EDCA is In the Form of an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate

Concurrence (Saguisag vs Exec Secretary, 2016)

Full Text
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use
the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be
agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country should
be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing
in assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens
may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they
show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from general statements that
the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights
as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a
particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their
failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax
measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those
challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this
case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or

spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been
neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured
party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is
the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental
importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The
challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec
25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public
interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of
legal standing in asserting that a public right has been violated through the commission
of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement
for Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but
because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded
jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the
Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the
form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the
President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases,
troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of
such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in
detail in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties
between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art
XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be
transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent

No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT.
Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is
immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves
the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the
absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty. Read more
Full Text
De Castro Dissent: EDCA is Entirely a New Treaty Needing Senate
Concurrence Full Text l Digest
Brion Dissent: EDCA Issue on Absence of Senate Concurrence Not a Political
Question Full Text l Digest
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924

October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and
it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!
l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,

unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based
on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief
Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction,
and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty
through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper
of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the
peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the
home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need
be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be
easy at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder
belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and
that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has
no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in
the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation
of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law
in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in

the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories
of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two
countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other
foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any
parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for
the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation
respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce
and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said
territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him,
is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese
residents to smoke opium on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 116688. August 30, 1996]

WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division
with HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ as Chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA
and HON. RAMON MABUTAS, as members, respondents.
D E C I S I O N - KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28883 dated 10 December 1993 and its resolution dated 14 July 1994 upholding the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City over the information for murder filed
against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the M/V Cebu City, an interisland passenger ship owned and operated by
William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12
May 1991.
Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTCs jurisdiction over the offense charged through a motion
to quash which, however, was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta
City. Petitioner Calmes petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and dismissed
by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated 10 December 1993. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied in the Court of Appealss resolution of 14 July
1994. Hence, the present appeal wherein the only issue for resolution is whether or not the
Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in transit, the
general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c)
(now Section 14) thereof since the exact location where the alleged crime occurred was known.
[1]

Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest
filed by the vessels captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor
Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes) received the report that a passenger jumped overboard.[2]
Petitioners contention is unmeritorious.
The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established. The
Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when
the captain was informed[3] of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder
took place in the same area.
In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it
occurred while the vessel was in transit. In transit simply means on the way or passage; while
passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation.[4] Hence, undoubtedly,
the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which provides that
(w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law.
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would
still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the venue under
the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories through which
the ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.[5]
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into
which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the
commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested in the proper court
of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during

such voyage x x x. This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we
do not qualify the same. We fully concur with the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to him is the spirit behind the present
Sec. 15(c), Rule 110. The said Act specifically provides, among other things, that for crimes committed
within the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of Philippine
registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province in which the vessel
shall come after the commission of the crime.
Petitioners reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act vesting jurisdiction in the province
where the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime is not carried in the present Rule.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law or rule is clear and unequivocal,
its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01; Pascual
vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining its true
meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it. In fact, it does not
seem that the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is now worded.[6]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]

SEC. 15. (now Section 14) Place where action is to be instituted.--

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or in any other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of
any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip,
including the place of departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action
may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first
filed. (Underscoring ours.)
[2]

MARINE PROTEST

Name: ELMER M. MAGALLANES Age: 36 Civil Status: Married

Address: Greenview Village, Maningcol, Ozamis City
Master of: MV CEBU CITY Type/Class: Cargo Passenger

Home Port: Cebu City Registry Number:6544

Burden Cargo: assorted
Gross Tons: 2,452.29 Net Tons: 1,404.76
After being duly sworn to in accordance with law, do hereby declare and state on protest:
1. That on 12 May 1991, the vessel left the port of Ozamis City enroute to Cebu City;
2. At around 2343HRS while the vessel was at longitude 123 degrees 47.1 minutes East and latitude
9 degrees 2.3 minutes north (8.0 miles of[f] Minalonan Point, Siquijor), I was informed by the officer
on duty that a passenger jumped overboard; (Underscoring ours.)
xxx.
[3]

Ibid.

[4]

Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 738.

[5]

Act No. 400 which took effect on 16 May 1982, provided, among others, that:

Section 1. Section fifty-six of Act Numbered One Hundred and thirty-six, entitled : An act providing
for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands, is hereby amended by adding at the end of
said section the following words:
8. Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any
country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or
water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws
there. The jurisdiction herein conferred may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any
province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall
come after the commission thereof: Provided, nevertheless, That the court first lawfully taking
cognizance thereof shall have jurisdiction of the same to the exclusion of all other courts in the
Philippine Islands. x x x.
[6]

Rollo, pp. 14-15

Article 2: Principle of Territoriality of the RPC

The RPC shall take effect within the Philippine archipelago and also outside of its
jurisdiction in certain cases (even if the crime has been committed in a foreign country
as long as such acts affect the political and economic life of the nation).
Cases outside the territory:
1. Any Philippine ship or Airship that is duly registered in the Philippine Bureau of
Customs. Crimes committed in these ships in the high seas, shall be tried under
the RPC, but if these ships happen to be in a foreign territory, crimes committed
shall be tried in the foreign country.
2. Forging or counterfeiting of coins or currency note of the Philippines and
Introducing such to the country.
3. When the offender is a public officer or employee should commit any offenses (in
Page 26) abroad shall be tried and prosecuted here.
4. Crimes that are against the national security and the laws of nations: treason,
conspiracy to commit treason, espionage, flight to enemys country, piracy and
mutiny on the high seas, etc.
RTC (Regional Trial Court) has jurisdiction over al crimes committed on the high seas.

EXCEPTIONS
1. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application.
e.g RP-US Visiting Forces Accord, The Military Bases Agreement between the RP and
the US, and RA No. 75.
1. Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant ship or airshipon the high seas is
not triable in our courts. This is so because our merchant ships are considered as
an extension of our territory, so as the foreign merchant ships.
2. Continuing Crimes: US vs Bull.
3. Crimes committed on a Foreign Merchant Vessel while on the Philippine waters
are triable in our courts: US vs Bull.
Two Rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed in foreign ships:
French Rule: Such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the safety of the state is
endangered.
English Rule: Such crimes are triable in that country, unless they merely
affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management
thereof.
PP. vs Wong Cheng (Smoking of opium aboard a foreign merchant ship within the
Philippine territory constitutes a felony against the RPC)
US vs Look Chaw (Mere possession of opium doesnt constitute a felony or breach of
public order thus it is not triable in our courts. However, if such opiums are landed from
the vessel unto the Philippine ports/soil, this shall constitute an open violation against
the laws of the Phils.)
US vs Ah Sing (If the ship is not in transit and Philippines is its port of destination, the
mere possession of opium on board the vessel is liable because he may be held guilty
of illegal importation of opium.)
EXCEPTION:
1. Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on board of
foreign warships even within the Phil. Territory.
Merchant Ships vs Warships
-Merchant ships are subjected to territorial laws.
-Warships are always reputed to be the territory of the country to which it belongs.
2. RA No. 9372 Human Security Act of 2007 (passed on March 6 2007) has extraterritorial application.