Cap K

US-China Trade relations relies on opening markets, furthering

capitalist relations as the cornerstone of relations.
Landsberg, Economics professor at Lewis and Clark College, 05
[The U.S. Economy and China: Capitalism, Class, and Crisis by Martin HartLandsberg Martin Hart-Landsberg teaches economics at Lewis and Clark College,
Portland, Oregon, and is the author with Paul Burkett of China and Socialism
(Monthly Review Press, 2005). http://monthlyreview.org/2010/02/01/the-u-seconomy-and-china-capitalism-class-and-crisis/ , accessed July 1, 2016, MJG]
The U.S. economy is in bad shape and people are understandably seeking solutions.
Many, encouraged by mainstream media and politicians, believe that Chinas trade
policies bear primary responsibility for the structural decay of our economy and that
recovery will require, above all, pressuring the Chinese government to implement
market-freeing policy changes that will bring the U.S.-China trade relationship into
balance. Despite its popularity, this nation-state approach to understanding the
dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship is seriously flawed. It encourages people to
see U.S. industrial problems, falsely, as the outcome of a contest between China
and the United States, in which the Chinese government has boosted the well-being
of its citizens at U.S. expense, through unfair practices. As a consequence, it leads
to counterproductive policy recommendations. In this paper, I offer an alternative
approach to understanding the U.S.-China trade relationship; one that relies on a
class-based analysis of (global) capitalist dynamics . It leads, not surprisingly, to very
different economic insights and political challenges. For example, it reveals that the
threat to U.S.-based manufacturing activity comes not from China, but from the
operation of a transnational, corporate-shaped, regional production system, in
which China serves as the regions final assembly platform. It also reveals that,
while both transnational capital and elites in China have greatly benefited from the
operation of this system, Chinese workers have paid a high cost; in fact, Chinese
workers experience many of the same negative consequences from its operation as
do workers in the United States. It also explains why both the Chinese and the U.S.
governments have responded to the current world crisis with strategies designed to
maintain the status quo, despite the negative effects of this decision on working
people.

Capitalism is the root cause of ecological destruction and

interventionism causing extinction

ICT, 16

[International Communist Tendency. 2016. Against Exploitation, Crisis and War:

http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2016-04-30/against-exploitation-crisis-and-war.
Accessed 7/6/16.-KS]
Capitalism is in its deepest crisis for 80 years. The falling rate
of profit has led to a worldwide stagnation in investment. Its effects are visible everywhere. This
includes the ecological destruction of the planet which increasingly threatens the
future of life on earth itself. Around the world, governments have attacked the living
standards of the working class non-stop, in a failed attempt to reduce the debt burden called forth by
financial speculation. Simultaneously, the economic crisis has led to acts of aggression
and warlike conflicts in many regions of the globe . Whether in the South China Sea,
the Middle East or Ukraine everywhere the imperialist powers are flexing their
muscles in anticipation of an open conflict. War and Growing Barbarism It appears that we are in
an embryonic phase of a global war. In the meantime, the front line of the imperialist conflicts runs
We live in an increasingly dangerous world.

through every location, as the bombings of the last few months in Brussels, Baghdad, Beirut, Istanbul and Ankara
have shown.

The terrorism of Islamic fundamentalism is an expression of the conflict

between imperialist powers, and/or those who want to become such . Initially sponsored
and supported by the USA against the Soviet Union and certain Arab nationalist regimes, IS then found favour with
the oil monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and enjoyed the silent complicity of Turkey. Nevertheless, it escaped the

IS is the central
reference of all the fundamentalist forces. It may be conducting an assymetrical
war, but the same logic lies behind ISs bombs as its "Westernenemy has made its
own. While the latter butchers defenceless shepherds and peasants with the most
modern weapons of warfare, IS busies itself in killing defenceless people on their
way to work by using more rustic brutal methods. But the aim and content are the same. The
sole difference is that one side hides its aims by affirmation of democracy, while the other
relies on an especially reactionary and obscurantist version of religion. But these are
merely two sides of the same coin. Both are based on the exploitation and holding
down of the working class, in the particular form of Islamic fundamentalism by resorting to mediaeval
forms of repression. But, although Islamic fundamentalism stinks of putrefaction, it finds
sympathy among proletarianised immigrant youth. Growing up in the miserable
suburbs of big cities, exposed to almost daily racist discrimination, they live a life
characterised by unemployment, precarity and low-wages. It is a bleak life, without
hope of change. The experience with state capitalism, which, to the joy of all reactionaries, masqueraded as
control of its backers and now plays its own game on the international chess board. Today,

