1 G.R. No.

L-35376 September 11, 1980

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines and The Director of Lands seek the review of the
decision dated July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge in Cad. Case No. 27, GLRO Rec. No.
1714, Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre entitled, "The Director of Lands, petitioner, versus
Tiburcio, Florencia, Fabian and Gonzala, all surnamed Aotes, claimants-movants", the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 28, 1940, declaring
Lot No. 4273 Public Land is set aside and said Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre is hereby adjudicated in favor of herein movants in undivided interests
and in equal share of each to GONZALA AOTES, married to Victorino
Gormanes; TIBURCIO AOTES, married to Epefania Maglasang; FLORENCIA
AOTES, married to Basilio Barabad; and FABIAN AOTES, married to Dulcisima
Barabad; all adjudicatees are Filipinos, of legal ages, the first named is residing
in Can-adiong, Ormoc City, Philippines; and as soon as this decision shall have
become final, let the Commissioner of Land Registration Commission, Quezon
City, issue the corresponding decree of aforesaid parcel of land in the names of
herein adjudicatees, subject to the liability and claims of creditors, Hens, or
other persons for the full period of two (2) years after their distribution as
imposed by Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 1
The following facts are undisputed in the instant case:
In a decision dated September 28, 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre was declared public land.
On February 23, 1972, private respondents Aotes filed with the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, presided by the respondent Judge a petition to reopen the
aforesaid decision dated September 28, 1940 under Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act
6236 claiming to be the owners and possessors of Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by
virtue of hereditary succession but, due to their non-appearance on the date of the hearing
of the Cadastral Case because of ignorance and excusable neglect, said land was declared
public land and that they had been in adverse, peaceful and notorious possession of the said
parcel of land since the time immemorial, paying all the taxes, interests and penalties. They
pray that the decision of the Cadastral Court affecting Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre be
reopened, and that they be allowed to file their cadastral answer.
On March 16, 1972, petitioners filed an opposition to the aforesaid petition on the ground
that such petition is barred by the expiration of the period for reopening cadastral
proceedings under Rep. Act 931 which expired on December 31, 1968 and this period has
not been extended under the provisions of Rep. Act 6236 because the latter applies only to
the extensions of time limit for the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9, 1972, denied the opposition for lack of sufficient
merit and set the case for hearing on June 24, 1972.
On July 22, 1972, respondent judge rendered decision setting aside the decision of the
cadastral court dated September 28, 1940 declaring Lot No. 4273 public land and
adjudicating said lot in favor of the private respondents in undivided interest in equal share
of one-fourth (1/4) each.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed this instant petition
assigning only one error to writ: The trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the
petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings.
In the Brief, 2 petitioners argue that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the proceedings
for reopening of the cadastral case because under the provision of Rep. Act 931, the period
for reopening of cadastral proceedings expired on December 31, 1968, and that period has
not been extended by Rep. Act 6236 which applies only to the extension of the time limit for
the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings. In the Manifestation and
Motion, 3 respondents Aotes claim that considering the time limit for firing applications for
free patents and for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles has been
extended up to December 31, 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases should also be
extended until December 31, 1980 in fairness and justice to them.
The sole issue to be resolved, considering the above facts, is whether or not Rep. Act 6236
which provides for the extension of the time limit to file applications for free patent and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1976 applies also to
the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands.
There is merit in the petition.
By way of background, Rep. Act 931, which was approved on June 20, 1953, is an act to
authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to
parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this act. Under this aforesaid act, all
persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings,
who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same but for some justifiable
reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit
established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such
claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this act, are
granted the right within five years after the date on which this act shall take effect, to
petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act 2259. Rep. Act
2061, which took effect on June 13, 1958, refers to an act setting a new time limit for the
filing of applications for free patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared
public lands. Under this act the time for filing applications shall not extend beyond December
31, 1968. Rep. Act 6236, approved on June 19, 1971, however, extended the time limit for
the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles not to extend beyond December 31, 1976. In resume, Rep. Act 931 granted
a right within 5 years from June 20, 1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastral proceedings.

