Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
No. 12-2496
ROBERT YATES, MJG08269; ALAN S. BARRY, MJG08269; DAVID
YOUNG,
MJG08269;
CARLO
HORNSBY;
ED
FRIEDLANDER,
MJG08269; PAUL ENGEL, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated MJG08292; WILLIAM D. FELIX;
DAVID KREMSER, on behalf of himself and on behalf of Elk
Meadow Investments, LLC; CHARLES W. DAMMEYER, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs Appellants,
and
F. RICHARD MANSON, individually and on behalf of, all
others
similarly
situated
MJG08269;
GEETA
SHAILAM,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
MJG08386; MICHAEL J. CIRRITO, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated MJG08476; JOHN J.
HUFNAGLE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly
situated
MJG08579;
WILLIAM
JOHNSTON,
derivatively on behalf of Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC
MJG08670;
ROBERT
STAUB,
derivatively
on
behalf
of
Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC
MJG08802; THE MARY L.
KIESER TRUST, by Mary L. Kieser and Ralph F. Kieser,
Trustees, derivatively and on behalf of Nominal Defendant,
Municipal
Mortgage
&
Equity
LLC
MJG08805;
JUDITH
GREENBERG; JOSEPH S. GELMIS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated MJG082133; ARNOLD J. ROSS,
MJG082133; TROY BROY; JULES ROTHAS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated MJG082134; NAOMI
RAPHAEL; FAFN/SLATER GROUP; KREMSER GROUP, MJG08269,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MUNICIPAL MORTGAGE & EQUITY, LLC; MELANIE M. LUNDQUIST;
MICHAEL L. FALCONE; MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER AND SMITH
INCORPORATED; RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC.; MARK K. JOSEPH;
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:08-md-01961-MJG)
Argued:
Decided:
March 7, 2014
ARGUED: David A.P. Brower, BROWER PIVEN, New York, New York, for
Appellants.
Mark Holland, New York, New York, William M. Jay,
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jason J. Mendro, GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Charles J. Piven, Yelena Trepetin, BROWER PRIVEN, Stevenson,
Maryland; Sherrie R. Savett, Barbara A. Podell, Eric Lechtzin,
BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kim E.
Miller, KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC, New York, New York; Susan K.
Alexander, Andrew S. Love, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, San
Francisco, California, for Appellants.
Jonathan C. Dickey,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith Incorporated, and RBC
Capital Markets, LLC.
Mary K. Dulka, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, New
York, New York; Anthony Candido, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, New York,
2
(collectively,
the
representatives,
MuniMae
defendants),
violated
that
the
MuniMae
defendants
in
2003;
and
(2)
concealing
the
substantial
cost
of
and
fraudulent
that,
conduct,
as
result
investors
of
paid
the
an
MuniMae
defendants
artificially
inflated
district
and
20(a)
court
of
dismissed
the
plaintiffs
Securities
Exchange
claims
under
Act
1934,
of
to
secondary
public
offering
(SPO).
The
court
and
12(a)(2)
that
claim.
plaintiffs
It
lacked
dismissed
standing
the
15
to
bring
claim
the
because
I.
In reviewing the district court's dismissal under Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6),
we
accept
all
factual
See In re
PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 390 & n.10 (4th
Cir. 2005).
2
A.
The putative class period for this case spans from May 3,
2004, to January 29, 2008.
(LIHTCs).
developers
developers
of
low-income
cannot
services
Federal
take
companies,
tax
rental
advantage
like
law
provides
housing.
of
MuniMae,
LIHTCs
Because
these
credits,
organize
LIHTC
to
most
financial
investment
management
fees
for
organizing
and
maintaining
them.
Accounting
46R),
which
Standards
Board
addressed
the
Interpretation
financial
No.
46R
reporting
activity. 3
of
VIE
if
the
company
is
its
primary
risks
and
rewards
associated
with
the
VIE.
Before
the
to
consolidate
financial
statements
if
it
had
reported
compliance
with
FIN
46R.
