USLS College of Law (Remedial Review I)

A.Y 2016-2017 | Fiscal Fernand Castro

Case Pool #1: Acero, J., Andaya,K., Caballero, C., de la Pena, C., de la Paz, J., Fernandez, H., Reyes, M., Simondo, M., Tan, K.

RULE 110- PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

1.

Venue of libel cases

Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of libel before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged.
According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the
RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC. The public prosecutor
argued that the RTC of QC had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to the case,
the complainant was a resident of both QC and Marikina as shown in his Reply Affidavit filed during the
preliminary investigation of the case. The petitioners contended that the complaint affidavit executed by
complainant and the information filed before the court state that the complainants residence is Marikina, thus the
dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in
the complaint or information. The trial court rendered and order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction and it
held that the editorial box of Abante is in Manila and that the address of complainant is in Marikina as provided in
the information.
The complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article was
published, he was actually residing in QC. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina
at the time of publication but he rectified the error by his supplemental affidavit which indicated QC as his actual
residence at the time of the publication of the defamatory article. However, the MR was denied.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners
filed an MR which was denied by the CA, hence this petition before the SC.
ISSUE: WON the RTC of QC had jurisdiction?
RULING: The RTC of QC had no jurisdiction. The SC held that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
In libel cases, the criminal action and civil action for damages, in cases of written defamation shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the CFI of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous
article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city
where he actually resided.
A perusal however of the information involved in the case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are
utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of QC. Other than perfunctorily stating QC at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the
jurisdiction of RTC QC was invoked either because Abante was first printed in that place or the private respondent
was a resident of that city. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Art. 360 of
the RPC, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself or the
absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private
respondent, the information filed falls way short of this requirement. The ACPs failure to properly lay the basis for
invoking the jurisdiction of the QC RTC effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.

2.

Venue of BP 22 cases
Rigor v. People, GR No. 144887, Nov. 17, 2004

FACTS: On November 16, 1989, appellant (petitioner herein) applied for a commercial loan from the Rural Bank of
San Juan, Inc., at N. Domingo St., San Juan, Metro Manila in the sum of P500,000.00. He signed a promissory note
stating that an interest of 24% per annum from its date will be charged on the loan. The loan was approved by
RBSJs Bank Manager Melquecedes de Guzman and Controller Agustin Uy. A cashiers check with RBSJ No.
2023424 in the amount of P487,000.00, net proceeds of the loan, was issued to appellant. Appellant endorsed, then
encashed the check with RBSJ Teller Eleneth Cruz, who stamped thereon the word paid. After appellant received the
proceeds, he issued an undated check, Associated Bank Check No. 165476, Tarlac Branch, in the amount of
P500,000, payable to RBSJ.
It was not the bank policy for a borrower to apply for a loan, obtain its approval and its proceeds on the same day.
Appellants case was a special one considering that he is the kumpare of the President of RBSJ and he is well-known
to all the banks directors since he, like them, comes from Tarlac.
Appellant failed to pay his loan upon its maturity. He personally asked de Guzman for a two-month extension and
advised RBSJ to date to February 16, 1990 his Associated Bank check no. 165476. Failing anew to pay, he asked for
another two-month extension or up to April 16, 1990. Both requests de Guzman granted. On April 16, 1990,
appellant still failed to pay his loan. Basangan and his co-employee, Carlos Garcia, went to Tarlac to collect from
appellant the amount of the loan. Appellants written request for another 30-day extension was denied by de Guzman
who instead, sent him a formal demand letter dated April 25, 1990.
On July 8, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: WON the Pasig Court had jurisdiction to try and decide the case for violation of BP 22?
RULING: petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no
proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. The contention is untenable.
As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reflects the old rule, provides:
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes . In such crimes, some
acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory
and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. Hence, a person charged with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro
Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990,
the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the
places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or
dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored
by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San
Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also
overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are
triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction
upon the RTC in Pasig City.

3.

Filing
Del Rosario v. Vda De Mercado 29 SCRA 116;

FACTS: The petition for habeas corpus was filed on July 29, 1965, petitioners being Aquilino del Rosario, Sr. and
Aquilino del Rosario, Jr., father and son. It was alleged therein that the latter was confined as of July 11, 1965 and
on the date of the filing of such petition still under confinement in the municipal jail of Aringay, La Union, by virtue
of a warrant of arrest issued by the municipal court of the same municipality, based on a criminal complaint for
murder filed by the widow. Then came the assertion of the nullity of such complaint based on the contention that the
widow was not authorized to file the same, she being merely the heir of the offended party but not the offended party
herself within the meaning of the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court. Consequently, with the alleged nullity
of the above complaint, the warrant of arrest was alleged to be void resulting, in the opinion of the petitioners, in the
confinement of Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. being arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, his right to be released by virtue of
this petition for habeas corpus. There was a motion to intervene as well as an opposition to the petition, dated July
31, 1965, filed on behalf of the widow, Juanita Olidar, maintaining her right to file the complaint and praying that
the petition for habeas corpus be denied.
The decision on the habeas corpus proceeding was rendered on October 29, 1965, sustaining the right of petitioners
to such a writ. The lower court held The most reasonable interpretation that can be given to the term, offended
party, is that it refers to the person, actually injured and whose feeling is offended, to the exclusion of the surviving
spouse or other forced heirs. In the present case, where the offended party is physically incapable of filing a
complaint in person, the prosecuting officers are the only ones who can present the complaint against the defendant.
Juanita Olidar could not validly file the criminal complaint for murder as she is not one of those authorized by law to
sign the same. The complaint in the present case should be filed by the chief of police of Aringay or any peace
officer or employee of the government charged with the enforcement and execution of the law. As a consequence,
the complaint signed by Juanita Olidar is void, and the warrant of arrest issued by virtue thereof is, likewise, void, so
that the subsequent arrest and detention of Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. became illegal."
It was likewise stated in the decision: "Under these circumstances, the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus is proper because when the Court issued the warrant of arrest it had not acquired any jurisdiction over the
defendant, for the complaint is void for not having been signed by the offended party or government official or
employee charged with the enforcement of the law violated. Hence, the necessity of another verified complaint to be
signed by any peace officer authorized by law."
ISSUE: WON the surviving spouse is allowed to file the criminal complaint as the offended party within the
meaning of the appropriate rules of court provision
RULING: YES. In the case before us, the injury to the widow cannot be disputed. Her right to consortium was
definitely put an end to. The loss of the material support to which she was entitled was equally evident. The
suffering she had to endure then as the survivor of the tragedy was unavoidable even if time could thereafter be
trusted to assuage the pain. It would show less than full regard then for the realities of the situation not to reconsider
her an offended party within the meaning of the Rules of Court provision. Certainly, it is not to be interpreted in a
manner that defies both logic and common sense, not to mention the deeply felt sentiment associated with the
relationship of such a close intimacy that unity rather than divisiveness is its distinctive characteristic.

4.

FilingSEC v Interport GR 135808 Oct 6, 2008

FACTS: The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB(Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under said
MOA, IRC acquired 100% of the entire capital stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) which would own and operate a 102
megawatt gas turbine power generating barge. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC. On
the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine Racing Club).
- It is alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the Philippine Stock Exchange
through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC received reports that
the IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC
shares utilizing this material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the directors to appear before the SEC to
explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied
with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated the Rules in connection with the then Old Securities
Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC
entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of the Revised Securities Act.
- Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on said matter since according to PD 902-A,
jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and Enforcement Department) of the SEC however, this
issue is already moot since pending the disposition of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was passed thereby effectively
repealing PD 902-A and abolishing the PED. They also contended that their right to due process was violated when the SEC
required them to appear before the SEC to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon them since such requirement
shifted the burden of proof to respondents.
The case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any
criminal, civil or administrative cases against respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that since there are no rules and
regulations implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDER TRADING OR ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against respondents. The CA, therefore,
prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action against the respondents for the alleged violations of the
Revised Securities Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the RSA
RULING: The Revised Securities Act does not require the enactment of implementing rules to make it binding and effective.
The provisions of the RSA are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. The requirements are specifically set out and the
acts which are enjoined are determinable. To rule that absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress
would empower administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. Where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent (as in this case, the RSA) there should be no impediment as to its
implementation.
The court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in the RSA such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of non-public
and undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct and that the intent of the law is the protection of investors against
fraud committed when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor.
Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This
duty to disclose or abstain is based on 2 factors: 1) the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone and 2) the inherent
unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.
This obligation to disclose is imposed upon "insiders" which are particularly officers, directors or controlling stockholders but
that definition has already been expanded and not includes those persons whose relationship of former relationship to the issuer
or the security that is not generally available and the one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the person from
whom he learns such fact is an insider. In some case, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for the nondisclosure of
material information but it should not be used for non-corporate purposes.
The SEC retained jurisdiction to investigate violations of the RSA, reenacted in the Securities Regulations Code despite
the abolition of the PED. In this case, the SEC already commenced investigating the respondents for violations of the RSA
but during the pendency of the case the Securities and Regulations Code was passed thereby repealing the RSA. However,
the repeal cannot deprive the SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the case.
Investigations by the SEC is a requisite before a criminal case may be referred to the DOJ since the SEC is an administrative

agency with the special competence to do so. According to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.

5. Reinvestigation
Crespo v. Mogul 151 SCRA 462;
FACTS: Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the
case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the
arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA.
The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused
then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining
order.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from, the
Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the
complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise,
that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.

6.

ReinvestigationTamargo vs Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

FACTS: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no
leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he
stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd
Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. Columna was arrested.

On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the
shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columnas handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned
the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial
confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing so
that Columna could clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing, Columna
categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said that he was only forced to
withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life
inside the jail. The RTC judge denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the March 8,
2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the
accused for trial. CA reversed the decision.
Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was
probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. Awingan and the Antipordas, on the other hand, contend
that Columnas extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the Antipordas
HELD: Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against
respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession
is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay
against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence
aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against
his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented
to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them. (Harold V.
Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010)

7.

