Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
No. 10-4957
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00346-TDS-1)
Submitted:
Decided:
remanded
for
David B. Freedman, CRUMPLER FREEDMAN PARKER & WITT, WinstonSalem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
In October 2009, a federal grand jury charged Michael
Uyioghosa
Ohangbon
with
possession
with
intent
to
distribute
convicted
felon,
in
violation
of
18
U.S.C.
922(g)(1)
in
violation
of
18
U.S.C.
922(g)(5)
(2006)
(Count
Four).
Ohangbon moved to suppress the evidence recovered from
his vehicle following a traffic stop and from the subsequent
search of his residence.
cause
or
reasonable
suspicion
to
stop
his
vehicle.
We
affirm
his
convictions
but
vacate
and
remand
for
resentencing.
We
review
factual
findings
underlying
the
district
Cir.
2009),
denied,
130
S.
Ct.
1104
(2010).
F.3d
326,
omitted).
evidence
337
(4th
However,
is
if
plausible
in
Cir.
the
2008)
district
light
of
quotation
courts
the
record
marks
account
of
the
viewed
in
its
we
would
have
decided
the
fact
differently.
United
States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Id. (internal
also
defer
to
the
district
courts
credibility
(4th
Cir.
2008)
quotation
3
marks
omitted).
We
construe
the
Government
evidence
as
the
in
party
the
light
prevailing
most
favorable
below.
United
to
the
States
v.
Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1599 (2011).
A
traffic
stop
of
vehicle
constitutes
seizure
officer
has
either
probable
cause
to
believe
traffic
v.
Ohio,
392
officers
subjective
813-19.
See
U.S.
United
1,
motivations,
States v.
(Observing
justification
vehicle
for
20-22
for
as
a
a
long
(1968),
regardless
Whren,
517 U.S.
Branch,
traffic
police
as
it
537
F.3d
violation
officer
takes
to
to
of
at
328,
the
810,
335
provides
detain
the
perform
the
the
evidence
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
initiate
traffic
stop
notwithstanding
the
discrepancies
Ohangbon identifies.
Ohangbon contends that, in any event, his movements
did
not
violate
North
Carolina
law
because
there
was
no
We disagree.
Stat.
law
20-146(d)(1),
20-154(a)
(2009).
The
does
not
motorists.
concluding
The
Detective
district
Saintsing
court
had
thus
did
reasonable
not
err
suspicion
in
that
Ohangbons
Whren,
further
argues
that
the
illegible
Stat.
20-111(1),
willfully.
Saintsing
(2)
(2009),
because
he
did
not
act
reasonable
suspicion
to
initiate
the
traffic
Ohangbon
argues
that
the
district
court
offense
level
based
on
its
finding
that
he
possessed
See U.S.
firearm
offense.
or
USSG
ammunition
in
connection
2K2.1(b)(6).
with
firearm
another
is
felony
possessed
in
USSG
alterations
(internal
omitted).
quotation
Here,
the
marks,
district
citations,
court,
and
relying
on
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010), among
other cases, concluded that the Government had established the
applicability of the four-level enhancement.
finding,
The
district
by
substituting
enhancement
under
2K2.1(b)(6). 3
Manigan,
for
court
erred,
the
standards
2D1.1(b)(1)
Those
example,
however,
to
provisions
concerned
the
reaching
applicable
one
are
in
to
applicable
not
its
an
under
interchangeable.
application
of
USSG
used
felony
or
possessed
offense.
firearm
USSG
in
connection
2K2.1(b)(6).
with
Section
2D1.1(b)(1)
provides
for
two-level
enhancement
while
different
2K2.1(b)(6)
burdens.
are
penalties
reflected
in
in
their
2D1.1(b)(1)
elements
and
and
shifting
USSG 2D1.1
or
had
the
potential
of
facilitating,
another
USSG 2K2.1
of
analogizing
in
connection
shifting
burden
standard
applicable
to
the
two-level
However,
because
8
it
appears
that
the
district
to
we
impose
four-level
vacate
Ohangbons
enhancement
sentence
as
under
procedurally