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2015 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)

It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS


requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the
disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from
the main archipelago and classifying them instead as regime of
islands. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory
constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large
areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular
enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of
Paris.

Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands or


naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain
above water during high tide. The principle forces claimant states
over a certain territory to maintain peace in the area because no
country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands. The
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.-

Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16,


2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KGI and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse
legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have
committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS
III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of
baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
-

Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:


A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting
waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated
that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an
intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have
historically regarded as an archipelago.

Archipelagic State - means a State constituted wholly by one or


more archipelagos and may include other islands.

Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat


Kalayaan Group of Islands (KGI) and Scarborough Shaol:
whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines;
and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.

Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of Region


IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found
some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan.

Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc) - also known as


scarborough reef, Panatag Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the
South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the province of
Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of reefs and islands
(but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square
kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200
EEZ

Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire


archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The
Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys,
which is nearest to Palawan.
RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration
of the archipelago, including the extended continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone to make it more compliant with the
UNCLOS.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over


the KGI and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these
outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any
straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint
will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
-

Constitutional issues:

of

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters


EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty
Paris vs. RA 9552

Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage


and right of overflight

200-Economic
Zone
(includes
Territorial
Seas
and
Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.

Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)


Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and


complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the
consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign
power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The
ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the
foreign State to which the premises belong.

Kalayaan Island Group


a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
f) RA 3046 (demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State)
g) RA 5446 (reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo
h) RA 9552

Republicanism
Separation of Powers
Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon
vs
Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive
privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643,
Mach 25, 2008)

Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR, et al.,


November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005; David et al. vs. Ermita, et al.,
April 20, 2006).
Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of
legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either
department now comprises different and non-intermingling official
personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of
public service and provide a system of check and balance between
the two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to
vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the
exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the
Governor of the executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May
10, 2005).
Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)

Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra nullius


ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Tests of valid delegation:


1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard
*Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
-

/19/97;

Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice,


GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014- In order to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that

when it reaches the delegate, the only thing to do is to enforce it.


The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to prevent the delegation from running riot.
-

Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the


country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law


is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amounts to
no more than well-meaning desires, without support of either State
practice or opinio juris.
-

Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted


principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that
it is subject to the police power of the State.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal


tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the
above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia,
2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances
(Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in
the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and
a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
[Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,


June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-

Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimente vs. Ermita, 462


SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of customary
law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no


obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires
the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of
the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April 8,


2010- At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlines in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Xxx Using even the most liberal
lenses, these Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is

accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,


intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.
Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interest.
-

Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the


Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours,
the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014- Conception
refers to the moment of fertilization and the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. Xxx Only those contraceptives that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.xxx section
7 of RH law which excludes parental consent in cases where a
minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
miscarriage is anti-family and violates Section 12 of Art. II. Also,
Section 23(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical
procedures.

Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and


healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
This right implies, among other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed
in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13,
2005)

Local Autonomy
( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of
local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an imperium in imperio
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is

the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local


governments.
-

Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No.


183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of the Philippine territory for independence.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power


voluntarily establish durable links. Xxx In international practice, the
associated state arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full
independence. Xxx The concept of Association is not recognized
under the 1987 constitution.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No.


195649, April 16, 2013- Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the State to its citizens, it
likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to
ones flag and country.

Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into
the political body of a nation by clothing him or her the privileges
of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.

Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at


the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian
passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute
an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate
against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons citizenship


may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To


claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age
at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the
parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA,
GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas
parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity].

Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in


order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of
the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority.
-

Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the


evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as naturalborn citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion
that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration
of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of
the right to Philippine citizenship.
The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent.
It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any.

Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no


specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct
filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts. CA 625- election within reasonable
time is 3 years from reaching the age of majority

Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had


under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of
the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other
time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and
economic necessity.

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is
an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine

Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance


to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the


taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil
registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones


application for repatriation.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original


nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he
lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino.

NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,


amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens
repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA


630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens).
In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual
citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The
oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy
constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC


must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this

disqualification. It should suffice if, upon filing of their certificate of


candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship.
-

Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who
also possesses American citizenship having been born of an
American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office.
The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin
requirements to cases which involve natural-born Filipinos who
later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter
ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
[private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of
another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do
not apply to him.

LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles
and Mercado Doctrines do not apply if one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that
the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008


Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.

Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19,


2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the
manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and
provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all
touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no
residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic
Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is

only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to
allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines
only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No.
9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
-

Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19,


2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public
office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines


shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount
to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of


Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007Dual
citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the

Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which


will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.
-

Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The


Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international
law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable
to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the
Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as
follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status
and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally a resident or the nationality
of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in
fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but
a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which
had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German
national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its
citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was
more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including the
Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
-

Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill
of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native
of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether
or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.

As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not


distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989


-

AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11,


2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep.
Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What
Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to naturalborn Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces
his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the

of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The


civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.
-

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA


292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.

Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata


principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in
a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General
or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the
Supreme Court.

Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants


Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born
and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for
judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120,
April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizens descendant.
Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation on
ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, GR No. 195649,


April 16, 2013- The act of using a foreign passport is not one of
the acts enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. Xxx The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation
of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens citizenship issue to attack.
ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right


is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.

The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon


certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act
of 1996).

Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of


residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a


man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile,
once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; (3) a
man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.

Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception


to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in


the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the

Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On


the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators).
It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote.

In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held


that the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy, [is] decisive in determining whether or not an individual
has
satisfied
the
Constitutions
residence
qualification
requirement. The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos
made an honest mistake in writing seven months residence in
her certificate of candidacy for a congressional seat, a period less
than the constitutional requirement of not less than one year for
that position.

Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held


that residency is not dependent on citizenship because even a
foreigner can establish a Philippine domicile.

More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a


former Filipino who was naturalized abroad may choose to
reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to the reacquisition of
citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law.

Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a


persons domicile: First, everyone must always have one of the
three kinds of domicile; second, once established, a domicile
remains the same until a new one is acquired; and third, a person
can have only one domicile at any given time.

Said the Supreme Court: [I]n order to acquire a new domicile


by choice, there must concur: 1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, 2) an intention to remain
there, and 3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired


the domicile (and citizenship) of her parents who, according to
generally-accepted principles of law, are presumed to be
Filipinos. So, her domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she married
an American and moved to and worked in the United States, she

Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the


abandonment of a home in Australia, renunciation of Australian
citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and settling down
in Zamboanga Sibugay show an intent to change domicile for
good.

Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the


use of an American passport after a renunciation of American
citizenship effectively reverses such renunciation and disqualifies

Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is


synonymous to domicile, not necessarily with a persons home
address. A man may have several places of residence but has only
one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling salesman with
no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile
for him.

There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of originthat is,


a child follows the domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by operation
of law; and 3) domicile of choice made freely by a person of legal
age.

lost her domicile of origin and followed the domicile of her husband
in America. When she and her husband moved back for good here
after the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a new domicile of
choice in the Philippines. As to when she acquired it depends,
on her clear intention, conduct and physical presence in the
new location.

Domicile of choice imports not only the intention to reside in


one fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent for business or
pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return. Makalintal vs.
COMELEC, July 10, 2003. In short, domicile of choice is a question
of fact. One intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent (animus
revertendi).

one who reacquired citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law


from being elected to a public office.
-

(References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino


citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of
ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA


9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile?

A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to stay


in the Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence from
the recovered domicile does not have the effect of removing him
from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus manendi et
revertendi
(Japzon
vs.
Ty,
January
19,
2009)

second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law


to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;"
"adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and
equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy
and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security
and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed
rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could
not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of
the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule
making authority under RA No. 8177.

ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
-

Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,


2008in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is
that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns
or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general
rules, there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1)
correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the
composition of proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3)
determination of the authenticity and the due execution of
certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as
amended by RA No. 9369.

Non delegation of legislative power

Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796,


first test, the law must be complete in
when it leaves the legislature such
delegate, the only thing he will have

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by filling the details which Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,


September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of legislative power. It
is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law
is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12%
rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the
12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive.

July 17, 2007 - Under the


all its terms and conditions
that when it reaches the
to do is to enforce it. The
10

Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the


President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12%
came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to
execute the legislative policy.

Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement


that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of
presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act
of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of the
two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.

The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rulemaking authority in implementing and executing constitutional or
statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers
vested in the Executive that are self-executory.

Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No.


166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the
power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the
Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No.


180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722.

SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives
and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively
in Congress.

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.


1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject
of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The
last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is

certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the


requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to
read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there
is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec
virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional
duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups
-

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244,


October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,
March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable
parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold:
only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes
cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the
House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4)
proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total
number of votes.

BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%


threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.

11

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives


under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:

(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from


the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats


shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less
the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not


limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the twopercenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each partylist candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in
the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is
the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved
under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of
the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until
all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed
all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List


Elections: The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party
system that allowed all political parties to participate in the
party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary,
the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the


Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes.
There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal
ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing.
The other major
political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors.
To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to
participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban
poor.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the


filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution,
in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

12

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, x x x.
The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives
is
merely
a
ceiling;
party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats
for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
-

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling


in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April


2, 2013- In determining who may participate in the coming 13
May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:


(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or


organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided


they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections
can participate in party list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized


and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains

to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk,
urban
poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
-

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations


that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not


be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013
partylist elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1)
all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and
(2) all nominees must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

13

Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is


no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000
minimum population that must compose legislative district. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing
mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated.
Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25,
2010- In this case, there is no official record that the population of
the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected
prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8,


2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting
standards that the marginalized and underrepresented sector
must demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered
by the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic,
attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and
(3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.

The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector
has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against
because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts
of violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community
by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added
that the magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation
in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sectors
lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations
seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have
been languishing in Congress.

LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) The


history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen
immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of


innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights.

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete


freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmea vs. Pendatun).

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard


Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to
and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a private organization
merely performing public functions, and that the PNRC Chairman
is not a government official or employee. Not being a government
office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual,
including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is
autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine
Government. It is a voluntary organization that does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the
government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government
office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the
1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly serve as the
Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial
position.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the
members. The base in computing majority is normally the total
membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority
simply means the greater number or more than half. Who shall
sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting
of term between Senate President Drilon and another Senator).
When the Constitution provides that the Senate President shall
be elected by the majority it does not delineate who
comprises the majority or the minority. The defeated senator
(s) in the election for the Senate presidency are not necessarily the
minority.

14

RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA


268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a

law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the
absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional
provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere
procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.
-

DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The House of


Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which
will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the
legislature.

People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman


did not thereby amount to a condonation of his offense; neither
does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from
confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for
the people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action and movement.

It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to


shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings.
A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at
most by correctional penalties.

jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning candidate


divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation.
-

RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. - clearly


under law and jurisprudence, it is the State thru its reps.
Designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter
how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it
authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.
To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. (Aug.
23, 2011).

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in


the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail
ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to
file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a
petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules.

Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002 Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed
a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable, as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as
the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as
the duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.

At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of


the Resolution of the COMELEC 2 nd Division was seasonably
challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for
reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.

Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election,


returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress


to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of
RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.
-

ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the


Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect.
This does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal. The
latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which
contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also
have himself inducted into office.
LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs.
Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRETs own

15

title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election


referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and
the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning
the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and qualifications to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of
his certificate of candidacy.
-

Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive


jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective
officials
(Sec.
242,
Omnibus
Election
Code),
nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members
of the House of Representatives.
What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns. To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto
must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in


the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it
calls for the re-opening and appreciation of ballots, the
Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and


resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because
of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission;
Pena vs. HRET).

Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of


congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution.

Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost


upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated.

Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts


jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave
abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and
despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal
hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506,


respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are
considered as elected members of the House, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , GR No. 193808, June


26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the COMELEC
with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives
and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee and that no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELECs First
Division and COMELEC En Banc which had declared President
Villanueva the proper party to submit CIBACs Certificate of
Nomination instead of Perla, who allegedly served as acting
secretary-general. As provided in Atienza v. Commission of
Elections, COMELEC also possesses the authority to resolve intraparty disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally
mandated power to enforce election laws and register political
parties. The power to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its
enforcement powers, the Court declared

Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the


SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of
Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of


Representatives is authorized to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the

16

changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its


membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not
include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
-

The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is


mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political
party must have at least two senators to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in the
CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).

Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even


assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections
17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives
must first show to the House that they possess the required
numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in
the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is
necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the
court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members to
the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to the


requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose
or concur with amendments.

and the priority to be given each project (LAMP vs. DBM Secretary,
GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)
-

Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November


19, 2013- Pork barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Legislature, although its
usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. Insofar as it has allowed legislators
to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it
has conferred unto the legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able
to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; insofar as
it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriation
bills, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment
and, in the process denied the President the power to veto
items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to
monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are
national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature,
despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy; and again insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended
by law for energy related purposes only to other purposes he may
deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification
of priority infrastructure development projects, it has once
transgressed the principle of non delegability.

Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014- the transfer


of appropriated funds, to be valid under section 25(5), must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1)
there is law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are saving
generated from the appropriations of their respective offices; and
(3) the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices. The following were

In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of


individual members of Congress to propose and identify priority
projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature and is
also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than
the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents
17

declared unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of unobligated


allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of
the
withdrawn
unobligated
allotments
and
unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and
without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of the savings
of the executive to augment the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive; 3) The use of unprogrammed funds despite
the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the
revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non
compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant GAA
(Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).
-

Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason to


spend funds made available by Congress.xxx there was no
instance of executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment is
prohibited by the GAA, unless there will be an unmanageable
government budget deficit.
Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July
14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding
appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no
dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or
not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior
appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a
loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds
enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds
to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan
proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan
falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law
authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in
the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the
loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation
IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate
Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the
determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of
legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of
separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the
matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and
that the inquiry into the same justiceable controversy would be an

encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that


had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).
-

Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to


judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs.
Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks,


GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a
criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasijudicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power


to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation as
the branch of government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and
punish contumacious acts against it. Except only when the
Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of contempt, it
cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of
criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures to address or
remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the
investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the


President to withhold information requested by other branches of
the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this
power to the President but courts have long recognized implied
Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out
powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive
under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several
decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the
1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being
the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the
2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief
Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military and
national security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge
of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to

18

withhold sensitive military and national security secrets


from the Legislature or the public.
-

As the official in control of the nations foreign service by virtue of


the Presidents control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy
relations of the State. The Presidents role as chief implementer of
the States foreign policy is reinforced by the Presidents
constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and
international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility,
the President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive
diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally,
states have conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There
is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets
that its allies have shared with it.

There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal


deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and
advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
exchange of views, the Presidents communications with his
Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of
publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers
may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues
and executive matters knowing that their discussions will be
publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid advice.

Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest


of protecting military, national security and diplomatic
secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be
weighed
against
other
constitutionally
recognized
interests. There is the declared state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of
legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure
testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.

