1.

RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong
charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the
respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be
not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his
name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster
mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about
1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and
forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and
her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse
with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to
subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her
foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed
ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster
mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became
pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of
Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors
that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent;
that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he
was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in
his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24,
t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the
Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office
of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from
January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he
limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed
her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she
had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took
place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty
times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity.
He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster
parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to
marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to
Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give
him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and
intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed
not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the
alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage
involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience
recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live
maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that
she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18
years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The
seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of
marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook
her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his
moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and
called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could
not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition
dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and
praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the
first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From
1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage

still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and
had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take
the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he
was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his
adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should
be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office
of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent
Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be
stricken from the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit
the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General
formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of
falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of
good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining
illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him
unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and
praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ...
from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the
complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different
and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the
necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed
that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted,
and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape
has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no
act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his
petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member
of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia
Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on
December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia AngelesRoyong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to
Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n.
24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr.
Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her
sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n.
26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later
on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent
were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her
to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left
Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and
respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left
Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already
reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25).
Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her
father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with
him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request
was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring,
among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because
the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place
on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with
his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began
courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit
the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told
him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said
date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law
husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga;
that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could
he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told
Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again;
that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia
strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him
anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines)
had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman;
that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this
Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did

not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being
used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed
he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first
learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when
he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators,
pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as
he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2)
Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even
after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to
his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally
(adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his
counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent
asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the
corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and
that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from
1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the
and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to
cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit
relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that
the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the
grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by
Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has
already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to
exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to
the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority,
and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised
in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard.
(1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a
well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power)
may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that
statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such
statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its

officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the
United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a
fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed,
the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In
Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he
refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he
himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking
her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took
advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of
his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him
as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence
over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him
'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her
age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it
is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit
relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by
these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds
for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is
a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We
cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and

another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify
him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral
integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close
its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to
shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting
the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why
he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way
finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to
abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an
excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate
himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining
sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with
a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece
is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit
and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever
he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the
present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or
offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape,
and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing,
if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor
General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation,
with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme
Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the
Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally
filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor
General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The

Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be
justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person
of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of
himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one
which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what
he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license
to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of
personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law
is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den.
[N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612).
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people
who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J.
Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City1and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely,
Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987,
however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University
of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and
alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed
the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that
the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March
1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no
avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's
husband, Carlos Ui.
In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known
him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a
Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that
during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact
got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because
respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his
second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she
was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of
Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in
March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work
with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of
Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating
with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in
Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos

(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give
birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged
her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started
and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos
were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and
they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of
1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which
is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged.
The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the
fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger
(U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed
for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the
Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However,
the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on
file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos
Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as
claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false
allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her
first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt
of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of
integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she
did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on
what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this
case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that
upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated
that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of
a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible
for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that
the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to
make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the
fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted
respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person

responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a
child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and
ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the
house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no
evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private
security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent
presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing
the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of
Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui
in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it
suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that
upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her
husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was
the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably
failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a
married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report
and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult
to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is
not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him.
When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.
Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the
children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should
deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed
her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint
for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio
is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending
in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition
to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).26

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and
as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not
only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised
prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if
Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos
Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting
her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we
find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy
of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a
marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year
when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense
of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice.
Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.
1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future.
SO ORDERED.

CONCERNED EMPLOYEE, complainant,

vs.
GLENDA ESPIRITU MAYOR, Court Stenographer, RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo
City, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
This administrative matter concerns a court employee called to task for her sexual liaisons with
a married man. While the recommended sanction merits affirmance, the story behind this case
contains previously unappreciated nuances which deserve full consideration and discussion.
Respondent Glenda E. Mayor secured a temporary appointment in 1990 as Court Stenographer
III of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Olongapo City.1 On 29 October 1998, a letter
addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo adverted to several immoral activities,
characterized by promiscuous sexual behavior, on the part of respondent. The letter-writer also
alleged that respondent had been unable to pass her Civil Service Eligibility Exams and noted
that "her boss the famous Judge E. Ubadias, has been exhausting all possibilities lately so
Glenda Mayor can extend and renew her appointment. [The letter-writer is] just curious and
wondering about the preference given to Glenda Mayor by Judge Ubiadias because the former
has a bad reputation in the entire Hall of Justice."2 The letter was signed by a "Concerned
Employee," whose true identity has never been revealed.
The letter was referred to then RTC Executive Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr.3 of Olongapo
City for Discreet Investigation and Report. On 30 April 1999, Judge Calderon submitted his
findings in a Report. The Report stated that on 19 May 1998, respondent filed a complaint for
parental recognition and support of her child, Glen Hzelle Joseph E. Mayor, with the Olongapo
RTC presided by Judge Calderon himself against Neslie L. Leao, a married policeman. In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she was single, and that her child was born on 14 May 1997,
"after a short courtship during which [respondent] was made to believe that [Leao] was
single."4 The Report further stated that on 3 February 1999, respondent and Leao submitted a
compromise agreement, wherein Leao admitted paternity of the child and promised to provide
support for the child. The compromise agreement formed the basis of a Decision which has
since become final.5 The Report also noted that respondent testified during the hearing on her
action for support that she and Leao had sexual trysts on several occasions, beginning in
February of 1996.6 The Report concluded that incontrovertible evidence established that
respondent had "indulged in an illegal and immoral sexual relationship with a married man,
openly, and in an (sic) scandalous manner." Judge Calderon recommended that respondent's
temporary appointment should not be renewed after its lapse.7 No reference was made in the
Report as to the other allegations adverted to in the anonymous letter.
Upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the case was redocketed
as a regular administrative matter, and respondent was required to comment on the anonymous