communism", and the bougeoisies massive propaganda campaigns led to all kinds of mystifications and
confusions. Social dissatisfaction and frustration are deep-seated, but a social alternative is for many scarcely
imaginable, let alone tangible. The "Arab Spring, which initially awoke great hopes, led to no positive

powerfully-funded fundamentalist
propaganda found fertile ground among some youth. It dangled before them the prospect of a
life once more given meaning, albeit an outrageous and destructive one, as cannonfodder (against themselves and others) for the economic and strategic interests of one of the
most reactionary segments of the world bourgeoisie. This shows dramatically how, given the absence of an
improvements. In this climate of socially empty existence,

organised political reference point in the working class, the anger of broad parts of the proletariat can be seized by
the bourgeoisie and used against the proletariat inside intra-bourgeois conflicts. War, Misery and Migration War
increases the importance of an essential characteristic of proletarian existence which has already always been
there: migration. Throughout the entire history of its development, the working class has been a class of migrants, a
class of people who have been forced to leave their homes to sell their labour-power wherever capitalism needed it.

This was and is the only alternative to hunger and misery in a social system in
which only submission to a merciless law of profit makes life possible . In addition to these
"traditional" migrants there is the millions of people who are trying to flee horrific

imperialist wars. They end up in the hands of unscrupulous human traffickers. If

they make it to the "rich" countries, they are forced to work in those sectors where
exploitation is especially brutal, wages especially low and working conditions
especially hard. They are held hostage by racist residence conditions, which are a
powerful weapon in the hands of the employers, keeping the migrants down and
weakening the ability of the class as a whole to fight . For this reason, a few capitalists play the
humanitarian and welcome the migrants. Others, on the contrary, who, of course, do not reject the exploitation of
migrants, make a scapegoat of them for social misery. Their strategy is to stoke up the rampant anxieties and
hysteria among those in society, but also in the class, who are unsettled by the crisis and, because of the lack of a
tangible political and social alternative, are completely disorientated. In this situation, right popularist, nationalist
and neofascist propaganda can be unleashed almost without hinderance against the "migrantsand the "Moslems,
representing them as enemies of national culture and values. It is a stitch-up, which now too often works perfectly,
especially in these economically poor times with their great social dissatisfaction and political confusion. Divide and
rule that has always been one of the essential organisational principles of capitalist society. Imperialist War or
Proletarian Revolution? We know from our daily experience as workers, whether fully employed, in precarious parttime work or unemployed, what counter-tendencies the ruling class puts into place against us, in order to put the
brakes on the crisis of their system: reduction of the costs of production (insecurity, flexibility, redundancies and
mass unemployment, competition among workers for jobs), the transfer of production to where labour-power is
cheaper, cuts in pensions and public spending, in education, in public health services and in public commuter
transport. In short, cuts in indirect and deferred wages, where these still exist. This class war of the rich has,
however, not yet called forth an adequate response of the working class. The financialisation of the economy, which
expresses itself in unprecedented financial speculation, is equally a symptom of the great problems of the world
economy and an attempt to circumvent these problems. They seek to sell us the idea that money can be made out

The huge heaps of enormous riches in tax

havens on the one hand, and the brutal intensification of exploitation on the other,
both expose the corrupt and thieving character of capitalism. The continual dismantling of
social provision and the increasing destruction of ecological resources makes one thing
completely clear: the further existence of capitalism is incompatible with the
survival of the working class, and even humanity and the sheer existence of this
planet. Our chief enemy is in our own country! It is "our" bosses and capitalists who are exploiting us and
of money, and the production process can be omitted.

burdening us with a life in misery. But every state, every nation, every political force which in any way whatsoever
participates in war and/or the preparation for future wars, is also our enemy .

For the working class there

is only one way out of the fateful spiral of crisis and war rejection of every nationalist
ideology, international solidarity, common class struggle for its own interests. The only war worth fighting
is the class war against the exploiters. For a society without exploitation, repression
and racism. A society in which the means of production are socialised and are no
longer in the hands of state or private capitalists. A society in which production and
distribution are in harmony with humanity and nature, in which "the free development of
everyone is for the free development of all."