Rep. Act 2061 fixed a new time limit which is up to December 31, 1968 to file applications for
free patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and for the
reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared public land. Rep. Act
6236 extended the time limit which is up to December 31, 1976 for the filing of applications
for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the
Cadastral Court under Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236. Respondents Aotes claim
that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial
confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to December 31,
1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until December 31, 1980. Rep. Act
6236, the very law on which respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents' contention. It will be noted that while
Rep. Act 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond
December 31, 1968, no similar provision is found in Rep. Act 6236 expressly 'extending the
time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the Rep. Act 6236
makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep. Act 2061,
expressly did. Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a
general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to
probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to
reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the
extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain
lands which were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is made clearer by reference to Rep.
Act 2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in Rep. Act
6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep. Act 6236 which is the sole basis
for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings applies only to
the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a
proceeding entirely different from "filing an application for a free patent or for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September 28, 1940, the respondent
Judge has concluded that Rep. Act 6236 is applicable also to reopening of cadastral
proceedings, thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a
function that properly pertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs.
Court of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm
speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law,
leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have
consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
where the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is called for,
and the law is applied as written, 7 for application is the first duty of courts, and
interpretation, only were literal application is impossible or inadequate. 8

More importantly, the lower court has no longer jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by
respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings because the latter, as we have noted,
did not file the aforesaid petition within the period fixed by the applicable laws to wit: Rep.
Act 931 and 2061. Consequently, the decision dated September 30, 1940 of the Cadastral
Court declaring the land in question a public land has become final and conclusive. It has
also acquired the status of res judicata. It must be remembered that generally, the
fundamental principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land
registration or cadastral proceedings.9 The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from
relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It is wellsettled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on
the subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to matters which were
decided in the first action, but also as to every other matter which the parties could have
properly set up in the prior suit. 10 Indeed, settled is the rule that a cadastral case is a judicial
proceeding in rem, which, as such binds the whole world. 11 The final judgment rendered
therein is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof, if not noted thereon,
like those of the petitioner, are deemed barred under the principle of res judicata. 12 In the
case of Cano vs. De Camacho, this Court held:
Although the title of Jesus Vao over said Lot 1-B is not as yet indefeasible, no
decree having been issued in his favor, all rights, interests or claims existing
before said date are deemed barred by said decision, under the principle of res
judicata, once the decision become final, upon expiration of the thirty-day
period to appeal therefrom. 13
By reiterating its ruling, this Court once more stresses and emphasizes that Rep. Act 6236
does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and as a consequence, the
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the petition of the respondents Aotes to reopen the
cadastral proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decisions dated July 22, 1972 of
the respondent Judge and reiterating that of the Cadastral Court dated September 28, 1940.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
2 G.R. No. L-28396

December 29, 1967

AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in its capacity as
Board of Canvassers for the newly created Municipality of Sebaste of the Province
of Antique, and BENITO B. GALIDO,respondents.
The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in the
general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the
respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal
board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard,
as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said

return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a
certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of
October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the
objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with
the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes
as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the
municipality of Sebaste.
On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action
of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and
challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit,
considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC resolved on
November 28, 1967:
To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of
Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of Antique;
To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the
results of the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in accordance with the
Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the Resolution of the Commission
No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and thereafter to proclaim the winning
candidates for local offices of said municipality.
In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the
provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the board
was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that the
COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without
giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the respondent
Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the canvass and proclamation
already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present
petition for mandamus andcertiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to
annull the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint
substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns,
including that from precinct 7.
The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the
respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the return
from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less number of
voters than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the provincial board
members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in
its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and (3) whether the Commission on
Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given precinct.
These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim, but we
must first proceed to dispose of the preliminary question raised by the respondent Galido,
namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and assumed office on
November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.

Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads:

The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall be
elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified [sic].
In our view, the last portion of the provision "and shall have qualified" is devoid of any
meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent's
reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately
after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But here
is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty
forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no
meaning in it," said the King in Alice in Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know,
as we needn't try to find any." Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage,
admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.
Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration." 2 Accordingly, we have to go by the
general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of
January following their election,3 and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in
no way affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function that of compiling and
adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. This is the teaching
in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections:4 "the canvassers are to be satisfied of the,
genuineness of the returns namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and
spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so
satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or because of
illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections." 5 Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of
an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast
in the precinct from whence it came are illegal. 6
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is
"obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195
registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that
only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967.Lagumbay v. Commission on
Elections7 is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as it
was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party garnered all
the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates
of the other party got preciselynothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid of
evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself
(res ipsa loquitur the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give
it prima facievalue.
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the
canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared in
the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of
registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to
justify its exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters were
allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims that after