AmendmentPeople vs JOSEPH CASEY, G.R. No. L-30146 February 24, 1981

Facts: On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information for Murder against accusedappellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging that on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of
San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused,
being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a
firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the
said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his
death.
On June 24, 1968, upon arraignment, said accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said complaint.
Then, sometime in September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was arrested.
Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as an accused. On
October 15, 1968, accused Ricardo Felix entered the plea of not guilty upon being arraigned and accordingly tried.
The court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. It found that two aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the crime, namely: employing or taking advantage of superior strength and evident
premeditation, one of which qualified the killing to murder. Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in trying appellant Casey on the amended information without arraignment, and in
finding him guilty after such illegal trial.
HELD: We do not find merit in the assignment of this error. The lack of arraignment under the amended
information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be a violation of such right, however, only
when the amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information
refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the
nature of the crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating circumstance is likewise
alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of
form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to his rights.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
12 A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the
accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not
expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of
form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants
Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without any

attending circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years ofprision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused
are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) jointly and severally, and to pay the costs.
8.

Amendment
Fronda-Baggao vs. People, G.R. No. 151785, Dec. 10, 2007

Facts:
Sometime in 1989, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao were filed in
the RTC of Bangued, Abra. The petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade, but was later arrested.
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion to amend the Informations, lumping them to one Information
for illegal recruitment in large scale. The trial court denied the motion. But, upon motion for reconsideration, the
trial court admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the RTC. The petitioner's petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
was also denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition to the SC where the petitioner argues that (a) Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four,
which cannot be joined in only one Information.
Issue: Whether the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended and lumped into one Information for
illegal recruitment in large scale.
Held: Yes. A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or
information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one
Information. Surely, such could not have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation
whereby two or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more Informations.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be
made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of
court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. Following the above provisions and considering that
petitioner has not yet entered her plea, the four Informations could still be amended.
9.

AmendmentPeople vs HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, GR 157472 Sep 20, 2007

FACTS:
On July 4, 2002, Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner.
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty
to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002. However, on
the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order, likewise dated September 12,
2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified
the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and
instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory

portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the
spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta.
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned
for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the
dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the
Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy.
In an Order dated October 25, 2002, the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a
claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment
was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit,
he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in
mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and
existing jurisprudence.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002, the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the
Motion for Reconsideration
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the
amendment of the information from Homicide to Murder.
HELD:
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for
Homicide. The argument of petitioner considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already
terminated without his express consent, cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the
same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without his express consent
is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner
in Double Jeopardy which is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 with Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment. While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the
Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder.
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction
of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in
the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the
killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption
and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal.
Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. A reading of the Order dated December
18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that
double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance which
does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original
Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[29]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge.

10. Sec 5 (Affidavit of Desistance)

PEOPLE vs ERNESTO DELA CERNA, G.R. Nos. 136899-904. October 9, 2002
FACTS: Six separate complaints were filed on May 16, 1997 against accused-appellant charging him with rape
committed on January 15, 1989, December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996, August 25, 1996, February 10, 1997 and
March 5, 1997. The first complaint alleged that on or about the 5th day of March, 1997, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is her father, by means of
force and intimidation upon undersigned complainant, then only fifteen (15) years old to wit: by carrying her to a
room and forcibly lie down on bed and removed her panty and short, placed himself on top of her, did then and there
have carnal knowledge with the undersigned against her will.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried. She recalled that one afternoon
when she was only seven (7) years old, her father, appellant herein, beckoned her to come inside the room. At the time, her
mother was not at home. When she went inside the room, appellant undressed her and made her lie down. Appellant then played
with her private parts and touched her vagina with his penis which lasted for about fourteen (14) minutes Thereafter, appellant
instructed her to put on her clothes as her mother was due to arrive any time. Appellant did the same act to Irene many times.
Irene eventually revealed the rapes to her two (2) best friends in school, namely, Cheryl Quano and Bernadette Comita.
Bernadette, in turn, told her own mother what Irene divulged Bernadettes mother talked with Irene regarding the rape incidents
after which the former brought her to the office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) at the City Hall
where she was interviewed by a social worker.
On September 15, 1998, the defense presented private complainant to prove that she voluntarily executed an affidavit of
desistance. Private complainant explained that she decided to forgive her father for the sake of her mother and her younger
siblings who experienced pain and difficulty in sustaining their daily needs as their whole family was dependent upon their father
for support. On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna guilty of six
counts of rape.
The entire records of these cases was then forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
ISSUE: WON the affidavit of desistance executed by private complainant created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt
HELD: An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he or
she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of
our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.
The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the
trouble of having the accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring
the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish
in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.
A careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance in this case reveals that private complainant never retracted her
allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her rape.
Plainly, the entire affidavit really stated was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints as she had already forgiven her
father and she wanted peace and happiness for her family. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainants testimony
that accused-appellant raped her on several occasions.
Accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irenes affidavit of desistance. Such an affidavit, by and of itself, does not mean
that what she previously said was false or the recitals of the affidavit itself are true. On the contrary, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can all too easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or monetary consideration. Thus, there is always the probability

10

that they will later be repudiated and there will never be an end to criminal litigation.[12] It is also a dangerous rule for courts to
reject testimony solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his or her mind for
one reason or another. This will make a mockery of solemn trials and put the investigation of crimes at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Ernesto dela Cerna is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of simple rape and is sentenced in each count to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim Irene dela Cerna the following: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity; (2)
P50,000 as moral damages and (3) P25,000 as exemplary damages.

11. Sec 6
Lasoy vs Zenarosa GR 129472
Facts: In an Information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor dated 03 July 1996, ] accused Marcelo Lasoy and
Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a
total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a guilty plea and applied for probation. On the same day, the prosecutor filed
a motion to admit an amended information and a motion to set aside the arraignment. The prosecutor alleged that the
information was tampered and that the accused were supposed to be charged with the sale of 42.4 Kilograms of
marijuana. The RTC first denied the motions but later on granted the same on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of small drugs cases. Thereafter, the amended information was filed. The accused moved to quash
the second information invoking double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion hence, eventually, the accused
filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the first information may still be amended
HELD: No. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
All of these requisites were met. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way
that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language
of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law. The first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. The purpose
of the law to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them has been complied with. Furthermore, the
first information, applying Rule 110 Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules, the
decision having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer
allowed at that stage.
Finally, the RTC had jurisdiction to try the case. The SC Resolution relied upon by the RTC to hold that it is
the MeTC which had jurisdiction has been superseded by a later resolution which vests in the RTC concerned the
jurisdiction to try the case in question.

11

12. Sec. 6
People vs Puig
Facts: On 7 November 2005, the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office filed before the RTC 112 cases of Qualified
Theft against respondents Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who were the Cashier and Bookkeeper,
respectively, of private complainant Rural Bank of Pototan to wit:
That on or about the 1st day of August, 2002, in the Municipality of Pototan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [respondents], conspiring, confederating, and helping
one another, with grave abuse of confidence, being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc.,
Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of the management of the Bank and with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said bank in the aforesaid amount.
The trial court dismissed the cases on the ground that it did not find the existence of probable cause that would have
necessitated the issuance of a warrant of arrest based on the following grounds:
(1) the element of taking without the consent of the owners was missing on the ground that it is the depositorsclients, and not the Bank, which filed the complaint in these cases, who are the owners of the money allegedly
taken by respondents and hence, are the real parties-in-interest; and
(2) the Informations are bereft of the phrase alleging "dependence, guardianship or vigilance between the
respondents and the offended party that would have created a high degree of confidence between them
which the respondents could have abused."
ISSUE: WON the Informations sufficiently alleged the element of taking without the consent of the owner and the
qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence
HELD: Yes. On the sufficiency of the Information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia,
that the information must state the acts or omissions complained of as constitutive of the offense. It is evident that
the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly.
It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who come into possession of
the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand,

12

where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. The Court has consistently considered the
allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and
prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to make out
a case of Qualified Theft.

13. Sec. 15
Isip vs People
Facts: Petitioner was charged with Estafa while his wife was charged for 7 counts of violation of BP 22. Both were
also charged with another 5 counts of Estafa. All were filed with the Cavite RTC. It is alleged in the informations
that misappropriations of jewelry, the acts being complained of in the estafa cases, as well as the issuance of the
checks, the act complained of in the BP 22 cases, took place in Cavite City. The petitioners assert however that
during all times that are material to the case, the private complainant was staying in his condominium in Emrita,
Manila. The RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at
complainant Atty. Leonardo Joses ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the
Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It also pointed out that the money with which the complainant
initially agreed to finance their transactions was withdrawn in Cavite City.
The petitioner appealed the conviction, arguing that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is
the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an
alleged ancestral house in Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the transactions there with him when he
and his late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into
in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is likewise inconsequential because
it is where the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that
determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. He asserts likewise asserts that there is no
competent proof showing that during private complainants leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City
ISSUE: WON RTC Cavite has jurisdiction
Held: Yes. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.

13

The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies. In the instant case, petitioner
failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. The fact
that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can
sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and
his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received
pieces of jewelry from complainant. It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence.

