China and R2P

Conflict, Security & Development
ISSN: 1467-8802 (Print) 1478-1174 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsd20
Debates in China about the responsibility to

protect as a developing international norm: a
general assessment
Tiewa Liu & Haibin Zhang
To cite this article: Tiewa Liu & Haibin Zhang (2014) Debates in China about the responsibility
to protect as a developing international norm: a general assessment, Conflict, Security &
Development, 14:4, 403-427, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2014.930590
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.930590
2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &

Francis.
Published online: 11 Jul 2014.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 1657
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ccsd20
Download by: [150.165.182.61]
Date: 07 April 2016, At: 10:35
Conflict, Security & Development, 2014

Vol. 14, No. 4, 403427, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.930590
Analysis
Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016
Debates in China about the

responsibility to protect as a
developing international
norm: a general assessment
Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin
Over the past several decades, international
concerning the R2P concept in China.
debates over intervention have usually
Based on a review of most of the academic
focused on the primacy of state sovereignty
studies on R2P in China, together with in-
or the protection of human rights. The
depth interviews with senior diplomats and
emergence of the responsibility to protect
practitioners, this article illustrates the
(R2P) stimulates more profound debates by
different views of Chinese officials and
providing
and
scholars on the concept of R2P, offering
terminologies. In this vein, an important
insight into how to construct the new norm
voice of dissent, or at least scepticism, comes
of R2P in order to shape the concept into an
from China. This article pays special
international norm that is more acceptable,
attention
legitimate and operational.
different
to
the
perspectives
domestic
debates
Liu Tiewa is a Lecturer at the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies
University. She also serves as an Advisory Board Member and the China Programme Co-ordinator of the Asia
Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (University of Queensland, Australia).
Zhang Haibin is Professor and Director of the Centre for International Organisations at Peking University. He is
also a member of Global Agenda Councils, World Economic Forum; adviser to the Ministry of Commerce and
serves as trustee of the United Nations Association of China. He published five books and more than 40 academic
articles on global governance and Chinas environmental diplomacy.
q 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.

This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly attributed, cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is
permitted. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
404
Introduction
Until the late 1990s, international debate about humanitarian intervention tended to focus
exclusively on the right to intervene, which contrasted with the long-standing principle of
non-interference in domestic affairs. Debates are flourishing about tensions between
territorial integrity and self-determination, nonintervention and human rights, and relief
and development.1 Many politicians and scholars noted that the international system was
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states. On the other side, as former UN
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Francis Deng proclaimed, [s]overeignty
cannot be an amoral function of authority and control; respect for fundamental human
rights must be among its most basic values.2 In practice, debates over intervention usually
ended without consensus and with few operational results. Thus, a singular focus on
whether or not the rights of humanitarian intervention should take legal precedence over
state sovereignty would only pose a potential (legal) dilemma to those inclined to restrict
national sovereignty.
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
sought to reframe the debate about the content of state sovereignty and, in particular, the
meaning of non-interferencea fundamental principle of the United Nations (UN)
Charter. Since the release of the Commissions report, titled The Responsibility to Protect,
this controversy has diminished but not disappeared. The responsibility to protect (R2P)
concept has two primary components. First, each state has the responsibility to protect its
own people. Second, if a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill that responsibility, other
states (ideally acting under the mandate of the Security Council) have the responsibility to
intervene.
Compared with the traditional debate about international intervention for the purpose
of human protection, the R2P concept has changed not only the perspective but also the
terminology. R2P highlights the right of the weak to seek and secure protection and the
responsibility of the state to protect its citizens. Instead of serving as an afterthought, the
protection of human rights is defined as the fundamental mission of a sovereign state
(sovereignty as responsibility). This new perspective has also brought a new wording
from the right to intervene to the responsibility to protect, thereby stressing the moral
obligation of the international community to protect the victims of violence when a state
has either failed to fulfill its responsibility or acts as the perpetrator of the abuse.3
Debates in China about the responsibility to protect
405
In this debate, an important voice of dissent, or at least scepticism, comes from China.
This article intends to explore the Chinese domestic debate on R2P by illustrating the
different views among Chinese officials and scholars with regard to the norm. The first
section discusses the general attitude of the Chinese Government, retired ambassadors,
diplomats and various academics toward the concept of R2P, attempting to categorise
these views as to whether they are positive, neutral or negative. The next section analyses
the possibility of constructing a conceptual framework for R2P from the perspective of the
Chinese Government and Chinese academic circles, including the content, conditions and
methods of its implementation. The third section concentrates on the comments of some
Chinese diplomats and scholars regarding the application of the R2P concept on specific
issues. It aims to provide a more concrete and comprehensive image of the ongoing debate
in China and hence bring forward the development of Chinese positions on R2P over time.
The fourth section concludes with the main suggestions of Chinese officials and scholars
for R2P norm-building.
Chinese foreign policy-making and debates about the

responsibility to protect
China is characterised by a high degree of centralisation of power and its insulated
decision-making process. Indeed, in contemporary China, foreign policy is still a field
greatly impacted by the central government. There are, however, more and more
governmental agencies taking part in the foreign policy decision-making process. To
understand Chinese diplomatic decision-making, one could imagine it as a pyramid with
three layers. At the first layer are the top leaders of the central government. The second
layer constitutes the main foreign affairs agencies.4 The third layer is made up of institutes
and think tanks that contribute to foreign policy formulation through policy research and
consultation.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the primary role in Chinese international
relations, especially in dealing with inter-state political affairs. Other ministries of the
central government have mostly established international departments to deal with related
foreign issues. For instance, the Ministry of Education sends officials to embassies to deal
with educational affairs. However, it is important to note that the decision-making power
of foreign policy is still limited to the top leadership, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
406
officially presents the attitudes of the central government.5 For this reason our
observations and analyses mainly concentrate on the speeches, announcements and
discussions of Chinese central leaders and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
After the Cold War, along with Chinas rising status and marked increases in Chinese
overseas interests, Chinese foreign policy has seen and is still undergoing substantial
changes. The central government has begun to emphasise the responsible great power role
of China,6 and to recognise the basic principles of human rights, while at the same time
protecting itself and its national interests through strictly defining the scope of R2P
implementation. In practice, China usually considers three aspects when adopting
intervention policy. The first is its national strategic interest. The second is the potential
risk of the intervention. The third is ideological concern over state sovereignty.7 To a great
extent, these aspects explain the prudent and generally neutral attitude adopted by Chinese
Government towards R2P.
The Chinese policy debate about R2P should also be seen in historical context. Chinas
history as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state feeds into a resistance to potential
interventions by states in another countrys domestic affairs. China is cautious about R2P
since it is neither willing to interfere in the domestic affairs of others nor would China, in
turn, be comfortable to be interfered with by others.
As a major member of the developing countries, China should take survival
and development as its paramount pursue. Human rights are very important,
but they should be put under the state sovereignty and be improved by the good
governance domestically.8
This article cannot comprehensively trace and explain the changes of Chinese policy
related to R2P issues, though some parts will touch upon changes in the Chinese stance
for instance, how the intervention in Libya impacted on China. The task here is to
generally introduce the discussions and trends of this field in China.
Debate on the general attitude toward R2P