The
Company
then
liabilities
remaining
to
the
unconsolidated
approximately
$970.3
Companys
LIHTC
million
and
financial
Funds
statements.
had
net
liabilities
of
assets
The
of
approximately
$90.8 million.
Through
mid-2006,
MuniMae
continued
to
represent
its
compliance with FIN 46R in financial reports filed with the SEC.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), MuniMaes independent public
accountant, certified that those reports had been prepared in
3
accordance
with
generally
accepted
accounting
principles
At the
restatement
corrected
certain
financial
reporting
errors
weaknesses
in
internal
controls
over
financial
J.A. 65.
A few
The
address
commitments
three
related
to
areas:
(1)
affordable
accounting
housing
for
projects;
equity
(2)
the
accounting
for
syndication
8
fees.
About
month
later,
however,
MuniMae
disclosed
that
it
had
not
yet
reached
October
26,
2006,
MuniMae
announced
that
it
was
months
later,
the
J.A. 1120.
Company
reported
its
40th
In the same
J.A. 1373.
timely
dedication
file
of
its
10-K
significant
restatement efforts.
for
2006
[a]s
management
J.A. 1129.
result
resources
to
of
the
. . .
in
its
internal
controls
over
financial
reporting,
including
July
Navigant
10,
2007,
Consulting
restatement.
to
MuniMae
assist
announced
its
that
internal
it
had
auditors
hired
in
the
currently
working
on
the
restatement,
including
J.A. 1145.
20
Around the
held
teleconference
on
November
8,
2007
to
net
cash
from
operations
due
to
the
costs
J.A. 1155.
being
The
credit
and
capital
markets,
and
the
desire
to
dedicate
J.A. 1171.
Id.
being
delisted
from
the
New
York
Stock
Exchange
because it could not meet a NYSE deadline for filing its 2006
Form 10-K.
to
FIN
46R,
the
Company
disclosed
that
it
With
had
to
financial
statements.
Because
the
Company
had
no
were
Companys
result
instance[,]
CEO
of
the
Michael
Falcone
mistakes
expressed
his
in
the
first
disappointment
and embarrassment over the the amount of time and energy and
11
shares
dropped
an
J.A. 1196.
additional
22.416%,
The price of
to
$7.13
per
filed
multiple
lawsuits
against
MuniMae,
&
571
Derivative
Litig.,
F.
Supp.
2d
1373
(J.P.M.L.
2008).
See
In
re
Mun.
Mortg.
&
Equity,
LLC,
Sec.
also
dismissed
plaintiffs
Securities
Act
The
with
claims
&
See id. at
II.
A.
We
first
consider
the
district
courts
dismissal
of
1934
and
SEC
Rule
10b-5
for
failing
to
adequately
plead
scienter.
The
purpose
of
the
Exchange
Act
and
its
accompanying
See 15
any
device,
13
scheme,
or
artifice
to
defendant;
(2)
misrepresentation
scienter;
or
(3)
omission
and
a
the
connection
purchase
between
or
sale
the
of
establish
defendant
acted
scienter,
with
deceive,
manipulate,
(internal
quotation
alleging
either
sufficient.
10(b)
See
context,
a
or
mental
state
or
reckless
act
At
severely
Capital,
must
576
is
551
the
at
that
that
the
intent
to
U.S.
pleading
reckless
F.3d
one
prove
embracing
Tellabs,
omitted).
intentional
plaintiff
defraud.
marks
Matrix
Id.
so
319
stage,
conduct
181.
is
at
In
is
the
highly
in
private
securities
complaints.
See
Teachers
Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 171-72 (4th Cir.
2007).
The
complaint
must
state
with
particularity
facts
required
state
of
mind
with
respect
to
each
act
that
15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2).
[T]o
respect
corporation.
to
at
least
Matrix
one
Capital,
authorized
576
F.3d
at
agent
182
of
the
(internal
See id.
of
scienter
can
only
be
strong
. . .
when
[A]n
it
is
facts
in
their
entirety.
Cozzarelli
v.
Inspire
Pharm.
Zucco Partners,
LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).