The balancing of interests between executive privilege on


one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the
courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the
factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on
executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and

between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the
courts.
-

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008


-Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear
that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential since there should be ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by
the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even
after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments
in
future
negotiations. xxx
Diplomatic
negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It
bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is
a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.

Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee,


G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications
elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President
followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize
the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve
the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered
by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of

19

the privilege and of the unavailability of the information


elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
-

Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with


publish rules.

Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the


Philippines, GR No. 180308, June 19, 2012- the wide latitude
given to the Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiries and
would not fault the Senate for approving the resolution on the very
same day that it was submitted. The court also held that the
petitioners were invited as resource persons at the inquiry,
and as such, they do not have the constitutional right to
counsel.

In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas


corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So
long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts
to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the
realm of proper investigation

Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a


mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power
of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.

Varieties of Executive Privilege


1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert
crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with
the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the


executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and state
the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way


for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must


be construed as limited in its appearance of department heads in
the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function.

The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by


Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to
determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

20

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its


oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely:
scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
-

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting


president evolved through case law.

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List, et al.


vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill by
the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the
certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by


virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative.

A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive


changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the
Senate to propose amendments, it cal propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to
originate in the House.

Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the


immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to which
he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the
immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure (representing the period during which the incumbent
actually holds office) and not his term (the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).

BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court


recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving said
conference ample latitude for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the
nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department.

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive


immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper
to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNALLopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the
Supreme Court the power to resolve an election contest between
or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is
created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the
functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for


President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with
the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA
1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers,
charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make
said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly
certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon

Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to
prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as
possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner
to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words
dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the
words used exclusively without doing violence to the Constitution
and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively

21

the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the


judicial power to determine whether or not said duly
certified election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in
the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the
ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the
validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall
be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which
Congress has no power to do.
-

In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has


effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA
559).
Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in
the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the VicePresidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v.
De Castro, February 12, 2008.
Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain
reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a
grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the
same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant
of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to
"promulgate its rules for the purpose."

expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1,


paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
-

Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated


in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are post election
remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The
word contest means that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
only be invoked after the election and proclamation of the
President or Vice-President there can be no contest before a
winner is proclaimed.

TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988,


August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President the second
time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on the second
election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved
in this case.

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs.


Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY DISABILITY
OF PRESIDENT- The question whether the claimed temporary
inability of Estrada is a political question beyond the Supreme
Courts power of review. The decision that President Arroyo is
the dejure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE)


Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the
Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an
agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia
in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of
ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should
be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives
of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by
him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will
validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11,
idem]. These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances,
and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,


resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated
that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that
"[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government."
And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the
22

freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive


prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused,
all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise
by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import. We cannot conclude that the power of the President to
contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same
exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or
guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to
any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which
arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the
established functions of governance.
-

APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison;


Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. CaraleCongress cannot expand the constitution by increasing
those officers who need prior confirmation by the CA.

Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De


Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No.
191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re
Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420,
Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April
20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the
Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the
outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the High
Tribunal. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the
Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the
JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this
Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about
the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to
the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly
mentioned, should prevail. Had the framers intended to extend
the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the

appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they could have


explicitly done so.
-

Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not
alter its permanent character. It is effective until disapproved
by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. It is
extended only during a recess of Congress. If disapproved
by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a new
appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew
the ad-interim appointment.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA


622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make such
acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.

Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap


measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. It may be extended any time there is vacancy,
given while Congress is in session.

Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under


Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the
heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of
lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may
by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. xxx The President appoints the first
group of officers with the consent of the Commission on

23

Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups


of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of
officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power,
or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission,
or
board
to
appoint
is
declared
unconstitutional.
-

Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position


of department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not
a third level position and does not require presidential
appointment.

CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR


ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple
positions and receiving compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS.
COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng


Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule has
always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to
inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President.

Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935,


December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief
Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but
only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.

Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the


Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July
31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution
and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of
control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution.
The Presidents power to reorganize the executive
branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20,
Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be
that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying
out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive
department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential


Decree No. 1416.
These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials.
The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.

Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003


The Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside of
the Office of the President Proper is limited merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The
DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even
if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any
function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President.
Under its charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is
attached to the Office of the President. Therefore, the President has
the authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities of
DECS related to sports development to the PSC, making EO 81 a
valid presidential issuance.

24

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The


presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from the
Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents
power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that
the President shall have control of all executive x x x offices,
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt
any executive office one performing executive functions outside
of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents
power of control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to
the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or
decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs. Perez, May


10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of state of rebellion
during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang
is not violative of the separation of powers doctrine. The President,
as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call
upon such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.

Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February


3, 2004- The Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the
same time draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers
pursuant to her calling out power.

Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The


President does not need any congressional authority to exercise his
calling out power.

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President that


the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and

obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without hesitation


affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President
or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
-

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The President


has full discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to
call out the armed forces.

David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP


1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. In the absence of legislation, the President
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.

The President can validly declare the existence of a state of


national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.

EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1)


there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must
be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the emergency
powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.

David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to
other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to
declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18,

25

Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the


declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers
could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of
national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, is different matter.
This requires a delegation from
Congress.
-

negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is


powerless to invade it.
-

Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling out


powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief and that a
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the
Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that only the President is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI and the calling out powers under Section 7,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. While the President exercises
full supervision and control over the police, a local chief executive,
such as a provincial governor, only exercises operational
supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in dayto-day operations. As discussed in the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, only the President has full discretion
to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, the Court stressed.

Akbayan vs. Aquino The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that


the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in
BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his
office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ
and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many
ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's
foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign
relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the Constitution vests the same
in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least
two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this
light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of
the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The


pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable.

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel


v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:

AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it extends to all persons
who committed the particular acts described in the provision, and
not just rebels or insurgents.

In our system of government, the President, being the head


of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.

TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE
Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of
26

the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court


via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of
mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole


authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring
the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into


treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the
authority of the President to enter into trade agreements
with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be
interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already
inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold
the President or its representatives accountable to Congress
for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE


SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable belongs to the
President. Only lands, which have been classified as alienable, may
be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or alienation by
the President or by another officer before conveyance can be
executed on behalf of the government (Section 48, Book I of the
1987 Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA
797- The President may not convey valuable real property of the
government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized by a
law enacted by Congress.

This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter


into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate
concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties
will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the
Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may
not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While
Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence,
such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant
to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole
that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking
the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to


ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. xxx
Insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively.

Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our


Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate
or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has
been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not
be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of

ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
-

JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona;


Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato;
IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa
(private citizen not proper party).

Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally


recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great
responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the allocation of
powers among the three great branches of the government.

The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April


24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are
not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from
that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and

27

resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made


with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or
executive department is contrary to the constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
-

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,


under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate
disputes between the legislative and executive branches of
government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.

PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the


DIRECT INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
-

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the


requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its discretion.
Even when the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental
importance; of overreaching significance to society or of
paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ
VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS.
ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA
739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, December 7, 2010.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
the cases involved constitutional issues;
for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the


challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party
1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his right of
suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the
third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional right;
the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court
is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claim.
-

As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is


not concerned with whether the petitioners are real parties in
interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGALBLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.

EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the


Court still entertains to adjudicate the substantive matter if there is
a grave violation of the constitution; to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable of
repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula


that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS.
ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656;
ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS.
COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent


upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS
REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will not preclude the
SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of judicial review to
determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion

AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a


citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
28

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing


authority under its EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.
-

preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can


still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of
nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named exofficio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.

KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a
member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate.
As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of
conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is
the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC
has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore,
that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father.
Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative
or Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact doctrine recognizes
the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In
short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. xxx It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances
exist
and
only
when
the
extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application. Xxx Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)

The Court held that considering that the complete membership in


the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over
the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation. It ruled that
the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant
for the position of Chief Justice, should participate in the
deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post
and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the
constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of
RA 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: In case of
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or
of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they
shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence,
until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every
Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.
-

Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held
that the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of
Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The
word Congress is used in its generic sense. Considering the
language of the subject constitutional provision is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids such as
the records of the Constitutional Commission.

The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to


create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public
clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they
adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the
private sector and the three branches of government would have
an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of
the Judiciary. To allow the Legislature to have more quantitive
influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether
with one full vote or one-half a vote each, would, as one former
congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is
enshrined in the Constitution, declared the Court.

Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBCs principal


function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every
vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three
nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in
the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the Constitution to be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot,
therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionally
named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be
29

The Court also held that the JBCs seven-member composition


serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting. It further held that under the
doctrine of operative facts where actions prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized as a matter of equity and
fair play, all JBCs prior official acts are valid.
The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who
should remain as sole representative of Congress in the JBC and
that such is best left to the determination of Congress.

Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In


cases where an objection to an applicants qualification is raised,
the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory
the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend. The
unanimity rule of the JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his
right to due process.

FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice


must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations
where augmentation is needed.

PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should


be resolved in favor of change of venue.

PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In


view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the
penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby


prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise
known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and
decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:


(a)
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court en banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they may
extend to the justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the courts granted power.
PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.

IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the


problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.

FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are
not the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.

(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.
-

PROMULGATE RULES
concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of law,
the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform;
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010The Supreme Court has now the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, pactice and procedure in all courts, Viewed
from this perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption
from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.

CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to


change the venue of (and authority to conduct) preliminary
investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the courts for lack of
jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function
of the Executive department and not of the judiciary.
30

WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a persons


rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of rights. It is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.


The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession,
custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and
permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf
of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in
which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court,
justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties.

Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment,


the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If
the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred
to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be extended to
the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons
and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to
the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply
with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court,
justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession
or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be
inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having
personal
knowledge
of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion
is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged
nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a
hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The
movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened
or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or
persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time,
place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe

(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon


motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other
government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition
for a writ of amparo is improper remedy to regain parental
authority and custody ove a minor child who was legally put up for
adoption.
-

31

Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case,

there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the


possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening
through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima
facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or
threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion
in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy
the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately
filed criminal case.
-

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person


whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires
the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.

Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule


requires that the petition must sufficiently allege the manner in
which the right to privacy is violated or threatened with violation
and how such violation, or threats affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.

Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The


forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zenarosa Commission
was not unlawful act as that violates or threatens to violate the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security as to entitle the petitioner
to the writ of habeas data.

Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September


29, 2014- petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy
that would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data when
their daughters shared the incriminating pictures with their
Facebook Friends. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in
his or her Online Social Network activity, it is necessary that the
user in this case, the sanctioned students, should manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or limit its visibility.

Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC


cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court.

Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the
Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning
there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which
requires full payment before the State may exercise proprietary
rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a deposit was
recognized by the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental law


requires mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where
the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The
Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely


within the rule making prerogative of the Supreme Court
than the law making power of Congress. The rule allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate

32

appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court


for automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
-

MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does


not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within the
constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained and the petition to review
decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Courts
denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the CA decision.

Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does
not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to
avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions
thereof) of the lower court.
ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA


329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution
is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e, given due
course and after the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course
to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof.

GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service
Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to
decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority
to see that what has been decided is carried out.

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The


constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the finding of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals.

Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is
the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the
responsibility
of
the
establishment,
administration
and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned
department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting
the department agency with respect to these qualification
standards and approving them.

CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution
grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including
every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further
classified into career and non-career service positions. Career
service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit
and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
there is security of tenure. A state university president with a
fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of
trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service
officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of
the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law,

Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide
whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a full-blown
decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court
explained that the grant of due course to a petition for review is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. When it fails
to find any reversible error committed by the CA, there is no need
to fully explain the Courts denial as it means that the Supreme
Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
There is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear
presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where
the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.

33

respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the


jurisdiction of the CSC.
-

CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though


the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided
by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the
authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its
discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct
the investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975.
The Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed
directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction
over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no report,
no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no
condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a
general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But a
distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made. If
the GOCC was established through an original charter (or special
law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and SSS.
However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered
agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the coverage of the
civil service.
Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government
refers to any of the various units of the government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality or government-owned
or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit
therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national
government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and governmentowned or controlled corporations,
MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in
a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law applies. It is
not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor Code

applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim, an


employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the Civil
Service Law.
-

Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the


appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service may
be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys security of
tenure.

Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235permanent


appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that
a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not
possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend
on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it.

Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer


of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation
of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.

Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by
indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation
constitutes removal.

Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious


exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable
to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom.
In the absence of a showing such state interest exists, man must
be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party


aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the
government involving termination of services may appeal to the
CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the
Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels
aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001The CSC is expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of

34

1987 to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily confidential.


(Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two instances when a
position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) President
declares the position to be primarily confidential upon
recommendation of of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the
functions, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and
appointing authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state.
-

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily
confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino


Operations Manager is not primarily confidential.
RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.

To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public


office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the
term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of
the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997)
Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as
board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is
unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the CSC, and for
violating the rule against holding of multiple government positions
as well as the concept ex-officio positions.

Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double


compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such
pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to
which another compensation is attached.

PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG Chair
Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from
simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The

position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since the
CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the
general rule to hold more than one office is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position/
-

Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is
later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is
considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the
silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back
salaries.

DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme
Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination
with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in
his favor.

David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil


service officer or employee, who has been found illegally dismissed
or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to back wages
and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal
dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the
time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he is already of
retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back wages but also
to full retirement benefits.

CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an aggrieved


party, may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a civil
service employee of administrative charges.

CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of
an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil service
system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary
actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par.
11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an
integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil
service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles
those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished
from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.

35

SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No.
6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.

exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated


to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of
such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

COMELEC
-

REAPPOINTMENT
OF
COMMISSIONERSMatibag
vs.
Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without reappointment
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not
such person completes his term of office which could be seven, five
or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.

ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in


aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA
690.

Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The


COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an
adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all
election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6,
Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the


power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v.
Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other


hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is
elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into


the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said
province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates
of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election
offense had possibly been committed could by no means be
classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was


exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the
allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao.

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx


-

(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of


violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by
the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be
classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial.
The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to
resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance
of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to

36

To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and


required the attendance of the parties concerned and their
counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their
respective positions.
-

Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular


election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]

The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a


government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or
proceedings.

Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely
to the President and Vice-President, states:

In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to


punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would
render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose
of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner
obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer
questions regarding the various election documents which, he
claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such
contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board
of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it,
the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of
canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasijudicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine
whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election
returns signed by the proper officers. 10 When the results of the
elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed,
counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the
certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the
issue of whether the election documents coming from
Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably
refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of
its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271.
October 18, 2011- The power to fix the date of elections is
essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified
by, the following provisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by law,


the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held
on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours while Section 3,
Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for . . . the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.]
-

Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not
have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of
the plenary legislative power.

LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The


COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity
of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is
well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other
than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC
the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of
such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission
is endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment
of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free,
orderly and honest elections.

LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007


COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within
a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders. xxx The
COMELEC is endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the

37

accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to


promote free and orderly honest elections.
-

Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2 of Art. IXC of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion
is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in
which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the limited scope of its
power over political parties.

Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February


22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act or omission of a
municipal or regional trial court, petition for certiorari shall be filed
exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the
procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal,
there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so,
considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is
expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions
therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3,


Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en
banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or
resolutions decided by a division.
Since the petitioner
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested
of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was
yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of
the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot,
thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th legislative
district of Leyte.

first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-proclamation cases


are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the provision
of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC are vested
with the authority to hear and decide these special cases.
-

Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot


validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that
power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced,
for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only


after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing
of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;
(3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters
affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.

Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of


plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case
involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en


banc does not have the authority to hear and decide cases at the
38

Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997


Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly
order a manual count notwithstanding the required automated
counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing the
commission to use an automated election system, if that is the
only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.

Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid


exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of
the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the
objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the
interest of justice and fair play.
Accordingly, those candidates
whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the
electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their proclamation shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases.

Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765The 1987


constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving barangay officials decided by the trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final
orders of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative defenses of
petitioner cannot be questioned before the Supreme Court even via
a petition for certiorari.

equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are


required to submit to post audit.
-

DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA
of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies.
The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and
its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and
their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of
a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution,
and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable
conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent
private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the
COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a governmentcontrolled corporation, or when a government corporation is
privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the
government borrows money from abroad.

BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing


to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and
applied to his indebtedness to the government.

MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by
himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the
commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and
accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which
has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.

PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868,


COAs power over the settlement of accounts is different
from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is
within the ambit of judicial power.

Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurers salary and other
emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to
apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her
liability is still being litigated.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
-

COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.


Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COAs auditing powers are
not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity
handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec.
2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or
39

NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.

DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7,


2012]- There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA
to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that
a post audit is mandated for certain government or private entities
with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special preaudit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this


Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is
in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit,
there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can
the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.
GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The
appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional; the appointing authority cannot validly shorten
the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed
by the Constitution;
Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D);

Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of


seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission;

40

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for


less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chair. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioners and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Char resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment; and that
Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18
of RA 6758 prohibits officials and employees of COA from receiving
salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from
any government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA
out of its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271.
October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their
term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room
for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term
itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at
three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term.
This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what
it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is
viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not
have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where


the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and
Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective
officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in
the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when
the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly,
not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or
more, than the constitutionally mandated three years as
this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmea.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back
to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered
to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case
of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with
the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in
the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service,
we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined
by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present
case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the
correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between
the President who has supervision over local governments as
provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to

the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the


President, until the law provides otherwise.
-

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no


approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their
right of representation and governance in their own local
government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through


their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,
etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent,
may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent
delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
(Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice


Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may
arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to
appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates


vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution
prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the
third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.

41

Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23,


2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive
suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption

of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to


avoid the three-term limitation.
-

The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the


three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss of
the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the
suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt
or liability.

Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran
for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the
position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation
of said office.

Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the


recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an
elective officials terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a
candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but
later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched
with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior to
the recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation
of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term.

succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully served


the term.
-

Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office


constitutes, for Francis Ong, service for the full term, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a
full term in contemplation of the three-term rule,
notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation.
There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and
the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No.


176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after
the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for
cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the ,
explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said
increased income requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending
cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and that the year
before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already met
the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its


function is limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does
not grant the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. The MMDA is a development authority. It is not a
political unit of government. There is no grant of authority
to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare
of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir
Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).

Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule
to apply, the local official concerned must serve three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The term served must be one for
which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of
42

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood


by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the
power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended to
coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local
political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided
by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and
traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the
petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of
Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the
MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner
must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be
authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).
MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of
advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3
(MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDAs powers were
limited
to
the
formulation,
coordination,
regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it
had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police
and legislative power.

LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY


RELEASED WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM
ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily
see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a
just share in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall be
determined by law; (3) that just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO,
429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.


(ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)

AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that


pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation,
the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art
X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of


local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The
State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments,
and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and
charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional
guidelines and limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no
mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept
that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court.
The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by
the Local Government Code but restored by the Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision
of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the
years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local
Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected
by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August
18, 2005).

G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province


of Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial
Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax,

MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657,


August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as
envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents
terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police
power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted
ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts
subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.
INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the
local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695).

43

the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw


such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in
National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.
-

MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is


primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it
may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by
virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An
agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein; while an
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions
and government-owned and controlled corporations. It had
already become, even if it be conceded to be an agency or
instrumentality of the Government, a taxable person for such
purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section
234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which,
as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.
PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the
port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the
general public does not exempt it from the payment of real
property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and
appurtenances are the petitioners corporate patrimonial
properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port
and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the
nature of ordinary business.

and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion.
As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property
Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
-

When local governments invoke the power to tax on national


government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing
the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is
taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with
greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities.

Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against


the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress
grants
an
exemption
to
a
national
government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is
construed liberally in favor of the national government
instrumentality.

PRESIDENTS
SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,
September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga
ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego.

The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a


local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of
his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the
law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President
or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a lawconforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a
patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy
and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA,
December 3, 2002).

MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties
of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands
44

Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of


LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion
the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on
the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local
autonomy is ensured.

Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no
power to grant franchises.

Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23,


2010- The doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to
reappointed coterminous employees like petitioners as in their
case, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion
of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it
would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly
local government, with blanket immunity from administrative
liability that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions


of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).

Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending


case before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of
bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.

OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March


20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts.

Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231,


September 4, 2012 January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770
providing that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman is
unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over her deputies.

Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear


constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The
inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of
the Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded
the same levels of constitutional independence as that of the
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.

Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has


consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act

ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
-

IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of


Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an
impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject
of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for
criminal offenses committed.
READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,
November 10, 2003definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice.

Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on


Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred
to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.

A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be


necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution,
De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa,
September 3, 1995.

Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him


beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be
impeached.

45

under the supervision and control and upon authority of the


Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power
to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no
mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this
exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the
power to preventively suspend.
-

Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,


April 13, 2004The power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees
is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not
precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.

Ledesma vs. CA,


July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee at fault, and direct and com the
head of the office or agency concerned to implement the
penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the
procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its
jurisdiction.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June


16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the
Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is
well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. xxx
The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the
conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including
the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer
or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned
the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist watchman, not
merely a passive one.

Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.

Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the
respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension
for the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one
months salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor
and unappelable, subject to judicial review.

Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26,


2011- The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states
that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Also, the power of the Ombudsman to implement the
penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.

Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.


165584, January 22, 2008 Supreme Court reiterated this ruling
in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that
the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory
or recommendatory but is actually mandatory. Implementation
of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative


investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be
in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due
process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that
R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the
DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive
procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No.
4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987
Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while
R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that
the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a
law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770
were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to
act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with
the exception of officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.

46

QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is


originally created by charter or not. What is decisive is that
it has been acquired by the government to perform
functions related to government programs and policies.

JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,


376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and
Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to direct
any officer or employee of government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters to perform any act or duty
required by law or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.

PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee


on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of
Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth and not to criminal cases.
ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)

0
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881,
July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere
license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or
exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has
sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining
licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by
executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or
modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the
State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or
license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the
due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in
which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the
license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to
the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is not even
a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as
such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx

by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a long


and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice,
abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to
its fitting conclusion by denying the petition.
-

CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically


declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as
never to have been public land. Domains and lands under native
title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been
public lands and are private. The right of ownership granted to
indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains does not cover
the natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate the
terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their
exploration to ensure ecological and environmental protection.

Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the


existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as
an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore


and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas
are also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable,
unless converted into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.

The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of


the public domain may only be leased and not sold to
private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
which the government could not sell to private parties
except if the legislature passes a law authrizing such sale.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public
use or public service. xxx The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine, which declares
that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to the State

But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable


lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to private
corporations which can only lease the same. The State may only
sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to


recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen
47

Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar
private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and
being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision
prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for
private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public
domain. There is no prohibition on the directors, officers
and stockholders of private corporations, if they are
Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire not
more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired
becomes private land.
Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property,
can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by
the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which
even private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise,
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred
to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration
become patrimonial property in the hands of the public or
municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial
property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal
corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR
No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become
patrimonial property or private property of the government only
upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands,
together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.

the Public Land Act merely requires possession since June 12,
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.
The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of title
as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and disposable.
This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020 deadline
imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.
-

Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership for at leats 30 years or
at least since May 8, 1947.

DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No.


17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State
except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do
not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these
give them a right to apply a title to the land they are presently
occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
Doctrine.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme


Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400 hecs of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.

Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No.


16678, April 24, 2009 The classification of lands of the public
domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The agricultural
lands of the public domain may further be classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary
classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted authority to a
number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or
industrial or other urban uses.

in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration


Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title, to such lands based on
the length and quality of their possession. The Court clarified that
48

Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014The DENR Secretary is empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.

Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009While the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the
country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the
Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties from
the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by


PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity, such
reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which
can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is
tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and
it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes
patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a
government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands
under its charterThe Revised Administrative Code of
1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law
to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment
titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the
State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless
to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate
lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its
avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial
lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise
funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find
that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of
NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.
Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian

doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the


public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated
to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.
-

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the


prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land.
It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined
under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have
a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property
such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would
be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.

Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the


Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public
domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A homestead
patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes
to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes.

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1,


2004 Foreign corporations are confined to technical and
financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or
utilize the countrys natural resources by entering into the
necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of
visible operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State.
Control by the state must be on the macro level, through
the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations,
industry standards and similar measures that would enable
the government to control the conduct of the affairs in
various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not
desirable or beneficial.

GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose


Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al.,

49

March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service


contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance as provided by law. The Court said that these
agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to
mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts
with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest
in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject
to the full control and supervision of the State.

Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293,


February 23, 2015- a franchise is not required before each and
every public utility may operate. There is no law that states that a
legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.
What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use
to the public.

Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc.,


556 SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has the
imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its
apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.

GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.


Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No.
152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No.
152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its Members,
et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June
23, 2006- Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation
Area lies within the full control of the executive branch of the
state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation
are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through the
executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can
either directly undertake the exploration, development, and
utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement with qualified
entities.

FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it


does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress
intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that
doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having
amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption
from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The


National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not authorized
to cancel the certificates of public convenience (CPCs) and other
licenses it had issued to the holders of duly issued legislative
franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the terms of
their franchise. As legislative franchises are extended through
statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate
expression of State policy.

City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the
public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to
alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted
away.

Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC,


410 SCRA 82 The
constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall not
be exclusive.

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426


SCRA 517 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does
not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease
granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution.

Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of


law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.

PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316


The operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both


voting control test and beneficial ownership test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a Filipino national.
50

Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7,


2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It
mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so
requires.

reviewees, and it does not require enrollment, attendance, a


grade or submission of a thesis in order to complete the review
center course requirements or take the licensure examination.
-

ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational


institution and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court
sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules
on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner and
even promoted him
despite his absence, the University was
exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may
continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).

Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The


Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondnets
academic freedom as it does not dictate upon the law professors
the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. They are free to determine what they will teach their
students and how they will teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent
with the principle of academic freedom for the Supreme Court to
subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers. The right to freedom expression of members
of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in
the legal profession and the justice system.

Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As


enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v.
Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion
may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not
disturb the Universitys decision not to confer honors to petitioner.

Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with


academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of
higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and determine whether these standards have been met.
At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an

ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
-

SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have


revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo v.
Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).

HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on
Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and
political rights only either by government official or private
individual.

Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial


powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to Section
5- perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by
law.

CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although


admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.

People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that


the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and
conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean validity or
legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of
resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.
ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)

Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR


No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not an institution
of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722[i]t does not offer
a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction
of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is only intended to
refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of

51

employee on probation, belongs to the university as the employer


alone.
-

UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic


freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith,
who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic
personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong: As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher
learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their
policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls
or pressure.

De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section


5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching


the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach.
Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education
Act of 1982 that students have a right to freely choose
their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, such right
is subject to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner
DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom,
which includes its free choice of students for admission to its
school.

IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general


principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3,
2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a charge
against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as
a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not
shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability
of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the
performance of his/her duties.

UP vs. Dizon, August 23, 2012- The funds of UP are government


funds that public in character. They include income accruing from
the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for
the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds,
subject of the action could not be validly made the subject of writ
of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered
against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not
immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13,
2009- The COA is an unincorporated government agency which
does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence,
even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its
primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its
consent.

Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June


26, 2009- Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary
contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be
sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be
the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health
insurance project of the German and Philippine governments, is not
entitled to immunity from suit in the Philippines as GTZ, being the
equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled corporation, has
the power and capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation
Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled

ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
52

corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the


Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued,
-

PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006When the


government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where,
as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main
case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as
jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized
officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it
thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus
opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may
have against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in
Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit.
Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set
up its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in
the same case.

NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive


Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000,
the new PNP absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC
and INP, all three of which accordingly abolished.

Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or


indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They
cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or


enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of.

OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.

MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTION60%
EXCEPT:
established by religious groups and mission boards.

The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos.


183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of
Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to
the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees
that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the
laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested
only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the
only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.

IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a


Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose
amendments or to call a convention. The grant to Congress as a
Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue
of the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to
the effective exercise of principal power granted, such as the
power to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc..

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is


insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for
constitutional amendments. While the Constitution recognizes the
right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot
exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation.

LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006


-Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready
and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.
The essence of amendments directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,

Schools

ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)

53

the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
-

DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS.


COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution
or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of
the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a Constituent Assembly.

When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals


for amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not
its acts are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly
subject to judicial review.

There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times


necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be
validly held together with general elections.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no


piece meal ratification.

Presidential proclamation is not required for


amendment/revisions.
UNLESS,
the
amendments/revisions so provide.

administration is engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a


mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on
native soil.
-

Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342
SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted
for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not
detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days
from ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation
between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August
30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified
with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United
States Senate.

AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,


Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No.
170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty
under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant
to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that
has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the
treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs.


Smith, et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et
al., G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the
VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered
to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for
the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which

effectivity of
proposed

ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
-

LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory


Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence,
foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only be way of
direct exception.

Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging


in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The Supreme Court,
however, cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo
54

the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this


Court.
ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
-

Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,


February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for
their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence
over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local government
unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals
right to property, the former should prevail,.

Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca


Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the
constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not apply
to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code.

Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for


Legal Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichays
right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. IN
administrative proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain
ones side.
Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm
is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a
vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of ones residence
maybe revoked at anytime.

MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to


operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege
granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the
State in the exercise of police power.

Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process


suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.

INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:


1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative
functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers);
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR
Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10. Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon a
prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs.
Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013)
-

SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April


23, 2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due pocess of
law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, not
when the government agency is engaged in the performance of
quasi legislative or administrative functions.

Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that
they were denied due process during the NBI Investigation. The
functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party, it cannot even
determine probable cause.

Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41,


January 21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counteraffidavits of his co-respondents.
Equal Protection of the Law

55

Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the
strict scrutiny standard, an American constituted construct, useful

in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a


class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict
scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier application to
equal protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in
Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially condemnable act- accessing the
computer system of another without right. It is universally
condemned act.
-

Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No.


192935, December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is but just
a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a
Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the


law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
-

Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10,


2003, Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.

PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot
find support in the equal protection clause of the constitution. It
was granted a franchise , subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National


Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a
gurarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees
of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987
constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Art. III, Sec. 2.

PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix;
Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs.
COMELEC.

Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012The confiscated items having been found in a place other than the
one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of
an invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to
warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible
in evidence since a barangay tanod is an agent of a person in
authority under the Revised Penal Code.

Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in


plain view is justified only when:

1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in


which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
56

2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had


the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted.
5. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless
searches and seizures:
6. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA
280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
7. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
8. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit
nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established
until after they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and
the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered
as evidence in plain view);
9. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
10. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person
waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively;
and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis
Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA
611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given;
11. stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search (Terry vs,
Ohio, 1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by
law enforcement officer based upon reasonable suspicion that a
person may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an
arrest requires probable cause that a suspect committed a
criminal offense;
12. Armed conflict (war time);
13. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No.
129756-58, January 28, 2000);
14. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA
716), where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a
prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
15. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181
SCRA 623);
16. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23,
2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).

charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. As a


corollary, neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense. xxx In this case, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a
traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
-

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be


continuous from the time of the commission of the offense to the
time of the arrest.
There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of
the chase.

Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest


proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant.

PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to


be availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a
crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officer.

PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large


measure of immediacy between the time of the offense was
committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an
appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited
to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of
the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an
earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the
commission of the crime.

PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection


against the State. The protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. Right applies only against the
government and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

WARRANTLESS ARREST
-

Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the
Rules, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
57

Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By


administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner


of the Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner
who has been ordered to be deported.

SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to


more than one offense.

PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE


SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT
REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be
reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not
be a mere roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is
to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be
arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do so. You will be
freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.

impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must


determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the expectation
has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
-

In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G.


Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25,
2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and
their lawyers.
The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could
read the letters.
If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a
law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a
citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the
public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA
7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment.
By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation
of privacy rights.

Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from


attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free
speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these
rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated,
his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
The making of
contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be
used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not
be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

Disini Jr., et al. vs. Secretary of Justice- Two constitutional


guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be left alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the state has
58

In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio,


October 17, 2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.
SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870,
November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes.
However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
said RA insofar as random drug testing for secondary and tertiary
school students, as well as for officials and employees of public and
private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least
minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individuals privacy interest under the premises.

Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the


right to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.

Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the
prohibition in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the freedom of
expression.

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of


unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of his
right without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.

GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the


COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which national
candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on
television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people.

RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping


Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of
private conversations, but also: (a) the possession of such tapes
with the knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the
replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate the
contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as the provision
of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges from six
months to six years.

Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to


the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official
and members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals, listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any mode,
form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other
suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication,
message, conversation, discussion or spoken or written words
between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or any person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors
and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential
business correspondence shall not be authorized.
Section 4- Freedom of expression-

59

Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880
practically codify the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569. By way of a
summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,

the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his


decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.

(b)

B.P. No. 880


SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However,
no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or
made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in
private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the
campus of a government-owned and operated educational
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of
said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during
any election campaign period as provided for by law are not
covered by this Act.

(b)

(c)
(d)

(e)

SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit


shall comply with the following guidelines:
The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of
the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the
date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.
The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.
The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city
or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be
held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public
assembly.
Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged
in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the
same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city
or municipal building.

(c)

(d)
(e)
(f)

(g)

(h)
(i)

danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public


morals or public health.
The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the
permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be
heard on the matter.
The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the
applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional
Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may
be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it
in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately
executory.
All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder
shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby
allowed.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies.

In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding


the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses,
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He
said that in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should

-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.


(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present
60

weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.
Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to
the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These
laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.
-

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy


has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and
is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it
does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the
use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for
the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger
standard.
IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP
which should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant
the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act.
It found that Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear
and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to
such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank
denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny
thereto,
Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election
surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as
they refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters
as regards to a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the
voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues
during the campaign period.The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4
of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior
restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period; and 3) the government

interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other


than the suppression of freedom of expression.
-

Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations


of speech may either be content-based (the subject of the speech
or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it
regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the
time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any
content-based regulation must show that the government has a
compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A
content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show an
important government interest, as long as it leaves open
alternative channels of communication.

Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February


15, 2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in
warning television stations against playing the Garci tapes under
pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions
and should be subjected to the clear and present and danger
test.

Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al.,


GR No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate
implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the
burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to
prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners
constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the
absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.

The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special


application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks


comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and

61

becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The


overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
-

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth


doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected.

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied


challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only


extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.

The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial


challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified


by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As
reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid
and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long
as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free


speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong

criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal


statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the
grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.
A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider
third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition
to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such
a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating
the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied
to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
-

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the


overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to
free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a


facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed
for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigant.

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the


Court, in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court
has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment,and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In
Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct.
Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.

American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that


do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the
statute's facial validity.

62

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under


the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the
Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the
crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases,
similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in
the present case.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the
offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the
offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the
crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.
Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech
vis-a-vis Section 4(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the
transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to
read his emails, even if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless
is entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of his right
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitmate forms of
expression.

ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA


811 (2000)- The
prohibition of publication of exit poll or electoral survey would be
unreasonably restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of
exit poll data not only for election day projections, but also for long
term research.

MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner the power to screen, review and examine all television
programs, emphasizing the phrase all television programs.
Thus, when the law says all television programs, the word all
covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs,
news documentary, etc.
The principle assumes that the
legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or
expression. It then follows that since The Inside Story is a
television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review.

Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No.


165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Sorianos
statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a G
rating for general viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB
suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not
Soriano, as the MTRCB may not suspend television personalities,
for such would be beyond its jurisdiction.

Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is


essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not necessary
that he be named. It must also be shown that a third party could
identify him as the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except
in the following:

1. private communication made by any person to another in the


performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceeding which are not
confidential in nature including any statement made therein or act
performed by public officer.

63

A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged


(those which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith,
e.g. speech by member of Congress therein or any committee
thereof) or qualified privileged (those containing defamatory
imputations which are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable motive, e.g., private
communications and fair and true reports without any
comments/remarks).

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and


constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.

Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that
[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus, it found a grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad.
The Court held that moral disapproval is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party list system. Upholding equal protection,
the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political process,
LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. As such, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a
transgression of AngLadlads fundamental right of freedom of
expression since, by reason of the COMELEC action, the former was
precluded from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)

Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared


that the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate
freedom of religion, It does not convey any religious doctrine of the
catholic church.

Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the


obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information
on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis
of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.

Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA


256 - members of Jehovahs witnesses may validly refuse
participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national anthem,
saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs.

Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear and
present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to
prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas
does not constitute clear and present danger.

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of religion


does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use
tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.
For the purpose of defraying cost of registration.

Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary,


405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards are drawn from the Quran and
Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organization to interpret what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The State has in
effect forced Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Quran
and Sunnah on halal food.

