G.R. No.

103047 September 2, 1994

The couple did not immediately live together as husband

and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro

discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for

private respondent.

live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for

four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was
adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of

(Sgd) C
Senior
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar
of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for
a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor.
She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract
on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.

Cardenas.
The trial court denied the petition.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow

PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by
private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As
ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of
their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to
file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default.

her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital

status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted
a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the
possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of

Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally

attended to the processing of the documents required
for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the
marriage contract itself states that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled

that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the
marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was
no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. She insisted that the

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a

certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently

established the absence of a marriage license.

certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro

Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed

the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

marriage between the contracting parties null and void

and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the
subject marriage contract.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City.

The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of

It held that the

above certification was inadequate to establish the

alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the

their marriage.

Trial proceeded in his absence.

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.

Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by

This is to certify that the names

EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA
M. CASTRO who were allegedly married
in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970
under an alleged (s)upportive marriage
license

no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the

municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be
located as said license no. 3196182 does
not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that
respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage
license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately
proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner
also faults the respondent court for relying on the selfserving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner
thus insists that the certification and the

uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are

insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such

certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule

ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any

other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due

the validity of a marriage.

132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be

remembered that the subject marriage was a civil

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A

between the parties as null and void, respondent

appellate court disregarded the presumption that the

written statement signed by an officer

having custody of an official record or

solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly

performed his duties when he attested in the marriage

by his deputy, that after diligent

search, no record or entry of a

contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly

presented to him before the solemnization of the

specified tenor is found to exist in the

records of his office, accompanied by a

subject marriage.

certificate as above provided, is

admissible as evidence that the records

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

of his office contain no such record or

entry.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is

whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to

certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the

We affirm the impugned Decision.

duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where

they are required to enter all applications for marriage

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June

licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date

the marriage license was issued and such other relevant

24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the

New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall

data.

be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by

a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential

The certification of "due search and inability to find"

requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would

render the marriage voidab initio. 5

issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative

value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil

registrar of due search and inability to find a record or
entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182
was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its
non-issuance.

a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage

license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion

ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The

subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a
"secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas
was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro
testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her
husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice
of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite
receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure
to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of
interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the
appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage
license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas
to the solemnizing officer.

and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of

Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the

case, the documentary and testimonial evidence

sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage

license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.

presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently

established the absence of the subject marriage license.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only

her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there

being no showing of any reversible error committed by

their two children were in the custody of their mother.

However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's

respondent appellate court.

residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988,

and from then on, lived with his father.7

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127263

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal

separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the

April 12, 2000

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,

Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later,

upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

to a petition for separation of property on the grounds

that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that

HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN

FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and

they have been living separately for more than one year;
and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of

FERNANDO SY, respondents.

Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the

rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their
conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also

QUISUMBING, J.:

10

For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the

granted custody of the children to Filipina.

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,

which affirmedthe decision2 of the Regional Trial Court

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for

of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition 3 for

declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses

attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as

Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon
of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando

Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but

operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him

were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on
July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively. 5

Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at

San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a
lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and

to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her

son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the
family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer
away from her son, and started spanking him. At that
instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son,
and punched her in the different parts of her body.

The spouses first established their residence in

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its

decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only
of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation
against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical
violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one
year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991,
granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of
legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter
Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent.

Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the

Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both

Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time
Fernando maltreated her. 11

Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking

her when she fell on the floor, and released her only
when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from
hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body
as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition

14

for the

declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to

Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She
points out that the final judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led
to the conviction of her husband for slight physical
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She
also cites as manifestations of her husband's
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and
(3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital
act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges
that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed
from the time of the celebration of their marriage and
became manifest thereafter.

15

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in

its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the

MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT

DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO,

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute

nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the

THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE

THERETO;

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and

alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do

not constitute psychological incapacity which may
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY

private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of

a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT

CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the

decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it

ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning

AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF

HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein

marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at

the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to

respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls

short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a

respondent];

her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage

and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate

marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential

requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

and marriage license are different and incongruous.

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot

THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT

THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS

raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would

contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a

OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE

PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE

number of instances, we have relaxed observance of

procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends

17

that petitioner failed to show that the alleged

psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the
time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the
couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or
almost ten years from the date of the celebration of

WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;

their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983,

they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court

in themselves but exist to protect and promote

substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court

which it found to be in accordance with law and the

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE

ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so

doing, the very reason for their existence would be

evidence on record.

18

ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT

THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

19

which the

Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated November

21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari
raises the following issues:

21

wherein petitioner now

SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT

FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS
CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS
ERRONEOUS; AND

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS

V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS

OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE

OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES'

APPLICABLE HERETO.

22

defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly

requires, exempting a particular case from the operation
of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. 25 In our
view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue
of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to
arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent
conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here
the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is
required now is a declaration of their effects according
to existing law.

Petitioner states that though she did not categorically

state in her petition for annulment of marriage before

6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither

petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in

the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the

marriage license and the celebration of the marriage

Carmona.

itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to

Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on

at the time their marriage was solemnized.

record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly

state in her petition before the trial court that there

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

was incongruity between the date of the actual

celebration of their marriage and the date of the

the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,

dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision

issuance of their marriage license. From the documents

she presented, the marriage license was issued on

promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and

its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No.

September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony

took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable

44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on

November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and

conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted

without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private

private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void

ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of

respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of

the Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There

celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported

marriage between petitioner and private respondent

SO ORDERED.

could not be classified among those enumerated in

Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude

G.R. No. 167684

that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage

between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning.

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage

DECISION

license are only photocopies. So are the birth

certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

that these critical dates were contained in the

documents she submitted before the court. The date of
issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the
course of the trial. 26 The date of celebration of their
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on
November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private
respondent's answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also
affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22,
1993, during her direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that
you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage
of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and
"C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked
as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage
license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered

30

Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as

Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and admitted by
the trial court, with no objections having been made as to
their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no
objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in
open court when she affirmed that the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15,
1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to
timely object thereto, these documents are deemed
sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.33

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of

private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted
by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license

July 31, 2006

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal

of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O.
Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the

City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain

Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused
him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the
said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never
applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage
to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage
license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of
Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly
on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on
31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the
local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
marriage license after having been married to her for 25
years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime]
testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain
Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel,
at the city hall in Manila where they executed a
Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A
certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged,
was an aide of defendant's father accompanied
them, and who, together with another person,
stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly
issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by
him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license
no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On

May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed,

this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan
Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they
executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F")
with the same marriage license no. 2770792
used and indicated. Preparations and expenses
for the church wedding and reception were
jointly shared by his and defendant's parents.
After the church wedding, he and defendant
resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970.
As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for
some time, for his medical studies. Eventually,
their marital relationship turned bad because it
became difficult for him to be married he being
a medical student at that time. They started
living apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981
and later secured a judicial separation of their
conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the
plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the
latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where
the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated.
His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh.
"J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994
(Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all
sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of
San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"),
and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September
20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no.

2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon

his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church
issued him a certified copy of the marriage
contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F")
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a
"purely religious ceremony, having been civilly
married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila,
under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at
San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of
the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11,
1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and
testified that their office failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may
have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that
she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced
to each other in October 1968. A model, she was
compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng
Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was
afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with
him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she
turned back on her family and decided to follow
plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to
Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the
latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her
parents were hostile when they learned of the
elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that
she will take care of everything, and promised to
support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of
her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98,
p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and
where she was made to sign documents. After
the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each

went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they

had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family
alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's
mother just came from hospital. Her family did
not participate in the wedding preparations.
Defendant further stated that there was no
sexual consummation during their honeymoon and
that it was after two months when they finally
had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero,
plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding
sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98,
p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded
by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over
her knees of which he would take endless
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to
have sex with her in between the knees which
she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex
between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage,
plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took
drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the
like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and
then would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain
for about four and a half years, and during all
those times, her mother-in-law would send some
financial support on and off, while defendant
worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was
supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their
marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led
to a break up in their marriage. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia
in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified

that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter
and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with
him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance,
and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs.
"9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister,
testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church
wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that
she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites
some time prior to the church wedding. She also
stated that she and her parents were still civil
with the plaintiff inspite of the marital
differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff
testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for
them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for and
obtained a divorce decree in the United States
on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact
authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to
represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During
his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a
recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh.
"EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792,
the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus
appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the
nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court
made the following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for

the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio.
It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent
one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by
that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May
31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the
rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the
civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo
D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage
solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31,
1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of
the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of
Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in
the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record
and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025,

February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it
is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita
Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they"failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the
employee handling is already retired." With
said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in
the parties' marriage contract was not issued
for in the end the failure of the office of the
local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a
copy of the marriage license was attributable
not to the fact that no such marriage license
was issued but rather, because it "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there
is a strong possibility that it would have
contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the
parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a
perception that ultimately was not substantiated
with facts on record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6

January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is

an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by

Jaime.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily

dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void
on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on
the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of
San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v.
Cario13:

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was
issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages
in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
correctly applied and relied on the presumption
of regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in
question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly
invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of
whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License
No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of
the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the
negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law
in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are
Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San

Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record
of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all
date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided
the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy.
Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the

necessary marriage license, and not being one of

the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should
be read in line with the decision in the earlier case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry could
not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence
of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written
statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the
certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in

connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied

with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot

give you our full force locating the above
problem.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil

Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March
1994. It reads:

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were
(sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards
(sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we
exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994

and provides:

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records
of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS.
CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said
application and license do not exist in our Local
Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of the interested party for whatever
legal intent it may serve.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila
This is to certify that no marriage license
Number 2770792 were ever issued by this
Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we
cannot find the said number.

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the

statement that "hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine
the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to
its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such license
was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated
that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that
the person in charge of the said logbook had already
retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was
not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record
that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased
or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured.
This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the
logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were
required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for
marriage licenses received by the Office of
the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province
of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3
of the request for subpoena?

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only
book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of
marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of
the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion
marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question
whether marriage license 2880792 is
the number issued by their office while
with respect to license no. 2770792 the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan is very definite about it it was
never issued. Then ask him how about
no. 2880792 if the same was ever
issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot
locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired,
sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the

effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate
the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may
have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil
Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a
species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One
such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that
an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence
as in the case at bar where the presumption has been
effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive
proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792.
It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar,
that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said
logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the

law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of
great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime
several years before he filed the petition for declaration
of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward
petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The breakup of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence,
their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties

were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,

they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based
on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.31

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon
C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server,
respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon,
Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the
Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not

trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we
have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably,
there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition

is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April
2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring

payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON
C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge,
and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court
II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein

respondents were charged with the following offenses,
to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) nonissuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents

filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was
thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval
of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation
report and recommendation. The case was however
transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio
N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the
reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge
Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the
factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as
culled from the records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized

marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
Thus, the following couples were able to get married by
the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin,
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage

contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of

his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the
marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin
falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is
exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish
the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file

made it appear that they have notarized only six (6)

documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will
show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and
that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50
for each document, although in fact they collected
P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.

the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to
do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses

Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage

registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent

subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a

marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a

judge are entered is under the exclusive control and

custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the

copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the
other five marriages alluded to in the administrative

only one who should be held responsible for the entries

made therein; that the reported marriages are merely

complaint were not illegally solemnized because the

marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did

based on the payments made as solemnization fees which

are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further

not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies

of these marriage contracts are in the custody of

avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of

the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held

complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of

Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and

accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in

the notarial fees because she is liable only for those

the celebration of said marriages.

Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and

of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not

payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the

notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts;

Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was

celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in

the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of

that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly

to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary

appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court

were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon

Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even

without the requisite license due to the insistence of the

Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of

the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal

Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against

her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when

parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests

but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage

Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent

theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report

she discovered that the court had a marriage Register

which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who

contract which remains unsigned up to the present.

were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that

he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly

contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did

not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the
reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents
to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the
marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with

failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage

contract and to register these with the local civil
registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these
marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative

2. Falsification of monthly report for

report.

July, 1991 regarding the number of

marriages solemnized and the number
of documents notarized.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous

case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file

copies of the marriage contracts were kept by

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that

respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had

instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the

he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July,

1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those
marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise

number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed

by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages
solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees
paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for
are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there
were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the

month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official

receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo

eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of

court. He claims that he would not be that naive to

who should be held accountable for any unreceipted

payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge

exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended

as a matter of honor and prestige.

of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by

complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,

respondent judge contends that he is not the one

It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled

supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he

merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.