The alternative is to vote neg to wither away the state via a

process of taking political power away from capital
Meszaros, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, 2008
[Istvan, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328]
The unreality of postulating the sustainable solution of the grave
problems of our social order within the formal and legal framework and
corresponding constraints of parliamentary politics arises from the
fundamental misconception of the structural determinations of capitals
rule, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the
political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary
framework is this that since capital is actually in control of all vital aspects

of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted

sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter,
thereby necessarily excluding the possibility of being legitimately
challenged in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive
operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the
parliamentary legislative process, even if the latter is supposed to be fully
independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the
democratic equality of all political forces participating in the legislative
process. To envisage a very different relationship to the powers of
decision making in our societies, now completely dominated by the forces
of capital in every domain, it is necessary to radically challenge capital
itself as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What
makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant
change on the margins of the established political system is that the latter
can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode
of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of
the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the
personification of capital but simultaneously functions also as the personification
of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such, the system can
claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating
the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto
but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given
necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional
foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy
of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the
conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of
labor-from the producers, and therefore capitals claimed
constitutionality (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an
unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. The social
productive powers of labor, or productive power or social labor, first develop
historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence appear as
something immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it . This
is how capitals mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes
eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system.
Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the
unalterable overall structure. The real state of affairs on thee plane of
socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor
and its absolute necessity for securing capitals own reproduction- disappears from
sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin
of capitals primitive accumulation and the concomitant, frequently violent,
expropriation of property as the precondition of the systems present mode of
functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established
productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of
labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as
subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity
is a personification of things and a reification of persons. None of this can be

challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political

reform. It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the
personification of things and the reification of persons by political
decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended
reform within the framework of capitals political institutions. For the
capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the
relationship between persons and things: capitals alienated and reified
powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle
if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as isolated
workers could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of
their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of
parliamentary reforms enacted under capitals order of social metabolic control.
For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over
the material stakes of either/or Capital can neither abdicate its-usurpedsocial productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor,
thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious political compromise. For
they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of
the rule of wealth over society. Thus it is impossible to escape, in the
domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of
either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human
society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated
producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers
arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer
isolated-members. Capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It
cannot possibly be politically constrained by parliament in its power of
social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political
representation compatible with capitals mode of functioning is one that
effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. And
precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence,
it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its
parliamentary political framework. Since the vital issue on which everything
else hinges is that the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed
under the worker buy, on the contrary, he appears as subsumed under them, no
meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics
capable of matching capitals extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and
in the domain of material reproduction. Thus the only challenge that could affect the
power of capital, in a sustainable manner, is one which would simultaneously aim at
assuming the systems key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the
corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being
hopelessly constrained by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated
political action to parliamentary legislation. There is a great deal of critique of
formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in
the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such
debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they
often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political
institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized personal
betrayals and the painful party derailments. Unfortunately, though the

advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to

reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising.
The reason why the now established political institutions successfully
resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves
part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they
are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions
through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of
bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the
last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided
mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the
material ground of capitals historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the
latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the
prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changingcircumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capitals
productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic
transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the
required function of being the overall command structure of the capital
system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall
decision making from the producers. Even the particular personifications of capital
were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their
system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the
capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of
comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely nave to
imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated
power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within
the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, in order to envisage a
meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to
submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the
political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of
the contingent and limited political practices. The combined totality of the
material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political
command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering
reality of the capital system. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question
arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both
socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive
political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of
societys vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political
change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem
characterized as the withering away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic
task of accomplishing the withering away of the state, self-management through
full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism
by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital
concern and not romantic faithfulness to Marxs unrealizable dream, as some
people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, the withering away of the state
refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process
that must be initiated right in our own historical time. It means, in plain
language, the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political

decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a

genuine socialist society. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only
the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched
material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode
of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed
the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the
particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated
producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the
material and political ground of globally viable planning - an absolute must
for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched
self realization- of its individual members - is synonymous with the
withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise.