As applied here, the question is whether the allegations
in the complaint, viewed in their totality and in light of all
the evidence in the record, allow us to draw a strong inference,
at
least
MuniMae
as
compelling
defendants
as
either
any
opposing
knowingly
or
inference,
that
the
recklessly
defrauded
If we find the
compelling
than
the
inference
that
they
acted
with
the
Id.
B.
1.
We begin by considering whether the facts alleged in the
amended complaint give rise to an inference of scienter and, if
so, the strength of that inference.
evaluate plaintiffs
allegations
16
of
Although we ultimately
scienter
holistically,
we
rely
on
four
categories
of
allegations
as
to
amended
complaint
incorporates
information
chooses
sources,
it
to
must
rely
on
describe
facts
the
provided
sources
by
obtained
When the
confidential
with
sufficient
quotation
marks
omitted).
[O]missions
and
factual
particularity.
allegations
must
be
stated
with
Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 (3d Cir. 2009)
(noting
that
confidential
courts
should
sources
reliability).
We
confidential
witnesses
steeply
that
present
lack
the
before
discount
sufficient
allegations
assessing
17
allegations
the
of
indicia
from
of
each
of
the
strength
of
the
i.
CW3
served
manager
in
attended
as
MuniMaes
accounting
defendants.
Confidential Witness 3
staff
accountant
Internal
meetings
According
to
Accounting
with
CW3,
and
several
MuniMae
later
project
Department.
of
CW3
the
individual
executives
considered
CW3
but
certain
recommendation.
MuniMae
executives
disagreed
with
that
PwC about how to classify the tax credit equity funds and how to
determine the percentage of ownership MuniMae held on each one.
J.A. 84. 4
CW3 also states that the Company was always in a state
of some confusion and chaos as a result of MuniMaes rapid
expansion.
J.A. 68.
and
staff
legal
was
with
documentation
as
the
J.A. 68-69.
18
unprepared
professionally
for
the
complex
nature
of
the
J.A.
69.
ii.
Confidential Witness 2
and
MuniMaes
Chief
Accounting
Officer,
Greg
Thor.
CW2 asserts that by early 2006, Lundquist and Thor had concluded
that there were widespread problems with the accounting done
under former CFO Harrison.
among
other
According
things,
to
restatement),
CW2,
the
by
mid-2006
Lundquist
knew
(at
that
LIHTC
the
Fund
time
the
accounting.
of
the
primary
first
beneficiary
determinations for most LIHTC Funds were incorrect and that the
Funds should have been consolidated under FIN 46R.
CW2 also
effort,
with
Falcone
receiving
updates
regarding
J.A. 82.
iii. Confidential Witness 1
In
that
capacity,
CW1
attended
regular
meetings
to
According to CW1, at
regular
subject
of
discussion
at
the
meetings,
and
Fall
2006
emphasizing
that
the
auditing
staff
would
be
The
memo made clear that the related audit work should be made a
priority
and
excuses
regarding
delays
providing
the
Audit
J.A. 81.
despite
their
representations
to
the
contrary.
The
knew--or
at
least
suspected--by
Fall
2006
that
To
do
not
begin
support
with,
the
strong
inference
confidential
of
witnesses
wrongful
do
not
20
failed
to
comply
with
GAAP
or
their
generally
vague
and
conclusory
own
internal
as
to
the
MuniMae
This complexity
The
then
by
allowing
the
Company
support
powerful
and
to
be
overwhelmed
by
the
inference
that
these
the
overwhelmed
conclusion
with
that
integrating
[the
large
defendant]
new
was
division
simply
into
its
existing business.).
That MuniMaes officers and outside auditor debated how to
account for the LIHTC Funds in light of FIN 46R does not compel
21
that
there
was
an
honest
over
the
defendants
were
ultimately
wrong
is
not
proper
That the
enough
to
Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 2002) ([T]he
mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure
to
follow
GAAP,
without
more,
does
not
establish
scienter.