letter. In her Comment, respondent admitted having filed the complaint for recognition and
support against Leao. However, she denied the other allegations in the anonymous letter. She
also averred that she passed the Stenographer's Examination given by the Civil Service
Regional Office of Pampanga on 16 September 2000, as a result of which her employment
status was subsequently changed from temporary to permanent on 26 February 2001.8
The administrative matter was referred to RTC Olongapo Executive Judge Eliodoro G.
Ubiadias9 for appropriate investigation and report. Judge Ubadias issued a Memorandum
directing all personnel of the RTC-Olongapo City to submit via a sealed envelope their
respective comments on the complaint filed against Mayor. As reported by Judge Ubadias, none
of the employees of Branch 72 submitted any report or comment in response to the
Memorandum. On the other hand, the employees of Branches 73 and 74 reported to Judge
Ubiadas that not one of them had written the anonymous letter. Judge Ubiadas concluded that
the charges posed against respondent were unsubstantiated, and consequently recommended
the dismissal of the complaint.10
Judge Ubiadas' report was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
On 3 October 2003, the OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez, issued
a Memorandum, wherein it was recommended that respondent be found guilty of disgraceful
and immoral conduct and that she be suspended for six (6) months without pay with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.11 The OCA conceded that there was no subsequent substantiation of the allegations in
the letter-complaint. However, as it was undisputed that respondent had given birth to a child
out of wedlock, such finding alone was sufficient ground to warrant the imposition of an
administrative sanction against the respondent for disgraceful and immoral conduct, the OCA
noted.12 Also cited was the previous conclusion of the late Judge Calderon that respondent had
engaged in an illegal and immoral sexual relationship with a married man, openly and in a
scandalous manner.
The bar of morality to which judicial employees should adhere to is quite high, and with good
reason. The words of wisdom of Justice Muoz-Palma bear repeating:
. . . The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest
of its personnelhence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the
court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. 13

At the same time, the Court's "imperative sacred duty" does not warrant any rush to judgment,
regardless of the rank of the employee or the gravity of the charges. Due caution must
especially be observed in cases such as this, where the complainant has not been openly
identified and where the accusations are particularly vituperative in nature. Gossip regarding
one's sexual proclivities is rarely flattering to its subject, and often demeaning. Unsubstantiated
charges as to sexual misconduct, especially those made from behind the convenient cloak of
anonymity, deserve immediate and emphatic rebuke from this Court, lest we engender an
atmosphere of sexual McCarthyism.
Administrative penalties must be supported by substantial evidence for the imposition
thereof.14 The constitutional imperative is that due process must always be
observed.15 Unquestionably, respondent has been informed of the charges against her and

afforded the opportunity to respond thereto. The question that remains is whether the evidence
presented warrants the imposition of an administrative penalty.
As correctly found by DCA Perez, most of the allegations stated in the anonymous lettercomplaint were unsubstantiated. Thus, they were correctly disregarded. What becomes clear
though from the facts is that respondent, a single woman, engaged in sexual relations with a
married man, resulting in a child born out of wedlock. Respondent admitted just as much in her
complaint for parental recognition and support filed on 19 May 1998, her admissions therein
verified under oath. Moreover, the illicit liaison occurred during her employment with the
judiciary. For this reason, the DCA recommends that respondent be found guilty of disgraceful
and immoral conduct and suspended for six months.16 In support of the recommendation, he
cited jurisprudence.17
However, we seriously disagree with the OCA's suggestion that the fact alone that respondent
had given birth to a child out of wedlock is sufficient to warrant sanction for disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Such a proposition would neither make nor operate as the general rule, but
would come into play only when the basic fact is conjoined with other circumstances. For
example, there is a wealth of jurisprudence, pertinent to disbarment cases, ruling that the mere
fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
sanction for such illicit behavior.18 In such cases, it was held that to be the basis of a disciplinary
action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must be "grossly immoral""it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree."19
In one of these cases, Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio,20 the respondent female lawyer actually cohabited
with, bore the children of, and contracted a foreign marriage with a man whose previous
marriage was still subsisting. However, when respondent eventually learned about her
paramour's subsisting valid marriage, she left him as a result.21Notwithstanding, a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the lawyer by the legal wife of her lover. The Court found the
sanction of reprimand appropriate due to respondent's attachment of an intercalated Marriage
Certificate to the record of the case in an attempt to foist the mistaken belief that her first child
was born after her Hawaii marriage.22 However, the fact of the illicit affair itself was not adjudged
as cause for administrative sanction, albeit the Court reserved comment on the moral
quandaries the situation presented. The following disquisition of Justice Sabino de Leon in the
Ui case illustrates the dichotomy between the difficult ethical questions posed in that case and
the appropriate legal standards governing the proper sanction:
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are
not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our
legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of
public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that
perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she
exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with
a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find

out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in
courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent
in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos
Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Respondent's act
of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies
just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the
contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
(Emphasis supplied)23

