Theorizing the state Adrian Leftwich + Introduction: institutions, politics, and the state 140 + The modern state ui * The state in the developing world: provenance and forms 144 *+ The state in the developing world: characteristics and features 9 * The state in the developing world: facing the challenges 182 + Conclusion 153 ‘OVERVIEW Explanation of successful and failed states in the contemporary developing world requires ‘an understanding of the provenance, characteristics, and functions of the modem state as itevolved in what isnow the developed world. This chapter fist explores the nature of insti tutions in general and, in particular, the modem states @ set of political institutions of rue, Geared to the organization, promotion, and continuous management of economic devel ‘opment, Second, it analyses the emergence and distinguishing features of the state in what is now the developed world; and, third, it investigates the transportation of the modem state to the now developing world and the consequences ofthat. The central argument is that the characteristics of any state, anywhere, are largely defined by its reations with the ‘economy and society which it reflects and both represents and dominates, in its historical, ‘regional, and international context, The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite mary problems, political processes in some developing countries could be moving towards the ‘establishment of the state institutions of rule that could at last provide more stability and «effectiveness for economic development and greater participation for citizens in decision- ‘making processes. But the process is both very slow and very uneven, eeePrien Introduction: institutions, politics, and the state Institutions Human societies cannot endure, proses OF tspecally—develop without broadly aBFes! and pproprite rules and conventions governing the wee got of social, ecomsomic, and political aff an com how man and otter sources ace 10 DE sed ae striated, Such sets of rules ate what politcal eiontsts near By institutions. in essence, inst eee are collections of (broadly) agreed norms ules, procedures, and routies-—whetter they are formally re abshed ancl writzen down (in aw ory decree) a5 wy constsutions, ot whether they are informal wfertandings embedded in the culture (March and Gisen 1989; 21-6) Essentially institutions direct and constrain human interaction. Ali societies have Ben hey must‘The diferent institutional spheres of reap and sometimescontict to produce desired aeecornes) and include socal institutions (governing social interaction and behavious), economic sastit> tions (the customs, rules, and procedures governih Cconomte behaviour, Fanging from silent arte! Seouies yowerning stockmarket bebaviout) and pulticalinstitetions Gowersingeations afore Political institutions and the modern state otiticl scientist take a special interes in the evalu, Fon ond forms of the last of these institutional spneres: that of politics and poves, the sphere sajna he processes ane practices ofrule of governing, Ot Of a particular form of insttutlonalized domtinatty Srneepe The forms ofrufeexpressedin diferent Dobe feat systems, ot polities, have varled widely 8055 “pace and time. For instance, sore polities initially speeived only very basic forms of localized village dpeadship or leadership; others, perhaps startg veith such Jocal and limited forms of rule and power, Mibsequently evolved at diferent specs and wih afferent intensities into steeper ancl mare extensive Hnierarcnies of centalized control and power OvEt vin increasing tertitorial space. The emergence of centralized politics (wihich some theorists refer f9 86 arly states) sometimes expanded over wide afe05 © rcompassothersocetiesso that they cametoconst fate wat have been called ‘centralized bureaucratic empires’ Tromeves, the immense range of historical pois) systems which gave expression to the differens For rey lstibutions of power has stirunk dramatically See the stxteenta century when one type of POLY evan to emecgein Buropeand came tobe the domi: st political form of the recent and contemDomey rode: the state of, more accurately, ee modert sine Sovne scholars see eariler potities a8 ‘non-modern! States, classifying them for example as ancient oly Maver, fenadal states, premodem, easly modem, of stole sates or even ‘princely states’ But the mod = Fratate, as we understand it sdistinetive in its cent ‘al characteristics, though found ina variety of forms Tn the main, the emergence of the modern state jn Europe wasan endogenous process, occuring PHT fy mithin the geography and history of panics egons and in the course of cont, compeltOny sua, especally, consolidation among them. Tos irate, in late fifteenth-century Europe there we ayy 500 independent pottical units, but by 19° this had shrunk to about twenty-five. Such sates, 8° a so akape te stones and gee me) ‘he emerging countries which they bot presente caefdominated. And from wii. this history of oropesn sate formation (here developed rom fifteenth century, outward thrusts of discover}. CON aquest, and contro, loosely called inmperaisn, and a onal, These imspertal processes carved OU! NEF amies” in. most cases which had not exist! renheand), they established new institutions ofr" Fa the form of tie colontal state (which elthes pressed or used and sometimes transformed exist} Pre abonsof rulers), and dew suer.ceuntis partsof them) intociferent Kinds of Tage subordit pee economic relations with the metropolitan Cow ee orthe ineeasingly dominant West. The ¢fee “att tis were tobe profound in the external SN fing of the states that emerged in the develo ‘wedi, and persist today inthe post-colonial erasto atic sical cally olity vrary state. tem’ ty. mod cent ms. tein cular ton, illus: were 1900 es,in les of ted vy of nthe cand tnew disted rule sup. isting es(or vrdin- soun- “ects shap- oping Key points « All human societies requlre Institutions, informal for formal, to govern and promote their collective affairs. «Institutions are best understood as collections of ‘ules, procedutes, practices, and routines. «+ The emergence of specialist political institutions marks the differentiation of political systems or polities a The modern state Traditional polities ‘The modem state was the product of slow evolution from prior political systems, pslor polities, but by the nineteenth century its central features were cleat. The ‘Getman sociologist Max Weber (1964) theorized those features of the ‘modem’ state which distingulshed it from prior ‘traditional’ institutions of rule, orsystems of authority. These earlier forms, he suggested, like the ‘patrimontal’ form of authority as he called it, were characterized by two overriding features. First, theabsence of any sharp institutional distinc tion between the rulers and the institutions frie. This ‘was typical of the absolutist rule of some Furopean monarchs well into the eighteenth century, and beyond in sorne cases (as well as earlier and elsewhere in East Asia and Middle America). For instance, Louis XIV, the king of France in the mid-seventeenth cen= ‘rary, made the point with great effect when he Is alleged to have said to the parlement of Paris in April 1655 ‘’Etatcest moi’ (Lax the state). ‘The second defining feature of traditional forms of rule (not only patrimonial or absolutist versions) was tthe relative absence of open, mexitocratic entry, autonomy, independence, and security of tenure for the officials who surrounded the rulers. in a manner that distinguished those officials from the ideal- typical bureaucracy of the modern state, they were essentially the personal staff of the culer, often paid by bim or her, and with the more or less explicit requirement of personal loyalty tohim or her. IZING Ye STATE 141 «+The most recent and dominant form fas been the moder state whose origins (and forms) were ‘primarily Buropean. «This form was carried outwardsby Buropean impeti- lism and colonlalism, and imposed on diverse societies, or adopted and adapted by them, The ‘external provenance of the state in many develop- ing