Japan DA
Political rhetoric has pushed alliance to the brink action now
is key
Tatsumi 5/7 [Yuki, Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Stimson
Center in Washington, Donald Trump: A Reality Check for the US-Japan Alliance
The Diplomat, 5/7/16, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/donald-trump-a-realitycheck-for-the-us-japan-alliance/] MG
Donald Trump caused a
major stir again in Japan when he said Tokyo should pay for all the costs of
stationing U.S. forces in Japan, or Japan will have to defend themselves . The Japanese
With the Republican nomination for this falls U.S. presidential election all but locked in,

government promptly dismissed Trumps remark as unrealistic. True, Trumps statement is yet another reflection of his gross lack
of basic knowledge (much less experience) in foreign policy. Even President Barack Obama could not restrain himself from joking
about this during his White House Correspondence Dinner speech, suggesting that theres one area where Donalds experience
could be invaluable and thats closing Guantanamo. Because Trump knows a thing or two about running waterfront properties into

Trumps accusation is far from the truth: Japan pays a considerable

amount of money to cover the cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan . On April 1, 2016, the
the ground. Indeed,

revised host nation support agreement took effect, under which the size of the host nation support that Japan will shoulder over the
next five yearsapproximately $1.6 billion per yearslightly increased compared to the previous five years. In terms of covering
the cost for U.S. forces overseas, Japan is by far the most generous ally, covering at least approximately 75 percent of the operation
costs for U.S. Forces in Japan. So, purely in dollar terms, Japan clearly pays its share. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for
full access. Just $5 a month. Looking beyond Trumps outlandish rhetoric, however, one has to recognize that the United States
expressing its frustration over allies not doing more is hardly new. Back in June 2011, Robert Gates, Obamas first secretary of
defense, bluntly warned in his last speech before NATO that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress
and in the American body politic writ large to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling
to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.
Trumps rhetoric, as provocative and unrealistic as it is, is largely consistent with the sentiment that Gates predicted as something
that we would see in U.S. politics. One might argue that Japan has been doing more. But the reality is, Japan still is not spending
enough, even on its own defense. Despite the proposition by the current government that Japanese defense budget is increasing,
the ration of defense spending to Japans Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has largely remain stagnant, hovering barely above 1
percent. Bluntly put, Japan was spending more on defense in FY 1997 than it is today. In fact, pressure on the acquisition budget is
so high that the introduction of major platforms such as the F-35A, Global Hawk, V-22 Osprey, C-2, and P-1 not to mention
continuing investment in ballistic missile defense is coming at the cost of a reduced budget for the items that are necessary to
maintain readiness and sustainment: ammunition, improvements in logistical capability, and training. Put simply, the current level of
Japans defense spending remains prohibitive for Japan to make the changes necessary to, in Gates word, be serious and capable
partners in their own defense. Legally speaking, with the security legislation that has been enacted on April 1, Japan today can
definitely do more, as long as the contingencies in question are considered to affect Japans survival, or security of its allies and
important partners. But if there is one takeaway from the debate over Japans security legislation last year, its that the Japanese
public is clearly more willing to support the government in its effort to harden its own defense, while they remain uncertain about
Japan joining broader international coalition to tackle security concerns that are far from their borders, especially when there is no

Despite the alliance managers aspiration for the U.S.-Japan

alliance to be a global strategic partnership, this may point to a serious disconnect
between what Japans policy elites envisions and what the public is willing to allow
its government to do. There is no doubt that Trumps portrayal of Japan and other U.S. allies
as if they are mere free-riders on the U.S. security guarantee is seriously flawed. At the same time,
however, his rhetoricand also the political reality that Trump, despite constant criticism from policy elites, has
emerged as the presumptive Republican nomineesuggests that a similar disconnect between what
policy elites envision as the U.S. role in the world and what the voters expect from
their government likely exists in the United States. Rather than remain dismissive, the alliance
managers in both countries may be better served if they consider Trumps
ascendance as a sign that they cannot be complacent and must double-down on
their efforts to articulate the strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance .
clear mandate by the United Nations.

Japan views US engagement with China as a signal of

abandonment, weakening the alliance
Novak 2014 - graduate student at the National Sun Yat-sen University (NSYSU) in
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies (ICAPS) and the
Center for Japanese Studies Nathan, "PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON WHY DO THE
JAPANESE FEAR ABANDONMENT?: A (POTENTIALLY NEW) PERSPECTIVE FROM
WHICH TO EXAMINE SINO-U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS," Mar 12,
https://eastasiaobserver.wordpress.com/2014/03/12/preliminary-reflections-on-whydo-the-japanese-fear-abandonment-a-potentially-new-perspective-from-which-toexamine-sino-u-s-japan-relations/
A discussion of what amounted to, although no one used the term extended deterrence, a discussion of the
creditability of both the conventional and nuclear elements of the U.S. policy of extended deterrence ensued. One
could, had one listened closely, noted a bit of a gulf between the American (with the exception of this writer) and
Taiwanese (with the exception of the Chief Executer of the CJS) scholars on one side, who believed that the JIIA
scholar was being too pessimistic about U.S. commitments and capabilities, and the Japanese scholars, who were
far more skeptical of said capabilities and commitments. Indeed, during the climax of the discussion, the wellknown American scholar asked the JIIA scholar point blank: Why