Our landmark ruling in Estrada v. Escritor24 emphasizes that in determining whether the acts
complained of constitute "disgraceful and immoral behavior" under the Civil Service Laws, the
distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the
other should be kept in mind.25 The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed
albeit not exclusivelyin the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is
important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.26 Thus, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose.27
Thus, any judicial pronouncement that an activity constitutes "disgraceful and immoral" behavior
under the contemplation of the Civil Service law must satisfy the test that such conduct is
regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. Such judicial declarations
cannot be mere effectuations of personal bias, notably those colored by particular religious
mores. Nor would the demand be satisfied by the haphazard invocation of "cultural" values,
without a convincing demonstration that these cultural biases have since been recognized and
given accord within the realm of public policy. The Constitution and the statutes of the land
would serve as especially authoritative sources of recognition, since they are irrefutable as to
what the public policy is. At the same time, the constitutional protections afforded under the Bill
of Rights should be observed, to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon
by the majority.
Under these tests, we can draw two conclusions arising from the fact that a single woman gives
birth out of wedlock.
If the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable
for disgraceful and immoral conduct. The situation may not be desirable, and may cause

complications in the life of both mother and child, but it does not give cause for administrative
sanction. There is no law penalizing such an unmarried mother under those circumstances by
reason of her sexual conduct, or for that matter, proscribing the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons. Neither does the sexual behavior among single persons
contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution, a document that
accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.
On the other hand, if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman
other than the mother, then there could be cause for administrative sanction against either the
father or mother. In this case, the "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a married person. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, the sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized28 and likewise
affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union.29 Accordingly, the Court has
had little qualms with penalizing judicial employees for their dalliances with married persons or
for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
Thus, respondent's possible sanction arises not from her having had a child out of wedlock, but
from her sexual relations with a married man. That respondent and Neslie Leao engaged in
extra-marital trysts is uncontroverted, admitted by respondent herself in her verified complaint
for parental recognition and support filed on 19 May 1998. Moreover, the illicit liaison occurred
during her employment with the judiciary. These circumstances were considered by the OCA in
arriving at its recommendation.
However, the facts are not actually as clear-cut as they seem, and the OCA failed to appreciate
the entire picture. Respondent's admission is qualified by what ostensibly is a valid
defensethat she was not aware that Leao, her paramour, was a married man. This is
evidenced by an allegation to that effect in her Complaint, which was verified and under
oath.30 Respondent testified under oath in open court during the hearing on her Petition that she
learned that Leao was married only after she became pregnant in 1997:
Q: And when did you come to know for the first time that the defendant is married?
A: When I was on the family way and he told me and keep [sic] on telling me that they were
just living-in and having one child.31

Had respondent indeed not known that Leao was married when they commenced their
relationship, such lack of awareness may constitute a valid defense for her actions. It is not
beyond belief that she would not have known of Leao's existing marriage.
The legal effect of such ignorance deserves due consideration, if only for intellectual clarity. The
act of having sexual relations with a married person, or of married persons having sexual
relations outside their marriage is considered "disgraceful and immoral" conduct because such
manifests deliberate disregard by the actor of the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
our laws. The perversion is especially egregious if committed by judicial personnel, those
persons specifically tasked with the administration of justice and the laws of the land. However,
the malevolent intent that normally characterizes the act is not present when the employee is
unaware that his/her sexual partner is actually married. This lack of awareness may extenuate
the cause for the penalty, as it did in the aforementioned Ui case.

However, the evidence on record also reveals that even after respondent learned of Leao's
marital state, she still, at least on one occasion, had a sexual encounter with him. In the
proceedings on her Petition for support, she testified as follows:
Court (to witness [Mayor])
Q: When was your last intercourse (sic) with [Leao]?
A: I can no longer remember the date but it was May, this May 1998.32

Significantly, this admitted encounter in May of 1998 occurred about one year after respondent's
child was born on 14 May 1997. Thus, while respondent may have been truthful in asserting that
she had not known Leao was married when they commenced their affair, or when Leao had
impregnated her, the fact remains that even long after respondent knew Leao was married,
she still consented to indulge in sexual congress with him.
Had respondent desisted from continuing her affair with Leao after learning he was married,
this would have exhibited not only prudence on her part, but also a willingness to respect a legal
institution safeguarded by our laws and the Constitution. Yet her persistence in maintaining
sexual relations with Leao after that revelation instead manifests a willful subversion of the
legal order, a disposition we are unwilling to condone, even if avowed in the name of love. The
Court, like all well-meaning persons, has no desire to dash romantic fancies, yet in the exercise
of its duty, is all too willing when necessary to raise the wall that tears Pyramus and Thisbe
asunder.
The conclusion of the OCA that respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct is
correct, albeit for the reasons we do not share.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Glenda E. Mayor, Court Stenographer III, RTC,
Branch 72, Olongapo City, GUILTY of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and orders that she be
SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay with WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
P.I. MANPOWER PLACEMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), and NORBERTO CUENTA,
SR.,respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the decision of the NLRC, affirming the
decision of the POEA dated April 20, 1990 which held petitioner P.I. Manpower Placements Inc., LPJ
Enterprises Inc. (now ADDISC Enterprises Inc.) and foreign employer Al Jindan Contracting and
Trading Establishment jointly and solidarily liable to private respondent Norberto Cuenta, Sr., for the