14. Sec. 15
Sony vs Supergreen
Facts: Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., filed a complaint with the NBI against respondent Supergreen,
Incorporated. The NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit
"PlayStation" game software, consoles and accessories in violation of Sony Computers intellectual property rights.
Thus, NBI applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for warrants to search respondents premises in
Paraaque City and Cavite. The NBI simultaneously served the search warrants on the subject premises and seized
a replicating machine and several units of counterfeit "PlayStation" consoles, joy pads, housing, labels and game
software.
Respondent filed a motion to quash the search warrant, alleging that the things to be seized were not specifically
described. Subsequently, another motion to quash was filed, this time, questioning the propriety of the venue.
Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that it violated the omnibus motion rule wherein all objections not
included shall be deemed waived. The trial court affirmed the validity of Search Warrants covering respondents
premises in Paraaque City, but quashed Search Warrants covering respondents premises in Cavite.
ISSUE: WON the quashal of the Cavite Warrant was valid.
Held: No. The respondents premises in Cavite, within the Fourth Judicial Region, is definitely beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila, in the National Capital Region. Thus, the RTC of Manila does not
have the authority to issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite. However, the case involves a
transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293. Respondents
imitation of the general appearance of petitioners goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly
in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus,
clearly, under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was
committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region.
15. Relationship
People vs Ceredon

14

Facts: Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of rape, defined and penalized under
Article 266(A) and (B) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. (sample of one of the information against him:
That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd design, by use of force or intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party,
AAA,4 his youngest sister, a minor, ten (10) years of age, all against her will and consent.)
At his arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all ten (10) charges.
However, during the pre-trial conference, his counsel manifested before the trial court the desire of appellant to
change his plea to "guilty" on all ten (10) counts. Said manifestation was granted and appellant was re-arraigned.
Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. No evidence was presented for the defense. The trial court convicted the
appellant and sentenced him to death on each count of rape.
ISSUE: WON THE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED IS A RELATIVE WITHIN
THE SECOND DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY WAS PROPERLY ALLEGED.
HELD: YES. There was no defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the youngest
sister of appellant. We do not agree with the defense that in order for relationship to qualify in this case, it must be
mentioned that the victim is a "relative within the second degree of consanguinity.
It was deemed necessary in the Ferolino case to require that it must be specifically alleged in the Information that
the offender is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree" because
we acknowledge the fact that there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree, in which
case, death penalty cannot be imposed on an accused found guilty of rape. However, a sister-brother relationship is
obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother relationship exists in civil law that falls beyond the
third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in this case that the Information should specifically state that
the appellant is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the victim. This is an exception to the
requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case.
Further, what is required by the Rules is that "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment."94 Perusing the ten (10) Informations for rape, private complainant AAA was categorically
identified as appellant's younger sister.

16. Date/time of commission

People v. Almendral G.R. No. 126025 Jul 6, 2004
FACTS:
The case involved a crime of rape (incestuous), wherein the victim, Jessica, was defiled by her own father about 40
times.
The victim was raped since she was 11 years old (1987) until she reached the age of 20.
However, it was only after her (victim's) marriage (1994) when she revealed to her husband, aunt, cousins and
friends that she was sexually abused by her father.
The victim filed a case against her father. During the trial, the victim testified that she was raped about 40 times.
However, she could not remember the approximate dates thereof.
Furthermore, the Information filed against the accused only alleged "that on or about sometime 1987, prior and
subsequent thereto". It did not specify the exact dates and time of commission of the offense.
The trial court found the accused (Almendral) guilty of the crime of rape. The case was automatically elevated to
the Supreme Court for appeal.

15

ISSUE:
1. Whether Jessica's testimony as a witness is credible even though she failed to recall the exact dates of the
sexual assault.
2. Whether the Information filed against the accused is sufficient .
Ruling:
1.

Yes. The victim's failure to recall the exact dates of the sexual assault she experienced in the hands of
appellant, a failure she frankly admitted in court, 24 does not necessarily puncture her credibility. Forcible
sexual invasion committed by no less than one's own father is an agonizing and distressful experience that,
by human nature, is better left buried in the deepest recesses of one's memory. Repeated forty (40) times,
the experience may only result in the victim's subconscious effort to erase and blot out any details thereof.

2.

Yes. To ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him is not violated, the information must state the name of the accused, the designation
given to the offense by the statute, a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the
offense, and the place where the offense has been committed.

However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the
crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. Failure to specify the exact
dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The
date or time of the commission of the rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime 35 because the
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time
when the rape takes places has no substantial bearing on its commission. 36 As such, the date or time need
not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime
has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.

17. Qualifying circumstances

People v. Buayaban GR No. 112459 Mar 28, 2003
FACTS:
Pedro Tumulak and his co-accused Paulino Buayaban, Larry Betache, Marciano Toacao and Yoyong Buayaban
were all charged with of the crime of robbery in band with homicide.
(This is what they did ---> ) That on or about January 2, 1990, the accused confederating together, conspiring and
helping one another, killed Dioscoro Abonales, and stole P30,000.00 from Dioscoro Abonales wife, Josefa Abonales
and P10,000.00 cash from Rolando Verdida.
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with "robbery in band with homicide." There is no
such crime in the Revised Penal Code. The felony is properly called robbery with homicide. Although conspiracy
was alleged the circumstance of "band" was not alleged in the information.
However, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime robbery with homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance that it was committed by a band should be appreciated as an ordinary circumstance.

16

RULING:
NO. The ordinary aggravating circumstance of band should not be appreciated because it was not alleged in the
body of the information. Though it is an ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
require that even generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information.
Section 8 simply provides that the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the
statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. With regard to Section 9, we held in
People vs. Nerio Suela 48 that the use of the word must" in said section 9 indicates that the requirement is
mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances,
although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the
information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they
benefit the accused.49
In this case, we cannot properly appreciate the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of the
crime since there was no allegation in the information that "more than three armed malefactors acted together in the
commission of the crime."

18. Qualifying circumstancesPeople v. Masapol 417 SCRA 371

FACTS:
The case involved the crime of rape.
That on or about 7:00 oclock in the evening of July 17, 1992, the accused, with lewd designs, and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there unlawfully have carnal knowledge with one Beatriz O. Pascuin, against
her will.
Manuel and his wife Beatriz Pascuin resided in a remote area. It was an area where the community did not
as yet have the luxury of electric light in their houses.
At around 7:00 p.m. of July 17, 1992, Beatriz dropped by the store of Marcial Olitoquit to buy
kerosene.1wphi1 The store was about 300 meters away from their house. She lighted the wick and used
the kerosene lamp to light her way back home. The road to their house was the path usually taken by
carabaos going to farm. The road sides were grassy and strewn with coconut trees.
Suddenly, the appellant Andres Masapol appeared out of nowhere and poked a knife at Beatriz. Before she
could shout for help, the appellant covered her mouth with his hand. He warned her not to shout; otherwise,
he would kill her. Beatriz tried to fight back but she was unsuccessful. Unfortunately, the accused did rape
her and left.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether the use of knife, a deadly weapon should be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in the present
case.
RULING:

17

NO. While it is true that The prosecutor was able to prove the appellant used a knife, a deadly weapon, in forcing
Beatriz to submit to his lustful desires. Such was not alleged in the Information.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the use of a deadly weapon such as a knife to commit a crime is a
special aggravating circumstance which requires the imposition of reclusion perpetua to death. However, such
circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Although the said rules took effect only on December 1, 2000, long after the commission of the crime on
July 17, 1992, the same should be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the appellant. Hence, such
circumstance should not be appreciated against the appellant. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
appellant should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

19. QualifyingPeople v. Coredon G.R. No. 167179 Jan 28, 2008

FACTS:
Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of rape, as defined by law, for sexually abusing
the victim, his sister.
The information filed against the accused merely averred that the victim was the youngest sister of appellant. It did
not mention that the victim is a "relative within the second degree of consanguinity."
The accused initially pleaded "not guilty". However, he changed his plea to "guilty" and was granted by the court.
The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals found the accused guilty of the crime rape.
ISSUE:
Whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship (that the accused is the brother of the victim) should be
appreciated by the court even though it was not alleged in the information that the victim was relative within the
second degree of consanguinity.
(ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH (SIC) WITH
PARTICULARITY THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELYERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED AS THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE BROTHER OF THE VICTIM AND, HENCE, A RELATIVE
WITHIN THE SECOND DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY WAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED)
RULING:
YES. A sister-brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother relationship
exists in civil law that falls beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in this case that the
Information should specifically state that the appellant is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of
the victim. This is an exception to the requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case.

18

(Ferolino case --->was deemed necessary in the Ferolino case to require that it must be specifically alleged in the
Information that the offender is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil
degree" because we acknowledge the fact that there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil
degree, in which case, death penalty cannot be imposed on an accused found guilty of rape)
Further, what is required by the Rules is that "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment."94 Perusing the ten (10) Informations for rape, private complainant AAA was categorically identified as
appellant's younger sister. Verily, the requirement of allegation as to relationship was more than satisfied.

20. Sec 13 (duplicity of offenses)

People v. Soriano GR 178325 Feb 22, 2008
FACTS:
The accused was charged with raping his then 12-year old daughter AAA.
(Information: That sometime between October 2000 to December 11, 2001, the accused, with lewd designs, by
means of force, threat, intimidation and grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own daughter AAA, 12 years old, against the latter's will and consent, to
her own damage and prejudice.)
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution had established that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, his minor daughter, on at least two
occasions, in violation of Article 266-A paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353. The first rape incident took place sometime in October of 2000 and the second on 11 December 2001.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
multiple rape.
ISSUE:
Whether the Information filed against the accused is in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
RULING:
YES. The Court observes that the information charged more than one offense in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Considering that appellant did not seasonably object to the multiple
offenses in the information, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved.
However, that both the trial court and the appellate court merely found the appellant guilty of "multiple rape"
without specifying the number of rapes that appellant is guilty of. While this may have been irrelevant considering
that appellant would have been sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death even if only one count of rape was

19

proven, the same is still important since this would have bearing on appellant's civil liability. Further, there is no
such crime as "multiple rape." In this case, appellant is guilty of two counts of rape qualified by the
circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the parent of the victim.
21. Complaint Affidavit
Hilario P. Soriano v. People, GR 162336

Feb 1, 2010

Facts: The BSP sent a letter along with five affidavits with the DOJ as bases for criminal charges for Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689, and for Violation of Section 83 of RA
337, as amended by PD 1795, against petitioner herein Hilario P. Soriano.
That spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel
(Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was then president of
RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been
authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks,
Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the BSP, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a
request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against petitioner at his last
known address. The State Prosecutor proceeded with the preliminary investigation. In due course, the investigating officer issued
a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner.
Petitioner move to quash the information. One of his grounds was that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted
the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription.[22] Moreover, petitioner argued that the
officers of OSI (office of special investigation), who were the signatories to the letter-complaint, were not authorized by the BSP
Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight violated
Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
The lower court denied petitioners motion to quash stating that the letter was not the complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not
comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The CA agreed with the RTC and said that it was only a transmittal or
cover letter. The CA further determined that the five affidavits attached to the transmittal letter should be considered as the
complaint-affidavits that charged petitioner and the affidavits complied with the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.
Held: The Court ruled that the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements
provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.
After a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as
envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of
any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of
the acts of petitioner. The Court ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary
investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then
there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP Governor or the Monetary Board to file a criminal case against
Soriano, we held that the requirements of Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653 did not apply because the BSP did not
institute the complaint but merely transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ.
The Court further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be
initiated by any competent person with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who
executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of any competent person who may institute the complaint for a public
crime.