countries has been a critical factor in shaping, and jifluencing their particular forms and the politics associated with them, Defining the modern state Many characteristics and functions dlistingulsh the modern state. But f was the development of insti: tionsof ral and governing which wereformally sepa ated from not just the rulers but the officials who ran them, on theonelaand, and hecitizenry, on theother Ihand, that was central in the shift from what Weber called ‘traditional’ formsof uleand authority, includ ing patrimonial polities, to the moder state. Held, McGrew, Goldblat, and Perraton (1999: 48) claim the modern state is aset of ‘political apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction lover a demarcated atea, backed by a claim toa mono: poly of coercive power, and enjoying legitimacy as ¢ Tesult of a minimums level of support oF loyalty from their citizens’ Within this compact definition cen be found all the essential elements of the complex set of institutions that make up thesnodemn state: rr institutions: the institutions of the modern. te are all ‘public’ institutions, not private or privately owned institutions, and include not only ‘the government’ and legislature (ofthe day) but also the courts, civil service, army, and police, plus any state-owned agencies. All of these, though more or less coherently linked, are differentiated from other institutions (especially private and non-state institu- ‘téons) and individuals, and from the incumbents of the offices and the citizens or subjects over whom they exercise authority.| 142, APRIAM LEFTENEH Sovereignty and hegemony: the institutions of the stateand the rulesand laws madeby ithave authority over a particular demarcated geographical area (though there mey be disputes about that, asin seces- sionist and irredentst conflicts). Moreover, the rales and laws of the modern state apply in theory to every- one within ts territory. Formal monopoly of violence; the modern state has a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and it is, or should be, the dominant agency of rule and law, whether democratic or not, in principle supetordin- ate over all othets. In practice most modern states hhave struggled at times and still do struggle to achieve Ghat dominancs—as iMlustrated by the Peruvian state's battle o subdue the Sendero Lunsinoso gueraila ‘movement which exercised considerable power over ppartsof Peru in the 1970sand 1980s, Impartial bureaucracy: the bureaucracy is, (theoretically) impersonal, impartial, and neatal ‘Theoreticaly, too, it does not make law, but receives it from whoever makes It (whether legislature or dictator) and applies it. In practice, policy-making is much more complex, and, incceasingly, specialist Dureaucratic input into policy-making is the norm, Furthermore, different parts of the public bureau cracy have often very different interests and compete forresources toassert theie policy preferences, expand their functions or increase thelr’ staff, Nonetheless, (Ep cesta tnat tingle the moa state from prior forms of rule is the principle, at least, of relative independence and autonomy of the public service from both the elected political elites and parties and also from the public. Moreover, the offices (and the powers of the offices) ofstateofficais, Whether constitutional monarchs, presidents, minis- teis, legislators, judges, police, orcivilservantsbelong to the state, not to them personally. It is a funda. ‘mental assumption of the modern state that these public offices (and associated powers) should not be ‘used for private gain by the incumbents of such offices (what would normally be called corruption), Occupancy of such offices should entail no powers of Private patronage nor be used for the support of any particular private client base (clientelism), whether personal, regional, ethnic, or economic. ‘These characteristics are of course ideal-typlcal; that Is, they define the modern state in abstract and {eal terms. Nostate in the modern world has been, or ‘ean be, found which fulfils them to perfection, And while many (though not all) theorists may agree o this limited set of characteristics of the modern state, ‘the most contentious issues of debate and interpreta. tion in political science revolve around other central Ssessuch ass themodenstate‘neuta”? Canithe? E) Do classes and their interests dominate its policy ‘output and, if so, in each case, which ones? Does or ‘can the state have its own interests? What should its role in economy and society be? How far should the state intervene in, or make rules for, the ‘private’ life ofits subjects andbe limited or constrained in what it does by constitutionally defined bills of rights? Modern states differ with respect to many other variables, for example thetr historical traditions (some have longer continuous traditions of centralized rule than others, as in England, Russia, or Japan); their structural properties (for example whether unitary ot, asin India and Nigerla, federal, and hence how state power is distributed regionally); whether they ate Formally democratic or not and for how long; their electoral systems andifor consultative patterns (and how these influence state power and policy-making); and the nature and extent of thele legitimacy in the perception of their subjects The modern state: imperatives, functions, and challenges As the modern state consolidated, replicated, and proliferated through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, more countries began to adopt its broad template as thelr system of rule, their polity. Por example, many Latin American counties adopted and adapted from France and (toa lesser extent) the ‘United States in shaping thetr constitutions (rule of the political game)as they gainedindependencefrom Spain and Portugal between 1811 and 1900. “But zhe realy central points thatthe modern state ‘emerged in the course of the great transformation trom agian t0 instal soci (mainly inked Europe) and in the consequential requirements for appropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks and functionstofaciltateand extend ths. twasboth product and agent ofthat transformation, Indeeditisa. And gree on state, preta- central tbe? policy Does or val its id the ite’ life what it other (some sdrale 5 thelr ay oF, state 2y ate their how King); nthe eth >road For opted 3 the les of from state ition yin for orks both G essential to understand that the fundamental defining role and function of the modern state has been to promote, organize, protect, and sustain this economic and social transformation to industrial- Ism—and beyond into the ‘post-industrial’ era. In the ‘nineteenth and twentieth centuries the history of the ‘now industtlal powers and more recent mnodern his- tory of the contemporary developing world shows that successful and effective modern states and suc- cessful economies go hand in hand. This process of state formation was of course intensified through the ‘competitive economic, military, and other forms of nationalism that it promoted, and by the turbulent socio-political changes associated with the economic ‘transformation. And by the early twentieth century four critical issues had come to confront thie modern state, The manner in which each state dealt with them in turn helped to define its specific shapesndits character in its relations with the society it claimed both to represent and to manage. These four issues re: defence against external attack and internal unity, the promotion and protection of the eco- nomy, democratization, and the associated demand forstate provision of welfare. Fist, with regard to defence, the perlod 1850-1939 saw an intensification of what has been called despotic power, that is the power to control and sup- press, as opposed to infrastructural power, the ower to penetrate and transform society (Mann 1986: 169-70; Weiss and Hobson 1995). But, second, as indicated above, national economic growth and development also was central to the emergence of the ‘modern state and its defence and was closely assocl- ated with the competitive nationalisms