In many ways, the range of scholarly debate and opinion in China resembles that in many
other countries. Some academics doubt that R2P can become a norm. Others believe that
R2P has become an authoritative international norm. The rest believe that consensus on
R2P has not yet been reached in the international community. Within the Government,
407
there is a generally supportive attitude (but in strictly defined conditions) to the R2P
concept, though in practice governmental officials, researchers and practitioners in China
try to figure out a distinctive way for China to properly and effectively participate in R2P
norm-building. This section proceeds in two parts: a brief note on methodology, followed
by a discussion of the debate and then an analysis of what appear to be the trends.
Methodological note
This is a first effort to analyse the debate within China about R2P and is necessarily
preliminary and subjective. It is based in part on an analysis of 43 relevant masters

dissertations and academic articles published both in public international law and in
international relations journals from 2006 to 2012.9 Equally important, the authors have
conducted interviews with a number of current and retired high-level officials and policy
practitioners in China and the United Nations. These interviews have contributed greatly
to a fairly clear picture of the core concerns and policy priorities of the Chinese
Government when dealing with R2P-related cases.
We categorised the published work as having affirmative, neutral or negative attitudes
toward the emergence of R2P. Basically there is a continuum that combines two variables:
respect for human rights and respect for sovereignty. To qualify, in the affirmative
category, articles contained clear expressions that the sovereignty principle originated
from and is based on human rights protections. The article must also support the premise
that the international community should militarily intervene when the human rights
situation has deteriorated to a certain level. In order to be placed in the neutral category,
articles demonstrated that authors did not support international military interventions,
while recognising the positive intent or import of this concept in pushing the state and the
international community to protect human rights. Further, this category indicates that
non-military interventions might be acceptable in certain scenarios. Finally, content
categorised as negative, demonstrates that the sovereign principle should remain superior
to the human rights principle at all times. Works in this category emphasise that the R2P
concept is just an excuse used by Western nations to pursue national interests, and that
there should categorically be no international humanitarian interventions. As a matter of
fact, in the present situation, it is nearly impossible to identify the influence of Chinese
academic institutions and scholars on the government, and thus our investigation
provides a general picture of the distribution of their arguments.
408
Basic interpretations and attitudes on the responsibility to protect concept

in China
Generally speaking, the Chinese Government supports the concept of R2P as agreed to
at the 2005 World Summit. Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, stated that the 2005 World Summit Outcome has made a prudent
definition on Responsibility to Protect. He also emphasised that the primary
responsibility to protect the population rests with the government of the state
concerned: the international community can offer certain help, but the responsibility
to protect its citizens should finally reside on the state government. He continued, [t]
his is in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty, because the
determination to follow the principle of sovereignty and non-interference should never
be shaken.10
However, Beijing is reserved about whether R2P has developed into an international
norm. It believes that R2P is not internationally binding and requires far more open
discussion. Besides, in order to properly implement R2P in practice, the Chinese
Government further emphasises that [h]umanitarian assistance should respect the
principles of impartiality, neutrality, objectiveness and independence, respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned and refrain from interfering
in local political disputes or impeding the peace process.11 In General Assembly debates,
China has explicitly questioned the capability to establish a UN early-warning system and
suggested that further assessment of existing capacities and proposals is required before
committing to the establishment of a new mechanism.12
In short, the attitude of the Chinese Government on R2P can be summarised in two
parts. First, upon the approval of the outcome document, the Chinese Government did
not oppose the concept of R2P. Second, when R2P is to be applied, the international
community should: (1) defer to the authority of the UN Security Council; (2) decide on a
case-by-case basis; (3) respect the territory and sovereignty principles; (4) not use force or
use minimal force. Though state sovereignty stays paramount, greater efforts may also be
considered based on the case-by-case principle with the authoritative approval by the UN
Security Council.
The senior officials we interviewed tended to belong to two categories: neutral and
negative. Some Chinese diplomats passed positive judgment on the nature of R2P, while
remaining conservative about the application of this concept.
409
We should account for the emergence of R2P as progress in the history of

mankind. [ . . . ] We certainly should not be indifferent to the tragedy of
genocide, but we should avoid it being manipulated and taken advantage of by
the great powers, and mostly being taken as an excuse for intervention and
aggression.13
Other officials also express the viewpoint that Beijing should actively participate in the
construction of the R2P norm. China is supposed to participate in the discussion of R2P
and behave more actively in the building-up of this norm. After all, the United Nations
remains the most authoritative intergovernmental organisation and China holds one of
the five permanent seats of its Security Council. Regarding Darfur, China went from
observer to messenger and then participant, which demonstrates the change in Chinese
foreign policy.14 The appointment of Ambassador Liu Guijin as the first special envoy to
Darfur is an important illustration of this development. Through Ambassador Liu, China
contributed to alleviating the confrontations among different parties and facilitated
effective communication, mediation and negotiation among them.15
Conversely, there exists scepticism towards and criticism of R2P among Chinese officials
and practitioners. It bears noting that in preparation for the 2005 World Summit, Chinese
Vice Premier Qian Qichen was nominated as the Chinese representative to the UN HighLevel Panel. The World Summit Outcome document was ratified by China partly because
of his special status as Chinas diplomatic godfather. There is speculation that, had Qian
not been the representative at that time, China might have needed more time to reach
consensus with the other countries on the document, due to the existence of different
views inside the Chinese Government.16 Some Chinese officials hold clear-cut negative
stances on the R2P concept. R2P is considered to be the old wine of humanitarian
intervention in a new bottle, and some believe that R2P is in fact humanitarian
intervention were it to be operationalised.17
Within Chinas academic circles, some scholars are optimistic about the development of
R2P. According to these academics, R2P has become part of customary international law
and developed into an authoritative and operable international norm: by a series of legal
practices, [the International Court of Justice] has actually made the responsibility to
protect, highlighted and advocated by the United Nations in the political field, especially
the responsibility to prevent, a legal norm.18 However, most Chinese scholars, including
policy analysts within the government, are cautious about the principle of R2P. They
410
accept the basic concept but with reservations. The authors are inclined to categorise them
as scholars who are neutral about the idea. In addition, there are scholars who maintain a
negative attitude toward the concept of R2P. These scholars believe that R2P is essentially
an instrument of Western countries to pursue self-interests. Hence, R2P cannot and
should not become an international norm. For example, two Chinese scholars said they
believe that the idea of R2P was developed from humanitarian intervention, which
inevitably reflected Western power politics. Thus, although the concept has been accepted
by the international community, it has not yet become an international norm.19 To sum
up, the research indicates that there are a lot of similarities between the opinions of
Chinese officials and academics, especially on the basic principles and implementation
measures.
Overall, the academic debate about a responsibility to protect has grown tremendously
since 2007, particularly in 2011 and 2012undoubtedly because of the attention that R2P
received in the international community during those years.20 The difference indicated in
Figure 1 in the realm of academia as well as among officials might possibly demonstrate
the increasing openness of Chinese society to this topic. It seems that the most common
position from academics and officials is one that positively receives the R2P concept and
agrees that, under specific situations, international society can intervene in prudent and
appropriate ways. We can basically define their attitude as neutral. Governmental officials
are usually more prudent and sceptical than scholars, especially when talking about
specific R2P cases.
The debates in China have certainly influenced Chinese policies toward R2P-related
issues. A number of criticisms of the application of R2P in Libya seem to have influenced
Figure 1. Number of R2P-related articles published 2006 2012
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
411
the official Chinese governmental stance on the Syrian situation, although we cannot get
direct evidence to prove that the top leaders have been influenced by the critical reception
and discussion of the Chinese policy toward Libya. Those officials and scholars with a
negative attitude towards R2P often proclaim that the West is abusing this concept and
that Western nations are applying it to situations that do not even require international
military intervention.
Debates about a concrete framework for R2P