October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register (making a total of 190, voters),
and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to
vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that
this question should be threshed out in an election contest.itc-alf Lagumbay itself explicitly
says
Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled and
finally settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general
rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary. . . .
Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled. 8
Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members
of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for
reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on Elections:9
And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board of
Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members were disqualified to act it appearing that
they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear from Section 28 of the Revised
Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a
candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the
performance of its duties in connection with the election.
Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that
reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when the
board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them fro canvassing their own
votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers.
With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of Oriental Mindoro,
three issues raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court held (1) that a provincial board
cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers where a municipal council has been formed;
(2) that provincial board members who are candidates for reelection are disqualified to sit in
the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from canvass the return from a
precinct acts "in contravention of law."
At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus:
Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate for
office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said body in the performance of
the duties the of relative to said election . . . .
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of
canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities,
and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemos.
Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvass
and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on incomplete returns, and order a new
canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded. 10 If it has power to direct
that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same

returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count all turns which
are otherwise regular.itc-alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing which it may be compelled
bymandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is the ministerial function a board of canvassers to
count the results as they appeal in the returns which on their face do not reveal any
irregularities or falsities.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission on
Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made and the subsequent proclamation of
the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent Commission on Elections is
hereby directed. (1) to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution of
Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the board of
canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes including those appearing in the
return from precinct 7, and, in accordance with the results of such canvass, proclaim the
winning candidates. Costs against the private respondent Galido.

3 G.R. No. L-30264

March 12, 1929

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
The question involved in this appeal is the following: How should dust shields be classified for
the purposes of the tariff, under paragraph 141 or under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the
Tariff Law of 1909? These paragraphs placed in parallel columns for purposes of comparison
read:
141. Manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for, forty per centum ad valorem
197. Vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof, ten per
centum ad valorem.
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of chief
value is the wool. They are used by the Manila Railroad Company on all of its railway wagons.
The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil
deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. "Dust guard," which is
the same as "dust shield," is defined in the work Car Builders' Cyclopedia of American
Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as follows: "A this piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or
other material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the back of a journal box, and fitting
closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to exclude dust and to
prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing."
Based on these facts, it was the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs that dust shields
should be classified as "manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for." That decision is
entitled to our respect. The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a
legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be
decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right. (Erhardt
vs. Schroeder [1894], 155 U. S., 124; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Collector of Customs [1913], 26

Phil., 647.) On the other hand, His Honor, Judge Simplicio del Rosario, took an opposite view,
overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs, and held that dust shields should be
classified as "detached parts" of vehicles for the use on railways. This impartial finding is also
entitled to our respect. It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or
duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every
case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in
favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed,
beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. (U. S. vs. Wigglesworth [1842], 2
Story, 369; Froehlich & Kuttner vs. Collector of Customs [1911], 18 Phil., 461.)
There are present two fundamental considerations which guide the way out of the legal
dilemma. The first is by taking into account the purpose of the article and then
acknowledging that it is in reality used as a detached part or railways vehicles. The second
point is that paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision.
Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general
enactment must be taken to effect only such cases within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular enactment (25 R. C. L., p. 1010, citing numerous
cases).
We conclude that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197
of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of
the same section of the law. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed in its
entirety, without special taxation of costs in either instance.
4 G.R. No. L-21516

April 29, 1966

BUTUAN SAWMILL, INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Ricardo S. Castillo, for respondents-appellants.
David G. Nitafan, for petitioner-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal on questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, in
its Special Civil Case No. 152, declaring as unconstitutional and ultra vires Ordinances Nos. 7,
11, 131, and 148 of the herein respondent-appellant City of Butuan "in so far as they impose
a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power of the
petitioner (appellee) Butuan Sawmill, Inc." and annulling Ordinance No. 104, also of the said
city, as unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive. The decision was rendered
on a petition for declaratory relief.
The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise, Republic
Act No. 399, approved on 18 June 1949, for an electric light, heat and power system at
Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions established in Act
3636, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 132 and the Constitution. It was also issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission on 18
March 1954.

