingvideos,
photoessays,articles,andaudioprogramsinmanydierent
languages.ThislevelofprogrammingrivalsanyTVnetwork,and
standsincontrasttotheolderal-Qaedamodelthatreliedongrainy
VHStapessmuggledfromthemountainsofAfghanistantoAl
Jazeera,wheretheywereheldhostagetothevagariesofhostilenews
producersandintelligenceagencies.
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ThedecentralizednetworkthroughwhichISISpropagandais
disseminatedisalsounique,usinganarmyofTwitteraccountsand
anonymouswebsitessuchasjustpaste.itandarchive.orgtohost
theirmedia.AbdelBariAtwan,anArabjournalistwhoseaccountof
theriseofISISdrawsuponwell-placedinsiders,claimsthatthe
organizationcontrolsoveronehundredthousandTwitteraccounts
andsendsadailybarrageof ftythousandtweets.Thisandother
formsofsocialmediaaretheconduitsthroughwhichISISboth
recruitsanddisseminatesitsmessages.
ISISstech-savvysidehasbeenwidelyacknowledged,mostrecently
inObamasfaciledescriptionofthemasabunchofkillerswith
goodsocialmedia.ButtheIslamicStateseectiveuseof
technologyandsocialmedianeedstobeseenasmuchmorethanan
issueoftechnicalskills,orsimplyaresponsetoconditionsofsecrecy
andconstantsurveillance.Rather,thehighpriorityISISplaceson
socialmediaandtechnologypointstotheorganizationsobsessive
concernwithperformativityandself-representation.
Indeed,itisdi culttothinkofanyotherpoliticalorreligiousentity
intheregionthattakessoseriouslythequestionofbrandingand
projectingacertainself-imagetotheoutsideworld.
Withinthisideologicalmessaging,threekeytropesstandout.The
rstoftheseisaself-evidentfeatureofanyfundamentalist
movement:religiousauthenticity,ortheneedtocontinuallyclaim
anddemonstrate delitytoreligioustext.Inthiscontext,what
constitutesauthenticityissomethingthatmustcontinuallybe
asserted,performed,anddefendedinfrontofrivalperspectives.
TherearemanyexamplesofISISspreoccupationwiththis
question.Severalcommentators,forexample,havenotedthe
groupsapparentlystrangeemphasisonthesmallandrather
insigni canttownofDabiq,locatedinnorthernSyria.Dabiq
possessesnomilitaryutilityornaturalresources.Nonetheless,
ISISsonlinemagazineisnamedafterthespot,andthegroup
reportedalargein uxofrecruitswhenitannouncedthebattleto
takethetown.
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Thereason?DabiqholdsaparticularpositioninIslamic
eschatology,asthesiteofafuturebattlewithin delarmiesthatwill
heraldthebeginningoftheapocalypse.Bytakingholdofthissmall
Syriantown,ISIScouldprojectitselfasfaithfullyfollowingapath
thathadbeenforetoldcenturiesago.Inasimilarvein,thegroups
announcementofthetownofRaqqaasitsWesternheadquarters
resonatedstronglyamongArabMuslims.Thetownhadbeenthe
homeofHarunal-Rashid,the fthcaliphoftheAbbasiddynasty,
whichmanyviewasagoldenageofIslam.
ThesecondcorefeatureofISISpropagandaisthewell-known
brutalitymeme:thelivedecapitations,executions,andother
shockingcontentthathavesplashedthegroupacrosstelevisionand
computerscreensthroughouttheworld.Thedeliberatelyhorrifying
materialhasguaranteedwall-to-wallmediacoverageandinstant
fame.
Comparethiswithal-Qaeda,whichtookdecadesandtheSeptember
11attackstobecomeahouseholdname.Brutality,however,ismuch
morethanjustaheadline-grabber.Itisalsointentionallyusedto
generatefear.
ThisstrategyhasbeenincrediblysuccessfulasISISapproached
thetownofMosulinJune2014,theIraqiarmysimplystripped,
droppedtheirweapons,andran,allowingthejihadiststocapture
untoldarmsandmilitarytransportvehicles,aswellasareported
$400millionfromtheIraqiCentralBank(althoughthislatterstory
hasbeendisputed).