This section explores reasons behind the range of attitudes concerning R2P and examines
why even those officials and scholars who have accepted the principle in theory still have
second thoughts about the concrete framework for this international norm.
Debates about implementation conditions

Generally, the Chinese Government restricts the application of R2P to the four mass
atrocity crimes specifically agreed upon at the 2005 World Summit: genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.21 China also believes that R2P operations
can only be undertaken with the agreement of the state concerned.22 From Beijings
perspective, a healthy and powerful sovereign state is beneficial to the stability, good
governance and balanced development of a country and international society. The
international community should pay more attention to economic and social development
as well as poverty alleviation in poor and weak states rather than to intervention. Helping
states enhance their capacity to protect their populations will help lay the foundation for a
more stable society in the future.23
Some scholars strongly support the governmental approach that stresses the principle of
non-interference and non-infringement on sovereignty and strictly regulates the
implementation of R2P, especially with respect to the use of military force. One scholar said:
As a basic principle of international law, the non-interference principle should
be unshakable. And there should be no restriction to the content and applicable
scope of domestic affairs. If there is indeed genocide, ethnic cleansing, war
crimes and crimes against humanity happening in a state, non-military
measures should be the primary consideration of international society. Military
412

intervention as the last resort should be authorized by the Security Council and
follow the principle of military proportionality.24
Even the focus on the responsibility to prevent and responsibility to rebuild is seen as
requiring further articulation. Another scholar said that:
If we read into the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild
carefully, well find the subject of these responsibilities is not clearly regulated.
Should it be certain agencies of the United Nations, or regional institutes, or
any states? This may become Pandoras Box, providing a chance for
intervention in domestic affairs of other nations.25

Those scholars with a positive attitude toward R2P take a different approach, mostly
citing the perspective of international law and the human security concept to demonstrate
that humanitarian interventions against large-scale violations of human rights have not
only a legal basis but a solid political foundation. These scholars deny the view that
sovereignty is absolute. They use a wider definition of the applicable conditions for R2P.
For example, one scholar argued that since China has ratified a number of binding
international declarations, conventions and treaties on human rights issues, it is illogical to
blindly advocate absolute non-interference in internal affairs:
in international law, although both the countrys joining and withdrawing
from the international agreements are the results of state sovereignty and the
manifestation of state will, with the traditional rule that conventions must be
observed, the state must be bound once it joins a certain international treaty.
The state must shoulder certain international responsibilities once it violates
the treaty.26
Another Chinese scholar had said that R2P is a manifestation of the international
communitys collective action under the new human security concept. Terrorism, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and large-scale humanitarian disasters caused by internal
armed conflicts have become legitimate threats to international security. If a state violates
or fails to fulfill this obligation, it must accept international responsibility, and the
international community should shoulder this responsibility, meaning the right to exercise
R2P.27
Other scholars nonetheless recognise that the lack of specificity in the Charter regarding
various crimes and suggest that the Security Council should better explain the expanded
concept of international peace and security that is the basis for its decisions. They believe
413
that the definition of security concerns not only national security but also human
security. According to this expanded concept of security, an intervention approved by the
Security Council in a countrys internal conflicts and humanitarian crises is consistent
with the UN Charter.28
Debates about implementation methods

Another issue relevant for constructing the R2P framework is how specifically to
implement this international concept. The debate centres mainly on two questions. First,
which is the main subject of the R2P concept, the sovereign state or the international
community? Second, should military methods be promoted and pursued or rather more
comprehensive, preventive methods?
The Chinese Governments attitude on the first question is similar to that of academics.
Both say that the main subject should be states. In addition, the role of the United Nations
and regional organisations should be highly valued. Among UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoons three pillars of R2P, the Chinese Government clearly stresses the relevance of pillar
one: the responsibility of the state for protection.29 The principles of sovereignty and noninterference constitute the unshakeable foundations of Chinese foreign policy. Compared
to the Western understanding of sovereignty the sovereignty principle advocated by
China has emphasised equality and independence.30
In the discussion over R2P, Chinese society has widely accepted that if a government
causes or fails to prevent mass mortalities, the principle of sovereignty cannot be used to
stop intervention for the purpose of saving lives. However, even under these special
circumstances, the protection offered by the international community should be
temporary and supplementary with the final aim being the restoration of the states
sovereignty. One Chinese scholar mentioned that it is worth continually repeating that the
state is still the main actor when it comes to the responsibility to protect because the aim
of R2P is to establish a responsible sovereignty but not weaken sovereignty. She further
pointed out that, in fulfilling the international responsibility to protect, all kinds of
prevention and protection instruments available to states, the UN system, regional
organisations, sub-regional organisations and civil society should be employed. However,
once coercive measures such as military force are deployed, the generalisations
surrounding the implementation of R2P and the implementation mechanisms without
restraints provide no guidance, and will easily cause controversy and heated debates about
414
non-interference among sovereign states. The international community should therefore

