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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CHAPTER I – FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
(Police Power)
1.

Define:

police power—is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the State and its
people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
The basic purposes of police power are:
a.

to promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people;

(ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175 SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil.
85
b.
to promote and preserve public health; (VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21,
1987; DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 [NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, 50
Phil. 595—apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004
POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
Facts:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful examinees
in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the grades of the 79
Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the
two (2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the
examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools,
the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to
each other. The NBI Investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the
test questions.”
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of
Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21,
1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of immorality,
dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended that the test results of the Fatima
Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow the
respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same was
appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision.

Hence, this petition.
Held:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner.
However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with
certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of
Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a
license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to
be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.
c.
to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB
OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )
d.
e.

to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)
to protect public morals; (DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE

HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS.
VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
f.
11155)
a.

to promote the economic security of the people. (ichong vs. hernandez, 101 Phil.
Not a valid exercise of police power:
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC VS. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759; (6%)

b.
YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659; the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman if the
National Meat Commission “may dispose of the carabeef to charitable agencies as he may deem
fit”. This is oppressive and unreasonable since the owner is denied due process of law and he is
given so much discretion as the law is not complete in itself nor is there a standard to guide the
official.
c.
DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
power of eminent domain
power of taxation

2.

Differences and similarities

Didipio earth savers multi purpose association vs. denr sec. Elisea gozu, et al., 485 scra 586
Chico-Nazario, J.
1.

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn or to take

private property for public use upon payment of just compensation while police power is the
power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property without compensation;
2.

In the exercise of police power, enjoyment of a property is restricted because the

continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare. In such case, there is no compensable
taking provided none of the property interests is appropriated for the use or for the benefit of the
public. Otherwise, there should be compensable taking if it would result to public use.
3.

Properties condemned under police power are usually noxious or intended for noxious

purpose; hence , no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of
property, it need not always be the case. Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of
the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for
which the property was intended such as the establishment of an easement.
As such, an imposition of burden over a private property through easement (by the government) is
considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required. The determination of just
compensation, however, is a judicial function (EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305) and initial
determinations on just compensation by the executive department and Congress cannot prevail
over the court’s findings.
Finally, service contracts with foreign corporations is not prohibited under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution with foreign corporations or contractors would invest in and operate and manage
extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however,
safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.
3.

Limitations in the exercise of said powers

4.

Tests for a valid exercise of police power

a.
the interests of the public, not mere particular class, require the exercise of police
power; (LAWFUL SUBJECT)
b.
the means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive to individuals. (LAWFUL MEANS). In short, the end does not justify the
means.

On January. CHURCHILL VS. c. Iloilo for alleged violation of Executive Order No. 2. 260 SCRA 319 b. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of the said law shall be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to charitable institution and similar institutions as the Chairman of the National meat inspection Commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef.626. VELASCO VS. 580 e. HERNANDEZ. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. the Judge upheld the validity of the act of the Police Station Commander in confiscating the carabaos. however. No.000. confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo. YNOT VS. J. 24 Phil. 3. in the case of carabaos. That Section 1 of the said law provides that “henceforth. ILOILO ICE & COLD STORAGE VS. CA.00. 1983 h. 88 SCRA 195 j. 148 SCRA 659 RESTITUTO YNOT VS. US VS. Read: a. 101 Phil. RAFFERTY. 15 Phil. 46 Phil. POMAR. 626-A which prohibits the inter-provincial transporting of carabaos and carabeefs which does not comply with the provisions of Executive No. 13. Facts: 1. THE ITERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. After trial of the case. ICHONG VS. G. 85 g. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS.5.March 20. 4. MAYOR OF MANILA. The six carabaos. PEOPLE VS. were. 447 f. February 13. 1984. 1987 Cruz. 1155 d. VILLEGAS. EDU. no carabaos regardless of age.R. sex physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. and to deserving farmers through the dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry. TORIBIO. July 31. 74457. Ynot was ordered to returned the carabaos but since he . IAC. 1967. 471 i. Ynot transported six carabaos by using a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo. JMM Promotions vs. AGUSTIN VS. 32 Phil. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him upon the issuance of a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount of P12.

it has lawful subject. Was there an undue delegation of legislative power? Held: 1. Art. sex. This is so because under Section 5. providing that “no carabao regardless of age. Since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos except where they are at least 7 years old when male and at least 11 years old when female is in furtherance of the public interest since said carabaos are very useful to the work at the farm. 5. But does the law meets the second requisite or test which is lawful method? Executive Order No. May a lower court (like the MTC. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police power of the state. subject only to review by the supreme court. The court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the said Executive Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so and also because of its presumed validity. it is conceded that the Executive Order meets the first test—. revise. Was it a valid police power measure? b. While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional question. of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the power to “review. Is Executive Order No. VIII. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court where YNOT claimed that the penalty of confiscation is INVALID the same was imposed without according the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due process. it must meet two tests: a. 2. of the Court of Appeals) declare a law unconstitutional? 2. Issues: 1. THEY ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RESOLVING THE SAME WHENEVER WARRANTED.could not do so. the subject must be lawful. This simply means that lower courts may declare whether or not a law is constitutional. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of carabaos BUT ON THIER MOVEMENT. the means employed is lawful. 626-A constitutional? Sub-issues under this are: a. the court ordered the confiscation of the bond.[2(a)]. modify or affirm on appeal” or certiorari as the rules of court may provide. physical condition or purpose . and b. RTC. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said court upheld the decision of the Trial Court. reverse. final judgements and orders of the lower courts in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.

WORSE IS UNDULY OPPRESSIVE. THE CONFERMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (like the police) OF THE POWER TO ADJUDGE THE GUILT OF THE SUPPOSED OFFENDER IS A CLEAR ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS AND MILITATES AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATIION OF POWERS. DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED BECAUSE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IS DENIED THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN HIS DEFENSE AND IS IMMEDIATELY CONDEMNED AND PUNISHED. l. with no less difficulty in one province than in the other. Also. ET AL. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. then violation thereof should be pronounce not by the police BUT BY A COURT OF JUSTICE. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed any where. The law is unconstitutional because it struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard. k. AND ONLY AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED.J Facts: . WHICH ALONE WOULD HAVE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY. there is no reasonable guidelines or bases of the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the NATIONAL Meat Inspection Commission in the disposition of the carabaos or carabeef other than what “they may see fit” which is very dangerous and could result to opportunities for partiality and abuse. Since the Executive Order in question is a penal law. and even graft and corruption. C. there is undue delegation of legislative power to the officers mentioned therein (Director of Animal Industry and Head of the National Meat Commission) because they were given unlimited discretion in the distribution of the property confiscated. invalid and unconstitutional and not a valid police power measure because the METHOD EMPLOYED TO CONSERVE CARABAOS IS NOT REASONABLY NECESSARY TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AND. retaining a carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there.and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. JUINIO. 127 SCRA 329 Fernando. The Executive Order is. thus denying him the centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play. ALFREDO JUINIO. 119 SCRA 597 BAUTISTA VS. 127 SCRA 329 MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. Also. BOT. Obviously. therefore.” The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question measure is missing. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.

Monday morning. TC—Tourist Cars 2. and b. 3. 1979. The banning of H and EH vehicles is unfair. more specifically of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings. the latter must be given leeway. 2. Definitely. This is so because there is a valid classification in this case. public safety and general welfare. 39 imposing “the penalties of fine. The LOI denies the owners of H and EH vehicles of due process. Heavy and Extra-Heavy vehicles .1. The police power is intended to promote public health. President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 3. Motor vehicles of the following classifications are however. 4. outings on week-ends and holidays.m. CC—Consular Corps. the then Commissioner of Land Transportation. On May 31. ROMEO EDU issued Circular No. of the holiday to 5:00 a. and arbitrary and thus contravenes the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.m. In the interplay of Bautista’s right to due process and the exercise of police power by the State. 1979. The Circular violates the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power because the LOI does not impose the penalty of confiscation. exempted: 1. It was therefore a valid police power measure to ensures the country’s economy as a result of spiralling fuel prices.m. public morals. reunions. Saturday morning to 5:00 a. T—-Truck. DPL–Diplomatic. 869 prohibiting the use of private motor vehicles with H (Heavy Vehicles) and EH (Extra Heavy Vehicles) on week-ends and holidays from 12:00 a. and 5. On June 11. or 1:00 a. while those not included in the prohibition are enjoying unrestricted freedom. S—-service. HELD: 1. of the day after the holiday.m. 2. discriminatory. Bautista is questioning the constitutionality of the LOI and the Implementing Circular on the grounds that: a. It must be pointed out that the LOI was promulgated to solve the oil crisis which was besetting the country at that time. confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified found violating such letter of Instructions”. c. The petitioners’ claim that their right to equal protection was violated is without basis.

CASTANEDA. there is no violation of the equal protection clause. SAN DIEGO. 122 SCRA 759 Reference: Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. it is not valid being an “ultra vires”.consume more gasoline that the other kinds of vehicles and it is but proper to regulate the use of those which consumes more gasoline. m. ERICTA. 180 SCRA 533 o. Larry D. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM. September 21. 1987 5-a. If all the owner of H and EH vehicles are treated in the same fashion. Gacayan (2008) College of Law University of the Cordilleras . ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. or whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is held equally binding on the rest. DECS VS. The penalty of “impounding” the vehicle as embodied in Circular No. Not a valid exercise of police power CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. 175 SCRA 343 n. 3. Therefore. VILLANUEVA VS. 39 has no statutory basis.

Due process is a law which hears before it condemns.000. 126995. 921 Requisites: 1. 1998 IMELDA R. On June 8. After petitioner’s husband was deposed as President of the Philippines.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CHAPTER II— DUE PROCESS Section 1—NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE. it is to determine whether it has a valid governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular class. she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019. October 6. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it.1984. Kinds of Due Process: a. liberty or property. PALANCA. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.760. 1998 Purisima. IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS. 2. BANCO ESPANOL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN. 2. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial (Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE) 1. NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. b. . 3. G. No. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. Requisites of “judicial due process”. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. Facts: 1. IMELDA MARCOS VS. substantive due process—requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to life. 1984. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734. a. a. PAMARAN (the 1st case) b. J. 3.00 per month for 25 years. 37 Phil. 4. GALMAN VS. LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. MARCOS VS. as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102. In short. On June 27. SANDIGANBAYAN. Procedural due process—one which hears before it condemns as pointed out by Daniel Webster. October 6.R.

and b. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low. 9. On September 21. 2. 1..4. After trial . 1993. Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. however. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. was violated: a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation. the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102. CUERVO. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario. Thereafter. As such. 8. misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. Held: The petitioner is hereby acquitted.760. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES. both substantive and procedural.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law. 7. 1998. 6. 1993. the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading. On the same date. witness for the petitioner. On June 29. the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS.000.760. Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102. Said . On September 24. 5. Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 3 [g] of RA 3019. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.

the Second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. COMELEC G. On certiorari with the S. Romero. e. On July 23. having been made before the lapse of the 5 – day period of appeal. CA. the proclamation made by the Board of Canvasser was set aside as premature. CJ Narvasa. January 29. COMELEC. the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC. MATUGUINA VS. (NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected assemblyman of Antique. 4. 5. 1984. CA. 3. 6. Jr. 263 SCRA 490 PEOPLE VS. Davide.number of questions could no longer be described as “clarificatory questions”. September 22. 1984.) c. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. 144 SCRA 194 JAVIER VS.. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984. CA.C. On June 7. JAVIER VS.L. 1999 d. 262 SCRA 452 f. which the petitioner seasonably made.R. Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival.68379-812. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns. 1986 FACTS: 1. 2. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. On May 18. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court. DBP VS. No. ISSUE: . and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan “to allow the corrections of the perceived ‘irregularities’ in the proceedings below. Justices Regalado.

and even if Javier had already died in the meantime. consonant with Sec. Thus it said: “The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. which shall be heard and decided en banc. all other cases can be – in fact. Unless otherwise provided by law. not only for the vindication of the outraged right. The pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at the time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on elections. returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ? APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION: The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. 3. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa had already been abolished by the Aquino government. This was because of its desire for this case to serve as a guidance for the future. which provide: “Section 2. The issue at that stage was still administrative and could be resolved by a division. 2 and 3. should be – filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.” CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: Petitioner: The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to law. Justice demands that we act.Was the Second Division of the COMELEC. as in this case. authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. The two are not always the same.” . The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.” “Section 3.C. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared. though gone. All election casesa may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa. HELD: a. secs. The S. Respondents: Only “contests” need to be heard and decided en banc. There is a difference between “contests” and “cases” and also a difference between “preproclamation controversies” and “election protests”. then. XII-C.

78 SCRA 485 (respondent was not a party to the ejectment case) so to enforce the decision on her violates her right to due process of law k.b. These sections do not distinguish between “pre-proclamation” and “post-proclamation” contests nor between “cases” and “contests”. 2 and 3 of Art. AZUL VS. including those arising before the proclamation of the winners. concurring: All election contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under Secs. d. 94 SCRA 707 j. it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. LORENZANA VS. There was also a denial of due process. The word “contests” should not be given a restrictive meaning. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the election. whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. 119 SCRA 353 . the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office. returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. on the contrary. 133 SCRA 271 h. 94 SCRA 261 ANZALDO VS.C. AZURA. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such only because of Sec. As employed in the 1973 Constitution. e. XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. Commissioner Jose Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter related thereto. FELICIANO and MELENCIO-HERRERA. The S. The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution. PADERANGA VS. i. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. AQUILIZAN. He denied the motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. CAYETANO. made before or after the proclamation of the winner. One of the members of the Second Division. c. 136 SCRA 266 DAVID VS. CASTRO. CLAVE. The case should have been decided en banc. l. CA. The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. The 1973 Constitution could not have therefore been intended to have divided contests between pre and post proclamation when that Constitution was written in 1973. g. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 175 of the 1978 Election Code.

m.
n.
o.