sum of US$10,560.00 representing his unpaid salaries and the unexpired portion of his contract, as
well as the resolution of the NLRC denying reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as found by the NLRC, are as follows:
On September 29, 1988, private respondent Norberto Cuenta, Sr., applied to petitioner P.I.
Manpower Placements Inc. (P.I. Manpower) for overseas employment as trailer driver. Danny
Alonzo, representing himself as an agent of petitioner, accompanied Cuenta to the office of Teresita
Rivera, Operations Manager of petitioner. Cuenta was asked to submit his BLT certificate, secure a
valid passport, undergo medical examination and pay a placement fee of P10,800.00. Teresita
Rivera wrote the Bureau of Land Transportation in behalf of Cuenta to facilitate issuance of the BLT
certificate.
When the requirements were almost complete, Rivera, in an urgent letter dated October 27, 1988,
told Cuenta to come to her office as soon as possible. For lack of funds, private respondent reported
only on November 5, 1988 and made a partial payment of P3,000.00. Rivera allowed Cuenta to pay
the balance of P7,800.00 later. Thereafter, she issued a receipt and made Cuenta sign in blank the
Agency-Worker Agreement, assuring Cuenta that the terms and conditions of his employment as
agreed would be stated in the contract, particularly Cuenta's salary at $440.00 a month.
On November 20, 1988, private respondent was advised of his flight to Dharan, Saudi Arabia.
Accordingly, on November 23, 1988, he paid the balance of P7,800.00, although no receipt was
issued to him even after he had left. It was when he was already on the plane that he was able to
read his employment papers as the same were handed to him by Rivera only before he boarded the
plane. To his surprise, Cuenta found out that his deploying agent was LPJ Enterprises, not P.I.
Manpower, and that his monthly salary was SR960.00, and not $440.00, which was less than what
he and Teresita Rivera had agreed.
Upon arriving in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, Cuenta was assigned by Al Jindan Contracting and Trading
Establishment (Al Jindan) to drive a trailer. He was later informed that he would receive an
allowance of SR200.00 for the first two months but none in the third, because he was on probation.
On March 23, 1989, without prior notice and investigation Cuenta was dismissed and told to pack up
and surrender his working permit (Iguama).
After arriving home in the Philippines, he immediately saw a certain Mr. Depsi, owner of P.I.
Manpower. Cuenta was told, however, that nothing could be done by P.I. Manpower because the
obligation of the agency was only to deploy workers, like Cuenta.
In July 1989, private respondent Cuenta filed a complaint in the POEA for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of wages and recruitment violations against P.I. Manpower Placements Inc., LPJ
Enterprises Inc., and Al Jindan Contracting and Trading Establishment and their respective bonding
companies. In addition, he filed criminal charges against Teresita Rivera, Issan El Debs, General
Manager of P.I. Manpower, and Danny Alonzo for estafa and illegal recruitment, but the cases were
dismissed after the fiscal found no deceit and misrepresentation on the part of the accused. 1
On April 20, 1990, the POEA, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 2

WHEREFORE, respondents P.I. Manpower Placement Inc., and LPG Enterprises,

Inc., (Addisc Enterprises) and Al Jindan Cont. and Trading Est. are hereby held
jointly and severally liable to pay complainant Norberto Cuenta the following:
1. US$8,800.00 representing salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract;
and
2. US$1,760.00 representing his unpaid salaries for 4 months of actual service.
or the total amount of $10,560.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC which, on November 20, 1990, affirmed the decision of the
POEA..
On January 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but its motion was denied on
January 21, 1991. 3Separate petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed by petitioner and the LPJ
Enterprises, questioning the decision of` the NLRC.
On July 15, 1991, this Court's First Division, in a resolution of that date, modified the decision of the
NLRC. The dispositive part of the resolution in G.R. No. 97857 reads: 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner. The
challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount of SR400 or
its equivalent in Philippine pesos, representing the food allowance paid to the private
respondent for two months, shall be deducted from the total amount awarded to him.
The temporary restraining order dated May 6, 1991, is LIFTED.
On December 11, 1991, a writ of execution was served upon the petitioner. In an Urgent Motion for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order 5 filed on January 2, 1992, petitioner sought to enjoin
the POEA from enforcing the decision against it in view of the pendency of this petition. Its motion was
granted on January 20, 1992. 6
Petitioner contends that the resolution of the NLRC has no factual and legal basis; that private
respondent's dismissal was for a just cause because, as stated in the telegram 7 dated April 5, 1989 of
the foreign employer, Cuenta was unwilling to work and was threatening to harm others if he was given
other assignments. In any event, it is contended that Cuenta cannot question the termination of his
employment because he was on probation and thus can be dismissed for failing to meet the minimum
standards required by his employer.
Petitioner also argues that public respondent improperly construed the rules on the joint and solidary
liability of the placement agency and the foreign employer for claims and liabilities arising from
violations of the terms and conditions of the contract. Petitioner claims that Cuenta was a walk-in
applicant whose application was accepted only for "manpooling purposes" and that Rivera only
referred Cuenta to her friend Danny Alonzo of LPJ Enterprises because Cuenta was in a hurry to get
a job. It denies liability under the contract of employment because the Agency-Worker Agreement
and the travel exit pass (TEP) show LPJ Enterprises to be the local deploying agent of private
respondent.