Even
A more
We
some
outside
entity--that
ultimately
disclosed
that
the
view,
defendants
this
disclosure
were
not
supports
acting
with
strong
scienter
inference
but
rather
In
that
were
we
recognize
that
the
Fall
2006
Falcone
the
large
number
of
personnel
working
on
the
investing
public
informed,
while
working
strenuously
to
have
alerted
the
MuniMae
defendants
to
the
FIN
46R
plaintiffs
emphasize
that
the
individual
these
defendants
were
directly
responsible
for
the
24
of
companys
problems,
may
provide
substantial
inference it supports.
Worldwide Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 48889 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (When a company is forced to restate its
previously issued financial statements, the mere fact that the
company
had
to
make
large
correction
is
some
evidence
of
scienter.).
While
the
red
flags
alleged
in
the
complaint
are
not
not
obvious,
at
least
with
respect
to
the
LIHTC
economic
adjustments--including
consolidation--was
Funds
was
impact
but
loss
of
not
of
one
percent
all
limited
of
to
approximately
25
or
less.
The
the
restatement
the
LIHTC
$44.9
Fund
million
in
as
sign
nefarious purpose.
of
rather
than
evidence
of
snowballing
costs.
While
Lundquists
resignation
is
26
1002
the
(Where
defendant
resignation
corporation
occurs
slightly
issues
See
before
or
restatement,
itself
in
order
for
resignation
to
be
strongly
indicative of scienter.).
Nor is PwCs October 2006 departure particularly telling.
The
dismissal
of
an
accounting
firm
around
the
time
of
control
its
especially
true
these
on
accounting
facts,
as
procedures).
MuniMae
was
This
required
is
to
weakened by the fact that PwC made clear in a letter to the SEC
that it had no disagreements with the Company on any matter of
27
accounting
principle
or
practice
that
it
felt
obligated
to
report. 7
Finally,
and
in
accordance
with
several
of
our
sister
must
have
acted
intentionally
or
recklessly
with
respect to the FIN 46R accounting merely because (1) they were
senior executives, and (2) the LIHTC Funds represented a core
business of the Company.
Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 282 (3d Cir. 2006) (A pleading
of scienter . . . may not rest on a bare inference that a
defendant must have had knowledge of the facts or must have
known of the fraud given his or her position in the company.
(internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds
by Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322-23; Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1000
(finding that bare allegations that officers must have have
had
knowledge
of
key
facts
relating
to
the
businesss
core
28
detailed
allegations
establishing
the
defendants
actual
Tellabs, 551
U.S.
that
at
325.
However,
the
inferential
weight
may
be
an
scienter
inference
defendants
of
trading
were
if
the
unusual
timing
or
and
amount
suspicious.
of
Teachers
To
stock
traded,
the
portion
of
stockholdings
sold,
or
the
this
case,
the
overall
value
of
MuniMae
shares
sold
Six
These numbers
Cf.
Teachers
complaint
Ret.,
that,
among
477
F.3d
other
at
184
things,
(finding
failed
to
December 2004, but that was well before plaintiffs say that any
officer of the Company knew that the FIN 46R accounting was
flawed.
his shares between late April 2005 and early June 2006.
these
sales
announcement
coincided
of
the
with
first
the
lead-up
restatement.
to
the
However,
Some of
Companys
the
sales
during the class period, with the bulk of the sales occurring in
2004 and mid-2005.
insider
sales
of
92%,
100%,
and
82%
of
defendants
fact
that
Falcone
and
Joseph
traded
MuniMae
shares
an
affirmative
defense
in
insider
trading
cases
that
the
an
inference
that
the
sales
were
not
suspicious);
In
re
Rule
10b5-1
plan
does
less
to
shield
him
from
in
2003.
Nonetheless,
entered
the
plan
year
allege
that
Joseph
traded
31
outside
of
the
plan.
