LLCJ Volume 1

LESOTHO
LABOUR
COURT
JUDGMENTS
A compilation
Vo lum e 1 (201 2 Judge m e nt s)
LESOTHO LABOUR
COURT JUDGMENTS
A COMPILATION
2012 JUDGMENTS
Volume 1
Before
His Worship, Advocate Thato Charles Ramoseme
Lecturer
Book author
Judge of the Labour Court of Lesotho
ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Biography
Advocate T. C. Ramoseme is a holder of a
Bachelor of Arts degree in Public
Administration and Political Science. He
also holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree and
two masters of laws, one in Labour Law and
Social Security Law, and the other in the
Law of Business Entities.
He has over10 years of experience in the
practice of law. He is a Lecturer in Business
and Management studies, a book and
article Author and a Judge of the Labour
Court of Lesotho. He has published two
monograph books, in the fields of Labour
Law and Company Law, and a chapter on Arbitration Law in Lesotho in a
book by Lise Bosman.
Works
Published Books
(2012) The Impact of Closed Shop Agreements: A Critical and Comparative
Analysis of South Africa and Germany Lambert Academic Publishing:
Germany.
(2012) The Rights of the Minority Against Majority Rule: A Critical Analysis of
South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 Lambert Academic Publishing:
Germany.
Arbitration Law in Lesotho in Bosman L (2013) Arbitration in Africa: A
Practitioners Guide Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International.
Published Articles
Maternity Protection under the Labour Code Wages Order: A Source for
Discrimination (2011) Vol. 28, No. 1, Transformation Resource Centre Work
for Justice Journal.
The Effect of Dismissal for Misconduct on the Right to Severance Payment
(2012) Vol. 12, Issue 2, DDPR Information Bulletin.
The Right of the Employer to Dismiss an Employee for Contravention of
Unwritten Rules of Standards (2012) Vol. 12, Issue 3, DDPR Information
Bulletin.
The Exclusion of the Right to a Fair Hearing in Dismissal for Misconduct
The Right of the Employer to Refuse Reinstatement: The Need for a
Corresponding Right for the Employer. (2012) Vol. 12, Issue 5, DDPR
Information Bulletin.
The Protection of Probationary Employees Against Dismissal for Incapacity
iii
PREFACE
Labour Law is a specialised field within our jurisdiction, as is the case in
many other jurisdictions. There are specified forum and courts of law that
have been specifically established to interpret and apply labour laws. This
compilation is intended to guide labour law practitioners towards the correct
application of the labour laws of Lesotho.
This is the first volume of judgments of the Labour Court of Lesotho before
His Worship Advocate Thato Charles Ramoseme, from early in the last
quarter of 2012 to December of that year. It contains 17 judgments, all of
which were issued in the period in question.
This is just a compilation of the judgments in the form in which they were
issued. No modification has been made to suit this purpose both in terms of
content and styling. The only modification has been in so far as the font and
pagination are concerned. Even then the modification has been done for
purposes of standardising the document.
Emphasis is made that some of the recorded judgments herein, may have
been appealed against, some successfully and others otherwise. As a result,
it is the responsibility of the practitioner to make sure, before relying on any
of the judgments contained herein, to verify that they have not been
reversed.
T. C. Ramoseme
Maseru
September 2015
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARTICULARS
PAGE NUMBER
About the Author...........................................................
iii
Preface...........................................................................
iv
Table of Contents...........................................................
v - vi
List of authorities
Cases............................................................................
vii - viii
Legislation.....................................................................
viii
Books and Journals......................................................
viii
Limkokwing University of Creative
Technology Academic Staff Union v Limkokwing
University of Creative Technology.
Declaratory order; jurisdiction of the court
Bofihla Makhalane v Leteng Diamonds (Pty) Ltd
and another..
Declaratory order; specific performance; postponement;
jurisdiction
Lebohang Moepa v DDPR and another...
Review; default
Factory Workers Union v Sun Textiles (Pty) Ltd...
Specific Performance; declaratory order;
jurisdiction of the court
National Aids Commission v Keketso
Sefeane and another...
Review
Lesotho Stone Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Construction,
Mining, Quarrying and Allied
Workers Union and others.
Interdict; object ceasing to exist
Lesotho Brewing Company v DDPR and others.
Review
Lesotho Express Delivery Services (Pty) Ltd v The
Arbitrator DDPR & another
Review; jurisdiction of the court
Lesotho Highlands Development
Authority v Thabo Mohlobo and Others..
Review; jurisdiction of the court
Tsebo Sepetla v Lesotho Brewing
Company (Pty) Ltd and another..
Review; condonation
Nthabiseng Moliko v C & Y Garments
(Pty) Ltd and others.
Review; condonation
Roman Catholic Church v Motoene
Masupha and others
Review
v
15
6 11
12 14
15 18
19 23
24 25
26 31
32 36
37 43
44 47
48 51
52 54
Pascalis Molapi v Metro Cash and

Carry (Pty) Ltd and another..
Review
Goodwill Auto Clinic v DDPR and another..
Review; dismissal for non-prosecution
Sun Textiles (Pty) Ltd v Lesole Tau and another
Review
Pitso Mahlapha v Neo Lepamo and
Associates (Pty) Ltd and another.
Review; default
Lerotholi Polytechnic and another v Masebofane
Ramaema and others
Review
vi
55 58
59 61
62 66
67 71
72 - 76
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
National
Tumo Lehloenya and Others v Lesotho Telecommunications Corporation
LC/20/2000
National Aids Commission v Keketso Sefeane and DDPR LC/REV/07/2010
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Rosalia Ramoholi and Another
LC/REV/33/2012
Thabo Mohlobo and Others v Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LAC/CIV/A/02/2010
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Thabo Mohlobo & Others
LC/REV/09/2012
Lesotho Delivery Express Services (Pty) Ltd v The Arbitrator - DDPR and
Another LC/REV/18/2010
Khalapa v Commissioner of Police and Another 1999-2000 LLR-LB 350 (CA)
Lesotho National Olympic Committee and Others v Morolong LAC (2000-2004)
449
Lesesa v Khutlisi LAC (2007-2008) 145
LUTARU v NUL 1999-2000 LLR-LB 52
JHL Real Estate Ltd. v Samuel Brandt Masia LC/90/2005
United Clothing v Phakiso Mokoatsi & Another LC/RV/436/2006)
Kopano Textiles (Pty) Ltd v Moteare Qokolo & Others LC/REV/19/09
Thabo Mohlobo & Others v Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LAC/CIV/A/05/2010
Mantsoe v R LAC (1990) 193
Lesotho Electricity Corporation v Ramoqopo & Others LAC/REV/121/2006
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Rosalika Ramoholi and Another
LC/REV/33/2012
Global Garments (Pty) Ltd v Mosemoli Morojele LC/REV/354/2006
Teliso Moiloa v Total Print House LC/REV/524/2006
Nokoane Mokhatla v Lesotho Brewing Company and Another
LC/REV/65/2012
Gerald Lerotholi Mokhobo v Maleloko Mokalanyane and Another LC/29/1998
Motlatsi Melato v Maseru City Council and Attorney General 1997-98 LLR 40
Lesotho Evangelical Church v John M. B. Nyabela 1980 (2) LLR 466
Lineo Moalosi v Catherine Xu and Another LC/23/04
Central Bank of Lesotho v DDPR and Others LC/REV/216/2006
Khutlang Mokoaleli v Standard Lesotho Bank & DDPR LC/REV/21/07
CGM Garments and DDPR v Matsoko LAC/REV/38/2004
Teaching Service Commission and Others v Judge of the Labour Appeal Court
and Others C of A/CIV/21/2007
JD Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Supreme Furnishers v M. Monoko and Others
LAC/REV/39/04
Lesotho Electricity Corporation v Liteboho Ramoqopo and Another
LAC/REV/121/2005
J. D. Group (Lesotho) (Pty) Ltd t/a Price and Pride v Labour Commissioner o.b.o
Molahli Molahli and Another LC/REV/67/2007
vii
Moleko Electrical contractors v Labour Commissioner obo Mokete Tsoeu and

Another LC/REV/20/2008
Lethoko Sechele v Lehlohonolo Sechele C of A (CIV) No. 6 of 1988
Foreign
Real Estate Services (Pty) Ltd v Smith (1999) 20 ILJ 196
Remington v Scoles (1897, 2 Ch.D at 5
Coetzee v Lebea NO and Another (1999) 20 ILJ, 129 (LC)
County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Conciliation and Others 1999
20 ILJ 1701
Liebenberg v Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board 1944 WLD 52
Slagment (Pty) Ltd v Building Construction and Allied Workers Union (1994)
15 ILJ 979 (A).
Coetzee v Lebea NO and Another (1999) 20 ILJ, 129 (LC)
Rickett & Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union and
Others (1991) 1 ILJ 806
Legislation
National
Labour Code Order 24 of 1992
Labour Code (Codes of Good Practice) of 2003
Labour Code (Amendment) Act of 2000
Labour Code (Conciliation and Arbitration Guidelines) of 2004
Labour Court Rules of 1994
Oaths and Declarations Regulations No. 80 of 1964
Books and Journals

H. Daniels (2002) 6th Ed., Becks Theory and Principles of Pleading in Civil
Action, Butterworths: South Africa
viii
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

HELD AT MASERU
LC/64/2011
In the matter between:

LIMKOKWING UNIVERSITY OF CREATIVE
TECHNOLOGY ACADEMIC STAFF UNION
APPLICANT
And
LIMKOKWING UNIVERSITY OF CREATIVE
TECHNOLOGY
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for several relief. Applicant abandoning some of its claims and
proceeding on two. Court declining jurisdiction to entertain both claims. Court
finding that prayer 2 (e) of the Applicants originating application is an unpaid
wages claim. Court leaving affected members of Applicant at liberty to refer
this claim with the DDPR as a Forum of first instance.
BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUE
1. On the 26th April 2012, Applicant filed an urgent application seeking an
ex parte order that:
1. That the rules of this Honourable Court pertaining to normal procedural
formalities, modes and period of service and time limits be dispensed with
on account of urgency hereof and this matter be heard and adjudicated
upon on an urgent basis.
2. That a rule nisi be and is hereby issued and returnable on the time and
date to be determined by this Honourable Court calling upon respondent to
show cause, if any, why an order in the following terms cannot be made
final, to wit,
(a) That the purported refusal to accept indefinite suspension of strike by
applicant shall not be declared unlawful
(b) That the indefinite suspension of strike by applicant shall not be
declared lawful.
(c) That the continued lock-out of members of applicant from the premises
of respondent shall not be declared unlawful.
(d) That pending the finalisation hereof applicants members shall not be
allowed access to the premises of respondent.
(e) That effective from the 9th day of December 2011 members of applicant
be entitled to their pro rata salaries for the month of December as
applicants members have, by suspending their strike action, tendered
their services to respondent
Page 1 of 76
(f) That the denial of access of applicants members to the premises of

respondent under the cloak of a lock-out be declared an unfair labour
practice
(g) That the respondent shall not be held guilty of unfair labour practice for
bargaining in bad faith.
(h) That respondent shall not be ordered to forthwith implement the issues
initially agreed upon by the parties.
3. That respondent shall pay costs only in the event of opposition.
4. That applicant be granted such further and/or alternative relief.
5. That prayer 1 herein operate with immediate effect as interim relief.
2. From the record, it does not appear like a rule nisi was ever issued and in
these proceedings parties made no mention of the existence of the rule.
However, Applicant informed the Court that most of its claims had been
overtaken by events and that as a result they no longer wished to pursue
them. They indicated that they now applied for an order in terms of
prayers 2 (c) and (e) of their originating application, safe that in prayer 2
(c) the word continued no longer applied. Consequential to this new
development, Respondent raised two points in limine on the jurisdiction of
this Court, in terms of which it sought the dismissal of Applicants
claims. The application was opposed and as such both parties made
representation. After representations were made, this Court declined to
deal with the merits before pronouncing itself on the preliminary issues.
The ruling and reasons on these points are as follows.
SUBMISSIONS
3. Respondent argued that the prayers sought by Applicant bordered on
issues of interest and issues of right that fell exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution
(DDPR). It was argued that prayer 2 (c), which was to declare the lock-out
to be unlawful, was an issue of interest whose determination fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DDPR. Respondent further submitted
that the DDPR has primary rights to either grant of decline a certificate to
strike or lock-out, so that the right to decide if a strike or lock-out is
lawful or not lies with it.
4. Respondent further submitted that prayer 2 (e), which was to declare that
Applicant members are entitled to unpaid wages for the period of the
alleged unlawful lock-out, was an issue of right whose determination
similarly fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DDPR. It was further
argued that from the wording of this prayer, clearly this is a simple claim
for unpaid wages which falls squarely within the jurisdictional powers of
the DDPR, as a court of first instance.
5. Respondent furthermore, argued that secondary to this issue is that of
the jurisdiction of the Applicant to sue on behalf of its members on
matters of right. It was argued that Applicant being a trade union, its
powers to sue on behalf of its members are limited only to matter of
interest and not right. It was further argued that the approach adopted by
Page 2 of 76
Applicant in prayer 2 (e) is actio popularis in nature in that it seeks

payment of outstanding wages of employees without stating who those
employees are. It was argued that this is particularly important as not all
of the Applicant union members were on strike and as a consequence not
all of them were affected by the non-payment of wages.
6. Applicant responded that had the issue of its locus standi to sue on
behalf of its members been raised earlier, they could have applied for
joinder of the relevant employees to the matter. As a result, they argued
that this is just a delaying tactic on the part of the Respondent. They
however argued that in the event that this Court finds that it had
jurisdiction to entertain their claim, they request an opportunity to apply
for joinder of the relevant parties.
7. Applicant responded that initially when the papers were filed, this Court
had jurisdiction and that such jurisdiction did not end when they
withdrew some of their claims. Applicant argued that for purposes of this
case, the Court must consider whether it had jurisdiction when the
matter was first lodged and not after a change in the circumstances. It
was further argued that while the DDPR may have original jurisdiction in
respect of prayer 2 (c), this Court has original jurisdiction over prayer 2
(e) in terms of section 231 of the Labour Code. This being the case, the
Labour Code (Amendment) Act of 2000, provides that where a claim
involves issues that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour
Court, then it will have jurisdiction over the entire claim.
8. Respondent replied that contrary to the submission that when the matter
was referred this Court had jurisdiction, the issue of jurisdiction comes
into play at the hearing. As a result, it would be wrong to limit this issue
to the referral and filing of the documents to the matter. In reaction to
section 231, Respondent argued that it is not applicable to this case as it
relates to a situation where a declaration has already been made about
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of ether a strike action or lock-out.
Respondent prayed that this matter ought to be dismissed on the basis of
these grounds alone.
9. We have considered the submissions of both parties in relation to the
preliminary issues raised. We wish to start by making a comment on the
right to time to contest jurisdiction. We are in agreement with Respondent
that the issue of jurisdiction may arise at any point depending on the
circumstances of the case. While this Court might have had jurisdiction
when the papers were filed, a change in the circumstances of the case
may alter the status quo. As a result, we are of the view that a point
challenging the jurisdiction may be raised at any point of the proceedings
provided that it is only arising then.
10. In view of this said, we shall now proceed to deal with the first issue
which relates to prayer 2 (c). We find merit in Respondent argument that
disputes involving not only lock-outs but also strikes are disputes of
Page 3 of 76
interest. The resolution of these disputes is provided for under section

225 of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992. The provision of this section are
quite lengthy in content but the important aspect of this section, and for
purposes of this case, is that such disputes must be referred to the DDPR
for resolution. The section further goes on to provide that after referral, a
conciliator must be appointed to attempt to resolve the concerned dispute
through the process of conciliation.
11. A procedure for both the referral to and resolution of disputes of
interest at the DDPR is provided for under code 39 of the Labour Code
(Codes of Good Practice) of 2003. Similar, the provisions of this section are
lengthy in terms of content but their essence is to tabulate the
procedures that must be followed from the referral stage, to the
commencement of an industrial action, it being strike action or a lockout, up to the point that the dispute is ultimately resolved. At this point,
it is important to highlight that this above said goes to fortify the
argument that the DDPR has primary jurisdiction over disputes of
interest.
12. The essence of the point is to also draw attention to that fact if this
Court is to have jurisdiction over disputes of interest, it would only be
over disputes of interest which are extra judicial the DDPR. This is
supported by the provision of section 231 of the Labour Code order
(supra), reference of which has been made by Applicant in support of his
argument. The provisions of this section read as follows,
a person who declares, instigates or incites others to take part in or
otherwise acts in furtherance of a strike or lockout that is stipulated to be
unlawful by sections 230 or 232 (5) shall be liable to a fine of one thousand
maloti. The Labour court may make an order forbidding the continuance of
such action and failure to comply with such an order may be punished as if
it were contempt of the High Court. However, no person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence under this section by reason of merely having
ceased to work or having refused to accept employment.
13. In the case at hand, Applicant is not asking for an order in terms of
this section as neither of its grounds relate to the said section. This being
the case, what they are asking for is not extra judicial the DDPR and as
such this Court has no jurisdiction over their claim as appears in prayer
2 (c) of the originating application. In our view, the legality or otherwise of
an industrial action is determined from the conciliation report issued by
the DDPR, after which the role of this Court is to impose a punishment in
respect of offences relating to a strike action or lock out, which in terms
of the same report is considered unlawful.
14. In relation to prayer 2 (e), there is no dispute that it relates to unpaid
wages of members of Applicant union who were on strike. Further, there
is no dispute that the said claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DDPR. In view of our ruling on prayer 2 (c), this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain prayer 2 (e) on its own safe in circumstances
Page 4 of 76
where it was incidental to a claim rightly before this Court. Authoritative

to this argument are provisions of section 226 (3) of the Labour Code
Order (supra) which read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the Director may refer a
dispute contemplated is subsection (2) to the Labour Court for
determination if the Director is of the opinion that the dispute may also
concern matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.
15. We also wish to comment that Respondent has rightly pointed out that
the way prayer 2 (e) is framed, it is actio popularis in nature. In view of
the fact that not all of Applicant union members were on strike, and thus
not paid their wages during the lockout period, it would be unfair and
highly prejudicial on Respondent if prayer 2 (e) were to be determined as
it appears. As a result, we have come to the conclusion that if those
affected employees so wish, they may refer their claims for unpaid wages
with the DDPR either individually or in a single referral as co-applicants.
AWARD
Having heard the submissions of parties, We hereby make an award in the
following terms:
a) That this declines jurisdiction to entertain applicants claims;
b) That Applicant members may refer their claims for unpaid wages with the
DDPR individually or in a single referral as co-Applicants; and
c) That there is no order as to costs.
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 30th DAY OF NOVEMBER
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
DEPUTY PRESIDENT (a.i)
THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO
Mr. MPHATOE
Ms. MOSEHLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. M. KOTO
ADV. T. MACHELI
Page 5 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/16/2012