Denying it was guilty of misrepresentation, petitioner claims that Cuenta read the documents before
he left for abroad.
Petitioner disputes the NLRC's assessment that "reprocessing" of applications was evil and asserts
that agencies, like itself, which refer applicants to other agencies for employment, help reduce
unemployment in the country. Petitioner maintains that its suspension for four months should be
sufficient to answer for its "misrepresentation" or for whatever indiscretions it may have committed in
the use of its license.
The petition has no merit. The facts of this case amply support the NLRC's findings that Cuenta was
not dismissed for cause and that petitioner was privy to Cuenta's contract of employment by taking
an active part in the latter's recruitment, justifying thereby the finding that petitioner is jointly and
solidarily liable with LPJ Enterprises and Al-Jindan.
First. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid grounds for dismissal rests upon the
employer. 8Considering this rule and the evidence of petitioner, particularly the telegram sent by Cuenta's
foreign employer to Danny Alonzo, we find no reason to disturb the NLRC's findings that Cuenta was
denied a hearing before he was dismissed from employment. In fact, petitioner does not deny that private
respondent was asked to leave his job without any notice and investigation at all. The telegram 9 claimed
to have been sent by Mohd Abu Dawood, general manager of Al Jindan, has no probative value to prove
just cause for Cuenta's dismissal. There is no proof of its due execution and no concrete evidence to
support its contents. It does not prove the charge that Cuenta was a dangerous person who carried
deadly weapon to work and who failed to meet the minimum requirements set by his employer. Petitioner
failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove its allegations.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's claim that private respondent was a probationary employee who
could be dismissed any time. Private respondent was an employee hired for a fixed term whose
employment was to end the only at the expiration of the period stipulated in his contract. 10 But even if
he was a probationary employee, he is nonetheless entitled to constitutional protection of security of
tenure that no worker shall be dismissed except for cause provided by law 11 and after due process. 12
Second. Cuenta was accepted for immediate deployment. This is shown by the following undisputed
facts: Rivera wrote a letter to the Bureau of Land Transportation to facilitate the processing of
Cuenta's papers, received from the latter the P3,000.00 as partial payment of the required fees, and
the P7,080.00 balance thereof, signed the order of payment accepting the partial payment made by
him and approving Cuenta's application for processing, and delivered to Cuenta his employment and
travel documents at the airport. 13 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, certain circumstances in this
case such as the fact that Rivera sent Cuenta a letter informing him that an employer was asking for
his (Cuenta's) employment papers as soon as possible and the issuance by petitioner of the order of
payment showing that Cuenta's papers were approved for processing indicate that Rivera indeed
recruited Cuenta within the meaning of the Labor Code, which defines recruitment as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not." 14
Petitioner does not question these facts attributed to Rivera. Instead, it avers that Rivera acted in her
personal capacity and denies that it received the money paid by private respondent. Petitioner
claims that its general manager did not approve the order of payment because no position was
available to accommodate private respondent's application.

This is a self serving claim. The mere fact that the order of payment was not signed by petitioner's
general manager does not prove that petitioner did not receive the money paid by Cuenta to Rivera
or that petitioner had no knowledge and did not consent to the acts of Rivera. The fact is that Rivera
was a responsible officer of petitioner. No evidence was adduced to show that the public was
properly warned that without the general manager's approval no order of payment was valid. The
fact that private respondent was received in the petitioner's business address and that petitioner's
name, seal and address were imprinted in the letters sent by Rivera for the processing and
completion of Cuenta's papers sufficiently make petitioner liable for these transactions. That these
documents are accessible to any person is immaterial. What is important is that Rivera, as
operations manager of petitioner PI Manpower, used them in the course of petitioner's business, i.e.,
recruitment. Indeed, except for its denial, petitioner has not presented evidence showing that it
disowned Rivera's representations to private respondent.
Third. Petitioner's claim that it had no opening and could not have considered Cuenta's application
does not negate the fact that petitioner was instrumental in his deployment. As observed by the
NLRC, LPJ Enterprises acted as a confederate agency of P.I. Manpower. With Rivera and Alonzo
agreeing to send Cuenta abroad as truck driver for Al Jindan (LPJ's foreign principal), it was
immaterial that P.I. Manpower did not have a foreign employer for Cuenta. This further explains why
the Agency-Worker Agreement and travel exit pass (TEP) indicate LPJ Enterprises and not to P.I.
Manpower to be the recruiter. The POEA's approval could not have been obtained had the name of
petitioner appeared therein.
The NLRC correctly found petitioner guilty of misrepresentation. Indeed, Cuenta could not have
known that LPJ Enterprises was his local employing agent because he had been dealing with
petitioner. His employment documents were given to him only when he was about to board the
plane, and therefore he had no time to examine them completely. As the NLRC, pointed out:
The true relationship between the applicant and the agency is usually revealed only
when the former is at the airport and is about to depart or is already abroad, at the
time and place where no matter how disadvantageous the contract of employment
maybe, in terms of salaries and benefits, prudence would deter the applicant from
backing out from the contract, what with all the time, effort, and money he had spent
for this.
Petitioner insists that there was no mispresentation because Cuenta knew that LPJ Enterprises was
his agency. Petitioner alleges that Cuenta read the documents and could not have signed the
Agency-Worker agreement in blank form because he is not an illiterate individual who could have
been made to do that.
The fact, however, is that private respondent, after arriving in the Philippines, promptly went to P.I.
Manpower's office and complained to its owner, Mr. Depsi. If Cuenta knew that LPJ Enterprises was
his agency, he would have undoubtedly have gone to the latter's office and not to P.I. Manpower.
Moreover, we cannot find any reason why Teresita Rivera should go to all the trouble of making sure
that private respondent was deployed, if petitioner had no part in the recruitment of Cuenta. That
private respondent is not an illiterate who could be victimized is not a reason for finding that he could
not have failed to notice that he was signing up for employment overseas with another agency and
not with petitioner. He was assured that everything he and Rivera had agreed could be embodied in
the contract and he believed Rivera.