Finally,andperhapsmostimportantly,theapplicationofexcessive
violenceisaconsciouselementofwhatISISdescribesasitsstrategy
ofpolarizationoneaimedatexplodingthebloodysectarian
warsthatunderpintheexpansionofISISacrosstheregion.
Nonetheless,incontrasttothestereotypepropagatedbyWestern
media,themaincontentofISISpropagandaisactuallymuchmore
mundanethantheviolenceforwhichthegroupisbestknown.This
isthethirdofthegroupsideologicaltropes:utopicthemesaimedat
showingthesupposedpleasuresofcivilianlifeinthecaliphate,
amongthembountifuleconomicactivity,beautifulscenery,and
stabilityoflife.
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Oneexhaustivestudythatdocumentedallmediaproducedbythe
organizationfrommid-Julytomid-August2015foundthatmore
thanhalfofthematerialwasfocusedonthesethemesofutopia.
Similarly,theaforementionedmagazine,Dabiq,isheavilyinfused
withthesesubjects.Thisisthemostmisunderstoodelementofhow
thegroupprojectsitselfintheArabworld,andarguablythemost
important.Itisanorientationthatseemsparticularlydirected
towardArabaudiences.
AglancethroughISIS-relatedTwitteraccountsinArabicshows
constantchatteraimedatemphasizingtheseeminglyinane,boring,
everydaynessoflifeintheIslamicState:waterpipesgetting xed,
marketsbustlingwithcolorfulfruitandvegetables,freshbread,and
newdentalclinics.
ThisobservationpointstotheundeniablefactthatISISconsciously
choreographsitselfasanislandofstabilityandpeaceamidaregion
ofchaos,war,andupheaval.Thisisimportanttounderstandingthe
pullthatISISpresentstosomelayersofthepopulation.Ina
momentofdeepcrisis,thepromiseofsomelevelofsecurityispart
ofwhatmakesISISattractive(or,attheveryleast,aless-worse
option).
Recognizingthisutopicpromiseisanimportantclueto
understandinghowtheorganizationhasmanagedtoexpandover
thepastyear.ThisisnottosuggestthatISISruleisnotbrutalor
repressive,particularlyforthoseatthereceivingendofitssectarian
violence,butratherthatitispreciselyinthehollownessofitsutopic
promisethatsomemeasureofhopecanbefound.
ManagingSavageChaos
ThistriptychofISISpropagandareligiousauthenticity,
brutality,andutopiaisitselfare ectionofawidereschatology:a
periodizationofhistoryandfuturebasedontheimminenceofend
times.ItisamajordierencebetweenISISandotherjihadistgroups
suchasal-Qaeda.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/isis-syria-iraq-war-al-qaeda-arab-spring/
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Unlikeal-Qaeda,theIslamicStatetendstoemphasizemuchmore
thesequentialunfoldingofhistoricalphasesassociatedwith
propheticalmoments(theexampleofDabiqisoneillustrationof
this).Thisiswhythequestionofauthenticity guressoheavilyin
thegroupspropaganda.Lessobviously,however,thiseschatology
alsoprovidesanexplanationforboththebrutalityandutopiatropes
discussedabove.
Theclearestre ectionofthiscanbefoundinapopularreference
pointforjihadiststrategy:thebookAdministrationofSavagery:The
MostCriticalStagethroughwhichtheIslamicNationWillPass(AoS),
rstpublishedontheInternetinArabicin2004,underthenomde
guerreAbuBakrNaji.Thebookshouldnotbethoughtof(asithas
beeninsomejournalisticaccounts)asastep-by-stepplaybookor
strategymanualforjihadistgroups;itisratheratextwhosevery
popularityinthesecirclesrevealssomethingabouttheworldview
thatinformsjihadistthinking.
Succinctly,thekeygoalofAoSistoexplainthestepsthattheyneed
totakeinordertoendthedominationofgreatpowers(principally
theUnitedStates)overtheregionandestablishastateinaccordance
withIslamicprinciples.AoSdelineatestwodistincthistoricalphases
thatmustbepassedthroughbeforeanIslamicstatecanbe
established.