BOFIHLA MAKHALANE
APPLICANT
And
LETENG DIAMONDS (PTY) LTD
JOHN HOUGHTON GENERAL MANAGER
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Urgent application to compel Respondent to acknowledge Applicant as its
employee to compel Respondent to accept the existence of contractual
relationship with Applicant to declare dismissal of Applicant as null and void
an order for payment of salaries, benefits and entitlements but for the
alleged termination. Applicant requesting postponement of the matter
application being refused. Respondent raising points in limine to the main
claim points in limine succeeding and Applicants claims being dismissed.
1. On the 26th April 2012, Applicant filed an urgent application seeking an
ex parte order that:
1. A Rule Nisi be issued returnable on the date and time to be determined
by this court, calling upon the Respondents to show cause, if any, why,
a) The Rules of Court pertaining to the mode of service and time limits shall
not be dispensed with due to the urgency of this application.
b) The Respondents shall not be compelled to acknowledge/accept that
there is an employer/employee relationship between the Applicant and 1 st
Respondent.
c) And due to (b) above, Respondent shall not be compelled to
acknowledge/accept that, there is a contract of employment between the
Applicant and the 1st Respondent and therefore be compelled to stop to act
or behave otherwise.
d) The purported dismissal of the Applicant by the 1st Respondent cannot
be declared as illegal, and of no force, and therefore, Null and Void.
e) The Applicant cannot resume his duties as the 1st Respondents security
Manager, as a matter of urgency, possibly by Monday 7th May 2012.
f) The Respondents shall not pay the Applicant his salary arrears with
effect from 1st September 2010 to date and the monthly salary after
assumption of duty.
g) The Respondents shall not pay the Applicant allowances; he is entitled to
with effect from 8th October 2007 to date. And the end of year bonuses for
the years 2010 and 2011.
Page 6 of 76
h) An interest of 18.5% p.a. shall not be charged on all salary arrears,

outstanding unpaid allowances and bonuses.
i) The Respondent shall not be ordered to pay costs of suit in the event of
opposition.
j) The alternative and/or further relief is, if the Respondent unreasonably
reuses to comply with the final orders for prayers b) to g), whether that
shall not amount to contempt of Court. And if proper and appropriate
sentence will not be delivered against 1st and 2nd Respondents.
2. That prayers (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) in paragraph 1 above to
operate with immediate effects as an interim order pending the finalisation
of this application.
2. This matter was initially before the late President of the Labour Court,
Judge President L. A. Lethobane. From the record, it does not appear like
a rule nisi was ever issued and in these proceedings, parties made no
mention of the existence of the rule. The application was opposed and it
proceeded on this day. However, before the matter could proceed,
Applicant made an application for the postponement of the proceedings.
Respondent was opposed to the application and as a result, I requested
parties to make formal presentations.
3. Presentations were duly made after which, I made a ruling dismissing the
Applicants request for a postponement and directing that the matter
proceed in main claim. At the commencement of the main proceedings,
Respondent raised two points in limine explicitly, that of lis pendens and
lack of jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this matter. These points
were argued and judgment was reserved for a later date. Parties were
promised the reasons for both the postponement and points in limine at a
later date. These are dealt with below.
SUBMISSIONS
Application for postponement
4. Applicant submitted that the application was based on two grounds.
Firstly, that there were good prospects of settlement of the matter
between the parties. He sought the postponement to allow them to
negotiate the matter further. Secondly, that he had not made any
preparations to proceed with the matter in anticipation that this matter
would be postponed. He was however initially prepared to proceed with
the matter in May 2012, after the proceedings closed but due to the delay
in having set down, his position of preparedness has changed.
5. Respondent replied that they did not wish to negotiate the matter much
further that than they had and as such there were no prospects of
success whatsoever. They wanted to proceed with the hearing and have
the matter finalised. In relation to the second ground, they indicated that
Applicant is the initiator of this matter, and as such he could not be
heard to allege unpreparedness on his part. Further, that the pleadings
closed on the 23rd May 2012 and by the 28th August 2012, Applicant was
Page 7 of 76
well aware that the matter was proceeding today. It was furthermore,
argued that before this date, Applicant had almost a month to prepare for
hearing so that clearly, he had no valid excuse not to proceed today.
However, they prayed that if the Court were to grant the postponement,
then it should be with costs.
RULING
6. It is trite that an application for postponement may be granted on good
cause being shown and at the discretion of the Court. Reference is made
to the conclusion of the court in Real Estate Services (Pty) Ltd vs. Smith
(1999) 20 ILJ 196 at 199, where Revelas J had this to say,
In courts of law, the granting of an application for postponement is an
indulgence by the court exercising its judicial discretion. A reasonable
explanation is usually required from the party seeking the postponement.
This case was cited with approval in the case of Tumo Lehloenya and
Others vs. Lesotho Telecommunications Corporation LC/20/2000.
7. In view of the submissions of parties, my view is that the grounds
advanced by Applicant are not sufficient to justify the granting of the
postponement application. In relation to the first ground, Respondent has
made it undoubtedly clear that it has no intention to conciliate or
renegotiate the matter. As a result, it is obviously clear that there are not
prospects of success. It would thus be futile and unnecessarily dilatory to
grant a postponement on this ground.
8. On the second ground, I am in total agreement with Respondent that
Applicant simply has no excuse at all to not to proceed with the matter. If
Applicant was ready as soon as the pleadings had closed, that is in May
2012, I do not see how he can now argue unpreparedness. The argument
that the delay caused unpreparedness is simply preposterous and cannot
be entertained by this Court. This is a specialised Court which was
intended to resolve labour disputes speedily, without technicalities and
through simple processes. To grant an application for postponement on
the grounds laid by Applicant would be contrary to the very spirit and
purport of this Court, which would undermine its very existence.
Consequently, the explanation for a postponement is not reasonable and
does not warrant the grating of a postponement.
POINTS IN LIMINE
Lis pendens
9. It was argued on behalf of Respondent that the issues raised in this
matter are lis pendens. Respondent submitted that this is the third
application that Applicant has brought before this Court involving
substantially the same issues, between the same parties. Further that the
first one was LC/68/2010 and later LC/42/2011 which were lodged in
the years 2010 and 2011, respectively. Reference was made to these
cases and they were duly brought before this Court. It was submitted that
both these matters are still pending as they have not finalised.
Page 8 of 76
Respondent maintained that the conduct of Applicant is abuse Court

process which stands to be dismissed on ground of lis pendens.
10. In response, Applicant submitted that LC/68/2011 has been
withdrawn and that the Court file will bear proof. Applicant stated that
the matter is a contempt application against Respondent for failing to
comply with an order of the Labour Appeal Court to reinstate him without
loss. He stated that LC/42/2010 is pending the decision of the Court of
Appeal against the decision of the Labour Appeal Court in which it
refused to hear this case as a court of first instance. This matter concerns
Applicants unpaid salaries from March 2010 to date of judgment. He
indicated that the distinction between LC/42/2010 and this matter
(LC16/2012) is that while he claims his salaries in the former, he wants
to resume his duties in the later. As a result, Applicant submits that the
point of lis pendens cannot hold water.
11. For a claim of lis pendens to hold, the principle is that a litigant must
proof that there is a pending case between the same parties, concerning
the same subject matter and founded on the same cause of action (see
Becks Theory and Principles of Pleading in Civil Action, 6th Ed., at page
157). It is important at this stage to highlight the gist of the current claim
by Applicant. Applicant seeks to this court declare his 2nd dismissal null
and to order his reinstatement with effect from the 7th May 2012 as well
the payment of his benefits, seniority and entitlements that he would
have received but for the purported dismissal, with interest at the rate of
18.5%.
12. LC/42/2010, on the one hand relates to payment of his salaries from
March 2010 to date, which period is covered under the prayer f) of his
notice of motion in this matter. In close observation of both cases, I have
found this matter to pass the requirements for a lis pendens. In both
matters, parties are still the same, the subject matter is same being a
clam for unpaid salaries which are both based on the purported failure by
Respondent to pay them when he was obliged to.
13. In relation to LC/68/2011, although Applicant has alleged that the
matter has been withdrawn, the court file depicts a contrary position.
There is no notice of withdrawal and without same, the matter is still in
existence before this very same Court. Similarly, in close observation of
LC/68/2011 and the current matter, and in view of my understanding of
the gist of Applicants claim, I have found the requirements of lis pendens
to be present. In both cases, Applicant wants to be reinstated to his
position without any loss of his salaries, benefits and other entitlements,
no matter how he has framed his claims. This is an issue of semantics
surrounding the claims construction.
Jurisdiction
14. Two grounds were raised under jurisdiction. Firstly, it was submitted
that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain Applicants claim in
that he was clearly unhappy about his dismissal. It was submitted that
Page 9 of 76
the proper forum is the DDPR which has original jurisdiction to entertain
Applicants claim. He submitted that it was clear that the intention of
Applicant was to avoid his second dismissal, following his reinstatement
pursuant to the Labour Appeal court decision that he be reinstated.
Respondent stated that Applicant was dismissed, which dismissal was
declared unfair by the Labour Appeal Court and Applicant was reinstated.
Subsequently thereto, Applicant was given new charges, found guilty and
dismissed in August 2010. This is the dismissal against which he seeks
to have prayers granted in terms of his notice of motion.
15. In reaction to this point, Applicant submitted that he has never been
dismissed since his reinstatement per the Labour Appeal Court judgment.
According to him, evident to this is that he was never called for a hearing
and there is no letter of dismissal. He, however, indicated that despite the
absence of these two, Respondent has since stopped paying him his
salaries as at September 2010 to date hence his prayer that they be
ordered to pay him.
16. I have made a concerted consideration of the submissions of both
Applicant and Respondent. They lead me one conclusion, which
unfortunately seems to favour the argument of Respondent that Applicant
was indeed dismissed. According to Respondent, Applicant was dismissed
sometime in August. Accordingly to Applicant, he stopped receiving his
salaries from September 2010 to date, which suggest that the last salary
that was paid over to him was in August 2010. If this is the position, the
attitude of Respondent was quite clear from its conduct that it no longer
considered Applicant as its employee, hence the hold placed on payment
of Applicants salaries.
17. Consequently, I have come to the conclusion that Applicant was
indeed dismissed as put by Respondent. If Applicant is unhappy about
his dismissal, the DDPR is the proper forum and not this Court.
Reference is made to section 226 (1) (c) r/w section 226 (2) (d) of the
Labour Code Order (supra). The said section read as follows,
(1) The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the following
disputes
(c) and unfair dismissal if the reason for the dismissal is

i) for participation in a strike;
ii) as a consequence of a lockout; or
iii) related to the operational requirements of the employer.
(2) The following disputes of right shall be resolved by arbitration
(d) unfair dismissal for any reason other than the one referred to in
subsection 1 (c).
18. The second ground was that the effect of Applicants claim was to
cause this court interpret the judgment of the Labour Appeal Court,
Page 10 of 76
which indicated that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain
Applicants claim as it was purely a labour matter. It was maintained that
this Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the decision of the
Labour Appeal Court. Applicant replied that his intention was not for this
Court to interpret the judgment of the Labour Appeal Court but to shed
an understanding of what the Court said.
19. Applicant argues that he simply wants this court to shed an
understanding to the parties about the judgment of the Labour Appeal
Court, in relation to the High Court judgment. What he is asking for in
essence is for this court to make parties to understand what the
judgment of the Labour Appeal Court says. In order to create such an
understating, the process requires the interpretation of the same
judgment. This is the issue that Respondent challenges on the ground
that this Court does not have jurisdiction to do. I am in agreement with
the argument for the reason that the Labour Appeal Court is a superior
Court and as an inferior court, I cannot meddle with its judgments safe to
apply them as the law. This is derived from the dictates of the principle of
stare decisis.
AWARD
Having heard the submissions of parties, I hereby make an award in the
following terms:
a) That this application is dismissed; and
b) That there is no order as to costs.
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 29th DAY OF OCTOBER
2012.
T. C. RAMOSEME
LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
Mr. L. MOFELEHETSI
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
IN PERSON
ADV. WOKER
Page 11 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/21/2011
A0761/2010

LEBOHANG MOEPA
APPLICANT
And
DDPR
SECURITY LESOTHO
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Respondent failing to attend
hearing hearing proceeding in default. Applicant having raised two grounds
of review. Applicant succeeding only on one ground of review. Court finding
ground sufficient to justify interference with the award of the DDPR. DDPR
award being review and set aside and matter remitted to the DDPR for a
rehearing before a different arbitrator. No order as to costs is made.
1. This is an application for the review of an arbitration award of the DDPR.
It was heard on this day in default of 2nd Respondent and judgment was
reserved for a later date. In this application, Applicant sought to have the
arbitration award handed down on the 17th February 2011, reviewed,
corrected and set aside. 2nd Respondent had also lodged a counter claim
to the Applicant review application but however failed to attend. In view of
this, this Court dismissed counter claim and proceeded with the
Applicant claim in default and unopposed. The applicants review was
premised on two grounds. Applicant duly made submissions and the
ruling and reasons are in the following.
SUBMISSIONS
2. It was submitted on behalf of Applicant that the learned Arbitrator had
erred in law in that he failed to apply his mind properly to the totality of
the evidence presented in the case. In support, Applicant argued that the
learned arbitrator ignored their evidence challenging the authenticity of
documentary evidence of rest days tendered by 2nd Respondent. Applicant
submitted that they had testified that this evidence was contrary to the
Occurrence book in the possession of the employer which showed both
days on and off duty.
3. We have considered both the record of proceedings before the DDPR and
the arbitral award. We have noted that there was evidence as suggested
Page 12 of 76
by Applicant, in particular at pages 5 to 7 of the DDPR record of

proceedings. We have also noticed that such evidence was not considered
by the learned Arbitrator in the arbitral award. This court has stated
before that it is irregular for the learned Arbitrator to ignore the evidence
of parties, particularly where such evidence is central to the claim before
court (see National Aids Commission vs. Keketso Sefeane and DDPR
LC/REV/07/2010). This being the case, we are of the opinion that it was
wrong for the learned Arbitrator to have ignored this evidence as it was
central both to the Applicants claims and the Respondent defence to the
claims referred. As a result, this is a gross irregularity that justifies the
interference with the arbitral award.
4. Applicant had also submitted that in the DDPR proceedings, they had
discharged the onus in respect of both their weekly rest days and public
holidays but that the learned arbitrator awarded them lesser days then
those proved. In support, Applicant stated that it was not in dispute that
Applicant was owed 186 days but that despite this, he was awarded 160
days payment. He submitted that the learned Arbitrator ignored the fact
that the 186 days were common cause between the parties.
5. Upon consideration of both the record and the arbitral award, we have
noticed that it was not in dispute that there were 186 days owed to
Applicant. There was also other evidence of days given in lieu of these
days which led to the reduction of the total number of days owed to a
lesser figure than the 186. In the referral, this issue was considered and
in concert with the rest of the evidence, an award was made leading to
the award of payment for lesser days. In our view, this issue was
considered and as such we do not find any irregularity to this extend. We
are of the view that Application is in this instance dissatisfied with the
conclusion of the learned arbitrator. This Court has pronounced itself
before that where this is the position, a review is not the proper route (see
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority vs. Rosalia Ramoholi and
Another LC/REV/33/2012). However, in view of our conclusion on the
first review ground, this review application is upheld.
Page 13 of 76
AWARD
following terms:
a) That this application is granted;
b) This matter be heard at the DDPR before a different arbitrator; and
2012.
T. C. RAMOSEME
Miss. P. LEBITSA
Mrs. L. RAMASHAMOLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
MR. K. MAHLEHLE
NO APPEARANCE
Page 14 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/26/2012

FACTORY WORKERS UNION
APPLICANT
And
SUN TEXTILES (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Claims for orders compelling Respondent to enter into a collective agreement
with Applicant and to declare that such refusal, and the refusal to recognise
Applicant union, amounts to an unfair labour practice. Court raising the
preliminary issue of jurisdiction over the Applicant claims. Court declining
jurisdiction over these claims and dismissing the matter.
1. This matter was heard on the 21st November 2012 and judgement was
deferred. Applicant prayed for two orders as follows,
(a) That Respondent be ordered to enter into a formal collective agreement
with the Applicant upon the mutually agreed terms as both parties may
deem fit under the circumstances.
(b) That it be declared that the refusal by respondent to formally recognise
and to enter into a formal collective agreement with applicant is an unfair
labour practice.
This mater was duly opposed by Respondent. However, on the date of
hearing the Court mero muto raised an issue of jurisdiction to grant the
prayers requested by Applicant. Both parties were given the opportunity
to make representation. The ruling and reasons are as follows.
SUBMISSIONS
2. Applicant submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court is spelled out in
section 24 of the Labour order 24 of 1992 as amended. It was submitted
that in terms of this section, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to
determine any matter that has to do with the interpretation of the rights
of parties, it be individual or collective rights. Reference was made to
section 24 (1) and (2) and in particular subsection (2)(a) which reads as
follows,
to inquire into and decide the relative rights and duties of employees and
their respective organisations in relation to any matter referred to the Court
under the provisions of the Code and to award appropriate relief in case of
infringement;
Page 15 of 76
Applicant further submitted that their argument is supported by the