of the nine- teenth century. Thus successful modern economic ‘growth and successful modem states with influence ‘that extends beyond thelr borders have been inextei ably linked. And there is nothing that sums this up better than the slogan ‘National Wealth, Military Strength’ (often translated as ‘rich country, strong army’) adopted by the new post-Melji elites im Japan after 1870. In pursuit of these goals, most of today's leading industrial economies used state-directed Industrial, ‘trade, and technological policies (Chang 2002; $8 ‘and passim) to get ahead, and try to stay ahead (asin ‘the case of Britain), orto catch upas Germany, Japan, THEORIZING THE STATE 143 and the United states began to do in the nineteenth century. The theoryand practice of stateinvolverent in promoting growth and protecting the national economy has varied from country t0 country and time to time, but three broad strategies, or models, may be identified (though each has contained a var ety of sometimes quite distinctive forms). The frst was the Anglo-American and Wester Euxopean ‘model which involved the state ensuring four prime conditions for the promotion of private, matket- driven growth, as argued by Douglas North (1990): securing property rights, establishing a fair and eff ent judicial system, setting out open and under stood system of rules and regulations, and facilitating market entry and functioning. At certain times state action has gone much further than this as in the depression years in the USA and inthe post-war years {in Burope. The second model has been the Soviet mode, of forced-match top-down industealization, pioneered from the 1920s and involving pervasive state ownership, control and management of the economy, and the mobilization by the state, not the rarket, of resources Gncluding human ones) in p suit of transformative objectives, The third model is essentially the Rast Asian model of the develop- ‘mental state, pioneered in Japan after 1870, and especially after the 1920s, which has been replicated in some other countries like Korea and Taiwan (Leftwich 1999) Thisinvolved amuch closer symbiosis Ietween state and private sector, (see Chapter 21b below) and has sometimes been called ‘managed capitalism’ or ‘goveraing themarket, . All modern states, then, have had to engage with the central isue: to what extent, when, and how to promote and protect their economies in a sharply (nd increasingly) competitive world economy, espe- cially when motivated by the urgent need to recon- struct (after wat) or catch up—ot go under (as they saw). Modder states in the developing world have sought toadopt (with often quite substantial local modifica- tions) versions of the thtee different strategies outlined above in the more o less serious pursult of the goals of economic growth through industrial ization, Crucially, however, successful intervention alongany of thestratesic patnshas only occurred, and hnas indeed only been possible, where the appropriate44 ADRIAN LEFTIVICH political coalitions and distributions of power underpinning the state have allowed rather than hindered growth-promoting institutions and strat egies. Thishas been one ofthe key differences between the older ‘modern states’ and the new ‘moclern states’ of the developing world. Finally, with regard to the third and fourth challenges besetting the modem state (those of democratization and redistribution), Huntington (1991) identified three great ‘waves’ of democratiza- tion occuring between 1828 and 1926, between 1943 ‘and 1962, and from 1974 to the present. In each of these phases, and varying fom country to country, dominant siate elites responded to democratic pres- suresin different ways, hence shaping thecharacter of ‘he polity, depending on whether and towhat extent they saw thelr Interests being threatened by such demands. Where democratic progress occurred, the ‘associated deepening and extension of clvil society has had the effect of redistributing some political power through the institutional forms of electoral, ‘bargaining, and consultative processes. Moreover, the growth of powerful and increasingly well-organized labour movements in particular has meant that few states in the developed world could afford to ignore the demand for redistributionist programmes, for example through taxation policy, welfare provision (health, old age, and education for instance), and ‘wage-level agreements. In consequence, those socl- ties managed effectively by modem statesare (witha few notable exceptions) characterized by levels of income inequality far lessextreme than in many parts ofthe developing world (see Chapter) The state in the developing world: provenance and forms Introduction Most of the conditions and capabilities associated with the state's emergence in the now developed ‘world have been largely absent in the developing world. In short, the formation of modern states in colonial and post-colonial contexts was not geared to Key points + Modern states are the political institutions of rule which are in principle differentiated and distinct from both theruless and the ruled. + The modern state emerged, evolved, consolidated, and was borroved as the centralized and organizing institutions of rule whose central function was to ‘manage, promote, and protect national transitions from agrarian to industrial society, and to sustain economic growth. + Historically, the modern state has been character- ‘vedi, in ideal typical terms, by its public institu tions, its sovereignty and hegemony, its formal ‘monopoly of legitimate coercion (violence), and its ‘theoretically impartial bureaucracy + Though cifferent states adopted different strategies, suceessful economic growth and successful states have without exception been inextricably linked. + In promoting economic growth and development, modern states have had to provide defence and censure law and order, respond to demands for a wider set of civic rights—notably greater demo- craticparticipation in policy-making—and manage some redistribution of resources through tax and welfare arrangesments. ‘+ The broad strategy adopted in the pursuit of ‘economic grovth has depended crucially on the character of the political forces and coalitions “underpinning state power, which in turn has influ ‘enced the achievement of developmental goals. the development of institutions of rule directed at ‘promoting economic growth or transformativedevet- ‘opment, as occurred in Europe, and elsewhere, ‘whether on a capitalist, soclalist, or mixed economy: basis. Moreover, most of the challenges that those catlier states had to meet—especialy those of demo- cratic pressures and redistributive demands—have‘thus farexceeded the capability of many of the newer states. And crucially, apartfrom some very irmportant exceptions, this is explained by the quite diverse political forces and coalitions formed during or after thecolonial era and which set up, inherited, adapted, ‘or battled for control of ti institutions of the mod- ‘ean state, Simply stated; these political forces, repres- enting varying kinds of socio-economic elites and interests, seldom fad the interest, the will, or the power to establish or encourage growth-promoting institutions in accordance with any of the thee mod Is sketched above, This is why so many states in the Jontemporary developing world have been associated with weak or uneven developmental performances. ‘But before proceeding further, two important intro- ‘ductory points should be made Fist, we do not need a special political science for the analysis of the state in the developing world today. The problems facing these states have been no different to those which faced (or still face) statesand societies in the now developed world, so-called; they may be different in complexity, intensity, and con- text, but not in principle. These problems have been (end remain) essentially those of how to establish and sustain the institutions of rule which promote the ‘momentum of economic development, within or ‘outside democratic polities, whether stateled or ‘marketed, in the face of both