"People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara

was allowed by respondent judge to change her property

3. Bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court

bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00

but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made
to appear in the records that the bond has been paid;
that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never

Complainants allege that because of the retirement of

the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the

returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been

shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal

Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon

Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised

Treasurer of Tinambac.

when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of

court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that

Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was

respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she

gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent

deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned

over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her
under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is
deposited with the bank; and that should the

Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga

bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should

follow the proper procedure therefor.

Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air

conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent
judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in
his office was with the consent of the Mayor of

Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that

he never employed detention prisoners and that he has
adequate household help; and that he had to order the
case archived because it had been pending for more than
six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.

6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket
fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the
payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding
receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited
the same in her personal account.

judge.

City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she

was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to

to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an

order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate

Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on
sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of
docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a
check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the
Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead,
was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438

was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the

for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her

account; and that after the check was cleared, she

body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he

has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as

remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other

P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of

this is the duty of the clerk of court.

Tinambac.

Tinambac.

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the
applications for the position of clerk of court to the
Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such

Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got

detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom

appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment

of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-

was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647

for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while

conditioning unit was bought from his

co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992,

Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the

former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order

On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First ViceExecutive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and
submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated
May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter.
We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are
favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
said report. We commend the investigating judge for his

industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said

report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence

copy of the marriage certificate as

required by Article 23 of the Family

marriage. It was actually a simulated

solemnization of marriage and not a real

and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and

hereunder reproduce at length the material portions

Code.

one. This happened because of the

pleading of the mother of one of the

thereof.

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is

contracting parties that he consent to

be photographed to show that as if he

xxx xxx xxx

The first charge against the
respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged
with having solemnized without a
marriage license the marriage of Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A).
Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido

shown to have been solemnized by

Judge Palaypayon without a marriage
license. The testimonies of Bocay
himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte, and the photographs
taken when Judge Palaypayon
solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to
K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their

was solemnizing the marriage as he was

told that the food for the wedding
reception was already prepared, visitors
were already invited and the place of
the parties where the reception would
be held was more than twenty (20)
kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.

marriage. Bocaya declared that they

were advised by Judge Palaypayon to

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is

difficult to believe. The fact alone that

return after ten (10) days after their

marriage was solemnized and bring with

he did not sign the marriage certificate

or contract, the same did not bear a

them their marriage license. In the

meantime, they already started living

date and the parties and the Local Civil

Registrar were not furnished a copy of

In all these aforementioned marriages,

the blank space in the marriage

together as husband and wife believing

that the formal requisites of marriage

the marriage certificate, do not by

themselves show that he did not

contracts to show the number of the

marriage was solemnized as required by

were complied with.

solemnize the marriage. His

uncorroborated testimony cannot

Article 22 of the Family Code were not

filled up. While the contracting parties

Judge Palaypayon denied that he

prevail over the testimony of Bocaya

and Ariola who also declared, among

(Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria

Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).

and their witnesses signed their

marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon
did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of
Abellano and Edralin when Judge
Palaypayon signed their marriage
certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article

solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and

Besmonte because the parties allegedly
did not have a marriage license. He
declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date
stated on it and both the parties and
the Local Civil Registrar did not have a
copy of the marriage certificate.

34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

In said marriages the contracting

With respect to the photographs which

show that he solemnized the marriage

parties were not furnished a copy of

their marriage contract and the Local

of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge

Palaypayon explains that they merely

Civil Registrar was not sent either a

show as if he was solemnizing the

others, that Bocaya and his bride were

advised by Judge Palaypayon to return
after ten (10) days with their marriage
license and whose credibility had not
been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start
of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificate in
front of Judge Palaypayon and on his
table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8,

K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just

to show a simulated solemnization of

years already before they got married

as they stated in their joint affidavit,

made to appear that it was solemnized

under exceptional character as there

marriage. One or two pictures may

convince a person of the explanation of

Abellano must ha(ve) been less than

thirteen (13) years old when he started

was not marriage license and Judge

Palaypayon had already signed the

Judge Palaypayon, but not all those

pictures.

living with Edralin as his wife and this is

hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon

marriage certificate. If it was true that

he solemnized the first marriage under

should ha(ve) been aware of this when

he solemnized their marriage as it was

exceptional character where a marriage

license was not required, why did he

his duty to ascertain the qualification of

the contracting parties who might

already require the parties to have a

marriage license when he solemnized

ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit

in order to have an instant marriage by

their marriage for the second time?

avoiding the marriage license

requirement.

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon

be used as an instrument of deceit by

making it appear that Bocaya and

On May 23, 1992, however, after this

case was already filed, Judge

marriage certificate did not state the

date when the marriage was solemnized

Besmonte were married by him when in

truth and in fact he did not solemnize

Palaypayon married again Abellano and

Edralin, this time with a marriage

and that the contracting parties were

not furnished a copy of their marriage

their marriage.

license (Exh. BB). The explanation given

by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized

certificate, is not well taken as they are

not any of those grounds under

With respect to the marriage of

the marriage of the same couple for the

second time is that he did not consider

Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the

Family Code which declare a marriage

the first marriage he solemnized under

Article 34 of the Family Code as (a)

void from the beginning. Even if no one,

however, received a copy of the

marriage at all because complainant

Ramon Sambo did not follow his

marriage certificate, the marriage is

still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64

instruction that the date should be

placed in the marriage certificate to

Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just

absolve himself from responsibility by

show when he solemnized the marriage

and that the contracting parties were

blaming his personnel. They are not the

guardian(s) of his official function and

not furnished a copy of their marriage

certificate.

under Article 23 of the Family Code it

is his duty to furnish the contracting

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to

believe that Judge Palaypayon would
allows himself to be photographed as if
he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere
pleading of a person whom he did not
even know for the alleged reasons given.
It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to

Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge

Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
their marriage, but he claims that it was
under Article 34 of the Family Code, so
a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a
joint affidavit that they have been
living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12;
Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did
not bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano
was only eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months and seven (7) days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6)

This act of Judge Palaypayon of

solemnizing the marriage of Abellano

that the first marriage of Abellano and

Edralin was not a marriage at all as the

parties (a) copy of their marriage

contract.

and Edralin for the second time with a

marriage license already only gave rise

With respect to the marriage of

Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido

to the suspicion that the first time he

solemnized the marriage it was only

(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and

Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and

Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio

executed joint affidavits that Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both
Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage as they did not have a
marriage license. On cross-examination,
however, both admitted that they did
not know who prepared their affidavits.
They were just told, Carrido by a

was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 1028-93).

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk
of court of Judge Palaypayon. She

purpose was to save his precious time as

he has been solemnizing marriages at
the rate of three (3) to four (4) times
everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).

signed the marriage contract of Gamay

and Belga as one of the two principal

This alleged practice and procedure, if

sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the

impression that she did not even know

true, is highly improper and irregular, if

not illegal, because the contracting

that the marriage was solemnized by

Judge Palaypayon. This is found very

parties are supposed to be first asked

by the solemnizing officer and declare

difficult to believe.

certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario

by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go

that they take each other as husband

and wife before the solemnizing officer

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial

to the Municipal building and sign their

joint affidavits there which were

of having solemnized also the marriage

of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The

in the presence of at least two (2)

witnesses before they are supposed to

already prepared before the Municipal

Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

contracting parties and their witnesses

also signed the marriage contract and

With respect to the marriage of Renato

Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their
marriage contract was signed by them
and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty.
Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy
(Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown
by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and
signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having
solemnized the marriage of Gamay and
Belga allegedly because there was no
marriage license. On her part,
respondent Baroy at first denied that
the marriage was solemnized. When she
was asked, however, why did she sign
the marriage contract as a witness she
answered that she thought the marriage

sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,

Family Code).

paid the solemnization fee, but Judge

Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize

The uncorroborated testimony,

however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his

their marriage due to lack of marriage

license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the

alleged practice and procedure before

solemnizing a marriage, is not true as

affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor

of Tinambac, to corroborate his

shown by the picture taken during the

wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs.

testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however,

did not testify in this case and so his

K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of

respondent Baroy herself who declared

affidavit has no probative value.

that the practice of Judge Palaypayon

ha(s) been to let the contracting parties

Judge Palaypayon testified that his

and their witnesses sign the marriage

contract only after Judge Palaypayon

procedure and practice have been that

before the contracting parties and
their witnesses enter his chamber in
order to get married, he already

has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p.

53;
10-28-93).

required complainant Ramon Sambo to

whom he assigned the task of preparing

Judge Palaypayon did not present any

the marriage contract, to already let

the parties and their witnesses sign

evidence to show also that he was really

solemnizing three (3) to four (4)

their marriage contracts, as what

happened to Gamay and Belga, and

marriages everyday. On the contrary his

monthly report of cases for July, 1992

Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His

shows that his court had only twenty-

seven (27) pending cases and he

solemnized only seven (7) marriages for

respondents, show that for said month

there were six (6) documents notarized

have close supervision in the preparation

of the monthly report of cases of which

the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly

report of cases for September, 1992

by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as

Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-

he certifies as to their correctness. As

a judge he is personally responsible for

shows also that he solemnized only four

(4) marriages during the whole month

1-b). The notarial register of the MTC

of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however,

the proper discharge of his functions

(The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.

(Exh. 7).

shows that there were actually one

hundred thirteen (113) documents

Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera

vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held

In this first charge of having illegally

notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the

said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).

that "A judge cannot take refuge

behind the inefficiency or

solemnized marriages, respondent

Judge Palaypayon has presented and

mismanagement of his court personnel."

marked in evidence several marriage

contracts of other persons, affidavits

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was

no falsification of the monthly report of

On the part of respondent Baroy, she

of persons and certification issued by

the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to

cases for July, 1992 because there

were only six (6) notarized documents

puts the blame of the falsification of

the monthly report of cases on

12-H). These persons who executed

affidavits, however, did not testify in

that were paid (for) as shown by official

receipts. He did not, however, present

complainant Sambo whom she allegedly

assigned to prepare not only the

this case. Besides, the marriage

contracts and certification mentioned

evidence of the alleged official receipts

showing that the notarial fee for the

monthly report of cases, but the

preparation and custody of marriage

are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is

not charged of having solemnized these

six (6) documetns were paid. Besides,

the monthly report of cases with

contracts, notarized documents and the

notarial register. By her own admission

marriages illegally also. He is not

charged that the marriages he

respect to the number of documents

notarized should not be based on how

she has assigned to complainant Sambo

duties she was supposed to perform, yet

solemnized were all illegal.

many notarized documents were paid of

the notarial fees, but the number of

according to her she never bother(ed)

to check the notarial register of the

The second charge against herein

documents placed or recorded in the

notarial register.

court to find out the number of

documents notarized in a month (TSN,

respondents, that of having falsified

the monthly report of cases submitted

p. 30; 11-23-93).

to the Supreme Court and not stating in

the monthly report the actual number

Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was

not personally verifying and checking

Assuming that respondent Baroy

of documents notarized and issuing the

corresponding receipts of the notarial

anymore the correctness of the monthly

reports because he relies on his co-

assigned the preparation of the monthly

report of cases to Sambo, which was

fees, have been sufficiently proven by

the complainants insofar as the monthly

respondent who is the Clerk of Court

and whom he has assumed to have

denied by the latter as he claims that

he only typed the monthly report based

report of cases for July and

September, 1992 are concerned.

checked and verified the records. He

merely signs the monthly report when it

on the data given to him by her, still it

is her duty to verify and check whether

is already signed by respondent Baroy.

the report is correct.

The monthly report of cases of the

MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is

The explanation of respondent Baroy

July, 1992 both signed by the

not well taken because he is required to

that Sambo was the one in custody of

marriage contracts, notarized

documents and notarial register, among

The fee for each document notarized as

appearing in the notarial register was

the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac

dated January 20, 1992 shows that on

other things, is not acceptable not only

because as clerk of court she was

P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo

declared that what was actually being

that date Baroy informed the personnel

of the court that she was taking over

supposed to be in custody, control and

supervision of all court records including

charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy

declared that P18.50 went to the

the functions she assigned to Sambo,

particularly the collection of legal fees

documents and other properties of the

court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of

Supreme Court and P1.50 was being

turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.