RULE 111- PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS

1.

Sec. 1
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., vs EMERENCIANA ISIP, GR 133978 Nov 12, 2002

20

Facts:
The accused, Emerencia Isip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks
Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days from the
date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga and were
then dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the RTC of Pampanga. After failing to present its second
witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action
from the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed
without prejudice to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the
sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection
of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases
Held: The Court ruled that the civil action can prosper.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender,(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC, and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action [Article 33 Civil Code].
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner shows that his cause of action is based on culpa
contractual, an independent civil action. The cause of action was the breach of the respondents breach of the
contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on the checks in
exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa
contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
2.

Sec.1
Anita Cheng v. Spouses William and Tessie Sy, GR 174238 Jul 7, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy
(Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing
to her checks in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn
against a closed account. Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against
respondents two (2) cases for violation of BP Blg. 22.
The RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy but the Order
in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is
purely civil, not criminal in nature.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint for
collection of a sum of money with damages.

21

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the money with
damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective
application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil
action correspondent to the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter.
Issue: Whether Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 5797 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the
present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was
[based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused (respondents herein)?
Held: The Court ruled that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should apply because Petitioner filed her BP Blg.
22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding
civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the
separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one
can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages
the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights maybe fully adjudicated in the
proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to
recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her.
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
x x x(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
maybe consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation
of the civil and criminal actions.

22

3.

Sec. 3
Manolo Samson vs Hon. Reynaldo Daway[G.R. Nos. 160054-55. July 21, 2004]

Facts:
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an
alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same
branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the
Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. The trial
court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings
Petitioner then filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for reconsideration of the order
denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He
contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair competition does
not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court,
per R.A. No. 7691. The motions were denied.

Issues: (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights?
(2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and
(b) the pendency of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair
competition?

Held: 1.) The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the
proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA
166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases
for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law
and IPC in relation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition
therefore should be filed with the RTC

2.) Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the
reversal of the order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said
prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-0041446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

23

In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A.
No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
4.

Sec. 5
Dominador Ferrer vs Sandiganbayan, et.al G.R. NO. 161067

March 14, 2008

Facts:
DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., being the Administrator of the Intramuros Administration (IA), Manila
was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT) by causing the award of the Lease Contracts to a company, involving Baluarte de San Andres,
Ravellin de Recolletos, and Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao, Intramuros, Manila, without conducting any public
bidding required by law.

Before he can be arraigned, petitioner filed a motion with public respondent, a Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause, invoking the ruling of the Office of the President (OP), dated February 29,
2000, which absolved petitioner of administrative liability. The OP reviewed the administrative case filed against
petitioner with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in
good faith and within the scope of his authority.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause stating that the dismissal of
the administrative complaint does not negate the existing criminal case pending before the Court. Moreover the
grounds and arguments raised thereat could be considered matter of defense that is more and properly to be
considered during a full blown trial.

Issue: Does a finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent government official bar the filing of a
criminal case against him for the same acts?

Held: The Court ruled in the negative.

The Court cited the case of Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, But one thing is administrative liability. Quite
another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for
falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v.
Comelec, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the
same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.
According to the Court, it is clear from Paredes that the criminal case against petitioner, already filed and
pending with the Sandiganbayan, may proceed despite the dismissal of the administrative case arising out of the
same acts. The same rule applies even to those cases that have yet to be filed in court.

24

Petitioner argued that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them based on the
same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be
true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The
purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle
that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of
crime.
To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merely
adopt the results of administrative investigations which would not only diminish the powers and duties of these
constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal and administrative cases against public
officials.

5.

Sec 7
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola GR 184861 Jun 30, 2009

Facts: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the
petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case
belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and
Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Pias City. Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22
against private respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20,
2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the
Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against
the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondents Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical
question for the following grounds;
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were
issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
The MTC granted the RespondentsMo tion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the
RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on
the basis of Prejudicial Question , with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
Held: This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The
elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action
and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter
is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that
is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists

25

6.

Implied reservation
Sarmiento v. CA 394 SCRA 315

FACTS:
Limpin and Apostol, doing business under the name and style of Davao Libra Industrial Sales, filed an application for an Irrevocable
Domestic Letter of Credit with the Associated Banking Corporation in favor of LS Parts Hardware and machine shop for the purchase of
assorted scrap irons
.-The application was approved.
-There after, a trust receipt was executed by Limpin and Apostol, which was also signed by Lorenzo Sarmiento Jr as surety.
- The scrap irons were loaded on board a barge owned and operated by Luzon Stevedoring for shipment to Toledo Atlas Pier in Cebu,
but the barge capsized while on its way.
-On due dates, demands were made for them to comply but Limpin and Apostol failed to comply
with their undertaking under the Trust Receipt.
-A complaint for violation of Trust receipt was filed
.-Sarmiento was dropped from the information and Limpin was convicted. The judgment did not contain an award of civil liability.
-Later a separate complaint for sum of money was filed against Sarmiento and Limpin.
TCandCA:
-Rendered judgment in favour of associated Banking with respect to Sarmiento, who was dropped as an accused in the criminal action,
it cannot in anyway, bar the filing by Associated Banking Corporation of the present civil action against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to claim for civil liability is already barred on the ground that the same was NOT RESEREVED but in fact
already instituted in the criminal action PREVIOUSLY filed.
HELD:
-The claim for civil liability is not yet barred.
-The Entrusters complaint against entrustee was based on the failure of the latter to comply with their obligation as spelled out in the
Trust Receipt executed by them. This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any
criminal liability for misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale
of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts, punishable under Section 13 of the Trust
Receipts
Law( P.D . 1 15 ) i n r e l a t i o n t o A r t i c l e 3 1 5 ( 1 ) , ( b ) o f t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e . B e i n g b a s e d o
n a n o b l i g a t i o n ex contractu
and not
ex delicto
, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners
regardless of the result of the latter.
7.

Express ReservationHambon vs. CA, G.R No. 122150, March 17, 2003

FACTS:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for
damages for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him on the night
of December 9, 1985.In answer thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident,
Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,
had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to
petitioners lack of interest; and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.

26

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case
was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried
with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it
amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. [10]
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action falling under article 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the new civil code be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation
HELD:
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived,
reserved or previously instituted.
The 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and
thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.
8.

Civil LiabilityAnamer Salazar vs People, G.R No. 151931, Sept. 23, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing. As payment for these, she
gave a check drawn against the Prudential Bank by one Nena Timario. J.Y. accepted the check upon the petitioners
assurance that it was good check. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed
account. Upon being informed of such dishonor, petitioner replaced the check drawn against the Solid Bank, which,
however,
was
returned
with
the
word
DAUD
(Drawn
against
uncollected
deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court. The trial court
rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to pay, as payment of her
purchase. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that she be
allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, but the court denied the motion.
Issue:

27

1) Does the acquittal of the accused in the criminal offense prevent a judgment against her on the civil aspect of the
case?

Held:
1) The rule on the Criminal Procedure provides that the extension of the penal action does not carry with it the
extension of the civil action. Hence, the acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case where a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; c) where the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on
the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private
offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the
institution of the criminal action.

9.

Civil LiabilityFirst Holdings Producers, Inc. vs Luis Co, G.R No. 139655, July 27, 2000

(Note from Jae: MAIN ISSUE IS PREJUDICIAL QUESTION PRO SA SYLLABUS NI FISCAL CIVIL LIABILITY)
FACTS:
1."On March 13, 1997, Armand M. Luna filed a criminal complaint for estafa and perjury against [herein
respondent] Luis L. Co in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila,
2.....On November 25, 1997, in the regular meeting of the Board of Directors of the Producers Bank of the
Philippines held at Manhattan Bldg. Nueva Street, Manila, a resolution was adopted authorizing the corporation to
purchase three (3) proprietary shares of Manila Polo Club to be placed in the names of Messrs. Co Bun Chun, Henry
Co and Luis Co to be held by them on behalf of the corporation.
3. In accordance with said resolution, the corporation purchased said proprietary shares in the name of the nominees
4. On March 17, 1994, after the separation from the service of Mr. Luis L. Co, Ms. Amelita F. Bautista demanded
from him the transfer of the subject certificate in the name of the corporation
5. Despite his duty to assign the certificate back to the corporation and the subject demand, Mr. LUIS L. CO, on
April 26, 1994, instead registered the loss of the said proprietary share with Manila Polo Club Inc. by executing a
false Affidavit of Loss and subsequently, he was able to secure a replacement certificate No. 4454 in his name
6. In so doing, Mr. Luis L. Co misrepresented himself to be the legitimate owner of subject share
9. Despite subject demand, Mr. Luis L. Co failed and [has] continuously fail[ed] to deliver the subject certificate to
the corporation and to execute a Deed of Assignment in favor of the nominee of the corporation to the damage and
prejudice of the latter;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of civil case was dilatory.