collectively fulfill the responsibility to prevent and to rebuild under the UN framework, in
case certain states take advantage of these operations to realise their political will or seize
resources from relevant states.31 Therefore, the role of the United Nations and regional
organisations should be highly valued.
With respect to the functions and possible contributions by the United Nations and
regional organisations, both Chinese officials and academics pay special attention to the
role of the Security Council, not the General Assembly, and they believe that operations by
regional organisations should be authorised by the Security Council.
In the event that the Security Council is paralysed, the 2001 report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposes two alternatives: action
under the auspices of the General Assembly using the so-called Uniting for Peace
mechanism, and/or action by regional and sub-regional organisations acting under
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and seeking Security Council approval after the fact.32
According to some Chinese scholars, such an approach not only ignores the regulation in
the UN Charter that the Security Council is the only agency authorised to use military
force, it also lowers the threshold for the use of force. Moreover, this approach attempts to
escape the UN collective security framework, which may facilitate the use of force by
stronger states and encourage other states to use force.33 In addition, the 2005 World
Summit decision does not include such possibilities, rather making Security Council
sanction a sine qua non for the application of R2P.
As to the second question of military reaction and comprehensive prevention, both
Chinese officials and scholars advocate ensuring that the R2P norm is not mainly a
means to authorise military intervention, but rather a mechanism to implement
more comprehensive methods. The original ICISS proposal also emphasises the
responsibilities to prevent and rebuild, in addition to react; the responsibility to prevent
is the priority. The international community of states should invest more in crisis
prevention. The Chinese Government and academics are very prudent about the use of
force and thus propose paying far more attention to the responsibility to prevent and to
rebuild.34
As stated, it is the position of the Government that [t]he protection of civilians should
focus on the prevention of conflicts. The UN Security Council should further prevent
conflicts and maintain peace.35 Some scholars believe the prevention of mass atrocities
would have to address not only state responsibility but also the fundamental unfairness of
415
international society and global order which directly or indirectly led to the disasters in the
states. As such, while Western countries try to address humanitarian crimes in the state
concerned by means of intervention, they ultimately fail to address the underlying
economic and social roots of the crimes committed.36 Other scholars believe that China
should take measures to further develop the three pillars and rely on the United Nations
to establish concrete international law. The key should be developing early engagement
mechanisms, especially deploying preventive arrangements.37
Comments on the applications of R2P to specific issues

The combination of Chinas principled stance and its policy in specific situations might
seem hard to reconcile. Years ago, the position of China in Africa was almost identical to
that of the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional organisations in Africa. However,
the African Union and the sub-regional organisations gradually accepted the ideology
proposed by Western states. In particular, the Constitutive Act of the African Union
enforces the principles of R2P, granting the right to intervene in a member state.38 The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) tends to be active in
interventions, and African countries brought the violence in Eritrea to the UN Security
Council. Responding to the Security Council sanctions resolution on Eritrea, Chinas
representative said he had abstained from the vote because the Council should always act
prudently in imposing sanctions.
China supported international efforts to encourage reconciliation in Somalia,
but the resolution of that countrys problems required the cooperation of all
countries in the region. In addition, the African Union was better suited to
address conflicts in the Horn of Africa through diplomatic methods.39
Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that the complexity of various situations and the
pressure placed on the Chinese state may transform Chinese foreign policy.40
Focusing on the most controversial cases, the following section aims to review the
comments from Chinese officials and scholars on Darfur and the Libya. The authors
further explore the unresolved Syrian case, focusing on the consequences and lessons
of the Libyan operation as they apply to Syria. It is demonstrated that reflection upon
the use of R2P in Libya has influenced the attitude of the Chinese Government on the
Syrian issue.
416
Reflections of China on the Darfur crisis

The Darfur crisis could be considered the first touchstone of R2P after the Western states
first articulated the concept. In the eyes of some Chinese officials and scholars, the conflict
required more prudent investigation and research before the international community
would have been in a position to decide whether the R2P concept was suitable for this
issue. There is no denying the fact that Muslims and non-Muslims in Darfur underwent
serious hardships that resulted in great casualties in a conflict that clearly was and remains
a humanitarian catastrophe. However, the scale of the conflict is not as dramatic as was
reported by the Western media. As mentioned, the Chinese side has brought forward
different viewpoints of a concrete framework to be institutionalised for the application of
R2P. Thus, when talking about specific issues, Chinese officials and scholars have made a
number of interesting comments.
On 16 June 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a commentary in The
Washington Post titled A Climate Culprit in Darfur, in which he proclaimed: look to its
roots, though, and you discover a more complex dynamic. Amid the diverse social and
political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part
from climate change.41 This claim again put the controversy between China and other
Western states, especially the United States, in the international spotlight. It seems that the
essence of this disaster, whether it is the result of economic underdevelopment or political
dictatorship, remains the respective contention of the two sides.
According to the statistics released by United Human Rights Council:
In the ongoing genocide, African farmers and others in Darfur are being
systematically displaced and murdered at the hands of the Janjaweed. The
genocide in Darfur has claimed 400,000 lives and displaced over 2,500,000
people. More than one hundred people continue to die each day; five thousand
die every month.42
Another UN report released by UN News Centre declared that:
The Darfur conflict erupted in February 2003 when rebel factions demanded an
end to economic marginalisation and sought power-sharing within the
Sudanese state. The ensuing 28-month civil war waged by the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
armed movements against the Government and its allied militia has killed
nearly 180,000 people and driven more than 2 million from their homes.43
417
In this article it was also mentioned that Kofi Annanin his monthly report to the
Security Councilnoted: [w]hile the daily rate of casualties from fighting has declined in
recent months, the damage to the social and economic fabric in Darfur and the longerterm costs of this conflict are steadily becoming clearer. As of 1 July 2005, 3.2 million
people were in need of humanitarian assistance and 1.9 million were living in crowded
camps in Sudan.44
The concerns shown above reflect to a great extent the anxieties of the Chinese
government. As the Special Envoy of China to Darfur Liu Guijin has repeatedly
emphasised, the key problem in Darfur is development and poverty as opposed to
genocide. Should the problems caused due to the resource shortage be properly solved, the
conflicts among the tribes could reach cessation. Ambassador Liu further called on the
international community to provide not only humanitarian assistance but also aid for
economic and social growth in Sudan.45 Liu, when responding to a BBC documentary
alleging Chinas violation on the UN arms embargo in Darfur, later stated: [t]he program
is strongly biased. Chinas arms sales were very small in scale and never made to nonsovereign entities. We have strict end-user certificates.46 In 2008, when Beijing was faced
with boycotts of its summer Olympics, then vice president Xi Jinping reiterated Chinas
position on the Darfur issue: China has always supported the resolution of the Darfur
issue via the three-party mechanism of the Sudanese government, the African Union and
the United Nations, and the double-track strategy of peacekeeping action and the political
process moving forward together.47
China has insisted on three conditions. First, a political solution is the only effective
approach. Second, the framework for the effective three-party AU-UN-Sudan consultation
mechanism should grant a leading role to the AU. Third, all countries should respect
Sudans sovereignty and territorial integrity throughout the whole process.48
Reflections of China on the Libya issue