more or less explicit pressutes for democratization and redistribution, in ‘an increasingly globalized political economy. Second, it is always difficult to generalize about states and politics czoss continents. Historically, the Kinds of modem state institution which developing countries inherited at independence varied widely and were everywhere shaped by the interaction of fourmain factors: the nature of the pre-colonial polit- les; the economic purposes of colonial rule; the char acteristics of the colonial state institutions and the socio-political groups winich dominated them; and ‘the manner of incorporation of pze-colonial political [processes and institutions in the systems of colonial ‘and post colonial rule:"Acoordingly, the conitempor- ary developing world is‘at least as diverse as were those societies in which the modern state emerged; ‘nd the differentiation in economic circumstances and political structure has been considerable, Nevertheless there aresomemajor, common underly- ingthemes too, THEORIZING THE STATE 145 The modern state in the developing | world: provenance Ifthe modem statein what wenow cal the developed ‘world grew largely through complex intaral political processes of conflict, consolidation, and regional con- testation (nationalisms) in the course of the great transformations from agrarian to industrial soceties, most states in the developing world owe thelr exist “enge (and indeed the very borders over which they seek or clair to rule) to the geographical definitions and institutions mpastions of te colonial ea orto FJ later adjustments. With few exceptions, the proven: ance of states in the developing would has largely been external, and few modem states there can tzace ‘their lineages back through indigenous systems and Institutions of rule. In short, few developed endogen: ‘ously from prior local polities. In Asla, the exceptions include Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand where some continuity can be traced backto prorlocal absoluis, i ‘monarchical, and imperial) systems and institutions ‘of centralized rule, asin Eyyptand Ethiopia in the case | ‘of Africa, In Latin America the main pre-colonial political institutions, especially the great centralized {eibute-extracting empires of the Aztecs (Mexico) and the Incas (Peru), were extinguished by the Spanish conquest from the early sixteenth century, though cultural legacies remain even today, Although the patterns of colonial state institutions varled widely across time and space (Young 1994: 244-81), they everywhere Ieft very important Influences on the politics and state structures after Independence. Everywhere, and almost without ‘exception, the purpose of colonial rule and control ‘was undertaken initially for the benefit ofthe metio- i politan countries or thei particalar interests k Colonial states: imposed borders | and the institutional patterns é of rule i External design and imposition of ‘national’ boundaries Perhaps tite most far-reaching influence and impact hasbeen the external shapingof geographicalbound- aries and institational stcuctures, the most dramatic146 ADRIAN LEFTWICH istration being the ‘scramble for Africa’, which produced the national boundaries of Aca today. OF Course there were no ‘countries’ with formally defined ‘national’ boundaries before this—indeed the notion of ‘nation’ or ‘nation state’ would have been alien in pre-colonia ica: political boundaries were vague and porous. What there were, however, was «wide range of ‘mittipte, overlapping anc alternative collective identities’ (Berman 1998: 310) expressed in, through, ard under an equally wide range of institutional political arrangements. Such ras the artificiality of the new, imposed boundaries that some 44 percent of those stil exiting today are straight lines (Hesbst 2000: 75), representing tines drawn cartographically on open maps. There was almost no indigenous definition of geographical boundaries, nor were any major ‘national’ move- ‘ments, or ‘nationalist sentiments, involved in estab lishing the boundaries of modern African nation- states. The Latin American experience was not much diferent, where the new states were carved from the huge Vice Royalties of the colonial system of role in the course of the struggles for independence in the nineteenth century. Ledlargely by the conservative Box 9.1 The colonial impact in Africa tn Alico, lage acts of fand were delmed by European powes:as thelr possesions, ether as ‘colnies or protectorates or asin the case of King Leopos of Beigivm, a5 private property the form of the Congo Free State. The distribution among the pers scramble for Aria” was formally recognized by thet representatives at the Congress of Berin, 1864-5, inal of ths Bia, France, Germany, and Portugal paid no regard tothe enormous ferences among the llerent Aican soceties that ranged fom Smallseale seltgovering hunting and. gathering bbands to large, hierarchical: poiial systems asin the empires of Mali-Ghana; andl Songhay in west Aico. Peoples with diverse cultures, religions, languages, and poli systems that had previous five along side one another, sometimes peacfuly and some tines a volent confit or subordination, but without formal boundaries, were now pulled together into cently artical created “ation states rill (colonia borm Spaniards) the nev states in consequence expressed politica and socio-economic relations which even today reflect deep and profound inequalitiesbetween asmall and very ich)cliteanda large and very poor) mass 1 Asia, a similar pattern occurred and the Indian subcontinent provides the best example, where British rae brought diverse ethnic and religious com munities often tense with commnalzivalties,notio mention over 500 Princely tats, togetherin colonial India, But at independence, the country was divided between India and Pakistan, with ast Pakistan (ater to become independent as Bangladesh) being sp arated by a great chunk of Inia from West Pakistan Indonesia emerged from Dutch rule asan improbable ‘nation-state’ of about 13,000 islands stretching for about 3,500 miles from west to east, containing diverse linguistic, cultural and religions cornmunitis (eeemapon page 256i Chapter 6), Cambodia, Kore, ‘Thailand, Myanmar, and, to some extent, Malaysia have been notable exceptions to this pattern, each refiecting close lineages with some historical polity Extractive rather than developmental purposes of rule ‘The purpose of impetial contiol or rule—and hence the character of the institutions of the coloniat states—was not developmental in the manner of the ‘emerging modern states of Europe, On the contrary, all the major col@nicl powers (and often the early private companies that acted for them) saw the extraction of riches, rawr materials and taxes as theit primary objective. External design and imposition of the institutions of rule In trying to understand the problems and failures of ‘many states in the developing world tis fundamental to recognize that these extractive purposes shaped the kind of institutions of rule, which in turn formed ‘the foundations for the states after Independence. In faras the institutions of colonial rulecan be térrhed ‘colonial states’ (Young 1994), they were essentially states of extraction, and not almed at pronioting, and organizing national economic development, With ‘the exception of Japanese rule in Korea, no colonial Institutions of rulebore any resemblance to any of the three models sketched above. In short, throughouittates in anomie found teanda Indian where "motto elonial, livided 1 later ag sp isan, ‘obable ing for aining nities Kore, alsjia sy eac ity. hence slonial ofthe atrary, early w the s thelr ses of rental raped med ce.In semed tally yand With onal ofthe gout Box 9.2 The extractive nature of imperial rule ‘The Spanish conquistader and congueror of Mexico, Hemand Cortés, inthe sxeenth century, s reputed | twhave sid" came to get gold, not ttl the sl, ike 2 peasant’, In the Caribbean, plantations exploiting Uunree labour (fest, indentured servants and then {almost enticoly slaves) were established forthe pro: duction and export of cotton, tobacco, and especially sug. Indonesia, the ‘culture system’ ofthe Dutch, fist under the Dutch East India Compary and thes through formal colonial rule, required Indonesians {0 deliver set amounts of spices to the authorities. Likes, the ruthless requirements of King Leopole's "Free Stale in the Congo demanded that rubber and | vory be collected, on paln of often crue punishment {amputation of hands was not unknown) by vilagers. severe, throughout colonial Alice ram materials ‘ich as palm of, beeswas, wild rubber, cocoa, and, later tea, plus diamonds, gold, and copper in the south flowed back to Furope. the colonial world, and until well into the twentieth: ‘century, the institutions of colonial rule and control ‘were authocitarlan, elitist, and geared to maintaining high levels of extraction for the benefit of interests in ‘the metropolitan powers, Intensities and paradoxes of colonial institutions ‘The institutions of colonial rule displayed something ofa paradox. Atthe centre, power was generally held very firmly, ‘despotic’ power that is: the capacity to deploy force and coercion (Mann 1986: 169-70) in order to suppress and control. Challenges to colonial rulewere usually put down with sometimes spectacu- larbrutality, commonly with the assistance of locally recruited indigenous police and soldiers, ‘the real locus of despotic power was largely confined to areas of economic or strategic importance—such as the cities, ssines, plantations, or ports Yer there was seldom much infrastructural power (Mann 1986: 169-70)—the capacity of the colonial institutions of rule to penetrate, administratively, the length and breadth of the country and to use that THEORIZING THE STATE 147 Box 9.3. The authoritarianism of colonial rule ‘Throughout the colonial werld uni welinto the wer tieth century the institutions of ule were authoritarian, jn some places harsher than others. in Latin America, for example, Viceroys and their officials answerable to the King of Spain and his Council ofthe Ines ruled ‘over vast areas. But it was the institutions of conto in the siver mines and, especially, the ltiundo or hhociendathe great estates of largely coerced labour—that ruled by force atthe local level In the Sitsh Caribbean, govemors, appointed fram London, ‘led over systems of slave labour. Wel after the abol- lio of slavery and the slave trade, the descendants of staves had ttle effective say inthe institutions of rule, ni wel into the twentieth century. Similar patterns Could be found in all of colonial sub-Saharan Aca, where governors, responsible to London, Pars, or Brussels, with executive councils made up mainly of officials, an vast territories. ish re in nda French ‘ulein Indochina, and Dutch ruler indonesia was ile diferent in tis concentration of power in the hands (of colonial officials, unul the early twentieth century \when consultative and elementary electoral processes began tobe intraduce at local or provincial eves ‘capacity to facilitate, organize, or promote transform ative programmes and policies of economic change and development (Migdal 19880: 4). For example, large areas of non-urban Latin America, inthe ‘Amazon and the Andes and especially in the huge rural hinterlands of countiles lke Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, though formally under Spanish. or Portuguese colonial rule, remained far beyond effect- ivecontrol of the centre and were run in effect by the ‘patrons and havendados of the great estates and the ‘exerging caudillos, the local strongmen. The same ‘was true for much of sub-Saharan Africa and large patts of South-East Asia. This lack of infrastructural ‘power should not be at all surprising, given that the ‘central purpose of European colonial rule wasextract- ive, not developmental or transformative, and much ‘of colonial rulewas done ona very limited budget and ‘a minimal administrative presence. But this dearth of infrastructural power of the colonial state created a148 ADPIAN REETWVICEL legacy that characterizes many new modern states in the post-colonial world, while despotic power—pro- tecting the new clites which took over after independ ence—remained pronounced in urban centres. Because of the weakness of infrastructural power, all colonial regimes came to depend on local-tevel ‘josses), ‘big men’, brokers, or oligarchs, some of ‘whom derived their power originally from theirtradt- tlonal positions (such as the caciques of Latin America ‘andthe sometimes artificially created—‘teadmen’ ‘or ‘chiefs’ in colonial Afsica). The net overall effect of this was generally to constrain the emergence of effective and centralized modemn states capable of establishing national institutions of rule for the pro- ‘motion, management, and maintenance of national ‘economic development, Indeed, the weakness of its ‘infrastructural penetration required the central insti- ‘tutions of the state alwvays to bargain and deal with the local brokers—often later institutionalize in federal political systems after independence, as in India and Nigeria and Brazil—thereby establishing complex reciprocal networks of political influence ‘and patronage in and around the institutions of the state, and hence imposing, serious constraints on their capacity and autonomy (Barton 1997; 49). The ppatiern could not be better expressed than io Parry's description of this political process in Latin America, {in hisaccount of thelegacy of colonial rale there: “This is caudlismo oF caigulsmo: the organisation of political fife by local ‘besser whase power and influence derives from personal ascendancy, family or egional association, In most ‘countries te concentration of formal authority atthe centre, the wealmess of lawfully constituted provincial and local authonty, leave wide scope forthe activities of such people. “The real effectiveness of central government may depend upon the natare ofthe bargain which it can strike with those who wield local influence and power; while the prestige of the cacique (local boss) may be enhance! bythe ‘pul’ which he can exer the capital (Paty 1966: 371-2) Patron-client relations and the politics of the new states, ‘This particular ‘organisation of political life’, as Parry describedit, was the context within which patterns of patronage and patron-client relations became so pervasive in the post-colonial world, frustrating the ‘emergence and consolidation of the institutions of rule of the modem state. Patron-client relations have typlfies human pollues, before the modern state, flmost everywhere, Te basie characteristic of the institution of patton-cent relations sof an nega power elation between patrons (big men’ Afian terminology) wino are powerful ich, and igh in satas,on the one hand, and clients (small boys in Aican terminology) who Tack power, wealth, or statu on the other hand. Tae patron-cfentelation- thip reciprocal but uneven in thatthe pation as contol of, or acces to resourees and opportunities which he (i is usually a male) can provide for the ‘lent in return for deference, suppor, loyalty, and Ga the context of postindependence electoral polities) votes, Pattons have an interest in maintaining the ‘lien baseby being good big men’ thats by deives- sng the goods, white cllents (depending on the paticular pattem ofthe réatonship may have some freedom to move fom one patron to ance from ‘whom they might expect better deal. Clearly the rules defining the iastittin of patron- age ae eniey at odds with the roles underpinning the modern state, and bear a staking resemblance to the presiate Institutions of patrimonial cule, i tsed by Weber But assocetiesin the colonial world Schieved thelr independence from metropolitan powers, and s attempts weze made to bald modem Slates, the principles and practices of patronage quickly established themseves in theinterstcesof the new institutions of rule, from top to bottom, thereby weakening state pacity and wndetnining Is auto- ‘omy. Thus in Latin Ametica, the patterns described by Paty continued. Nationa eades, whether on the lett or the right polticaly,wete constrained by the immense