28

HELD:
The criminal action for estafa had been lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor on March 13, 1997. Yet,
respondent filed the civil case only eight months later, on November 18, 1997. Indeed, as early as 1994, a written
demand had already been served on him to return the said share. He did not contest petitioners claim; in fact, he filed
the present civil action several months after the institution of the criminal charge. Verily, it is apparent that the civil
action was instituted only as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal case.
The dilatory character of the strategy of respondent is apparent from the fact that he could have raised the issue of
ownership in the criminal case. He himself admits that the issue of ownership may be raised in the estafa case.
Yet, he resorts to subterfuge, arguing:
"x x x. The resolution of the issue of ownership in Criminal Case No. 97-734 would only be for the purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of the respondent. The said issue may not be resolved with finality in the same
criminal proceedings, since the court a quo would be bound by what appears on the face of the Manila Polo Club
Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 203. Considering that the subject Membership Certificate clearly shows that
the same is registered in the name of the respondent, the same is conclusive evidence of his ownership."
This argument is bereft of merit. We find no sufficient reason why the trial court hearing the criminal case cannot
resolve the question of ownership. Significantly, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the filing of the criminal action. Hence, respondent may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in
the criminal action. In fact, there is no law or rule prohibiting him from airing exhaustively the question of
ownership. After all, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the said defense. The rules of evidence and procedure for
the recovery of civil liabilities are the same in both criminal and civil cases.
10. Civil LiabilityCelestina Corpuz vs Judge Siapno, AM MTJ-96-1106 Jun 17, 2002;
Facts: Celestina B. Corpuz, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed an Affidavit
Complaint against the respondent Orlando Ana F. Siapno, Presiding Judge of the same Court, charging him with
Violation of Administrative Circular Nos. 3-92 and 17-94, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Falsification,
Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer, Abuse of Authority, Delay in the Administration of Justice and Ignorance
of the Law.
Complainant alleged, among others, that he failed to award Civil Damages in 2 Criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos.
12527 and 13482). In his comment, the respondent Judge claimed that he did not award civil damages in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12527 and 13482 because the prosecution did not present any evidence therefor. The court then referred
the matter to the RTC of Dagupan City for investigation. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. OCA adopted findings of RTC that all the charges be
dropped except for Ignorance of Law for failure to award Civil Damages in the said 2 criminal cases. For that, OCA
fined the respondent judge.
Issue: whether or not there is a need for the prosecution to present evidence regarding the civil aspect for the court
to award civil damages.

Ruling: no. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when a complaint or information is filed even without
any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, it is understood that the offended party has the
right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made, or unless in the meantime, the offended
party instituted a separate civil action. In such case, the civil liability arising from a crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to
institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil
liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
The rule expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the civil liability
arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in a separate action. Indeed, even in case of

29

an acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. Therefore, it was
error for respondent not to have entered judgment with respect to the civil liability.
Nature of civil damages in Criminal action: It is also fundamental that the imposition of the fine imposed in the
criminal case is not for the purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party but for vindicating the State for the offense
committed by the wrongdoer.
[A]n offense causes two classes of injuries-the first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought
to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the
victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity which is civil in nature. Hence, when no
civil action is expressly instituted it shall be impliedly instituted with the criminal action. That means that if two
actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same completeness as any of the two normal persons
composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes
provided by law.
The methods for indemnifying the private complainant is provided for under the provisions on civil liability
which, under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, includes: restitution; reparation for the damage caused; and
indemnification for consequential damages. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, it behooves respondent to require
the production of evidence to make a finding on civil liability. This is especially so where the accused has pleaded
guilty and has therefore admitted his liability.

11. Civil liabilityLutgarda Cruz v. Court of Appeals 388 SCRA 72

Facts: The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document before the Manila Regional Trial Court. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered
owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the right to
file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal
case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable
doubt. In the same decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to
the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.
On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994,
assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a
copy of the motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF A
CRIMINAL CASE FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED
IN BULACAN

30

Ruling: Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that
the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes restitution.
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the
offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed
instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal,
grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to
decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.

12. BP22
Sps Benito Lo Ban Tiong v. Balboa GR 158177 Jan 28, 2008;
Facts: Vicente Balboa filed two (2) cases against Sps. Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng:
(1) A CIVIL CASE for sum of money based on the three (3) post-dated checks issued by Caroline in the total
amount of P5,175,250.00. The Regional Trial Court found the spouses liable and ordered them to pay the amount.
(2) A CRIMINAL CASE for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Caroline covering the said three checks.
The Municipal Trial Court acquitted Caroline but held her civilly liable. On appeal, the RTC modified the MTC
Decision by deleting the award of civil damages.
The spouses now comes to court charging Balboa with forum-shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and criminal cases constitute forum-shopping.
Held: no. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on
the supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties
who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., the Court ruled that there is identity of
parties and causes of action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of
bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of
the
civil
action
so
as
to
prevent
double
payment
of
the
claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which provides
that "the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal

31

action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation
to
file
such
civil
action
separately
shall
be
allowed.
The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal case were filed on February 24, 1997 and on July
21, 1997, respectively, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. At the
time of filing of the cases, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then the civil case may proceed independently of
the criminal cases and there is no forum shopping to speak of. Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding
for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of
the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases.
13. BP 22Cheng v. Sps Sy GR 174238 Jun 7, 2009
Facts: Anita Cheng filed 2 criminal cases for estafa against SPS Sy for issuing 2 Philippine Bank of Commerce checks worth P300,000
each, in payment for their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. Based
on the same facts, petitioner also filed 2 complaints for violation of of BP 22. RTC dismissed both actions for estafa. The criminal case
against the wife Sy contained no declaration as to the civil liability. On the other hand, the case against the husband Sy that the liability is
purely civil.
Later, MeTC dismissed the BP22 case without pronouncements as to the civil liability of the accused respondents. Petitioner lodged
against respondents before the RTC, Manila, a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same loaned
amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases. In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC stated that it lacked jurisdiction ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages
was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners action to recover respondents civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg.
22 cases were dismissed
Ruling: Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover
the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the
Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint
is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule
governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

32

In this case, the Court reinstated a civil action for the recovery of civil damages:
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from
respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioners Notice of Claim involving the same
amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy ),
which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time. [21] Expectedly, respondents
would raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks along with
the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings
critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her
establish the identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the
BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have
been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil
action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary
period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross
mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. But this rule admits of exceptions (1) where the
counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of
gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. Tested against these guidelines, we
hold that petitioners lot falls within the exceptions.

14. Sec 4 (death of accused)

People v. Abungan GR 136843 Sept 28, 2000;
Facts: All of the 3 accused were charged with the crime of murder of Camilo Dirilo. The appellant, Abungan, with
the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, all of the accused were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Penalty of imprisonment with civil liability of P50,000 was imposed. Notice of appeal
was timely filed by the appellants counsel. During the pendency of the appeal however, the Abungan died.
Issue: whether or not the death of Abungan extinguish his civil liability based solely on delict.
Ruling: yes. In the present case, it is clear that, following the disquisition in Bayotas, the death of appellant
extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the
finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was
also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than
delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules.
Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal case
against him. Necessarily, the lower court's Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual.
15. Sec.4
ABS-CBN et.al v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et.al [G.R. NO. 133347 : October 15, 2008]
Facts: The day after the declaration of martial law, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center
ordering its closure. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of ABS, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan
Ponce Enrile, of their desire to sell the network to the government. Such proposal, however, did not materialize.
KBS/RPNs Benedicto through Alfredo Montelibano relayed his plan to temporarily use ABS-CBN's
broadcast studios in Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9 after their studio in Pasay was consumed by
fire. Through an agreement, ABS-CBN eventually conveyed to KBS/RPN by way of lease its TV and radio
equipment, its premises at Quezon City and indicated that upon termination of this lease, KBS/RPN shall return the
possession of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN, vacate the same without the need of notice or demand. Moreover,

33

KBS/RPN assumed full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all
losses and damages to such facilities.
In years following until the Marcos regime was toppled down, KBS/RBN was able to transfer possession
and control of the leased premises and equipment to ABS on a staggered basis. Some ABS-CBN properties and
massive equipment, however, were found to be missing. ABS filed several criminal cases for Execution of Deeds by
Means of Violence or Intimidation, Estafa, Theft, Robbery, Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real
Rights in Property, and Other Deceits.
Respondent Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death (With Prayer for Dismissal) moving that he be
dropped as respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending criminal cases subject of this appeal are
actions which do not survive the death of the party accused."
Issue: Whether the civil liability of Benedicto, upon death, is extinguished together with his criminal liability.
Held and Ratio: YES. To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The Ombudsman did
not find probable cause to prosecute respondents for various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action
is deemed instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b) reserves
the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action is not applicable.
In People v Bayotas, G.R No. 102007, Sept. 2, 1994 the death of the accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of
the criminal case against him, regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives
the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code (Law,
contracts, delicts/torts, quasi-contracts, quasi-delicts). In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused
founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability
based solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and
prosecuted in the same criminal action.
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, taking cognizance of respondent Benedicto's death on
May 15, 2000, has ordered that the latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well as
civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in Criminal Cases pending before the RTC of Manila.

16. Prejudicial questionPP VS RAFAEL JOSE CONSING JR. [G.R. NO. 148193. JANUARY 16, 2003.]
Facts: Respondent and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true
and lawful owners of a 42,443 sqm lot situated in Imus, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 687599. They represented that
they acquired said lot from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on such representations, PBI purchased the
questioned lot. In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the
subject lot and that Teng and Yu never sold said lot to them. PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot
while respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid
by PBI.
Consing filed an action for "Injunctive Relief" against PBI. On the other hand, PBI filed a complaint for "Damages
and Attachment," and a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against
respondent and his mother.
Issue: Is the pendency of Civil Case for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment a prejudicial question to
the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document?
Held and Ratio: NO. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

34

It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.
In the case at bar, a prejudicial question does not exist. The issue in Civil Case for Injunctive Relief is whether or
not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, while in Civil Case for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Hence, the determination of the issues involved in both civil
cases are irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.
A ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not
necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal
laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. The civil case for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case
at bar.
17. Prejudicial QuestionANTHONY REYES VS PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC. [G.R. NO. 171435 : JULY 30, 2008]
Facts: Pearlbank Securities, Inc. (PEARLBANK) is a domestic corporation engaged in the securities business.
Westmont Investment Corporation (WINCORP) is a domestic corporation operating as an investment house. Among
the services rendered by WINCORP to its clients in the ordinary course of its business as an investment house is the
arranging and brokering of loans. Petitioner Anthony T. Reyes was formerly the Vice President for Operations and
Administration of WINCORP.
PEARLBANK alleged that in March 2000, it received various letters from persons who invested in WINCORP
demanding payment of their matured investments which WINCORP failed to pay. According to these investors,
WINCORP informed them that PEARLBANK was the borrower of their investments. WINCORP alleged that it was
unable to repay its investors because of the failure of its fund borrowers, one of which was PEARLBANK, to pay
the loans extended to them by WINCORP. As proof of their claims, the investors presented Confirmation Advices,
Special Powers of Attorney and Certifications signed and issued to them by WINCORP.
PEARLBANK denied having any outstanding loan obligation with WINCORP or its investors and filed two
complaints with the SEC for full and accurate accounting of the investments of WINCORP and of PEARLBANK's
alleged loan obligations to WINCORP and/or its investors (CIVIL). It further instituted a complaint for falsification
by private individuals of commercial and private documents before the DOJ (CRIMINAL).
Issue: Whether the two cases before the SEC are prejudicial questions which have to be resolved before the criminal
cases may proceed.
Held and Ratio: NO. There is no prejudicial question here. Under Rule 111 of the Rules, a criminal action may be
suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action. A prejudicial question is defined as one
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.