Labour Code (Codes of Good Practice) of 2003.
3. In support, it was argued that this application is based on paragraph 4.7
of the originating application which reads as follows,
the respondents recalcitrance, silence and or inertia displayed against the
applicant in so far as the implementation of annexure FAWU 4 is concerned
inevitably prompts the applicant to pray the Honourable Court to grant the
following relief: ...
4. Applicant argued that in view of this said, they are only asking that the
conduct of Respondent be declared an unfair labour practice and for
Respondent to be directed to enter into a collective agreement with
Applicant on matters that may be mutually agreed upon by parties.
Applicant argued that in refusing to enter into the collective agreement,
Respondent is refusing to formally recognise them, which conduct they
are asking to be declared an unfair labour practice. Applicant maintained
that this claim is referred in terms of section 198(A) of the Labour Code
(Amendment) Act of 2000, in particular subsections (2), (3), and (4) on the
duty to bargain in good faith.
5. Respondent replied that this Court has no jurisdiction over this claim for
the reason that no one can be compelled to sign a collective agreement. It
was submitted that this is the effect of Applicants claim. It was further
argued that before a collective agreement can be concluded parties must
negotiate over it and only sign it when they are in agreement on the terms
contained therein. Reference was made to section 29 of the Codes of Good
Practice (supra) on the processes that must be followed before a collective
agreement is concluded. Applicant submitted that these processes have
not been adhered to hence why the agreement has not been made.
Applicant replied that what they are asking for is an order directing
Respondent to bargain in good faith and not to be ordered to sign a
collective agreement.
6. Our basis for raising this preliminary issue on own accord draws from the
case of Thabo Mohlobo and Others vs. Lesotho Highlands Development
Authority LAC/CIV/A/02/2010 where the Court had the following to say,
Where a point of law is apparent on the papers, but the common approach
of the parties proceeds on a wrong perception of what that law is, a court is
not only entitled to raise that point of law but also to require parties to deal
therewith. Otherwise, the result would be a decision premised on an
incorrect application of the law. That would infringe the principle of
legality.
Having laid the basis of our concern, We shall now proceed to deal with
the issues and submissions.
7. We wish to start by highlighting that indeed We agree with Applicant that
this Court has jurisdiction to determine any matter that has to do with
the rights of parties, it being individual or collective rights. However, in
Page 16 of 76
terms of section 24 (1), this is subject to this Court having jurisdiction

over such matters. Without this limitation, Applicants interpretation
would mean that this Court has jurisdiction even over matters that fall
within the realm of authority of both the DDPR and the Labour Appeal
Court as long as they have to do with the rights of parties. This argument
cannot be accurate as it would cause this Court to act beyond its powers
conferred by statute.
8. Now in relation to prayer (a) as appears in para 1 above, we are of the
view that key to this prayer are the words collective agreement. A
collective agreement is defined under section 3 of the Labour Code Order
24 of 1992 as follows,
an agreement entered into freely between an employer or a group of
employers and a trade union representing any employees of that employer
or group of employers; [My emphasis].
9. From a simple reading of this definition, compulsion is ousted in the
process of conclusion of a collective agreement. We have a view that what
Applicant is asking from us in the form of a relief, is exactly that which
We say is ousted in the process of conclusion a collective agreement.
Applicant has in its submissions attempt to tilt this Court attention from
this issue in arguing that they are not asking for Respondent to be
compelled to sign the agreement but that in the event that they agree on
terms then Respondent must sign. In our view, and as rightly pointed out
by Respondent, the effect is still the same and as such We find that We
have no power to grant this prayer. However, We do not see how reference
to section 29 of the Codes of Good Practice (supra) advances Respondents
case.
10. Prayer (b) is two-legged in that it has two aspects namely to declare
the refusal to formally recognise Applicant an unfair labour practice and
secondly to declare the refusal to enter into a collective agreement an
unfair labour practice. On the first issue, Applicant seems to rely on
section 198A (2), (3) and (4) of the Labour Code Order (supra) as the basis
of his claim. This section reads as follows
(2) An employer shall bargain collectively in good faith with a
representative trade union.
(3) in any collective bargaining relationship
(a) a recognised trade union shall bargain in good faith with any
employer or employers organisation;
(b) an employer or employers organisation shall bargain in good faith
with the recognised trade union.
(4) a breach of the provisions of this section shall be an unfair labour
practice.
11. From a simple reading of this section, it does not in any way compel
the employer to recognise a trade union so that Respondent is not obliged
to formally recognise Applicant. It simply makes reference to the duty to
bargain in good faith where a trade union is recognised. As a result, it
cannot in any way form the basis of Applicants claim before this Court.
Page 17 of 76
In any event there is generally no legally imposed obligation on the part of

the employer to formally recognise a trade union. This is reflected in
section 24 (2) of the Codes of Good Practice as follows,
There is no duty to recognise a trade union. The obligation is only to
bargain with a representative one.
In our view, this goes a long way to fortify our stance that We have no
power to grant the prayer requested. This is an issue of interest which
can only be dealt with in term of section 225 of the Labour Code Order
(supra).
12. In view of our conclusion on prayer (a), We are of the opinion that this
Court lacks the power to declare the refusal to enter into a collective
agreement an unfair labour practice. Our premise is simply that
Applicant has failed to establish the legal basis of its claims. Unfair
labour practices are provided for under sections 196 to 202 of the Labour
Code Order (supra). None of the provisions reflected under these section
provide for that the refusal to enter into a collective agreement is an
unfair labour practice. Consequently, We decline jurisdiction over all
Applicants claims.
COSTS
13. Applicant prayed for an order of costs in the event that this Court
determines that it has jurisdiction to entertain this claim. Having found
that this Court has no jurisdiction, this prayer falls of.
AWARD
following terms:
a) That this Court declines jurisdiction over Applicants claims;
b) That this application is therefore dismissed; and
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 13th DAY OF DECEMBER
2012.
T. C. RAMOSEME
Miss. P. LEBITSA
Mrs. L. RAMASHAMOLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. RASEKOAI
ADV. MATETE.
Page 18 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/07/2010
A0240/2009

NATIONAL AIDS COMMISSION
APPLICANT
And
KEKETSO SEFEANE
DIRECTOR - DDPR
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Applicant raising five grounds of
review. Applicant succeeding only on one ground of review. Court finding
ground sufficient to justify interference with the award of the DDPR. DDPR
award being review and set aside and matter remitted to the DDPR for a
rehearing. No order as to costs is made.
It was heard on this day and judgment was reserved for a later date. In
this application, Applicant seeks to have the arbitration award handed
down on the 3rd February 2010, reviewed, corrected and set aside. This
application is premised on five grounds of review. The application was
duly argued and the ruling and reasons are in the following.
SUBMISSIONS
2. It was submitted on behalf of Applicant that the learned Arbitrator did
not notify parties about the date and time on which he would be ready to
deliver his verdict or to even invite both parties for that purpose.
According to Applicant, when the learned Arbitrator eventually decided to
issue the award, it was served on parties at different times, in that it was
served upon 1st Respondent on the 5th February 2010 while Applicant
received it on the 15th February in its mail. Applicant maintained that the
way in which the learned Arbitrator handle the dispute vis-a-vis the
parties constituted a gross irregularity and a sufficient ground to warrant
the setting aside of the arbitral award.
3. 1st Respondent denied the argument on the premise that both parties
were at the close of the arbitration proceedings, informed that the award
would be issued within a period of 30 days, in terms of the section 228E
of the Labour Code (Amendment) Act of 2000. Further, that the learned
Arbitrator having said that, it was the responsibility of the parties to
Page 19 of 76
make a follow up on the availability of the award, which responsibility

Applicant failed to shoulder thus leading to its awareness of the award at
a later date than 1st Respondent. 1st Respondent argued that the only
irregularity that occurred was the late issuance of the award by almost 6
months, which irregularity does not warrant the setting aside of the
arbitral award.
4. As rightly pointed out by 1st Respondent, the issuance of the arbitral
awards is provided for under section 228E of the Labour Code
(Amendment) Act of 2000. However, we feel that is important to highlight
that the proper citation of the relevant law is section 228E (3) of the
Labour Code Order 24 of 1992 as amended, which reads as follows,
(3) within 30 days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings
1. the arbitrator shall issue an award with brief reasons singed by that
arbitrator;
2. the Director shall serve a copy of the award to each party to the
dispute or the person who represented the party in the arbitration
proceedings; and
3. the director shall file the original of that award with the Registrar of
the Labour Court.
5. From a simple reading of the above section we have noted that it neither
requires the learned Arbitrator to deliver a verdict before the parties, nor
for the learned Arbitrator to give a specific date and time of delivery of the
verdict or even to require or compel the Director to serve copies of the
award on parties at the same time or even to place the time limits on
service of awards. In view of this said and the quoted extracts of the law,
we do not see the basis of Applicants alleged irregularity. We are
therefore in agreement with the 1st Respondent that once the learned
Arbitrator had announced that the award would be ready within a period
of 30 days in terms of the above cited law, it was the responsibility of
parties to make a follow-up on the availability of the award. We however
reserve our comment in relation to the second argument raised by 1st
Respondent, as it is not the subject of the application before us.
6. Further, Applicant submitted that in that hearing, it had raised an issue
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the DDPR to entertain the 1st
Respondent claim. It had argued that the claim fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Applicant submitted that this was for
the reason that 1st Respondent was not dismissed as his contract had
ended by effluxion of time. It therefore maintained that he had no
legitimate expectation of it being renewed. Applicant argued that the
learned Arbitrator failed to apply his mind to this issue that it raised.
7. 1st Respondent replied that it was wrong for Applicant to have raised this
issue as the claims referred fell within the jurisdiction of the DDPR, in
terms of section 226 (2) of the Labour Code (Amendment) Act of 2000. He
stated that the claims were unfair dismissal, leave pay, underpayments
and unlawful deductions. 1st Respondent maintained that when his
Page 20 of 76
contract of employment between himself and Applicant was terminated,

Applicant failed to intervene contrary to its responsibility as his employer
to ensure its renewal as provided for under the contract and the section
11 of the Applicant Act of 2009. He concluded that on these bases he had
a legitimate expectation of a renewal and the learned Arbitrator duly
applied his mind on all issues before him.
8. We have considered both the submission of the parties and the arbitral
award. We have noted that the issue of jurisdiction was raised, argued
and deliberated upon by the learned Arbitrator. In the end, He made the
conclusion that the DDPR had jurisdiction to determine the dispute
before him. We have noted that all the issues raised were considered by
the learned Arbitrator safe that he came to a different conclusion than
that anticipated by the Applicant. All these are reflected under paragraph
3 of the arbitral award. Clearly, Applicant is dissatisfied with the
conclusion of the learned Arbitrator.
9. The Labour Appeal Court has set a precedent over this issue in the case
of Thabo Mohlobo & Others vs. Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LAC/CIV/A/02/2010. The Court in this case held that review
proceedings are concerned with the procedures of making a conclusion
and not whether the conclusion was right or wrong or if a different
conclusion would have made by a different Court. This position has been
adopted by this Court in a plethora of cases (see Lesotho Highlands
Development Authority vs. Thabo Mohlobo & Others LC/REV/09/2012;
Lesotho
Delivery
Express
Services
(Pty)
Ltd
and
Another
LC/REV/18/2010). In view of this said, we find that a review is not the
proper recourse for Applicant for the reason that it challenges the merits
and not the procedures.
10. Furthermore, Applicant argued that the leaner Arbitrator made a
conclusion that is both irrational, unreasonable and unsustainable in law
in that while he had dismissed 1st Respondent Claim for retrospective
adjustment of his salary, he proceeded to award 1st Respondent
compensation on the basis of the same adjusted salary. 1st Respondent
replied that the learned Arbitrator had erred by dismissing the claim for
retrospective adjustment in view of the provisions of the contract of
employment of 1st Respondent. He further stated that the amount used to
calculate 1st Respondents compensation was based on the fair and
reasonable salary in the market for the position of the Chief executive, in
which 1st Respondent was.
11. Moreover, Applicant argued that 2nd Respondent misdirected himself
in finding for 1st Respondent on his claim of unlawful deductions when
there was evidence that he had contrary to the policies of Applicant
purchased a cell phone in the sum of M5,394.74, which amount was
deducted from his terminal benefits. Applicant submitted that there was
evidence in the proceedings that its policy prohibited such conduct. 1st
Respondent replied that the cell phone that 1st Respondent purchased
Page 21 of 76
was intended to facilitate the execution of the work of the Chief Executive.
Further that the said cell phone remained the property of Applicant hence
why it was retuned when 1st Respondent was terminated.
12. The arguments raised in respect of the two above grounds of review
relate to the merits of the matter and in no way demonstrate a procedural
flaw on the part of the learned Arbitrator, either in support or in defence.
In respect the first of the two above grounds, Applicants submission
seem to suggest that because the learned Arbitrator had dismissed the
claim for a retrospective salary adjustment, then he ought not to have
calculated 1st Respondent compensation on the basis of the adjusted
salary. Similarly, in respect of the second ground, Applicant seems to
suggest that because there was evidence of the policy of the employer
prohibiting Applicant from purchasing a cell phone, then the learned
Arbitrator ought to have found in its favour.
13. Applicant does not in any way suggest that there is evidence was not
considered or that there are other grounds of procedural irregularity on
the part of the learned Arbitrator in making his conclusion. Clearly,
Applicants attitude is that given the circumstances surrounding both
issues, the conclusion ought to have been different. In our view, this
argument takes us back to the issue of a party that is dissatisfied with
the conclusion of the Court without demonstrating the irregularity in the
process of making such a conclusion. In the same vein we reiterate our
stance as stated above on this issue.
14. Lastly, it was argued that the learned Arbitrator committed a gross
irregularity in that he failed to apply his mind to the issue before him. In
support, it was submitted that Applicant had argued that it was the
wrong party to be sued in the matter in that an employment relationship
existed between the Lesotho government and 1st Respondent and not with
it. Applicant submitted that it had tendered a copy of the contract of
employment of 1st Respondent which corroborated its argument.
Applicant further stated that in spite of this, the learned Arbitrator
ignored these issues and went ahead to make an award against it.
15. 1st Respondent the argued that the augment that the contract of
employment was between the Lesotho Government and 1st Respondent
was misguided hence why it was dismissed by the learned Arbitrator. He
further submitted that the fact that contract has been signed by the
Government secretary does not make the employer the Lesotho
Government as the Government Secretary was signing on behalf of the
Applicant, as at the time its Board of Directors was not yet in place. 1st
Respondent further argued that this does not in any way constitute an
irregularity as suggested by Applicant.
16. We have gone through both the DDPR record of proceedings and the
arbitral award to verify the arguments of both parties. We have discovered
that in the record of proceedings, the above issue arose when Applicant
Page 22 of 76
testified that 1st Respondent was an employee of the Lesotho Government

and not itself. Upon our inspection of the arbitral award, we have not
found anywhere in the award where this issue was considered by the
learned Arbitrator. This in our view goes on to fortify the Applicant
argument that the learned arbitrator has ignored this issue altogether
and/or failed to apply his mind to same. We find this to be a gross
irregularity that justifies interference with the arbitral award. We have
found this issue to be very important as it touches upon the rights of the
parties and legal obligations attendant thereto. If ignored, as it is the
case, there is a high likelihood that judgment in the DDPR proceedings
could have been entered against a wrong party. Consequently, this
application succeeds on this point alone.
COSTS
17. 1st Respondent prayed that of the basis of his submissions above, this
application be dismissed with costs in his favour. In view of the fact that
we have resolved to grant the application for review, we do not find it
proper to make an award of costs against Applicant or even 1st
Respondent for that matter. The circumstances of this matter do not
warrant the granting of such a request.
AWARD
following terms:
b) This matter be heard at the DDPR before a different arbitrator; and
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 23rd DAY OF NOVEMBER
2012.
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. M. MPHATOE
Mrs. L. RAMASHAMOLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. LOUBSER
ADV. MATOOANE
Page 23 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/38/12

LESOTHO STONE ENTERPRISES (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
And
CONSTRUCTION, MINING, QUARRYING
AND ALLIED WORKERS
THE DIRECTORATE OF DISPUTE
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION
ARBITRATOR KETA
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
3rd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for interdict interim rule interdicting Respondent members from
strike being issued. Respondent members continuing on a strike in spite of
subsistence of the rule Applicant terminating their employment contracts.
Applicant subsequent thereto withdrawing the application as object no longer
exists.
1. This is an application for an order of an interdict restraining Respondent
members from engaging in allegedly unlawful strike. The application was
moved on the 28th September 2012 and rule nisi was issued temporarily
staying the strike action by Respondent members pending the finalisation
of the matter. The rule was extended over a series of dates on request by
both parties, until the 18th October 2012 when the matter was finally
argued. It is against this background that this application was heard on
this day.
SUBMISSIONS
2. Mr. Motlere submitted that since the granting of the rule nisi interdicting
Respondent members from continuing on their industrial action was
granted, Respondent members have ignored the order and continued to
strike. As a result, Applicant management has since terminated all their
employment contracts. He further submitted that due to these
developments, the object of their application had ceased to exist and they
wished to withdraw the matter. Mr. Mokhahlane for Respondent raised
no objection to the withdrawal of the application but indicated that he
was not aware about the developments.
3. In view of the submissions of the parties, I find no reason not to grant the
withdrawal of this matter. Clearly the circumstances warrant the move
Page 24 of 76
taken by Applicant. Consequently, this application is dismissed in terms

of rule 10 of the Labour Court Rules.
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 18th
2012,
DAY
OF OCTOBER
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
Miss. P. LEBITSA
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
MR. MOTLERE
MR. MOKHAHLANE
Page 25 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/04/12
A0932/2009

LESOTHO BREWING COMPANY
APPLICANT
And
DIRECTORATE OF DISPUTE PREVENTION
AND RESOLUTION
M. MONOKO (ARBITRATOR)
NOKOANE MOKHATLA
2nd
1st RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT
3rd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Points in limine raised by 3 rd