SINGSON VS. NLRC, 273 SCRA 258
ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353
MAYOR ALONTE VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245
MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245

Vitug, J.
Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25, RTC of Laguna.
However, as a result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by the prosecution and granted
by the SC, his case was transferred to RTC Branch 53, Manila, presided over by the respondent
judge.
After the petitioner’s arraignment, the prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
signed by the private complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the
withdrawal of the case because she is no longer interested in pursuing the same with no
intention of re-filing the said case in the future.
Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for bail. The
same was not resolved despite several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve the same.
On December 17, 1997, counsel for the petitioner, ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN, received a
notice from the respondent judge notifying him of the promulgation of the decision in this
case despite the fact that the prosecution and the defense have not presented their evidence
in court.
On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of
rape and sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law.
Held:
In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given the right to
due process of law, the following requisites must be complied with before a decision is
rendered:
1.
the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the matter before it;
2.
that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
3.
4.

that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; and
that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. DAPITAN, 197 SCRA

378)
The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the petitioner the
right to adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due process of law.
The Decision rendered is NULL AND VOID for want of due process.
p.

DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999

2.

Procedural due process before administrative bodies

a.

a.

TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
Requisites:
the right to a hearing which includes the right to present evidence;

b.
c.

the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
the decision must have something to support itself;

d.
e.

the evidence must be substantial;
the decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing;

f.
facts;

the tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration of the law or

g.
the board or body shall in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved.
b.

AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. DIRECTOR, 67 SCRA 287

c.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA 531

d.

DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986

If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the trial (though he thought that he was a
lawyer), his right to due process was violated and therefore entitled to a new trial.
3.

Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students

Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacityas
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON
HIGHEREDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR,
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980,
December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University
(DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in
an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle,
when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his
two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their

dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and
confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his
testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble
or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.
“Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went out of the
campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross
Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him.
He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head
with something heavy in his hands – “parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were
behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were
also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted;
guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the
group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang
mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running
with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James
Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux
Fraternity,” while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival
fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint [2][7] with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints[3][8] were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente.
Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (ABBSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BSAPM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A.
Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written
complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

the Board acquits him of the charge. “[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion. In administrative cases. I SSUE Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them? H E L D: Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated. if desired. with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony. 1995. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. considering all the foregoing.m. you are further directed to provide the Board. 1995 at 9:00 a. On or before April 18. In the case of respondent MALVIN A. the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[5][18] finding private respondents guilty. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion. (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel.”[8][66] . PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227). private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19. 4. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 1995. the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (ABBSM/9152105).[7][20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE. and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. 1995. On May 3. During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28. ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of. [6][19]pursuant to CHED Order No. through the Discipline Office. at the Bro. such as investigations of students found violating school discipline. (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403).

essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary. No. 1986 FACTS: Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment.[9][67] Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY G.Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so.[12][70] A formal trial-type hearing is not. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they. The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the required permits. 9495-3-25121. 142 SCRA 706 GUZMAN VS. submitted their respective answers. he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. in fact.R. x x x an essential part thereof.” GUZMAN VS. the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. National University[15][73] where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. July 11. there is no denial of due process. NU.[10][68] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. Lastly. private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. or as applied to administrative proceedings. L-68288. and cross examination is not. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is [13][71] accorded. This argument was already rejected inGuzman v. Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.[14][72] Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. [11][69] So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course. HELD: . at all times and in all instances. the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. Moreover.

Under the Education Act of 1982. Philippine Maritime Institute. that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting due investigation. or violation of disciplinary regulations. b. conducted without prior permit from school authorities. EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency. But the S. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the school against the petitioners. 117 SCRA 581. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that: “* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof. c.a.” The petitioner were denied of this right. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.” d. b. students have the right “to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation. Of course. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of justice. It has already been held in Berina vs.C. the proceedings may be summary. In fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every private school. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students: a. all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. c. the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated “in activities within the university premises. and were being disciplined without due process. that disturbed or disrupted classes therein”. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process: . in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.

they shall have the right to answer the charges against them. CORDENILLO VS. MGG Marine Services vs. a. 263 SCRA 174 e. 276 SCRA 652 5.1. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES VS. with the assistance of counsel. NLRC. and 2. BERINA VS. 4. Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to violation of the right to due process a. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Philippine Savings Bank vs. 265 SCRA 788 f. they shall be informed of the evidence against them. 276 SCRA 635 b. 261 SCRA 409 c. STOLT-NIELSEN VS. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. NLRC. Hearing a. 261 SCRA 589 d. EXENEA. which provides that a respondent in an administrative case should be assisted by counsel in order that . whether the Civil Service Act or the Administrative Code of 1987. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. GARCIA VS. NLRC. NLRC. 1982 Due process in the dismissal of employees Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC 1. CASUELA VS. 264 SCRA 261 4. 3. SAMILLANO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. 282 SCRA 125 There is no law. 2. NLRC. RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS. Notice. 5. NLRC. 259 SCRA 664 b. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. NLRC. In administrative proceedings. does due process require that a party be assisted by counsel and be able to cross-examine the witnesses? LUMIQUED VS. PMI. September 30. 264 SCRA 307 g.

00. when in fact. 166809. whose office is located in San Fernando City. 1999 charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government vehicle. Accordingly. petitioner herein was given the opportunity several times to engage the services of a lawyer to assist him but he confidently informed the investigators that he could protect himself. Administrative Due Process ATTY. Pertinent portions of the formal charge read: 1. That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4. 99-1360 dated July 1. in order to receive the transportation allowance. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not use any government vehicle for the corresponding month. G. April 22. 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to petitioner.R. that. Erece is hereby formally charged with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Not only. ET AL. and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle. in order to collect transportation allowance. LYN MACALINGAY. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated October 2. preferably one of your lawyers.. that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle. he did. 2. as follows: ‘to regularize your receipt of the transportation allowance component of the RATA to which you are entitled monthly. the memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your name.’ 3. which is not true because he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.the proceedings therein is considered valid. you are hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff. The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has been prejudiced by the acts of Erece. Romeo L. when in fact he did. WHEREFORE. the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No. ROMEO ERECE VS. he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his Answer under oath and . That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office addressed to all Regional Human Rights Directors.000. After a fact-finding investigation. No. he still prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central Office that he cannot use the service vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive his transportation allowance. 2008 THE FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I. La Union. Respondent filed his answer denying the allegations against him.

Likewise. he is advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of his choice. he should indicate whether he elects a formal investigation or waives his right thereto. in view of the foregoing. Any Motion to Dismiss. Any of these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an Answer and shall be evaluated as such. the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. the CSC issued Resolution No. 2005. the CA upheld the CSC Resolution. 020124. On his Answer. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. which motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioner’s) objection. He stated that at his instance.[17][5] Hence. it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. but moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence. finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service. Respondents then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits. I S S U E: Petitioner raised the issue of violation of his right to due process because he was denied the right to cross-examine the respondents on their affidavit-complaint. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA. respondents did not present their evidence. Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first.affidavits of his witnesses. After he rested his case. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right. H e l d: Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to crossexamine his accusers and their witnesses. he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. 2002. still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses.[16][4] After a formal investigation of the case. In the Decision promulgated on January 7. to the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). this petition. dated January 24. . in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. request for clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be entertained by the Commission. if any.

[5][18] Id. drunkenness. [2][7] Id. the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. at 139-150. dishonesty. Thus. 77(c) provides that expulsion is “an extreme penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary. .[18][6] Velez v. hazing. . carrying deadly weapons. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. drug dependency. Gacayan (2008) College of Law University of the Cordilleras [1][1] College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System. Reference: Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. at 128-129. . and other serious school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel. De Vera[19][7] held: Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process” for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings. the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. preventing or . in certain proceedings of administrative character. . at 127. . at 130-133. hooliganism. [20][8] The dismissal of the petitioner from the government is valid. The penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct. instigating or leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in the stoppage of classes. .The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to crossexamine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. vandalism. there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana. The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. [6][19] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992). [3][8] Id. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. immorality. [4][9] Id. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter. Larry D. In administrative proceedings. Sec.

Bayron. 142 SCRA 699. 2004. 2006. 2004. [14][72] Batul v. v. 2004. 430 SCRA 353. July 11. 441 SCRA 277. [16][4] Id. G. Jr. No. [8][66] Guzman v. G. forging or tampering with school records or school forms. No. Court of Appeals. [12][70] Barza v. February 26. Bul-an.R.R. Inc. No. July 26. Velez v.C. Jr. A. G. 424 SCRA 26. [11][69] Valiao v. November 25. 157219.R. National Telecommunications Commission. 146621.R. July 25. Inc. 706-707.threatening any pupil or student or school personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties. [19][7] [20][8] Id. [17][5] [18][6] Id.. [13][71] Seastar Marine Services. 6697. 435 SCRA 110. Nos. G. at 706. 143964. forms and documents. . Dinglasan. Court of Appeals. Emphasis supplied. G. May 28. 2004. 496 SCRA 345. 435 SCRA 543.” [7][20] Rollo. and securing or using forged school records. G. National University.R. No. 136350. No.R. L-68288. 157687 & 158959. 151-153. 2004. v. De Vera. at 387-388. No. 444 SCRA 140. [9][67] Bautista v.R. 142609. pp. [10][68] Globe Telecom. [15][73] Supra note 66. October 25. G. at 34. at 35-36. July 30.. 2004. 1986. No.

of Agrarian reform. MELDA MARCOS VS. 95 SCRA 420 2. 12 a. It must be germane tot he purposes of the law. Association of Small Landowners vs. 301 SCRA 278 (There is real and substantial distinction between business inside the Subic Special Economic Zone and outside wherein those inside are exempt from other taxes as a result of the policy of the government to accelerate the development of the portion of Subic left by the Americans) 3. 56 2. There must be real and substantial distinctions. CA. July 14. and d. Cayat. Equal protection in generalRead: 1. The scope of the equal protection clause. October 7. 1994 The fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 6 years are to be suspended during the entire duration of the case unlike other government employees is valid . PEOPLE. Equal protection of the law. 68 Phil. Requisites for a valid classificationRead: 1. TIU VS. c. 1. 2. vs. Sec. 65 Phil. P. Vera. 1989 4. People vs. 13 SCRA 266 3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only. CA.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CHAPTER III – THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE …nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. It must apply equally to all members of the same class. b. 278 SCRA 843 4. Read again. HIMAGAN VS.

. 1. PANFILO LACSON VS. HON. 1999 2-b-1. HON. PETRON. WIGBERTO TANADA. MOBIL and SHELL. 1993 There is no valid distinction for a law removing the franking privilege of the judiciary while leaving the same to the Executive and Legislative despite the fact that there is considerable volume of mails from the courts. 37 SCRA 420 2-b. CALTEX. No. 1997. FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION vs. Director of Prisons. 2-A Gumabon vs. G. There were four (4) refining companies at that time. PUNO. BATAAN REFINING COMPANY and FILOIL MARKETING and six (6) petroleum marketing companies: ESSO. FRANCISCO VIRAY. Loss of revenue is not a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all government offices. 1991 No violation of the equal protection clause if Congress would legalize cock-fighting and horse racing since police power could regulate gambling. SHELL. New players were free to enter the oil market without any government interference. PAGCOR. November 5.since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. R. ENRIQUE GARCIA. 1997 EDCEL LAGMAN. 124360. no government agency was regulating the oil industry. FILOIL. FILIPINAS SHELL and CALTEX PHILIPPINES. May 14. Prior to 1971. J. JOKER ARROYO. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and for Other Purposes”. November 11. PRADO. These petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. G. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. SANDIGANBAYAN. GETTY. January 20.R. 127867. FRANCISCO TATAD vs. CALTEX. The facts: 1. RUBEN TORRES. RA 8180 seeks to end 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. No. BASCO VS. November 5.

Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. These are: CALTEX. 3. Pres. Marcos through section 8 of PD 1956 created the OIL PRICE STABILIZATION FUND (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by the exchange rate adjustments or increase of the world market prices crude oil and imported petroleum products. 1997. In March. By 1985. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8180 on the following grounds: a. transporting. The Board was empowered to “fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products and other related merchandise. 5.2. 1973. 7. 1997. IS STABLE. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in the title thereof. The law requires that the implementation of the regulation. Executive Order No. FILIPINAS SHELL and PNOC. there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market. 4. the country was driven to its knees by the crippling oil crisis and in order to remedy the same. 172 creating the ENERGY REULATORY BOARD to regulate the business of importing. shall as far as practicable be made at a time WHEN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD ARE DECLINING AND WHEN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE PESO IN RELATION TO THE US DOLLAR. Congress enacted RA 8180 deregulating the Oil Industry not later than March. marketing and distributing energy resources “WHEN WARRANTED AND ONLY WHEN PUBLIC NECESSITY REQUIRES”. 1996. exporting. refining. it runs counter to the objective of the law “to foster a truly competitive market”. shipping. On November 9. Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order No. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil and likewise bought controlling shares of the Bataan Refining Corporation. On February 8. Pres. 5 [b] providing for tariff differential violates Section 26 [1] of Art. The inclusion of Sec. b. In 1984. 6. 8. Thus. then President Marcos created the Philippine national Oil Corporation (PNOC) t break the control of the foreigners to the oil industry. 1987. PNOC then operated under the business name PETRON CORPORATION and for the first time. 372 was issued by President Fidel Ramos implementing full deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE OPSF FUND HAS BEEN DEPLETED. only three (3) oil companies were left operating in the country. . The imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the oil industry and even bars the entry of other players in the oil industry but instead effectively protects the interest of the oil companies with existing refineries. the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was enacted REGULATING the oil industry . In 1971. 9. processing. In May.