35

Although apparently arising from the same set of facts, the issues in the criminal and civil cases are clearly different
from one another. We note that the Informations filed in the criminal cases charge petitioner and his other coaccused with falsification of commercial and private documents in signing and/or issuing the questioned documents
on behalf of WINCORP, stating therein that PEARLBANK owed the third parties (lenders and investors).
Petitioner particularly calls attention to the purported prejudicial issue in the civil cases: whether PEARLBANK has
outstanding loan obligations to WINCORP or its stockholders/investors. Although said issue may be related to those
in the criminal cases instituted against petitioner, we actually find it immaterial to the resolution of the latter. That
PEARLBANK does have outstanding loans with WINCORP or its stockholders/investors is not an absolute defense
in, and would not be determinative of the outcome of, the criminal cases. Even if the RTC so rules in the civil cases,
it would not necessarily mean that these were the very same loan transactions reflected in the documents issued by
WINCORP to its stockholders/investors, totally relieving petitioner and his other co-accused from any criminal
liability for falsification. The questioned documents specifically made it appear that PEARLBANK obtained the
loans during the first four months of the year 2000. Hence, in the criminal cases, it is not enough that it be
established that PEARLBANK has outstanding loans with WINCORP or its stockholders/investors, but also that
these loans were acquired by PEARLBANK as WINCORP made it to appear in the questioned documents it issued
to its stockholders/investors. This only demonstrates that the resolution of the two civil cases is not juris et de jure
determinative of the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases.

18. Prejudicial QuestionDREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR A.
FAMINI [G.R. NO. 184861 : JUNE 30, 2009]
Facts: Petitioner corporation filed a case against Janiola for violation of BP 22. Janiola, on the other hand, instituted
a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as
well as for damages. The checks, which were the subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.
Private respondent Janiola claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Issue: Does a prejudicial question exists on the basis of the civil complaint with damages filed by Janiola to warrant
suspension of criminal case for violation of BP 22 against her?
Held and Ratio: NO. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is
closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case,
the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State
with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and
the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a
mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
Furthermore, the Resolution of the Civil Case is not determinative of the prosecution of the criminal action.

36

The fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were
issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long
line of cases that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for
violation of BP 22.

RULE 112- PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

1.

Probable cause discretion of investigating prosecutor

Rodney Hegerty vs CA and Allan Nash [G.R. No. 154920. August 15, 2003]

Facts: Respondent Allan Nash alleged that petitioner Hegerty, together with the deceased Don Judevine and James
Studenski, invited him to invest in a foreign exchange scheme with a guaranteed return of 10.45% per annum on the
money invested. From July 1992 to November 28, 1997, Nash invested a total of US$236,353.34. Sometime in
December 1997, Hegerty informed Nash that all his investments had been lost after he lent a portion of the
investment to Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., of which he was a stockholder. Initially, Hegerty offered to return to
Nash half of his total investment, but later on withdrew the offer.
After his demands were ignored, Nash filed a complaint-affidavit against Hegerty before the City Prosecutor of
Manila for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether the City Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint for
estafa against Hegerty.

Held and Ratio: NO. We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An
investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has
the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to
prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient
to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the
prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.

The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa based on the following findings: Recouping
everything that has been maintained and asserted by the parties, there is really reason to believe that the
complainant had in fact made some investments with the late DON JUDEVINE who acknowledged receipts thereof
and bound himself thereby alone. There is, however, an utter and absolute absence of a showing that the respondent
partook of the said investments nor had any business dealing with either the late DON JUDEVINE or the
complainant. Complainant also tried in vain to show some form of a partnership between the respondent and the
two deceased individuals but the former failed to adduce any tangible evidence to support the same except his
general declarations which remain bare as they were.

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The remedy of mandamus does not lie to compel the City Prosecutor to file an Information against
petitioner. There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion which will warrant the reversal of the dismissal of
the complaint against petitioner, there is also no ground to issue a writ of mandamus. In the case at bar, we find no
evidence to prove that the City Prosecutor abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion when he dismissed the
complaint for estafa filed against Hegerty.

In addition, the appeal made by Nash with the DOJ and his motion for reconsideration were both filed out of time,
hence, the prosecutors resolution finding no probable cause has become final and executory. Consequently, the DOJ
and the CA never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Corollarily, the CA does not have the authority to order the filing of a case in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor. Although it is entirely possible that the investigating fiscal may
erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law, this does not render his act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction

2.

Cause of accusation
Miranda v. SB GR 154098 Jul 27, 2005

FACTS: The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive
suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently,
then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro
contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda
asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he
reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate
his office and he immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counter-affidavit also stated that
he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002,
preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.
RULING: No. instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002, preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.
RATION: This Court finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan. Its conclusions are amply supported by
the record. Additionally, the issue of whether petitioner committed fraud upon the government or public funds or
property is essentially factual.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot correct errors of fact or law
which do not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
We are not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office under an honest belief that he
was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand scrutiny.
By petitioners own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez
and left only a few days after receipt thereof due to the coercion of the Philippine National Police. This contradicts
his assertion that he immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez. [35] Petitioner cannot
escape from his own admission.

38

People v. Hilvano:
There is no excuse for defendant-appellant. In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the
designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the
provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted.
Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He
alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the
rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into
their own hands.
The records will show that petitioner did not file a motion to quash the information or a motion for bill of particulars
before pleading to the information. It is basic that entering a plea waives any objection the petitioner may have to the
validity of the information except on the following grounds: (1) the information charges no offense;
(2) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(3) the penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and
(4) double jeopardy has attached.
Objections to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information do not fall among the exceptions to the
rule. They fall under the objection that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
Needless to state, the petitioner has by his acts acquiesced to the validity and sufficiency of the Amended
Information. It is, thus, incorrect for the dissenting opinion to peddle the proposition that the petitioner has been
deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Worse, it is
improper for the dissenting opinion to raise this issue motu proprio.
Under our Rules of Court, it is the petitioner who should raise this objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill
of particulars before entering his plea. The irregular procedure followed by the dissent would encourage the
pernicious practice of sandbagging where counsel foregoes raising a pleading defect before trial where it can be
easily corrected only to raise the defect later in the hope of obtaining an arrest of judgment or new trial from a
sympathetic magistrate. It is precisely this evil that is addressed by Rule 117, Section 9 of our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison detreof the rule is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. A perusal of the Amended Information will bear out that it has hurdled this legal bar.
Using this test, it cannot be said that the Amended Information failed to properly apprise the petitioner of the charge
against him. The information charged the petitioner with assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining to the
office of Mayor willfully, unlawfully and knowingly under the pretense of official position. Moreover, it states some
of the specific acts which constitute usurpation of official functions, namely, issuing directives and memoranda and
appointing certain persons to various positions in the city government. These allegations are clear enough for a
layman to understand. Indeed, even the petitioner does not complain about their ambiguity. Only the dissent does.
With due respect, the dissent fails to focus on the proper issue. The issue before this Court is whether
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days. The validity of
the Ombudsmans order of preventive suspension of the petitioner for 6 months is not the one assailed in the case at
bar.
Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the
Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created office and independent from the Executive branch of
government. The Ombudsmans power of preventive suspension is governed by Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provides:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong,
and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect

39

in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit
provided by its enabling law. This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.
The dissenting opinion submits that providing for a six-month limit for the Ombudsman while keeping the
limit for executive officials at sixty days violates the constitutional proscription against equal protection of the law.
In essence, it avers that there is no substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the
Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On the contrary, there is a world of difference between them.
The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political
pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an
impeachable officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica.
Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2)
that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The dissenting opinion finally points out the possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman in imposing
preventive suspensions. The short reply is that all powers are susceptible of abuse but that is no reason to strike
down the grant of power. Suffice it to say that the proper remedies against abuse in the exercise of power are a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or amendment of the Ombudsmans
enabling law by the legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by this Court.
We further hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that petitioners
act fell within the catch-all provision x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon government. The term fraud is
defined, viz.: An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving misrepresentation: an act of deluding
It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase fraud upon government means any instance or act of trickery or
deceit against the government. It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is
covered by the preceding phrase any offense involving . . . public funds or property. It ought to follow that fraud
upon government was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to
the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.

3.

Contents of the information People v. Ibanez 523 SCRA 136

FACTS: Zaldy Ibaez y Francisco was charged with 3 counts of Rape with lewd designs and by taking advantage of
his moral ascendancy over his own daughter, AAA, then twelve (12) years old and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with AAA, a
minor, against her will and consent.