(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims

that Sambo did not turn over to her

Court), but she herself admitted that

from January, 1992 she was already in
full control of all the records of the
court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-

Baroy, however, did not present any

evidence to show that she really sent to

were for those documents notarized (i)n

July and September, 1992 already.
Besides there never was any demand
she made for Sambo to turn over some

23-93).

the Supreme Court the notarial fees of

P18.50 for each document notarized and

The evidence adduced in this cases in

to the Municipal Treasurer the

additional notarial fee of P1.50. This

connection with the charge of

falsification, however, also shows that

should be fully accounted for

considering that Baroy herself declared

respondent Baroy did not account for

what happened to the notarial fees

that some notarial fees were allowed by

her at her own discretion to be paid

received for those documents notarized

during the month of July and

later. Similarly, the solemnization fees

have not been accounted for by Baroy

September, 1992. The evidence adduced

in this case also sufficiently show that

considering that she admitted that even

(i)n those instances where the

It is admitted by respondent Baroy that

on October 29, 1991 a cash bond

she received cash bond deposits and she

did not deposit them to a bank or to the

marriages were not solemnized due to

lack of marriage license the

deposit of a certain Dacara in the

amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)

Municipal Treasurer; and that she only

issued temporary receipts for said cash

solemnization fees were not returned

anymore, unless the contracting parties

Pesos was turned over to her after she

assumed office and for this cash bond

bond deposits.

made a demand for their return. Judge

Palaypayon declared that he did not

she issued only a temporary receipt

(Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash

For July, 1992 there were only six (6)

know of any instance when solemnization

fee was returned when the marriage

bond in any bank or to the Municipal

Treasurer. She just kept it in her own

was not solemnized due to lack of

marriage license.

cash box on the alleged ground that the

parties in that case where the cash

documents reported to have been

notarized by Judge Palaypayon although
the documents notarized for said month
were actually one hundred thirteen (113)

notarial fees supposedly in his

possession. Neither was there any
memorandum she issued on this matter,
in spite of the fact that she has been
holding meetings and issuing memoranda
to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V,
W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).

bond was deposited informed her that

they would settle the case amicably.

as recorded in the notarial register. For

September, 1992, there were only five

Respondent Baroy also claims that

Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her

(5) documents reported as notarized

for that month, though the notarial

some of the notarial fees. This is

difficult to believe. It was not only

Respondent Baroy declared that she

finally deposited the aforementioned

register show(s) that there were fiftysix (56) documents actually notarized.

because Sambo vehemently denied it,

but the minutes of the conference of

cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)

Pesos with the Land Bank of the

Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,

after this administrative case was

deposit it either (in) a bank or (with)

the Municipal Treasurer. Her

chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was

still placed in the same box when it was

already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-2293). The Pass Book, however, shows that

explanation was that the parties in Crim.

Case No. 5180 informed her that they

bought and was not used yet.

actually Baroy opened an account with

the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26,

would settle the case amicably. It was

on April 26, 1993, or almost two months

The respondents claim that Baroy sold

1993 when she deposited an amount of

Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs.

later when Judge Palaypayon issued an

order for the release of said cash bond

8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One

Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the

(Exh. 7).

installment basis with a down payment

of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and

initial deposit was the cash bond of

Dacara. If it were true, it was only

Respondent Baroy also admitted that

as proof thereof the respondents

presented a typewritten receipt dated

since she assumed office on October 21,

1991 she used to issue temporary

May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was

signed by both respondents and by the

receipt only for cash bond deposits and

other payments and collections she

Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines

Sur and another person as witness.

after keeping to herself the cash bond

of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
around one year and five months when
she finally deposited it because of the

it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty

Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on

filing of this case.

received. She further admitted that

some of these temporary receipts she

On April 29, 1993, or only one month

issued she failed to place the number of

the receipts such as that receipt

and two days after she finally deposited

the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos

marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-2393). Baroy claims that she did not know

cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it

from the bank without any authority or

that she had to use the official receipts

of the Supreme Court. It was only from

order from the court. It was only on

July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3)

February, 1993, after this case was

already filed, when she only started

months after she withdrew it, when she

redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6;

issuing official receipts.

the office of Judge Palaypayon it was

not used yet. The sale to Judge

1-4-94).

The next charge against the

Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere

typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992

The evidence presented in this case also

respondents is that in order to be

appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave

when this case was already filed. The

receipt could have been easily prepared.

show that on February 28, 1993

respondent Baroy received also a cash

Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a

gift. The evidence adduced with respect

The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who

signed in the receipt as a witness did

bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)

Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones

to this charge, show that on August 24,

1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for

not testify in this case. The sale is

between the Clerk of Court and the

in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash

bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued

the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six

Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I

Judge of the same court. All these

circumstances give rise to suspicion of

only an annumbered temporary receipt

(Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept

and I-1). The same was paid partly in

cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3).

at least impropriety. Judges should

avoid such action as would subject

this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos

cash bond to herself. She did not

When the air conditioner was brought

to court in order to be installed in the

(them) to suspicion and (their) conduct

should be free from the appearance of

The alleged sale between respondents is

not beyond suspicion. It was bought by
Baroy at a time when she was applying
for the vacant position of Clerk of
Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the
time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in

impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60

SCRA 27).

former utility worker of the MTC of

Tinambac.

supposed to be confined in the municipal

jail if his claim is true that he did not

With respect to the charge that Judge

Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit

Herein investigator finds said evidence

not sufficient. The complainants should

The explanation also of Judge

of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos

from Januaria Dacara without issuing a

have presented records from the police

of Tinambac to show that Judge

Palaypayon why he ordered the case

archived was because he heard from the

receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit

regarding this charge that Judge

Palaypayon took out from the municipal

jail Alex Alano where he was under

police that Alano escaped. This

explanation is not acceptable either. He

Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for

the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited

detention and said accused escaped

while in the custody of Judge

should ha(ve) set the case and if the

police failed to bring to court Alano, the

(Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no

probative value as she did not show that

Palaypayon.

former should have been required to

explain in writing why Alano was not

this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its

way into the hands of respondent Baroy

The order, however, of Judge

brought to court. If the explanation was

that Alano escaped from jail, he should

take custody of Alano.

who issued only a temporary receipt for

it and this has been discussed earlier.

Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim.

Case No. 5047 archiving said case
appears to be without basis. The order
states: "this case was filed on April 12,

have issued an order for his arrest. It

is only later on when he could not be
arrested when the case should have
been ordered archived. The order

Another charge against Judge

Palaypayon is the getting of detention

1991 and the records show that the

warrant of arrest (was) issued against

prisoners to work in his house and one

of them escaped while in his custody

the accused, but up to this moment

there is no return of service for the

and was never found again. To hide this

fact, the case against said accused was

warrant of arrest issued against said

accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said

ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon.

The evidence adduced with respect to

case, however, show that in fact there

was a return of the service of the

this particular charge, show that in

Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.

warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991

showing that Alano and Adupe were

Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan

Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan

arrested (Exh. 0-3).

The last charge against the respondents

is that they collected filing fees on

Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991

and placed in the municipal jail of

Judge Palaypayon explained that his

collection cases filed by the Rural Bank

of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was

Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1,

0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence
presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail
where said accused was confined and
that he escaped while in custody of
Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial,
particularly that of David Ortiz, a

order dated April 6, 1992 archiving

Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to
one of the accused who remained at
large. The explanation cannot be
accepted because the two other
accused, Alano and Adupe, were
arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have
issued an order for the arrest of Adupe
who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was

archiving this case for the reason that

he only heard that Alano escaped is
another circumstance which gave rise to
a suspicion that Alano might have really
escaped while in his custody only that
the complainants could not present
records or other documentary evidence
to prove the same.

supposed to be exempted in paying filing

fees under existing laws and that the
filing fees received was deposited by
respondent Baroy in her personal
account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4,
1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed
ten (10) civil cases for collection against

farmers and it paid the total amount of

Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos

In view of the foregoing findings that

the evidence presented by the

of marriage and under Article 4(3) of

the Family Code of the Philippines, he

representing filing fees. The

complainants cited Section 14 of

complainants sufficiently show that

respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon,

shall be civilly, criminally and

administratively liable.

Republic Act 720, as amended, which

exempts Rural Banks (from) the

Jr. had solemnized marriages,

particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and

payment of filing fees on collection of

sums of money cases filed against

Gina Besmonte, without a marriage

license, and that it having been shown

farmers on loans they obtained.

that he did not comply with his duty in

closely supervising his clerk of court in

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing

the preparation of the monthly report

of cases being submitted to the

to do with the payment of the filing

fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it
was respondent Baroy who received
them and besides, on February 4, 1992,
he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy
claims that the bank paid voluntarily the
filing fees. The records, however, shows
that respondent Baroy sent a letter to
the manager of the bank dated January
28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank
would not pay she would submit all Rural
Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,

Supreme Court, particularly for the

months of July and September, 1992
where it has been proven that the
reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of
documents notarized, it is respectfully
recommended that he be imposed a fine
of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS with a warning that the same or
similar offenses will be more severely

whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac

was really exempt from the payment of
filing fees pursuant to Republic Act
720, as amended, instead of threatening
the bank to have its cases be submitted
to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the
filing fees was made on February 4,
1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos was only turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992.
Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as
accountable officer.

his duty of closely supervising his clerk

of court in the performance of the
latter's duties and functions,
particularly the preparation of the
monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs.
Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that
he only signed the monthly report of
cases only when his clerk of court
already signed the same, cannot be
accepted. It is his duty to closely
supervise her, to check and verify the
records if the monthly reports prepared
by his clerk of court do not contain
false statements. It was held that "A

dealt with.

judge cannot take refuge behind the

inefficiency or incompetence of court

The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not

personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA

158).

comment by respondent Baroy).

Respondent Baroy should have checked

Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for

his negligence or failure to comply with

sign the marriage contracts or

certificates of those marriages he
solemnized without a marriage license,
there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they
were solemnized, the contracting
parties were not furnished their
marriage contracts and the Local Civil
Registrar was not being sent any copy of
the marriage contract, will not absolve
him from liability. By solemnizing alone a
marriage without a marriage license he
as the solemnizing officer is the one
responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites

In view also of the foregoing finding

that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy,
the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has
been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months
of July and September, 1992 with
respect to the number of documents
notarized, for having failed to account
(for) the notarial fees she received for
said two (2) months period; for having
failed to account (for) the solemnization
fees of those marriages allegedly not
solemnized, but the solemnization fees

were not returned; for unauthorized

issuance of temporary receipts, some of

the provincial, city or municipal

treasurer for the amount withdrawn.

of her duties shown by her constitute(s)

a serious misconduct which warrant(s)

which were issued unnumbered; for

receiving the cash bond of Dacara on

Court deposits cannot be withdrawn

except by order of the court, . . . ."

her removal from office. In the case of

Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk

October 29, 1991 in the amount of One

Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which

(Revised Manual of Instructions for

Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.

of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas

City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993,

she issued only a temporary receipt

(Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the

127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A

circular also provides that the Clerks of

it was held that "The clerk of court is

not authorized to keep funds in his/her

Land Bank of the Philippines only on

March 26, 1993, or after one year and

Court shall immediately issue an official

receipt upon receipt of deposits from

custody; monies received by him/her

shall be deposited immediately upon

five months in her possession and after

this case was already filed; for

party litigants and thereafter deposit

intact the collection with the municipal,

receipt thereof with the City, Municipal

or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court

withdrawing said cash bond of One

Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29,

city or provincial treasurer and their

deposits, can only be withdrawn upon

Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25,

1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982.

1993 without any court order or

authority and redepositing it only on

proper receipt and order of the Court

(DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p.

Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the

cash bail bonds and fine she collected

July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond

of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos

136, Manual for Clerks of Court).

Supreme Court Memorandum Circular

constitutes serious misconduct and her

misappropriation of said funds

from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case

No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines

No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides

that "all collections of funds of

constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent

Norma Hiam was found guilty of

Sur, for which she issued only an

unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X

fiduciary character including rental

deposits, shall be deposited immediately

dishonesty and serious misconduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the

and X-1) and for not depositing it with a

bank or with the Municipal Treasurer

by the clerk of court concerned upon

receipt thereof with City, Municipal or

service and (the Court) ordered her

immediate dismissal (from) the service.

until it was ordered released; and for

requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac,

Provincial Treasurer where his court is

located" and that "no withdrawal of any

xxx xxx xxx

Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on

February 4, 1992 for collection cases

of such deposits shall be made except

upon lawful order of the court

We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the

filed against farmers in the amount of

Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but

exercising jurisdiction over the subject

matter.

conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an

office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the

turning over said amount to the

Municipal Treasurer only on March 12,
1992, it is respectfully recommended
that said respondent clerk of court
Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed
from the service.

Respondent Baroy had either failed to

comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her
conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and

It is provided that "Withdrawal of

court deposits shall be by the clerk of

responsibility of her duties and

functions as a clerk of court and

court who shall issue official receipt to

accountable officer. The gross neglect

presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be

circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example
of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from
the judge to the least of its personnel, they being

standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and

morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family
Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of

P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr.,
with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or
similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely
dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government,

pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the

Philippine Navy.1wphi1.nt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

including government-owned or controlled corporations.

void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal

requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage,

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of

the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records

the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall

be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8

and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for

appropriate action.

Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June

2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties

and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we

SO ORDERED.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge

are providing for herein pertains to the administrative

liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390

averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo

on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the

April 11, 2002

respondent judge to comment.