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel64

Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CARelate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected
countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs.
Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The


persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.
Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for
humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the courts
discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001).

permission. Hence, there is a duty on the part of members of the


government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law. xxx While public officers in the custody or control
of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in
which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested
parties, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to
prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records.
After all, public office is a public trust.
-

Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC

Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official


records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that


everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector


-

Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no


one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.

Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM


NO. MTJ-10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does
not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be
complied by judges and court [personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a
person from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct
according to rule.

Section 9- Expropriation
-

Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the


procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the
solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private
property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code
governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power
of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there
is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No.


favorable to
in instances
for national

Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551


SCRA 303- There are at least two crucial differences between the
respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the
statute, the government is required to make immediate payment
to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be
entitled to a writ of possession, whereas Rule 67, the government

Section 7- Right to Information


-

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional


right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.

United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited
supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike does form
an integral part of the Right to Association.

Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under
Section 17, Art. XI has classified the information disclosed in the
SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a
duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a
65

8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more


the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies
when the national government expropriates property
government infrastructure projects.

is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized


government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property
as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value
of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
-

LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February


29, 2012- When the State exercises the power of eminent domain
in the implementation of its agrarian program, the constitutional
provision which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution
which provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of the farmers and regular
farm workers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. Notably, the provision also imposes
upon the State the obligation of paying landowner compensation
for the land taken, even if it is for the governments agrarian
reform purposes. It pertains to the fair and full price if the taken
property.

LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust
account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we
struck down as void the DAR administrative circular46 that
provided for the opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit
in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No.
6657.47 We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section
16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or
bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the governments
payment of just compensation.

Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process,
the Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after
recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a
forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the
judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should
have been imposed from the time the RTC decision fixing just
compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was
imposed from the time that the Republic commenced
condemnation proceedings and took the property.

LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation
cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall
be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from the time of
taking.

Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As


often ruled by this Court, the award of interest is imposed in the
nature of damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes
the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to
ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the
opportunity loss of the owner. However, when there is no delay in
the payment of just compensation, the Supreme Courthas not
hesitated in deleting the imposition of interest thereon for the
same is justified only in cases where delay has been sufficiently
established.

Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The


twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by
themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain,
arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The simple
fee does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse,
expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner
being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the
expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private
owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the
mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a
genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property,
the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible
from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has
now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessity the very
reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first
instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or
disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
governments retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the
property to another public use very much different from the
original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by

66

the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their


productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive to our
laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly
keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in
the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in
keeping with the idea of fair play
-

While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just


compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.
To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually.
This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The
State, through expropriation proceedings may take private
property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to
another private party as long as there is public purpose to the
taking.

Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent


domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).

Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a
property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.

Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private


capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be
paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or
otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of
Baguio vs. NAWASA).

To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).

GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land


Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said that the
total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis
in the National Building Code or its implementing rules and
regulations. It added that the State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without
payment of just compensation.

Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26,
2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July
21, 2006 The tax credit given to commercial establishments for
the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a
form of just compensation for private property taken by the State
for public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does
not come directly from the State, but from private establishments
concerned.

ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners
who were able to prove the commitment of the government to
allow them to repurchase their land.

MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009
For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two
requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review
by the LWUA.

Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the
detriment of the individuals rights.
Given this function, the
provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.

67

Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into
play. It is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long
as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of


property for socialized housing is for public use.

Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following


order: 1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public
domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within
the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement
program sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which
have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs.
Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).
Section 10- Non-impairment clause

There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real


estate transactions entered or perfected even prior to its
imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of
the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has
been granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of
Finance)

The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts


that impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR


No. 195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not
divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right
by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No.
3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of
foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of
sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is
likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period
because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties
foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain
their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.

People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay


based organizatios in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of
bantay bayan, are recognized by local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Banting and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The
Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of
Lauga which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.

Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial
investigation, nor it can be considered a formal arrest, by the very
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.

Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer


need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his
client. The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed
counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.

PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the


constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has
not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning.

PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private


person is admission in evidence.

PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is


inadmissible.

Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights


68

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by


counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court
sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of the other
accused, explaining that the investigations performed by the PNP
were administrative and not custodial in nature.
Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.


2. The right to be heard
-

The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of


certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19,
2001).

Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused


appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the
failure of the information to allege relationship to the victim. It
would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process
(PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).

A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign


State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will
call into operations all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. The extraditees right to notice and hearing is
present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court- it is
only then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence
against him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).

Section 13- Bail


-

Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense


but later convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail
cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).

The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal


proceedings. The right is not available in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in
the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not
granting bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.

Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in


extradition cases, bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1) that, once
granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling reasons (Govt. of USA vs. Purganan, September 24,
2002).
Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge
Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007 Potential extraditee may be granted bail
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the person is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court.

Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11,


2014- the burden of demonstrating political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present
evidence.
3. Right to public trial

A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies


that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE


MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR
ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility
of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the

Section 14- Rights of accused


69

right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general


public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside
the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the
Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for
live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings
of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines
outlined therein.
-

Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to


speedy trial maybe waived except when otherwise expressly
provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition of his case must,
therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert
his right, he is considered to have waived it.

Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of


the privilege to practice medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of
Medical Examiners).

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541


SCRA 456- The right against self incrimination is extended in an
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently
been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party of not.

The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature


of documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).

In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19,
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative
value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme
Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v.
Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the
Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests

In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant


contended that the blood sample taken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent
as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17
of Art. III of the Constitution.

The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the
right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987,
151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt and that it does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.

4. Right to face to face confrontation


-

The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the


supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render
the deceaseds testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be
attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike
out all that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs.
Narca, 275 SCRA 696).
Section 16- Speedy disposition

Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for
preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3
years and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was
prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was violation
of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to
speedy disposition extends to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).
Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative


hearings when the nature of the penalty is penal in nature (like
forfeiture of property or dismissal from employment) and the
hearing partakes the nature of criminal proceeding (Cabal vs.
Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).
70

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320


SCRA 383, the Court held that although accused-appellant insisted
that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to
the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the
hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It cited People v.
Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures
of the accused without the presence of counsel. In that case, the
Court ruled that there was no violation of the right against selfincrimination. It further stated that the accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the
Revised Penal Code)
Exceptions:
Punishment for a crime;
service in defense of the state
naval enlistment;
posse comitatus;
return to work order;
patriapotestas

Section 21- Double Jeopardy


-

As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because


it places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs.
People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not


concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare
the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted
nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his
express consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that
the claim of double jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April
3, 2001).

Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal


of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for
offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years or
a lapse of two years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years.

For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against
the accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional
dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional
dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no
justification to file a subsequent case beyond the period of one or
two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).

The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a


judgment of conviction. It merely approved the agreement
between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the accused
and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)

Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the


offender under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of
RPC is unconstitutional because it constitutes a violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy. Same with charging the
offender under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child
Pornography constitute double jeopardy.

Section 19- Death penalty


-

The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total


abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper
for Congress to determine its reimposition because of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA
682).
Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the


Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a criminal
offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by the
constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of
the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment
of debt

71

Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double


jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the accused with
different offense, even if it arises from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense.
Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the


Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on
jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson
vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be


considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively
since its stricture would cover only offenses committed after and
not before its enactment.

The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to


court doctrines pursuant to the maxim legisinterpretatiolegis vim
obtinet- the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying


circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc,
398 SCRA 62).

Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being


unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount
to the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument
as specious, the Supreme Court held no ex-post facto law was
involved in the case at bar. It added that the science of DNA
typing involved the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas, an ex-post
facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the
evidence presented. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19, 2004)

72

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