40

Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that he was often away from home and usually returned
only four days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He would usually return home in the morning
after his wife had gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA would already be in school. He admitted being in a
rehabilitation center for sometime, but continued to take drugs upon his release. He also admitted that he would beat
and threaten his wife if she did not give him money for drugs. He testified further that in January 1999, he left the
house, stayed in Pasig and returned home only to steal his wife's car. His wife threatened to have him arrested if he
did not return the car. He asked his cousin to return it minus the stereo. When he returned home, his family had gone
and he started to sell their things to buy shabu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not considering the information in the other criminal cases
where it is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise dates of
the commission of the alleged rapes, it being an essential element of the crime charged.
RULING: RTC- GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
CA - AFFIRMED
SC - Decision of the CA finding Zaldy Ibaez y Francisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape is AFFIRMED with modification
RATION: An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime charged.
Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not
the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the
crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information
with ultimate precision.
It cannot be seriously asserted that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him when the prosecution failed to state the exact date of the commission of the
offense. This Court has previously upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely
alleged that a rape has been committed "sometime in the month of April 1993," for a rape which was committed in
1993; "on or about May 1998," for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998; and "sometime in the
month of September 1998," for a rape committed on an evening in September 1998.19 The allegation in the
informations that the appellant committed the rape "sometime in June 1997"20 and "sometime in April 1999"21was
sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of qualified rape committed against his daughter. The
allegation adequately afforded appellant an opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus, appellant cannot complain that
he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
It is now too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding the dates of the
commission of the offense. Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a
motion to quash on the ground that the informations alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea. However, he
did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case,
appellant has waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged
rape.
Withal, we are in agreement with the submission of the Court of Appeals and the OSG that the RTC erred in the
imposition of the appropriate penalty because it imposed only one penalty of death for two convictions of rape. The
penalty imposed on the appellant should be modified so that in each case, the conviction of rape should separately
be penalized by death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty in each case to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua.
4.

Authority of prosecutor Tolentino v. Paqueo 523 SCRA 377

FACTS: June 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an Information charging private respondent
Benedict Dy Tecklo, the owner/proprietor of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28
(e) of Republic Act No. 8282 for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System
despite demand. The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino.

41

The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by respondent Judge Pablo M. Paqueo,
Jr. It was set for arraignment on August 7, 2001. On said date, counsel for private respondent moved for the
deferment of the arraignment and requested time to file a motion to quash the Information, which request was
granted by the court.
On August 10, 2001, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash.
On August 16, 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to Quash.
August 24, 2001, RTC issued an Order quashing the Information and dismissing the case.
State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Objection and Motion praying that the Order dated August 24, 2001 be
set aside and that the case entitled People v. Tecklo be scheduled for arraignment without unnecessary delay.
In an Order dated October 15, 2001, respondent Judge denied Tolentinos Objection and Motion.
Petitioners, thereafter, filed this petition praying for the nullification of the Orders dated August 24,
2001 and October 15, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject Information
without the approval of the City Prosecutor?
RULING: petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATION: In their Memorandum, petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Tolentino was duly authorized to file the
Information based on the following:
1. Petitioner Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan, per Regional Order dated July 14,
1997, authorized State Prosecutor Tolentino to file the necessary Information for
violations of Republic Act No. 8282 in the Bicol Region, except Masbate and
Catanduanes, and to prosecute the same in courts of competent jurisdiction. This was in
response to the request of the SSS, Region V for the designation of a Special Prosecutor
to handle the prosecution of said criminal cases with the Office of the City Prosecutor
and Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the cities of Naga, Legaspi and Iriga and all
provinces of the Bicol Region.
2. Per ruling of the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter dated October 24, 2000, . . . the information
to be filed in court by prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the Regional
State Prosecutor or the Provincial or City Prosecutor. An administrative opinion
interpreting existing rules issued by agencies directly involved in the implementation of
the rules should be respected and upheld.
Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Rule 117. Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds:
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
Notably, changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. It is noted that the letter dated October 24, 2000 of

42

Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to support his authority to file
the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor, was issued before the changes in the third
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that no complaint or information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city fiscal of chief state prosecutor, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that [n]o complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the provision is
couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory.
An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree No.
1275 showed that they do not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor. It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing
or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor
Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before entering his plea and the
trial court is barred from granting further time to the accused to do so; and that there is no evidence in support of the
motion to quash.
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash provides:
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.At any time before entering his plea, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information.
SEC. 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the
accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall
consider no grounds other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent with the rule above quoted, as it
was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum that his counsel orally moved to quash the Information before the
arraignment on August 7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date, respondent Judge required private respondents
counsel to file a motion to quash within five days from the issuance of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed
on August 10, 2001.
Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for quashing the Information,
since it was apparent and within judicial notice that petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino was not the City Prosecutor
or the Provincial Prosecutor.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the Information, the Court finds
that respondent Judge failed to cite in his Order the correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court where
the ground relied upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is important, however, is that he correctly
cited the ground for quashing the Information.
Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh
pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation.

43

In this petition for certiorari, the Court finds that respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino for failure to comply with the
third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5.

Sec 3 Santos-Concio et al v. DOJ Sec GR 175057 Jan 29, 2008;

FACTS: In the days leading to February 4, 2006, people started to gather in throngs at the Philsports Arena
(formerly Ultra) in Pasig City, the publicized site of the first anniversary episode of Wowowee, a noontime game
show aired by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN). With high hopes of winning the bonanza,
hundreds queued for days and nights near the venue to assure themselves of securing tickets for the show. Little did
they know that in taking a shot at instant fortune, a number of them would pay the ultimate wager and place their
lives at stake, all in the name of bagging the prizes in store.
Came the early morning of February 4, 2006 with thousands more swarming to the venue. Hours before the show
and minutes after the people were allowed entry through two entry points at six oclock in the morning, the obstinate
crowd along Capt. Javier Street jostled even more just to get close to the lower rate pedestrian gate. The mad rush of
the unruly mob generated much force, triggering the horde to surge forward with such momentum that led others to
stumble and get trampled upon by the approaching waves of people right after the gate opened. This fatal stampede
claimed 71 lives, 69 of whom were women, and left hundreds wounded which necessitated emergency medical
support and prompted the cancellation of the shows episode.
The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through then Secretary Angelo Reyes, immediately
created an inter-agency fact-finding team to investigate the circumstances surrounding the stampede. The team
submitted its report to the DOJ on February 7, 2006.
By Department Order No. 90 of February 8, 2006, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez (Gonzalez) constituted
a Panel (Evaluating Panel) to evaluate the DILG Report and determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed
with the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted.
The Evaluating Panel later submitted to Gonzalez a February 20, 2006 Report concurring with the DILG Report but
concluding that there was no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation in view of
the following considerations:
a) No formal complaint/s had been filed by any of the victims and/or their relatives, or any law
enforcement agency authorized to file a complaint, pursuant to Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure;
b) While it was mentioned in the Fact-Finding Report that there were 74 deaths and 687 injuries, no
documents were submitted to prove the same, e.g. death certificates, autopsy reports,
medical certificates, etc.;
c) The Fact-Finding Report did not indicate the names of the persons involved and their specific
participation in the Ultra Incident;
d) Most of the victims did not mention, in their sworn statements, the names of the persons whom
they alleged to be responsible for the Ultra Incident.
Respondent NBI-NCR, acting on the Evaluating Panels referral of the case to it for further investigation, in
turn submitted to the DOJ an investigation report, by a March 8, 2006 transmittal letter (NBI-NCR Report),
with supporting documents recommending the conduct of preliminary investigation for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries against petitioners and seven
others as respondents.
Acting on the recommendation of the NBI-NCR, Gonzalez, by Department Order No. 165 of March 8, 2006,
designated a panel of state prosecutors (Investigating Panel) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case,
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-291, NCR-NBI v. Santos-Concio, et al., and if warranted by the evidence, to file the
appropriate information and prosecute the same before the appropriate court. The following day or on March 9,

44

2006, the Investigating Panel issued subpoenas directing the therein respondents to appear at the preliminary
investigation set on March 20 and 27, 2006.
At the initial preliminary investigation, petitioners sought clarification and orally moved for the inhibition,
disqualification or desistance of the Investigating Panel from conducting the investigation. The Investigating Panel
did not formally resolve the motion, however, as petitioners manifested their reservation to file an appropriate
motion on the next hearing scheduled on March 27, 2006, without prejudice to other remedies.
On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals which issued
on March 27, 2006 a Resolution granting the issuance of a temporary restraining order, conducted on April 24,
2006 a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and subsequently promulgated the assailed
two issuances.
In the meantime, the Investigating Panel, by Resolution of October 9, 2006, found probable cause to indict
the respondents-herein petitioners for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries,
and recommended the conduct of a separate preliminary investigation against certain public officials. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration of the said October 9, 2006 Resolution, filed on October 30, 2006 with abundance of
caution, is pending resolution, and in the present petition they additionally pray for its annulment.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Department Orders were issued within the scope of authority of the DOJ Secretary
pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 bestowing general investigatory powers upon the DOJ.
2) Whether or not appellate courts committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the preliminary
investigation given the fatal defects in the supposed complaint.
3) Whether or not respondents to have lost the impartiality to conduct the preliminary investigation since they had
prejudged the case, in support of which they cite the indecent haste in the conduct of the proceedings.
RULING: petition is DENIED.
RATION: 1) The measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not partake of a criminal investigation, they having
been done in aid of evaluation in order to relate the incidents to their proper context. Petitioners own video footage
of the ocular inspection discloses this purpose. Evaluation for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation entails not only reading the report or documents in
isolation, but also deems to include resorting to reasonably necessary means such as ocular inspection and physical
evidence examination. For, ultimately, any conclusion on such sufficiency or insufficiency needs to rest on some
basis or justification.
Had the Evaluating Panel carried out measures partaking of a criminal investigation, it would have gathered the
documents that it enumerated as lacking. Notatu dignum is the fact that the Evaluating Panel was dissolved functus
oficio upon rendering its report. It was the NBI, a constituent unit of the DOJ, which conducted the criminal
investigation. It is thus foolhardy to inhibit the entire DOJ from conducting a preliminary investigation on the sheer
ground that the DOJs constituent unit conducted the criminal investigation.
Moreover, the improbability of the DOJ contradicting its prior finding is hardly appreciable. It bears recalling that
the Evaluating Panel found no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Since the
Evaluating Panels report was not adverse to petitioners, prejudgment may not be attributed vicariously, so to speak,
to the rest of the state prosecutors. Partiality, if any obtains in this case, in fact weighs heavily in favor of petitioners.
2) A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a complaint for purposes
of instituting a criminal prosecution. Confusion apparently springs because two complementary procedures adopt
the usage of the same word, for lack of a better or alternative term, to refer essentially to a written charge. There
should be no confusion about the objectives, however, since, as intimated during the hearing before the appellate
court, preliminary investigation is conducted precisely to elicit further facts or evidence. Being generally
inquisitorial, the preliminary investigation stage is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the preparation of a complaint or information.
Consider the following pertinent provision of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