Respondent Court dismissing them. Three grounds of review raised by
Applicant. Review application being dismissed. No order as to costs.
It was heard on the 26th September 2012 and judgment was reserved for
a later date. In this application, Applicant seeks to have the arbitration
award handed down on the 28th December 2011, reviewed, corrected and
set aside. Facts surrounding this Application are basically that, after
Applicant had filed its notice of motion with this Court, the record of
proceedings was dispatched and Applicant was called to collect for
transcription. There was an unexplained delay between the time of
collection, the transcription and the filing of an answer to the notice of
motion. As a result, 3rd Respondent filed an application for dismissal of
the review application for want of prosecution. In that application, 3rd
Respondent had also prayed for costs.
2. However, the application for dismissal of the review application was never
moved by Applicant but only came up once more on this day. Even on
this day, it was not moved as parties reached an agreement to abandon it
except for the arguments on the issue of costs. In his answering affidavit,
3rd Respondent had raised two points in limine in terms of which he asked
for the dismissal of Applicants claim. These points were that Applicant
had failed to comply with the provisions of rule 16 (5) and (6) of the
Labour Court Rules; and that this application was an abuse of court
processes. Both parties made representations on these issues but
judgment was reserved and the Court directed them to proceed to argue
the merits of the application. Parties were duly informed that in the event
Page 26 of 76
that points in limine were upheld, the Court would not bother to consider
the merits. It is on these bases that the review was heard on this date.
POINTS IN LIMINE
3. It was submitted on behalf of 3rd Respondent that Applicant had failed to
comply timeously with the provisions of rule 16 of the Rules of this Court
and in particular sub rules (5) and (6). It was argued that contrary to the
dictates of the rule, while Applicant had belatedly filed and served 3rd
Respondent with the record of proceedings, it has not to date served 3rd
Respondent with the notice contemplated in Rule 16. It was submitted
that the gist of Rule 16 (5) and (6) is for the applying party to serve the
other with record of proceedings and inform them about their intention to
or not to add further grounds of review. Once this is communicated, it
would then place 3rd Respondent in a position to respond and have the
matter finalised expeditiously.
4. Applicant responded that it was impossible on their part to serve a copy
of the record of proceedings on the 3rd Respondent within the 7 days, in
the light of the fact that the record was electronic and was yet to be
transcribed. In support of this argument, Applicant further submitted
that once transcribed, the record then had to be served on the DDPR for
certification and given its bulk, these processes could not have been fitted
within the 7 days period. Respondent argued that be as it may, Applicant
was still obliged in terms of the rules to apply for condonation which
Applicant has not been made to date especially since this Court has the
power to grant such an extension if requested. Reference was made to
several cases in this regard among which were Khalapa vs. Commissioner
of Police and Another 1999-2000 LLR-LB 350 (CA) at 354; Lesotho National
Olympic Committee and Others vs. Morolong AC (2000-2004) 449 at 456G)
to support the argument that this Court had power to grant an extension.
As a result, 3rd Respondent maintained that there is still non-compliance
on Applicants part.
5. I have considered the submissions of the parties and my attitude towards
this point in limine is that it is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
this claim. Rather, if well argued, it can only delay the processes to give
Applicant the opportunity to correct the error on their part, through
measures such as an application for condonation. The error complained
of, is failure to file a notice giving direction to 3rd Respondent on whether
to proceed to file his answer or to wait until further grounds of review
have been filed by Applicant. As at this date, no further grounds have
been filed and 3rd Respondent has filed his answer. In my view, this point
has been overtaken by events. At best, and given the current
developments, it can be argued as a ground for the award of costs against
Applicant for causing the delay occasioned by its failure to file the
necessary notice, which delay may have caused a certain level of
prejudice on the 3rd Respondent. Consequently, this point in limine
cannot succeed.
Page 27 of 76
6. It was further argued that this application for review amounts to abuse of
court processes in that the grounds for review raised are without merit. It
was maintained that the grounds of review relate to issues that were
deliberated upon by the leaned Arbitrator in the proceedings. This
according to 3rd Respondent has led them to the conclusion that
Applicant simply wants to delay the execution of the DDPR award granted
in their favour. Reference was made to the case of Remington vs. Scoles
(1897, 2 Ch.D at 5, to illustrate the point that where the court finds that
the conduct of a party amounts to an abuse of process intended to delay
there proceedings, then the court may dismiss such a claim. Applicant
responded that there is merit in its application as all the grounds raised
relate to the serious irregularities by the learned Arbitrator which if
approved will entitle this Court to correct the award in issue.
7. The manner in which this point in limine is structured and in view of the
framing of the review grounds, requires this Court to consider and make
a determination on the merits of the matter. Having done so, this Court
will be in position to validly make a conclusion on whether or not
Applicants claim is without merit and intended to delay the execution of
3rd Respondent award. In view of this said, it cannot stand as a point in
limine but a ground for costs, again if well argued. Although 3rd
Respondent relied on the Remington vs. Scoles (supra) case to support his
argument, the circumstances in the two cases are different. In that case,
there was prima facie evidence that the defendant was abusing court
processes in that he had barely denied each and every substantial claim
of the Applicant. In the present matter, Applicant has made allegations
with supporting averments. Clearly the circumstances are different and
as such that case is not applicable in this instance. Consequently, both
points in limine fail.
THE MERITS
8. Three grounds of review were raised by Applicant alleging gross
irregularities on the part of the learned Arbitrator in the following,
a) By awarding cellphone allowance to the third respondent when the was
no evidence adduced in relation thereto.
b) By failing to investigate whether or not the Applicant companys rules
allowed bringing of new evidence on appeal.
c) By failing to inquire why third Respondent sought to bring in new
evidence on appeal and what nature of evidence he had sought to bring in
on appeal, otherwise there was no basis for finding that the procedure was
flawed as he did.
9. Respondent answered that all these grounds raised by Applicant are
unfounded as all the issues were duly addressed in the proceedings and
as such there was no irregularity as suggested. In relation to the first
ground of review, reference was made to page 142 of the record. It was
submitted that at this page, evidence was led that 3rd Respondent was
given airtime allowance on a monthly basis. I have considered both the
Page 28 of 76
submissions of the parties and the record of proceedings before the

DDPR. I have discovered that indeed evidence was led at page 142 of the
record, by 3rd Respondent himself that he was entitled to a monthly
airtime allowance of M100.00. Therefore, contrary to Applicant assertion
of absence of such evidence, I have confirmed that there was and I
accordingly dismiss this ground.
10. In relation to the second ground, 3rd Respondent argued that there
was evidence during cross examination of one Mr. Motselebane to the
effect that the rules of Applicant Company allowed for the bringing in of
new evidence on appeal. Reference was made to pages 83, 201, 202 and
203 of the DDPR record of proceedings. Similarly, as suggested by 3rd
Respondent, evidence of one Motselebane and 3rd Respondent was led in
pages 83 and 201-203 of the record, respectively. Their evidence was to
the effect that the bringing of new evidence was allowed on appeal in
terms of the rules of Applicant Company. If this is the case, there was no
need for the learned Arbitrator to make an inquiry in the suggested
fashion and accordingly no irregularity was committed on his part.
11. On the third ground, Applicant argued that it was incumbent upon the
learned Arbitrator to inquire about the nature of evidence that 3rd
Respondent wanted to bring on appeal. Further that, the learned
arbitrator had to investigate what evidence this was, that would have
influence on the chairman of the appeal to find otherwise. Without doing
this, the learned arbitrator misdirected himself concluding that it was
wrong for 3rd Respondent to have been denied the chance to bring in new
evidence on appeal. To further fortify this point, it was alleged that in the
hearing, 3rd Respondent did not state the evidence that he wanted to
bring on appeal but simply testified that he wanted to bring in new
evidence on appeal but was denied the chance without stating what is
was.
12. In reaction to the third ground, 3rd Respondent argued that it was not
the responsibility of the learned Arbitrator to inquire about the nature of
evidence that 3rd Respondent wanted to bring but that of Applicant. It
was further argued that in any event, the nature of the evidence that 3rd
Respondent wanted to bring on appeal appears at para 3 on page 220 of
the DDPR record as being the evidence that would contradict the charges
against him.
13. In terms of section 25(3) of the Labour Code (Conciliation and
Arbitration Guidelines) of 2004,
Unless there are good reasons for doing otherwise, the arbitration
proceedings are inquisitorial in nature. This means that, it is the
arbitrators task to find out the truth by asking questions requiring parties
to produce documentary or other forms of evidence that may lead to a just
and expedited determination of the dispute.
Page 29 of 76
14. In view of this above quotation, it is clear as put by Applicant, that the
learned Arbitrator had an obligation to enquire about the evidence that
3rd Respondent alleges to have been denied the opportunity to tender on
appeal. However, this is subject to such evidence having not been
adduced by one or both parties and such evidence being necessary for the
dispute to be determined fairly. According to the record, in particular at
page 220, 3rd Respondent testified that he wanted to bring evidence in the
form of correspondence to his seniors to show that he elevated the
shortage to them and had thus followed the procedure. If then this is the
case, 3rd Respondent explained why he wanted to bring in new evidence
and the nature of the evidence he wanted to tender. Clearly, there is no
defect in the conduct of the learned Arbitrator as there has no need for
him to engage into such an inquiry. In making his conclusion that there
was a flaw in the appeal procedure of Applicant Company, he had made
the necessary considerations in the light of evidence before him.
Therefore, this ground fails.
COSTS
15. 3rd Respondent argued that in the event that this court finds in his
favour, an award of costs be made against Applicant. He argued that
because Applicant had handled this matter in a dilatory manner without
a satisfactory explanation, coupled with the fact that there is no merit in
the application, the Court should made an order of costs de bonis propriis
and/or on attorney and client scale. Reference was made to the cases of
Lesesa vs. Khutlisi LAC (2007-2008) at page 145 at 147-148 and LUTARU
vs. NUL 1999-2000 LLR-LB 52 at 64, an order of costs de bonis propriis
was made. 3rd Respondent maintained that as a result of the conduct of
Applicant, he has suffered prejudice in that he has failed to maintain his
wife and two daughters whose lives have been compromised and have
thus deteriorated since his loss of employment.
16. In reaction, Applicant submitted that 3rd Respondent had failed to
illustrate how Applicant was at fault in occasioning the delay in
prosecution of the matter. It was further submitted that given the bulk of
the record, it was only reasonable that it was completed at the time it
was. It was further argued that the discretion to condone the breach of
rules lies with the court. Reference was made to the observation of the
court in JHL Real Estate Ltd. vs. Samuel Brandt Masia LC/90/2005 where
this view was expressed. In reaction to this, 3rd Respondent argued that
no application for condonation had been made so that there was still a
breach of the rules which caused an unnecessary delay.
17. I have found the explanation given by Applicant to be satisfactory
except that it did not follow the proper procedures to have the delay
condoned. However, the issue of condonation is not the basis of the 3rd
Respondent application for costs but that the manner in which the
proceedings were dealt with was dilatory and without satisfactory
explanation. An award for costs in intended to discourage certain
unwanted behaviour from happening or continuing. It is not in any way
Page 30 of 76
intended to intimidate parties from exercising their respective rights and

as such it must be given in very extreme circumstances such as where
prima facie there is no claim or defence. In this matter, this was not the
situation hence why an application for dismissal of the matter on account
of abuse of process was refused. As a result, this Court declines to make
an award of costs.
AWARD
following terms:
d) That the review application is dismissed; and
e) That there is no order as to costs.
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 31st DAY OF OCTOBER
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. S. KAO
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. NTAOTE
ADV. THULO.
Page 31 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/18/2010
A0939/2003

LESOTHO EXPRESS DELIVERY
SERVICES (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
And
THE ARBITRATOR DDPR
NKOTO MIRIAM CHABANE
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Review application of DDPR award. Respondent raising three preliminary

points on jurisdiction of this Court. First point being lack of jurisdiction to
entertain a review in respect of a reviewed matter second point being late
referral of the review application - third point being an appeal disguised as a
review. Court dismissing the latter two points and declining jurisdiction to
entertain Applicants claim on the basis of the third point. No order as to costs
being made.
It was heard on the 30th October 2012 and judgment was reserved for a
later date. Facts surrounding this application are basically that 2nd
Respondent initially referred a claim for unpaid wages with the DDPR
sometime in 2003, under referral number A0939/2003. This claim was
granted in favour of 2nd Respondent in default by Arbitrator Rantsane.
Applicant then made an application for rescission which was
unsuccessful. Thereafter, Applicant lodged a review application with this
court under case number LC/REV/252/2006. This court made the
conclusion that the matter be heard de novo before a different Arbitrator.
The matter was duly remitted to the DDPR before Arbitrator Thamae,
whose award is subject of review in these proceedings.
2. In this application, Applicant seeks to have the arbitration award before
Arbitrator Thamae, handed down on the 10th February 2010, reviewed,
corrected and set aside. In his answering affidavit, 2nd Respondent raised
three points in limine on jurisdiction, in terms of which he asked for the
dismissal of Applicants claim. The points in limine were that, it is
irregular to review the same matter twice; that the review application had
been lodged out of the prescribed time limits; and that this application is
an appeal disguised as a review. Having heard the submission of parties
Page 32 of 76
on these points, the Court declined to hear the merits before pronouncing
its self on the preliminary issues. It is on these bases that this matter
proceeded on this date.
SUBMISSIONS
3. It was submitted on behalf of 2nd Respondent that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain this review for the reason that Applicant is asking
the Court to review the same matter twice. It was argued in support that,
referral A0939/2003 was first reviewed under LC/REV/252/2006 and
remitted to the DDPR to be heard on a specific issue sometime in 2006.
This issue was whether 2nd Respondent had received a letter of dismissal.
The learned Arbitrator had decided that Applicant had not, which was a
similar conclusion to the one reached by the learned Arbitrator who
presided over the matter prior to the first review. It was argued that to
allow this review would be permitting 2nd Respondent to review the same
matter twice, when the proper remedy is an appeal.
4. Applicant responded that they are reviewing the conducts of two different
Arbitrators at different times. In the initial review, the conduct
complained of was by Arbitrator Rantsane while in this mater, it is the
conduct of Arbitrator Thamae. As a result, the acts complained of are acts
of two different functionaries at two different times. It was thus argued
that the procedure adopted by Applicant is proper in the circumstances.
5. I have taken the liberty to peruse LC/REV/252/2006. I have found that
in this matter, the Court came to the conclusion that referral
A0939/2003 be heard afresh before a different arbitrator. This, I wish to
highlight, is contrary to the allegation of 2nd Respondent that the matter
was remitted back to the DDPR only in respect of a particular issue. Our
law is clear on issues of contradictions in averments of parties that such
averments cannot be relied upon. However, since this is not the thrust of
this application, I will deliberate on its further. If then it is the position
that in terms of LC/REV/252/2006, referral A0939/2003 was to be
heard afresh, I see no wrong in Applicant lodging this review. There is no
rule of law, that I know of or which 2nd Respondent has referred to, that
prevents Applicant from taking this route. I am in agreement with the
submissions of Applicant that the current matter is concerned with the
conduct of a different arbitrator altogether. I further add that this review
is premised on the conduct of the latter Arbitrator during the conduct of
arbitration proceedings before him and not the conduct of the former
Arbitrator.
6. 2nd Respondent further argued that this matter had been lodged with this
Court out of time without an application for condonation. It was alleged
that the referral was served upon Applicant more than 30 days before it
was lodged with this Court. As a result, this Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain this application. Applicant responded that the matter was well
within prescribed time limits, as they received the award on the 1st March
2010 and then lodged a review application by the 31st of the same month.
Page 33 of 76
Reference was made to the stamped notice of application. Applicant

submitted that by the time they filed this application, the 30 days period
had not lapsed.
7. It is trite that he who makes an allegation bears the onus of proof (see
United Clothing vs. Phakiso Mokoatsi & another LC/RV/436/2006). My
conclusion on the averments of 2nd Respondent about the lateness of the
referral of this review application is that they are bare. 2nd Respondent
has simply made an allegation about lateness, which allegation has been
denied by Applicant with supporting evidence. The effect of this has been
to place a burden on the 2nd Respondent to bring evidence to support his
allegations or contradict the evidence of Applicant. In the absence of such
evidence, I find the allegation about the matter having been referred out
of time to be unsatisfactory and unconvincing. This court has expressed
this view in many of its decisions (see Kopano Textiles (Pty) Ltd vs.
Moteare Qokolo & Others LC/REV/19/09). Consequently, this point fails.
8. It was submitted on behalf of 2nd Respondent that the grounds raised by
Applicant in its notice of motion are appeal and not review grounds. This
was said to be premised on the fact that the grounds so raised only
echoed the dissatisfaction of Applicant with the decision of the learned
Arbitrator in the initial hearing. It was emphasised that the grounds
relate to both the substance and application of law which issues are not
reviewable but appealable. It was further argued that there is no
allegation of a procedural irregularity in the application. 2nd Respondent
argued that in view if his contention above, this Court has no jurisdiction
to hear appeal from the DDPR decisions.
9. Applicant responded that grounds raised are review grounds. It was
argued that the use and non-use of the words irregularity do not change
their approach to an appeal. It was submitted that grounds raised clearly
relate to a review and not an appeal as they highlight a mistake of law on
the part of the learned Arbitrator which materially affect his decision.
Reference was made to the case of Thabo Mohlobo & Others vs. Lesotho
Highlands Authority LAC/CIV/A/02/2010, in which this principle was
applied. In reply, 2nd Respondent argued that in the above case, the Court
went further to state that the mistake of law contemplated must relate to
the procedure or processes of reaching the conclusion in issue.
10. I have gone through the notice of motion and founding affidavit of
Applicant and have the ground of review phrased as follows;
1. That the learned Arbitrator failed to adequately apply his mind to the
matter as required by law and the standard of proof and came to a
conclusion which is not supported by the evidence and facts presented
before him; and
2. The learned Arbitrator failed to adequately apply his mind to the matter
as required by law in awarding the 2nd Respondent M280 000.00 in
outstanding wages as from paragraph 5 of his own award the second
Page 34 of 76
Respondent had no reasonable and legitimate expectation of being paid or

employed by the Applicant, at latest, since 28th August 2003.
11. I have noted, as suggested by 2nd Respondent that there is no use of
the word irregularity in the grounds of review raised by Applicant.
However, I am in agreement with the Applicant to the extent that the use
or non-use of the word irregularity is not the only determining element
of what does or does not constitute grounds of review. What is important
is for the parties to highlight the points of defect in respect of the
procedures adopted in reaching the conclusion complained of. This has
been reflected in the case of Thabo Mohlobo & Others vs. Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority LAC/CIV/A/05/2010) and in applied in
Thabo Mohlobo and 19 Others vs. Lesotho Highlands Development
Authority LC/REV/09/2012.
12. However, I have found both grounds of review raised by Applicant to
constitute appeal grounds as they express Applicants dissatisfaction with
the conclusion that the learned arbitrator made. I have not found any
allegations of processes or procedures being flawed or it being indicated
how they were in effect flawed. In view of the 1st ground of review,
Applicant is alleging that the conclusion so reached should not have been
on the basis of the standard of proof in proceedings of this nature. What
he is effectively saying is that a different conclusion would have been
reached given the evidence that was presented in the hearing.
13. The effect is the same even on the second ground of review, that it is
an appeal and not a review ground. Applicant is suggesting that the
decision of the learned arbitrator was wrong when he allegedly found in
favour of Applicant in the sum stated. Applicant had argued that on the
balance of probabilities, the learned Arbitrator ought to have found that
2nd Respondent had no legitimate expectation of continuing to be
employed, at latest since the 28th August 2003. Clearly, the issue here is
the ultimate conclusion of the learned arbitrator as Applicant had failed
to indicate how procedural flaw occurred in these proceedings. This being
the case, Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Applicants claim for the
reason that it is an appeal and not a review ground.
Page 35 of 76
AWARD
following terms:
a) That this application is dismissed on lack of jurisdiction; and
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 31st DAY OF OCTOBER
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
Mr. S. KAO
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. MOKEBISA
ADV. NTENE
Page 36 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/09/12
A0649/2008