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides

that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination

parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that

all the documents to the marriage were complete, he

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner,

or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or

authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the

Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage

Law." 9 This is of course, within the province of the

PUNO, J.:

the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost

25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent

requested if respondent judge could solemnize the

marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative
sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the
charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually
trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of
marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status.
This, and his undeniable participation in the other
offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of
gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as
to ineludibly require a higher penalty.

judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn

Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the

However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him

that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand

Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,

Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February

Respondent judge further avers that before he started

the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents

2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her

late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite

submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that

the parties did not possess the requisite marriage

marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is

outside his territorial jurisdiction.

license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and

suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength

of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to
inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the

the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors,

and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding,
it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he

reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and

admonished the parties that their failure to give it would

7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the

Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his

local ordinance to marry the faithful is

render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured

respondent judge that they would give the license to him

of their marriage.

authorized to do so only within the area or

diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An

in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to

comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of

appellate court Justice or a Justice of this

Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines

the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the

respondent judge so the latter could communicate with

the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,

to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue,

as long as the requisites of the law are complied

Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license.

Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the

Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a

Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed

contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite

the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the

respondent judge that their office cannot issue the

marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit

hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner

as due to her own fault and negligence.

the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a

resultant irregularity in the formal requisite

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and

laid down in Article 3, which while it may not

affect the validity of the marriage, may

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of

Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the

Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the

respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage

subject the officiating official to

administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)

Court Administrator. She attested that respondent

judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to

without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so

outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00

the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was

because of her prodding and reassurances that he

was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6)

months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a

eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she

filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after

We agree.

marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross

ignorance of the law. We further held that:

reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she

realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.

129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and

"The judiciary should be composed of persons

who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in

her conscience.

judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is

confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by

the law they are sworn to apply, more than the

ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that

the Supreme Court.1wphi1.nt

petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for

Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in

competent in understanding and applying the law.

It is imperative that they be conversant with

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.

this Application that the marriage license shall be issued

on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor

Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and had

jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.

basic legal principles like the ones involved in the

instant case. x x x While magistrates may at

Orobia claimed it.

Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he

solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar

of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica

General issued a Certification that it has no record of

such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February
2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated

with. However, judges who are appointed to

specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage

times make mistakes in judgment, for which they

are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons."3

and Burgos. We held that:

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of

Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the

marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,

Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,

Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to

administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross

Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN

WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar

ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the

marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he

offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing

G.R. No. 145226

a marriage without the requisite marriage license.

InPeople vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot

February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

render valid or even add an iota of validity to the

marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did
not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge

DECISION

acted in gross ignorance of the law.1wphi1.nt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the
Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court
has consistently held in a catena of cases that the
withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have
the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of
court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary
actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon
the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound
by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline
judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and
impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a
disciplining authority.6

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No.
8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
ofprision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this
petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are
as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were

boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period
of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a
card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters,
they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but
left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to
her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court
on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen
sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint
seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the

ground that no marriage ceremony actually took

place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with
Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment
on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification
of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in
the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its
judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day ofPrision Mayor as
maximum.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial

court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court
of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such,
a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good
faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not
know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does
not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since
no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was
taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CAG.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.7
SO ORDERED.11
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted
petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid
marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the

appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration
of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the
CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce

decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could
not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate
courts decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult
question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce
decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the
motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a
split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original
decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date
of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage
and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law,
never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED
THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or
not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted
the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person
intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material
to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime
of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the
Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow
that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General
relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which
held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided
all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is
a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the

petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account

as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith
and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine
whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this
case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note
that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the
RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar,
Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage

ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus
held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance
with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to
begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts
to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all
intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the
date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken
from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak
of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married
to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with
Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of
the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be
distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case,
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
was likewise obtained after the second marriage was
already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous

marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first
marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but
twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate
was duly issued and then again six months later before a
priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all
was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute
an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to
liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we
also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25,
2000, denying herein petitioners motion for

reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven with moral certainty.

The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties

securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license,
procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167746

August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child

Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6

DECISION

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of

marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license

issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal
2

and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 971325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by
petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging
that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without
securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person
who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a

the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to

petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to
their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann
Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed
the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent
prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be
denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch
143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as
follows:

certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of

the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on the same day,

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went

through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the

Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983.

sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per

month as support for their two (2) children on

the first five (5) days of each month; and

case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No.

127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

3. To pay the costs.11

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error when it failed to relax the

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law

applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its

Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.

observance of procedural rules to protect and

promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.14

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these

requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

12

We deny the petition.

(2) Their consent, freely given;

the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and

petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his

marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was

(3) Authority of the person performing the

the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage

contract being a public document is a prima facie proof

no marriage license because he and respondent just went

to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who

of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of

the Rules of Court.13

arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took place

at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the

following issues for resolution:

Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the

marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error when it ruled that the Petition

issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a

resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal

for Annulment has no legal and factual basis

despite the evidence on record that there was

Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight

because the certification states that "Marriage License

no marriage license at the precise moment of

the solemnization of the marriage.

number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto

Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their marriage

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error when it gave weight to the

contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage

license number.

Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact

that the same was not identified and offered as

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8

December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family

evidence during the trial, and was not the

Marriage license number appearing on the face

Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the

Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its

of the marriage contract.

celebration.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under

reversible error when it failed to apply the

ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the

Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which

renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the
States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage
license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases
where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void are
clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the
Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties.
The Court held that the certification of "due search and
inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
certification, the Court held that there is absence of a

marriage license that would render the marriage void ab

initio.

Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further

validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to

publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day

period for publication are considered mere irregularities

the parties herein.

that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An

irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L.

does not affect its validity but the party or parties

responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and

23

In Cario v. Cario, the Court considered the marriage

of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the

Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

deceased bears no marriage license number and, as

certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of

Manila, their office has no record of such marriage

license. The court held that the certification issued by

administratively liable.31
Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the

and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

marriage license number in the certification of the

Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage

the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the nonissuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having

This Certification is being issued upon the request of

license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the

marriage contract states that the marriage license

been solemnized without the necessary marriage license

and not being one of the marriages exempt from the

Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or

intents it may serve.26

number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more,

this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to

marriage license requirement, the marriage of the

petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was
issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the

This certification enjoys the presumption that official

duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of
the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business.27 The presumption of regularity of

assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as

a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our
conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said

ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court

held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage

official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the

was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,

Under the principle that he who comes to court must

marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes

conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in

come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that

he was not responsible or a party to the marriage

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be

support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an

officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should

celebration which he now insists took place without the

requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the

considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage

license, the law requires that the absence of such

be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from

these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage

civil marriage took place because he "initiated

it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical

marriage license must be apparent on the marriage

contract, or at the very least, supported by a

license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29

engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went

to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and

certification from the local civil registrar that no such

marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative

voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot

benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a

the marriage contract between the petitioner and

respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely

value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor

respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then,
we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of

marriage license to the parties.

himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when

the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited
to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery.
His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage

ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing

COURT

official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the

contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of

the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went

through the second wedding ceremony in church under

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de

law.38

Manuguit church that you have with you already a

Marriage Contract?

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is

WITNESS

always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every

intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity

Yes your honor.

of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this

presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly

COURT

repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great

weight.

duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was

executed without nary a whimper on the part of the
petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and
respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit
Church the marriage contract executed during the
previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall.
This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the

WITNESS

same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued

which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the

WITNESS

necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to
produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
church.

Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the

decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of
Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Yes your honor.35

SO ORDERED.

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and

a willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is

Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of

36

WITNESS
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they
I dont remember your honor.

appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for

them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain

COURT

Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the

CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage

License?

authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have

performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the

WITNESS

absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the

solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have

whether or not a marriage license has been duly and

regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the

already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good

enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has

been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said

G.R. No. 191425

September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as
the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No.
31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November
2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

(Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino)
was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del

Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted the second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 in Quezon City;

The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond
Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino
("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married
to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage
has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic]
co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly
consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married
man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora
assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a
plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him.
Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of
not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even
date, pre-trial conference was held and both the
prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation
of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage
between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and
Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of

Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that
he contracted the second marriage to
Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to
her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate
of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P.
Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as
admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the
RTCs resolution is whether or not the second marriage is
bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was
terminated and the case was set for initial hearing.
Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the
respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as
follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that
she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi
Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in
King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the
[IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said
hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another
wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she

left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN,

October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines,
the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with coaccused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001
(Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to the
civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from
the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in
November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant
confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latters workplace
in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the
first marriage between complainant and Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still
married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so
much and because they were neighbors and childhood
friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P.
Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought
by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in
Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in
the house together with a friend and she heard
everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to
return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife
thereby losing income opportunity in the amount
of P34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about
the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what
happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained
[thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that
because of what happened to her, her mother died and
she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left
her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However,
she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her
money in the amount ofP50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew

of the marriage between the private complainant and
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the
sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003,
she was asked by the private complainant to accompany
the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in
FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private
complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation
and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that
she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still
went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she
loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the
herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having
contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private
complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P.
Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the private
complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly
entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the
Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his
marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August
2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is
stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as
a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4).
Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge
of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same
Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad
Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a
Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic]

told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia

and the reason why said private complainant filed the
instant case was due to hatred having learned of his
second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic]
further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware
of his first marriage with the private complainant and he
did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a
Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of
his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa
Pinat, it is indicated that he was a Catholic Pentecostal
but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on
said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P.
Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also indicated
because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim
since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim.
He also indicated that he was single despite his first
marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN,
January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified
that he is the founder and president of Balik Islam
Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such
president, he has the power and authority to convert any
applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and
after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On
January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the
Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every
Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and
asked for a certification because of the filing of the
instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate
of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam
also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He
declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than

one according to the Holy Koran. However, before

marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is
required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be
secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is
no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9,
2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a
Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the
Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of
the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four
times but he should be able to treat them equally. He
claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but
was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the
Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to remarry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim
marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages
3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a
victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa
Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case
was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the
latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with
the private complainant, she confronted the former who
admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she
asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the
latter responded that he was single. She also knew that
her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but
after she learned of the first marriage of her husband,
she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed
that after learning that her husband was a Muslim
convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married
in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the
allegations of the private complainant that she was
sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private

complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to

marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted
that she only came to know the private complainant when
she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August
14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court
convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions
to prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family
Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited
Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing
Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further
stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general
rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs.
Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second wife subject to certain
requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is
merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain
circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the
Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir,
1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is
necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract
subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the
Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family
resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to
the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said
council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed
marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide

whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,

Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife,
co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the
above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not
even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both
marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting
to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the
mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again
after marrying the private complainant. What is clear,
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled
right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth
time. There are requirements that the Sharia law
imposes, that is, he should have notified the Sharia
Court where his family resides so that copy of said
notice should be furnished to the first wife. The
argument that notice to the first wife is not required
since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation
to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law.
It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.

be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino

understands what was going on between her and Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance
favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account,
proof against him must survive the test of reason and
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This
Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. This court hereby renders
judgment imposing upon him a prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
accessory penalties provided by law.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the

accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with
the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person
of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no
sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P.
Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the
prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of
the first marriage between private complainant and
Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to
several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that
when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the
latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P.
Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard
their conversation. From this incident, private
complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was
aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married.
This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P.

GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for
failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the
allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail
bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras
motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and
assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accusedappellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed
Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision. 11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his
second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of
his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The
appellate court denied Nolloras invocation of his religious
beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil
laws.1avvphi1 Nolloras two marriages were not conducted
in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply.
Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize
the State and render it impotent in protecting the
general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate
court denied Nolloras motion for reconsideration. The
allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere
rehash of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no
reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this
Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally
married.
2. That the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, theabsent spouse
could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the
elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to
Pinat;14(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been
legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and
Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to
his prior marriage.16

The Courts Ruling

Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of
the appellate court and of the trial court.