Section 15 of RA 8180 and EO No. Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to question the validity of the subject law and executive order. 1997. 8180. EO 392 implementing the full deregulation of the oil industry is unconstitutional since it is arbitrary and unreasonable since it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund. the rate for which shall be the same. d. Provided.” xxx “Section 15. and b. Whether or not the petitions raise justiciable controversy. Provided. combination in restraint of trade and unfair competition. that beginning on January 1. e. the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. . further. a condition which is not found in RA No.c. upon approval of the President. Implementation of full deregulation. 2004. except fuel oil and LPG. tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven (7%) percent.” The issues are: Procedural Issues: a. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the one title—one subject requirement of the Constitution. implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March. Pursuant to Section 5 [e] of RA 7638. 392 are unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy. the DOE. As far as practicable. that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. The provisions of the law being questioned as unconstitutional are Section 5 [b] and Section 15 which provide: “Section 5 [b] Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act. Substantive Issues: a. the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. Section 15 of RA 8180 is unconstitutional for it allows the formation of a de facto cartel among three existing oil companies in violation of the Constitution prohibiting against monopolies.

the Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title—one subject rule.b. d. As a policy. A law having a single . AND IN KEEPING WITH THE COURT’S DUTY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER BRANCHEDS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE KEPT THEMSELVES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT ABUSE THE DISCRETION GIVEN TO THEM. THE COURT HAS BRUSHED ASIDE TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE AND HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF THESE PETITIONS. Whether or not EO 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus.” There is no disagreement on the part of the parties as to the far-reaching importance of the validity of RA 8180. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASES TO THE PUBLIC. When the statute violates the Constitution. standing. however. it was held that: “Objections to taxpayer’s suit for lack of sufficient personality. have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. The question of locus standi must likewise fall . Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. INC. We have consistently ruled that the title need not mirror. there is no good sense in being hyper-technical on the standing of the petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution. in the main procedural matters. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle controversies involving rights but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or branch of the government. HELD: 1. it is not only the right of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. It is contended that Section 5[b[ of RA 8180 on tariff differentials violates the Constitutional prohibition requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not concur with this contention. or interest are . c. as guardians of the Constitution. 3. As held in KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS. VS. TAN. Whether section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power. and e. fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. 2. The courts.

general subject indicated in the title may contain a number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject. We hold that Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
4.
The contention that there is undue delegation of legislative power when it authorized
the President to determine when deregulation starts is without merit. The petitioners claim that
the phrases “as far as practicable”, “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and
“stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in
meaning and could not therefore provide the “determinate or determinable standards” which can
guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the oil industry. The power of Congress to
delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court in 1916 in the case of COMPANIA
GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINA VS. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS WHERE IT
WAS HELD THAT:
“The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law , which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter, no valid objection can be made.”
wo tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws
does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and
bounds of these tests in EASTERM SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power , viz: the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when
it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. BOTH TESTS ARE INTENDED TO
PREVENT A TOTAL TRANSFERENCE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE, WHO IS NOT
ALLOWED TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND EXERCISE A POWER ESSENTIALLY
LEGISLATIVE.”
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape
because such has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of
government. In fact, in HIRABAYASHI VS. UNITED STATES, the Supreme Court through Justice
ISAGANI CRUZ held that “even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, THE COURTS
WILL BEND BACKWARD TO LOCATE THE SAME ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE STATUTE; IF IT
CAN, FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY.”

5.

EO No. 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180 when it considered

the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF Fund. The misapplication of this extra factor
cannot be justified. The executive is bereft of any right to alter either by addition or subtraction
the standards set by RA 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the executive the power
to make laws would invite tyranny and to transgress the separation of powers. The exercise of
delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action
cannot infringe the terms of the agency.
6.

Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution provides:

“The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interests so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting of the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture
a particular article or control the sale or the whole market structure in which one or only a few
firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a combination in
restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of
contract, trust, pool, holding company, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition,
monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution
and price or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination
in restraint of trade refers to means while monopoly refers to the end.
Respondents aver that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in
refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic
supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also claim that the prohibition
against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants.
The validity of the assailed provisions of RA 8180 has to be decided in the light of the letter and
spirit of Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. While the Constitution embraced free enterprise
as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however,
be regulated in the public interest. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to
achieve the goals of our national economy as defined under Section 1, Art. XII of the Constitution
which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase
in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for all, especially the underprivileged.
It also calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair and trades practices.
The provisions on 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and inventory requirement blocks the
entry of other players and give undue advantage to the 3 oil companies resulting to monopolies or
unfair competition. This is so because it would take billions for new players to construct
refineries, and to have big inventories. This would effectively prevent new players.

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly (dominated by a handful of players) and a foreign oligopoly at that. As the dominant
players, SHELL, CALTEX & PETRON boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% works to their immense advantage. Yet, this is only one edge on tariff
differential. THE OTHER EDGE CUTS AND CUTS DEEP IN THE HEART OF THEIR COMPETITORS. IT
ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NE PLAYERS. New players in order to equalize must build their
refineries worth billions of pesos. Those without refineries had to compete with a higher cost of
4%.They will be competing on an uneven field.
The provision on inventory widens the advantage of PETRON, SHELL AND CALTEX against
prospective new players. The three (3) could easily comply with the inventory requirement in view
of their numerous storage facilities. Prospective competitors again find compliance oft his
requirement difficult because of prohibitive cost in constructing new storage facilities. The net
effect would be to effectively prohibit the entrance of new players.
Now comes the prohibition on predatory pricing or “selling or offering to sell any product at a
price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
the competitors”. According to HOVENKAMP:
“The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly
profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is
flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.”
Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement, the predatory pricing is a
significant barrier which discourage new players to enter the oil market thereby promoting unfair
competition, monopoly and restraint of trade which are prohibited by the Constitution.
Reference:
Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan (2008)
College of Law
University of the Cordilleras
________________________
2-d.LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
3. Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30,l982

119 SCRA 216 12. Bautista vs. 82 SCRA 30 13. UNIDO vs. Ormoc City. COMELEC. Puno.4. 104 SCRA 38 9. 151 SCRA 306 14. Flores vs. 111 SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar 10.127 SCRA 329 5. 22 SCRA 603 15. Villegas vs. Peralta vs. 95 SCRA 763 8. Sison vs. Nunez vs. 86 SCRA 270 7. Hawaiian-Phil. Ancheta. COMELEC. vs. COMELEC. Hiu. vs. 130 SCRA 654 11. Citizens Surety vs. Asociacion. Juinio. Dumlao vs. 95 SCRA 392 6. Ceniza vs. Co. 184 SCRA 484 . Sandiganbayan. COMELEC. Ormoc Sugar Co. COMELEC.

The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. any police or law enforcement personnel. 9372. It shall be the duty of the judge. notwithstanding. . Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest. who. to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her. The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall. among other things. houses. and taken into custody by the said police. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Sec. detained. Approved on March 6. or law enforcement personnel: Provided. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. 2007 and effective on July 15. That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 pf this Act. DELIVER SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from the moment said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested. before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism. to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the subject has been subjected to any physical. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Republic Act No.. WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CHAPTER IV – THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office. moral or psychological torture by whom and why. 18. present him or her before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night.

computers. Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism—even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be:    Detained under house arrest. assets. Sundays. shall be released immediately. city. suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal. to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. placements. Seizure and Sequestration. or after office hours. trust accounts. That where the arrest is made during Saturdays... moneys. Restricted from traveling. Section 19. and/or Prohibited from using any cellular phones. or judge of the municipal. The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph. provided.. association or group of persons. the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. and records in any bank or financial institution. businesses.Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned. or other means of communications with people outside their residence. to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:  To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit   terrorism. . regional trial court. however. supplies and other implements. transportation and communication equipment. Section 39. holidays or after office hours. If the arrest is made during Saturdays. That within three days after the detention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established. the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest.In the vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack. Provided. the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.The deposits and their outstanding balances. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack. Sundays or holidays. provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission.

transfer or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State. CA. Section 40. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is controlling PEOPLE VS. what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind. the seizure…shall be lifted by the investigating body or the competent court and restored to him without delay. sequestration and freezing. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason. sequestered. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation thereof.145 SCRA 739 b. The filing of an appeal or motion for reconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure. CJ In applying for a search warrant. As . Section 41. c. sequestered and frozen bank deposits…shall be deemed property held in trust by the bank or financial institution and that their use or disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are pending. The seized. 291 SCRA 400 Narvasa. however. The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed by his family including the services of his counsel and his family’s medical needs upon approval of the court. Essentials of a valid search warrant. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or his case dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court. AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. said seized. the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. and frozen in order to prevent their use.-shall be seized. The same was not. If convicted. sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically forfeited in favor of the government. Requisites of a valid search warrant Read: a.

288 SCRA 626 On December 13. P/Lt. She was carrying a traveling bag at that time.5 kilos of marijuana. The bag allegedly contained 8.such. d. When the accused got off. This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified in the search warrant—is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. but a clear case of a search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. PEOPLE VS. she was pointed to by the informer. it was not just a case of “obvious typographical error”. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer’s tip. NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action base don the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court. After trial. 1988. ARUTA. Issue: Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible in evidence. NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS. the policemen waited for a Victory Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo. IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURT—SUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING. near Rizal Ave. Held: Warrantless search is allowed in the following instances: . any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding. She was not acting suspiciously. As such. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF. she was convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment. Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court. As a result of the tip. She was arrested without a warrant.

In order that the information received by the police officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause. The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. seizure of evidence in plain view. search incidental to a lawful arrest. there was no legal basis for the police to effect a warrantless search of the accused’s bag. 5. and 6. it logically follows that the subsequent search is similarly illegal. the accused’s identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant should have been easy. consented searches. 3. The arresting officers do not have personal knowledge that the accused was committing a crime at that time. the accused was not acting suspiciously. 2. the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street Consequently. customs searches. it must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. searches of moving vehicle. so. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed to do b. d.1. there being no probable cause and the accused’s not having been legally arrested. however. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the conditionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. Since there was no valid warrantless arrest. stop and frisk measures. The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible as evidence for the following reasons: a. The arrest was made only after the accused was pointed to by the informant at a time when she was not doing anything suspicious. 4. This is so because if a . it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. c.

While there is indication that the informer knows the courier. 3. SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin of the Dasmarinas. they could have applied for a search warrant. The arrest was without warrant. PEOPLE VS. 1994. AMINNUDIN. Cavite. The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana based on the testimonies of the Above-named police officers without presenting the alleged informer. for being contrary to law. 2. Furthermore. ENCINADA. The informer likewise informed them that he could recognize said person. at about 2 p. the appellant was arrested by the abovenamed police officers while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a waiting shed in Salitran. At about 4 in the morning of June 20. and an arrest effected based on the evidence produced by the search. The said contention is without merit considering that the information given by the informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. warrantless search is allowed in the following instances: 1. upon being pointed to by the informer. and PEOPLE VS. searches of moving vehicle.. Dasmarinas. 284 SCRA 703 On June 19. 1994 and therefore. Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER that a drug courier would be arriving in Barangay Salitran. Dasmarinas. . Cavite. seizure of evidence in plain view. from Baguio City. MONTILLA. This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS.m. the police could not have secured a warrant from a judge. the records do not show that he knew his name. both such search and arrest would be unlawful. On bare information.search is first undertaken. customs searches. 1994. Issue: Was the warrantless arrest valid? Held: The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal because the alleged information was received by the police on June 19. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. with an undetermined amount of marijuana.

MENGOTE. 163 SCRA 402. and 6.4. On Appeal. upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier. (PEOPLE VS. October 2. search incidental to a lawful arrest. ENCINADA. The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court considering the fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable one who had supplied similar information to the police in the past which proved positive. the policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the same and upon cursory inspection. In the case at bar. consented searches. In short. Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana. An arresting officer has the right to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons. The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and cartoon which should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing a crime. Hence the arrest. Encimada where the appellant was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an informer received by the police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. 5. the subsequent search on his person is justified. stop and frisk measures. there was no probable cause for these policemen to think that he was committing a crime. AMINNUDIN. PEOPLE VS. the SC reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police. . He is merely a corroborative witness to the arresting officers. The search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. 144 SCRA 1. it was found out that it contains marijuana. 220 SCRA). and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. 1997. ) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To say that “reliable tips” from informers constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. PEOPLE VS. The case is similar to the case of People vs. (NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect the case for the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. PEOPLE VS. BURGOS.

000.June 19.1967 . ET AL. Stonehill vs. that the person involved had knowledge. There must be proof of the following: a. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure. Are the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure? Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. the residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. the waiver must be made voluntarily. 2004 Right against unreasonable searches and seizures. MATILLANO. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. b. VS. of the existence of said right. Diokno. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA. either constructive or actual. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be valid. General or roving warrants Read: 1. they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. that the right exists.00 owned by the employer.ELI LUI. Finally. e. In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. c. May 27. Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search. Thereafter. The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs.

As to the searches made on their offices. The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers. to wit: “Books of accounts. TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS BELONG. AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY. journals. b. CONSEQUENTLY. warehouses and to seize and take possession of the following personal property. The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the Constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that: a. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized.J. directing the peace officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices. correspondence. Issue: Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the petitioners valid? a. PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS. e. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against them. TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner. THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD PARTIES. balance sheets and profit and loss statements” since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK LAWS. C. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE. books and things to be seized. receipts. they could not question the same in their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and distinct with its officers. vouchers. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a manner provided for by law. financial records. . ledgers. d. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents. typewriters and other documents or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts. c.Concepcion.

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANTS TO HAVE FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. Ruiz. “A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more than one specific offense like one for estafa. Marcos. tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid) 6. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners. Dizon vs. July 14. FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETENT PROOF THAT THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS SOUGHT HAS PERFORMED PARTICULAR ACTS. IN OTHER WORDS. Bache vs. AS A CONSEQUENCE. 1995. Viduya vs. 73 SCRA 553 8. the same may not be used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the nature of a general warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that: 1. OR COMMITTED SPECIFIC OMISSIONS. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause.b. theft and qualified theft”) f. Define probable cause. 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa. PEOPLE. VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF OUR CRIMINAL LAWS. April 12. Villaluz. 2. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Who determines probable cause? . People vs. April 30. NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED IN SAID APPLICATIONS. Tariff and Customs Laws. Secretary vs. robbery. CA. Castro. Asian Surety vs. TAMBASEN VS. 48 Phil. 216 SCRA 101. THE AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WEREABSTRACT. falsification. June 18. 76 SCRA 301 4. PEOPLE VS.1976 7. 37 SCRA 823 3. Pabalan. Collector vs. Verdiago. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision. Herrera. 1985 9. 169 1. Internal revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central bank Laws. and 2. Castro vs. Veloso.l976 5.

a motion for change of venue. FELIX (G. Sr. a warrant of arrest was issued on July 31. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati. 99054-57) EN BANC GUTIERREZ. Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. JR. 254 SCRA 307 b. filed by the petitioners was granted by the SC. designated to review the case. with three others. 247 SCRA 85 VICENTE LIM. On September 22. After conducting a preliminary investigation. They were initially charged. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of initial records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate.a. and three of his security escorts and the wounding of another. These motions were however denied by the court because the prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause.SR. ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists? . Thereafter. N. 1989. Facts: Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman Moises Espinosa. CA.R. informations were complete in form in substance . MONTESA. J. Bail was fixed at P200. and there was no defect on its face. Fiscal Alfane.000. 1989. DE LOS SANTOS VS. with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. issued a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of Murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects. four separate informations to that effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended. 1989. NO. ROBERTS VS. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM VS. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s certification in each information. On November 21.HON.