LESOTHO HIGHLANDS
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
APPLICANT
And
THABO MOHLOBO & 19 OTHERS
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Court finding other grounds as
constituting an appeal disguised as a review. Applicant failing to substantiate
grounds to qualify as review grounds. Review application being dismissed.
Respondent failing to justify an award of costs in favour. Court making no
order as to costs.
It was heard on the 20th September 2012 and judgment was reserved for
a later date. In this application, Applicant seeks to have the arbitration
award handed down on the 12th December 2011, reviewed and set aside.
This application was duly opposed and both parties made
representations. At the commencement of the proceedings, it was brought
to the attention of the Court that there was a point in limine raised by
Respondent. The point in limine was to the effect that the grounds raised
by Applicant were not review but appeal grounds. However, parties made
a special request that, rather than to adopt the convention approach of
arguing the point in limine separately from the merits, they would argue
them together in their submissions. It is on these bases that the review
was heard on this date.
SUBMISSIONS
2. There are six grounds of review of the award in referral A0649/2008, that
have been raised on behalf of Applicant, as follows:
29.1 As a matter of law on the evidence, the material factual conclusions
of the Arbitrator are so manifestly wrong that they are conclusions which
no reasonable court could have arrived at. Accordingly, the said
conclusions constitute a mistake of law as contemplated by section 228F(3)
of the code; and/or
Page 37 of 76
29.2 The process of reasoning followed by the Honourable Arbitrator is so

flawed that she did not properly exercise the process entrusted to her;
and/or
29.3 On the evidence before her, the factual conclusions that she arrived at,
caused her to reach legal conclusions which resulted in her award not
being in accordance with the law; and/or
29.4 In deciding the facts of the matter, she failed to take material evidence
into account, alternatively she had regard to and relied upon evidence that
was irrelevant, all of which resulted in factual conclusions which no
reasonable court could have arrived at; and/or
29.5 The award and determination reached on the correct acts, is so wrong
that it is unfair and hence the Arbitrator acted outside her authority and
mandate as conferred upon her by section 228C of the Code. This section
enjoins her to determine the dispute fairly. As a result of her misdirection in
this regard, her award constitutes misconduct rendering the award a
nullity; and/or
29.6 The Honourable Arbitrator, in arriving at her conclusions did not
properly apply her mind to the matter. In particular, she failed to appreciate
the relevant and credible facts and the law or she failed to direct her
thoughts to the relevant and truthful evidence or the relevant principles
and/or she relied on relevant considerations and/or her approach was
arbitrary and hence the gross irregularity.
3. In amplification of these grounds, Applicant has not made any specific
submissions to each and every one of them but has rather generalised
their submissions, in the points below. As a result, I will deal with them
in the generalised manner adopted by Applicant.
4. Applicant submitted that the learned Arbitrators conclusions are so
wrong that no reasonable Court could have arrived at. The premises of
this argument is that whereas there was evidence that Respondent herein
were employees of the Government of Lesotho, the learned Arbitrator
nonetheless made a factual conclusion that they were not, but the
employees of Applicant herein. It was argued that this constitutes a
reviewable ground. Reference was made to the conclusions of the Labour
Appeal Court in Mantsoe vs. R LAC (1990) 193 at 195,where the Court
had this to say,
The only conceivable basis on which an attack on the factual conclusions
of the court a quo involves a question of law would be if these were
conclusions which no reasonable court could have arrived at.
5. Respondent replied that Applicants arguments are grounds for appeal
and not a review, which jurisdiction this Court does not have. It was
argued that these grounds are purely based on the decision of the learned
Arbitrator, which Applicant is unhappy about. Respondent further argued
that without admitting that the grounds raised are review grounds, there
was evidence to the effect that Respondents herein were employees of
Applicant and not the Lesotho Government. It was further argued that in
Page 38 of 76
fact, no evidence at all was availed to show that Respondents were

employees of the Lesotho Government as suggested.
6. Review applications are brought before this Court in terms of section
228F(3) of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992 as amended. In terms of this
section,
The Labour Court may set aside an award on any grounds permissible in
law and any mistake of law that materially affects it.
An attempt has been made in several judgments of this Court and other
superior Courts to interpret the provisions of section 228F(3), and in
particular what is meant by any grounds permissible in law. In the case
of
Lesotho
Electricity
Corporation
vs.
Ramoqopo
&
Others
LAC/REV/121/2006, the Court concluded that the phrase should be
interpreted to mean various common law grounds of review.
7. It is important at this juncture to define what is meant by a review. This
subject is not new as it has been dealt with previously by this court when
it sought to highlight the distinction between an appeal and a review. A
review is thus a process that is concerned with the process or the
procedure in which the conclusions were made (see Thabo Mohlobo &
Others
vs.
Lesotho
Highlands
Development
Authority
LAC/CIV/A/05/2010). The effect of Thabo Mohlobo case and Lesotho
Electricity cases (supra), is to suggest that the phrase any grounds
permissible in law must be interpreted within the context of the definition
of a review. That is to say, any ground permissible in law must relate to
the process or procedure adopted by the decision maker in arriving at the
conclusions that form the subject of challenge. This therefore means that
even the argument that that the Court arrived at a conclusion that no
reasonable court could have arrived at, must be related to the processes
and procedure of arriving at the conclusion in issue.
8. In the case at hand, no reference has been made by Applicant to the any
processes or procedural irregularity on the part of the leaned Arbitrator.
The premise of Applicants argument has simply been that the
conclusions were so unreasonable that no court could have arrived at.
This in my opinion means that a different Court in the same
circumstances could have reached a different conclusion. This clearly
indicates a dissatisfaction with the conclusions of the leaned Arbitrator.
This is clearly not a ground for review but that of appeal. In Coetzee vs.
Lebea NO and Another (1999) 20 ILJ, 129 (LC) at page 130, the court
concluded that where the argument is that, on the basis of the present
facts a different decision could have been arrived at, that constitutes a
ground for appeal. This case was cited with approval in the case of
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority vs. Rosalika Ramoholi and
Another LC/REV/33/2012. Consequently, this ground fails on this
premise alone.
9. It was further argued on behalf of Applicant that the learned Arbitrator
relied on section 3 of the Labour Code, to come to the conclusion that
Page 39 of 76
Respondents were employees of Applicant, yet section 3 was never argued

or relied upon by any of the parties. Applicant maintained that it was
thus wrong for her, to have relied on legal considerations for which no
argument was heard. It was further submitted that even in assuming that
it was legally permissible for the learned Arbitrator to base her conclusion
on the provisions of section 3 of the Labour Code, her interpretation of
the section was so wrong that it led her into an incorrect conclusion.
Respondent replied that it is not true that the definition of an employee
was not argued or that it was a misdirection of law on the part of the
Learned arbitrator to make the conclusion that she made.
10. In reviewing the decision of an inferior court, among the
considerations to make is whether the decision reached was rationally
justifiable. This principle was highlighted in the case of County Fair Foods
(Pty) Ltd vs. Commissioner for Conciliation and Others 1999 20 ILJ 1701
and cited with approval in the case of Global Garments vs. Mosemoli
Morojele LC/REV/354/2006. This in essence means that the decision
maker in an inferior Court, must provide justification for the conclusions
that he or she makes. In my view, I do not find any irregularity in the
approach of the Learned Arbitrator to have made reference to section 3 of
the Labour Coder Order (supra), to justify her decision, that Respondents
were employees of Applicant. I have gone through the record of
proceedings before the DDPR as well as the arbitration award and have
found that the issue of whether Respondents were employees or not, was
raised and argued. Therefore, I find no irregularity in this regard.
11. It was furthermore submitted that the learned Arbitrator, in deciding
that Respondents were employees of Applicant, was wrong to have
concluded that they were ordinary or normal employees of Respondent.
She ought to have found that they were a special group or class of
Respondent employees, on whom the Human Resources Management
manual did not apply. It was also submitted that there was truthful and
reliable evidence to this effect. Respondent replied that there was no
evidence to suggest any classifications of employees within the LHDA as
put by Applicant. Further, it was submitted that there was no evidence
that Respondents had been exempted from the application of manual.
Consequently, there was no basis for the learned Arbitrator to have
concluded that the manual did not apply to Respondents.
12. It was also submitted that should it be found that the learned
Arbitrator was correct in finding that Respondents were Applicant
employees and that the Human Resources Management manual applied
to them, the learned Arbitrator misdirected herself in holding that
Respondents were entitled to payment of mountain allowance/deprivation
allowance of M1800.00. It was further argued that the learned Arbitrator
should have found on proper reading of clause 20.3.4 of the manual, that
Respondents were not entitled to mountain allowance or it did not apply
to them. Respondent rejected this argument on the ground that it does
not constitute a ground for review but an appeal. It was further stated
Page 40 of 76
that all evidence surrounding this argument were raised and deliberated
before the court a quo so that there was no misdirection on the part of the
learned Arbitrator.
13. My understanding of these grounds of review is that Applicant is
dissatisfied with the conclusions of the learned Arbitrator about the
status of Respondent and their relationship with the Human Resources
Management
manual
as
well
as
their
entitlement
to
mountain/deprivation allowance. There is nothing to suggest an
irregularity on the part of the learned arbitrator in the processes or
procedures she adopted to formulate this conclusion. Applicant is simply
making submissions based on what its anticipated outcome was in
relation to these issues. I have satisfied myself that all these issues were
raised and argued in the initial arbitration hearing and that the learned
Arbitrator considered them in making her conclusion. I have already
pronounced myself in relation to the dissatisfaction of Applicant about
the conclusion of the learned Arbitrator and therefore see no point in
reiterating myself. As a result and in the same vein, these grounds fail as
they are appeal and not review grounds. I therefore find no reason to
deliberate on it further.
14. It also argued that there is clause 2.4.2 of the manual which provides
that
where these policies and procedures are in conflict with the terms and
conditions of contracts for employees, the contracts shall prevail, unless
agreed otherwise between such employees and the LHDA.
15. In the context of this clause, Applicant argued that the learned
Arbitrator overlooked or ignored the correct facts which showed that the
terms of the contracts and the manual conflicted, in that the contracts
provided for M300.00 while the manual provided for a different amount.
Applicant further argued that the learned Arbitrator should have applied
the express terms of the provision of the manual in which case, she
would have dismissed Respondent claims. Further, it was submitted that
the learned arbitrator side stepped clause 2.4.2 of the manual by
suggesting contrary evidence that employees contracts on mountain
allowance came later than the clause conferring upon them the right to
mountain allowance of M1,800.00. Furthermore, Applicant submitted on
this basis the learned Arbitrator came to the wrong conclusion that a
right given cannot be taken away without the concerned employees
consent. It was said that the right alleged to have been taken away was
never conferred and as such the approach adopted by the learned
Arbitrator was completely arbitrary. Respondent replied that this is an
appeal ground, for the reason that the Honourable Arbitrator did apply
her mind to the question of the applicability of clause 2.4.2 and all other
clauses of the manual, including the evidence led before her.
16. I have gone through both the record of proceedings before the DDPR
as well as the arbitration award and have found that evidence was indeed
Page 41 of 76
led as parties suggest. Further, I have found that the issue of clause 2.4.2
of Applicant Manual, was considered by the learned Arbitrator in
formulating her decision. This learned arbitrators finding on this issue
has been that clause 2.4.2 had the effect of depriving Applicants of their
existing rights as suggested by Applicant. She then came to the
conclusion that Respondents were entitled to a mountain allowance of
M1,800.00. As a result, there is nothing that the learned Arbitrator
overlooked or ignored safe that she only came to a different conclusion
from that anticipated by Applicant.
17. It was furthermore argued that the learned arbitrator was not justified
in relying on clause 2.5 of the manual which empowers the Respondent to
exempt certain persons from its applicability. According to the said
clause, there has to be a written authorisation of exemption by the
Human Resources branch. The learned Arbitrator concluded that no such
exemption was granted so that the manual applied to Respondents. It
was submitted that if clause 2.5 applied on these bases, so then did
clause 2.4.2 which provided that the contacts shall apply in the event
that there is conflict with the manual. The effect of this would be that all
Respondents were not entitled to mountain allowance of M1,800.00 per
the manual but the M300.00 per their contracts. Respondent relied that
clause 2.5 was relevant to the issue in hand and as such the learned
Arbitrator was justified in relying on it to determine if Respondents were
exempt from applicability of the manual.
18. Applicants argument on this point is incomplete for the reason that
there is a bare allegation that the learned Arbitrator was not justified in
relying on clause 2.5. No further submissions have been made to indicate
how this could have resulted into an irregularity. Rather, what happened
is that Applicant uses the conclusion of learned Arbitrator to suggest that
if clause 2.5 applied and so did 2.4.2. Even the Respondent was not
much of help on this point of whether the learned Arbitrator was justified
or not in relying on clause 2.5. Rather, Respondent went on to advance
their augment in relation to this clause. I have already dealt with the
issue of clause 2.4.2 and as such I find that it would be a unnecessary to
dwell on it again. The argument about cause 2.5 of the manual falls off,
on the grounds that it is unsubstantiated.
COSTS
19. Respondent prayed that this review application be dismissed with
costs for want of merit on attorney and client scale. Respondent opposed
the application on the ground that their application has merit and that it
should succeed as the learned Arbitrator clearly misdirected herself. In
spite of the submissions of the parties, I decline to make an award of
costs. My view is based on the fact that costs are awarded in extreme
circumstances. The intention behind making an ward of costs is not to
intimidate parties away from enforcing their rights but mainly to
discourage abuse of court processes. I do not find the current
circumstances to justify an award of costs, more so in the light of the fact
Page 42 of 76
that Respondent has not given this Court enough justification to awards
costs in their favour.
AWARD
following terms:
a) That the review application is dismissed; and
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 22nd DAY OF OCTOBER
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mrs. L. RAMASHAMOLE
Mr. L. MATELA
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. WOKER
ADV. SEKONYELA
Page 43 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/60/2009
A0558/2005

