20

O/r Morlrr~r Ihtwr~vrrq

the ~nlcre\ls and apperilc\

of vulgar ambition and when. in a word. it
;!ppcm
itr coclcty. and when at the same time \ocicty appears IO he
~lragmcntcd.
then WC see the dcvclopmcnt
of rhc fantasv of the Pcoplcas-One. rhc beginnings of a quc~t for a substantial idcniity.
for a social
body which is welded to its head, for an embodying
power. for a
state free from division.
It is sometimes
said that democracy
itself already makes room
for totalitarian
institutions.
modes of organization
and modes of
represenration.
Whilst this is certainly true, it IS also still true to say
that a change in the economy of power is required if the totalitarian
term of Lociety is to arise.
In conclusion.
I return to my initial considerations.
It seems strange
IO me that most of our contemporaries
have no sense of how much
philosophy owes IO the democratic experience.
that they do not explore
its matrix or take it as a theme for their rellections.
that they fail to
recognize it as the matrix of their investigations.
When one recalls how
certain great philosophers
were drawn to Nazism. at least in its early
stages. and. to a much greater and lasting extent. to Stalinism.
one
begins to wonder whether. in modern philosophy.
the ability to break
with the illusions of both theology and eighteenthand nineteenthcentury rationalism
does not carry with it. in turn. quasi-religious
faith.
1 a nostalgia for rhe image of a society which is at one with itself and
\; Hhlch h,l\
,_.. mdstered its history, for the image of an organic community.
But can we restrict discussion to the idea of ;I separation
between
philosophlcal
thought and political belief? Can either remain unaffected.
once they have come into contact? It appears to me that the question
is worth asking. and that we might be able to shed Some light on it
by following the evolution of the thought of Merleau-Ponty.
A Gmilar
necessity led him to move from the idea of the body to the idea of
the flesh and dispelled
the attractions
of the Communist
model by
allowing
him to rediscover
the indeterminacy
of history and of the
being of the social.

Human Rights and The Welfare

State

As soon as we begin to ask ourselves about human rights. we find

ourselves
drawn into a labyrinth
of questions.
We must first ask
ourselves if we can in fact accept the formula without making reference
to a human nature. Or, if we reject the notion of human nature,
without surrendering
to a teleological
vision of history, For can we in
fact say that human beings have embarked
upon a voyage of selfdiscovery.
that they create themselves
by discovering
and instituting
_
rights in the absence of any principle that might allow us to decide as
to their true nature and as to whether their evolution
does or does :
not conform
to their essence? Even at this early stage. we cannot :
ignore the question. Even if we attempt to avoid it and simply examine
the import of an event such as the proclamation
at the end of the
eighteenth
century of the rights known as the rights of man. other
difficulties
lie in store. If we adopt the latter course. our investigations
appear to be guided. if not by observation,
at least by a reading and
interpretation
of the facts. We begin by asking ourselves about the
meaning of the mutation
that occurred in the representation
of the
individual
and of society. That question
leads to another:
can the
effects of that mutation elucidate the course of history up to the present
time? To be more specific: is it the case that human rights merely
served to disguise relations established
in bourgeois society. or did
they make possible. or even give rise to. demands and struggles which
contributed
to the rise of democracy?
Even this is too crude a statement
of the terms of the alternative.
Even if - and I believe that the
organizers of this debate would accept the hypothesis - we agree that
the institution
of human rights has come to support a dynamic
of
rights. do we not have to investigate
the effects of that development?
It is one thing to say that social. economic and cultural rights (notably
those mentioned
in the United Nations Charter) arise as an extension
of those original rights. It is quite another to say that they derive from
the same inspiration.
and it is yet another to take the view that they
promote freedom. The question takes us further still if we ask whether