do the Japanese fear

abandonment? This question followed several comments by this particular American scholar about the
continuous strengthening of the alliance especially since the mid-1990s. It is a difficult question, one which the JIIA
scholar handled in a typical way but which, I think, needs further historical background if one is to drive the real
the United States had throughout the history of the alliance given
mixed signals to the Japanese government about its preferences and intentions on a
plethora of issues. There was no reason to believe that this would suddenly stop because now China was
point home. The JIIA scholar responded that

perceived by many as the external threat binding the two allies (and, by way of inference, other allies as well as
security partners) together. In effect, Japans

pursuit of a limited first-strike capacity was at

once both a demonstration to its senior alliance partner that Japan had the will to
possess and use such capabilities if necessary (enhancing the credibility of Japans own
commitment as the junior member of the alliance) and ahere comes the watchwordhedge against
potential U.S. nonintervention in, or even an altogether abrogation of the alliance due to, a regional
conflict that pitted Japan against another regional power. (The obvious reference here was to
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, although the JIIA scholar did not mention China or that dispute in particular.)
After the question was asked and before the JIIA scholar answered, the Chief Executer of the CJS, who is also one of
my co-advisers, turned to me, and we both said the same thing to each other quietly: It [the alliance dilemma
mentioned in the question] is structural. Thati.e., the structural element of abandonment and entrapmentis
certainly one, and admittedly a major, factor. But as I have revisited this question, thought deeply about my own

not only are there structural

postwar-alliance (discussed by the
scholar from the JIIA in the previous paragraph); and political, economic, and sociocultural (as
discussed at length in the Calder book, referenced in f.n. 1) factors involved; there are also deeper
historical (pre-1945) and very important long-term strategic factors with historical
antecedents that play into these fears, warranted or not, of Japan passing, a SinoU.S. condominium (or a so-called G2) basically at Japans expense, and an abrogation of
the U.S.-Japan security treaty in order for the United States (and potentially Japan) to seek
closer relations with China at the expense of Japan. The logic behind this, too, is partly
structural, but it is also historical and often overlooked because many scholarly
works on Japan and U.S.-Japan relations, since they focus on either the nature of Japans political
academic work, and read much more, I have come to the conclusion that
(the one briefly mentioned between my co-advisor and myself, above);

system or on the post-1945 U.S.-Japan relationship (i.e., the alliance), either purposely or inadvertently leave out
the competitive influences that drove the United States and Japan towards total war. And as perhaps the best
single-volume work on the broader history of the U.S.-Japan relationship, a study which spans nearly a century and
a half of these two nations relations, put it, one of these competitive influences rested on the role Japan and the

United States (as well as other powers) would play in China and their competing views regarding what China would
ideally resemble and whose interests it would ultimately serve. Hence ,

it is no mistake that as China

develops, seeks greater amounts of foreign capital, sees its domestic market grow numerically
and with regard to purchasing potential, and becomes a major regional and even global strategic player, both
Japanese and Americans are concerned not only with how China itself will behave
but also how the two (Japan and America) will behave towards each other. The competing
discourses in both countries on China the threat and China the opportunity
clearly factor in here as well, and these competitive influences make it ever easier for Chinese strategy
to exploit, or at least probe, these areas of intra-alliance weakness. Simply put, both allies, for both
structural and deeper strategic reasons (which can be traced throughout their prewar and even
postwar historical interactions), view each others approaches toward China with
incredulity , uncertainty, and, at times, open cynicism . These sentiments further
heighten the security dilemma in alliance politics . However, the contextual and historical
background as well as particular features of the U.S.-Japan relationship itself suggest not only that these structural
factors will be more acute but that, beyond these structural variables themselves, policy, strategic thinking, and
strategic behavior will increasingly, and ultimately, be at odds.