Ordinance No. 7, which took effect on 1 October 1950, imposes a tax of 2% on the gross
sales or receipts of any business operated in the city, payable monthly within the first 20
days of the following month, and provides penalties for violation thereof. This ordinance was
amended on 14 December 1950 by Ordinance No. 11, by enumerating the kinds of
businesses required to pay the tax, and further amended by Ordinance No. 131, enacted on
16 May 1961, by modifying the penal provision, and still further amended by Ordinance No.
148, approved on 11 June 1962, by including within the coverage of taxable businesses
"Those engaged in the business of electric light, heat and power (sic) ... " (Rec. on Appeal,
pp. 116-131).
Ordinance No. 104, enacted on 13 April 1960, makes it unlawful, and provides a penalty of
fine and imprisonment
for any person, firm or entity to cut or disconnect electric wire or wires connecting the
electric power plant of any franchise holder or electricity supplying current with any
consumer in the City of Butuan without the consent of the said consumer except in
cases of fire and/or when there is a clear and positive danger to the lives and
properties of the residents of the community, or upon order by the proper authorities.
(Rec. on App., pp. 133-134).
The stand of the respondents-appellants is that the franchise of the
petitioner-appellee is subject to "amendment, alteration or repeal by the National
Assembly ...", as per Section 12 of Act 3636, as amended; that the city is empowered under
its charter (Republic Act 523, approved on 15 June 1950) to "provide for the levy and
collection of taxes for general and special purposes"; and that its taxing power was enlarged
and extended by the Local Autonomy Law, Republic Act 2264, which was approved on 19
June 1959; and that all said statutory enactments gave the city the authority to impose the
2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power of the
Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc., on the other hand, disputes the
constitutionality of the taxing ordinance, as amended, as one that impairs the obligation of
contract, its franchise being a contract, and deprives it of property without due process of
law; it maintains that the said ordinances are ultra vires and void.1wph1.t
Examination of the laws involved shows that the inclusion of the franchised business of the
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing
ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the
power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the
franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power. Be it
noted that the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18 June 1949 while the
city's charter was approved on 15 June 1950.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of
the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact
that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.], 425)
(Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224)

The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business
of the petitioner-appellee. Its pertinent provision states:
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all chartered cities ... shall have
authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any
occupation or business ... Provided, however, That no city, municipality or municipal
district may levy or impose any of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) Taxes on persons operating waterworks, irrigation and other public utilities except
electric light, heat and power.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(j) Taxes of any kind on banks, insurance companies, and persons paying franchise
tax.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(Sec. 2, Republic Act 2264) (Emphasis supplied)

The argument of the appellant city is that, under subparagraph (d) of the above-quoted
provision, the business of electric light, heat and power, being an exception to those which it
cannot tax (like waterworks and irrigation), is within the city's taxing power. This argument is
untenable, because (1) subparagraph (j) of the same section specifically withholds the
imposition of taxes on persons paying franchise tax (like appellee herein), and (2) the city's
interpretation of the provision would result in double taxation against the business of the
appellee because the internal revenue code already imposes a franchise tax. The logical
construction of section 2(d) of Republic Act 2264, that would not nullify section 2(j) of the
same Act, is that the local government may only tax electric light and power utilities that are
not subject to franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes additional taxation by
cities or municipalities.
The passage of ordinance No. 104, which prohibits the disconnection of any electrical wire
connected to any consumer's building with the power plant, without the consent of the
consumer; except in case of fire, clear and positive danger to the residents, or order of the
authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of power for the general welfare. In effect, the
ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric current to a customer
even if the latter does not pay the bills therefor, and to that extent deprives the company of
its property without due process. It is no answer to the objection that the company is not
prevented from resorting to the courts for the collection of unpaid bills; for unless the supply
of electricity is stopped, the bills will keep mounting during the pendency of the case, and
the company will be unable to stop litigating. How the general welfare would be promoted
under the ordinance has neither been explained nor justified; in fact, the respondents spare
no bones in asserting that the ordinance was directed against the petitioner in protest
against its allegedly inefficient service. But the general welfare clause was not intended to
vent the ire of the complaining consumers against the franchise holder, because the
legislature has specifically lodged jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services
and their franchise in the Public Service Commission and not in the City of Butuan.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in the result. Costs
against appellant City of Butuan.