Thus,
although
Joseph
the
from
Rule
10b5-1
suspicion,
plan
it
does
does
not
mitigate
completely
any
immunize
inference
of
additional
problem
with
the
allegations
of
insider
The
See
attract
investors,
fund
corporate
acquisitions,
avoid
however,
to
infer
fraud
from
financial
a
We
motivations
Inc.,
353
repeatedly
F.3d
338,
rejected
352
these
(4th
Cir.
types
of
2003)
([C]ourts
generalized
have
motives--which
MuniMae
during
the
conducted
class
numerous
period,
offerings
very
little
of
and
this
But
In short, nothing
about
MuniMaes
the
specific
facts
alleged
render
general
appropriate
to
consider
such
disclosures,
which
in
It
some
33
10, 2006, MuniMae also alerted investors to the fact that the
Company
suffered
from
material
weaknesses
J.A. 821.
material
identified,
weaknesses
were
then
related
to
the
Company
warned
Id.
discovered
material
weaknesses,
and
might
identify
additional
problems
that
reiterated
would
that
render
it
its
recklessly)
misstate
the
underlying
financial
information.).
MuniMae also attempted to update investors regarding the
escalating cost of the second restatement.
yet
determined
its
full
scope.
In
May
2007,
the
Company
disclosed that it was unable to timely file its annual Form 10-K
for fiscal year 2006 because of the dedication of significant
management resources to these restatement efforts.
J.A. 1129.
conference
with
investors
the
following
In a
month,
the
Finally,
informed
at
investors
November
that
both
teleconference,
the
magnitude
and
the
cost
J.A.
Company
of
the
J.A. 1157.
by
information
the
in
press
fact
that
releases
it
occasionally
headlined
with
buried
favorable
the
news.
MuniMae
defendants
acted
in
good
faith,
but
they
also
2.
After evaluating the inferential weight owed to plaintiffs
allegations of corporate fraud in light of context and common
sense,
we
regard
the
must
consider
inference
that
whether
reasonable
defendants
knowingly
person
or
would
recklessly
inference
that
[the
MuniMae
defendants]
were
merely
Matrix Capital,
recognizing
that
allegations
of
scienter
that
compliment
[sic]
each
other
to
create
an
inference
of
Id. at 187-88.
We accept as fact
before
the
first
restatement,
and
that
by
mid-2006,
at
financial
motivations--albeit
universal
ones--to
avoid
And we know
at
most,
negligent.
In
2004,
MuniMae
was
faced
with
not
on
the
Companys
financial
statements.
MuniMae's
challenge,
which,
together
with
other
accounting
errors
over the course of 2004 and 2005, required the Company to twice
restate
cost.
its
financial
accounting
statements
at
substantial
some
officers
may
have
believed
that
MuniMaes
to
intentionally,
infer
that
the
MuniMae
defendants
or
even
affairs.
F.3d
1049,
1069
(9th
Cir.
2008)
(finding
insufficient
And
with
fraudulent
purpose
to
conceal
the
problems
until
January 2007.
The strength of the inference with respect to MuniMaes
knowledge of the costs of the second restatement is even weaker
on the facts alleged.
Companys
officers
attempted
successive
to
internal weaknesses.
keep
disclosures
investors
suggest
updated
that
about
its
MuniMaes
That
period
initially,
challenge
was
chronically
professionally
before
it,
understaffed
unprepared
strengthens
38
the
for
and,
the
inference
at
least
accounting
that
final
the
facts
alleged,
the
inference
that
the
MuniMae
III.
We turn next to plaintiffs Securities Act claims.
The
protection
&
MacLean
to
v.
purchasers
of
Huddleston,
459
registered
securities.
U.S.
383
375,
(1983).
statements
prospectuses,
77l(a)(2).
or
omissions
respectively.
in
See
registration
15
U.S.C.
statements
77k(a);
39
Newcome v.
Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1106 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
The
amended
complaint
alleges
that
defendants 9
certain
prospectus
for
the
2005
SPO
incorporated
by
registration
statement
incorporated
by
reference
For example,
reference
the
FIN
46R.
However,
it
also
noted
that
[d]ue
to
the
J.A. 1578.
40
A.
1.
Section
13
of
statute of repose.
the
Securities
Act
contains
three-year
It provides:
the
meaning
of
the
phrase.
The
district
court
MuniMaes
registration
statement
effective,
i.e.,
was not filed until February 1, 2008, the court concluded that
the 11 claim was two-weeks late.
appeal,
plaintiffs
arguments
are
threefold.