A weak alliance causes Japan to seek nuclear weapons and

trigger an arms race
Hunt 2015 - postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit,
nonpartisan Rand Corp
Jonathan, "Out of the Mushroom Clouds Shadow," Aug 5,
foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/
The U.S. explosions that devastated Hiroshima and, three days later, the city of Nagasaki, seared an aversion to
nuclear weapons into the Japanese psyche, embodied by people like Sumiteru Taniguchi. But although Japan never
developed nuclear weapons, this aversion has not kept Japan out of the business of nuclear weapons altogether: Its
advanced civilian nuclear program helped it recruit the United States and its nuclear deterrent as its guardians in

With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society
gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind , however, the security
alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are
increasingly crucial backstops for Japans commitments to nonprolif eration and
disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia . If Japan
pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread , especially
in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club , Japan has
long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts
the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency the global nuclear watchdog on
activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing . In 1998, it was the first
the 1960s and 1970s.

to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous
inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials
of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and
eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs
enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in
Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During
the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive
aftereffects on the cities populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry
in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese
fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to
public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies Godzilla.
One year later, Japans parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a
norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear

Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet

Japanese leaders

renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute . In private remarks, many of
Japans prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their countrys national
security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted
that he saw no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything
else.) After Chinas first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that if the [Chinese]
had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them. He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U.

Japan not build atomic

bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security
Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were nonsense. Why then did

treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those
treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after Chinas nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team
devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965,
Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, if Japan needs our
nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.

These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect . In 1967, Sato acknowledged the
importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara: The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no
intention to make nuclear weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence
also formed a pillar of Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime
minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Fords
reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the
Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries foreign and defense ministers would
thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and
international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio
Kishida who hails from Hiroshima renewed calls to accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review
Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to witness with their own eyes
the reality of atomic bombings. And yet,

Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its

military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States
that encourage Japan to function more proactively in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing
aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War
II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a
limited nuclear arsenal would not necessarily violate the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear
status in 2006, but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional
and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems
inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own
nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyangs provocations. South Korea is even more
exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the
radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to
withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing
defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space
program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than

if Japan wanted to, it could probably

develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to
five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as
Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play
1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed,

a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level
consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea trilateral coordination is overdue. The
United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military
spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset
smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and
increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and
humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the
generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a
more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some experts
promoting tailored proliferation to U.S. allies to counter Chinas rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks
regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70
years after two artificial suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has

With
Japans nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of
the nuclear pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential .
afforded Tokyo the security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them.

That escalates quickly into a global war

Tan 2015 - Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales
Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31
East Asias arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which
a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by
other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and
ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are
supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asias sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War
in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that
growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 4748). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have
remained. Japans imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account
for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South
Korea. In additions, t he divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as
strong as intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean
peninsula . The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional
institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust
and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during the Cold
War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the SixParty Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem
North Koreas open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again.
The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of
miscalculation as a result of misperception . Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced
that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same

there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should
now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and
South China Seas. Thus, Chinas nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory
emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China
and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional .
As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South
Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and
in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East
Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long . In fact , it is likely that it would
rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely
China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.
time,

Case

Relations Adv
China wont go to SCS war threats are a diplomatic
bargaining tool.
Kelly 13 (Michael Kelly, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for International
Programs @ Creighton School of Law, Why China Doesn't Really Want the Senkaku
Islands, JURIST - Forum, December 7, 2013,
http://jurist.org/forum/2013/12/michael-kelly-china-senkaku.php)
Mr. Xi knows he can get much
more fossil fuel to feed his carbon-thirsty economy from the South China Sea deposits
than he could from the comparatively meager East China Sea. His strategy is to create the biggest
fuss possible with brinksmanship tactics over the Senkaku Islands in order to bring a
frayed and twitchy Japan to the bargaining table, with the US nervously in the
background pushing hard for peace. And then, he will pitch his grand bargain. In
exchange for relinquishing China's claim to the Senkakus, Mr. Xi would want Japan
to support China's claim to the South China Sea. Politically, the Japanese
government comes home with a huge victory that costs it virtually nothing. But of
Whatever the origins of the revived Senkaku claim forty three years ago,

course, what Japan gives China in this grand bargain is far more valuable to China than a handful of rocks near

With Japan backing its claim in the South China Sea and the US backing off,
China will be in a position to deal bilaterally with the claims of the smaller states.
Unable to withstand the political, economic and military might of their vastly larger
neighbor, the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines will eventually
collapse through bribery, bullying and benevolence alternately applied. Long the object
of Euro-Japanese grand bargains that carved up its territory and subjugated its people, China now seeks a
grand bargain of its own. Mr. Xi understands that his country has the leverage to
pull one off, and he is gambling that this feint to the Senkakus will get him the
support from the other Great Powers to do it.
Okinawa.