TSEBO SEPETLA
APPLICANT
And
LESOTHO BREWING COMPANY (PTY) LTD
DDPR
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Condonation for late filing of
review application having been earlier granted Review application being
heard in the merits. Court finding it irregular for learned Arbitrator to have
reopened an issue that he had earlier made a ruling on for argument. Court
also finding it irregular for the learned Arbitrator to have made a conclusion on
a factual issue without hearing facts. Application for review being granted. No
order as to costs.
down on the 18th June 2009, reviewed, corrected and set aside. This
matter was initially before the late President of the Labour Court, Judge
President L. A. Lethobane. The matter had finalised in that He had dealt
with both the application for condonation and the merits of this matter.
2. However, by the time of his untimely passing he had only dealt with and
granted the condonation application and had not pronounced himself on
the merits. As a result, the matter started afresh in relation to the merits
only. This application is premised on two grounds of review namely that
the learned Arbitrator erred in law by allowing a finalised matter to be
argued for the second time; and that He relied on submissions only to
dismiss Applicants claim when he ought to heard viva voce evidence as
well. The application was argued and the ruling and reasons are in the
following.
SUBMISSIONS
3. It was submitted on behalf of Applicant that in the matter under review,
the learned Arbitrator had raised a preliminary issue that one cannot
accept his terminal benefits and later challenge that fairness of their
Page 44 of 76
dismissal. According Applicant, the learned Arbitrator had premised his

contention on the decision of the Court in the case of Teliso Moiloa vs
Total Print House LC/REV/524/2006. The learned Arbitrator was
addressed by both counsels on the matter and they in agreement
submitted that the matter before him was distinguishable from the
Teliso Moiloa case (supra) and they requested that the matter proceed in
the merits. Their request was accepted by the learned Arbitrator who
made a ruling that the matter would proceed in the merits on the next
date of hearing.
4. On the next date of hearing, the same preliminary issue was raised again
by 1st Respondent. Despite their objection to the matter being raised for
the second time, it was nonetheless entertained and a ruling was made
dismissing their unfair dismissal claim. In this application, Applicant
thus argued that it was unprocedural and irregular for the learned
Arbitrator to have allowed a finalised issue, on which he had pronounced
himself, to be re-opened more so when it related to the same augment
and submission earlier made before him. It was further argued that the
conduct of the learned Arbitrator was a gross mistake of law which
materially affected his decision.
5. Furthermore, it was argued having decided to re-open the matter, the
learned Arbitrator erred in law by relying only on the submissions of
parties without viva voce evidence. Had he heard viva voce evidence, He
would have discovered that acceptance of a cheque paid to Applicant did
not bar him from challenging the fairness of his dismissal. It was
submitted that in this matter the cheque was accepted after the matter
had been referred to the DDPR whereas in the Teliso Moiloa case (supra),
which His decision was based on, the money had been accepted before a
referral was made and with the intention to settle the matter. It was thus
argued that the circumstances of the two cases are different and
incomparable.
6. Reference was made to the case of Nokoane Mokhatla vs. Lesotho Brewing
Company and Another LC/REV/65/2012 where the Court made a
distinction between the facts of matter before it and the Teliso Moiloa
case (supra). It was submitted that the facts of the Nokoane Mokhatla
case (supra) are similar to the facts of the case before this Court in that
both cases relate to an irregularity on the part of the learned Arbitrator by
making factual conclusions on the basis of submissions and without
hearing supporting facts.
7. In response, 1st Respondent representative submitted that they did not
object to review application being granted. It was submitted that at the
time that the review application was made, the Nokoane Mokhatla (supra)
decision had not yet been delivered. For the reason that the facts and
circumstances in the present matter and in the Nokoane Mokhatla
(supra) are similar and in view of the decision of this Court in that case, it
Page 45 of 76
would be an unnecessary exercise that would attract costs on their side if

they pursued the matter further.
8. This Court has considered the submissions of both parties on the issues
raised and has the following to say. In relation to the first ground of
review, this Court is in agreement with the submissions by Applicant that
it was both irregular and unprocedural for the learned Arbitrator to have
re-opened a finalised matter for argument. In our view the conduct of the
learned arbitrator in this instance was tantamount the appeal or review of
its own decision, a prerogative left only with superior courts. In our view,
this is a gross mistake that materially affected the learned Arbitrators
decision to dismiss Applicants claim. As a result, this matter stands to be
reviewed and set aside on this point alone.
9. However, since both points have been argued, we have also considered
the second ground of review. We have come to the conclusion that the
issue of whether or not acceptance of the cheque by Applicant from 1st
Respondent constituted a settlement of the matter, is a matter that
required the leading of evidence. This Court has pronounced itself on this
issue in the case of Nokoane Mokhatla (supra) as referred to by Applicant
above. We have satisfied ourselves that the facts and surrounding
circumstances are similar on both the Nokoane Mokhatla case (supra) and
the present matters. We have further satisfied ourselves that the
circumstances of the Teliso Moiloa case (supra) and the Applicants claim
are the DDPR were not the same and thus incomparable. As a result, it
was wrong for the learned Arbitrator to have made a conclusion without
first hearing viva voce evidence as suggested by Applicant. Consequently,
this matter warrants the granting of the review application as sought by
Applicant.
Page 46 of 76
AWARD
following terms:
b) That referral A0558/2005 be heard de novo before a different arbitrator;
and
2012.
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
Mr. S. KAO
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. MOKEBISA
ADV. MABULA
Page 47 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/120/2011
A0696/2011

NTHABISENG MOLIKO
APPLICANT
And
C & Y GARMENTS (PTY) LTD
ARBITRATOR C. T. THAMAE
DDPR
3rd
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Respondent filing an answer out of

time together with an application for condonation. Condonation being granted
and matter proceeding into the merits. Court finding that review application is
based on what took place at the initial disciplinary hearing. Further that
Applicant is challenging the decision of the learned Arbitrator and not the
procedure of making the decision. Court not finding any irregularity on the part
the learned Arbitrator. Review application being dismissed. No order as to
costs being made.
down on the 28th September 2011, reviewed, corrected and set aside. Five
grounds of review were raised in the founding documents. However, at
the commencement of the proceedings, Applicant withdrew four grounds
leaving only one. In terms of this ground Applicant argued that the
learned Arbitrator erred in law in that He made a conclusion that a
recommendation of the chairman in the disciplinary hearing is final. Both
parties made presentations in the matter and the ruling as wells as
reasons are in the following.
SUBMISSIONS
2. It was averred that the decision to dismiss an employee is the sole
prerogative of the employer and not the chairman of the disciplinary
hearing. It was submitted that the role of the chairman in such activities
is merely to recommend to the employer to dismiss and not to make
decisions with adverse impact of the rights of the employee. It was further
argued that although the rules of the employer allowed for the
chairperson to make the final decision to dismiss, this arrangement was
Page 48 of 76
contrary to the rules of natural justice. Reference was made to the case
of Gerald Lerotholi Mokhobo vs. Maleloko Mokalanyane and Another
LC/29/1998 in support of this argument, where the Court said the
following,
Even if the Companys rules and regulations designated Mr. Tom Sekhobe
as entitled to proceed over disciplinary hearing and to fire the applicant in
the event of a conviction, such authority would infringe the rules of natural
justice and render the proceedings unfair.
3. Applicant further stated that the chairperson is also the one who signed
the letter inviting Applicant to the hearing but yet later stood in the
proceedings as the chairperson. He argued that clearly in signing the
letter he became the complainant yet it is trite that no man can be a
judge in his own cause. According to Applicant, the fact that the same
person who acted as the chairperson in the Applicant disciplinary hearing
is also the deponent to the founding documents in these proceedings goes
to validate her argument that he was biased and ought not to have
proceeded as chairman in the initial proceedings. Reference was made to
the case of Motlatsi Melato vs. Maseru City Council and Attorney General
1997-98 LLR 40, where the decision of the court in Liebenberg vs.
Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board 1944 WLD 52 was cited as thus,
every person who undertakes to administer justice whether he is a legal
official or is only for the occasion engaged in work of deciding rights of
others, is disqualified ... if there are circumstances affecting him that might
reasonable create a suspicion that he is not impartial.
4. As a result, and in view of the above said, it was argued that the fact that
the chairperson made this decision, this was ultra vires his powers for the
reason that the principles of natural justice are imported into all
disciplinary hearings. Reference was made to the case of Lesotho
Evangelical Church vs. John M. B. Nyabela 1980 (2) LLR 466 where the
court said the following,
discipline ... must be in conformity with the rules, such as there are, and
the minimum requirements of the canons of natural justice must observed.
Applicant concluded that in accepting that the recommendation of the
chairperson is final and finding for Respondent, the learned Arbitrator
committed both a gross error and misdirection.
5. In reply, Respondent submitted that they denied that the learned
Arbitrator committed an irregularity in finding that the recommendation
of chairperson of the disciplinary hearing is final. It was submitted that
decision of the chairperson was based on the evidence of the rules of the
employer. It was further argued that rules of the employer and in
particular the Respondent Human Resources Policy, mandated him to do
make a final decision to dismiss. In support of this argument, reference
was also made to the case of Lineo Moalosi vs. Catherine Xu and Another
LC/23/04 where the court said the following,
Managers are not in law recognised as agents of the company although
they may be clothed with such authority through administrative process of
Page 49 of 76
delegation. Thus is in the case of Mahlomola Seboka v. Lesotho Bank

CIV/APN/227/91 (unreported) Maqutu J remarked as follows:
companies and public bodies which have an artificial persona are
strictly governed by the constitutions, memoranda of association and
statues if they are founded by some law. Anything not done in terms of
their founding documents can be deemed not to have happened at all.
Hence the action is null and void. The brains, the eyes, the ears, the
mouth and hands of these bodies are their Board of Directors and
committees. Usually maters of day to day administration, hiring and
firing juniors members of staff and some matters of discipline are
delegated to a manger or management.
6. We have considered all the evidence before us, and in particular the
record of proceedings before the DDPR, the arbitral award and the
submissions of parties. With particular reference to the review ground
raised and submissions in support, We have noted a few issues that are
worthy of mention. As a starting point, We are in agreement with the
Applicant that the Rules of Natural Justice must live within every other
rule as they form the basis of the rule of law. This is evident in the extract
taken from the case of Lesotho Evangelical Church vs. John M. B. Nyabela
(supra). As a result, it is only legally logical that in any proceedings where
these rules have not been observed, then such proceedings are rendered
unfair on that account.
7. We also with to highlight that within the Rules of Natural Justice, there
are three precepts namely the rule against bias, the right a hearing and
the evidence rule. In the case at hand, Applicant has based her claim on
the rule against bias as she contends that the chairperson in her initial
disciplinary hearing was both the complainant and the trier. She argues
that the person who sat as the chairperson in her hearing is the same
person who invited her to a hearing and ultimately dismissed her. To
further fortify her argument, she made reference to the fact that the very
same person is the one who deposed to an affidavit in defence of her
claim before this Court. We are of the view that in the light of the facts
presented before us concerning the proceedings at the initial hearing as
well as the law pleaded, indeed a different conclusion possibly ought to
have been made at the DDPR.
8. However, We are of the opinion that Applicant has not been able to
motivate her case in a claim for review. We have not found any procedural
irregularity on the part of the learned Arbitrator in making His conclusion
as none have been pleaded. What comes out clear from the submission of
the parties is that the learned Arbitrator made His decision based on His
view and understanding of the facts before him, which conclusion is
being challenged by Applicant. To fortify our view, the submissions of
Applicant are based on the procedural irregularities that took place at the
initial disciplinary hearing and not at the DDPR. The only connection that
is being made with regard to the DDPR is that the learned Arbitrator
ought not to have accepted the Respondent argument.
Page 50 of 76
9. The issue in a review application is not whether the decision reached was
correct or if a different conclusion ought to have been made. Rather a
review is concerned with whether the processes adopted in making a
conclusion were right or wrong. The Labour Appeal Court has set
precedent over this issue in the case Thabo Mohlobo & Others vs. Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority LAC/CIV/A/05/2010. This position has
been adopted by this Court in a plethora of cases (see Lesotho Highlands
Development Authority vs. Thabo Mohlobo & Others LC/REV/09/2012;
Lesotho Delivery Express Services (Pty) Ltd v Arbitrator - DDPR and Another
LC/REV/18/2010). In view of this said, We do not find any flaws on the
procedure adopted by the learned Arbitrator in accepting Respondent
arguments over those of Applicant. Consequently, this review ground
cannot sustain.
AWARD
Having heard the submissions of parties, we hereby make an award in the
following terms:
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. L. MOFELEHETSI
Mrs. M. MOSEHLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. RASEKOAI
ADV. KAO.
Page 51 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/85/10
A0246/2010

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
APPLICANT
And
MOTOENE MASUPHA
1st RESPONDENT
TRANSPORT AND SECURITY WORKERS UNION
2nd RESPONDENT
rd
DDPR
3 RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Two grounds raised by Applicant.
First ground - Applicant failing to raise a procedural issue before the DDPR
only raising it for the first time before this Court. Court finding no fault on the
part of the leaned Arbitrator. Second ground - Court finding the second ground
of review as constituting an appeal ground. Review application being
dismissed. No order as to costs.
later date. In this application, Applicant seeks to have the arbitration
award handed down on the 30th August 2010, reviewed and set aside.
This application was duly opposed and both parties made
representations. It is on these bases that the review was heard on this
date.
SUBMISSIONS
2. Applicant raised two rounds of review namely that the learned Arbitrator
erred in law by proceeding to determine a matter against the Roman
Catholic Church when there is no such legal person. Secondly, that the
learned Arbitrator erred by refusing to accept the oral evidence that
Respondent was employed as a domestic servant and thus not entitled to
the claims he made before the DDPR.
3. On the first ground, Applicant submitted that the Roman Catholic
Church was not the right party to sue, for the reason that there is no
such legal person in Lesotho. It was submitted that what exists is the
Roman Catholic Church in the Diocese of Maseru as an Association,
established in terms of the laws of Lesotho. It was submitted that this
issue was raised and argued in the DDPR proceedings and but that the
Page 52 of 76
learned Arbitrator nonetheless decided to proceed with the matter as

referred. This thus resulted in a reviewable irregularity. Although there
was a prayer for costs in the event of opposition of this review application,
no submissions were made.
4. On the second ground, Applicant submitted that there was evidence
before the DDPR, by Fr. Mokhele and Sr. Moeketsi, that Respondent had
been employed as a chauffeur at the then Archbishop Mohlalisis private
residence. Applicant further submitted that the evidence of these two was
sufficient to establish that Respondent was a domestic servant and thus
not entitled to make the claims he did before the DDPR. It was argued
that this evidence was rejected by the learned Arbitrator and/or he failed
to apply his mind to the fact that the Sr. Moeketsis evidence corroborated
that of Fr. Mokhele to prove that Respondent was a domestic servant, as
opposed to an employee per the Labour Code.
5. Respondent replied that he was employed as a driver by Applicant for the
whole period of his service. He maintained that the question of the legal
personality of Applicant was never raised at any point, in particular at the
DDPR and as such should be disregarded. He stated that if it was indeed
true that there is no such legal person, Applicant would not have
forgotten to raise it at the DDPR. He further submitted that all the
grounds raised by Applicant are appeal and not review grounds. He thus
prayed that this review be dismissed.
6. In analysing the first ground raised by Applicant, I have considered the
conclusion of this court in the case of Slagment (Pty) Ltd vs. Building
Construction and Allied Workers Union (1994) 15 ILJ 979 (A). In this case,
the Applicant had failed to comply with its own procedures in relation to
the composition of its disciplinary committee. The irregularity was only
raised for the first time when the decision of the initial hearing was being
challenged. The court found no wrong in the conduct of Applicant on the
ground that in failing to that raise this issue in the initial hearing, the
Respondent had denied the Applicant a chance to deal with the conduct
complained of. This principle was cited with approval by this court in the
case of Central Bank of Lesotho vs. DDPR and Others LC/REV/216/2006.
7. In the case at hand, I have perused both the record of proceedings before
the DDPR and the arbitration award and have not found anywhere
therein, where the issue of the Applicant being wrongly cited was raised
and/or argued. This is essence means that, it is only coming for the first
time at the review stage. As a result, in not raising this issue at the
arbitration hearing, Applicant had denied the learned Arbitrator to
address the issue and pronounce himself. As a result, Applicant is
estopped from raising it for the first time at this stage. For this court to
entertain this argument would be an absurdity which would
prejudiciously affect the interests of Respondent. Consequently, this
argument fails.
Page 53 of 76
8. In relation to the 2nd ground of review, I have noted from the record of
proceedings that there was evidence of Fr. Mokhele that 1st Respondent
was a domestic servant. The said evidence was indeed corroborated by
that of Sr. Moeketsi safe that she stated that when she came 1st
Respondent was already working with Applicant. This evidence was then
challenged as hearsay for the reason that Sr. Moeketsi had no first-hand
knowledge of the arrangement between 1st Respondent and Applicant. As
a result, the evidence of both Fr. Mokhele and Sr. Moeketsi was
considered and the learned Arbitrator applied his mind to it, safe that he
made a conclusion that was different from that anticipated by Applicant.
9. In view of my conclusion above, clearly Applicant is unhappy about the
decision of the learned Arbitrator. As a result, this is an appeal and not a
review ground. The premises of my argument is the conclusion of the
Court in Coetzee vs. Lebea NO and Another (1999) 20 ILJ, 129 (LC), where
Court concluded that where a party feels that on the basis of the present
facts a different decision could have been arrived at, that constitutes a
ground for appeal. this case has been cited with approval in a number of
judgments of this court (see Lesotho Highlands Development Authority vs.
Rosalika Ramoholi and Another LC/REV/33/2012; also see Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority vs. Thabo Mohlobo and 19 Others
LC/REV/09/2012). In the same vein, it is clearly the attitude of Applicant
that in the premise of the evidence presented before the learned
Arbitrator, He should have held that 1st Respondent was a domestic
servant and not an employee in term of the labour Code. Consequently,
this ground fails.
AWARD
following terms:
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 22nd DAY OF OCTOBER
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. S. KAO
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
FR. MICHEAL MOKHELE

MS. MAPHARINA LECHE-LECHESA.
Page 54 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/66/09
C0058/2009