First,
41
2005,
that
pricing
is,
the
commenced.
when
MuniMae
securities,
issued
or
Alternatively,
on
prospectus
February
plaintiffs
3,
suggest
supplement
when
the
the
SPO
securities
were not bona fide offered until February 8, the last date of
the SPO.
rule
is
effective
the
of
statute
the
of
repose
registration
begins
to
statement,
we
run
on
the
should
not
law
defines
the
effective
date
of
the
registration
F.3d
377,
382
(4th
Cir.
2013).
42
At
first
blush,
the
In ordinary usage,
See
and
in
intended
offering.
Joel
authorities
context,
to
have
they
considered
have
distinguish
concluded
true
meaning
that
offering
of
Congress
from
bona
simply
simulated
Seligman
&
Troy
Paredes,
Securities
Regulation
2-B-
6(g)(i), at 773 & n.355 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the dealer
exemption under 4(3)(A) of the Securities Act, which also uses
the term bona fide offered to the public).
The meaning of the word offer is no more certain.
As
rejection
consideration.
Dictionary 1344.
and
also
See
to
propose
Random
House
or
put
Websters
forward
for
Unabridged
15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(3).
43
But we think it
unlikely
that
offered
in
Congress
13
to
intended
be
offer in 2(a)(3).
the
meaning
coterminous
with
of
the
bona
fide
definition
of
Co., 445 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (The term bona fide
offered to the public is a term of art and one not necessarily
synonymous
with
the
full
breadth
of
the
statutory
term
offer.).
Because we believe the statutory language is susceptible to
more than one meaning, we look beyond the statute for guidance.
The
Second
Circuits
opinion
in
P.
Stolz
is
the
leading
99.
A majority of courts have followed the P. Stolz guidance,
see, e.g., Armstrong v. Am. Pallet Leasing Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d
827, 868 (N.D. Iowa 2009); In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 2010 WL
537740, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2010); In re Countrywide Fin.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 2009 WL 943271, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6,
2009),
and
congressional
we
agree
purpose.
that
this
Section 11
44
approach
is
best
violated
reflects
when
the
defendants
fide
offering
liability
to
date
the
logically
statutory
links
violation.
putative
See
Fed.
the
effective
date
is
also
consistent
with
the
date
plaintiff.
determined
by
the
personal
circumstances
of
the
n.7 (4th Cir. 1993); see also City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret.
Sys.
v.
MBIA,
Inc.,
637
F.3d
169,
176
(2d
Cir.
2011)
violation,
with
statute
of
limitations,
which
10
offered
to
That
provision
the
public.
exempts
See
certain
15
dealer
U.S.C.
77d(a)(3)(B).
transactions
from
the
of
forty
days
after
the
effective
date
of
such
the
first
date
upon
which
the
security
was
bona
fide
Plaintiffs
from
the
declared effective.
date
on
which
registration
statement
is
46
But
provides
the
that
fact
that
different
the
bona
fide
offer
section
and
of
the
registration
statute
can
be
distinct events does not inexorably mean that they always will
be.
152, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (To be sure, the phrase bona fide
offered
to
circumstances
the
public,
in
which
recognizes
stock
that
covered
there
by
an
will
be
effective
later
than
the
effective
date
of
the
registration
17
Hicks,
Civil
Liabilities
4:77.
The
only
11
At the time of the 2005 SPO, the SEC did not consider the
pricing information MuniMae filed in its prospectus supplement
the kind of fundamental information that would merit exceptional
treatment.
See 17 C.F.R. 229.512(a)(1)(2004); In re Lehman
Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
47
Plaintiffs
argue
nonetheless
that
we
should
not
accept
is
virtually
no
delay
between
registration
and
the
was a shelf offering, and there was a two-week delay between the
effective date and the commencement of the offering.
did
not
file
prospectus
supplement
announcing
MuniMae
that
the
priced
the
securities
on
February
2.