The rst,thephaseofvexationandexhaustion,isthestagethat
theauthorbelievedtheArabworldwaspassingthroughatthetime
ofwriting(early2000s).Duringthisstage,thetaskwastoharassand
destabilizetheenemythroughvexationoperations,including
actionssuchasbombingtouristresortsandeconomicallysigni cant
areas(particularlythoseassociatedwithpetroleum).
TheseactionswouldforceArabgovernmentstodispersetheir
securityforcesacrosswideareas,anexpensiveundertakingthat
wouldinevitablyleavenewtargetsexposed.Moreover,theapparent
abilityofgroupstoundertaketheseactionswithimpunitywouldact
asakindofpropagandabydeedandhelpattractnewrecruits.
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Theultimategoaloftheseoperationsistogenerateasituation
oftumultandbreakdownofstatestructures,whichtheauthor
describedasthephaseofsavagechaos.Thisperiodcorrespondsto
aprofoundincreaseinindividualandsocialinsecurity,alackof
basicsocialprovisions,andariseinallformsofsocialviolence.Itis
conceivedasanaturaloutcomeofthewithdrawalandcollapseof
statestructures;moreover,itsarrivalisviewedaspositiveforthe
jihadistgroup.Bysteppingintothesubsequentchaos,the
responsibilityofjihadistswouldbetotakechargeofthesituation
andmanageoradministersavagery.
Concretely,thismeansthesupplyofservicessuchasfoodand
medicaltreatment,preservationofsecurityandjusticeamongthe
peoplewholiveintheregionsofsavagery,securingthebordersby
meansofgroupsthatdeteranyonewhotriestoassaulttheregionsof
savagery,aswellassettingupdefensiveforti cations.
ThissidetothemanagementofsavageryclearlymirrorshowISIS
viewsitscurrentroleintheArabworld(particularlyinIraqand
Syria),andhelpsusunderstandwhytheutopicthemeisso
prominentinitspropaganda.
Moreover,withintheAoSschema,theroleofviolenceisalso
elemental.EchoingthewaysinwhichISISemploysbrutality,AoS
recommendsthatviolencebedeliberatelyexcessiveandhighly
performative.Massacringtheenemyandmakinghimfrightened
wouldservetomake[enemies]thinkonethousandtimesbefore
attacking.Thiswouldincludeso-calledpayingthepriceactions,
aimedatdeterringenemiesfromattackingduetothefearof
subsequentreprisals.
Likewise,allactionsshouldaimtocreatesocietalpolarization
throughtheuseofdisproportionateviolence.AstheauthorofAoS
notes:
Draggingthemassesintothebattlerequiresmoreactions
whichwillin ameoppositionandwhichwillmakethe
peopleenterintothebattle,willingorunwilling,suchthat
eachindividualwillgotothesidewhichhesupports.We
mustmakethisbattleveryviolent,suchthatdeathisa
heartbeatawaysothatthetwogroupswillrealizethat
enteringthisbattlewillfrequentlyleadtodeath.
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Thereisanirresistiblednouementtothisformula:theworsethe
situationgetsthebetteritis.Theauthorrecognizes(andapplauds)
thisself-ful llinglogic,notingthatevenifthejihadistgroupwasto
failintheimmediateadministrationofsavagery,thentheresults
wouldactuallystillbepositive:failure,itissaid,doesnotmeanend
ofthematter;rather,thisfailurewillleadtoanincreaseinsavagery.
Thereisestablished,inshort,aninevitableteleologythatthrivesin
profoundlynegativesituations,wheretheveryexistenceof
mutuallyreinforcingandever-worseningcyclesofviolencebecome
themselvestheevidenceforthecorrectnessoftheschema.
SectarianismandPost-Invasion
Iraq
ThelinkbetweenISISsworldviewandthedisastrousrisein
sectarianismthroughouttheregionisclear.Althoughtheauthorof
AoSandtheleadersofearlierjihadistgroupswerecarefultoavoid
religioussanctionforintra-Muslimviolence,andcondemnedany
deliberatetargetingofotherMuslims,thiswastochangewiththe
emergenceofal-QaedainIraq(AQI)duringthemid-2000s.