3. Abbas. Inting reiterates the following doctrines: (1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge.S vs. However. This has been the rule since U. on the basis thereof. If on the face of information. the prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor’s present to him. decided under the 1987 Constitution.Held: 1. Villanueva. The case of People vs. 2. This decision interpreted the “search and seizure” provision of the 1973 Constitution. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. Under this provision. Only the judge alone makes this detemination. (2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause. In the case of Soliven vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of order of arrest. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. . he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Following established doctrine and procedures. issue a warrant of arrest. the Court noted that the addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Makasiar. he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination. the transcripts of stenographic notes. By itself. the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof. issue a warrant of arrest. It is the report. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. Honorable Enrique B. In the case of Placer vs. the judge finds no probable cause. the affidavits.

he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. 5. Considering that all the records of the investigation are in Masbate. effective on January 1. CA. Quintero vs. 164 SCRA 655 1-b. CA. 1989 SOLIVEN VS. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. In the present case. Nov. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. GR No. 1. 1985. 16. As such. March 16. Pendon vs. Villaluz. CA. 98 Phil. Although the judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same functions as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification.(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation proper. 4. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or deposition of the complainant and his witnesses. 83578. All of these should be before the judge. 20th Century Fox vs. the court ruled that judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. NBI. He could not have possibly known what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. 4. 167 SCRA 393 The word “personally” after the word determined does not necessarily mean that the judge should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. 739 1-a. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. 1990 . there is no need to examine the complainant and his witnesses face to face. The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. In the case of Castillo vs. 162 SCRA 467 1-c. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied. MAKASIAR. The determination was made by the provincial prosecutor. the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor. Abbas. Amarga vs. the latter ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. 1-e.

July 25. vs.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. July 9.NO. Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Villanueva.. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave. Geronimo vs. 155 SCRA 486 1. P. Olaes vs. P. Villaluz. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR. Villanueva. Placer vs. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in the day by Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator Enrile.. Branch 103. Ramos. 1990. warrant of arrest (Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law) Narvasa.1-f. GR No. NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION AND NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST. On February 27. Gatan. 1991 1-h. Drilon. April 19.. 136 SCRA 435 7. 1990. 85289. 1990 Due process. 74 SCRA 226 5. WITHOUT BAIL. right to bail. Inting. 1990 with the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in November. 92163. Ramos. Department of Health vs. vs. 110 SCRA 465 2-b.July 27. J. February 20. Regional trial Court. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio. Umil vs. ET AL. 1991 2. 1989 2-a. and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10. Cruz vs. et al.R. P. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge.1987 4.. Sy Chi Siong. 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to determine probable insofar as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is concerned) 3. Manila. 9010941. Paderanga vs. Tolentino vs. HON. G. 1990 1-g. Inc. . June 5. JAIME SALAZAR..

142-A which sought to nullify if not repealed the Hernandez Doctrine. In view of the majority. petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being. This is so because of the fact that the incumbent President (exercising legislative powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution) repealed PD No. or as necessary means for the commission. 942 which added a new provision of the Revised Penal Code. particularly Art. On the first option. On the second option. 1. whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. . Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Montemayor that “rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes”. 1990. he was denied due process. HELD: The parties’ oral and written arguments presented the following options: 1. BUT NOT TO ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A REBELLION WHICH ALSO CONSTITUTE COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE CHARACTER. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition. of rebellion. b. Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance. c.On February 28. 11 justices voted AGAINST abandoning Hernandez. denied the right to bail. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course. Two members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 3. 2. the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated the Hernandez as a binding doctrine with the effect of law. In thus acting. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW. absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing. and d. the Supreme Court was unanimous in voting to reject the same though four justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is not entirely devoid of merit. hence. ITS SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES AND NO NEW ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL. 2. or having been: a. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted.

THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT. Section 2. IF WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. . it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. OR COULD NOT HAVE. With the rejection of the first two options. the petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. in violation of Art. the Hernandez Doctrine remains a binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. either as a means necessary to its commission or as unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. III. GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner was filed by the NBI Director and that based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the questioned information. On the issues raised by the petitioner: a. c. WHILE TECHNICALLY CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED THAT REBELLION MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF. the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION. NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED. SO COMPLIED. The petitioner’s contention that he was charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books. Read in the context of Hernandez. b. that indictment is to be read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. This Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination.3. MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY . By a vote of 11-3. of the Constitution. the Court ruled that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Also. MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC.

AND EVEN THEN. In the light of the Court’s affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner’s case. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. NOTES: This might be useful also in your Remedial Law. 1992. June. Is “Operation Kapkap” valid? Read: PEOPLE VS. 1987. MENGOTE. No. the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd. NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE. . 87059. Even assuming that the petitioner’s premise that the information charges a non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before conviction. Facts: 1. g. The correct course was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail. Manila. Under either hypothesis. ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED. THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT PROPOSITION. Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge is the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. in Tondo. On August 8..R. 210 scra 174 Warrantless search and seizure Cruz. claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. J. Warrantless searches and seizures–when valid or not. the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent judge.d. G.

Section 3 [2]. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Issue: Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure? Held: There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. Arrest without warrant.A peace officer or private person may.. Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. is actually committing. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Justice Learned Hand that “only in case the prosecution.” Section 5. a . or is attempting to commit an offense. they saw the accused “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. arrest a person: (a) When. After trial. in his presence. without warrant.38 cal. 5. when lawful. the person to be arrested has committed. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from the accused and several days later. After their arrest. 3. an information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against him. which itself controls the seizing officials.2. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced to sufferreclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence. of the Constitution. 4. x x x . Hence this automatic appeal. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. When the surveilance team arrived therein. They approched these persons and identified themselves as policement that is why they tried to ran away because of the other lawmen. knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed. they were unable to escape. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III.

And the setting of the arrest made them less so.” according to the arresting officers themselves. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie presence. At the time of the arrest in question. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. like a darkened alley at 3 o’clock in the morning. Par. if at all.We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we we can agree with the prosecution. as the prosecution suggests. all of them innoent. the accused-appellant was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen. These are certainly not sinister acts. it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. xxx The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers’ suspicion other than Mengote’s darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen.He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun. The question is. The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote’s acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that accused-appellant had committed it”. there could have been a number of reasons. It might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place where he had no reason to be. What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and in aplace not exactly forsaken. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. By no stretch of the . But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers. (b) of this Section. why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding his abdomen. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. (a) or Par. Par. (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. On the other hand.

151 SCRA 279. the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote’s identity. He was not even acting suspiciously. it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. however. Section 5. or just committed. the officer arresting a person who has just committed. In short. and about a crime that had yet to bem committed. xxx Before these events. This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. what was that crime? There . AMMINUIDIN. Burgos. let alone the fact that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan’s house. (SAYO vs. xxx In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b). This was effected while he was coming down the vessel. thus: If the arrest was made under Rule 113. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote’s arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. 80 Phil.imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed.. or was actually being committed. as the prosecution incorrectly suggested. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. or is about to commit an offense must have personalknowledge of that fact. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. 859). of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed. there was no probable cause that. being committed. or was at least being attempted in their presence. He had not committed nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. 163 SCRA 402 where the Court held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. Par. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. This is similar to PEOPLE vs. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant. is committing. 144 SCRA 1. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. this Court declared: Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113. CHIEF OF POLICE. In the landmark case of People vs. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. Castro.

it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it. no personal knowledge of the arresting officer PEOPLE VS. Burgos. the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act is actually committing or attempting it. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE . Parenthetically. the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accusedappellant when the latter was taken into custody. When illegal arrest is deemed waived. it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113. indeed. Indeed. ironically enough. It would be a sad day. xxx The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. However. by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment. they allowed their over zealousness to get the better of them. even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache. the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or. personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be justified in the name of security. worse. The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had invalidly seized. J. Warrantless arrest. GALVEZ. if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen. because. As it happened. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime. Section 5(b). This should be a lesson to other peace officers. 355 SCRA 246 Mendoza. escaping the clutches of the law. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted. his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.is no allegation in the record of such a falsification.

when it is not valid) Read: 1. security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana. INC. g-1. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. dollar smuggling. and prostitution. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL.PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA. OTHERWISE. the Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an illegal search. 301 SCRA 66 Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals 2. THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance. After their acquittal. ET AL.. MENDOZA. PEOPLE VS. In the morning of January 11. VS. Held: . An information for violation of the dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents. Once inside the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. 32 of the Civil Code. 1988. After trial. while the respondent union officer was opening the Union Office. the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner for violation of Art. ROGELIO SOLUTA. Issue: Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is valid. 482 SCRA 660 Carpio-Morales. (Valid since the constitutional provision is not applicable to him. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. J.

is admissible. 81561. also revealed bricks or caselike marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively. If indeed there was surveillance made. the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the State. he told them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his office. co-owner and husband of Anita opened the boxes for final inspection. The ruling in People vs. he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box.The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. Switzerland. Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI. allegedly in violation of one’s constitutional rights may be invoked against the State. Marti refused. The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. In the presence of the NBI agents. Job Reyes. Upon further perusal. NO. then they should have applied for a search warrant. Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich. Upon opening.R. January 18. following standard operating procedure. the issue was whether an act of a private individual. The alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of the union officers and without a search warrant. owner of the place (no relation to Shirley). ANDRE MARTI G. 1991 Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person Bidin. J. Anita Reyes. a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to contain gloves. Two other boxes. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. However later. FACTS: Andre Marti and his common-law wife. Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti. 3. before delivering it to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts. 32 of the Civil Code. In other words. a criminal case. received said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it. .

state (429 s. the constitutional provision against unreasomable searches and seizure was intended as a restraint upon the activities of the sovereign authority and NOT intended against private persons. in US cases. He opened the packages and took the samples to NBI. cases cited: Burdeau v.S. The Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused Marti of violatingsec. the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. the evidence from therein is admissible evidence. Art.2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United States constitution. on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Barnes v. Chadwick v. state v. (U. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921]. In short. Since Art. Hence.21(b) of said RA. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the constitution. the SC may consider US Fed. Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search. 2. likewise applies only to the government and its agencies and not to private persons. No. state (329 sw 2d 135). Walker v. If a search was initiated by a private person the provision does not apply since it only proscribes government action. since the search was valid. III. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. ISSUES: 1.w 2d 121 [1969]). constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only against the state and not to private persons.Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the dried leaves. Yes. VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE: . Was the evidence procured from the search admissible? Held: 1. Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968]. Did the search conducted by a private person. us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]). Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. This view is supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. SC cases as likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction. violate accused’s right against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state? 2.III [2].

251 SCRA 660 c. can be used as evidence against the accused. 256 SCRA 539 d. No warrant is necessary in such a situation. 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest must be done at the place where the accused is arrested. NOLASCO VS. Search made incidental to a valid arrest a. he may be arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. LUA. without a search warrant in accordance with Section 12. US. there is no valid search incidental to a valid arrest if she will be brought to her residence and thereafter search the said place) f. 439 b. he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. PEOPLE VS. PANO. As such. As a consequence of the accused’s valid warrantless arrest inside the nightclub. Search of moving vehicles a. As such. if accused was arrested while inside a jeepney. 2. it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in the street during a buybust operation. of a drug paraphernalia and shabu. Moreno vs.1. Rule 126. no search warrant is necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm. the items do not fall under the exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms. Figueroa. PEOPLE VS. the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the Police Station after his warrantless arrest) . PEOPLE VS. CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. the search of his house nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid arrest) PEOPLE VS. GO. CA. 267 US 132 . Ago Chi. Carrol vs. 12 Phil. ESPANO VS. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. 248 SCRA 679 e. drug paraphernalia and the shabu. ANG CHUN KIT. In fact. 354 SCRA 338 Where the gun tucked in a person’s waist is plainly visible to the police.

R. PEOPLE VS. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to Manila. the two proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland China. Since the bags were not closely examined. the later turning out to be Tia’s intended companion. PEOPLE VS. Tia telephoned Capt. while the other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter. he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates. Palmera that they would return to the Philippines on October 6. 257 SCRA 430 d. et al. From Hongkong.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for examination. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4. CFI. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the . Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. As an agent. 1987. the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing). PEOPLE VS. appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea. the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs. customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of tea. they recruited confidential men and “deep penetration agents” under OPLAN SHARON 887. CAPTAIN PALMERA.b. In Manila. 88017) January 21. (G. they went to Lo Ho Wing’s room and he saw two other men with him. head of oplan sharon 887. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. 193 SCRA 122 FACTS: In July 1987. LO HO WING. No. They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Later. PEOPLE VS. appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. 101 SCRA 86 e. CA. To infiltrate the crime syndicate. One was fixing the tea bags. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. 1991 c. There. MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401 f. That evening. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). LO HO WING. in turned informed the Dan gerous Drugs Board of Tia’s activities. Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. The next day en route to Manila.

3. A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile. To stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scot-free. Sgt. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas around the airport. Meamwhile. ISSUES: 1.airport and loaded their luggage in the taxi’s compartment. the CIS car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia . Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25.000 each. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug. 22 SCRA 857 . a team composed by Capt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence? HELD: 1. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning. III. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. The CIS team asked permission to search their luggage. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties were in their favor. Since the search and seizure are valid. 2. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid) a. The CIS team asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi. Mago. the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape. Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. sec. he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. they were later captured. the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in any proceeding. Papa vs. However. Along Imelda Avenue. The three suspects were indicted for violating Art. Was the warrantless search valid? 2.