On
these
facts,
pursuant
to
less
typical
delayed
offering,
the
is
not
the
disclosure--rather
the
allegedly
complaint
unusual
than
false
directly
or
the
case
which
registration
misleading
avers
in
that
post-effective
statement--contained
information.
the
The
registration
amended
statement
two-week
gap
between
the
effective
date
and
the
The fact
that plaintiffs did not know that the registration statement was
effective as of January 14 is of no consequence for statute of
repose purposes.
allows
for
no
circumstances.);
also
emanating
P.
Stolz,
from
355
the
F.3d
claimants
at
102-03
12
49
commencement
offerings.
of
sale
in
the
context
of
non-delayed
Thus,
to
registration
the
public
statement
on
the
date
effective.
the
SEC
Applying
declares
this
the
holding,
we
January
relates
14,
back
to
2005.
the
Plaintiffs
original
amended
complaint
filed
complaint,
on
which
February
1,
omission
shall
be
liable
. . .
to
the
person
15 U.S.C. 77l(a)(2).
J.A.
89.
It
incorporates
50
by
reference
Dammeyers
The slip also bears the logo of RBC Dain Rauscher and
district
confirmation
standing.
court
slip
found
the
insufficient
J.A. 1606.
amended
to
complaint
establish
and
Dammeyers
appeal,
plaintiffs
contend
that
the
district
court
slip
show
that
Dammeyer
purchased
his
securities
the
amended
on
the
review
the
plausibility
of
complaints
Rule 8(a).
accepted
possibility
that
allegations
must
as
true,
Dammeyer
also
are
merely
purchased
render
such
consistent
shares
a
in
with
the
SPO;
the
the
conclusion
plausible.
that
he
purchased
shares
from
[a]ny
person
who
of
art
referring
to
specific
document
in
public
Thus, 12(a)(2)
([A]
plaintiff
seeking
redress
pursuant
to
Section
52
number
of
district
courts
have
concluded
that
the
The
they
offering,
directly
and
that
purchased
a
failure
securities
in
to
implies
do
so
the
relevant
that
the
See,
securities
pursuant
and/or
traceable
to
public
(finding
the
Corp.,
632
terminology
F.3d
762,
sufficient
776
(1st
when
Cir.
2011)
coupled
with
agree
that
language--coupled
using
with
the
pursuant
sufficient
53
and/or
supporting
traceable
facts--can
to
give
rise
to
plausible
circumstances.
inference
of
standing
in
certain
with
the
possibility
that
Dammeyer
purchased
his
occurred
[o]n
or
about
February
2,
2005,
J.A.
233.
helpful
to
plaintiffs,
the
confirmation
slip
shows
states
see
that
J.A.
SPO
1557.
shares
These
would
be
supporting
available
facts
are
for
not
Cf. In re Century
and
sale
dates
insufficient
in
the
context
of
11,
the
notation
prospectus
under
Gustafson,
513
[ 12(a)(2)]
distribute
PROS
separate
U.S.
cannot
the
UNDER
at
cover.
571
attach
prospectus
SEP
COVER,
See
J.A.
([T]he
unless
1606;
liability
there
. . . .).
which
is
an
However,
means
see
also
imposed
by
obligation
to
as
defendants
under
prospectus
SEC
to
77d(a)(3),
regulations,
Dammeyer
77e(b)
in
it
may
either
(prospectus
have
had
capacity.
delivery
to
See
deliver
15
U.S.C.
requirement);
17
plausibility
of
the
claim
against
the
underwriter
13
55
designated
underwriter
for
the
SPO.
See
J.A.
1590.
Dammeyer does not allege that these were the same entity as of
2005,
or
that
they
should
be
treated
as
such
for
liability
purposes.
At best, the allegations are merely consistent with the
possibility that Dammeyer purchased his securities in the SPO.
The pursuant and/or traceable to language of the complaint is
conclusory,
sufficient
and
the
factual
confirmation
enhancement
slip
to
does
support
not
a
provide
reasonable
omitted).
agree with the district court that Dammeyer did not adequately
allege standing to bring a 12(a)(2) claim. 14
14
56
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
57