LedbytheJordanianAbuMusabZarqawi,AQIcametounderstand
thebombingofreligiousceremoniesandinstitutionsasoneofthe
moststunninglyeectivetoolsofpolarization.InIraq,Zarqawi
consciouslysoughttoigniteacivilwarbetweenShiaandSunni
throughamethodicalseriesofdevastatingattacksonShia
communities.
Suchactivities,coupledwiththegruesomebeheadingvideosthat
earnedhimtheappellationSheikhoftheSlaughterers,provoked
increasingangeramongtheolderal-QaedaleadershipofOsamabin
LadenandAymanal-Zawahiri.Indeed,thelatterpennedafamous
lettertoZarqawiin2005upbraidingtheJordanian,inwhichhe
describedthethescenesofslaughteringthehostagesand
ZarqawisattacksonShiainIraqastacticsthatwouldalienatealQaedafromtheirnecessarysupportbase.
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Nonetheless,despiteZawahirisprotestations,arangeoffactors
thathadlittletodowithZarqawiprovidedafertileenvironmentfor
sectarianism.First,thenotoriousde-Baathi cationpolicy
implementedbyUSoccupationforcesfollowingtheinvasionofIraq
in2003ledtoaprofoundmarginalizationofthecountrysSunni
population.Underthispolicy,anypersonwhohadbeenamember
ofSaddamHusseinsBaathPartywassummarilydismissedfrom
theirjob,deniedpublic-sectoremployment,andbarredfrom
accessingtheirpensions.
Asmanyanalystspointedoutatthetime,thiswasarecipefor
disaster.Baathpartymembershiphadbeenanexpectationfor
virtuallyanystatejob,sothepolicyledtothemassdismissalof
thousandsofteachers,doctors,police,andlow-rankingcivil
servants.Byevisceratingthestateinthisway,theUnitedStates
virtuallyguaranteedacollapseofbasicsocialservicesa
catastrophicprospectforasocietyemergingfromovertwodecades
ofsanctionsandwar.
Sunnimarginalizationwasnotsimplyfeltintheeconomicsphere.
AmericanforcesfrequentlyledattacksagainstSunni-populated
townsandvillages,andtensofthousandsofprisonerswerelocked
awayinUS-runprisonswhereisolation,torture,andthe
Taylorizedbureaucracyofdetentionwereroutinelyusedto
bolstertheoccupation.
ThemostnotoriousoftheseprisonswastheAbuGhraibdetention
facility,whichexplodedintoWesternconsciousnessin2003
followingthereleaseofphotographsshowingUSmilitarypersonnel
torturingprisoners.Inthewakeofthisscandal,manydetainees
weretransferredoutofAbuGhraibtoanotherprison,CampBucca.
Itwasherethatonedetainee,laterknownasAbuBakral-Baghdadi,
cametoestablishastrongrelationshipwithacoterieofformer
Baathistmilitaryo cerswhohadspenttimeinAbuGhraib.
Today,ofcourse,al-BaghdadiistheleaderofISIS,andthosesame
Baathisto cersnowserveashisclosestdeputiesandadvisors.In
thismanner,theexperienceofSunnidetaineesatthehandsofthe
USmilitarynotonlyfurtherentrenchedthecountrysemerging
sectariandivisions,butalso,inaconcretesense,actuallyforgedthe
IslamicStateitself.
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Sectarianriftscontinuedtodeepenfrom2006onwards,astheUS,
intacitagreementwithIran,cametoinstitutionalizeaShiadominatedstatebackedbyarangeofShiamilitias.Thissituation
onlyworsenedfollowingtheformaldepartureofUStroopsfrom
Iraqin2011.Coupledwithunparalleledlevelsofsocioeconomic
insecurity,Sunnimarginalizationproducedarealsocialbasewhose
attractiontoISISgoesbeyondreligiousorideologicalfactors.
Alargeproportionofthemid-rankingcadresofISISareformer
Baathistfunctionariesdrawntotheorganizationpartlythrough
economicincentives.Financialrewardsarealsoappealingatthe
rank-and- lelevel.PayforanISIS ghter,forexample,isestimated
tobearound$300to400permonth,morethandoublethat
providedbytheIraqiarmy.Thetruckdriversandsmugglerswho
todayshipISIS-producedoilfromSyriatoIraqaremotivated
primarilybythechancetomakealiving.Forallitsreligious
pretensions,theISISstate-buildingprojecthasaverymaterial
grounding.