Prior to March 2011, Libya emerged as a battlefield between domestic opponents and since
deposed president Muammar Gaddafi. In a matter of weeks, it became a theatre for foreign
intervention. At the request of such regional organisations as the African Union and the
Arab League, China allowed the passage of Resolution 1973 in the UN Security Council.
NATO subsequently became directly involved in the Libyan war, which may have intensified
the humanitarian crisis more than bringing peace and the installation of good governance.
418
In China, this outcome is widely considered as a failure or mistake in Chinese foreign

policy. A number of Chinese officials and scholars have expressed their dissatisfaction and
disappointment with the role of the United Nations Security Council and regional African
organisations. According to a senior Chinese diplomat, the UN Security Council
resolution practically signed a blank check to the Western countries and there were hardly
restrictions to the no-fly zone by the Security Council. I myself also should reevaluate the
whole process.49 Some believe that China lacked the fundamental research into matters
regarding R2P, and it also lacked a detailed understanding of the implications of terms
such as no-fly zone, which allowed for insufficient restraint by the Western countries once
R2P was invoked. The intervention in Libya led by the United Kingdom, France and the
United States thus set a poor precedent for action by the international community. Even
though action was granted by the Security Council, it did not change the intention of these
countries to realise regime change under the banner of R2P.50
This sense of deception and betrayal by Western countries has tested Chinese officials
and academics support for R2P.
It has been proven once again that the Security Council resolution has been
used as a blank check, which was taken full advantage of by the Western states
to overthrow the Gaddafi administration. And African countries reflected upon
their mistake in Libya after it too.51
That the Chinese view Western maneuvering at the UN as a conspiracy or trick does not
mean that senior officials were unaware of the domestic dynamics in Libya: the original
reason for Libya lies in the Libyan peoples dissatisfaction with the autocracy of Gaddafi,
while the ultimate goal of interference by the Western countries is their dominance of the
Middle East.52
In April 2012, Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng stated Chinas official lesson
learned from Libya:
Libya [ . . . ] has gone too far from the original intention of R2P. We should not
forget the lessons we have learned from Libya. On the first protection day led
by NATO in Libya, there were 64 civilians killed and 150 injured. And the final
result of the protection is that over 20,000 civilians were killed and 900,000
displaced. It is evident to the international community that Libya continues to
be disunited, that violence continues to rage, and that some regions have even
declared their autonomy. It has been vividly described as a successful surgery
419
with a dead patient and it is patent that this kind of protection is a failed and
irresponsible one applying protect as the cover of the brutal intervention. The
courage to say No to it absolutely demonstrates our determination to be
responsible. We respect Responsibility to Protect and at the same time we
value Responsibility while protecting even more.53
Syria
Compared with the heated debates about Libya in China, there are almost no open debates
concerning Syria, as both the Government and academia are quite conservative about
military intervention in Syria. In an interview, Ambassador Chen Shiqiu said:
The United Nations Security Council could not reach consent on Syria in that
the great powers, with the different interests [they] pursued, collided with each
other and thus made it hard to invoke R2P. In addition, if the Syrian tragedy
was taken as a humanitarian disaster, how should we understand the fact that
the opposing faction was provided with weapons? Therefore, it seems that it was
not meant to terminate the conflict, but to topple the Bashar al-Assad
administration and turn Syria into a second Libya.54
In the case of Syria, China does not support Bashar, but it does strongly oppose regime
change instigated by foreign intervention.
Only citizens of the concerned countries are entitled to pursue regime change
without foreign opinion factoring innote that China did not protest the
regime change of Mubarak in Egypt. And we have to confront the fact that 40%
of Syrians continue to support Bashar.55
In addition, the Syrian issue should not be considered only a matter of human rights
violations, as a large part of the problem relates to domestic politics: it is well-known that
there are complicated, mixed problems of tribes, ethnic groups and religions, and the
reckless foreign intervention cannot solve these problems.56
The echoes of Libya and the sense of betrayal run deep. In mid-2013, when the world
debated US air strikes on Syria as a result of revelations over chemical weapons use, China
remained relatively silent. Except for some third-party reports on the ongoing situation
and the official call from Beijing that all parties exercise restraint, China has spent more
time emphasising the need to evacuate its people and corporations from Syria while
420
warning its citizens against entry into the territory. While the Libyan case should not be
mistaken as the end of Chinas prudent support for R2P, the Chinese Government places
more restrictive conditions upon, and undergoing deeper consideration of, the future
application of this concept.
Suggestions on future R2P norm-building

Despite the cautionary note, there are some constructive suggestions on R2P normbuilding emerging from Chinese officials and scholars, and they might be helpful for the
further development of the R2P concept. A prevailing viewpoint holds that, in order to
make R2P a stronger international norm, we should integrate different national and
regional perspectives. More specifically, the following tenets should be adhered to: UN
authorisation (though regional organisations could also be the main parties when
necessary as proclaimed in the outcome document); collective instead of unilateral action;
neighbouring countries which would be most likely influenced by the military activities
should be party to deliberations; and strong emphasis on a peaceful settlement.
First, the United Nations should play the primary role in establishing the normative
properties of R2P. Theoretically speaking, China should not oppose this norm in
multilateral diplomacy and should be more active in the process. Some ambassadors even
asserted in interviews that:
R2P could constitute the moral high ground when dealing with atrocities, and
that we should not immediately oppose R2P. In practice, we should be more
cautious about the implementation of R2P and proceed accordingly. First, R2P
should not aim at regime change. Second, it should be adopted on the basis of
case-by-case analysis. Third, large-scale military intervention should be
prohibited. As R2P ascends to the realm of global governance, just as climate
change and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons did before it, we must take
part in actively formulating the rules of the game.57
These rules, according to another diplomat, must feature the development of local
political entities and institutions, the economy and society so as to comprehensively
facilitate the harmonious co-existence of the different ethnic groups and religions and
eliminate the confrontation and conflicts among these parties. The situation relates to
human rights but the core issue is not human rightshuman rights merely serve as
legitimate proof for intervention by Western states.58
421
Second, on implementation conditions, some Chinese scholars have articulated

constructive suggestions that could prove helpful to the norms further development. One
scholar, for example, argued that there needs to be an evaluation mechanism for mass
violations of human rights that is comprehensive and reasonable, rather than based on a
static comparison with Western countries, which can hardly be counted as an objective,
accurate and comprehensive evaluation of the function situation of R2P in [countries such
as] Sudan.59 In a similar vein, one senior diplomat argued that even the four core crimes
are not necessarily easy to identify for lack of precedent.60
Another scholar argued that in determining the implementation conditions of R2P, not
only concerns with the resident government but also those with rebel forces should be
taken into account. He indicated that in Syria both the resolutions of the Arab League and
the draft resolution by the Security Council (which was eventually vetoed by China)
required the government to stop the atrocities perpetrated against its civilians, but
remained silent on its responsibility to protect civilians from rebel forces. According to this
scholar:
The bottom line of R2P is that it should never be used as an instrument to
promote regime changebecause this will send a wrong message to the public,
making domestic rebel factions believe they can get external support by
launching violent agitations, which may threaten the internal security order of
all the nations. And the people will be exposed to a more dangerous
environment, which is far from the mission of R2P.61
After the Libyan war, developing countries, particularly the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa) made great efforts to re-evaluate the R2P concept and attempted
to contribute some restricted and supplementary principles to it. Among these, the notion
of Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), as put forward by Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff in September 2011, attracted great attention and sparked a new round of debate
over R2Ps operability. The Chinese Permanent Mission to the UN proclaimed its support
for this new concept in the General Assemblys informal dialogue, and further underlined
the significance of RWP in its ability to monitor and enhance the implementation of
Council resolutions. Ruan Zongze, Vice President of the China Institute of International
Studies (CIIS), proposed the concept of Responsible Protection. Former Australian
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans summarised that concept at the conclusion of a CIIS
conference in October 2013:
422

Tough criteriaspecifically, legitimate intention, last resort, proportionality
and balance of consequencesshould be clearly satisfied before any military
mandate is granted, with every effort made to exhaust diplomatic solutions
before more robust alternatives are embraced. There should be better methods
of supervision and accountability to ensure that the protection objective
remains at the heart of any response. And the primary emphasis of the entire
R2P enterprise should continue to be prevention of mass-atrocity crimesboth
their occurrence and their recurrence.62
The constructive suggestions put forward by various Chinese officials and academics
illustrate the willingness of China to participate in the norm-building of R2P. However, a

prerequisite for future use of R2P will forever be prudent evaluation of the crisis and the
attendant high degrees of responsibility and co-operation.
Conclusion
Both Chinese officials and academics are generally positive about the idea of R2P. As a
permanent member of the Security Council, China has supported the version of R2P as
agreed to in 2005, and it emphasises UN authority over its implementation. China stresses
the value of peaceful measures on the spectrum of R2P implementation. It also stresses
that the use of military force for human protection purposes should be rare and used only
as a last resort.
The number of scholars with a completely negative attitude is indeed quite small.
However, China and the West, both in government and in scholarly circles, have distinct
opinions about implementation conditions and methods. And Chinese scholars display a
range of opinions toward them, some of which resemble their colleagues in the West and
elsewhere. In short, such views suggest that China is becoming more open to the issues of
human rights and humanitarian intervention.
On the concrete framework for R2P, the authors have found controversy among Chinese
scholars regarding the implementation conditions. Scholars have different opinions as to
whether human rights can qualify as a threat to international peace and security, the
grounds for Security Council resolutions. There is no obvious divergence in views about
the implementation methods among the Chinese Government and scholars. But their
opinions are quite different regarding the weight accorded by the West to military
423
intervention as opposed to other R2P measures. China emphasises the prevention of mass
human rights abuses by seeking to enhance the strength of sovereign states, non-military
intervention, the Security Council and prevention and post-conflict peace-building.
After the Libyan conflict, a large number of Chinese officials and scholars became more
sceptical and prudent about the R2P concept, and they are trying to bring forward some
constructive suggestions on the principles normalisation. Chinas stance in the Libyan war
has been widely considered a mistake, and the role of regional organisations has also been
carefully scrutinised. But these developments have not been enough to change the
essentially positive evaluation of R2P in China. There are more and more officials and
scholars understanding R2P from the perspective of its use to protect legitimate Chinese
overseas interests.
In the past couple of years, China has implemented several large-scale evacuations of
overseas Chinese citizens, including in Libya. Some Chinese officials and scholars have
forwarded a hypothetical case that could mirror the atrocities committed in Indonesia in
the 1950s and in 1998, when overseas Chinese became the direct target of mass human
rights violations and their businesses suffered greatly. In such a scenario, China could
invoke R2P to gain the attention of the international community, which would in turn
denounce the atrocity and perhaps even sanction the use of force to intervene in order to
protect the overseas Chinese.63 This hypothetical case reveals one potential manner in
which Chinese policy toward R2P might evolve: with the rise of overseas national interests
and great power responsibility, there will be more support and intellectual desire in China
to understand and promote this norm.
We hope that this review of debates related to R2P in China will help the international
community in a modest way to better understand Chinas approaches to this issue and
normative consolidation more generally. As Erin McCandless observed in her newlypublished article discussing the peace-building and state-building process in fragile states,
these processes are becoming more endogenous and less Northern and template driven
[ . . . ] a more holistic notion of the end states of peacebuilding and state-building is
emergingone that recognizes security, political and developmental requirements.
However, the results of these shifts cannot yet be known.64 This resembles the debate
ongoing in China and some other developing countries when talking about R2P. As the
norm gradually matures and echoes the concerns of developing countries, we hope that a
more holistic and balanced notion of a responsibility to protect is developed in the future.
424
Acknowledgements
This article draws on Tiewa Liu, Is China Like the other Permanent Members?. The authors would like
to thank the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) for putting the project together and for facilitating
the research with their greatest devotion and patience. The several workshops and interactive activities
organised by GPPi provided the authors the opportunity to communicate extensively with the
colleagues in the research group, and their humour and wisdom assisted the authors in shaping and
strengthening the article. The detailed and thoughtful suggestions provided by Philipp Rotmann, Tim
Ruhlig and Oliver Stuenkel after their attentive review of the article ensured that it emerged with a
more balanced and logical analysis. In addition, two anonymous reviewers provided enormous help to
make the article more concise and focused. The authors will shoulder responsibility for any mistakes
and insufficient research in the article. This article is part of a collaborative research project on Global
Norm Evolution and the Responsibility to Protect (www.globalnorms.net), generously funded by the
Volkswagen Foundation through its Europe and Global Challenges programme.
Endnotes
1. Weiss and Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and
Intervention, 37.
2. Ibid.
3. For the further elaboration on R2P, please refer to
Rotmann et al., Major Powers, in this special issue.
4. These organs include but are not limited to: Ministry of
international concerns. For more detail on the concept of