Double Bind the US and China cooperated over climate change

during the Paris agreements; either status quo solves
relations, or the plan cannot solve
US-China relations strong, military proves
Pavgi 15 (Kedar Pavgi, 8-4-2015, Kedar Pavgi is an M.A. candidate at Johns
Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced International Studies. He received his
bachelors degree from the College of William and Mary, where he studied
economics and international relations. "Heres One Way the US-China Relationship Is
Improving," Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/08/heres-oneway-us-china-relationship-improving/118865/)
As for China, it has long seemed to regard mil-to-mil contacts less as a tool and
more as a signal. Beijing switched contacts on and off depending on the state of
diplomatic relations, said Joseph Prueher, a retired admiral who led U.S. Pacific Command and served as
ambassador to China. When relations were warm, as in in the late 1990s, military contacts
were relatively robust and extensive. When they chilled after U.S forces accidentally bombed the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, or after the 2001 collision with a Chinese fighter jet that downed a Navy

Right now, the

U.S. and China work together in several areas, including counterpiracy and
counterterrorism missions in the Gulf of Aden. Chinese military officials also pay regular visits to
intelligence plane on Hainan Island mil-to-mil contacts were among the first to be cut off.

U.S. military educational institutions, like the February visit that brought to the National Defense University a 12person delegation led by Rear Adm. Li Ji, the head of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs. A senior

mil-to-mil relationship has sustained positive momentum over

the past few years, deepening bilateral engagements and making progress
developing risk reduction measures. Thats in large part because the countries themselves
are becoming more and more intertwined. As the U.S. continues its turn towards the
Asia-Pacific, bringing two nuclear-armed powers in closer contact with each other,
the military-to-military relationship is becoming more important than ever. The
question of whether war is inevitable is at the base of this, said Miller, the former policy
chief. This administration in particular has made the calculation that its not
inevitable, but its possible, and we want to both work with the Chinese, and at the
same time approach that work with them from a position of strong alliances and
strong military and other capabilities.
defense official said that the

Climate Change Adv

Double Bind The Paris talks applied emission restrictions to
almost all countries in the world, including the US and China;
either the status quo solves, as it applies to all countries, or
the plan doesnt solve, as it does less than Paris
Climate Change isnt anthropogenic - the 97% consensus is
riddled with inaccuracies and errors
Tol14, (6-6-2014, Richard Tol, "The claim of a 97% consensus on global warming does
not stand up," Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jun/06/97-consensus-globalwarming)

At best, Nuccitelli, John Cook and colleagues may have accidentally stumbled on the
right number. Cook and co selected some 12,000 papers from the scientific literature to test whether
these papers support the hypothesis that humans played a substantial role in the observed warming of the Earth. 12,000 is a

climate literature is much larger. The number of papers on the detection and attribution of
Cooks sample is not representative. Any conclusion they draw is
not about the literature but rather about the papers they happened to find. Most
of the papers they studied are not about climate change and its causes, but many were
taken as evidence nonetheless. Papers on carbon taxes naturally assume that
carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming but assumptions are not conclusions.
strange number. The

climate change is much, much smaller.

Cooks claim of an increasing consensus over time is entirely due to an increase of the number of irrelevant papers that Cook and co

abstracts of the 12,000 papers were rated, twice, by 24 volunteers.

Twelve rapidly dropped out, leaving an enormous task for the rest. This shows. There are
patterns in the data that suggest that raters may have fallen asleep with their nose
on the keyboard. In July 2013, Mr Cook claimed to have data that showed this is not the
case. In May 2014, he claimed that data never existed. The data is also ridden with error. By Cooks own
calculations, 7% of the ratings are wrong. Spot checks suggest a much larger number of errors, up
to one-third. Cook tried to validate the results by having authors rate their own papers. In almost two out of
three cases, the author disagreed with Cooks team about the message of
the paper in question. The 97% consensus paper rests on yet another claim: the raters are incidental, it is the rated
mistook for evidence. The

papers that matter. If you measure temperature, you make sure that your thermometers are all properly and consistently calibrated.