QUE. 65 SCRA 336 c. VEROY VS. 188 SCRA 288 c. 65 Phil. LESANGIN. HIZON VS. 265 SCRA 517 d.b. DAMASO. 265 SCRA 721 4. Mengote. PEOPLE VS. Commissioner. they instead seized an unlicensed firearm. June. De Garcia vs. 1997. Harris vs. 210 SCRA 97. PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid waiver to a warrantless search. 1992 b. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent. Locsin. an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The search is valid) . there is no consent to a warrantless search) 6. 252 SCRA 135 d. Lopez vs. 390 US 234 b. As the policemen ran after them. 56 SCRA 16 c. 689 b. PEOPLE. US. STOP AND FRISK. Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned) d. Seize of evidence in plain view a. POSADAS. Pamaran. PEOPLE VS. a. VELOSO. CA. Example: The landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. a. PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. 212 SCRA 547 c. (The policemen saw several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near them. 252 SCRA 213 5. LAYAGUE. (If the owner of the house allowed the policemen to enter his house because they are searching for rebel soldiers but when inside the house. the waiver or consent should be given by the person affected. Pacis vs. not just anybody. Said tenant himself should give the consent in order to be valid. DAMASO. The doctrine in Lopez vs. October 9. People vs. MANALILI VS.

the residents are herded like cows at the point of high powered guns. ET AL. 283 SCRA 159.. the other military men conduct search and seizures to each and every house without civilian witnesses from the neighbors. Jr. Most of them are in civilian clothes and w/o nameplates or identification cards. ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks. January 30.d. 80508. 17 of the Constitution which provides: The respondents would want to justify said military operation on the following constitutional provisions: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary. that the raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their homes. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA. (Mere suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless arrest) 6. invasion or rebellion xxxxxx . in the dead of the night or early morning hours. The 41 petitioners claim that the saturation drives conducted by the military is in violation of their human rights because with no specific target house in mind. “zonings” and “saturation drives” Section 17. EDDIE GUAZON. police and military officers without any search warrant cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay. Art. MAJ. J. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. kicking their doors open (destroying some) and ordering the residents to come out. VS. VII of the Constitution Gutierrez. Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military and police officers from conducting “Areal target zonings” or “saturation drive” in Metro Manila particularly in places where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. ET AL. The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives under Art. MALACAT VS. 1990 Warrantless searches. VII. CA. Sec. that while examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted. GR NO.. shouting. some victims complained that their money and other valuables were lost as a result of these illegal operations.

the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated. The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights. However. ALBA. 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. JIMENEZ. California. the remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged. Lozada was in fact an aberration. Padilla and Sarmiento. DEMETRIA VS. all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. TOLENTINO VS. 603. ******************** Cruz. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are constitutional questions that must be met (RODRIGUEZ VS. 35 SCRA 481. EDU VS. 342 US 165). CA. COMELEC. In the meantime. GONZALES VS. Court of Appeals. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations so that the erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted. 154 SCRA 199. The government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left.The President shall have control of all the executive departments. Gonzales. III. However. rising lawlessness and alarming communist activities. This is so because Art. If the military wants to flush out subversive and criminal elements. COMELEC.148 SCRA 208). GELLA. it must be pointed out that police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend one’s sense of justice (Rochin vs. Dissenting The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction. including the essential and legitimate ones. PHILCONSA VS. 41 SCRA 702. Also. 164 SCRA 655. nowhere in the Constitution can we see a provision which prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering the military to stop unabated criminality. However. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions. The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila. . 92 PHIL. . The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. 27 SCRA 835. Held: There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances. bureaus and offices. LAGUNZAD VS. It is basically for the executive department and the trial courts. Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs. the police action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly violative of the Bill of Rights. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. 65 SCRA 479. JJ. ERICTA. the same must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of the people.

FIDEL RAMOS. Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. DAYRIT. Manila & People of the Philippines. RTC 33. 1988 (No because a warrant is issued in order to have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused and to assure the court of his presence whenever his case is called in court. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. September 26. Section 2. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. FELICITAS SESE VS. must he issue a warrant of arrest as a matter of course? See the distinctions.Where liberty is involved. December 14. 82870. and companion cases. 1989 (En Banc) . No. 81567. then he may not issue said warrant. Art. the Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground. Note: This case involves a minor offense) 2. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. THEY COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should instead categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be stopped immediately. 7. 300 SCRA 265. Searching questions Read: DR. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR DURAL. July 9. While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the insurgents. 1990 (An NPA may be arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a hospital because his being a communist rebel is a continuing crime) h. If the judge finds that there’s probable cause. As such. if the court believes that the presence of the accused could be had even without a warrant of arrest. G. GOZO VS. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL. THE HON. TAC-AN. Salvani. If the offense committed is a serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder. GR No. every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited. It is not only the owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen. SAmulde vs.R. ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. Read: 1. ET AL. the Judge must issue a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of probable cause) i.

an application for the issuance of a Search Warrant for violation of PD 1866 against the petitioner. Florencio Angeles executed a “Deposition of Witness dated October 31. Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. requirements/requisites of a valid search warrant. 2. Ricardo Abando. searching questions Padilla. P/Major Dimagmaliw alleged that: “1. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x “. presided by the respondent Judge. the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant on the grounds that: a. “2. 4. Prudente’s office a bulging brown envelope with three live fragmentation hand grenades separately with old newspapers. Branch 33. 3. In his application for search warrant. hand grenades and ammunition intended to be used as the means of committing an offense x x x. a member of the searching team executed an affidavit alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. explosives. a Sunday and All Saints Day. 5. 1987 .Search and seizure. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines x x x has in his control or possession firearms. 1987. Facts: 1. On November 1. On November 2. Angeles had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers. On October 31. P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw. 1987. Lt. In support of said application. P/Lt. 1987. the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col. 87-14 as well as its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. . 1987. Edgar Dula Torre and Major Maganto. b. On November 6. the complainant’s lone witness. J. This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent Judge DENYING the motion of the petitioner to quash Search Warrant No.

and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. US VS. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. SY JUCO. the same judge denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. and d. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched”. which is to be determined by the judge. . It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant. Issue: Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there probable cause? Held: a. June 23. On March 9. 6. they “gathered information’s from verified sources” that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not licensed t possess them. The “probable cause” for a valid search warrant. In his affidavit. on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 667. ADDISON. the search warrant was a general warrant. has been defined “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. 1988. 33. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous surveillance for several days. For a valid search warrant to issue. 64 PHIL. Hence this petition. CFI. 28 PHIL. before issuing the warrant. 566). This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. NBI. the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and on April 20. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and that he “has verified the report and found it to be a fact.c. (Quintero vs. Major Dimagmaliw declared that “he has been informed” that Nemesio Prudente “has in his control and possession” the firearms and explosivees described therein.” On the other hand. (P. Lt. 64 PHIL. but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must. 1988). 1986. there must be probable cause. for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense. VS. in writing and under oath. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. ALVAREZ VS.

Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. vis-a-vis the said applicant. The rule is. not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable. In ALVAREZ VS. it was held that the following test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not“The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended (P VS. but there were none. c. On the contrary. The examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. NBI. Gonzales. “the questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of Court. the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple “yes” or “no” answer. June 23. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers.” The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as enunciated in earlier cases. do not come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant. 145 SCRA 694. whether searching or not. VELOSO. Besides. the allegation of the witness.” Tested by the above standards. 1988. YET THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. In fact. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge because as shown by the record. Lt. 48 . As held in Roan vs. his questions were too brief and short and did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Angeles. CFI. this requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that “he verified the information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact.” b. 33. the records yield no questions and answers. 64 PHIL. True. As held in Quintero vs. “mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient.

De Mulata vs.PHIL. Chief of Staff. d. Bayona. 33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge from an informant. HUBERT WEBB VS. There is also no violation of the “one specific offense” requirement considering that the application for a search warrant explicitly described the offense: illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD 1866. P. CFI. P. Siochi. 247 SCRA 650 Read also: 1. departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of the search warrant provided the constitutional requirements are complied with. 180). 104 SCRA 423 5. Roan vs. Plaza. more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the Office of the President.1988 . 147 SCRA 509 9. Lising. Burgos. Gonzales. vs. In the case at bar. July 6. 26 SCRA 313 3. CIRCULAR NO. September 14. vs. DE LEON. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a guideline. 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and witnesses should be attached to the record of the case) 7. Mata vs. Irizari. 62 SCRA 210 4. Nolasco vs Pano. a. Burgos vs. Marinas vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni. Corro vs. 145 687 6. Nemesio Prudente. 64 Phil. Alvarez vs. 133 SCRA 800 10. the same is not valid) 2. 137 SCRA 541 8.1986 11. the warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of the PUP. Luna vs.

Metro Manila. On July 9. July 31. J. Aberca vs. mere conclusions of law. 1988 at dawn. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. the apprehensions of the residents of Valenzuela increased because Benjamin Parpon. 1987. the residents of Valenzuela.12. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. (When the questions asked to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed. . GEN RENATO DE VILLA. Read: 1. Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints. and not positive statements of particular acts. Ver. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela.1988 2. Warrantless searches and seizures–when valid or not. CA. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. MM are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. GR No. the supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by the military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of several warning shots fired in the air. On January 20. the warrant is not valid) 13. Panganiban vs. September 29.1987 (When the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities. November 16. 159 SCRA 599 3. Ignalaga. the same is not valid since there could have been no searching questions) j. especially at night or dawn. Cesar. 2. validity of checkpoints Padilla. April 15. 1990. 83988. Ponsica vs. Facts: 1. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. PENDON VS. 1989 Warrantless searches and seizures.

A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.Issue: Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic searches and seizures made by the military authorities without search warrant valid? Held: Petitioners’ concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. 190 MW 289). it must be emphasized that on July 17. the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHT AGAINST A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER REASONABLY CONDUCTED. AT THE COST OF OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE. 1988. or flashes a light therein (Rowland vs. 97 SE 62). Commonwealth. DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE CITIZEN. these do not constitute unreasonable search. for example. Metro Manila may be considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and to thwart plots to destabilize the government. the military checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief. THE CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY. Case. Gaina. The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela. Where. so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA’s “sparrow units. the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. or simply looks into a vehicle (State vs.” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms. 259 SW 33). Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. JJ.. BUT . True. Finally. In this connection. THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL. the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform. Cruz and Sarmiento. dissenting: . in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse.

P. Cruz. Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15. 1990 2. P s. October 17. held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the people. 22 SCRA 857 3. 65 SCRA 336 4. June 23. 1990. Nolasco vs. Arca. or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril.The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. P. Lopez vs. Papa vs. 1990 1-c. 165 SCRA 135 8. vs. Mago. 185 SCRA 665 Read also: 1-a. Gen. 1990 1-d. Pano. vs. P vs. Cendana. the Supreme Court held further that the military officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY. CFI. RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 1990 Very Important: The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 June. Roldan vs. Olaes. July 30. Commisioner. Rizal Alih vs. However. Pamaran. P.1987 1-b. vs. Castro. August 6. NOT BODILY SEARCH. 101 SCRA 86 5. 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152 . 56 SCRA 16 6. JUNE 15. Castiller. The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on the balance. 1990. 65 SCRA 336 7. Pacis vs.

00. Manuel et al. Bati. CA. HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. The arrest is not valid since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113) Likewise. G. there is a probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs) 2. (After the informant was given by the police the amount of P100. February 9. GR No. June 26. Rule 126. Warrantless searches and arrests Read: 1. 1990 (En banc) 5. Moreno vs. 66 SCRA 299 4. 2. vs. Here . Miriam Defensor-Santiago. 1989 l. Properties subject to seizure Read: 1. 84666. vs. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO. Lim vs. 1990 1-a. Judge Tirso Velasco. 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same. said gun is inadmissible in evidence. Ponce de Leon. an unlicensed firearm was seized instead. ESPANO VS. the policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. CA. Sec.. Harvey vs. NO. as amended 2. Vivo. 81510. Presidential Anti_Dollar Salting Task Force vs. he went to buy marijuana from the accused then return to the police headquarters with said article. July 10. k.1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure. after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia and instead. 1994. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO) Read: 1. Thereafter. 1989 . DEL ROSARIO.1988 2. August 27. 20 SCRA 562 3. Claudio. P. March 14. PEOPLE VS.R. March 16. P vs.9. 288 SCRA 558 m.

1991 2-e. (The alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the accused) PEOPLE VS. 1990 (Compare with P. August 20. vs.. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN. May 31. 144 SCRA 1 2-b. People vs. 212 SCRA 547 2-h. Mati. De la Cruz 1-f. Burgos. 1988. CUISON. Posadas vs. 11. July 6. GALVEZ. vs. 355 SCRA 246 Mendoza. de la Cruz. PEOPLE VS. 184 SCRA 416 2-c. CA. Sucro. 1990 1-g. 2. Dec. Morales vs. P vs. Feb. 256 SCRA 325 2-g.1-b. P. 262 SCRA 255 2-f. Rule 113. Sec. vs. 1991 2. 1990 1-e. People vs. Jr. Maspil. Aug. supra) 1-d. Ponce Enrile. if the arrest was illegal. 1991 2-d. CA. 6. CA. March 18. ortiz. Board. vs. SOLAYAO. 3. 258 SCRA 188 2-i. P. January 18. Gatchalian vs. People vs. OPOSADAS VS. Garcia-Padilla vs. P. Aminnudin. J. Enrile. DAMASO. 121 SCRA 538 2-a. . as amended n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment. Rolito Go vs. PEOPLE VS.121 SCRA 47 & 137 SCRA 647 1-c. 1992 1-h. 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation) 3. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. PEOPLE VS.