5 G.R. No. L-23052

January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a
jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney,
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses
and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom,
impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the
manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries
were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left
upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg
and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and
the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital,
required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance
of Manila, a complaint which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City
of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As
stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman
and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various
business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the
Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also
associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of
Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his
customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00
during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation
and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment,
plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since
he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself
to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove
that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of
the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta

Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day
(Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on
January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the
Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin
in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been
a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and
care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from
whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended
to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with
steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing,
stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer
has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to
prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of
catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete
cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had
been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the
aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the
amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to
enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic
Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is
a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that,
insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the
Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the
City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from

negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works
under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because
the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the
answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the
performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus,
the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for
the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such
assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial
court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act
409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for
lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers,

and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the
stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to
provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners
thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop
rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public
places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other
animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city;
to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for
and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such
railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to
require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide
suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair
ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural
drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and
Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the
disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces,
chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their
respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of
said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway
funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of
national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be
accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the
supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special
appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our
review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1wph1.t

[G.R. No. 127116. April 8, 1997]

ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7,
Kalookan City and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA
PILIPINAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY, Department of Interior and Local Government, and THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY,
Department
of
Budget
and
Management, respondents.

[G.R. No. 128039. April 8, 1997]

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by BONIFACIO M.
RILLON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The two petitions before us raise a common question: How long is the term of office of
barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective offices
on the second Monday of May 1994? Is it three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code) or five years, as contained in RA 6679? Contending that their term is five
years, petitioners ask this Court to order the cancellation of the scheduled barangay election
this coming May 12, 1997 and to reset it to the second Monday of May, 1999.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 127116
In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as
president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David filed on
December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on
the second Monday of May 1997. On January 14, 1997, the Court resolved to require the
respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of fifteen days
ending on January 29, 1997.
On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with
petitioner and praying that the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in
abeyance.Respondent Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1,
1997 opposing the petition. On February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due
course to the petition and requiring the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a nonextendible period of twenty days from notice. It also requested former Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr.[1]to act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also within a non-extendible
period of twenty days. It noted but did not grant petitioners Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 (as
well as his Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same effect, dated March 6,
1997). Accordingly, the parties filed their respective memoranda. The Petition for Leave to
Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by Punong Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied as it
would just unduly delay the resolution of the case, his interest like those of all other
barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David who filed this
petition as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas.
G.R. No. 128039
On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter
represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039,
to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:

1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall
be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994.
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay
elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and expenses
in holding the 1997 barangay elections; [2]
Comelec Resolution 2880,[3] promulgated on December 27, 1996 and referred to above,
adopted a Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts for the May
12, 1997 Barangay Elections. On the other hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on
February 5, 1997 moved certain dates fixed in Resolution 2880. [4]
Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents to submit
their comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten days ending on March 7,
1997. The Court further resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised
basically the same issue. Respondent Commission filed its Comment on March 6, 1997 [5] and
the Solicitor General, in representation of the other respondent, filed his on March 6,
1997. Petitioners Urgent Omnibus Motion for oral argument and temporary restraining order
was noted but not granted. The petition was deemed submitted for resolution by the Court
without need of memoranda.
The Issues
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the
term of office of barangay officials?
Petitioners[6] contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved on May 6,
1988, (t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years x x x. This is
reiterated in Republic Act No. 6679, approved on November 4, 1988, which reset the
barangay elections from the second Monday of November 1988 to March 28, 1989 and
provided in Sec. 1 thereof that such five-year term shall begin on the first day of May 1989
and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994. Petitioners further aver[7] that although Sec.
43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law
applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local
government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the
term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the same provision states that the
term of barangay officials shall be determined by law;and (4) thus, it follows that the
constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise,
there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay
officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution. Petitioners
conclude (1) that the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it
promulgated Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 because it substituted its own will for that of the