PASCALIS MOLAPI
APPLICANT
And
METRO CASH AND CARRY (PTY) LTD
DDPR
1st RESPONDENT
2nd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Applicant having filed an unfair
dismissal claim. Applicant being granted an award for reinstatement status
quo ante dismissal. Applicant later retiring and subsequent thereto claiming
provident fund and unpaid leave before the DDPR. Arbitrator dismissing claim
as being res Judicata. Applicant seeking the review of DDPR award, deeming
it irregular on the ground that the matter is not res Judicata. Court finding the
award irregular and setting it aside and ordering a hearing of the Applicants
claims for provident fund and unpaid leave, before the DDPR.
1. This an application for the review of an arbitration award of the DDPR. It
was heard on the 13th September 2011 and judgment was reserved for a
award handed down on the 18th September 2009, reviewed and set aside.
The review application was unopposed and as such it proceeded solely on
the basis of the averments of Applicant.
2. Facts surrounding this application are basically that Applicant had
initially referred a claim for unfair dismissal sometime in the early 1990s.
His claim was dismissed by the Labour Court. He then lodged an
application for review with the Labour Appeal Court. The Labour Appeal
Court then ordered Applicants reinstatement without loss of
remuneration, seniority or other entitlements or benefits which Applicant
would have received but for the dismissal. The Court further directed that
the Labour Court determine the emoluments and quantum thereof, due
to Applicant. This matter was dealt with by this Court in line with the
order of the Labour Appeal Court.
3. Pursuant to both the orders of the Labour Appeal Court and this Court,
Applicant commenced his duties in November 2009 until his retirement
from employment in March 2009. He then lodged a claim for provident
Page 55 of 76
fund and leave earned but not taken with the DDPR. His claim was
dismissed through an arbitration award handed down on the 18th
September 2009, on the ground that it was res Judicata. It is in the light
of this background that he lodged this review application.
SUBMISSIONS
4. Applicant submitted that the learned arbitrator erred in law in holding
that his claim was res Judicata, when it only accrued after his
reinstatement, pursuant to an order of the Labour Appeal Court. The
dismissed claims, namely that of provident fund and leave earned but not
taken, arose upon his retirement and became payable then. As a result,
they could not have been claimed prior to the time of his retirement.
5. It was further argued that the learned Arbitrator further erred in law by
premising Her decision on that of Her colleague, in the case of Queen
Komane and Another vs. City Express Stores. It was argued that the DDPR
does not hold precedent in its own decisions and for the learned
Arbitrator to have done that, it constitutes a gross irregularity. It was
thus prayed that the award in C058/2009 be reviewed, corrected and set
aside.
ANALYSIS
6. A review is primarily concerned with manner in which one making a
decision has come to their conclusion. It seeks to determine if the
decision that has been made is rationally justifiable or not. This principle
has been echoed in the case of County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd vs.
Commissioner for Conciliation and Others (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 and cited
with approval in a number of judgments of this court (see Global
Garments vs. Mosemoli Morojele LC/REV/354/2006). As a result, in an
application of this nature, the Court is not concerned with the
correctness of the award but rather the reasoning behind it.
7. I have considered both the award of the leaned Arbitrator, the record of
proceedings as well as the submissions of Applicant. It is evident from
them that there was a claim for unfair dismissal after which Applicant
was reinstated without of loss of remuneration, seniority or other
entitlements or benefits which Applicant would have received but for the
dismissal. It has also been alleged that Applicant was indeed reinstated
until he resigned in March of 2009. Thereafter, he referred a claim for
provident fund and leave earned but not taken, which has led to the
lodging of the present application.
8. It is my opinion that the above evidence was key to the final
determination as to whether the matter was res Judicata or not. The
premise of my argument is that for a claim of res Judicata to succeed,
there are a number of requirements that must be met. Reference was
made to these requirements in the case of Lethoko Sechele and
Lehlohonolo Sechele C of A (CIV) No. 6 of 1988 at page 5, as thus,
Page 56 of 76
... for a defence of res Judicata to succeed the judgement in the prior suit
had to be:
(a) With respect to the same subject matter;
(b) based on the ground;
(c) between the same parties.
9. In the circumstances of the matter at hand, a claim was initially referred
which related to the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal of Applicant.
The subsequent claims of provident fund and unpaid leave were not part
of the referral. Although the parties and the basis of the claims may have
been similar but the subject matter was different.
10. It is thus my strong view that, had the learned Arbitrator taken the
above referred evidence into consideration, she would have come to a
different determination that the claims referred therein were not res
Judicata. Consequently, I find that the decision of the learned Arbitrator
is not rationally justifiable as she has failed to apply her mind judiciously
to the facts before her, which were relevant towards her determination of
the matter. On this ground alone, the decision of the learned arbitrator
deserves to be reviewed, corrected and set aside. However, as Applicant
has raised two grounds for review, I shall now proceed to deal with the
second one.
11. It has also been argued that the learned Arbitrator erred in law by
basing her decision on that of her colleague, in an allegedly similar case
as the DDPR does not hold precedent in its own decisions. I am in
agreement with Applicant for the reason that the principle of judicial
precedent provides that inferior courts are bound to apply the legal
principles set by superior courts in cases that came prior to their case
where the facts are sufficiently similar. In the present case, the learned
Arbitrator relied on the decision of Her colleague to justify the decision
that she made. This does not in any way fit within the dictates of the
principle of judicial precedence. Consequently, I find that it was irregular
for the learned arbitrator to have acted in this fashion.
Page 57 of 76
AWARD
Having heard the submissions of Applicant, I hereby make an order in the
following terms:
a) That the application for review succeeds and the award in C058/2009 is
reviewed, corrected and set aside;
b) That the DDPR must hear Applicants claims for provident fund and leave
earned but not taken; and
THUS DONE AND DATED AT MASERU ON THIS 8th DAY OF OCTOBER
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. M. MPHATOE
Mrs. M. MOSEHLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. SELLO
ADV. MABULA
Page 58 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/29/2007
A0932/2006

GOODWILL AUTO CLINIC
APPLICANT
And
THE DIRECTORATE OF DISPUTE
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION
SENG MASENKANE
1ST RESPONDENT
2ND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Review application of DDPR award. Respondent applying for dismissal of

review application for want of precaution. Applicant failing to attend
proceedings despite proof of service of notification of hearing. Court granting
application for dismissal for want of prosecution. Costs being awarded on
attorney and client scale against Applicant.
1. This is an application for the dismissal of an application for review of an
arbitration award of the DDPR, for want of prosecution. It was heard and
granted on the 8th November 2012. Facts surrounding this application are
basically that Applicant 2nd Respondent referred a claim for unfair
dismissal with the DDPR under referral A0128/2007. The matter was
heard on the 30th January 2007 and judgment was granted in favour of
2nd Respondent in default on the 31st January 2012.
2. Thereafter, Applicant filed an application for rescission in March of the
same year, which application was dismissed. Subsequent thereto, this
application was lodged with this Court by Applicant on the 12th April
2007. On the 27th January 2010, 2nd Respondent lodged an application
for the dismissal of the review application for want of prosecution. The
application was not opposed and as such 2nd Respondent applied for
judgment in default. The matter was set down for this day and both
parties were notified as the record reflects. However, only 2nd Respondent
was in attendance and the matter proceed in default.
SUBMISSIONS
3. It was submitted on behalf of 2nd Respondent that Applicant instituted
these proceedings on the 12th April of 2007. Thereafter a notice calling
upon them to collect the record of proceedings for transcription was
served on them on the 12th July 2007. Since then to date, no further
Page 59 of 76
steps were taken by Applicant to prosecute this matter. As a result, 2nd

Respondent instituted an application for dismissal of this matter for want
of prosecution. He argued that from the conduct of Applicant, it was not
interested in prosecuting this matter to finality but rather to delay the
execution of the award granted in his favour by the DDPR. This
application was not opposed and as such 2nd Respondent applied for
default judgment of the application for dismissal of the review application
for want of prosecution. He further prayed for an award of costs on
attorney and client scale for abuse of court process by Applicant.
4. This Court is a specialised forum for both employers and employee to
seek the protection and/or enforce their labour rights. This process is
done by giving both parties to a dispute a fair chance to make
representation. However, this opportunity can only be granted in favour
of a party that is willing to utilise it. This court has pronounced itself on
this issue before in the case of Khutlang Mokoaleli vs. Standard Lesotho
Bank & DDPR LC/REV/21/07) as follows,
The court can only give effect to the right to be heard to a party that is
willing and does utilise the opportunity to exercise its right to be heard. As
a result, a party that fails to prosecute its case without a reason summarily
waives their right to be heard.
5. In the case at hand, Applicant has been given the opportunity to be
heard. However, it has through conduct demonstrated its unwillingness
to make use of this opportunity. Evident to this is the five year period
that lapsed between the referral of this review application and today as
well Applicants failure to react to both the applications for dismissal for
want of prosecution as well as the application for judgment in default. I
am inclined to agree with 2nd Respondent in his submission the referral of
this review application was intended to delay the execution of his DDPR
judgment award. I am convinced that the conduct of Applicant is an
abuse of court processes, so extreme that it warrants the granting of an
award of costs against.
Page 60 of 76
AWARD
following terms:
a) That the application for dismissal of the review application is granted;
b) That the review application is accordingly dismissed; and
c) An order of costs is made against Applicant on attorney and client scale.
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mrs. L RAMASHAMOLE
Mr. L. MATELA
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
NO APPEARANCE
ADV. MAJAEEA
Page 61 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/105/10
A0795/2010

SUN TEXTILES (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
And
LESOLE TAU
AND RESOLUTION
1ST RESPONDENT
2ND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. 1st Respondent raising two points
in limine first point being failure to comply with the oaths and Declaration
Order Court not finding issue sufficient to warrant dismissal of claim. 2 nd
point being review application being disguised appeal Court finding for 1st
Respondent and dismissing the review application. An order of costs being
made against Applicant for its abuse of court process.
1. This is an application for the review of an arbitration award of the DDPR
in referral 0795/2012. It was heard on the above referred date and
judgment was reserved for a later date. In this application, Applicant
seeks to have the arbitration award handed down on the 20th November
2010, reviewed, corrected and set aside. The history of this matter is that
after the review application had been lodged with this Court by Applicant,
1st Respondent instituted an application for the dismissal of this
application for want of prosecution. The application was duly opposed by
both parties. However, on the date of hearing, they informed the Court
that they had agreed to abandon that application but to proceed with the
main review proceedings.
2. At the commencement of the proceedings, 1st Respondent brought it to
the attention of the Court that he had raised two points in limine and
wished to argue them. These points were that Applicant had failed to
comply with the Oaths and Declarations Regulations No. 80 of 1964; and
that the relief sought in this application did not disclose the cause of
action under review proceedings. Both parties made representations on
these issues but judgment was reserved and the Court declined to hear
the merit before pronouncing itself on these issues. It is on these bases
that the review was heard on this date.
Page 62 of 76
POINTS IN LIMINE
3. It was submitted on behalf of 1st Respondent that Applicant had failed to
comply with the Oaths and Declarations Regulations No. 80 of 1964 in
that the Applicants affidavit in the notice of motion was neither deposed
to nor commissioned. He argued further that the last page of the affidavit
had not been stamped with a M2.00 revenue stamp in terms of the rules
of this Court. He argued that on the basis of these procedural flaws, this
review application must be dismissed.
4. Reference was made to the case of CGM Garments and DDPR vs. Matsoko
LAC/REV/38/2004 where the Court stated that it is grossly irregular and
contrary to the rules of this Court not to commission evidence. However,
1st Respondent argued that in the event that this Court holds that the
defect be corrected, he is asking for costs against Applicant. Applicant
replied that documents filed with the Court were in order. He stated that
there was an error on their part in dealing with papers served upon the
1st Respondent. He argued that this defect is correctable and thus cannot
lead to the dismissal of the review application.
5. We have considered the submission of parties on this point and are in
agreement with Applicant that the defects in his papers are correctable.
We have also considered the case of CGM Garments and DDPR vs.
Matsoko (supra) and have found it inapplicable in this case. The
circumstances therein are different from the present circumstances in
their entirety. In that case, the learned arbitrator had allowed witnesses
to testify without swearing them in and subsequently thereto made a
determination on the basis of their unsworn testimony.
6. As a result, the only way of correcting the defect was to have the matter
heard afresh which by necessity required the interference with the award
of the learned Arbitrator. In the current scenario, the matter has not
proceeded in the merits, which in effect means that the Applicant still has
an opportunity to correct the defect complaint of. Consequently, this
point does not warrant the dismissal of Applicants claim but for it to be
given an opportunity to correct the defect. The essence of our argument is
that the point raised by 1st Respondent is merely dilatory. However, the
real effect of this defect on the proceedings as well a request for an award
of costs, will be determined by how this court will rule on the second
point in limine.
7. On the second point in limine, it was submitted on behalf of 1st
Respondent that the relief sought did not disclose the cause of action
under review proceedings. This was premised on the argument that the
substance of the application made a point for appeal and not a review. It
was argued that the grounds raised are appeal grounds as they directly
challenge the merits and not the procedure adopted in making the
decision. Reference was made to the case of Teaching Service Commission
and Others vs. Judge of the Labour Appeal Court and Others C of
Page 63 of 76
A/CIV/21/2007 were the Court made a distinction between an appeal

and a review.
8. Applicant replied that it does dispute the fact that the grounds raised are
appeal and not review grounds. It however, argued that its major concern
relates to paragraph 7.3 of the DDPR award on the issue of
compensation. In response, 1st Respondent submitted that in not denying
that grounds raised are appeal and not review, that disposed of
Applicants case. Further, that the way 7.3 of the Applicant founding
affidavit is phrased, makes it an appeal and not a review ground.
9. In view of the submissions of the both parties, and in particular those of
Applicant, we are in agreement with 1st Respondent that the submissions
by Applicant, that it does not dispute the augment that its grounds are
appeal and not review, disposes of their claim before this Court. This
Court is only seized with reviewing powers so that once a claim lodged
does not fall within the scope of its powers, then it immediately lacks
jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. It is trite that one an allegation is
not denied or challenged, then it is taken to have been admitted. In not
challenging the averment that the grounds raised are appeal, Applicant is
in essence admitting that it has wrongly approached this Court as the
remedy it seeks is outside its scope of authority.
10. Despite Applicants stance on this point in limine, we have gone further
to consider the grounds of review raised by Applicant per its notice of
motion and in particular paragraph 7 which is phrased as follows,
I received Arbitration Award No. A-0795/2010 on behalf of the Applicant
on the 02nd December 2010.
7.1 It is the said Arbitration Award that this Honourable Court will be
asked to review correct or set aside on the following grounds:
7.2 That the arbitrator of the 1st Respondent erred and or misdirected
herself in holding that the 2nd Respondent and Mpho (complainant) were
friends who normally play a fighting game. This is because being friends
and playing fighting game does not necessarily meant that the 2nd
Respondent could not intentionally fight and injure Mpho-the complainant.
7.3 There was no evidence before the 1st Respondent of actual loss suffered
by the 2nd Respondent herein, whereas such evidence is pre-requisite in
determining the amount of compensation due.
7.4 The Respondent ought to have enquired into the alternative employment
in mitigation of damages. 2nd Respondent was employed on the 29th June
2008, having been paid in lieu of notice in 16th July 2010.
11. It is our view that these grounds are aimed at challenging the merits of
the matter as opposed to the procedure adopted by the learned Arbitrator
in reaching her conclusion. The Court of Appeal court in Teaching Service
Commission and Others vs. Judge of the Labour Appeal Court and Others
(supra) has stated in several other cases that a review is concerned with
the procedures or process in which the conclusions were made. This
position of the law has been adopted by this Court in several cases
Page 64 of 76
including Thabo Mohlobo & Others vs. Lesotho Highlands Development

Authority LAC/CIV/A/05/2010; Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
vs. Thabo Mohlobo & Others LC/REV/09/2012; Lesotho Delivery Express
Services (Pty) ltd vs. DDPR and Another LC/REV/18/2010).
12. In this matter, no averment has been made by Applicant to suggest
any procedural irregularity on the part of the leaned Arbitrator as the
grounds are purely premised on evidence. Applicant is in effect arguing
that a different decision ought to have been reached on the basis of the
evidence led which on its own is an appeal ground. His arguments lack
the necessary ingredients to render them review grounds. Consequently
we find that the grounds raised are appeal and not review grounds and as
such this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Applicants claim.
COSTS
13. 1st Respondent asked for the dismissal of this review application with
costs on attorney and client scale. His reasons were that the matter had
been dealt with the Applicant in cavalier manner and contrary to the
rules to his prejudice. Applicant made no representation on this issue but
rather left it to the court to make a fair and equitable determination. It is
our view that indeed as suggested by 2nd Respondent, the conduct of
Applicant warrants the award of costs in favour of 2nd Respondent to
discourage it from further improper use of the processes of this Court.
14. We have found its conduct to have been cavalier, as suggested by 1st
Respondent, in that it failed to ensure that its founding documents are in
order and further that it proceeded with this matter knowing that they
had no claim. We have been led to this conclusion by the submission of
Applicant that it did not challenge the averment that they had no review
grounds. We are of the view that their conduct has been nothing but an
abuse of the processes of this Court, which conduct cannot be ignored.
Consequently an award of costs is made against Applicant on attorney
and client scale.
Page 65 of 76
AWARD
Having heard the submissions of parties, we hereby make an award in the
following terms:
a) That the review application is dismissed on lack of jurisdiction;
b) The DDPR award in A0795/2012 remains in force;
c) That the said award be complied with within 30 days of receipt of this
judgment; and
d) That an order of costs is made against Applicant on client and attorney
scale.
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. S. KAO
I CONCUR
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR 1ST RESPONDENT:
ADV. MATETE
ADV. RASEKOAI.
Page 66 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/92/10
A0768/2009