1989 p. OTHERWISE. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. PEOPLE VS. his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA. THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. The exclusionary rule. PEOPLE VS. 263 SCRA 222 4. What is the status of a document obtained through subpoena? . NAZARENO.The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. LAPURA. 260 SCRA 256 3. by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment. Indeed.155 SCRA 494 n. May 28. PEOPLE VS. Read: 1. FILOTEO VS. However. 254 SCRA 491 o . 77 SCRA 377 2. 260 SCRA 256 5. PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO. 106 SCRA 336 q. NAPOLCOM. Callanta vs. Penalty for illegal arrest Read: Palon vs. 255 SCRA 85 6. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime. Villanueva. SILAN. the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody. SANDIGANBAYAN. Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized evidence. the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest.

ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Office of the Tanodbayan. Century Fox vs.Read: Dianalan vs. Pros. Nov. especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause. PEOPLE VS. 341 SCRA 25 . 3. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. 27. 344 SCRA 36 The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant: 1.. CA. BIR. nor on mere suspicion or belief. Search warrant for pirated video tapes 1. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. the judge must examine under oath and affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. 2. AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE WARRANT. In determining probable cause. 164 SCRA 655 (The master copy of the allegedly pirated tape should be presented before the judge in order to convince him of the existence of probable cause) 2. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or any other person. Search warrants are not issued on loose. most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity. VALDEZ. and 4. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE. vague or doubtful basis of fact. In this case. 261 SCRA 144 LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES UY VS. CA. with reasonable effort. 1990 r.

BAULA. 2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does nor prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the Constitution. THE PERSONS INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE.The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforces. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is the immunity of one’s person. which includes his residence. The “plain view” doctrine. (PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA. Larry D. it is fundamental that to constitute waiver. BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF. AND ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS. papers and other possessions. APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED. IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT EXISTS. Reference: Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. The third condition did not exist in the instant case. July 6. within a fenced yard or private place. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures. he need not be in his home or office. Gacayan (2008) College of Law University of the Cordilleras . which may justify a search without warrant. of the existence of such right. EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE. Neither was the search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest. CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL. 344 SCRA 663 In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. PEOPLE VS.

. conversation. or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. Republic Act No. messages. SURVEILLANCE OF SUSPECTS AND INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTS OR CHARGED OF TERRORISM Section 7. conversations. The provisions of RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding. with the use of any mode. and record communications. a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may. Section 8. Approved on March 6. intercept.The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down. form or kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. listen. listen to. and upon examination under oath and affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses who may produce to establish: . discussion. Provided.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CHAPTER V – THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Section 3. journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. or with the use of any other suitable ways or means for that purpose. upon a written order of the Court of Appeals. tap. discussions. That surveillance. not found in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Surveillance of suspects and interception and recording of communications. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. association. doctors and patients. message. 2007 and effective on July 15. 9372. or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Read: NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. any communication. intercept and record. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election). or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism. shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals UPON AN EX-PARTE written application of a police or law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex-parte application. or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization. Please observe the procedure in obtaining the “The Warrant [or Order] of Surveillance”. interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients.

such as name and address. Sec. papers. which shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the original period…The ex-parte application for renewal has been duly authorized by the Anti-terrorism Council in writing. discussions. and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team judicially authorized to track down. if any. or telephone (whether wireless or otherwise) communications. bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge. letters. or spoken or written words are to be tracked down. The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order. listen to. if he or she intends to do so. 10. if known. messages. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. to extend or renew the same. tapped. in case of radio. the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down. which shall not exceed 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official. or sought to be prevented. listened to. intercepted. The CA may extend or renew the said authorization for another non-extendible period. listened to. . electronic. discussions. The written order of the authorizing division of the court of Appeals shall specify the following:  The identity. of the charged of suspected persons whose communications. the original application of the applicant. Section. conversations. or spoken or written words. messages. intercepted or recorded and. tap. and recorded and their locations if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known. if any. or spoken or written words. listened to. or is being committed. intercept. or being committed. will be obtained. tapped. conversations. Any authorization granted by the authorizing division of the court of Appeals…shall only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. and record the communications. spoken or written words and effects have been monitored. the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued said written order. or is about to be committed. That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and  circumstances that evidence which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for. and That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence. That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and  circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed. conversations.  The identity (name and address. messages. and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided. discussions. That the person being surveilled or whose communications. or to the solution or prevention of any such crimes. conversations. including his application to extend or renew. such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is reasonable ground to do so.  The offense or offenses committed. discussions. 9. and  The length of time which the authorization shall be used or carried out. messages.

PROCEEDING. JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS. placements. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. and records in a bank or financial institution. trust accounts. may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of his team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: 1. interception and recording shall be penalized to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. Application to examine deposits. and 2. judicial authorization required to examine bank deposits. gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits. interception and recording. trust accounts. placements. Section 15. . intercepted. examine or cause the examination of. ACCOUNTS. LEGISLATIVE. [Penalty to be imposed on the police official who fails to inform the person subject of surveillance of the termination of the surveillance. accounts and records. assets.If no case is filed within the 30-day period. assets. Sec. association or group of persons. interception. 28. assets and records:   A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. and records from a bank or financial institution. accounts and records. and recording of the termination of the said surveillance. OR HEARING. The justices of CA designated as special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that:    A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. AND RECORDS OF SUSPECTED OR CHARGED TERRORISTS Section 27. INQUIRY. placements. SHALL ABSOLUTELY NOT BE ADMISSIBLE AND USABLE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ANYBODY IN ANY JUDICIAL. OR ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. The bank or financial institution shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information. trust accounts. when so ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals. monitoring. messages. Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. conversations…WHICH HAVE BEEN SECURED IN VIOLATION OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT. The written order of the CA authorizing the examination of bank deposits. Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. QUASI-JUDICIAL. Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. and recorded communications. the deposits. Any listened to. the applicant police or law enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance.

excerpts. CABALQUINTO. she used the same in their legal separation case. assets and records of:  A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. 502 SCRA 419 2. 1. 3.. then President FIDEL V. Said documents are inadmissible in evidence. data. Thereafter. notes.  Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. memoranda. placements. shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial. reports or documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits. work sheets. association or group of persons. inquiry. July 23. September 19. placements. Facts: On December 12.  Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. OPLE VS. Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. legislative or administrative investigation. quasi-judicial. J. Section 35. Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization. ZULUETA VS. 1996.Any information. association or group of persons. CA. PEOPLE VS. trust accounts. association or group of persons. 1996 The wife forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her doctor-husband and took diaries. summaries. trust accounts. 2006. February 10. assets and records:    Of A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. TORRES. proceeding or hearing. checks and greeting cards of his alleged paramours. Evidentiary value of deposited bank materials. -which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. . Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons. 1998 Puno. in a bank or financial institution- -SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE CA UPON AN EX-PARTE APPLICATION TO THAT EFFECT OF A POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL who has been duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file such ex-parte application and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits. This is so because the intimacies of husband and wife does not justify the breaking of cabinets to determine marital infidelity.

It is the confirmation of an individual’s identity through a fingerprint. and 3. hand geometry or facial features. but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse. The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds: 1. however. The AO violates the citizen’s right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure. AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order.The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore. Administrative Power. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. which is supposed to be exercised by the President. . Held: 1. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts. not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Through the PRN. 2. the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts. The data. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. 2. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power. retinal scan. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines. it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope. a mathematical analysis of a biological data.

April 19. and b. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No.. CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE. Based on the Ople ruling. usurpation of legislative powers.. ET AL. Multi-purpose Identification System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. This is so despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS. The Supreme Court likewise held that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the citizen’s right to privacy. 2006 Carpio. 308[National computerized Identification Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V. Only those dealing . April 19. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. 420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified. OR WORSE. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizen’s right to privacy. WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY. ET AL. 420 does not violate the citizen’s right to privacy since it does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO 308. THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES Administrative Order No. KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. 2006 & June 20. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds: a. AO No. it infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy Held: The said Executive Order No.Further. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. J. the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN. where none existed before”. AN INTRUDER. YET. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. 2006 BAYAN MUNA VS. 2006 & June 20. the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be handled. Ramos that the same is unconstitutional because “a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system.

any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. 2006. G. Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[3][7] At the same time. [4][46] Within these zones. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 2006. inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by theCommittee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. No. Gordon. Chief of Staff Rio C. under the authority of Senator Richard J. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez. The Facts: On February 20.O. and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. 455 (Senate Res. Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. October 17. Arroyo and Members.”[6][48] . GORDON. CAMILO L. No. I S S U E S: Is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of their right to privacy? H E L D: The claim of immunity is without merit. No.R.. 1 earlier quoted. 2006. 455). 455. 2006.” On May 8. No.m. No. 2006. Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building. Hence.”[5][47] but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that. their Chairmen. Inocencio. 174340. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men. they invoked Section 4(b) of E. SABIO vs.[2][6] On May 9. “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT).or employed with the said government entities who are required to provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID. Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.[1][4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). wrote Chairman Camilo L. Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Sabio of the PCGG. On September 12. at around 10:45 a. one of the herein petitioners. J. 82 EDSA.

” In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy.Our Bill of Rights. In Morfe v. particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. PHC and POTC. to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed. Under the present circumstances. how much. ranging in millions of pesos. a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and. the important inquiries are: first. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. Taking this into consideration. the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacyas compared to ordinary individuals.[9][51] the Court. such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information. to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption.. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest.[8][50] Applying this determination to these cases. maintain a standard of honesty in public service. Mutuc. 455. and second. Consequently. the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions. particularly “on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG’s efficacy. the inquiry focus on petitioners’ acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations.” Section 3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and correspondence” and further cautions that “any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. houses. i. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any [49] purpose. Certainly. No. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy . did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?. provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy.[10][52] employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose.[12][54] the Court remarked that as public figures.e. Belmonte. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overridingcompelling state interest. and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to determine what.” Obviously. the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT. [11][53] In Valmonte v. did the government violate such expectation? The answers are in the negative. Roe. and promote morality in public administration. whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.”[7] Section 2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons. if so. and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors. in line with Whalen v. and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. enshrined in Article III of the Constitution.

507. 2001. Nicasio Conti. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. Marquez v. Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses. Mutuc No. No. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Ct. and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.105 Cal. Reference: Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. United states (1967). [10][52] 429 U. 19 L. 1968. 135882. will be respected by respondent Senate Committees. 3d 238. L-20387. must comply with theSubpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 347. 174318. Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy. Narciso Nario. University of the Cordilleras Baguio City [1][4] [2][6] Annex “E” of the Petition in G. 3d 623624. Rptr. 13 Cal. and Tereso Javier. at 221. The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy. citing I. 174318. p. 455. [11][53] [12][54] Justice Puno. PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede. 529 P 2d 590 (1974). G. Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No. See Katz v. 3d 357. 455. as well as its directors and officers. 589 (1977). 359 SCRA 772. 2d 576.S.People v. 350-352. INSERT Herrera’s Handbook on Arrest. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae. June 27.S. Academy of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence. Gacayan (2008) College of Law. January 31. Search and Seizure. 170 SCRA 256 (1989) . 486 P. Annex “F” of the Petition in G. [3][7] [4][46] Annex “G” of the Petition in G. 62. 88 S. it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees. 1990. Larry D. Cortes. 2d 1262. PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.R. No. [5][47] [6][48] See Morfe v.R. it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. 7 (1970).R. and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni.R. 2d 457. [9][51] Supra.R. 364. No. In fine. [8][50] Burrows v. 389 U. like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners. Ed. 22 SCRA 424. Sison. 521. [7][49] Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries. Desierto. Rptr. 60. 504 P. No. 174318. to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees. 8 Cal. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 96 Cal.

CFI. Bustos. Republic Act No. Perez. The interest of the government and the society demands full discussion of public affairs) 3. People. 599 4. 37 Phil. P. computers.. US vs. vs. PRESS. 116 SCRA 93 2. 444 SCRA 28 [November 25. 90 Phil. EXPRESSION. in general Read: BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER & CECILLE AFABLE VS. 2007 and effective on July 15. Espuelas vs. Freedom of the press. Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. of expression. NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law. or other means of communications with people outside their residence. 2004] . 731 (A public official should not be onion-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. etc. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for the redress of their grievances. Approved on March 6. 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election) Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism—even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be:  Detained under house arrest. 9372. Mercado vs. 1.  Restricted from traveling. JR. Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers Read: 1. 45 Phil. 524 2. or of the press.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CHAPTER VI – FREEDOM OF SPEECH. COURT OF APPEALS & RAMON LABO. and/or  Prohibited from using any cellular phones.

moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. The Regional Trial Court. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was allegedly described as “Dumpty in the Egg” or one “who is a failure in his business” which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to mean “zero or a big lie”. . reputation and honesty of private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City. If he wins. FACTS: 1. He likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed. 1988 column at the Courier: “I heard that the ‘Dumpty in the Egg’ is campaigning for Cortes.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections. 4. filed a complaint for Damages before the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous.Freedom of Expression. that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged failure to pay his medical expenses. People would ask: “can he read and write”? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-inlaw? Is he really a Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. Jr. Not fair.” 3. The petitioners. several teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever. 1990 dismissed Labo’s complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity. the public has the right to be informed on the mental. in her column “In and Out of Baguio” made the following comments: “Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City). in its Decision dated June 14.415. In the same column. were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation to the Courier in the amount of P27. 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC).” 2. As a result of the above articles.000 only. Cecille Afable. however. Labo has the most imponderables about him. Baguio City. Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid their medical services with them. Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her January 10. and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio. Ramon Labor. In the January 3. Branch 6. Since he is donating millions he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27. the Editor-in-Chief. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old account first.

As pointed out by the petitioners.000. the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo. 310 SCRA 1. that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved. 2. Although such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been commendable.00 after concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg” refers to no one but Labo himself. that such discussion must be privileged. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in the Egg” in the questioned article.On January 7. This argument is without merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio. the Petition to the Supreme Court. The importance to the State and to society of such discussions is so vast. and the advantages derived so great. had he done that. 376 U. which he actually did. the article is still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the public’s right to be informed of the mental. CA. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. ISSUES: 1. damages in the total amount of P350. 14 Phil. it is contrary to common human experience. the case should be dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility. Was Labo the “Dumpty in the Egg” described in the questioned article/ 2. Jr. Hence. The public benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small. This was recognized as early as the case of US VS. This is so because the article stated that “The Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes”. 1992. and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare.S. “ . that ‘it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed. but it must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication’. As such. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS. another candidate for mayor and opponent of Labo himself. SEDANO. Were the articles subject of the case libelous or privileged/ HELD: 1. although at times such injury may be great. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke “public interest” to justify the publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent and against himself. SULLIVAN. moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. 254where the US Supreme Court held: “…it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. it is doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections.

entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law. Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution No. J. Petitioner claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same. 2. commentator. On October 23. Pursuant to said law. . SANIDAD VS. on the day before and on plebiscite day.” 4. January 29. the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at that time. Province. 1989 but was reset to January 30. no mass media columnist. On January 9. On November 20. Facts: 1. 1990. filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. SANIDAD who is a columnist (“OVERVIEW”) for the Baguio Midland Courier. the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 90878. 3. the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. Section 19 of which provides: “Section 19. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881. 2167.Clearly. 5. 1989. commentators or announcers. 1989. a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881). G. NO. Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao. all comprising the autonomous region shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27. 6. the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet.R. On November 28. 1989. RA 6766. COMELEC. announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. PABLITO V. 2. Abra. 1990 Freedom of expression and of the press (Note: Unanimous en banc decision) Medialdea.During the plebiscite campaign period. Prohibition on columnist.. 1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act. 2167. petitioner PABLITO V. Mt.

July 12. there are no candidates in a plebiscite. commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate. Burgos vs. Held: What is granted by Art.he may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. Corro vs. While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. and the right to reply. including reasonable. Read also: 1. for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. Lising. 137 SCRA 448 . 2ND PAR. Emil Jurado. 199 2. HOWEVER. 133 SCRA 800 4. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW. INCLUDING THE FORUM. Comelec Resolution No. In re: Atty. In re: Ramon Tulfo. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. This is also the reason why a columnist. In fact.March 19. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. ACCORDINGLY. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time and space. permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity. said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section 19. 1990 3. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Chief of Staff. The people’s right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues. 2167. 2167 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. time and space. equal rates therefor. NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B).

IAC.376 U. Obscenity. April 15. Tipon.254 10. P vs. Adiong vs. Eastern Broadcasting vs. Freedom of expression in general Read: 1. March 5. Zaldivar vs. Comelec. 1955 expression clause of the Constitution . 489 SCRA 160. GR No. 34 SCRA 116 9. 132 SCRA 316 6. Manila Times. March 31. 11 SCRA 477 IN RE: Atty. Babst vs. Gonzales. De Villa. GO PIN. Tests: Zaldivar vs. February 1. the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual proceedings.S. New York Times vs. 79 SCRA 372 9. and [c] no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer} 7. May 3. GR No. Gutierrez. 2. 2006. 1989 5. NIB. 1992. 10. 8. 7960-707 & 80578. Policarpio vs. 352 a. P. Comelec. 1992 (putting of decals and stickers in one’s car is within the protected freedom of expression) 3. 142 SCRA 171 7. Real also the dissenting and separate opinions of the justices. Sullivan. PCGG. Kapisanan vs. test of Read: a. [b] must be done in good faith. (Preventing campaigns through radio. Elizalde vs. ARROYO. vs.5. CA. 1988 4. Not within the protection of the freedom of 1. Liwayway Publishing vs. IAC. December 6. 5 SCRA 148 8. August 8. May 23.137 SCRA 628 Newsweek vs. Camara Shoes. TV and newspapers is valid in order to even the playing field between rich and poor candidates) 4. 45 Phil. 6.1988 Kapunan vs. Lacsa vs. Sandiganbayan.76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news item relating to a judicial proceeding will not be actionable. RANDY DAVID VS. Kottinger. National Press Club vs. Dans. Lopez vs.l988 3.

Cases undersub-judice Read: a. otherwise. HELD: The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the 1st half of October. vs. 200 SCRA 323 where it was held that “these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike. vs. Ed. artistic. California. He should obtain a search warrant from a judge) 2. value. Freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances GESITE et al. Lopez and Manila Times cases. 629 e. prosecutor and judge at the same time. b. 96 Phil. 37 L. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary . right of public school teachers to form union. he will become the complainant. they constituted a . 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they claimed that they were not on strike. Alarcon. Quisumbing vs. 1990 was a strike or not has been decided in the case of MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS. political or scientific c. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community standards would find the work appeals to prurient interest. P. CA. Ginsberg vs.S. 178 SCRA 362 (A City Mayor may not order the warrantless seizure of magazines which he believes to be obscene.a. Pita vs. 265 5. Lopez. New York. 69 Phil.390 U. c. Libel or slander. 2d 419 d. test ofRead: a. supra b. They claimed that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. 510 3. LAGUIO. 444 SCRA 51 Freedom of public school teachers to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass actions in Metro Manila from September to the first half of October. they may not be penalized administratively. Miller vs. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual conduct. COURT OF APPEALS. Thus.

169881. Gen. employees in the public service may not engage in strikes.. 276 SCRA 619) The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service. Jess del Prado. allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6. 2006 AZCUNA. The third group. who allege that they were injured. petitioners in G.R. No. WITHOUT INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. May. Gen. No. in G.concerted and unauthorized stoppage of. et al. put the country under an “undeclared” martial rule. (Bangalisan vs. et al. NCRPO Chief Maj.: The Facts: Petitioners come in three groups. ARTURO M. Chief of the Philippine National Police.. CA. J. arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26. VIDAL QUEROL. mass leaves. Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA. et al. 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their .R. The first petitioners. 2005. 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P. AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE. Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution. No.) No. WILL BE DEEMED CONTROLLING. a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which. and GABRIELA vs. or absence from. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential. 880.R. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). They further assert that on October 5. 169838. Bayan. undertaken for essentially economic reasons.EDUARDO ERMITA. 169848. in his capacity as Executive Secretary. BAYAN. SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION. in G. KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP).. they claim. LOMIBAO. work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform. KARAPATAN. 169848. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners.R. G. and Western Police District Chief Gen. No. PEDRO BULAONG.” It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize IS LIMITED TO THE FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY.

2. liberty and equal protection of the law.M. or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational . the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life. They were then forcibly dispersed. police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. claim that on October 4. 13(a).P. – This Act shall be known as “The Public Assembly Act of 1985. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.individual members as citizens. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. 6. are affected by Batas Pambansa No. no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced. park. No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. boulevard. a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C. Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled: Section 1. 880. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them. avenue. specifically the right to peaceful assembly. 5. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. They further allege that on October 6. et al. road. (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of restraint that the military. 2005. causing injuries on one of them. “The Public Assembly Act of 1985. and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. Declaration of policy. 4. causing injuries to several of their members. Permit when required and when not required. 12. 2005. KMU. To this end. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit. plaza square. as well as the policy of CPR. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. street. 3. 880. Title .” Sec. 880 An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes. Sec.– A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. Three other rallyists were arrested. and 14(a).. some of them in toto and others only Sections 4. Definition of terms.” provides: Batas Pambansa Blg. – For purposes of this Act: (b) “Public place” shall include any highway. B. Sec. a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. bridge or other thoroughfare. However.

4. and the probable number of persons participating. Application requirements. Action to be taken on the application. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twentyfour hours. 2. 3. Upon receipt of the application. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. time and duration thereof. Sec. 5. Sec. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. public morals or public health. – 1. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. failing which. public convenience. 2. public safety. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity. 5. the permit shall be deemed granted. the purpose of such public assembly. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. . 6. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. 4. the transport and the public address systems to be used. 3. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.institution. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. the date.– All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: 1.

We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. 7. 2 Official NEWS September 21. The President’s call for unity and reconciliation stands. disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or. shown in Annex “A” to the Petition in G. 169848. in his absence. 2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA On Unlawful Mass Actions In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation. Philippines Release No. No. to the next in rank. The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force. sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities. any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. the Regional Trial Court. . and the peace of mind of the national community. we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a “no permit. or the Intermediate Appellate court. 2005.6. the Municipal Trial Court. 8. on the other hand. based on the rule of law. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. In all cases. CPR. no rally” policy. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required.R. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21. thus: Malacañang Manila. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing.

Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? 2.Petitioners Bayan. Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? . The words “lawful cause.P. specifically Sections 4. the limits provided are unreasonable: First. As a content-based legislation. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B. otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. Furthermore. 7160: 1. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right. it is not contentneutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. No. the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly. et al. that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.P. contend that Batas Pambansa No. As to the CPR policy. No.P. allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. I s s u e s: 1. the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. and Republic Act No. No. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent. the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. Regarding the CPR policy. argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B. Furthermore.” “opinion. 5. 880. aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. No.P. they argue that it is preemptive.. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. et al. 880. it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. Also. ordinance or executive order supports the policy. They argue that B. and that no law. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. Finally. Second. 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof. it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B. 6. Furthermore.. petitioners KMU.

On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR): 1. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity. of expression. in fact. 2005? H e l d: Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Section 2(5) of . and of the press. Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: Sec. Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 2. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. As stated in Jacinto v. 4. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. on the other hand. No. purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents. The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. as early as the onset of this century. Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4. v. have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. 5 and 6. the Court. to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law. or of the press.S. as guaranteed by the Constitution. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. Is it void for lack of publication? 3. of expression. Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? 2. for that matter. together with freedom of speech. is directly affected by B. as follows: There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and. CA. They have. Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? 5. particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights. without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.P.3. Do they constitute prior restraint? 4. in U. Apurado already upheld the right to assembly and petition.

and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. as follows: It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. this Court said: The right to freedom of speech. in Primicias v.S. is not absolute. are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities. to promote the health. while sacrosanct. the less perfect. municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose Reyes v. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power. and general welfare of the people. The Constitution is quite . and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks. Next. the grievance and the more intense the feeling. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions. peace. however. arising from the denial of a permit. if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its limits. this Court in U. vs. and the greater. morals. Apurado. education.Article IX. it must be remembered that the right. InPrimicias. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights. then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment. As early as the onset of this century.” which is the power to prescribe regulations. the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefore. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. and it may be delegated to political subdivisions.” Again. good order or safety. such as towns. Fugoso. nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.

the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve. may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. are inseparable. speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. or action for damages. of course. public morals. of a character both grave and imminent. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.” Free speech. or of the press. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: “It must never be forgotten. prosecution for sedition. of a serious evil to public safety. or any other legitimate public interest. is the danger. it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. whether verbal or printed. even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. Collins. like free press. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge. In every case. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly.” Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. public health. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. 3. There are. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits. that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right. much less denied. the utterance. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. or contempt proceedings unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of. Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech.” What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason. well-defined limits. allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views.explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions. therefore. resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. All these rights. except on a showing. being in a context of violence. of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. as is the case with freedom of expression. much less preach rebellion . while not identical. however. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution.

been a part of the privileges.under the cloak of dissent. this Court categorically declared: “Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. and discussing public questions.” which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. of 1939 vintage of. immunities. penned in 1907 to be precise. it is not absolute. communicating thoughts between citizens. CIO: “Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest. as a rule. State of New Hampshire. Primicias v. but relative. but must not. in the guise of respondents. injury to property. Fugoso.L. rights and liberties of citizens. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. the statute of New Hampshire P. Rojas. from ancient times. There can be no legal objection. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.” It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked. be abridged or denied. The utmost calm though is not required.S. Justice Roberts in Hague v. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard.’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the . It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.” The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee. the less perfect. In that case. Such use of the streets and public places has. 145. 312 U. have been used for purposes of assembly. providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon. and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo. Apurado: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary. and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling. and acts of vandalism must be avoided. time out of mind. riotous conduct. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. Reference was made to such plaza “being a promenade for public use. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all. will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. chap. To repeat. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. a 1915 decision. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion.. United States v. As pointed out in an early Philippine case. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy. 569. and in consonance with peace and good order. because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. section 2. where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. 4. there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.

to a consideration of the time. in the issuance of licenses. if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved. in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court. speaking for the American Supreme Court. place. the public place where and the time when it will take place. and held valid. is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license. as the statute is construed by the state courts. That would deprive it of its peaceful character.” There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence.” xxx 8. imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. . with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. the licensing authorities are strictly limited. as guaranteed by the Constitution. held that ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press. still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. given all the relevant circumstances. It is true that the licensing official. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all. not as to the relations of the speakers. The exercise of such a right. is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur. “Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: “Civil liberties. here respondent Mayor. By way of a summary. where.” xxx 6. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. And the Supreme Court of the United States. * * *. is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. unfettered discretion. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question. in the language of Justice Roberts. however. but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. and manner of the parade or procession. It is not.

only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. B. the applicants must be heard on the matter. only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. No. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Thereafter. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.P. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil.R. 1983. 4. L-65366. The provisions of B. they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. . his decision.P. If it were a private place. no sanctifying phrase can. the public place where and the time when it will take place. whether favorable or adverse. Free speech and peaceable assembly. No. or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes: Reyes v. B. 125 SCRA 553. 880 Sec. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary. Permit when required and when not required. — even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. of course. the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.P. No. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date. Bagatsing (G. whether favorable or adverse. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. along with the other intellectual freedoms. Thereafter.” Nonetheless.– A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. No verbal formula. However.If it were a private place. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. 569) 8. dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. By way of a summary. x x x. are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. November 9. Thus if so minded. Thus if so minded. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. the applicants must be heard on the matter. his decision. must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. No.

5. – (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. the Regional Trial Court. Action to be taken on the application. or the Intermediate Appellate Court. 6. the permit shall be deemed granted. its . the Municipal Trial Court. (d) Upon receipt of the application. the date. failing which.– All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. and the probable number of persons participating. Application requirements. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity.Sec. Sec. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. public morals or public health. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. public convenience. time and duration thereof. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. the transport and the public address systems to be used. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. public safety. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. the purpose of such public assembly. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

public safety. no prior restraint. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies[3] that would use public places. Finally. that B.P. otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. This was adverted to in Osmeña v.” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content based. the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution. and manner of holding public assemblies. public morals or public health. There is. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or. and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.P.decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. Comelec. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. place and manner of the assemblies. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes. No. (h) In all cases. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor.[2] A fair and impartial reading of B. place.[1] where the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. . therefore. any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order. No. maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time. likewise. Neither are the words “opinion. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. to the next in rank. since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. in his absence. Neither is the law overbroad. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is very clear. public convenience. 6(a). Furthermore. so its use cannot be avoided. 7160[4] is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. since they can refer to any subject. The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec.