regional and oct power of the old ose, ligarchies, and politcal ets, in courtry and town, wine could contain ifnot deal eform even under the toughest of mitay regimes, a5 in Breil afer 1965. And in Aftie, wines patsimonialism predated the Colonial impact and where, at independence, the commercial, capt, or Ianded clases were Sal and weak itwaslmostinesitable thatthe resouressot the state would be the target hat competing groups ‘woul seek to capture after independence, to feed and fuel ther patronage Baks to “riends and followers, ‘whether of aregional in, arethnic character Te was lite diferent ta mach of south and South Bast Asia during and after the colonial pezlod. Only im those few cases where revolutionary politcalmovements seized state power and largely crushed prior elites and dominant classes, as in Cuba and (North) Vietnam, has the power of patronage been contained, though It has sometimes reappeared. ‘Other exceptional cases, where electorally or militar: ily dominant elites have taken over and pursued national economic growth for purposes of national defence the classic recipe for state formation and. consolidation—include South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Key points + Unlike the development of the modern state In Europe, most contemporary states in the develop- ing world had thelr borders and main institutions imposed from without, + With few exceptions, the originel purpose and point of colonial rule and hence colonial institutions of state were extractive rather than developmental +The institutions of rule of the colonial state reflected these purposes, being characterlzed by generally authoritarian patterns, designed to pro- ‘mote extraction and the control of labour, THEORIZING THE STATE 149 + Yetmost colonial states were marked by the paradox of having strong ‘despotic’ (coercive) power and. ‘weak ‘infrastructural’ or transformative capacities. + So, many countries in the developing world achleved independence in circumstances where powerful economic and political forces in society ‘exerted considerable regional and local influence ‘and hence constrained dramatically the emergence of centralized, autonomous, and effective modern states, * Colonial rule commonly built on, extended, and ‘nstitutionalized patron-client relations, from top tobottom. In the post-cologial era, these institutions of patronage merged with the formal institutions of the modem state, commonly transforming it so {that ithas been unable to perform the central func tion of the modem state, namely the encourage ‘ment, promotion, and maintenance of economic growth. ‘+ Many of the characteristics of pre-modern politics ‘and ‘patrimonial’ polities were entrenched within the institutionsof the modernstate,leadingto their characterization as neo-patrimonial states. The state in the developing world: characteristics and features Introduction Having explained the provenance ofthe modern state inthe developing worldand then explored thetypical legacies that the colonial period bequeathed, tisnow possible to assess the distinguishing structural char- acteristics of the post-colonial modern state in the developing world. As before, there are two important qualifications: all states are different and generaliza- tion is difficult; and second, notwithstanding that observation, there are enough common pattezns— some more pronounced in some states than in lothers—to warrant the following general points, State characteristics in the developing world Public institutions Oncor thecentalcharactersticsofthemodernstateis that its snstitutions aze, of should be, essentially ‘public not owned or treated as their private domain by their incumbents, as was typical of many pre-nineteenth. century European public insttstions. ‘One of the greatest problems in establishing modern states in the developing worid has been to liberate public institutions from private contol or ffluence150 ADRIAN LEFTWICHE ‘of political leaders, or from their ‘capture’ by special interests (fleliman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000). The Combined effects of patrimoniat rule and patronage have been to erode the independence of public institutions whether they be policy-making bodies, “outis, bureaucracies, amies, oF other sateowned fgencies_and the net effect has often been. the informal privatization of public institutionsin so farss they have been used to advance the private interests fd ints of (usally) longstanding civitan oF rmlitary leaders who have become heads of stat. Atits Coxe, this private use of public ofice and resources s the core definition of corruption. Certain heads of state, for instance Presidents Marcos and Suharto in thePhilippinesand indonesia, Presidents Mobutoand Kenyatta of Zice and Kenya; and Presidents Batista, Diivalies, and Samoza of Cuba, Haiti, ancl Nicaragua might quite easily have repeated the view of Lous XIV thet (Etat cst moi (Cam the stat), One of the key institutional instruments of the modera stave to the developed world for protecting the publicinstitutions {euch asthecivilsezvice) hasbeen the establishment of boats suchas civil service commission, responsible for appointing, managing, and escilining civil ser vans, thereby establishing clea differentiation from. the political leadership and protecting bureauccts {tom politica interference. Ithesbeen profoundly dit felt 10 esiblish and sustain the independence of such bodies in many developing counts Sovereignty, hegemony, and the monopoly of violence ‘Many states in the developing world have had great difficulty in establishing thetr hegemony and main- taining sovereignty within thelr borders and in relation to regional and international political forces. ‘This isnot only because ofthe power of local, private, or regional ‘bosses’ or ‘Influential’ but because the legitimacy of the state has been commonly chal- lenged by various groups (ethnic, religious, cultural, or regional) which do not wish to be part of it, or by political opponents who refuse (for good or bad reasons) to accept the incumbent regime. Also, seces- sionist, iredentist, and civil wars have plagued the ‘modern states of the developing world from Peru to ‘he Philippines and fram Angola to Afghanistan. ‘The eatlier generation of modern states also faced these ‘nation-building’ challenges; for instance state education policy innineteenth-century France had as ‘one of its prime concerns the Dullding of a sense of national identity and unity. Indeed such isues persist to this day, as demonstrated in Basque separatism in Spain and Quebecois nationalism in Canada, However such challenges have arguably been much ‘more severe in the developing world. These they have ‘been compounded by the legacy of colonialism inchuding the imposition of artificial borders and such practices as the Importation of slave or inden tured labour rom afar and biased pattems of reéruit- ‘ment to (colonia) state institutions lke te miltey. ‘While the present chapter has not identified nation: building as itself one ofthe core tasks or imperatives of the modem state, t must nonetheless be re0og- ‘ized that fallure to achieve some degree of national, ‘or multinational, integration and caheston will jeop- andize the state-building project. In effect if is in ‘Arica that the greatest incidence of conflict ofthis kkind and the adverse consequences are to be found. But there are many examples from elsewhere, such as Sci Lanka's Jong-running conflict between the ‘Ceylonese-majority in the south and Tanallaninosity inthenort, Moreover, Indonesia struggled for many yeats to hold on to East Timor (ee p. 251 below). Guerilla movements, both w:ban and rural, have challenged the hegemony and legitimacy of a num: ber of Latin American states dince the 1960s, most notably the Shining Path (Send Luminoso) move ‘ment in Peru in the 1970s and 1980s. Many states in the developing world cannot claim a format mono- poly of violence, characteristic which marks them off sharply from most states in the developed world although not all of those have in recent years been {kee from all violent intemal