PITSO MAHLAPHA
APPLICANT
And
NEO LEPAMO AND ASSOCIATES (PTY) LTD
AND RESOLUTION
1ST RESPONDENT
2ND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Respondent failing to attend
hearing hearing proceeding in default. Four grounds of review raised by
Applicant. All grounds failing to sustain and review application being
dismissed. No order as to costs.
award handed down on the 30th September 2010, reviewed, corrected and
set aside. Facts surrounding this application are that on or around the
22nd October 2009, Applicant referred a dispute to the 2nd Respondent in
terms of which he claimed an unfair dismissal and underpayment of
salaries. Both claims were dismissed and Applicant lodged this review
proceedings. The application was opposed but 1st Respondent failed to
make appearance on the date of hearing. As a result the matter proceeded
on the basis of the presentation by Applicant only. It is against this
background that this application was head on this day.
SUBMISSIONS
2. Several grounds of review were raised Applicant in his notice of motion
and founding affidavit. However, in his submissions, he indicated that he
only had four grounds against which his review application was premised.
These grounds were namely that learned arbitrator failed to apply her
mind to the facts as there was no valid reason for the dismissal of
Applicant; that the learned Arbitrator failed to understand that there was
no hearing prior to the dismissal of Applicant; that the learned arbitrator
failed to appreciate that Applicant only came to know about his dismissal
upon receipt of the letter of dismissal; and that the learned Arbitrator
Page 67 of 76
demanded irrelevant and immaterial issues not relevant to the matter,

hence committing an irregularity.
3. In amplification of the first ground, Applicant submitted that in the
proceedings before the DDPR, no evidence was led on the charges that led
to the dismissal of Applicant. Rather, the evidence that was led related to
shortage of an amount in the tune of M40.00. Consequently, Applicant
argued that clearly, there was no valid reason for dismissal as the
evidence adduced related to something different from what Applicant was
charged and dismissed for. We have considered both the record of
proceedings before the DDPR as well as the arbitration award and have
discovered that evidence was led in relation to the charges that had been
preferred against Applicant. The said M40.00 is what instigated the
investigations into Applicant as well as the subsequent charges. Evidence
was led in relation to the M40.00 and how it led to the charges. This
evidence was not only led but considered by the learned Arbitrator as
appears in paras 5 to 9 of the arbitration award.
4. On the second ground, it was submitted that on the day in issue
Applicant was called for a meeting in which workplace issues involving
him were going to be discussed. Reference was made to exhibit PM1
which was the letter inviting Applicant to the said meeting. Applicant
argued that the learned arbitrator miscarried the whole issue in holding
that a hearing was held for Applicant on the date reflected in PM1 when
none of the procedural aspects for a fair dismissal were followed. In
consideration of both PM1 and Applicants argument, I have formed an
opinion that Applicant is dissatisfied with the conclusion that the leaned
Arbitrator made, in relation to the status of the meeting that was
organised for Applicant prior to his dismissal. It is clear from the
construction of this ground that it is not an issue of an irregularity on the
part of the learned Arbitrator but her interpretation of the PM1 to be an
invitation to a disciplinary hearing. Clearly Applicant challenges that
decision of the learned Arbitrator and not the procedure or processes
following in reaching her decision.
5. This Court has pronounced itself in several cases about grounds that are
valid for review. It has been said over and over that review proceedings
are concerned with the process or the procedure through which the
conclusions were made (see Thabo Mohlobo & Others vs. Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority LAC/CIV/A/05/2010: also see Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority Thabo Mohlobo & 19 Others
LC/REV/09/2012). Applicant has not challenged the processes of
procedures adopted by the learned Arbitrator in concluding that a
hearing was held. The argument is simply that she miscarried or wrongly
interpreted the evidence, in particular PM1, to mean that a hearing was
held. Consequently this point fails.
6. In relation to the third ground of dismissal, it was submitted that
Applicant only came to know about his dismissal upon receipt of his
Page 68 of 76
letter of termination of employment and that in that letter no reason for

the dismissal was stated. It was argued that this is contrary to the
established principles of procedure in disciplinary matters. As a result,
Applicant maintained that the learned Arbitrator committed an
irregularity by failing to take the fact that there was no reason for the
termination of Applicant. Reference was made to the letter of termination
marked PM2.
7. Upon perusal of the record proceedings before the DDPR, I have noted
that Applicant had raised three procedural issues which he felt
constituted procedural unfairness in his hearing. These issues are
reflected under his opening statements as follows,
1) I have never been given a letter of hearing.
2) I was not called for a hearing.
3) No rights contributing to hearing given to me for example
i. To be represented.
ii. To be given a hearing record.
iii. To be given a hearing decision
iv. To mitigate before disciplinary committee and others
4) therefore the reason for dismissal is not valid.
8. The fact that no reason for the termination of his employment was given
is an afterthought as it was not among them. It is being raised for the
first time at the review stage. It was never part of the issues that
Applicant complained of in the DDPR proceedings and as such there was
no way that the learned Arbitrator could have considered it. Applicant
cannot at this stage be heard to allege an irregularity on the part of the
learned Arbitrator over this issue. This Court has stated in Central Bank
of Lesotho vs. DDPR and Others LC/REV/216/2006 that it will not allow
for a procedural issue to be raised for the first time on review as to do so
would be prejudicial on the other party.
9. Lastly, it was argued that the learned Arbitrator committed an irregularity
in that on the date of hearing, whereas Applicant had attended the
proceedings alone, the learned Arbitrator did not proceed with the matter
by way of default but caused it to be postponed. The reason for
postponement was that the learned Arbitrator question the right
appearance of the union representative and demanded a copy of the
constitution of Applicant representatives union. According to Applicant,
in doing so she demanded irrelevant and immaterial issues not relevant
to the matter at hand and thus committed an irregularity. It was argued
that the learned Arbitrators conduct was also contrary to the established
rules of procedure that where one of the parties is not in attendance, as it
was the case, the matter ought to have proceeded by way of default.
Reference was made to section 227 (8) of the Labour Code Amendment Act
3 of 2000 in support of this argument.
10. As rightly pointed out, section 227 (8) of the Labour Code Order 24 of
1992 as amended, provides the procedures that may be followed in
Page 69 of 76
dealing with a case in which only one of the parties is in attendance. This
section is phrased as follows;
if a party to a dispute contemplated in subsection (4) fails to attend the
conciliation of hearing of an arbitrator, the arbitrator may
(a) Postponed the hearing;
(b) Dismiss the referral; or
(c) Grant an award by default.
11. From the simple reading of the section, the use of the word may
suggests that it is within the discretion of the learned Arbitrator to
exercise any of the three options listed in that section from (a) to (c). This
being the case, there is nothing that bound the learned Arbitrator to
proceed by way of default in the absence of the other party, as suggested
by Applicant. In referral A0768/2009, the learned Arbitrator had a choice
of two options to either postpone or proceed by way of default. Clearly,
she exercised her discretion and made a choice to postpone the matter to
allow for the presentation of the union constitution.
12. The DDPR is specialised labour disputes Tribunal that was
established, among others, to protect and enforce the rights of both
employers and employees. As a result, this places an obligation on the
officers of this Tribunal, in particular Arbitrators, to act in line with its
spirit and purport and this includes raising issues that may affect the
protection and/or enforcement of rights of parties. It is alleged that the
learned Arbitrator demanded irrelevant issues when she demanded a
copy of the constitution of union that appeared on behalf of Applicant to
determine its locus standi in the matter. Demanding the constitution of a
partys trade union is an issue of representation.
13. Representation of parties before the DDPR is regulated under section
228 of the Labour Code Order (supra). This section states the people who
may represent litigants in a referred dispute. As a result, it is the
obligation of the DDPR to ensure that representation is made in line with
the provisions of the law and that it does not undermine the rights of
parties. It is this courts view in demanding a copy of the constitution of a
union, purporting to be appearing for a party to a dispute, the learned
Arbitration was executing her mandate. As a result, her conduct of
demanding the constitution of the union representing applicant was not
immaterial or irrelevant as it affected the rights of the other party,
whether present or not.
14. Even assuming that it were to hold that it was irregular for the learned
Arbitrator to have demanded a copy of the constitution of the
representing union rather than to proceed by default, this point would
not be sufficient to warrant the review and setting aside of the arbitration
award. This is so in that even if the matter had proceeded, that would no
guarantee that judgment would be entered in favour of Applicant.
Whether a dispute is opposed or not, it is within the Courts discretion
after consideration of all evidence led, to decide to either grant or refuse
Page 70 of 76
the claims. In view of this said above and assuming there was an
irregularity in this conduct, this ground of review raised by Applicant
would not materially affect the decision of the learned arbitrator to render
it reviewable.
AWARD
Having heard the submissions of parties and having considered all papers
filed of record, We hereby make an award in the following terms:
e) That the review application is dismissed;
f) That the award in referral A0768/2009 remain in force;
g) The said award be complied with within 30 days of receipt of this
judgement; and
h) That there is no order as to costs.
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Miss. P. LEBITSA
Mr. R. MOTHEPU
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
FOR RESPONDENT:
ADV. MOSUOE
NO APPEARANCE.
Page 71 of 76

HELD AT MASERU
LC/REV/91/2010
A0035/2010

LEROTHOLI POLYTECHNIC
RECTOR LEROTHOLI POLYTECHNIC
1st APPLICANT
2nd APPLICANT
And
MASEBOFANE RAMAEMA
PULENG SAKOANE
DIRECTOR - DDPR
1st RESPONDENT
2ND RESPONDENT
3rd RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Application for review of arbitration award. Respondent raising a preliminary
issue that grounds raised by Applicant are appeal disguised as review
grounds. Court not finding merit in argument and dismissing preliminary
point. Court not finding merit in the review grounds raised by Applicant.
Review application being dismissed. No order as to costs being made.
down on the 1st October 2010, reviewed, corrected and set aside. Three
grounds of review were raised in the founding documents. Respondent
had also raised a preliminary issue that the grounds raised by Applicant
were in fact appeal and not review grounds. Both parties made
presentations in the matter and the ruling as wells as reasons are in the
following.
SUBMISSIONS
Preliminary issue
2. It was submitted on behalf of Respondent that the grounds raised by
Applicant are infact appeal and not review grounds. It was argued that
Applicant wanted to have the judgment set aside for the reason that the
learned Arbitrator had come to the wrong conclusion. It was argued that
the appropriate remedy in that case is an appeal and not a review.
Reference was made to the cases of JD Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Supreme
Furnishers vs. M. Monoko and Others LAC/REV/39/04; and Thabo
Mohlobo and 13 others vs. Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LAC/CIV/A/2010.
Page 72 of 76
3. In response, Applicant submitted that a review is the process by which

proceedings of inferior courts are corrected by this court in respect of
gross irregularities, on the part of the learned Arbitrator in the exercise of
the powers vested in him by law, occurring during the course of such
proceedings.
In support of the above argument, reference was made to the cases of
Liteboho Ramoqopo and Another LAC/REV/121/2005; J. D. Group
(Lesotho) (Pty) Ltd t/a Price and Pride vs. Labour Commissioner o.b.o
Molahli Molahli and Another LC/REV/67/2007; Moleko Electrical
contractors vs. Labour Commissioner obo Mokete Tsoeu and Anotehr
LC/REV/20/2008; and Global Garments vs. Mosemoli Morojele
LC/REV/354/2006. Applicant submitted that case at hand passes this
test as the grounds raised are concerned with procedure by which the
learned Arbitrator made His conclusion.
4. We are conscious of the many judgments that both parties have referred
this Court to and We acknowledge that We are bound by the principles
enunciated therein. We have considered the grounds of review raised by
Applicant under paragraph 5 of its founding affidavit from paragraphs 5.1
to 5.3. In paragraph 5.1, Applicant challenges the fact that the learned
Arbitrator found that the dismissal was unfair on a ground that was not
raised or argued by Respondent. In paragraph 5.2, Applicant challenges
the fact that the learned Arbitrator overlooked certain facts thus failing to
take relevant considerations into account in making His decision. In
paragraph 5.3, Applicant is challenging the fact that their opposition to
reinstatement was overruled without any reasons being given. In our
view, all these grounds relate to the process of reaching the decision and
as such they prima facie qualify as review grounds. They are reflected
under para 5 of the Applicant founding affidavit and will be analysed in
the subsequent paragraphs of this judgment. Consequently this
preliminary issue cannot sustain.
The merits
5. It was submitted on behalf of Applicant that the learned Arbitrator erred
in law in that He found that 1st and 2nd Respondents had been unfairly
dismissed due inconsistency, which ground they had not relied upon
when challenging their dismissal. However, in their submissions,
Applicants argued that the learned Arbitrator relied on a bare allegation
of Respondents that a certain employee had committed a similar offence
but was not dismissed. It was also argued that the Applicant was not
aware about the conduct of that other alleged employee hence why a plea
of inconsistency cannot hold. Reference was made to the case of Rickett &
Colman SA (Pty) Ltd vs. Chemical Workers Industrial Union and Others
(1991) 1 ILJ 806. It was stated that that the Respondents had been
specific that there was no reason for their dismissal and/or that the
reason was invalid.
6. Respondent replied that it was denied that there was any irregularity on
the part of the learned Arbitrator as one of the reasons why they
Page 73 of 76
challenged their dismissal was on the ground of inconsistency. It was

submitted that this was part of their evidence which Applicant failed to
rebut hence the finding. Reference was made to the DDPR record of
proceedings.
7. The submissions of Applicant are self-defeating in that at one point it is
their case that the dismissal was found to be fair on a ground that was
not relied upon by the Respondents. However, they later argue that
evidence was led in relation to this issue safe that in their opinion such
evidence amounted to bare allegations of facts not supported by evidence.
In our view, and even before considering the response of Respondents,
clearly the issue of inconsistency was part of the grounds raised by
Respondents hence why evidence was led on it. With the submissions of
Respondents in the picture, they go on to fortify our opinion that the
issue of inconsistency was part of the grounds raised by Respondents in
challenging the fairness of their dismissal.
8. Even assuming that this issue was not a ground relied upon by
Respondent, the law enjoined the learned Arbitrator to consider the issue
of consistency in determining whether dismissal was fair substantively.
This is clearly captured under section 10 (1) (b) (iv) of the Labour Code
(Codes of Good Practice) of 2003 which read as follows,
10 (1) Any person who is determining whether a dismissal for misconduct
is unfair should consider:...
(b) if a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not ...
(iv) the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer;
and
Consequently, this point cannot sustain and it is accordingly dismissed.
9. It was further submitted that the learned Arbitrator erred in law in that
He awarded the reinstatement of Respondents while overlooking the fact
that they had been negligent. It was further submitted that having found
that the Respondents were negligent, He went ahead and awarded their
reinstatement as if there was no wrong doing on their part, thus failing to
take relevant considerations into account in making His decision.
Respondent replied that the learned Arbitrator took all relevant facts into
consideration as reflected in paras 7 and 8 of the arbitral award. It
submitted that the learned Arbitrator stated that Applicant had not
complied with the law in terminating Respondents contracts hence why
He made his conclusion.
10. We have considered the arbitral award and have found that the issue
of negligence did in fact come up during the proceedings. This issue was
considered by the leaned Arbitrator as appears from paras 15 to 20 of the
arbitral award. Indeed as presented by Applicant, the learned Arbitrator
found that the Respondents had been negligent in that they did not take
all reasonable steps to execute their functions. However, the learned
Arbitrator later found that in spite of His findings, the Applicant had been
inconsistent in dealing with Respondent situation as they had earlier
failed to terminate the employment contract of another employee who had
Page 74 of 76
committed a similar act of misconduct to that of Respondents, hence the

issue of inconsistency. In our view, the learned Arbitrator considered all
evidence and made a ruling with clear reasons for the decision He made.
Consequently, this point cannot sustain as well and it is accordingly
dismissed.
11. It was furthermore argued that the learned Arbitrator erred in law in
that He decided to reinstate Respondents without regard to the
unequivocal opposition to reinstatement by Applicant and without giving
reasons why He overruled the said opposition. In reply Respondent
submitted that there was no irregularity on the part of the learned
Arbitrator in that He based His decision on the law and not on what
parties liked. The decision of the Arbitrator took into account the fact that
the relationship of trust between the parties had not demolished but the
dismissal was a result of a misunderstanding and miscommunication
which could be corrected.
12. We have gone through the arbitral award and have been able to
confirm part of Applicant argument. We have found that there is nowhere
in the arbitral award where the learned Arbitrator discussed Applicants
opposition to reinstatement or even the reason why such opposition was
overruled. We have also gone through the record of proceedings, and in
particular from pages 4 to 86 which relate to the Applicants evidence. In
our inspection, We have not found anywhere in the record where
Applicant made a clear and unequivocal opposition to the remedy of
reinstatement being granted in favour of Respondents.
13. In our view, there was no need, as has been the case, for the learned
Arbitrator to either consider such alleged opposition or to give reasons
why he overruled same. The issue of opposition to reinstatement was
never canvassed in evidence. In terms of the Labour Code Order 24 of
1992, particularly section 73, reinstatement is the principal remedy,
deviation from which may only be in the event that it is not practical to
reinstate. In the absence of evidence that reinstatement was impractical,
We do not find any irregularity on the part of the learned Arbitrator for
the reason that the procedure He adopted was sanctioned in law. We
therefore agree with Respondents and consequently dismiss this point.
Page 75 of 76
AWARD
following terms:
a) That the review application is dismissed;
b) The DDPR award in A0035/2012 remains in force;
c) That the award be complied with within 30 days of receipt herewith; and
d) That there is no order as to costs.
2012,
T. C. RAMOSEME
Mr. L. MATELA
Mrs. M. MOSEHLE
I CONCUR
I CONCUR
FOR APPLICANT:
MS. MAJARA IN PLACE

OF ADV. MABULA
ADV. MAIEANE.
FOR RESPONDENT:
Page 76 of 76

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LESOTHO

Vo lum e 1 (201 2 Judge m e nt s)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Pascalis Molapi v Metro Cash and

Moleko Electrical contractors v Labour Commissioner obo Mokete Tsoeu and

Books and Journals

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

(f) That the denial of access of applicants members to the premises of

Applicant in prayer 2 (e) is actio popularis in nature in that it seeks

interest. The resolution of these disputes is provided for under section

where it was incidental to a claim rightly before this Court. Authoritative

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

h) An interest of 18.5% p.a. shall not be charged on all salary arrears,

Respondent maintained that the conduct of Applicant is abuse Court

(c) and unfair dismissal if the reason for the dismissal is

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

by Applicant, in particular at pages 5 to 7 of the DDPR record of

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

Applicant further submitted that their argument is supported by the

terms of section 24 (1), this is subject to this Court having jurisdiction

In any event there is generally no legally imposed obligation on the part of

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

make a follow up on the availability of the award, which responsibility

contract of employment between himself and Applicant was terminated,

testified that 1st Respondent was an employee of the Lesotho Government

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

taken by Applicant. Consequently, this application is dismissed in terms

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

Application for review of arbitration award. Points in limine raised by 3 rd

submissions of the parties and the record of proceedings before the

intended to intimidate parties from exercising their respective rights and

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

Review application of DDPR award. Respondent raising three preliminary

Reference was made to the stamped notice of application. Applicant

Respondent had no reasonable and legitimate expectation of being paid or

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

29.2 The process of reasoning followed by the Honourable Arbitrator is so

fact, no evidence at all was availed to show that Respondents were

Respondents were employees of Applicant, yet section 3 was never argued

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

dismissal. According Applicant, the learned Arbitrator had premised his

would be an unnecessary exercise that would attract costs on their side if

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

Application for review of arbitration award. Respondent filing an answer out of

delegation. Thus is in the case of Mahlomola Seboka v. Lesotho Bank

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

learned Arbitrator nonetheless decided to proceed with the matter as

FR. MICHEAL MOKHELE

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between:

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

In the matter between: