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show that the caretaker was appointed only in 1989. The initial tax
declaration she presented although dated 1974 cannot automatically be
deduced that the occupation of the subject property was likewise done in
1974. To so conclude will amount to speculation and conjecture on the part
of the court. Declaration of a land for tax purposes cannot be equated with
its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of
land comes before declaring it for tax purposes. The 1974 tax declaration
cannot be made a basis to prove its conjugal nature as the land was declared
for tax purposes solely in the name of Albert, who sold it as his exclusive
property. In a long line of cases, this Court held that tax declarations,
especially untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are
good indicia of possession of an owner. Thus, the presumption of conjugal
nature of the property allegedly acquired during the subsistence of the
marriage cannot be applied.
FRANCISCO vs. GONZALES
565 SCRA 638 (September 17, 2008)
Estranged couple Cleodualdo and Michele, whose marriage was
later on voided, entered into a compromise agreement involving their
property covered by TCT No. T-167907 and located at 410 Taal St., Ayala
Alabang Village where they agreed that said conjugal property shall be
transferred by way of a deed of donation in favor of their 2 minor children
when they reach they reach 19 and 18, respectively. Meanwhile, Michele
and George Matrai were ordered by the court to vacate the premises leased
to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorneys fees. A
notice of sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff covering the
property in 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang that was still under the name of
Cleodualdo and Michele.
SC: It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the
subject property was being made to answer was incurred by Michele and her
partner, Matrai. Gonzales alleged that the lease of the property in Lanka
Drive redounded to the benefit of the family. By no stretch of ones
imagination can it be concluded that the said debt/obligation was incurred
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or that some advantage accrued to
the welfare to the family.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she
borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to deliver the
needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred
to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances means
that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wifes personal
obligation.
BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009)
Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also
adjudged to pay the sum of P35,000.00 representing moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and cost. Erlindas property however, was
insufficient to answer for the liability so the sheriff levied the conjugal
property of the Nicol spouses. The husband questioned the levy and the
subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence, levy
upon the conjugal property was improper.
SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the
judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and
adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. It must further be settled whether the obligation
of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
or not.
Unlike in the system of absolute community property where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains.
The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RAVINA v. VILLA ABRILLE 604 S 120 (October 16, 2009)
In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square
meter lot adjacent to the land that was acquired by Pedro while still single.
They then introduced improvements on the property. In 1991, Pedro offered
to sell the house and the 2 lots to Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified
Ravina of her objections but Pedro, nonetheless, sold the house and 2 lots
without Mary Anns consent.
SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the FC is void if done a.) without the written consent of both
the husband and the wife, or b.) in case of one spouses inability the
authority of the court.
If the sale is with the knowledge but without the approval of the
wife, thereby resulting in disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date of the contract
implementing the decision to institute the case.
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ, SR. v. MINGOA, SR. 608 S 394 12/18/2009
residential house and a 2-door apartment building were made during the
marriage using their conjugal funds to pay off the loan obtained by Alfredo
for the construction of said improvements. Subsequently, a warehouse was
also constructed on the lot using the spouses conjugal funds. Sometime in
1989, when Alfredo was already bedridden, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer
made the former sign a document purported to be his last will and testament.
It turned out however, that it was a sale covering Alfredos lot and the
improvements thereon to the herein respondents. Alfredo then instituted an
action for the annulment of the sale but the trial court held that the sale is
valid and should be complied with by the parties in good faith. The appellate
court upheld the decision of the lower court. Alfredo died in 1999 and
relying on the decision rendered in the previous case where the court held
that inasmuch as the lot is of greater value than the improvements and since
Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of
accessory follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject lot with all
its improvements became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with
an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of
improvements at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
Josefa is now demanding reimbursement for the cost of the improvements
from respondents.
SC: What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite
allegations contained in the complaint that they are the buyers of the subject
premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the
owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her
costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the
conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the
case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to
respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Article 134- In the absence of express declaration in the
marriage settlements, no separation of property shall take place during the
marriage except upon judicial order. The separation of property may either
be for sufficient cause (Article 135) or voluntary (Article 136).
Article 135 For causes falling under numbers (1), (2), and (3)
i.e.1. sentenced to a penalty that carries with it civil interdiction, 2. judicially
declared an absentee, and 3. loss parental authority decreed by the court, the
presentation of final judgment is enough basis for the grant of the decree of
judicial separation of property.
Article 136 Voluntary dissolution must be verified and jointly
filed by the spouses.
Articles 137, 138, and 139 liquidation of either the absolute
community or conjugal partnership upon grant of petition, effect the
property relations of the spouses is now governed by the regime of complete
separation of property and the requirement of registering the petition for
separation of property and the final judgment granting the same with the
appropriate registries.
Article 141- revival of the former property regime that existed
prior to its separation upon proper motion. Thereafter no voluntary
separation of property shall again be granted by the court.
ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
August 29, 2006
Elena and Helmut, a German national, were married in 1989 in
Hamburg, Germany. They initially lived in Hamburg but in 1992, the
spouses decided to move and permanently reside in the Philippines. Helmut
sold the house he inherited from his parents in Germany. With the money, he
bought a P528,000.00 lot in Antipolo and constructed a P2.3 million peso
house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in Elenas name. The
marriage however, did not last due to Helmuts alleged womanizing,
drinking and maltreatment and eventually the spouses separated. In 1994,
Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties. He claims that he is not
praying for the transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property as he is aware
of the constitutional prohibition of aliens acquiring lands of the public
domain but merely reimbursement. That the property is titled in the name of
Elena because of said prohibition. That the funds paid by him for the said
property were in consideration of his marriage to Elena; that funds were
given to her in trust and equity demands that he should be reimbursed of his
personal funds.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the funds used
for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?
SC: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands. The
primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the constitutional prohibition. It has been held that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Further, the distinctions between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To
allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of
a property that he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is, likewise proscribed by
law.
his own funds with the tax declaration for the structure
under his name and thru money he borrowed from his
relatives as proofs. The proof of indebtedness is a 1990
affidavit of one Macaraeg who stated that John borrowed
P30,000.00 from him. The MTC found for John which decision
was affirmed by the RTC. The CA however, reversed the
ruling of lower courts holding that their property relations
cannot be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code but
by the rules on co-ownership. John went to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the
suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of John.
SC: Other than Johns bare allegation that he
alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed form his
relatives, spent for the construction of the annex, evidence is
wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John failed to
reveal how much he spent therefore. Neither did he divulge
the names of the alleged relatives from whom he made his
borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed
from them. All he could offer by way of reinforcing his claim
is the affidavit of Macaraeg but the affidavit stated that it
was in 1990 when John borrowed P30,000.00 from him. The
annex structure was constructed in 1992 or 2 years after he
borrowed the P30,000 from Macaraeg. There is a paucity of
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support Johns selfserving allegation that the annex structure was put up thru
his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Tax
declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of
claims of ownership.
In this connection Article 147 of the Family Code is
instructive. (Cite Article 147 in toto).
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs
to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law
spouses during the period of cohabitation is presumed to
have been obtained thru their joint efforts, work or industry
and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules in co-ownership. And
under this regime, they owned their properties in common
in equal shares. Being herself a co-owner of the structure
in question, Juliet, as correctly stated by the CA, may not be
ejected therefrom.
True, under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a coowner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner
who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
ownership of a common property. In this case, evidence is
totally wanting to establish Johns or Juliets exclusive
ownership of the property in question. As borne by the
record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure by
virtue of being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much
entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
Juliets failure however, to pay the balance of
Johns share in their common properties could at best give
rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for
rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
METROBANK v. PASCUAL 547 S 246 02/29/2009
The marriage was declared void under Article 36.
In said decision, the court ordered the partition/dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. No liquidation was, however, made.
Subsequently, ex-wife Florencia mortgaged the property to
Metro Bank to secure a loan. Attached to the loan documents
were the decision of the court nullifying the marriage to
Nicholson and a waiver purportedly signed by Nicholson
where he waived his share in the conjugal property. Florencia
failed to pay the loan so Metro Bank foreclosed the
mortgage. When Nicholson learned of the foreclosure
proceedings, he instituted a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the mortgage as it was made without his consent.
February 2, 2001
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HEIRS
OF
ROMUALDO