Cook does not test whether the raters judge the

same paper in the same way. Consensus is irrelevant in science. There are plenty of
examples in history where everyone agreed and everyone was wrong. Cooks
consensus is also irrelevant in policy. They try to show that climate change is
real and human-made. It is does not follow whether and by how much greenhouse
gas emissions should be reduced.
Unfortunately, although he does have the data,

Their own Jamail 15 evidence says extinction is inevitable, as

we are already too far into the feedback loops
Climate change cant be solved by developed countries alone
polluters move elsewhere; this leads to higher levels of
pollution
Stephen Sewalk, 2014, (Assistant Professor Real Estate and Construction
Management, University of Denver, page 527-528, Construction Management, Real
Estate, Built Environment, Carbon Emissions, Tax, The EU-27, U.S., U.K., and China
Should Dump Cap-and-Trade as a Policy Option and Adopt a Carbon Tax with
Reinvestment To Reduce Global Emissions, Hein Online,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/sufflr47&type=Image&id=563)
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (dubbed "the
Earth Summit"), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, called upon developed
countries to reduce GHG emissions.34 This Summit led to the Kyoto Protocol.35
Following Rio and Kyoto, foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countrieswhich were not held accountable for their levels of emissions-boomed,
leading to rapidly rising emissions in these countries. After developed
countries capped their emissions, the significant flow of FDI into developing
countries allowed [developing] nations to benefit from their omission to internalize
environmental negativities [, which] could be both environmentally and
economically counter- productive. If mobile taxpaying industries relocate to
pollution haven countries that offer little environmental regulation or taxation, then
an environmentally conscious country could lose valuable industries and their
receipts, while no overall environmental benefit would accrue, as the industry may
continue, or even increase levels of pollution overseas.36

Ignore their Schiller card which says Warming outweighs

nuclear war, its only warrant is that people believe warming is
worse, it doesnt factor in the impact triangle and warrants
like magnitude, probability, or timeframe
No Impact to Warming
Daily Mail 2015
(Is climate change really that dangerous? Predictions are 'very greatly
exaggerated', claims study, 1-21, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article2920311/Is-climate-change-really-dangerous-Predictions-greatly-exaggeratedclaims-study.html)
The paper claims that the measured, real-world rate of global warming over the past
25 years, equivalent to less than 1.4 C per century, is half the IPCC's central

prediction in 1990. In 1990, the UN's climate panel predicted with substantial
confidence that the world would warm at twice the rate that has been observed
since. According to the study, another error made by the complex climate models,
include the assumption that temperature feedbacks would double or triple direct
manmade greenhouse warming. The simple model instead found that feedbacks could reduce warming. Also,
modellers are said to have failed to cut their estimate of global warming in line with a new, lower feedback estimate from the IPCC.
They

still predict 3.3C of warming per CO2 doubling, when on this ground alone
they should only be predicting 2.2C - about half from direct warming and half from
feedbacks, said the researchers. Though the complex models say there is 0.6C
manmade warming "in the pipeline" even if we stop emitting greenhouse
gases, the simple model - confirmed by almost two decades without any
significant global warming - shows there is no committed but unrealised
manmade warming still to come. Once these errors are corrected, the
researchers predict that the most likely global warming in response to a doubling of
CO2 is not 3.3 C, but 1C or less. And, even if all available fossil fuels were
burned, less than 2.2C warming would result, they claim. Author Dr Willie Soon, an
solar physicist at the Harvard-Smithsonian Centre for Astrophysics, said: Our work suggests that man's
influence on climate may have been much overstated. The role of the sun has been
undervalued. Our model helps to present a more balanced view. A high-school student with a
pocket scientific calculator can now use this model and obtain credible estimates of global warming simply and quickly, as well as

As a
statistician, I know the value of keeping things simple and the dangers in thinking
that more complex models are necessarily better. Once people can understand how climate sensitivity
is determined, they will realise how little evidence for alarm there is. While Lord Monckton said: 'Our
irreducibly simple climate model does not replace more complex models, but it does
expose major errors and exaggerations in those models. For instance, take away
the erroneous assumption that strongly net-positive feedback triples the rate of
manmade global warming and the imagined climate crisis vanishes.
acquiring a better understanding of how climate sensitivity is determined, added statistician and co-author Dr Matt Briggs.