Lastly, the finding of the prosecutor in the criminal case filed by Cuenta that there was no
misrepresentation and deceit on the part of Teresita Rivera, Issan Al Debs and Danny Alonzo is not
binding on the NLRC. The two cases are separate and distinct and require different quantum of
evidence and involve different procedure. 15 Furthermore, the POEA and the NLRC conducted
independent means of finding the ultimate facts of this case which serve as basis of their decisions.
These factual findings of the NLRC, when supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect if not
finality by courts. 16
Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in Ilas v. NLRC 17 is misplaced. Unlike in the case at bar, the agency in
that case was exonerated from liability (although it appeared as a party in the contract of employment of
the complaining workers) because the agency did not consent nor have knowledge of its involvement in
recruiting the workers. The complaining workers there admitted that they knew that the agency was not
their recruiter and that it was merely used to enable them to travel and obtain travel exit passes as their
actual recruitment agency had no license. It was also found that transactions were not made in the
business address of the agency. On the other hand, here petitioner actively took part in recruiting and
deploying Cuenta. It allowed its name, business premises, office supplies, and other facilities, including
the services of its Operations Manager, to be used for the transaction.
Fourth. While the practice of agencies in referring applicants to other agencies for immediate hiring
and deployment, what is referred to by the POEA and petitioner as "reprocessing," is not evil per se,
agencies should know that the act of endorsing and referring workers is recruitment as defined by
law and, therefore, they can be held liable for the consequences thereof. Recruitment, whether a
business activity or otherwise, has economic and social consequences, as its failure or success
affects the very livelihood of families and, ultimately, of the nation.
The joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is
meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. This
is in line with the policy of the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. Hence,
petitioner's contention that the four-month suspension of its license is enough punishment is without
merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued on January
20, 1990 is LIFTED. The decision of the NLRC, as modified in G.R. No. 97857, must now be
executed.
SO ORDERED.

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P.
Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the
case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the
release of the payment for the latters 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the
subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The
agreement also included the payment of the debts of Presbiteros late husband to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed
to payP700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to
PNB for P1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNBs claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the
filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorneys fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the
expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from respondents fees. Respondent
received P50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came
out of it.
In May 2006, Presbiteros daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondents
services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the
registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of
30% of the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained P200,000 from
Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the
property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would
not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of
10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in
Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also
agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan
as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an
account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce,
Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling
Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third
MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in
Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against
an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under
the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to
Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a
total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon.
In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When
complainants called respondents attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding
months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero
terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent
countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants
also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high
interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his
sons accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the
identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263square-meter property to her for P1,000,000 but he later sold it for only P150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that
it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him
that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed
the money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages
and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to
Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because
the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro
was valuable and it was actually worth more than P8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was
unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him.
Respondent also denied that he was hiding from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him P530,000 as interest due for
September to December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that
complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current account and they were the
ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he

already started with the titling of Yulos lot but his services were terminated before it could be
completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbiteros case in February
2006 and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the
IBP-CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed P2,000,000 from Navarro and P1,000,000 from
Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD
found that based on the documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good
faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either promised or agreed to
pay the very high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in
accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and
her husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also
mortgaged a property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was
only P300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that property for only P150,000.
Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later
claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing P300,000 from the
amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all
the money he borrowed in three months except for his claim that the price of sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of
the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed
them that it would be his wife or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that
respondent had not been transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection with
Presbiteros VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration
of Yulos property which was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts
were already closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received
from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the clients interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records
were not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD
likewise found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his
cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended
penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors likewise ordered respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to
complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be
instead imposed upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no
longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the
interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263square-meter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for
only P150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged
property. Respondents allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from
the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only
claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that
they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to
agree with the IBP-CBDs finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged
to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued
to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged
to accounts in respondents name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
1

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondents private capacity.
Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulos lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyerclient relationship. However, respondent was Presbiteros counsel at the time she granted him a
loan. It was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he
mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a
Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with
respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the
terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates
were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same
MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his sons account whose name was
similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will
show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBPCBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not
account for all of them.
4

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulos 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent
received P265,000 from her. Respondent countered that P105,000 was paid for real estate
taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he
paid P70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only for P15,000. Respondent claimed that he
paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not
substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been
less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of
Yulos property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo
who had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent
received P50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how
respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he
received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from
his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.
1wphi1

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the
time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondents loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real
estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his
son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the
ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks
issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already
closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes
that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation. In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage
of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
6

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see
no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the

penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to
secure undue gains for himself that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we
cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors recommendation ordering respondent to return his
unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his
client, Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondents administrative liability.
7

10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to
file against each other. Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a
particular purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. If the lawyer does
not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his
client. Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must
return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to P50,000.
11

12

13

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero,
amounting to P50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this
order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public
Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
1

In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners,
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that
he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito
Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006,
during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with
pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was
assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following
during her speech:
2

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal
sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang
ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang
bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae
na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon."
3

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.
4

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and
filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability,
to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter
was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No. 8942
(Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for rape, which was pending before the
RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed
Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and alleged that
the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty to
a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and
discredited Areola.
5

In her unverified Answer dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the
administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed
several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail
warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained. These actuations show that
Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against anybody who does not accede to his
demand. Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co6

detainees as one. She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were
not proper.
8

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15,
2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part.
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective
position papers.
9

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must,
however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found
no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees
as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:
10

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the
inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to
file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by the act/s being complained
of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove the said charges. Hence,
it is simply hearsay in nature.
11

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their
relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be
granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner,
this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and
lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.
12

13

In a Notice of Resolution dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
14

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP
Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B,
Section 12, Paragraph b of the Revised Rules of Court.
15

16

17

The Courts Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola
has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from his codetainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint
on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that

no document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint.
They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said codetainees to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas
statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated
this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the
pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of Atty.
Mendoza. It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no
matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice
and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put
to good use by cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers
and other government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more
intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply , he
made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english . He also called
the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office" which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While
Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of
cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the
PAO instead of maligning it.
18