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage

states that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang
Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa,

Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the

ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and
Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino
were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev.
Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office
of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is
alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from
ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT,
appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom
for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following
information:
Date of Marriage

Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999

b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN

a) December 08, 2001

b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his

Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his
religion allows him to marry more than once.
Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith
at the time of celebration of both marriages,20 Nollora
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The
applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but
a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not
subject to stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall
be perfected unless the following essential requisites are
complied with:

(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly
witnessed by at least two competent persons
after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has
given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr)
duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim
male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female
of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from
any impediment under the provisions of this Code may
contract marriage. A female is presumed to have
attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of
marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the
two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by
the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested
by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall
be given to the contracting parties and another sent to
the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall
keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage
maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be
wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any
person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or

(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court

or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated
by the judge, should the proper wali refuse
without justifiable reason, to authorize the
solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar,
residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of
dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahrmusamma) before, during or after the celebration of
marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not
been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon
petition of the wife, be determined by the court
according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family
Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall
apply." Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here.
Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were
solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of
his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with
Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both
of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a
Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is
not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions
are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy.
Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus
further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]

Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa

Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic
Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10,
1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr.
Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since
January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract
with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you
have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your
marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic
but I didnt know why they did not place any Catholic
there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your
attention with respect to your marriage contract with
your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x
will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that
you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on
January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with
Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as
Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then
keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my
Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since
I know that the society doesnt approve a Catholic to
marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as
my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why
did you indicate there that youre single, Mr.
Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married,
earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you
allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in
fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in
your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just
signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights
[sic] because after that we even got married under the
[M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife,
are you required under your faith to secure the
permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife,
Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because
she was very mad at me, at the start, she was always
very mad, maam.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on
the validity of his marriage to Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora
may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to
extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization
of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated
in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law

itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on
30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on
23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two
years, four months and one day ofprision correccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the
accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the

beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and
wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void
ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198780

the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring

the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of

The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to

conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to
appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the
pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the

marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the

CA.

reads:

here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid

marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios
to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

Ruling of the CA
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and
Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never
acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the

CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married and that their case

petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was

similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void
from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating

was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained

that the parties never intended to enter into the

its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

xxxx

marriage contract and never intended to live as husband

and wife or build a family. It concluded that their

Ruling of the Court

SO ORDERED.6

purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for

Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of

law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the

consideration of $2,000.00.

acquiring American citizenship in consideration of

$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of

testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted

Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire

Hence, this petition.

consent?

American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she

agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the

Assignment of Error

The Court resolves in the negative.

ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that

Fringer returned to the United States and never again

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first

examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the

communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant

benefits. This has led to the development of marriage

to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be

paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to

fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular

benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple

the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into

that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences

marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire

specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited

of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent

should be distinguished from motive, the latter being

purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage

is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a

inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by

it and used it only as a means to acquire American

child.12Another, which is the subject of the present case,

is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall

citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of

within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit.
It explained that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the

their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who

use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do

not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC

ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a

always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this

rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is

purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and

family life, such was a farce and should not be

quite true that a marriage without subsequent

consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a

recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying

the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on

marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to

the outside world and with the understanding that they

to explain that the marriage was declared void because

the parties failed to freely give their consent to the

will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose

to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married

marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by

it and used it only as a means for the respondent to

at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is

ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood

acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the

CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was

as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18

lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not

understand the nature and consequence of getting

(Italics supplied)

married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the

marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of

Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a

that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of

legal validity or existence of a marriage.

marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain

entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage

$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage

contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage

could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was

entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980

declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose

of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The

immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further

recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was

The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on

early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United

States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable

intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

the parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of

the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of

case of

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of

marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the

absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage

consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic.

The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration

void ab initio.

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein

in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the
parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and

benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present,

United States courts have generally denied annulments

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be

to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through

Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert

involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple

married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have

temporary into permanent permission to stay in the

country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to

upheld such marriages as valid.23

that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately

enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the

wit:

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by

any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of

Respondents marriage not void

the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and

undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test
for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married. "This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never

married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the

(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a

solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires

intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of

intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the

beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their

act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by

undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the

very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire

all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though

the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the

insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be

married would allow them to further their objective,

only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not

precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between

considering that only a valid marriage can properly

support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an

Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent

because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the

apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage

status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited

Although the Court views with disdain the respondents

attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It

purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the

respondents marriage may be considered a sham or

beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their

marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the

fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void

ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their

conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship

Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and

family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage

through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they

willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There

might have no real intention to establish a life together

is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely

was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid

marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of

entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1

provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of

an application for citizenship. There was a full and

complete understanding of the legal tie that would be

marriage are governed by law and not subject to

stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void

created between them, since it was that precise legal tie

which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is

no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into

In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of

consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage
by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not

for purposes other than what the Constitution or law

declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.28

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the

ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation
or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action
to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify
under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be
brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present
case, there is no injured party because Albios and

be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct

indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and

complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the

Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no

intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the

kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to

regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred

absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are

void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent

right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional

questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married

consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is

no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely

couples to structure their marriages in almost any way

they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have

no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

children or no children, to love one another or not, and so

on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,

The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a

limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,

money, status, and title, provided that they comply with

marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an

institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with

Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such
a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a

marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to

again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient

The present case stems from a petition filed by

petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration

marriage license number appearing in the marriage

contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,

situation.

of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria)

with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.

was the number of another marriage license issued to a

certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as

03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed

alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided

certification reads as follows:

for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order

No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the

11 July 2003

Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage

to Gloria.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when
it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage

3

nullified when no longer needed.

In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is

stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at

License filed in this office, Marriage License No.

9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September

Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to

the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is

GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January

19, 1993.

29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is

crucial to the resolution of this case.

DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991,

and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei

January 8, 1993.

Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in

December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar

oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws

residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo

DECISION

some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in

the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said

VELASCO, JR., J.:

ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a

document. He claimed that he did not know that the

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the

ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He

further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite

Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,

2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October
5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to

MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on

to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never

resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the

Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may

serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had
filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and
that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an
employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers
for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued

chronologically.10 He testified that the certification

dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina

marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing

of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing

them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin

returned with the marriage license, they gave the license

Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,

Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967

officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the

solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed

was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on

January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter

were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she

was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9,

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with

any other license of the same serial number, namely

9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and
presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez,

1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the

help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing

Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29

the marriage license, and that a week before the

marriage was to take place, a male person went to their

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against

23

Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

house with the application for marriage license. Three

days later, the same person went back to their house,

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a

showed her the marriage license before returning it to

Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the

minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that

he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
12

Philippines. He testified that he solemnized the

marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated
that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he
had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he
15

is familiar with the requirements. Rev. Dauz further

testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage

Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon

Buenaventura during the existence of the previous
marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30

solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did

not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been

married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not

that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case

know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim

rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was

had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for

Chinese, and those around them at the time were

Chinese.31

Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch

47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

The Ruling of the RTC

license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for

both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the

the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with

the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz

sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on

January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos

submitted the marriage contract and copy of the

marriage license with that office.17

and she could identify all the persons depicted in said

photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held

that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the

Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified

that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the

sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her

Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither

party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where

the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified

that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the

husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing

their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought

Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of

Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not

marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin

secured the license and gave the same to him on January

the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license,

and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain

one of those exempt from the license requirement, and

that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of

8, 1993.19He further testified that he did not know

where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended

Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days

a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on

January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the

returned with an application for marriage license for

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE

TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE

considered that the parties had comported themselves

as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING

THAT THERE WAS ONE.

petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for

bigamy.38

II

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as

follows:

the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as

follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT

Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;

CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and

2. Terminating the community of property

EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE

CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE

Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-

APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING

PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING

0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is

OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL

DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH

DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar

Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the

Civil Registrar General, National Statistics

OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE

PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO

1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their

respective civil registries the marriage

WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

SO ORDERED.39

contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and

respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993

III

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April

1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a

in Manila.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING

ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON

Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41

THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE

TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

Hence, this petition.

relations between the petitioner and the

respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity
of the marriage of the parties.

SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the
Court of Appeals.

Grounds in Support of Petition

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted
her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state
that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria

The Ruling of the CA

and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said

certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following

CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and

documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been

assignment of errors:
I

validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING

THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to

having signed the marriage contract. The CA also

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS
THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect

the validity of the marriage but the party or parties

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement

signed by an officer having the custody of an official

SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL

AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE

responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally

and administratively liable.

record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no

record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE

PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the

beginning:

the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate

as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The Ruling of this Court

xxxx

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of

The petition is meritorious.

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those

the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a

marriage license, the Court held:

covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the

documents to certify that despite diligent search, a

2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of

the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct

particular document does not exist in his office or that a

particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found

of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that

is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage

in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil

registrars are public officers charged with the duty,

license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The

resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a

inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are

required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

valid marriage license had been issued for the couple.

The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been

including the names of the applicants, the date the

marriage license was issued and such other relevant

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases

provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage

license.

data.44

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with

the appearance of the contracting parties

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty

was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance

before the solemnizing officer and their

personal declaration that they take each other

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage

of a marriage license.

license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage

contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where

prove the existence of said license. To prove that no

such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the

the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly

issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal

requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except

Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had

allegedly issued said license. It was there that he

marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that
the serial number of the marriage license pertained to

as stated in Article 35(2).

requested certification that no such license was issued.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such

another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A

certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render

certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule

132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and

indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on

January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

as husband and wife in the presence of not less

than two witnesses of legal age.

the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

The Court held in that case that the certification issued

the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of

the certification, stating that it did not comply with

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage

license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to

was valid, and that the required marriage license had

been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that

Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,

Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party

burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is

that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words

resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she

is not the best witness to testify to the validity and

said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage

license that would not affect the validity of the

existence of said license. Neither could the other

witnesses she presented prove the existence of the

marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent.

No marriage license was proven to have been issued to

probative value.

marriage license, as none of them applied for the license

in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not

Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the

Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of

even testify as to the contents of the license, having

admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.

Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in

that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding

Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas

Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to

of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,

relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar

admitted not knowing where the license came from. The

task of applying for the license was delegated to a

of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage

license could not be located as the same did not appear in

certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the

license was secured and thus impeached the certification

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence,

testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee

their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it

categorically stated that the officer involved conducted

of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony

of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this

have been validly married and there was compliance with

all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are

a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration

absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules

Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar

still enjoys probative value.

legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal

capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in

"despite diligent search" in the certification, and since

the certification used stated that no marriage license
appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted and thus the certification could not be given

of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified

that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage

disputable presumption that an official duty has been

regularly performed, absent contradiction or other

license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of

Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have

evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of

regularity of official acts may be rebutted by

simply been secured from that office and submitted to

the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so,

affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform

a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that

further weakening her claim that there was a valid

marriage license issued for her and Syed.

the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her

duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a
diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.

support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly

married. To quote the CA:

favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent

freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures
were presented showing appellant and appellee, before
the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch
was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all
is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.

In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of

Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local

xxxx

Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a

marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance

The parties have comported themselves as husband and

of said license. The case of Cario further held that the

presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had

wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas,
who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more

been overcome, and that it became the burden of the

party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage

than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003

his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under

Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that

said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with

Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto

after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10

January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a

Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in

Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of

parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family.

In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States

second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon

(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward

petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby

REINSTATED.

of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived

together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against

(appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and

give him his freedom and in the process allow him to

No costs.

the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease

her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in

SO ORDERED.

Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported

marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital

ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was

signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid

G.R. No. 201061

status, assured him that the marriage contract would not

be registered.

marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear

when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding

formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,

except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the

July 3, 2013

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized

without a license is void from the beginning, except those

DECISION

exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27

to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this

CARPIO, J.:

marriage cannot be characterized as among the

exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a

The Case

marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17

Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children,

Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage

to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it

August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012

Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
94226.

may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage

The Antecedent Facts

license, given the weight of evidence presented by

petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin)

filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent

attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to

procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11,
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of

marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before

the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial
court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973,
he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of

Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in
the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994
when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley
with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin,
in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before

the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally

was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to

that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it

trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.

61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783

a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for

the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in

could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting

marriage with Azucena.

were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and

Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute

accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his

appointment as administrator of the properties during
the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of
Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally
named 37 properties in her answer.

his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad

ruled that the second marriage was void not because of

the existence of the first marriage but because of other

faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to

Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the

causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.

Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial

trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties

covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor

court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of

Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the

of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted

to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a

demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally

case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal

support because she was not married to Benjamin. The

filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court

also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before

trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and

Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for

the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the

support.

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN

BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at

Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to

present any evidence before the trial court citing the

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally

Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL

and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared

pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals.

The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to

could not claim the 37 properties she named in her

answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision

reads:

NONEXISTENT.

The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to
Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was

Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the

claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the

properties to their children, including Benjamin, as

thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722,

17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821;

advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of

Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to

in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035,

194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625,

Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil

status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT

194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631,

194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637,

The Decision of the Trial Court

Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they
were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that

194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,

206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court

Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,

property or industry in their purchase. The trial court

The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan,

Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and

found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots

covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as

Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of

"Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for

well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782

and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot

Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words

"married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.

present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008,

4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October
2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still
refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial
court to consider the case submitted for decision.

ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to

the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig
Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial,
that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982
and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was
5

not issued to Benjamin and Sally. The trial court ruled

under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units

were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860,

CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from

SO ORDERED.6

petitioners money without contribution from respondent,

hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition

the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong

to Benjamin and his siblings.

with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27

August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties,

the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties

appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of

Appeals.

under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the

name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he

days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30)

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

was able to establish that they were acquired by him

solely. The Court of

days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender

control and possession of these properties including the

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals

lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the

administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of
income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30)

documents of title to the petitioner.

partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled

that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-

decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six

resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally,

253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the

parties shared by them equally. However, the share of

for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly

warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or

respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice

Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the

the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to

petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with

Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and

present her evidence. She insisted on presenting

Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed

distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further

processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of

despite the presence of her other witnesses.

March 15, 2003.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later

Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of

nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that

proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondents claim of spousal support, children support

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of
proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT
No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally
shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally.
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the
conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the
absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to

Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to

Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage

present clear and convincing evidence that would show

bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that
would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision

was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted

the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals

reads:

ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring

Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

No other relief granted.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations

of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the

respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their

counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and

Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the

properties acquired by the parties through their actual

AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720

and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-

the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and

Caloocan.

joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be

owned by them in common in proportion to their

appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656

and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be

respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that

solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other

and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, no declaration of the status of the parties
children.

PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order

dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,

hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common

and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming

the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to

courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the

fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any

appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under

his first marriage while the share of respondent-

present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing

her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were

temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally

could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect

appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision

stands.

married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect

marriage as an inviolable institution.

marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial

court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds

SO ORDERED.8

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for

continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of

is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this

case, Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six

resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of

Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the

Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28

November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance.

The Issues

Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the

trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

present her evidence, the case would be submitted for

decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error in affirming the trial courts
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present
evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision declaring the marriage between

the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted

on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on
that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court
could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning
due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could
not complain that she had been deprived of her right to
present her evidence because all the postponements were

despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by

one of the parties.10

Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a

marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time,
null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she
were allowed to present her evidence, she would have
proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage
to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife
by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was
the informant in their childrens birth certificates where
he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In
contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in
the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.

Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and

non-existent; and

at her instance and she was warned by the trial court

that it would submit the case for decision should she still
fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error in affirming with modification

1973 was duly established before the trial court,

evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage

We agree with the trial court that by her continued

contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a

purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage

the trial courts decision regarding the property

relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have

waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the

First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September

between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her

evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally,

court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the

case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the

Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of

the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that

case because she was waiting for the decision of the

Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial

there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin

and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence

Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of

February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not

certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were

married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant

match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further

testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did

in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that

Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
19

marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not

bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous
under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal

not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and

Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is

1982. Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7

March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on

adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license

and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification

the birth certificates.

Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that

the first or former marriage shall not be null and void.

enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer

charged under the law to keep a record of all data

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between

The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be

assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence

Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code,

to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or

irregularity on the face of their marriage contract.

a marriage solemnized without a license, except those

covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,

However, if the second marriage was void not because of

the existence of the first marriage but for other causes

"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the

marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized

such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not

committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it

It was also established before the trial court that the

purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not

without a license. It was duly established that no

marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage

was held that what was committed was contracting

marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article

recorded with the local civil registrar and the National

Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by

License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license

numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City

349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.

Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not

Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office

of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of

for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls

under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their

bigamous because there was no marriage license. The

daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is

Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives

Division of the Records Management and Archives

marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin

and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general

legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be

sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has

Office, National Commission for Culture and the

Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil

rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409

of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely

the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous,

civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior

Registration Department of the National Statistics

Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence

simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the

beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in

existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23

proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and

Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage

sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage

between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage

relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if

indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license.12

between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and

"a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended

non-existent.

must have all the essential requisites for validity except

for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case,

to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming

from relatives, friends and the society especially from

Except for the modification in the distribution of

there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and

Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a

properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects

the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the

marriage license. The supposed marriage was not

recorded with the local civil registrar and the National

decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did

notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from

Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between

Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth

certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of

the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that

"the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of

represented themselves as husband and wife without the

benefit of marriage.

the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court

notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth

Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the

16

her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it

was a fictitious marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property

relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that

the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while

Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in

148 of the Family Code which states:

with the evidence on record. Only the property covered

by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of

writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his

prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the

Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under

TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of

in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.

preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both

of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally."

The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive
title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under

SO ORDERED.

the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse

are merely descriptive of the civil status of the

G.R. No. 138322

registered owner.29 Such words do not prove coownership. Without proof of actual contribution from

absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in

such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith

either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership

under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be

forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

the preceding Article.

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella
even if both parties are in bad faith.

(Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the

case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of

accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She

further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled

marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them

through their actual joint contribution of money,

her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his

partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

property, or industry shall be owned by them in common

in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamins father to his children as
advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition
before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins
late father himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses which included
Sally x x x."25

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the

name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or

her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision

and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is

primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition,
there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable
error which may be inferred from the decision or order
itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for
decision because of Sallys continued refusal to present
her evidence.

October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIARECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage

between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan
City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to
any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the abovequoted Decision.

respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in

November, 1997.

Issues
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been

Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March

1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an

"I

marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's

divorce decree obtained in Australia by the

respondent ipso facto terminated his first

wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity

was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce

marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating

him to contract a second marriage with the

decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because

the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13

petitioner.
"2

Australian family court.

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be

dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian

action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with

respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the

citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian

Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual

documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they

submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.17

Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for

a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed

and "Filipino."8

Decision and Order.

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent

Ruling of the Trial Court

lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their

marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in

Petitioner submits the following issues for our

consideration:

validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in

Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to

The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha

Hence, this Petition.18

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the

ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and

The failure of the respondent, who is now a

naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence
of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application
of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in

Australia.9

recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage

ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for

element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged

lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on

the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior

Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.

The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,

"5

subsisting marriage at the time he married her on

January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of

there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that

the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that

disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53

of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in
this case.

the divorce decree obtained by the respondent

in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of
the judgment granting the divorce decree
before our courts."19

legal requirements of the place where the marriage was

performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles
as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required,

each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license
with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this

does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts

cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot

Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)

whether the divorce between respondent and Editha

be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because

of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed

Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was

proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article

2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a

Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more

necessity to take up the rest.

subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly

obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting

The Court's Ruling

her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,

who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,

The Petition is partly meritorious.

provided it is consistent with their respective national

laws.27

xxx

xxx

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where

the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx

xxx

parties has been previously married, the

applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of
the birth of baptismal certificate required in
the last preceding article, the death certificate

First Issue:

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as

pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha

Samson

the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may

be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof

v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces

abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute

divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She

Divorce as a Question of Fact

adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these

elements.

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the

admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the

registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of

Australian divorce decree is a public document a

written official act of an Australian family court.

the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

Therefore, it requires no further proof of its

authenticity and due execution.

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the

divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect,
the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the

of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of

annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect
their persons."

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign

judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in

evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the

divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a

legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the

political and civil rights belonging to a

exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon

the subject should be resolved in the negative.

judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports

to be a written act or record of an act of an officially

citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective

cloak of their former states, don the attires of their

Second Issue:

adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,

respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

body or tribunal of a foreign country.

32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other

hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an

the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal

laws.

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient

proof of the divorce, respondent was legally

official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by

the officer having legal custody of the document. If the

Burden of Proving Australian Law

record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab

divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party

challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He

initio.

contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original

of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,

diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign

service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.34

laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in

that country for quite a long time. Besides, the

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha

Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an

Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine

courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign

Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not

sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on

laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

evidence must be demonstrated.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce

"the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing

necessary in the prosecution or defense of an

decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,

counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,

action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of

proving the material allegations of the complaint when

but only to the fact that it had not been registered in

the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial

those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the

burden of proving the material allegations in their answer

court ruled that it was admissible, subject to

petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in

when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce

was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of

evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,

petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the

proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls

squarely upon him.

divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family

Court of Sydney, Australia.38

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the

Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer

other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian

marital laws are not among those matters that judges are

bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired

Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the

supposed to know by reason of their judicial

function.44 The power of judicial notice must be

incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately

established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.
It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the
lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage
may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a

divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may

be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow

legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in

court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that

respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian

a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47

prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the

part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on

January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree

contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy."48

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that

proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only
the following exhibits were presented before the lower
51

court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint; (b)

Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick

that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce

decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce

A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia

(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her

marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of

obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did

not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry

Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between

Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson

bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian

law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a

according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for

the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed

(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro

Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of

direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe

that the most judicious course is to remand this case to

that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored

respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of

Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of

annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.

the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show

petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in

evidence on this matter.

Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E"

Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.

that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the

parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce

Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended

Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree

already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,

which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in

Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of

Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian

Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the

other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive

evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
49

39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no

proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that

Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4"

Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5"
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between
Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and

substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a

quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which

conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.

respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

SO ORDERED.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

marriage is determined by the national law of the party

concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.

whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back

to the Philippines with her American family, staying at

since the family hardly had enough money for basic

needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons

CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not

bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not

as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then

earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was

DECISION

be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused
him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more:

insufficient to support their family. Although she left all

of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus,

Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth

provide financial support to them, as well as, to

respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely

continued to live with her American family in New

her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who

had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did

Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of

her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A.

file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied

having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus

For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had

invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely

requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After

securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married

Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had

been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent

her American husband and acquired American citizenship.

She argued that her marriage to her American husband

Crasus, and there was no more possibility of

reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally

was legal because now being an American citizen, her

status shall be governed by the law of her present

alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger

and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her

nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus

himself was presently living with another woman who bore

psychological incapacity to perform the essential

obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable

him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of

misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced

and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of

nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to

to him to finance the brain operation of their son,

Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed

Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the

Philippines.

that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus

null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to

the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,

represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
1

2001, affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No.
CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the
filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of
marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus
married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal
ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hottempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left
the Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest
then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting
that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus
learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on

05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already

pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with

interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses.

an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to

Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their

married to respondent Crasus and having five children

with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by

respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both

parties the opportunity to present their evidence.

respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that

she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person,

Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the

Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6

and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on

certain occasions but it was because of the latters
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to
find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of
their household. She could not have been extravagant

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of

evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;7 (2) the

Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health

Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the

the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a

divorce decree in the United States of America and

Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely

in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration

married another man and has establish [sic] another

family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,

taking place on 16 December 1961; and (3) the invitation

to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
Fely openly used her American husbands surname,
Micklus.9

wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to

another man in another country.

to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and

defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,

Defendants intolerable traits may not have been

apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY

affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no

reversible error therein. It even offered additional

Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to

take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her

CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage

provided that these were eventually manifested after

ratiocination for declaring the marriage between

respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit

children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written

interrogatories, before the consular officers of the

the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the

said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee

abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in

erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and
inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation

the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated

this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of

of human society throughout the civilized world. It is

quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind,

nullity of their marriage

will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such

incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage

in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards

her marriage to plaintiff.

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

Commissions13issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls

of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever
submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented
his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have
the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines

October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right

to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is

defendants psychological incapacity to comply with the

submitted for decision.

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also

essential marital obligations which already existed at the

time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC

be valid in this country, except those prohibited under

Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the

irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of

respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO

CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY

basis of the following findings

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly

credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity

CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER

VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE

exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological

incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These

CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE

FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY

are her excessive disposition to material things over and

above the marital stability. That such incapacity was

TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."

already there at the time of the marriage in question is

shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-

deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed,

plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court
finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that

to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground

quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust

situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married

to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a

divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has

Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of

respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had

party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants

that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by

undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship

and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot

already become an American citizen. He further

questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,

the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by

Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual

see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be

extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually

represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to

institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the

obligations to live together, observe love, respect and

fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any

embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself

an alien.

Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the

doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine

the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most

Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in

proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of

serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give

marriages.

married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor

her marital covenants to the former. To condemn

meaning and significance to the marriage. This

psychological condition must exist at the time the

After having reviewed the records of this case and the

marriage is celebrated21

plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth

and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a

applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the

instant Petition to be meritorious.

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential

marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the

party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;

relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the

nullity of the marriage of the parties.16

The totality of evidence presented during trial is

insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08

March 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration,

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial

provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these

circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as

disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will

not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given

petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this

Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents
wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the

time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the

history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.22

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes

considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious

errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of

psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court

laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v.

Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite

the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18

19

In his Comment to the Petition, respondent Crasus

maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological

incapacity was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a

lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced

below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This

is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our

laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may

for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to

the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the

family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article

on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the

be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other

spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of

prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such

certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the

nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"

thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the

the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be

relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not

case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.

The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent

parties. Both the family and marriage are to be

"protected" by the state.

necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the

exercise of a profession or employment in a job

function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under

Canon 1095.24

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that

there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent

permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,

mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be

spouse should be personally examined by a physician or

psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as

downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or

declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological

incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must

difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a

natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an

be established by the totality of the evidence presented

during the trial.

be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the

complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could

adverse integral element in the personality structure

that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned

jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological

not have known the obligations he was assuming, or

knowing them, could not have given valid assumption

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as

incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis

for declaring their marriage null and void under Article

thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be

given here so as not to limit the application of the

regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,

221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and

36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,

nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a

their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)

must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent

psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully

explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified

and included in the text of the decision.

Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be

easily put into question for being self-serving, in the

psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

absence of any other corroborating evidence. He

submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be

Certification on the recording with the Register of

Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent

time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence

must show that the illness was existing when the parties

given great respect by our courts

Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16

December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of

exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the

illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her

American husbands surname. Even considering the

illness itself must have attached at such moment, or

prior thereto.

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel

for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons

admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to

respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely

had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from

assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting

no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of

their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of

respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the

United States in 1984, after which she married her

the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos

v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied

American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she

alleged that she had been an American citizen since

with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of

Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the

1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle

incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that

its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad.

personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,

physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the

validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution

perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not

warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the

of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the

family as the basic social institution and marriage as the

said Article.27

foundation of the family.32

could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent

Crasus.

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous

II

III

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the

Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on

behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.

cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce

law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume."28

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code

of the Philippines

Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,

respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on

behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts

that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse

declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of

the Solicitor General had no personality to file the

rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and

extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus;

shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine

law.

instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48

provides

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a

special situation wherein one of the couple getting

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the

married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at

the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and

prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on

behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion

literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be

applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife

between the parties and to take care that the evidence

is not fabricated or suppressed.

her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of

her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of
the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be
proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is

Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,

she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date
was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor

General does not bar him or his Office from intervening
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as

the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
General as the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring

or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of

the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed
the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that
were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the

doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the

Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of
the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.

case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36

The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced

below

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

the services of lawyers.34

198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the

interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the

Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as

Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is

represented and protected in proceedings for annulment

counsel for the State:

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall

serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the

and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing

collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial

Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing

suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the

Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel

for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless

and submit to the court proof of such service within the

same period.

defender of the land, then his intervention in such

proceedings could only serve and contribute to the

the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be

quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons

realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to

the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties

prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such

certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the

and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office

of the Solicitor General, to file their respective

case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.

The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent

memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days

from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the

General is authorized to bring or defend actions on

behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court
of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of

function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under

Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor

General takes over when the case is elevated to the

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA

285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v.

Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be

eventually responsible for taking the case to the

Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the State 37

appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is

only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision
and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other

Office of the Solicitor General to file its own

memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the
State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted
for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the

public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the

decision personally or by registered mail. If the

respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second

paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of

the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be

published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of

the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-

the divorce decree obtained against him by his American

wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry

20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE.

under the Philippine Law.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of

fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration
or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the

IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court,

are as follows.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Sec. 20. Appeal.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the

Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a

DECISION

Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of

denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The

bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,

Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as

QUISUMBING, J.:

an American citizen.

appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the

adverse parties.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his

where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen

and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her

wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a

certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by

to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry

under Philippine law?

him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San

Gabriel, California.

abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give

respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the

Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition

for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article

under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,

but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under

question, presented as a pure question of law.

26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding

merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The

Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court

commiserates with respondent Crasus for being

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails

Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion

contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys

continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and

loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answer
to every individual problem.39

the Decision dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial

Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and

was denied.

its Resolution dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion

for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that
herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1)

there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original

Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise

it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a

marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an

controversy must be between persons whose interests

are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a

signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the

Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article

alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file

a petition for annulment or for legal

legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is

ripe for judicial determination.8

26. As so amended, it now provides:

separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law

that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that
this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also

where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a

divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The

be valid in this country, except those prohibited under

Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not

directly applicable to his case but insists that when his

interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner

representing the State asserts its duty to protect the

naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which

capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by

institution of marriage while respondent, a private

citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to

operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the

Constitution.7

remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal

interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to

remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted

for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent

remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)

validity of his second marriage.

a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to

govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of

seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino

RULE 63

Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of

respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at

the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested

under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,

Brief Historical Background

obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and

indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing

or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive

order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed

in the U.S.A.

into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as

the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the

regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring

an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,

Article 26 thereof states:

Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the

Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

thereunder.

accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against

...

be valid in this country, except those prohibited under

Articles 35, 37, and 38.

those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them

abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able

to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly

divorce them abroad can.

divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer

married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained

abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity

of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and

applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an

foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be

considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.

Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases

involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of

American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that

has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate

We propose that this be deleted and made into law only

after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of

them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and

would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently

obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.

Legislative Intent

obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should

likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were

Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code

a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the

marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction

Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be

allowed to remarry.

deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a

absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a

statute according to its exact and literal import would

member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid

the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear

purpose of the legislature, it should be construed

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a

divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as

necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore

remarry.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin

to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van

Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen

and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its

terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were,

as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.

therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino

badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation

would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever

remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining

a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then

spouse.

the instant case must be deemed as coming within the

contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

However, we note that the records are bereft of

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for

the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges

a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is

competent evidence duly submitted by respondent

concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of

not evidence.13
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

11

The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954

and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court

this particular case, not even feasible, considering that

the marriage of the parties appears to have all the

the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino

spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien

foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case

petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.

Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to

avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time

of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the

proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein

must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other

fact, such laws must be alleged and

DECISION

summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading

but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation

proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that

the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as

BRION, J.:

to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts

petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar

specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there

would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,

case herself but was prevented by financial and personal

circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be

capacitated to enter into another marriage.

elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to

Gerberts.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.

209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen

who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied

Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was

to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a

spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and

on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert

married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in

not the proper party to institute the action for judicial

recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a

remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in

the present petition there is no sufficient evidence

Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional

commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the

naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the

Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second

submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based

on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was

wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April

2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for

him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine

naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a

divorce decree and had remarried an American, that

that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a

law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such

declaration could only be made properly upon

petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,

Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,

respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his

favor.

divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took

effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the

Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and

has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying

May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the

Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,

his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went

to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the

Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage

certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce

No pronouncement as to costs.

decree, an official of the National Statistics Office

(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him

SO ORDERED.

and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be

enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the

legislative intent behind the enactment of the second

judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,

pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as

determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that

G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial

recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the

legislative history and intent behind the second

that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital

bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van

From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Dorn v. Romillo that:

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino

marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,

the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity

spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien

spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x

or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the

time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,

cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be

obliged to live together with, observe respect and

contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for

cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not

fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The

latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with

recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling

unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the

possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be

discriminated against in her own country if the ends of

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in

justice are to be served.22

standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse

an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence

marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President

Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included

petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of
his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the

19

of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested

powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted

Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of

in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the

Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,

with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as

there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for

the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the

Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit

bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines

since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,

of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital

status, settling the doubts created by the divorce

on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the

Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where

they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26

of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article

26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse

foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding

instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related

shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine

law.

issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance

to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize

THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the

substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino

law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused

spouse

to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital

rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between
the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized

divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article

17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.

The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a

specifically for the purpose or in another action where a

party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of

recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court

finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to

foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the

judgment or final order is as follows:

his claim or defense.

remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse

is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is

and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her

capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts

conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the

Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a

proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies

attested by the officer having legal custody of the

person, the judgment or final order is

presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

documents. If the copies of official records are not kept

in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the

Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse

can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

In either case, the judgment or final order may be

repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of

Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under

this provision.

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of

law or fact.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a

right that clothes the party with legal interest to

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of

the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with

certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to

include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under

petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

the requisite interest to institute an action before our

courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a

this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the

petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second

divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the

divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in

we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the

RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is

the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to

his or her national law.27

consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no

rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other

foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)

authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course

words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce

judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not

of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be

served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious

necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the

RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.

Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign

conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same

time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity

and conformity with the aliens national law have been

is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment

rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means

foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners

presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of

duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as

a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,

that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be

proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together

jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or

clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every

pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This

with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect

of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The

precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our

laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign

Section states:

recognition may be made in an action instituted

judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res

judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served
by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a

foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered

not only the marriages solemnized but also

that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law

on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the

divorces and dissolved marriages.

registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,

judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of

the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper

change of name and naturalization register.

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for

basis for extending judicial recognition and for

considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This

recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be

entered:

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce

decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of
the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the

same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the

Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that

(a) births;

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code

provides.

decrees registration. The law should be read in relation

with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the

(b) deaths;

foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata

effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial

(c) marriages;

order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce

decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted

(d) annulments of marriages;

totally out of turn and without authority of law when it

annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and

(e) divorces;

Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of

the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign

divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the

(f) legitimations;

decree.34We consider the recording to be legally

improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench

(g) adoptions;

and the bar to what had been done.

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events

and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law

(i) naturalization; and

requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees

that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons

(j) changes of name.

legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his

personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent

xxxx

in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such

as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall

married or not."35

keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in

which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware

of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian

particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by

March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for

divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the

cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition

which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be

measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional

"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of

Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue

for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper

proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for

infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,

or clear mistake of law or fact.

and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki,

to file the petition.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on

certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision

The Facts

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a

civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article

of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as

well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national

412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a

special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil

REMAND of the case to the trial court for further

proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a

registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule

108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional

copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar

General. No costs.

and procedural requirements that must be complied with

before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or

SO ORDERED.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi

G.R. No. 196049

Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being

dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May

the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also

requires, among others, that the verified petition must
be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON

who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay

(Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought

Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3

CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL

REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to

reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped

STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan

which declared the marriage between Marinay and

DECISION

Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January

2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should

not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings

CARPIO, J.:

Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute

Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese

for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the

civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree

The Case

Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the

bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be

and another specifically for cancellation of the entry

under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a

declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the

Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to

jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the

present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108

proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2

direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to

annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the

Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National

Statistics Office (NSO).6

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued

that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil

or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final

decree of the court to the local registrar of the

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of

marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A

municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was

solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC

petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special

proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or

in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments

of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring

immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and

withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The

a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the

enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention

marriages void from the beginning" are subject to

cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC

RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in

the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and

sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the

Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage

Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and

wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese

between Marinay and Maekara.

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between

Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also

marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute

The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment

was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of

nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the

husband or the wife.

the Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to

recognition by Philippine courts.12

xxxx

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-1110-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family

the Family Code on the ground of psychological

incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the

respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the
petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.

provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.

asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its

own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue.
Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept
of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is
lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case
on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate

Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot

pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing
the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial
court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and
improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of

Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is

11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third

person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the

applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of

the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to

husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese

Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially

Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law

imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce

recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not

explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said

that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a

ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He

prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the

divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family

Court judgment also affected the civil status of the

together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x

which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in

parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor

General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of

the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of

Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza

ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on
the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground"
to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and

marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the

bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void.
The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In JulianoLlave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who

Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events

and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407
of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity
and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting

previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the

party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the

financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior

Court to comply with the directive for them to comment

on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed

provision.

marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to

the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be

from him the fact that she was previously married to

Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the

a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the

disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is

violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote

that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She

protected by the Constitution.34

would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything

she say might cause misunderstanding between her and

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to

Fujiki.46

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be

made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo

The Issues

certification against forum shopping of the petition was

not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same

Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and

Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file
their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor
General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

Tomas, this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the

foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign
36

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is

applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court

judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a

courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over

whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the

certification or copy attested by the officer who has

custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody

status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification

may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a

of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and

authenticated by the seal of office.50

foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute

their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity

trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,

including the form and contents of the petition,51 the

of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of

another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize

service of summons,52 the investigation of the public

prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and

the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of

evidence.

the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because

it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose

We grant the petition.

of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit

repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The

No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize

a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or

for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts

cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition

for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the

The Ruling of the Court

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.

marriage void does not require relitigation under a

Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition

interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating

the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides

that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage

affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of

delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a

foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine

its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is

not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign

court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its

merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the

I.

judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must

determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with

party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."