legislative and usurped the judicial function x x x by interpreting the conflicting provisions of
Sec. 1 of RA 6679 and Sec. 43 (c) of RA 7160; and (2) that the appropriation of P400 million
in the General Appropriation Act of 1997 (RA 8250) to be used in the conduct of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 is itself unconstitutional and a waste of public funds.
The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not repealed by
RA 7160 and thus he believes that the holding of the barangay elections (o)n the second
Monday of May 1997 is without sufficient legal basis.
Respondent Commission on Elections, through Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, defends its
assailed Resolutions and maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160 includes all laws,
whether general or special, inconsistent with the provisions of the Local Government Code,
citing this Courts dictum in Paras vs. Comelec[8] that the next regular election involving the
barangay office is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May
1997. Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189
(providing for a general registration of voters) both indicate that Congress considered that
the barangay elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided for in RA 7160, Sec. 43 (c).
[9]
Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since they were elected
under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 which prescribes a term of only three
years. Finally, Respondent Comelec denies the charge of grave abuse of discretion stating
that the question presented x x x is a purely legal one involving no exercise of an act without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[10]
As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the
petitions because (1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 not only by
implication but by design as well; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay
officials to three years; (3) the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of
their administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors; and (4) barangay officials are
estopped from contesting the applicability of the three-year term provided by the Local
Government Code as they were elected under the provisions of said Code.
From the foregoing discussions of the parties, the Court believes that the issues can be
condensed into three, as follows:
1.

Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679?

2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?

3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA
7160?
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are devoid of merit.
Brief Historical Background of Barangay Elections
For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into the history of
barangay elections.

As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the

Philippines. The word barangay is derived from the Malay balangay, a boat which transported
them (the Malays) to these shores.[11] Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan
missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez [12] wrote that the barangay was ruled by
a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the
barangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his powers.
[13]
Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in
the encomiendero and
later,
in
the alcalde
mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who
was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The position degenerated from a title
of honor to that of a mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no
matter how low, accepted the post. [14]
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as barrios.
For some time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. [16] Barrios
were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as
quasi-municipal corporations[17] by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial
law regime, barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a reversion really to their preSpanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization and functions under
RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained. However,
the titles of the officials were changed to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barangay
secretary and barangay treasurer.
[15]

Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, [18] a Punong Barangay (Barangay
Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall
constitute the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay
Council) respectively were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years which
began on June 7, 1982.
The Local Government Code of 1983 [19] also fixed the term of office of local
elective officials at six years.[20] Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the
punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay
chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer. [21]
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code,[22] reiterated that barangay officials shall hold
office for six years, and stated that their election was to be held on the second Monday of
May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter. [23]
This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to
the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter [24] by RA 6653. Under
this law, the term of office of the barangay officials was cut to five years [25] and the punong
barangay was to be chosen from among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn were to
be elected at large by the barangay electorate. [26]
But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was
again postponed and reset to March 28, 1989 by RA 6679, [27] and the term of office of
barangay officials was to begin on May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further
provided that there shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second
Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall be

for five years x x x. [28] Significantly, the manner of election of the punong barangay was
changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven kagawads were to be elected by
the registered voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who obtains the highest number of
votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots
under the supervision of the Commission on Elections.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160, [29] several provisions concerning
barangay officials were introduced:
(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows:
SEC. 43. Term of Office. -xxxxxxxxx
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall
be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May, 1994 (Underscoring supplied.)
(2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of electing its officials
were altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to be elected directly by the electorate,
as follows:
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong
barangay, seven (7) sanggunian barangay members, the sanggunian kabataan chairman, a
barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay,
shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular
sanguniang barangay members elected at large and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as
members.
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x
by the qualified voters in the barangay. (Underscoring supplied.)
Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the qualified barangay
voters actually voted for one punong barangay and seven (7) kagawads during the barangay
elections held on May 9, 1994. In other words, the punong barangay was elected directly and
separately by the electorate, and not by the seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.
The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the intent and design of the
legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under
the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. [30] And three
years is the obvious intent.