ManycommentatorswritingaboutIraqoftenchalkthisoutcome
uptothestupidityandhubrisoftheBushadministration,andthe
successionofobviouspolicyerrorsmadefollowingtheoccupation.
SuchanapproachassumesthattheUnitedStatesactuallysoughta
stableandunitedIraq.
Yetanon-sectarian,uni edIraqledbyagovernmentwithstrong
popularsupportwouldhavebeenadisasterforUSinterestsinthe
MiddleEast.Withoutthispossibilityeverseriouslyinthecards,itis
nothardtoseethatfromtheoutset,thefragmentationofIraqalong
sectarianlineswasthemostlikelyoutcomeofUSoccupation
(particularlysincethisalsocoincidedwithIranianinterests).Divide
andrulehaslongbeenapreferredmethodofcolonialdomination.
Thesearetheactualmaterialandpoliticalrootsoftheregions
currentsectarianturn.DespitewhatISIS,SaudiArabia,orIran
mightclaim,sectarianismisnottheresultofever-presentdoctrinal
orethnicschisms,existingsincetimeimmemorialandpersisting
unchangedintothecontemporaryera.
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Ithasalwaysbeen,astheLebanesecommunistMahdiAmelargued
decadesago,amoderntechniqueofpoliticalpower,ameans
throughwhichrulingclassesattempttoestablishtheirlegitimacy
andsocialbase,whilefragmentingthepotentialforanykindof
popularopposition.Post-invasionIraqandthesubsequentriseof
ISISprovideatragiccon rmationofthisthesis.
SaudiArabia,Syria,andthe
IslamicState
Theutilityofreligioninshoringupearthlypowershas,ofcourse,a
lengthypedigreeintheregion.Itisnowwidelyacknowledgedthat
theorganizationalrootsofIslamicfundamentalistmovements
(includingtheprogenitorsofISIS)havetheiroriginsinanalliance
betweentheUSandtheGulfStates,particularlySaudiArabia,
throughthe1960sand1970s.
Facedwithgrowingleft-wingandnationalistpoliticalmovementsin
theregion,thesponsorshipofIslamismwasseenasaneectiveand
disarmingcounterweight.Bythe1980s,thispolicywasapplied
mostsystematicallythroughUSandSaudisupportforArabIslamist
ghtersinAfghanistan.Itwasherethatpreparationsforarmed
jihadreceivedtheir rstpracticalboost.
ThislongstandinginstrumentalizationofIslamicfundamentalism
hasledsomeobserverstoarguethatISISisatooloftheGulfStates.
At rstglancetheseclaimswouldappeartomakesense.
Ideologically,thereareclosecommonalitiesbetweentheSaudi
regimeandtheIslamicState.Bothshareaparticularlyrestrictive
interpretationofIslamicpunishments(hudud).Indeed,the
signaturebeheadingsandamputationsseeninISIS-controlledareas
arefoundnowhereelseintheregionexceptforSaudiArabia.When
ISISwaslookingfortextbookstouseintheschoolstheygovern,the
onlyappropriateversionswerefelttobethosetakenfromSaudi
Arabia.
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ThereisalsoundoubtedlysympathyforISISamonglarge
portionsoftheSaudipopulation,includingthosewhocontribute
nancially,orvolunteerto ght.Yetwhileweaponssuppliedby
SaudiArabia(andQatar)toSyriangroupshavelikelyendedupin
thehandsofISISthroughdefectionsorcapturethereislittle
convincingevidencethatISISisdirectlyfunded,orarmed,bySaudi
ArabiaoranyotherGulfstate.
Atarhetoricallevel,therelationshipbetweenthetwoisoneof
profoundantipathyandhatred.ISISconsiderstheSaudimonarchy
tobeoneofitsmostdespisedenemies,andtheoverthrowofthealSaudrulingfamilyisoneofthegroupsprincipalaims.TheSaudi
monarchywillcountenancenootherclaimanttoglobalIslamic
leadership,andfearsthethreatISISpresentstoitsownrule.