19

20

21

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and
plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to
one of Areolas charges against Atty. Mendozathat she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang
ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it
appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and
crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule
15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is uncalled for.
22

It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
1wphi1

23

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great

caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court
notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice.
While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
24

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in
the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents length of service, the
respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among
other things, have had varying significance in the Courts determination of the imposable
penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the present case and her
being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by
Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to
Atty. Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
25

26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of
giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female client is guilty of
reprehensible conduct that is unbecoming of a member of the Bar and may be condignly
punished with suspension from the practice of law.
Antecedents
Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedrea, a Public Attorney. She
averred in her complaint-affidavit that Atty. Pedrea had sexually harassed her as follows:
1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I went to the Public Attorneys Office
in Paraaque City, in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA about the status of my
case for support for my two minor children against my husband, which case is being handled
by Atty. Pedrea;

2. At that time, said Atty. Pedrea was at a court hearing, so I waited at his office until he
arrived at about 11:45 a.m. Atty. Pedrea told me to go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so
we could take our lunch together and to talk about my said case;
3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked me many personal matters rather
than to discuss my said case. But still, I answered him with respect, for he was my lawyer;
4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m.
because according to him, my said case was quite difficult, that he needed more time to
study;
5. Since Atty. Pedrea was also already going home then, he told me then to ride with him
and he would just drop me by the jeepney station;
6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently convinced me to get in the car, and so I
acceded to his request so as not to offend him;
7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far from the City Hall, Atty. Pedrea
immediately held my left hand with his right hand, insisted me to get closer with him and laid
me on his shoulder;
8. I immediately responded by saying "AYOKO HO!" But he persisted in trying to get hold of
my hand and he also tried very hard to inserting (sic) his finger into my firmly closed hand.
Thus, I became very afraid and at the same time offended for his lack of respect for me at
that moment; 9. Despite my resistance, he continued rubbing my left leg. I was then
attempting to remove his hand on my leg, but he grabbed my hand and forced it to put (sic)
on his penis;
10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I continued to wrestle and struggle,
and as I saw that we were already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place where I was
supposed to get off, Atty. Pedrea made another move of pressing his finger against my
private part;
11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the cars door and told him categorically that I was
getting off the car. But because the traffic light was on green, he accelerated a bit more
instead, but sensing my insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed me to get off.
He then reminded me to see him on February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. for the continuation of
hearing of my case;
12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case, but this time, I brought with me my
five-year-old child to avoid another incident. I was not able to see Atty. Pedrea then, so I
just signed some documents;1

In his answer, Atty. Pedrea averred that De Leons allegations were unsubstantiated; that
entertaining such a complaint would open the gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the
names of good lawyers; that the complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the
ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already charged him with acts of

lasciviousness in the Paraaque City Prosecutors Office; and that he had also filed a complaint
for theft against De Leon.2
Attached to Atty. Pedreas answer were his counter-affidavit in the criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness and his complaint-affidavit for theft. In his counter affidavit, Atty. Pedrea
admitted giving a ride to De Leon, but he vehemently denied making sexual advances on her,
insisting that she had sat very close to him during the ride that even made it hard for him to shift
gears, and that the ride had lasted for only two to three minutes.3 He claimed that De Leon was
allowing herself to be used by his detractors in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) after he had
opposed the practice of certain PAO staff members of charging indigent clients for every
document that they prepared. In his complaint affidavit for theft, he stated that he had another
passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to De Leon, who did not notice the presence of
the other passenger because the ride lasted for only two to three minutes; and that the other
passenger was Emma Crespo, who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had witnessed
De Leons act of taking his (Pedrea) cellphone from the handbrake box of the car.4
Only De Leon appeared during the hearing.5 Hence, Atty. Pedrea was deemed to have waived
his right to participate in the proceedings.6
Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedrea
and the striking off of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.7 Holding that a disbarment case was
sui generis and could proceed independently of the criminal case that was based on the same
facts; and that the proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedrea was finally resolved, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. Pedrea had made sexual advances on De Leon in violation of
Rule 1.018 and Rule 7.039 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Pedrea suspension from the practice of law for three
months.10
Atty. Pedrea filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP,11 which adopted and approved
Resolution No. XX-2012-43 dated January 15, 2012, denying the motion and affirming with
modification its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to six
months.12
On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX2012-43 and the records of the case for final approval.13
In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted the IBP Board of Governors notice of
Resolution No. XX-2012-43.14
Ruling
The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner stated thusly:

There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove her case against the Respondent. During
the clarificatory hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in answering the questions
propounded on her. Her account of the incident that happened on 30 January 2006 was
consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint and Verified Position Paper.
On the other hand, Respondents defenses are not credible enough to rebut the claims of
Complainant. His defenses are replete with
Decision 5 A.C. No. 9401 inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire proceedings show lack
of integrity in his dealings with both the Complainant and this Commission.
xxxx
We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by Respondent. The Theft case filed by
Respondent is a mere afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal complaint hinged on
a claim that there was another person during that incident who allegedly saw Complainant
stealing Respondents mobile phone. Yet, in Respondents Position Paper and in his CounterAffidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was executed after the institution of the
criminal complaint for Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about a third person being
present during the incident. If the presence of this third person was crucial to prove his case
against herein Complainant, there is no reason why this allegation would be omitted in his
Position Paper and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense.
Furthermore, Respondents contention that Complainant is being used by his detractors is selfserving. His memo regarding the amount of RATA he receives is a relatively harmless query to a
higher authority, which could not possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other people to file
cases against Respondent.15
We adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the
IBP Board of Governors, for being substantiated by the evidence on record.
The records show that Atty. Pedrea rubbed the complainants right leg with his hand; tried to
insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch
area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he
committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful
and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it
bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.16
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession.
Members of the Bar are clearly duty- bound to observe the highest degree of morality and
integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a
lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor,
be it in the lawyers public or private activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyers suspension or
disbarment.17 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member of the Bar

may be disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Towards that end, we have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar to live up to the
standards and norms of the Legal Profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Pedreas misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney
mandated to provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was
then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be
accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then
in desperate need of his legal assistance.
Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we consider the recommended penalty of
suspension for six months not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.
Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Courts
discretion. The exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated
by any animosity or prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the Bar and to exact from
the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the Court, to his client, to his brethren in the
profession, and to the general public.18
1wphi1

In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Atty. Pedrea, therefore, we take into
consideration judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters. Although
most of the judicial precedents dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs, or
cohabited with women other than their wives,19 they are nonetheless helpful in gauging the
degree of immorality committed by the respondent.
In Advincula v. Macabata,20 the Court held that the errant lawyers acts of turning his clients
head towards him and then kissing her on the lips were distasteful, but still ruled that such acts,
albeit offensive and undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the respondent lawyer was
merely reprimanded but reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealings with clients.
In Barrientos v. Daarol,21 the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but the severest penalty was
imposed not only because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but also because of his
deceit. He had been already married and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to
a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of her, and made her pregnant. He not only
suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he also breached his promise to marry her, and, in
the end, even deserted her and their child.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,22 the Court adjudged the respondent lawyer, a married man with
children, highly immoral for having taken advantage of his position as the chairman of the
College of Medicine of his school in enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to
have carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects should
she refuse. The respondent was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
Without diminishing the gravity of the complainants sad experience, however, we consider the
acts committed by Atty. Pedrea to be not of the same degree as the acts punished under the

cited judicial precedents. Neither did his acts approximate the act committed by the respondent
lawyer in Calub v. Suller,23 whereby we disbarred the respondent lawyer for raping his neighbors
wife notwithstanding that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal
prosecution for the crime. We further note that, unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and
in Delos Reyes where there were threats and taking advantage of the respondent lawyers
position, Atty. Pedrea did not employ any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he desisted
upon the first signs of the complainants firm refusal to give in to his advances.
In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years
is fitting and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA from the practice of law for
two years effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in
existent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC)
instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office,
represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter

requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request
for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It
was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had
decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter
dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October
12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of
the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the
situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,
2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in
an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the
latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation
to the Office of the Bar Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion
on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent
laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that
Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he
had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy
Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue
in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from
Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong,
Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the
assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been
responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of
the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the
purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084
concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo
as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration
of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that
the respondent had receivedP60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She
rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel
Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn
statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first
place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction
of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names and dates?
Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and
merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made
this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought.
Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would
falsely implicate him in this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-200870921 denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as
his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the
petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment
within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he
had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of
Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in
Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a
history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation
of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the
respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive
evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only
after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to
comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than
an after thought.
1wphi1

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that
declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged
decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was
rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the
sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately
exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his

fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in
this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing
that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity
and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for
them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x
x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as
lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny
the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of
ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary
authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.28The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.29WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt
of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated

against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony
J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and
Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When
Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above
his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos
affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and
Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified
the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit
dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the
original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6
which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly
close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the lettercomplaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to
Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that
the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the

Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of
the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial
and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed
as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for
the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of
law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law
firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in
the complaint filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9,
for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the
act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge
of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to
exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in
his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry
the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his
law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task
and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed
by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation
of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may
not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as
a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing
ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.
1wphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take
any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to
the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer,

Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he
was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed
the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: ATTY. RUFILLO D. BUCANA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:
Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas,
Iloilo, dated February 26, 1976, respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. Bucana was required by this
Court in its Resolution of March 23, 1976, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice, why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo
an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the aforementioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no
objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the afore-mentioned

Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of them to
remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an
illicit and immoral purpose.
On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation, admitting that he notarized the aforementioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public policy", but in mitigation
he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero without his
previous knowledge; that when said document was presented to him for signature after it was signed
by the parties, he vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document was
immoral; that he placed the said document on his table among his files and more than a week later,
he asked his clerk where the document was for the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he
found that the same was notarized by him as per his file copies in the office; that he dispatched his
clerk to get the copy from the parties, but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their
respective residences; that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in view of the numerous
documents on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased)
was then seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of respondent were corroborated substantially by
the separate sworn statements of his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both
dated April 20, 1976. 1
There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law, morals and good
customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of society without which there
could be neither civilization nor progress. 2
The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife
to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man,
without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit bigamy. 3 This
is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime. A notary public, by virtue of the nature of
his office, is required to exercise his duties with due care and with due regard to the provisions of existing
law.
As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, 4 "it is for the notary to inform himself of
the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually
a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties
notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who
performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the
court even to the extent of disbarment."
In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency, claiming that the notarization of the
questioned document was due to his negligence. We find, however, that the aforementioned
document could not have been notarized if the respondent had only exercised the requisite care
required by law in the exercise of his duties as notary public.
WHEREFORE, We hold that respondent Rufillo D. Bucana is guilty of malpractice and is hereby
suspended from the office of not try public for a period of six (6) months, with the admonition that a
repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.