responsible great power, see Congwen, The Concept of a
Responsible, 77.
7. For more details about the reasons for maintenance and
change of Chinas foreign policy on R2P, see Liu, China
and Responsibility to Protect, 159 160.
Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Commerce; International
8. Ibid., 159. According to the China Society for Human
Department; Central Committee of CPC; General Staff
Rights Studies, China should adopt the principle of
Department of PLA; Commission on Science, Technol-
promote the human rights, safeguard the state sovereignty
ogy and Industry for National Defense; Taiwan Affairs
and oppose the hegemony. See also Research Centre of
Office of the State Council; Hong Kong and Macau
Chinese Characteristic Socialism, Shi Po Ren Quan Gao.
Affairs Office of the State Council; Overseas Chinese
9. The articles are all from Zhong Guo Qi Kan Wang [China
Affairs of the State Council; Xinhua News Agency;
Journals Network], which is considered the most
Ministry of State Security.
complete and authoritative research resource in China.
5. According to a communique issued after the Third
Although comprehensive, this number is actually quite
Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China
small as R2P is not yet a major topic for researchers.
(CPC) Central Committee, China will establish a new
10. Window of China, Chinese Diplomat: Implementing
state security committee to improve systems and
Responsibility to Protect Must not Contravene State
strategies to safeguard national security.
Sovereignty, 25 July 2009. Available at: http://news.
6. The core meaning of a responsible great power attaches

more importance to civilisation and justice. Though
xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/25/content_11769124.
htm [Accessed 29 November 2013].
there is no denying the fact that the great powers ultimate
11. Position Paper of the Peoples Republic of China.
goal is to realise their national interests, the approach
12. Report on the General Assembly Plenary Debate.
should be differentiated from the traditional principles
13. Interview with senior Chinese diplomat, Beijing, 10 May
adhered to by the great powers. It calls for the respect of

the diversity and interdependence among different states
and pursues the common security of the international
community; the equality of the countries, big or small,
strong or weak; the peaceful means like the diplomatic,
2013.
2013.
15. Interview with senior Chinese diplomat, Beijing, 8 June
2013.
economic and cultural ways to solve the problems instead
16. In addition, it is said that Kofi Annan asked Qian Qichen
of the use or threat of the use of force; the establishment of
to become the representative instead of the Chinese
a more just and reasonable international order; more
Government official already nominated at that time in
responsibilities of the great powers when confronting the
order to secure passage of the outcome document. It
global issues and balance between state sovereignty and
draws from the interviews.

17. One Ambassador underlined in the interview, [w]e
43. UN, Despite Fewer Casualties.
didnt bring forward R2P at the earliest time. The first
44. Ibid.
stage was that human rights are superior to state
45. Window of China, Chinese Special Envoy Says Darfur
sovereignty. The second was about humanitarian
Issue Needs more Efforts in 3 Spheres under 3
intervention, which we and some developing countries
Principles, 22 June 2007. Available at: http://news.
couldnt agree with. We took it as the excuse for the big
xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/22/content_6275128.
powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of the small
countries. It was finally turned into RtoP, which was only
46. China Daily, BBC Film on Darfur Strongly Biased-
considered a concept hard to implement. Therefore, I
Chinese Envoy, 15 July 2008. Available at: http://www.
believe that RtoP indeed is humanitarian intervention
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/15/content_6845920.
when it would be operationalized.
htm [Accessed 29 November 2013]. We can also refer to
18. Song, The Responsibility to Protect.
some other responses to this challenge in this news as
19. Qiu and Zhou, Responsibility to Protect: A Theoretical
followed: Some Western countries have traditionally
Study.
425
been supplying arms to African countries, and they far
20. For more details about the statistics and analyses of the
outweigh Chinas in terms of both quantity and quality.
debates on this topic in academia, see Liu, Is China Like
Dai Yan, a former Chinese diplomat posted in Ghana,
the other Permanent Members?.
said: Some people in the West have been trying to play
21. China News, Chinese Diplomat: Firmly Prevent the
up the Darfur issue [ . . . ] and are trying to stir new
Abuse of Responsibility to Protect, 13 January 2012.
trouble, the newspaper has quoted Ma Zhengang,
Available at: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/01-13/
president of the China Institute of International Studies,
3603886.shtml [Accessed 29 November 2013].
as saying. A few shots of Chinese trucks in Darfur
22. Position paper of the Peoples Republic of China.
cannot be used to accuse China of fueling the conflict in
23. Yang, Harmonious Cooperation.

24. Li, The Responsibility to Protect and Non-intervention.
Darfur, Liu said.

47. China Daily, China Reiterates Position on Darfur Issue,
25. Cao, Some Comments on State Responsibility.
11 June 2008. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.
26. Ibid., 153.
cn/cndy/2008-06/11/content_6751118.htm [Accessed 29
27. Li, Responsibility to Protect and International.
November 2013].
28. Liu, Responsibility to Protect in the View.
48. Window of China, Chinese Special Envoy.
29. WFM-IGP Summary of SG Report. The three pillars
are: the protection responsibility of the state; international assistance and capacity-building; timely and
decisive response.
30. Zhao, Chinese Sovereignty Marching.
31. Yan, On Responsibility to Protect.
32. ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.
33. Qin, Responsibility to Protect.
2013.
50. Wang, Responsibility to Protect and the New
Features.
2013.
2013.
34. Position Paper of Peoples Republic of China.
53. Le, Chinas Relations with the World.
35. Ibid.
36. Qiu and Zhou, Responsibility to Protect: A Theoretical

Study.
37. Guo, The Responsibility to Protect and Chinas
Response.
2013.
38. Bizos, New-Institutionalism.

39. Security Council Imposes Sanctions.
2013.
2013.
2013.
41. Ban Ki-moon, A Climate Culprit in Darfur. The

Washington Post, 16 June 2007.
42. United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Darfur.
Available
2013.
at:
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/
2013.
59. Zhao Zhou, On the Development and Construction.
2013.
genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm [Accessed 29 Novem-
61. Yang, From Libya to Syria.
ber 2013].
62. Evans, On Moves by China.
426

2013.
64. MacCandless, Wicked Problems in Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding.
Politics of Human Rights, eds. Serrano Monica and

Thomas G. Weiss. Routledge, London, 148 170.
Liu, Xia, 2011. Responsibility to Protect in the View of New
Security Concept [in Chinese; English summary].
Economic Research Guide 25, 269 270.
References
Bizos, Anthony, 2011. New-Institutionalism and the Origins
of the African Union. Available at: http://wiredspace.
wits.ac.za/handle/10539/10378 [Accessed 29 November
2013].
and Statebuilding: Making Progress in Measuring

Progress Through the New Deal. Global Governance
19(2), 227 248.
Position Paper of the Peoples Republic of Chinaat the
63rd Session of the United National General Assembly,
Cao, Yang, 2007. Some Comments on State Responsibility to
16 September 2008. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.
Protect Theory [in Chinese; English summary]. Journal
cn/eng/zxxx/t512751.htm [Accessed 29 November
of Gansu Political Science and Law Institute 25(4),