Ontheotherhand,thegrowingstrengthofISISdoeshaveaclear
linktotherepressiondirectedbytheAssadgovernmentagainstthe
Syrianuprising.Afewmonthsintotheuprising,Assadreleased
hundredsofprisoners(amongthemwell-trainedjihadists),manyof
whombecameleadersand ghtersinIslamicfundamentalist
groups.Formerhigh-rankingSyrianintelligenceagentshave
claimedthatthiswasadeliberateattemptbytheregimetostoke
sectariandiscordandpainttheuprisinginanIslamistlight.
TheAssadgovernmenthasalongrecordofattemptingto
manipulatesuchgroups,includingaprisonerreleaseintheearly
2000sandthefacilitationofthousandsofjihadistvolunteersacross
thebordertojoinupwithZarqawinetworkinIraq.Indeed,by
February2010,Syrianintelligenceo cialswereattemptingto
markettheirin ltrationandmanipulationofjihadistgroupsasa
basisfordeepeningsecuritycooperationwiththeUSintheregion.
ItishardlysurprisingthatwhenSyrianprotesterswerefacedwith
thebarrelbombs,tanks,andindiscriminateaerialattacksofAssads
military,itwastothewell-trained,battle-hardenedjihadistgroups
thatsomebegantoturn.ThesegroupsincludedJabhatalNusra
(JaN),anorganizationestablishedaftertheIslamicStateinIraq
dispatched ghterstoSyriainlate2011andwhichmadeitspublic
debutinJanuary2012.
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During2013,astheviolenceanddisplacementworsened,JaN
sueredabittersplitwithitsparentgroupoverstrategicdirection:
whethertofocusonconfrontingtheSyrianmilitaryand
deemphasizingsectariandivisions,ortoprioritizeterritorial
control,basedonIslamiclawandthepursuitofastrategyof
polarizationagainstallothergroups.IslamicStateinIraqchosethe
latterpath,announcingtheexpulsionofrecalcitrantJaNcadreson
April9,2013andtheformationofthenewlycon guredISIS.
Re ectingthesestrategicprioritiesandcontrarytopopular
beliefISIShaslargelyavoideddirectconfrontationwiththe
Assadgovernment.Instead,takingadvantageofitscontrolover
smugglingroutesandthebordercrossingsthatstraddleIraqand
Syria(allowingitstrategicdepthandthesafetyofretreatdeniedto
anyotherarmedorganization),ISIShasprimarilysoughtterritorial
expansion.
Inthisendeavor,themilitarycounselofformerBaathistgenerals
fromthedaysofCampBuccahasbeenkeytoitssuccess
theemphasisbeingondominatingaccessandsupplyroutesthat
connectstrategicnodesratherthananobsessionwith xedpoints
perse,securingoil elds,andcontrollingcoreinfrastructure
(particularlywaterandelectricitygeneration).
Thisstrategyhasnotonlymadetheorganizationfabulouslyrich
(holdingatleastninelucrativeoil eldsinSyriaandIraqestimated
tobeworthover$1.5millionperdayinoilsales).Ithasalsomade
therestofSyrianterritory(whethergovernment-oroppositioncontrolled)heavilydependentonISISfortheirenergyandpower
needs.
Coupledwithvastamountsofmoneyamassedfromkidnapping,
extortion,thesaleofantiquities,smuggling,andtaxes,ISISisunlike
almostallactualstatesintheMiddleEastindependently
wealthy, nanciallyself-su cient,andoperatingwithinborders
thatdeliberatelytransgresstheboundariesestablishedbycolonial
powersintheearlytwentiethcentury.
MoreIntervention?
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Inthesecircumstances,callstoratchetupWesternmilitary
interventionintheregionwillonlyprovidefurthersustenancefor
theorganization.Preciselybecausewarandoccupationhavelaid
suchafertilegroundforIslamicStatetogrow,itispatentlyobvious
thatthiskindofresponsewillonlyworsenthesituation.Indeed,in
linewithitsstrategyofpolarization,therecentISISattackshave
beenexplicitlyaimedtowardthisoutcome,andtodrawingmore
Westerninterventionintotheregionasameanstodeepenthesense
ofcrisisandchaos.