The rule on limited review embodies the policy of

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment

domestic public policy and other mandatory

laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws

efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as

well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62

annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason

behind the petition is bigamy."48

relating to the status of a marriage where one of the

parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of

relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,

condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international
law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine

courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between
a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign

capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property

regime of the marriage.71

divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure

under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.

proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings

(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is

While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,

Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign

precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a

particular fact."67

divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26

of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a

divorce decree abroad.65

extends further to relational rights recognized under

Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in

Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot

"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply

prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous

any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil

status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can

prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court

the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the

marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of

judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and

25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of

bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as

married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the

Court.

personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the

entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the

II.

civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese

Family Court.

special proceeding for cancellation or correction of

entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the
Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108

the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In

any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves
this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue
to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.

supplied)

marriages are declared void from the beginning under

Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires

proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a

Property rights are already substantive rights protected

by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a

spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity
of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal

and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the

subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to

file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriage he contracted and the property relations

arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is

marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous

marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares

public record of his marriage. The interest derives from

the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve
68

(or dissolve, in limited instances ) his most intimate

human relation, but also to protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include
the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial

bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil

aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads
to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.

The prior spouse does not only share in the public

interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an

entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on

Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign

personally interested in the purely civil aspect of

protecting his marriage.

to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to

prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural

divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing

trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the

safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these

marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a

safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited

grounds for the dissolution of

Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a

divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and

children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino

spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine

the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of

the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct

law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the

legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26

action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage

is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the

which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino

spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after

jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts

Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for

obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino

spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The

cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry

may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only

authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a

corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words,

a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the

foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines

does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the

mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the

civil registry.

case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a

case for divorce.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction

or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective

measure to address the anomaly that results from a

Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has

no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action"
to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.

recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage

where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign

marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow

divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.

country. There is neither circumvention of the

substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under

The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to

the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry

Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts

under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment

under the laws of his or her country. The correction is

made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the

is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for

Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign

foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the

country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of

judgment, which presupposes a case which was already

tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in

Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts

decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a

recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to

recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous

Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her

own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is

violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real
party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage
in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the

foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a

marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who

obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the

ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition

are limited to the question of whether to extend the

effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying

a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution

abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of

bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article

foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage

involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts

for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal

Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a

26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign

spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the

only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino

party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in

bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of

criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised

marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his

or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized

Article 15 of the Civil Code.

Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised

Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of

in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated

the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)

bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from

the Philippine archipelago."

spouse cannot remarry.

whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an

overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to

repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no

longer sees the need to address the questions on venue

Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a

situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the

of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake

of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with

and the contents and form of the petition under Sections

4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.

Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family

public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,

Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the

Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to

extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the

foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that

Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does

not contravene domestic public policy. A critical

the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of

a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the

difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree

and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is

foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the

judgment serves as the basis for the correction or

that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is

fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed

cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition

of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is

SO ORDERED.

in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of

the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the

a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right

and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil

option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-

registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency

between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign

G.R. No. 133778

10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or

her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a

judgment and the public records in the

Philippines.1wphi1

foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without

prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide
on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated

31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad

Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID

NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on

September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from

assailing the validity of the second marriage

foundation of family life which shall be protected by the

State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage

herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting

in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months

after it was dissolved due to their father's

death. 1

as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law

considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime

thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and

respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners

commitment."

13

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have

filed the action to declare null and void their father's

However, there are several instances recognized by the

marriage to respondent before his death, applying by

analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates

Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,

one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring

the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review

to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived

together and exclusively with each other as husband and

with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage

of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was

wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five

years before the marriage. The rationale why no license

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance

void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed

under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of

with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state

is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties

to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant

the second marriage would affect petitioner's

successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on

the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in

the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated

the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since

they are not among the persons who could file an action

as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect

under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However,

for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the

Family Code.

upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the

dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of

Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition

The two marriages involved herein having been

solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code

after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,

obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the

Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of

action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is

their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite

of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article
8

58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is

the State's demonstration of its involvement and

already dead;

participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of

which the general public is interested. 9 This interest

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of

proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State

recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording

plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is

null and void ab initio;

protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social

institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the

with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a

valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners'
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs
to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation

wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively

with each other as husband and wife during the entire

order to notify the public that two persons are about to

be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or

present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of

five-year continuous period regardless of whether there

is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,

has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two

shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil

multiple marriages by the same person during the same

period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted

which impediment may have either disappeared or

intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Code provides:

during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and

void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons

or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.

The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have

lived together as husband and wife for five years without

having knowledge of any impediment to the

marriage to advice the local civil registrar

the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be

computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and

thereof. . . .

the contracting of two or more marriages and the having

of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,

wife" where the only missing factor is the special

contract of marriage to validate the union. In other

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged

bigamy and concubinage and adultery.

monogamy.

words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,

which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected

impediment to the marriage, the local civil

registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,

19

The law sanctions

examining persons under oath. . . .

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's

marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to

their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall

request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .

was dissolved to the time of his marriage with

respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with

as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.

The presumption that a man and a woman deporting

each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact

from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage

themselves as husband and wife is based on the

approximation of the requirements of the law. The

even where there was actual severance of the filial

companionship between the spouses cannot make any

parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply

with every single requirement and later use the same

cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as

being one as "husband and wife".

missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to

nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in

Having determined that the second marriage involved in

this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the

personality to file a petition to declare their father's

contrary, the property regime governing voidable

marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the

be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous

marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a

marriage void after his death?

children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based

only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of

Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to

petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The

petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond

between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous

reason, the law makes either the action or defense for

the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by

the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an

and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a

marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It

annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either

party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,

should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is

deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of

periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a

suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is

either extinguished nothing.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no

judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an

silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity

of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no

absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but

not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or

identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until

otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
22

valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is

imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties
of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the

judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the

nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require
a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though
no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained

imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either

party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground
for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution

of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be

material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,

between any parties at any time, whether before or

after the death of either or both the husband and the

Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered

wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such

marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-

REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt

existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage

which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct

SO ORDERED

proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties

so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329

March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)

impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40

of the Family Code expressly provides that there must

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,

vs.

(Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed

that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for

without any legal impediment to marry each

other. The contracting parties shall state the

JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,

Pangasinan, respondent.

being designed merely to harass him.

foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person

authorized by law to administer oaths. The

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment,

solemnizing officer shall also state under oath

that he ascertained the qualifications of the

R E S O L U T I O N

the Court Administrator recommended that respondent

Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a

repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting

parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage

more severely.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital

cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must

is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against

respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to

concur:

Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant

Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12

manifest whether they were willing to submit the case

for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.

reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint

and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the

the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of

the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly

Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of

that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties
were "separated."

unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction.

In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to

marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment
between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating

since their respective marriages had been marked by

constant quarrels, they had both left their families and

that they have lived together for at least five

years [and are without legal impediment to

had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses

anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of

marry each other]; and

those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in

question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn

Code.

Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was

legally married. What he knew was that the two had been

We find merit in the complaint.

living together as husband and wife for seven years

already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he

together as husband and wife for at least five

years before the marriage;

Payao expressly stated that they were married to

Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his

Comment that when he officiated the marriage between

their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known

that the late Manzano was married, he would have

1. The man and woman must have been living

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation

May 1999.

late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21

May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta

contracting parties and found no legal

impediment to the marriage.

statement that he had ascertained the

qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at

No license shall be necessary for the marriage

of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and

bar. It is significant to note that in their separate

affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to
before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior

existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was

indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And

marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no

one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule

Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had

their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and

1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the

embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the

couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the

It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with

the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law

marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to

push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,

transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to

know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating

that they had been living together as husband and wife

respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos

and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court

Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the

clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were

subscribed and sworn to before him.

MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed

upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.

of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,

administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband
and wife.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart
from their respective spouses for a long time already is

SO ORDERED.

immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows

spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation

G.R. No. 160172

to live separately from each other, but in such a case the

marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less

authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the

case at bar.

for at least five years. The couple got married on the

same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child

February 13, 2008

D E C I S I O N

named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth,

respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint

Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating

TINGA, J.:

Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent

alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the

that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for

seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1)

his child."4

cohabitation with another person for at least five years

does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance
of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous

Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the

petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that

latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to

financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent,

claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he

purpose.

was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the

marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant

state; and that he was not able to get parental advice

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts

in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied

from his parents before he got married. He also averred

that they never lived together as husband and wife and

for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil

that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court

ruled that the marriage between petitioner and

should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner

to support the child and his wife on the basis of the

the instant action for support. Citing several

authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can

respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without

a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the

marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by

petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of

be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no

necessity to institute another independent proceeding

natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her

support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of

the decision reads:

for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between

the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration

Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave

abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and
conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the
child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital

of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be

presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties,
would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner

own child.

Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,

is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1)

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the

declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the

legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee

rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a

judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the

and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995

between the appellant and the appellee valid

appellate court declared that the child was born during

the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In

until properly annulled by a competent court in a

proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court

required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor

addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners

refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity

against the appellant.8

General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the

petition.13

and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty

the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used
as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward

motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this

petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court
properly annulled his marriage with respondent because

by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is

the legitimate father of the child.

as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties,

the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license.

declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null

and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in
actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in
an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court

paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely

erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the

him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of

Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an

action for support, it was improper for the trial court to

claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with

respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs

He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a

marriage license, contained a false narration of facts,
the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should
never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally
argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant

petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the
findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues
that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being
subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
filiation.15

ordinary action for support and not an action for

annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals

In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had

jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage

erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court

to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and

since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in

respondent in the action for support. Citing the case

of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon

the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since

When such need arises, a final judgment of

declaration of nullity is necessary even if the

the right to support from petitioner hinges on the

existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence

purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on

the basis of a final judgment declaring such

presented during the proceedings in the trial court

showed that the marriage between petitioner and

previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the

Family Code connotes that such final judgment

respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,

and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have

need not be obtained only for purpose of

remarriage.20

lived together and exclusively with each other as

husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus,

Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a

mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement
for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21 the Court ruled

that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon

exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and

embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous

the validity of two marriages despite the main case being

a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held

cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to

the publication of every applicants name for a marriage

petitioner and thus entitled to support.18

that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage

even in a suit not directly instituted to question the

license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous

cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether

validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the

determination of the case. However, evidence must be

cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner

and respondent executed so they could push through

the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the

validity of the marriage between petitioner and

adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the

existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an

with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere

scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage

respondent in an action for support and second, whether

the child is the daughter of petitioner.

absolute nullity.22

license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a

marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

it concludes the trial court correctly held that the

marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of
the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the

essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage

void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is

petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled

marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity

of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus,

requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the

instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that

to support.

in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:

petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license

when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

However, other than for purposes of remarriage,

no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.

presented an affidavit stating that they had been living

together for more than five years.24 However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus
ATTY. CARPIO:

filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as

legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate
filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.28

Q
But despite of (sic) the fact that you have
not been living together as husband and wife for

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists

the last five years on or before March 13, 1995,

you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an

affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of

respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child,

thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA
TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque,
Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following
findings of the trial court:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose

and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The

in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision

of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in

marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In

lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a

JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is

hereby REINSTATED.

sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting

that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and

SO ORDERED.

that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband

and wife for at least five years.

G.R. No. 175581

March 28, 2008

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment

and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent

with the petitioner is supported not only by the

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He

contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no

testimony of the latter, but also by respondents

own admission in the course of his testimony

JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties;

that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that

wherein he conceded that petitioner was his

former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least

five years; and that his consent to the marriage was

he used to visit petitioner at the latters house

or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to

G.R. No. 179474

secured through fraud.

have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,

petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events

to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier

ruled. While respondent claims that he was

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house,

the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later,

merely forced to undergo the marriage

ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion

DECISION

reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C,"

"C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1"

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581

and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule

pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant

is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners
finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1"
and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
kissing the petitioner.31

which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he

was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately

Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City

Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her

45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the

Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively,
1

both challenging the Amended Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot
(Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City

Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so
that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told
him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her
brother who had learned about their relationship.