880. thus: The truth of the matter is the policy of “calibrated preemptive response” is in consonance with the legal definition of “maximum tolerance” under Section 3 (c) of B.” Unfortunately. Blg. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. More so. submitted by the Solicitor General. police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be “tolerated.P. as far as practicable. Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit. which is the “highest degree of restraint that the military. 880. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila. no rally policy” or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed.P. the popular connotation of “maximum tolerance” has departed from its real essence under B. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. This could only mean that “maximum tolerance” is not in conflict with a “no permit. No. Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time: Sec. and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. Blg. 880. for those who cannot wait. when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now acquired. Thus. 15. the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued. the phrase “maximum tolerance” has acquired a different meaning over the years.Finally. since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. As stated earlier.” Clearly. shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. however. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the . 2 The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions which. which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit. Freedom parks.

Read: 1. “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists. this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people. “we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit. Navarro vs. Right of assembly. Evangelista vs.” None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg.51 SCRA 189 7. Far from being insidious.notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional.. 880. . 57 Phil 255 3. 71 4. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. 125 SCRA 553.see 8. 346 5. 99 Phil. Primicias vs. . insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. No. not the government. Thus I said. 126 SCRA 233 9. . the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. 135 SCRA 705 guidelines . 31 SCRA 731 6. especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. TIP. unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. On the other hand. Gordon. B. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound “clear and present danger” standard. WHEREFORE. I wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Villar vs. Reyes vs. Fuguso. it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time. Philippine Blooming Mills Case.P. is NULLand VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVEthe requirements of maximum tolerance. it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms. arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . In sum.31 SCRA 734 and 742 2. 80 Phil. Ela. no rally policy . and Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). the petitions are GRANTED in part. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any law. De la Cruz vs. Earnshaw. Bagatsing. place and manner of assemblies. . Villegas. Ruiz vs. For this reason.

. Nestle’ Phils. City of Chicago. conditional. Gonzales. Gonzales vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Freedom from prior restraint Read: 1. Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent. Cabansag vs. 102 Phil. Fernandez. New York Times vs. 713 (Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity) 3. 43 5. Araneta University Foundation. Ramento. The balancing-of-interest test (When a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of the public order. then such words are punishable) Read: 1. GR 80578. 380 U. 137 SCRA 94 6. Read again the Reyes and Ruiz cases. 106 SCRA 685 12.) Read: AYER PRODUCTION VS. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent) 7-a.S. Arreza vs. No. the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand greater protection under the circumstances presented. Kalaw Katigbak. GR No.10. 51 5. 365 U. 283 U. Carpio vs.S. Sanchez. Read again Zaldivar vs. Maryland. 1989 8. and the regulation results in an indirect. Malabanan vs. vs. 160 SCRA 861 . Near vs. 152 2.S. partial abridgment of speech. 403 U.S. JUDGE CAPULONG. U. Freedman vs. 129 SCRA 359 11. ET AL. 697 4.S. Sandiganbayan. 137 SCRA 717 2. February 1. 154 SCRA 542 13. Guevara. supra 3. 7960-707& Zaldivar vs.. Minnesota. Times Film vs.

Gonzales. 652. enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. Lagunzad vs. Gitlow vs. maintain peace and order. Larry D. See also Zaldivar case above Reference: Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. those necessarily implied therefrom.R.Read also: 1. 478. or incidental for its efficient and effective governance. the preservation and enrichment of culture.S. and public assemblies in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution. (Sec. Except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute. 92 SCRA 476 2. thus: Sec. which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. political meeting or rallies held during any election campaign period.P. [2] [3] Ibid. which are governed by the Election Code and other election related laws. New York. 3[a] and Sec. 1998. and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. p. 268 U. enhance economic prosperity and social justice. Section 16 stating the general welfare clause. 16. including the criticism on this test by Justice Holmes 3. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. appropriate. local government units shall ensure and support among other things. Specifically. improve public morals. No. encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities. promote health and safety. 132231. March 31. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions. No. 880). 288 SCRA 447. Gacayan (2008) College of Law. General Welfare. as well as powers necessary. promote full employment among their residents. University of the Cordilleras Baguio City [1] G. 4 of B. [4] The Local Government Code. which are governed by the Labor Code and other labor laws. .

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious freedom—may be enjoyed. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253. HELD: Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Complainant requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. IN THE AREA . thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. ESTRADA VS. without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because:    She is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio. 408 SCRA 1 Puno. That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation. Jr. Las Pinas City. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a “DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS” in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CHAPTER VII – THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE Section 5. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs. 492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration). J.

the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. often involving a code of ethics and philosophy. The idea is to delineate the boundaries between two institutions and prevent encroachments by one against the other. and so the stateinterest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. HOWEVER. The existence of a Divine being is not necessarily inherent in religion. Insulation from political process—growth through voluntary support of its members will not take place if there is intervention from the State. The doctrine cuts both ways. NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE: It simply means “that the State cannot set up a church. the Buddhists espouses a way of life without reference to an omnipotent God. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs. that the State cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa” (EVERSON VS. FREEDOM OF RELIGION – Any specific system of belief. “Strong fences make good neighbors”. or force him to profess a belief or disbelief. Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE. 330 US 1) This clause seeks to protect: Voluntarism—must come into existence through the voluntary support of its members. aid all religion. BOARD OF EDUCATION. or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will. – A profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. nor pass laws which aids one religion. There will be no violation of the non-establishment clause if: .OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists. worship or conduct.

it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. KURTZMAN. “It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American People. 370 US 421) “It is unconstitutional for a school to require the students to recite a prayer composed by the Board of Regents at the starts of the day’s class. 403 US 602) The government is neutral and while protecting all. THE RIGHT TO WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP. it prefers none and disparages none. the statute has a secular legislative purpose.” SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES FREEDOM FROM RELIGION. and 3. SCHEMPP. ALLEN. This is constitutional since it is not the parochial school which gets the benefits but the parents. “All” here applies both to the believer and the non-believer.1. SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL VS. its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . (LEMON VS. 392 US 236 A law requiring the Board of Education to lend textbooks free of charge to all students from grades 7-12 of parochial school. 2. VITALE. 374 US 203 It is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses from the Holy Bible be read daily without comment because the same constitute a religious exercise which violates the nonestablishment clause.

This is so because religious freedom can be exercised only with due regard to the rights of others. PEOPLE VS. Aglipay vs. his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. IN RE SUMMERS. Religious freedom in relation to impairment of associations. Freedom to act. such freedom is absolute. if the individual externalizes what he believes.G. Ruiz. or none at all. and b. Freedom to believe. Example: “Go forth and multiply—cannot marry several times just to comply. He may indulge in his own theories about life and death.EVERSON VS. IN the first. 201 contracts and the right to join . RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP HAS TWO ASPECTS: a. not the parochial school. LAGMAN & ZOSA. 64 Phil. 1676 Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4. 38 O. worship any god he chooses. the State may call all citizens to render military or civil service.36 SCRA 445 2. Article II—The state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty. 1. 325 US 561 The act of the Illinois Supreme Court denying admission to the bar because of his refusal to take in good faith an oath to support the Constitution of the State of Illinois which requires mandatory service in the military in times of war was reversed by the US Supreme Court stating that this constitutes a violation of the 1st Amendment which guarantees religious freedom. In the second. Read: 1. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 330 US 1 The law authorizing reimbursement of transportation expenses of school children going to and from parochial schools is not violative of the non-establishment clause because it will be the parents who get benefits. He may not be punished even if he cannot prove what he believes.

Gironella. 106 SCRA 1 4. they were expelled by the respondent school authorities. November 20. Estenzo. 8 dated July 21. City of Manila. 398 5. Issue: May the petitioners be expelled for refusing to salute the flag. Elizalde Rope. Victoriano vs. 1978 7. Sec. 59 SCRA 54 1. Teleron. Pamil vs. March 1. 1955 and by Department Order No. 1993 Grino–Aquino. That because of their refusal to perform the foregoing acts as required by RA 1265 of July 11. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU. German vs. Hence this petition. 11 6. Facts: 1. American Bible Society vs. of Education.2. Gerona vs. Barangan. saluting the Philippine Flag and reciting the patriotic pledge because they considered the flag as an image and they should not worship it except GOD. recite the patriotic pledge or sing the national anthem in order to follow their religious beliefs? . That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by a band or singing the Philippine National Anthem. J. 101 Phil. 2. Garces vs. INK vs. The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in the different public schools of the Province of Cebu and who belong to the religious group known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 3. 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. 106 Phil. ET AL VS. 135 SCRA 514 ROEL EBRALINAG. 104 SCRA 510 3.

Held:
The same issue was raised in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna
vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960) where the SC held that:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in
the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
The law, RA 1265 was likewise incorporated in Executive Order No. 297, September 21, 1988.
Our task is extremely difficult for the 30-year old decision of this Court in GERONA upholding the
salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be
trifled with.
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge, during flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one’s job or be expelled in
school, IS ALIEN TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PRESENT GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT THEIR
TEETH ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND THE FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP (Section 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man and his Creator (Chief
Justice Fernando’s separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 530).
The right to religious profession has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of the
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom
(according the Former Chief justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Baranagan)
is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has the right and duty to presvent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the
expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified since they are not doing anything that
could warrant their expulsion since during flag ceremonies, they just quietly stand at attention to
show their respect for the rights of others who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, we upheld the exemption of the
members of the Iglesia ni Kristo from the coverage of the closed-shop agreement between the

labor union and the company because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any
labor group.
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah’s Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect to their religious beliefs, however “bizarre” those
beliefs may seem to others.
Reference:
Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan (2008)
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CHAPTER VIII – THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism—even if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be:

Detained under house arrest;

Restricted from traveling; and/or

Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications with
people outside their residence.
Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspect’s right to travel shall be limited to the
municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national
security and public safety. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of
the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the bail which shall then be
forfeited as provided in the Rules of Court.
These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal of the case
filed against him; or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the prosecutor.
1. The constitutional as well as human right to travel,

129 SCRA

2. Read:
FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211, September
15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989
Right to travel; liberty of abode and “right to return”
En banc
Cortes, J.
This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme Court to Order the
respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin the implementation of the
President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution:

are: 1. the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. the petitioners claim that under international law. which had been ratified by the Philippines. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country. AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY. under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Likewise. The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Issue: Whether or not. public safety or public health. which could help in the determination of the main issue. Thus: Art. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security. Does the President have the power to bar the Marcoses to return to the Philippines? a. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Art. in the exercise of the powers granted in the Constitution. Section 6. Is this a political question? . 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. provides: Art. The sub-issues. The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so “within the limits prescribed by law”. particularly the Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. including his own. citing Section 4. they argue that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.Section 1. as may be provided by law. nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Furthermore. Also.

And if she has made that finding.2. the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under Section 1. Art. Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING the petition. BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. even the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state. These are what the right to travel connote. independent from. Paras. Bidin and Sarmiento). public welfare or public health. judicial power now includes the duty to “determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged by the insurgency. Essentially. Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez. public safety or public health. have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding? Has there been prior notice to the petitioners? Held: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. etc. . the right to return to one’s country. IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. has the President made a finding that the return of the petitioners to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security. Lastly. Narvasa. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former Pres. The power involved is the President’s RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines. separatist movement in Mindanao.” NOTE: The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (CJ Fernan. the right to leave a country and the right to enter one’s country as separate and distinct rights. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE’S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS. capriciously and whimsically. though related to the right to travel. Melencio-Herrera. UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION. Grino-Aquino. WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. Jr. a totally distinct right under international law. rightist conspiracies to grab power. in the interest of national security. Padilla. VIII of the Constitution. Cruz. Feliciano. the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily. To the President. With these before her. Thus. Gancayco..

With all due respect for the majority in the Court that the main issue in this case is not one of power but one on RIGHTS. Manotoc vs. THERE IS NO LAW PRESCRIBING EXILE IN FOREIGN LAND AS THE PENALTY FOR HURTING THE NATION. 82 Phil. If he comes home. Salazar. however. The SEC requested the Commissioner on Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure pending disposition of the case involving him. CA. CA. December 7. 1991 Read also: 1.*********************** Gutierrez. 142 SCRA 149 1.. PCGG. Caunca vs. April 8. 851 2. 4. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc. the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist “factual bases for the President’s decision” to bar Marcos’s return. dissenting. The same was granted by the Commissioner. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which also denied the same. He is also involved in a case pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions. “relative to his business transactions and opportunities”. Kwong vs. In said cases he was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. J. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after the hearing. BUT THE DENIAL OF TRAVEL PAPERS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE POWERS BECAUSE THE BILL OF RIGHTS SAY SO. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled “motion for permission to leave the country” stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States. Silverio vs. Jr. 2. 1. 2. claiming his .C. 3..l987 3. Jr. Amazingly. the government has the power to arrest and punish him but does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die among familiar surroundings? x x x The government has more than ample powers under existing laws to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. Petitioner brings the matter to the S.

said orders and processes will be nugatory. and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Uy Tuising.”(People vs. He must however convince the courts of the urgency of his travel. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. Hermoso. and that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel. Villavicencio vs. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad.A. 1989 Reference: Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. the duration thereof. Gonzales. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason would place him beyond the reach of the courts. supra. because. No. 13. as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel. Feb. petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel. 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. 4. 6. Unlike the Shepherd case. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Roan vs. e. 404 (l935) c. 778 5. Lukban. HELD: Petition denied. the duration thereof. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. 97 SCRA 121 7. 39 Phil. “x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court. Salonga vs. 61 Phil. 23505-R. d. Larry D. The S. Shepherd (C. was to prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines. neither the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty.C.constitutional right to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right. a. b.-G. Read also the Ferdinand Marcos Cases of August & October. otherwise.R. Gacayan (2008) .

College of Law. University of the Cordilleras Baguio City .