First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic
that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later
enactment prevails.[31] Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is
simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be
presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the
older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have
intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones --[32] and not the other way around.
Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at three (3)
years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday
of May 1994. This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679
which states that such term shall be for five years. Note that both laws refer to the same
officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994.
Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong
barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the punong
barangay from among themselves. On the other hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a
direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from the
seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay officials, namely, the
punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for
only seven kagawads, and not for the barangay chairman.
Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters
actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with the
thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus,
Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less
president of the national league of barangays which he purports to represent in this
petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-in-interest and on that
ground, his petition should be summarily dismissed.
Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, [33] Congress appropriated the
amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this
year.Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of
voters shall be held immediately after the barangay elections in 1997. These are clear and
express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected
this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec,[34] this Court said that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled in May, 1997. This judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.
Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law, should prevail over
RA 7160, an alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non
derogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to
local government units. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that the term
of office of barangay officials x x x shall be for three years. It is a special provision that
applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May

1994.With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may
be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating (without
however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. [35] It is a
special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing
clause,[36] RA 7160 states that all general and special laws x x x which are inconsistent with
any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. There being a
clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand
together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing
clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former
enactments, the latter is deemed repealed. [37]
The Second Issue: Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay
officials whose term shall be determined by law from the general provision fixing the term of
elective local officials at three years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress
from legislating a three-year term for such officers. We find this theory rather novel but
nonetheless logically and legally flawed.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of
office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking
body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be
remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. [38] For a law
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied)
breach of the Constitution.[39] To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear
and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.
[40]
The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec.
8, Article X of the Constitution -- limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years,
except that of barangay officials which shall be determined by law -- was an amendment
proposed by Constitutional Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G. Davide,
Jr.According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the amendment was readily accepted without much
discussion and formally approved. Indeed, a search into the Record of the Constitutional
Commission yielded only a few pages [41] of actual deliberations, the portions pertinent to the
Constitutional Commissions intent being the following:
MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the
office of barangay officials as provided for?

MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.

MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
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THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new
section as submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted by the Committee?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three
consecutive terms apply to barangay officials?
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not
include the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must be
determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the restriction on
the number of reelections will be included in the Local Government Code.
MR. RODRIGO. So that is up to Congress to decide.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. I just wanted that clear in the record.
Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief, they
nonetheless provide the exact answer to the main issue. To the question at issue here on
how long the term of barangay officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear
and quick: As may be determined by law; more precisely, (a)s provided for in the Local
Autonomy Code. And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three
years.
The Third Issue: Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms
We have already shown that constitutionally, statutorily, logically, historically and
commonsensically, the petitions are completely devoid of merit. And we could have ended
our Decision right here. But there is one last point why petitioners have no moral ascendancy
for their dubious claim to a longer term of office: the equities of their own petition militate
against them. As pointed out by Amicus Curiae Pimentel,[42] petitioners are barred by
estoppel from pursuing their petitions.
Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex A of its memorandum, [43] a
machine copy of the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in the May 9, 1994
barangay elections, the authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. In said
certificate of candidacy, he expressly stated under oath that he was announcing his
candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay 77, Zone 7 of Kalookan City and
that he was eligible for said office. The Comelec also submitted as Annex B[44] to its said
memorandum, a certified statement of the votes obtained by the candidates in said
elections, thus:

BARANGAY 77
CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES
VOTES OBTAINED
May 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS
PUNONG BARANGAY VOTES OBTAINED
1. DAVID, ALEX L. 112
KAGAWAD
1. Magalona, Ruben 150
2. Quinto, Nelson L. 130
3. Ramon, Dolores Z. 120
4. Dela Pena, Roberto T. 115
5. Castillo, Luciana 114
6. Lorico, Amy A. 107
7. Valencia, Arnold 102
8. Ang, Jose 97
9. Dequilla, Teresita D. 58
10.Primavera, Marcelina 52
If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner David
should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because
under RA 6679, there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected
barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay should have been
Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among the kagawads -- 150,
which was much more than Davids 112; (3) the electorate should have elected only seven
kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads.
In other words, following petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner David as well
as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.
The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners theory is that barangay officials are
estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to,
under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local
Government Code. Petitioners belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their

election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, (i)gnorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Epilogue
It is obvious that these two petitions must fail. The Constitution and the laws do not
support them. Extant jurisprudence militates against them. Reason and common sense reject
them.Equity and morality abhor them. They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving
propositions to lengthen governance without a mandate from the governed. In a democracy,
elected leaders can legally and morally justify their reign only by obtaining the voluntary
consent of the electorate. In this case however, petitioners propose to extend their terms not
by seeking the peoplesvote but by faulty legal argumentation. This Court cannot and will not
grant its imprimatur to such untenable proposition. If they want to continue serving, they
must get a new mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.
SO ORDERED.