Oppositiontoforeigninterventionisnotsimplyademandthat
needstobedirectedagainsttheUSorEuropeanstates.Despite
o cialclaimsoftargetingISIS,theRussianaerialbombardmentof
SyriathatbeganonSeptember30haslargelyavoidedISIScontrolledareas,focusinginsteadonareaswherenon-ISIS
oppositiongroupsarelocated.
TheseRussianattackssupportedonthegroundbyHezbollah,
Iraniantroops,IraqiShiamilitias,andtheSyrianarmyhave
primarilysoughttobolsterthepositionofAssadintheleadupto
whatappearstobeanemergingdealbetweenthemajorregionaland
internationalplayersinSyria.Inthiscontext,thepresenceofISIS
actuallyservestoreinforceAssadsclaimtoberesistingterrorism,
afunctionthatisclearlyillustratedbythenumerousWesternstates
thathavenowswungovertosupportinghisgovernmentasa
supposednecessaryevil.
Ofcourse,theRussianmilitaryorientationmaychangeinthewake
oftheSinai,Beirut,andParisattacks,butthefactisthatthe
longstandingunspokendtentebetweenIslamicStateandthe
Assadgovernmenthasuntilnowservedtheinterestsofbothsides.
InthesecircumstancestherearefeweasyanswersfortheLeft.Yes,
weneedalternative,radicalvisionsgroundedindemocratic
demands,socialandeconomicjustice,andarejectionof
sectarianism.Butthisalsorequiresasoberassessmentofthe
balanceofforcesandsomekindofaccountingofwhatwentwrong
overthelastfewyears.
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Weneedtobewaryofanalysesthatattributesomekindof
automaticre exivitytotheriseofISISandthemachinationsofwar
andimperialism.Therewasnothinginevitableaboutthisoutcome.
Itwasinthereversalsofthe2011uprisingsandtheirfailureto
fundamentallychallengeautocraticrulersthatISISfoundan
ecosysteminwhichitcouldprosperandgrow.
Politicsabhorsavacuum,andwiththesetbacksforpopularand
democraticmobilizationsoverthelastthreeyears,theIslamicState
wasoneofthoseforcesthatcametoreapthefruitsofretreat.In
parasiticfashion,theorganizationhaslatchedontotheexplosionof
sectarianviolencedeliberatelycultivatedbyrulersacrossall
countriesintheregion, ndingahost rstinIraqandlaterinSyria.
Inboththesestates,thegroupencountered(andhelpedbringinto
being)arealitythatmacabrely titsadministrationofsavagery
schema.
Yetdespitetheapparentbleaknessofthesituation,thereare
groundsforhope.LocalforcesareconfrontingtheIslamicStatein
extraordinarilydi cultcircumstancesmostimportantly,
Kurdishmovements(simultaneouslyfacingtheTurkish
governmentsrepression),aswellasthenon-ISISoppositionforces
inSyria.
Atthesametime,courageoussocialandpoliticalmovementsin
Iraq,Syria,Lebanon,Egypt,andelsewherecontinuetodefythe
logicofsectarianismanddemonstratethatthestrugglefora
progressivealternativeremainsalive.
ISISmayprojectautopicpromiseofstabilityandprosperity,but
thisisfarfromtherealityontheground.Wecanbeabsolutely
certainthatitwillexperienceitsowninternalrevolts,assimilarly
declarativeexamplesofIslamicstateshavefacedinthepast.
Moreover,ifweunderstandtheriseofISISthroughtheprismof
retreat,wecantakesomecon denceinknowingthatthe
organizationdoesnotoeranyeectiveanswertotheregions
currentpredicament.Itdoesnotrepresentanykindofantiimperialistresponse,orplausibleroutetoaMiddleEastfreeof
dominationorrepression,whetherforeignorlocal.
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Despiteallthesetbacksofthelastfewyears,thepotentialgrowthof
agenuinelyleftalternativehasnotbeenextinguishedand,most
importantly,hasneverbeenmorenecessary.
ThankstoLalehKhaliliandRafeefZiadahfortheir
comments.
12.3.15
Adam Hanieh is a senior lecturer at the School of Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS), University of London and the author of LineagesofRevolt:
IssuesofContemporaryCapitalismintheMiddleEast.
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