conflict, as ta Northern Irelandandspain. ‘One consequence hasbeen the often astonishingly high levels of military expenditure by the govern- ‘ments of developing counties, much of it deployed for purposes of inteznal control ancl the suppression of dissent or secession. Whereas in many developet countries military expenditure asa percentage of gor- fernment expenditure averages under 7 per cent, the comparative figures for some developing countries (mostly outside Latin America) are semarkable—over 40 percent in Angola and Sudan, and between a quer- ter and a third In Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Cambodiasehadas sense of "spersist varatism, Canada, a much ey have nialism as and inden. recruit. uiltary, ration. zatives recog: tional, jeop: isin of this, ‘ound, such 8 the »ority many slow), have um most rove. esin ono. hem orld pen em aly, em ‘yea ston ped the les ver ‘Thus, weakened from within by intemal conflict and held down by low rates of economic growth, ‘many states in the developing world have found it difficult to maintain sovereignty. Sovereignty is a diffcult concept at the best of times, rarely found in practice in an absolute sense anywhere, But poor ‘countries find itharder to maintain their sovereign, independence In the international arena than rich. countries. Economic strength not only provides for defensive (or offensive} military capacity but also. redluces dependency and increases bargaining capa- city in international negotiations and discussions with public institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund as well as foreign gov- ‘emments, and also with sources of private invest ‘ment and finance. Jn particular, where foreign aid inflows form a significant part of government expend- iture, de facto sovereignty is seriously reduced as ai donors come to apply increasingly. stringent and’ ‘wide-ranging conditions.-As a percentage of central govesnment expenditures (World Bank 2002: 360-2), aid contributions have been very high in such coun- tuies as Kenya (16 percent), Bangladesh (21 per cent), Burundi (40 per cent), Cameroon (31 per cent), Haiti (64 pet cent), Madagascar (48 per cent), Nepal (46 per cent), Nicaragua (86 pet cent), and Uganda (77 per cent), In other countties, with lower ald.lependency ratios, the figure has not been so high, such as Brazil (02 per cent), India (1.9 per cent), Morocco (6 per cent), Pakistan (5 percent), and the Philippines (4 per cent). The second group have been better able 10 maintain a grip on their own policy-making, though, ‘his has not meant tharthey:have escaped high levels, of debt (See Chapter), another element that impacts ‘on sovereignty. Debt payment obligations as a per- ‘centage of the value of exports or goods and services ceventin these lessaid-dependent countriescan be very high—for example in Brazil—though’ much lower elsewhere, asi India for instance. Impartial bureaucracies ‘The pervasive legacy of patrah-elient relations, the culture of patrimonialism within the state, the absence of democratic accountability (even in its ln ited electoral forma) low levels of economic growth, the power and wealth—of special private interests Unrough ‘state capture’, limited and often ald- dependent state budgets, low pay, high levels of state THEORIZING THE STATE 151 involvement in the economy, and hence much opportunity for discretionary bureaucratic decisions have all contributed to the undermining of bureau- cratic impartiality in many developing counties, Moreover, bureaucratic continuity in much of Latin ‘America has been constrained by the polities of the appointive bureaucracy, a system whereby incoming governments are able to dismiss (often many thow- sands of) buteaucrats (especially senior ones) and appoint their ‘own men and women (Schneider 1999: 292-4). Corruption too erodes state capacity to pursue coherent and consistent policies of economic ‘growth, undermines development, and institutional- izes unfaleness, By discouraging political elites from ‘aking the tough decisions that development requizes and by disabling the buceaucratic institutions of thestate from carrying out effective implementation, ‘she consequences for development-can be severe. The difficulties in achieving appropriate forms of land reform in many developing countries offer a prime ‘example, of which President Bhuto’s failed attempts at land reform in Pakistan in the 1970s provides an ‘excellent case study (Herring 1979), Key points + States in developing counties vary greatly but, in ‘many, institutional and political legacles Dlur the boundaries between public institutions andl private Interests + Establishing institutions to monitor and control these boundaries have been dificult where there ts... no politcal willto doo. + Many states in the developing world have found it dificult to maintain hegemony within their own j territory to protect their sovereigaty and achieve a ‘monopoly of violence. + Impartial bureaucracies, protected from politcal ot : sectional interests, are less common in the develop. i Ingthan in the developed world. + Patcimonialism and patronage, low levels of pay, | and pervasive opportunities for discretionary behaviour all contribute to varying but sometimes intense patterns of corruption, thereby subverting ‘hecentral purpose ofthe modern state: the promo- tion of economic growth and welfare152 ADRIAN LEFTWIICH The state in the developing world: facing the challenges Introduction ‘The central function of themodern statehas been the promotion, management, and maintenance of eco” jhomic transformation and growth, and especially the shift from agrarian to industrial society, and all the ‘complex social and political complexities which that ‘entailed, The effective elimination of patronage, the dde-institutionalization of corruption, the clear differ~ ‘entiation of private and public interests and institu. tions, and the establishment of relatively impartial ‘pureaucracies have alwaysand everywhere been both condition and consequence of national economic growth, managed direcily or supervised indirectly by the institutions of the state-In the course of ts evol tion, the modern state has also had to respond to the challenges. of democratization and the associated ‘demands for redistribution of welfare, and has done ‘so more of less successfully in the more developed ‘economiesin the course of the twentieth century. ‘The same cannot be said of many parts of the developing worid where many states have not yet been able to organize or manage economictransitions ‘on any of the three main models outlined earlier. Instead, where attempted, industrial capitalisms— ‘and the institutions that might facilitate it—have been distorted by excessive state regulation, corrup tion, and the relative general weakness ofthe kinds of social anid economic classes that would normally be forces for change, Elsewhere, revolutionary socialist forced) march’ state-led economic transformations and the state institutions of rule and management they have required of the kind that occurred first in the Soviet Union after 1917 and then in China after 1949, where the political forces that backed it were strong, have generally failed too. And the extraord- {nary symbiotic marriage of state and market typified by various forms of the ‘developmental state’ that pave promoted economic progress in countries as different as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, ‘Thailand, Mauritius, end Botswana (Leftvrich 1995) thas simply been impossible to replicate elsewhere Its the particular constellation of social, economic, ‘and political forces that explains these tates’ success, ‘and not whether they happen to be democracies or hnot. In all cases they illustrate the axiom that suc. cessful and effective modern states and successful ‘economies gohand in hand. Until the 1980s, few states in the developing world qualified as consolidated democracies, at Teast electoral democracies, There were Important cexceptions—india, Jamaica, Venezuela, Costa Rica, ‘Mauritius, and Botswana ave but some, though many ‘would question whether they all counted as fiber? democracies (Burnell and Calvert 1999). This is ‘because in much of the developing world, conflicts— cof class, regional, religious, or ethnic groups—have ‘been so sharp that consensus about rules of the political game has proved to be impossible. Different groups tend to preter rules that would protect oF advance their own particular interests and limit or reduce the interests of others, Secondly, many though rot all the, conflicts—most dramatically in Latin ‘Ametica—have been about distsibutional issues land, jobs, income, welfgte support. Where economic growth has been slow or negative, it has simply Proved impossible (even i desired) to meet such demands. Elsewhere, especially in Aftica, cycles of military coup and counte-coup have been symp~ tomatic of rival factions—ethnic, political, oF reglonal-secking to gain control of the state and henceits resources and opportunities, in orderto feed their clientelistic chains. This again illustrates a cen~ tral theme of tfé chapter. The modem state in the developed world has beert compatible with demo- ‘cratic (at least electoral) politics only where.tt hes censured that economic growth could subsidize steady Gf slow and sometimes intermittent) increase in the broad welfare of the majority. The more the state has been able to do that, the more robust has been its legitimacy and the mote consolidated has its democracy become.where. tecess, sles or cessful oping ss) at ortant Rica, many beral his is ets “have of the ferent ect or nit or rough Latin ssues: romic imply such des of symp: A, or e and ofeed acen- Inthe emo- it has ize a crease ce the st has hasits Key points + Most states in the developing world have exper enced great diffeulty in overcoming the challenges of economic growth, democratic claims, and redis- ‘nibutional demands. «+ With important exceptions, states in the develop: ing world have been unable to establish the institu tions of rule that would permit economic growth Conclusion strong and effective states are inconceivable without strong economies. And strong economies are incon ‘ceivable without the institutions of state that make them possible, All examples of sustained economic growth and development, not simply stalls or devel- ‘opmental statist models, have required effective states to make (and adjust and adapt) appropriate instita- tions of rule and to facilitate the coordination of the public with the peivate institutions. Market-oriented models would have not been successful in the West without pervasive state support in the form of invest ment in human and infrastructural capital, tbe raising of taxes, the regulation of commerce, the establishment Of judiclal and legal systems and welface proviston—and much more. Top-down state Ted Soviet-style post-revolutionary industeiaization, tikewise, tas also required appropriateinstitutions for ‘success, as have the complex developmental states of Fast Asia, Buti each and every case, behind thestate ‘and the institutions of development it has created or facilitated, has been a coslition of political and social forces willing and able to establish, maintain, and adapt those institutions. ‘The problem in many developing countries has ‘been that few such social and political forces existed cf, whee they did, were seldom strong enough to make the running, fa short, the polities underpin: ning states in many countries of the developing ‘world have made them inept, disjointed, and divided agencies of economic growth—whatever model they have adopted. ‘With the collapse of the bipolar world, the largely economic processes of globalization have accelerated. THFORIZING THE STATE 153 according to capitalist, socialist, or developmental state models. « Inthe absence of economic growth and in the pres- cence of profound inequalities, states in the develop: {ng world have found it impossible to absorb and institutionalize democratic demands, « For the same reasons inany states in the developing ‘world have found it impossible to deliver improved human welfare through redistributional means. If, as as often been argued, such processes do indeed stimulate capitalist growtb, then=wheréver that ‘docs happen in the developing world—it is unavoid- able that social and political forces will also gather ‘momentum there and help to build modern states on the template of thelr European precursors. Instead of being the agents and beneficiaries of patronage and corruption, such forces will become the agents of their destruction and of the creation ofboth the pub- lie and private institutions of rule that promote e¢o- nomic growth, In hort, they will become much more Like the states of the developed world. For sure, this ‘will not happen everywhere, norwillithappensisnul- Tancously. AE the same time, such developments, ‘where they occur, will bring into politics other Pop ‘ar social forces, already on the march in some of the now-indastiatizing countries of the developing world. They will use the space created by demo- Cratization to demand sodal and welfare reforms that will constitute new challenges fr the state. How teach responds and adapts is uncertain. But what's Certain is that the politcal science and political economy of the modern slate in the developing ‘world, and elsewhere, has not by any stretch of the {Imagination seached Its terminus. . QUESTIONS ee 1 What are institutions? 2. In what ways do institutions ofthe state ltfer from private oF informal institutions?154 ADRIAN LEETWIEH 3 Why are state and other institutions so important for development? 4 In what ways did the provenance af many modern state: the developing world difler from the provenance of European states? 5. Eiplore how diferent economic systems in the colonial ea influenced the character and capacity of the colonial and post-colonial states {6 How do institutions of patronage differ from institutions of bureaucracy? 7 In what respects are political forces important in crafting the character and capacity of modern state in the developing world? 8 Will globalization erode or help to strengthen states in the developing work? 9 What makes developmental states 50 cificul to replicate in the post-cold war era? GUIDE TO FURTHER READING Bates, Robert H, Prosperity and Violence. The Political Economy of Development (New York 'W.W. Norton ancl Company, 2001) This short book arillant an wide-ranging analyssof ‘the kinds of politica arrangements that have enhanced o: hindered economic development, ‘Changs Ha-Joon, Kicking Avay the Ladder (London: Anthem Press2000). Amastety account of ‘how, fom the eighteenth century on, the statin: many now developed countriesplayedan, active rolein the promotion of development, Leftwich, A, ‘cinging Politics Back In: Towardsa Model ofthe Developmental State Journal of Development Studies, 315 (1995): 400-27. — (Ci), Democracy and Development (Camnbeldge: Polity Press, 1996). ‘MigdAl, JS, Kohli, A, and Shue, V. (ed. State Power and Socal Forces (Cambridge: Cambridge ‘University Press, 1994) explores therelations between social and politcal forcesand state powerand capacity i numberof developing countries, ‘Woo-Cumings,M.(), The Developmental state (hacs, NY: Comnel Unser ees, 1993), Explores the conditions and characteristics of developmental states. ‘Young, Crawiord, The Africas Colonial Statin Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale ‘University Press, 1994), One ofthe finest accounts ofthe colonial state and it legacy, with insightful comparetive observations WEB LINKS http:/globalcorruptionreport.org forthe annul survey of corruption in the world, ‘zccording to the non-profit non-governmental organization dedicated to itsstudy. wor peitferedu/-tidenes/DSS/Weber/BUREAU.NTML Mex Weber on bureaucracy inthe smodera state En.wikipedia.org/wiki/sramble for Africa Siteon the ‘scramble for Africa contalns material on Africa an global markets, strategicrivalty, the colonial encounter—Wwith special attention tote Congo—and partition, i Sad COMPANION WEB SITE Foradditional material anc resources, see the companion web sitet: www.oup.com/uk/booksites/poltics/