45

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable
cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official
file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed
and understood their affidavits.
As clearly worded, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is treated as a
component of the complaint. The phraseology of the above-quoted rule recognizes that all necessary allegations
need not be contained in a single document. It is unlike a criminal complaint or information where the averments
must be contained in one document charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable to a
motion to quash.
The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document denominated as complaintaffidavit. It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent
of ones personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private
offended party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer
or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a
referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that
these were not intended to be the complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred
from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank
employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the
BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the
criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that
what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These
affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary
public. Since theaffidavits, not the letters transmitting
them, were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112
of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals correctly held that a
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended
party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by any competent
person. The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts
committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of any competent person who may institute
the complaint for a public crime.
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without
the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal
complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not
appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports
and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be
held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of
the case in court.
In the present case, there is no doubt about the existence of affidavits. The appellate court found that certain
complaint-affidavits were already filed by some of the victims, a factual finding to which this Court, by rule,
generally defers.
A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit the attending structure of
a complaint or information laid down in Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) which already speaks of the People of

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the Philippines as a party, an accused rather than a respondent, and a court that shall pronounce judgment. If a
complaint or information filed in court does not comply with a set of constitutive averments, it is vulnerable to a
motion to quash. The filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit is proscribed by the rule on
preliminary investigation, however. The investigating officer is allowed to dismiss outright the complaint only if it is
not sufficient in form and substance or no ground to continue with the investigation is appreciated.
The investigating fiscal, to be sure, has discretion to determine the specificity and adequacy of
averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to
be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry,
or proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form. It certainly
is not his duty to require a more particular statement of the allegations of the complaint merely upon
the respondents motion, and specially where after an analysis of the complaint and its supporting
statements he finds it sufficiently definite to apprise the respondents of the offenses which they are
charged. Moreover, the procedural device of a bill of particulars, as the Solicitor General points out,
appears to have reference to informations or criminal complaints filed in a competent court upon
which the accused are arraigned and required to plead, and strictly speaking has no application to
complaints initiating a preliminary investigation which cannot result in any finding of guilt, but only
of probable cause.
3. Petitioners fears are speculatory. Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be
anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with
such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a
mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the
Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular
performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.
As for petitioners claim of undue haste indicating bias, proof thereof is wanting. The pace of the proceedings is
anything but a matter of acceleration. Without any objection from the parties, respondents even accorded petitioners
a preliminary investigation even when it was not required since the case involves an alleged offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is below Four Years, Two Months and One Day.
Neither is there proof showing that Gonzalez exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor their decision with
his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined result. The Evaluating Panel in fact even found no sufficient
basis, it bears emphatic reiteration, to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation, and one member of
the Investigating Panel even dissented to its October 9, 2006 Resolution.
To follow petitioners theory of institutional bias would logically mean that even the NBI had prejudged the case in
conducting a criminal investigation since it is a constituent agency of the DOJ. And if the theory is extended to the
Presidents declaration, there would be no more arm of the government credible enough to conduct a criminal
investigation and a preliminary investigation.
On petitioners citation of Ladlad v. Velasco where a public declaration by Gonzalez was found to evince a
determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause, their attention is drawn to the following
ruling of this Court in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:[
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the
case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile. In these exceptional cases, this
Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the
records of the preliminary investigation x

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Even assuming arguendo that petitioners case falls under the exceptions enumerated in Brocka, any resolution on the
existence or lack of probable cause or, specifically, any conclusion on the issue of prejudgment as elucidated
in Ladlad, is made to depend on the records of the preliminary investigation. There have been, as the appellate court
points out, no finding to speak of when the petition was filed, much less one that is subject to judicial review due to
grave abuse. At that incipient stage, records were wanting if not nil since the Investigating Panel had not yet
resolved any matter brought before it, save for the issuance of subpoenas. The Court thus
finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and
prohibition and in refraining from reviewing the merits of the case until a ripe and appropriate case is
presented. Otherwise, court intervention would have been only pre-emptive and piecemeal.
6.

Sec 3- Racho v. Miro GR 168578 Sep 30, 2008;

FACTS: November 9, 2001, DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP) of the Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. addressed a
letter on behalf of an anonymous complainant to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro. The letter
accused Nieto A. Racho, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)-Cebu, of having accumulated wealth
disproportionate to his income. Photocopied bank certifications disclosed that Racho had a total deposit
of P5,793,881.39 with three banks.
Pio R. Dargantes, the Graft Investigation Officer I (GIO) assigned to investigate the complaint, directed DYHP to
submit a sworn statement of its witnesses. Instead, the latter filed a Manifestation dated October 16,
2002 withdrawing its complaint for lack of witnesses. Consequently, GIO Dargantes dismissed the case. He ruled
that the photocopied bank certifications did not constitute substantial evidence required in administrative
proceedings.
Then, in two separate Memoranda dated May 30, 2003, Ombudsman Director Virginia Palanca-Santiago disapproved
GIO Dargantess Resolution. In OMB-V-A-02-0214-E, Director Palanca-Santiago held Racho administratively liable
for falsification and dishonesty, and meted on him the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits
and perpetual disqualification to hold office. In OMB-V-C-02-0240-E, Director Palanca-Santiago found probable cause
to charge Racho with falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code. The latter
moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman.
May 30, 2003, Racho was charged with falsification of public document in RTC of Cebu. Racho appealed the
administrative case and filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals to question the ruling
in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E. In a Decision dated January 26, 2004, the appellate court annulled both Memoranda and
ordered a reinvestigation of the cases against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss dated July
21, 2004. The same was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated August 24, 2004.
On reinvestigation, petitioner submitted a Comment dated January 4, 2005 along with supporting documents. On January
10, 2005, the OMB issued the assailed Reinvestigation Report. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied by the
OMB in the Joint Order dated April 1, 2005.
ISSUE: 1) Whether Ombudsman Director Palanca-Santiago gravely abused her discretion when she did not inhibit
herself in the reinvestigation;
2) Whether there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable for falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised
Penal Code.
3) Whether petitioner was denied due process of law on reinvestigation

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RULING: instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case.
RATION: 1. After considering the contentions and submissions of the parties, we are in agreement that the instant
petition lacks merit. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the OMB. For
this purpose, the OMB has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). Its discretion is freed from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the OMB is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with
the exercise of the Ombudsmans powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the guardian of the integrity of the public service.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. Such finding of probable cause is a finding of fact which is generally not reviewable by
this Court. The only ground upon which a plea for review of the OMBs resolution may be entertained is an alleged
grave abuse of discretion. By that phrase is meant the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty; or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law; or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents. As already well-stated, as long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsmans ruling, his decision
will not be overturned. Here, the finding of the Ombudsman that there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable
for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts rests on substantial evidence.
2. Petitioner argues that his culpability should not be ascertained on the basis of photocopied bank
certifications. Apparent from the records, however, is the Order dated August 27, 2004 of the OMB which required
petitioner to comment on the certified true copies of bank certifications issued by BPI and Equitable PCIB. All the
same, even if we exclude his deposit in Metrobank, a significant disparity between his declared cash on hand
of P15,000 and cash in bank of P2,860,985.12 subsists when compared to his total bank deposits duly certified for
the same year.
Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. A finding of probable cause merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
Moreover, we are unable to agree with petitioners contention that he was denied due process when no hearing was
conducted on his motion for reinvestigation. In De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, we ruled that a clarificatory
hearing is not required during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is
optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term may in Section 3(e) of Rule 112,
thus: (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
This rule applies equally to a motion for reinvestigation. As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been granted
virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law. As a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may,
for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to
pursue such investigation. In the present case, the OMB found it unnecessary to hold additional clarificatory
hearings. Notably, we note that a hearing was conducted during preliminary investigation where petitioner invoked

49

his right to remain silent and confront witnesses who may be presented against him, although there was none
presented.
Besides, under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 07), particularly
Rule II, Section 7(a), in relation to Section 4(f), a complainants active participation is no longer a matter of right
during reinvestigation. Admittedly, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in
administrative proceedings. Thus, it is settled that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense.
3. Petitioner complains of how quickly the reinvestigation proceedings were terminated. The OMB issued the
Reinvestigation Report on January 10, 2005, barely a week after petitioner filed his Comment dated January 4,
2005. Thus, the latter surmises that no reinvestigation was actually made. However, a review of the facts would reveal
that after the Court of Appeals directed a reinvestigation of the case, the OMB issued an Order dated August 27,
2004 requiring petitioner to submit a comment within 10 days from receipt. The latter failed to comply. On December
1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment of 30 days; the OMB granted the same for 15
days. On December 17, 2004, petitioner asked for another extension of 30 days reckoned from December 19,
2004 within which to submit a comment; the OMB gave him up to December 28, 2004. On December 28, 2004,
petitioner moved for a third extension. Then, without waiting for the OMBs resolution of his latest motion, petitioner
filed his Comment on January 4, 2005. But with his repeated motions for extensions, he already contributed to palpable
delay in the completion of the reinvestigation.
Clearly, the requirements of due process have been substantially satisfied in the instant case. In its Order
dated December 22, 2004, the OMB warned petitioner that no further extension will be given such that if he fails to
file a comment on December 28, 2004, the cases against him will be submitted for resolution. Even so, the OMB
considered petitioners belatedly-filed Comment and the documents attached therewith in its Reinvestigation
Report. In our view, petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process in this case, where as a party
he was given the chance to be heard, with ample opportunity to present his side.
Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her
refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case, public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They are not considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely
quasi-judicial officers. Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a
party sufficient to disqualify even a judge. Hence, absent proven allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice
and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse
themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays in the
prosecution of actions.
Finally, we note that petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed Resolution in OMB-C-C-030729-L in disregard of paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 65 on certiorari. As previously ruled, the requirement of
providing appellate courts with certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the subjects of review is
indispensable to aid them in resolving whether or not to give due course to petitions. This necessary requirement
cannot be perfunctorily ignored, much less violated

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