148 153.
MacCandless, Erin, 2013. Wicked Problems in Peacebuilding
2013].
Qin, Xiaocheng, 2009. Responsibility to Protect and the
Congwen, Qu, 2012. The Concept of a Responsible Great
Principle of State Sovereignty. In Chinas Diplomacy in
Power [in Chinese; English summary]. World Econ-
UN, ed. Jian Chen. World Affairs Press, Beijing,
omics and Politics 10, 72 77.
97 117.
Evans, Gareth, 2013. On Moves by China and Other BRICS
Qiu, Meirong and Qing Zhou, 2012. Responsibility to
Countries to Embrace Humanitarian Intervention. Avail-
Protect: A Theoretical Study of the Western Humanitar-
able at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-
ian Intervention after the Cold War [in Chinese;
moves-by-china-and-other-brics-countries-to-embrace-
English summary]. Chinese Journal of European Studies
humanitarian-intervention-by-gareth-evans [Accessed 29
November 2013].
2, 122 138.
Report on the General Assembly Plenary Debate on the
International Commission on Intervention and State
Responsibility to Protect, 2008. ICRtoP. Available at:
Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001. The Responsibility to Protect.
http://globalRtoP.org/media/pdf/GCRtoP_General_
International Centre for Development Research,
Assembly_Debate_Assessment.pdf
Ottawa.
November 2013].
[Accessed
29
Guo, Ran, 2012. The Responsibility to Protect and Chinas
Research Centre of Chinese Characteristic Socialism, 2012.
Response [in Chinese; English summary]. Journal of
Shi Po Ren Quan Gao Yu Zhu Quan De Mei Li Wai Yi
Taiyuan University of Technology (Social Sciences
[Tearing the Facade off the Doctrine of Human Rights
Edition) 5, 25 30.
over State Sovereignty]. Report by the Research Centre
Le, Yucheng, 2012. Chinas Relations with the World at a
of Chinese Characteristic Socialism, National Education
New Starting Point. Speech delivered at China Institute
Ministry. Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/
of International Studies (CIIS) Forum, 10 April.
136457/17898313.html [Accessed 29 November 2013].
Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjb_
Song, Jie, 2009. The Responsibility to Protect: Studies on the
602314/zzjg_602420/zcyjs_602426/jbzc_602428/
Judicial Practice of the International Court of Justice
t921682.shtml [Accessed 29 November 2013].
[in Chinese; English summary]. Science of Law (Journal
Li, Bin, 2007. The Responsibility to Protect and Nonintervention of Internal Affairs [in Chinese; English
summary]. Science of Law (Journal of Northwest
of Northwest University of Political Science and Law) 5,

55 64.
United Nations (UN), 2005. Despite Fewer Casualties in
University of Political Science and Law) 3, 131 139.
Darfur, Conditions Steadily DeterioratingAnnan
Li, Shouping, 2006. Responsibility to Protect and
Report. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/
International Legal Order [in Chinese; English
story.asp?NewsID15466&Cr1Darfur [Accessed 29
summary]. Tribune of Political Science and Law 24(3),

99 107.
November 2013].
United Nations (UN), 2009. Security Council Imposes
Liu, Tiewa, 2012. China and Responsibility to Protect:
Sanctions on Eritrea over its Role in Somalia, Refusal to
Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention.
Withdraw Troops Following Conflict with Djibouti.
The Pacific Review 25(1), 159 160.

Liu, Tiewa, 2014. Is China Like the other Permanent
Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/

sc9833.doc.htm [Accessed 29 November 2013].
Members? Governmental and Academic Debates about
Wang, Shuming, 2012. Responsibility to Protect and the
RtoP. In Rallying to the RtoP Cause? The International
New Features of American International Intervention:

Libya Crisis as a Case Study [in Chinese; English
summary]. Global Review 6, 64 77.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cetur/chn/xwdt/t259229.
Weiss, Thomas G. and Cindy Collins, 2000. Humanitarian
Yang, Yonghong, 2012. From Libya to Syriathe End of
Challenges and Intervention. 2nd ed. Westview Press,
Responsibility to Protect? [in Chinese; English sum-
Boulder, CO.
mary]. Forum of World Economics & Politics 3, 80 81.
WFM-IGP Summary of SG Report on RtoP: Implementing
Zhao, Zhou, 2009. Chinese Sovereignty Marching towards a
the Responsibility to Protect, 2009. Available at:
Responsible Concept and its Practice [in Chinese;
http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf
English summary]. Social Sciences in Nanjing 5,
[Accessed 29 November 2013].

Yan, Haiyan, 2010. On Responsibility to Protect [in Chinese;
English summary]. Western Law Review 1, 125 131.
427
112 117.
Zhao, Zhou, 2009. On the Development and Construction of
Performance Evaluation Mechanism about the Function
Yang, Jiechi, 2006. Speech by Yang Jiechi on the First
of Responsibility to Protect [in Chinese; English
Conference of the UN Human Rights Committee
summary]. Journal of University of Electronic Science
Harmonious Cooperationto Initiate Further Devel-
and Technology of China (Social Sciences Edition) 11(5),
opment of International Human Rights. Available at:
17 23.

China and R2P

Cargado por

Información del documento

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

China and R2P

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

Conflict, Security & Development

ISSN: 1467-8802 (Print) 1478-1174 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsd20

Debates in China about the responsibility to

2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1657

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 2 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

Date: 07 April 2016, At: 10:35

Conflict, Security & Development, 2014

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Debates in China about the

Over the past several decades, international

concerning the R2P concept in China.

debates over intervention have usually

Based on a review of most of the academic

focused on the primacy of state sovereignty

studies on R2P in China, together with in-

or the protection of human rights. The

depth interviews with senior diplomats and

emergence of the responsibility to protect

practitioners, this article illustrates the

(R2P) stimulates more profound debates by

different views of Chinese officials and

scholars on the concept of R2P, offering

terminologies. In this vein, an important

insight into how to construct the new norm

voice of dissent, or at least scepticism, comes

of R2P in order to shape the concept into an

from China. This article pays special

international norm that is more acceptable,

legitimate and operational.

q 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.

Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Debates in China about the responsibility to protect

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Chinese foreign policy-making and debates about the

Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Debate on the general attitude toward R2P

Debates in China about the responsibility to protect

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

preliminary and subjective. It is based in part on an analysis of 43 relevant masters

Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin

Basic interpretations and attitudes on the responsibility to protect concept

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Debates in China about the responsibility to protect

We should account for the emergence of R2P as progress in the history of

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Debates in China about the responsibility to protect

Debates about a concrete framework for R2P

Debates about implementation conditions

Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

intervention in domestic affairs of other nations.25

Debates in China about the responsibility to protect

Debates about implementation methods

Downloaded by [150.165.182.61] at 10:35 07 April 2016

Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin