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G.R.No.193038,March11,2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.:MARCH2015PHILIPPINESUPREME
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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2015 > March 2015 Decisions > G.R. No. 193038, March 11,
2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.:
G.R.No.193038,March11,2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,
Respondent.
ChanRoblesOnLineBarReview
THIRDDIVISION
G.R.No.193038,March11,2015
JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA,JR.,J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 14, 2010 and the Resolution2
dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 70235, which affirmed with
modification the assailed Decision3 dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
MarikinaCity,Branch273,inCivilCaseNo.96274MK.
Thefollowingfactsarefoundbythetrialcourtandaffirmedbytheappellatecourt:
DebtKollectCompany,Inc.
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1,
1990.4 Sometime in 1988 when the parties were still engaged, Shirley was working as a domestic
helper in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money 5 for the purchase of a
residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home. Rogelio was then
alsoworkingabroadasaseaman.Thefollowingyear,oronSeptember13,1989,Rogeliopurchased
thesubjecthouseandlotforOneHundredTwoThousandPesos(P102,000.00)6fromRodeannaRealty
Corporation.Thesubjectpropertyhasanaggregateareaofonehundredelevensquaremeters(111
sq. m.) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N133844.7 Shirley claims that upon her
arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject
property with the developer through SSS 8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly
amortizations. On October 19, 1989, TCT No. 1719639 over the subject property was issued by the
RegistryofDeedsofMarikina,RizalsolelyunderthenameofRogelio.
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The
following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that
Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned,
and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been
introducingEscobarashiswife.
ChanRoblesIntellectualProperty
Division
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the
RTCofPasigCity.Shirleylaterwithdrewthecomplaintforlegalseparationandliquidationofproperty,
butrefiled10thesameonJanuary29,1993.Inbetweenthefilingofthesecases,Shirleylearnedthat
Rogeliohadtheintentionofsellingthesubjectproperty.Shirleythenadvisedtheinterestedbuyers
one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) of the existence of
the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property
until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale 11 dated
December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's consent in the
amountofThreeHundredEightyThousandPesos(P380,000.00),includingpetitioner'sundertakingto
assumetheexistingmortgageonthepropertywiththeNationalHomeMortgageFinanceCorporation
andtopaytherealpropertytaxesduethereon.
Meanwhile,inaDecision12datedMay16,1994,theRTCofPasigCity,Branch70,grantedthepetition
forlegalseparationandorderedthedissolutionandliquidationoftheregimeofabsolutecommunityof
propertybetweenShirleyandRogelio,viz.:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
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G.R.No.193038,March11,2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.:MARCH2015PHILIPPINESUPREME
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the instant petition for
legalseparationbetweenthesubjectspouseswithallitslegaleffectsasprovidedforin
Art. 63 of the Family Code. Their community property is consequently dissolved and
mustbeliquidatedinaccordancewithArt.102oftheNewFamilyCode.Therespondent
isthusherebyenjoinedfromselling,encumberingorinanywaydisposingoralienating
anyoftheircommunitypropertyincludingthesubjecthouseandlotbeforetherequired
liquidation. Moreover, he, being the guilty spouse, must forfeit the net profits of the
community property in favor of the petitioner who is the innocent spouse pursuant to
Art.43oftheaforesaidlaw.Finally,inthelightoftheclaimofownershipbythepresent
occupantswhohavenotbeenimpleadedintheinstantcase,aseparateactionmustbe
instituted by the petitioner against the alleged buyer or buyers thereof to determine
theirrespectiverightsthereon.
LetacopyofthisdecisionbefurnishedtheLocalCivilRegistrarofManila,theRegister
of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila and the National Statistics Office (NSO), sta. Mesa,
Manila.
SOORDERED.13
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
Rogelio appealed the abovequoted ruling before the CA which denied due course and dismissed the
petition.ItbecamefinalandexecutoryandawritofexecutionwasissuedinAugust1995.14
OnAugust27,1996,ShirleyinstitutedaComplaint15forRescissionofSaleandRecoveiyofProperty
against petitioner and Rogelio before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 273. After trial on the merits,
thetrialcourtrendereditsdecisiononFebruary14,2001,viz.:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
WHEREFORE,foregoingpremisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorof
plaintiffShirleyNuegaandagainstdefendantJosefinaNobleza,asfollows:
1)
2)
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 insofar as the 55.05 square
meters representing the one half (1/2) portion of plaintiff Shirley Nuega is
concerned,isherebyorderedrescinded,thesamebeingnullandvoid
defendant Josefina Nobleza is ordered to reconvey said 55.05 square meters to
plaintiff Shirley Nuega, or in the alternative to pay plaintiff Shirley Nuega the
presentmarketvalueofsaid55.05squaremetersand
topayplaintiffShirleyNuegaattorney'sfeesinthesumofTwentyThousandPesos
(P20,000.00).
March2015Jurisprudence
3)
Forlackofmerit,defendant'scounterclaimisherebyDENIED.
SOORDERED.16
PetitionersoughtrecoursewiththeCA,whileRogeliodidnotappealtherulingofthetrialcourt.Inits
assailedDecisionpromulgatedonMay14,2010,theappellatecourtaffirmedwithmodificationthetrial
court'sruling,viz.:
WHEREFORE,subjecttotheforegoingdisquisition,theappealisDENIED.TheDecision
dated14February2001oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMarikinaCity,Branch273inCivil
Case No. 96274MK is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 29 December 1992 is hereby declared null and void in its entirety, and
defendantappellant Josefina V. Nobleza is ordered to reconvey the entire subject
property to plaintiffappellee Shirley B. Nuega and defendant Rogelio Nuega, without
prejudice to said defendantappellant's right to recover from defendant Rogelio
whatever amount she paid for the subject property. Costs against defendantappellant
Nobleza.
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
SOORDERED.17
Petitionermovedforreconsideration.InaResolutiondatedJuly21,2010,theappellatecourtdenied
themotionforlackofmerit.Hence,thispetitionraisingthefollowingassignmentoferrors:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
[I.] THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDWHENITAFFIRMEDTHEDECISIONOF
THEREGIONALTRIALCOURTBYSUSTAININGTHEFINDINGTHATPETITIONERWAS
NOTAPURCHASERINGOODFAITH.
[II.] THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDWHENITMODIFIEDTHEDECISIONOF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTESALEDATED29DECEMBER1992INITSENTIRETY.18
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
Wedenythepetition.
Petitionerisnotabuyeringoodfaith.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the
buyeratthetimeofthepurchaseorbeforereceiptofanynoticeofclaimsorinterestofsomeother
personintheproperty.19Itisthepartywhoclaimstobeaninnocentpurchaserforvaluewhohasthe
burden of proving such assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good
faith.20Tosuccessfullyinvokeandbeconsideredasabuyeringoodfaith,thepresumptionisthatfirst
andforemost,the"buyeringoodfaith"musthaveshownprudenceandduediligenceintheexercise
of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do for
the protection and defense of his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns
when placed in such a situation. The prudence required of a buyer in good faith is "not that of a
person with training in law, but rather that of an average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances
withoutresortingtothecalibrationofourtechnicalrulesofevidenceofwhichhisknowledgeisnil.'"21
Abuyeringoodfaithdoeshishomeworkandverifiesthattheparticularsareinordersuchasthetitle,
theparties,themodeoftransferandtheprovisionsinthedeed/contractofsale,tonameafew.Tobe
morespecific,suchprudencecanbeshownbymakinganocularinspectionoftheproperty,checking
the title/ownership with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or
inquiringintotheminutiaesuchastheparametersorlotarea,thetypeofownership,andthecapacity
of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil
statusofthesellertoensurethatifmarried,maritalconsentissecuredwhennecessary.Infine,fora
purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise due
diligence,conductaninvestigation,andweighthesurroundingfactsandcircumstanceslikewhatany
prudentmaninasimilarsituationwoulddo.22
Inthecaseatbar,petitionerclaimsthatsheisabuyeringoodfaithofthesubjectpropertywhichis
titledunderthenameofthesellerRogelioA.NuegaaloneasevidencedbyTCTNo.171963andTax
Declaration Nos. D01204723 and D01204724.23 Petitioner argues, among others, that since she
has examined the TCT over the subject property and found the property to have been registered
under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is an innocent purchaser for value and "she is not
requiredtogobeyondthefaceofthetitleinverifyingthestatusofthesubjectpropertyatthetimeof
theconsummationofthesaleandatthedateofthesale."24
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G.R.No.193038,March11,2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.:MARCH2015PHILIPPINESUPREME
Wedisagreewithpetitioner.
AbuyercannotclaimtobeaninnocentpurchaserforvaluebymerelyrelyingontheTCToftheseller
whileignoringalltheothersurroundingcircumstancesrelevanttothesale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong,25 petitioners therein as does petitioner
herein were also harping that due to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there was nothing in the
TCTofthepropertyinlitigationthatshouldhavearousedthebuyer'ssuspicionastoputheronguard
thattherewasadefectinthetitleofthereinseller.TheCourtheldintheSpousesRaymundocasethat
thebuyerthereincouldnothidebehindthecloakofbeinganinnocentpurchaserforvaluebymerely
relying on the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the land purchased is the seller. The
Court ruled in this case that the buyer was not an innocent purchaser for value due to the following
attendantcircumstances,viz.:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
In the present case, we are not convinced by the petitioners' incessant assertion that
Jocelynisaninnocentpurchaserforvalue.Tobeginwith,sheisagrandnieceofEulalia
and resides in the same locality where the latter lives and conducts her principal
business.Itisthereforeimpossibleforhernottoacquireknowledgeofhergrandaunt's
business practice of requiring her biyaheros to surrender the titles to their properties
and to sign the corresponding deeds of sale over said properties in her favor, as
security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on guard for any possible abuses that
Eulaliamaycommitwiththetitlesandthedeedsofsaleinherpossession.26
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
Similarly,inthecaseofArrofov.Quio,27theCourtheldthatwhile"thelawdoesnotrequireaperson
dealing with registered land to inquire further than what the Torrens Title on its face indicates," the
rule is not absolute.28 Thus, finding that the buyer therein failed to take the necessary precaution
required of a prudent man, the Court held that Arrofo was not an innocent purchaser for value,
viz.:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Inthepresentcase,therecordsshowthatArrofofailedtoactasaprudentbuyer.True,
sheaskedherdaughtertoverifyfromtheRegisterofDeedsifthetitletothePropertyis
free from encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that the Property is within the
neighborhoodandthatsheconductedanocularinspectionoftheProperty.Shesawthe
houseconstructedontheProperty.Yet,Arrofodidnotevenbothertoinquireaboutthe
occupants of the house. Arrofo also admitted that at the time of the sale, Myrna was
occupying a room in her house as her lessee. The fact that Myrna was renting a room
from Arrofo yet selling a land with a house should have put Arrofo on her guard. She
knew that Myrna was not occupying the house. Hence, someone else must have been
occupyingthehouse.
Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the house, and if a lessee, who
received the rentals from such lessee. Such inquiry would have led Arrofo to discover
that the lessee was paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and Myrna, who claimed to
owntheProperty.29
G.R.No.183511,March25,2015REPUBLICOFTHE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI,
Respondent.
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
Ananalogoussituationobtainsinthecaseatbar.
TheTCTofthesubjectpropertystatesthatitssoleowneristhesellerRogeliohimselfwhowastherein
also described as "single". However, as in the cases of Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are
circumstances critical to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the ruling of both the appellate
andlowercourtsthathereinpetitionerisnotabuyeringoodfaith.
First,petitioner'ssisterHildaBautista,atthetimeofthesale,wasresidingnearRogelioandShirley's
house the subject property in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner been more
prudentasabuyer,shecouldhaveeasilycheckedifRogeliohadthecapacitytodisposeofthesubject
property. Had petitioner been more vigilant, she could have inquired with such facility considering
thathersisterlivedinthesameLadislaoDiwaVillagewherethepropertyislocatediftherewasany
personotherthanRogeliowhohadanyrightorinterestinthesubjectproperty.
To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village
including petitioner's sister not to engage in any deal with Rogelio relative to the purchase of the
subjectpropertybecauseofthecasesshehadfiledagainstRogelio.Petitionerdeniesthatrespondent
had given such warning to her neighbors, which includes her sister, therefore arguing that such
warning could not be construed as "notice" on her part that there is a person other than the seller
himself who has any right or interest in the subject property. Nonetheless, despite petitioner's
adamant denial, both courts a quo gave probative value to the testimony of respondent, and the
instantpetitionfailedtopresentanyconvincingevidenceforthisCourttoreversesuchfactualfinding.
Tobesure,itisnotwithinourprovincetosecondguessthecourtsaquo,andtheredeterminationof
thisfactualissueisbeyondthereachofapetitionforreviewoncertiorariwhereonlyquestionsoflaw
maybereviewed.30
G.R.No.200983,March18,2015REPUBLICOFTHE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HUANG TE FU, A.K.A.
ROBERTUY,Respondent.
G.R.No.175433,March11,2015ATTY.JACINTOC.
GONZALES,Petitioner,v.MAILACLEMENF.SERRANO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015 TEOFILO B.
ADOLFO,Petitioner,v.FE.T.ADOLFO,Respondent.
G.R.No.155701,March11,2015LIMTECKCHUAN,
Petitioner, v. SERAFIN UY AND LEOPOLDA CECILIO,
LIMSINGCHAN@HENRYLIM,Respondents.
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale also pose question on the
claimofpetitionerthatsheisabuyeringoodfaith.Ascorrectlyobservedbybothcourtsa quo, the
DeedofAbsoluteSalewasexecutedanddatedonDecember29,1992.However,theCommunityTax
CertificatesofthewitnessesthereinweredatedJanuary2and20,1993.31Whilethisirregularityisnot
adirectproofoftheintentofthepartiestothesaletomakeitappearthattheDeedofAbsoluteSale
was executed on December 29, 1992 or before Shirley filed the petition for legal separation on
January 29, 1993 it is circumstantial and relevant to the claim of herein petitioner as an innocent
purchaserforvalue.
Thatisnotall.
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the civil status of Rogelio as seller was not
stated,whilepetitionerasbuyerwasindicatedas"single,"viz.:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with postal address at 2A2
Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the
VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and with postal address at
No. L2A3 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred
toastheVENDEE.32
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
ItpuzzlestheCourtthatwhilepetitionerhasrepeatedlyclaimedthatRogeliois"single"underTCTNo.
171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D01204723 and D01204724, his civil status as seller was not
statedintheDeedofAbsoluteSalefurthercreatingacloudontheclaimofpetitionerthatsheisan
innocentpurchaserforvalue.
Astothesecondissue,werulethattheappellatecourtdidnoterrwhenitmodifiedthedecisionofthe
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trialcourtanddeclaredthattheDeedofAbsoluteSaledatedDecember29,1992isvoidinitsentirety.
ThetrialcourtheldthatwhiletheTCTshowsthattheownerofthesubjectpropertyisRogelioalone,
respondent was able to prove at the trial court that she contributed in the payment of the purchase
price of the subject property. This fact was also settled with finality by the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case for legal separation and liquidation of property docketed as
JDRCCaseNo.2510.Thepertinentportionofthedecisionreads:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
xxx Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the parties prior to their marriage
formspartoftheircommunitypropertyregime,xxx
From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial contribution for the
purchase of the house and lot covered by TCT 171963. Thus, the present lot which
forms part of their community property should be divided equally between them upon
the grant of the instant petition for legal separation. Having established by
preponderance of evidence the fact of her husband's guilt in contracting a subsequent
marriagexxx,Shirleyaloneshouldbeentitledtothenetprofitsearnedbytheabsolute
communityproperty.33
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent's financial
contributioninthepurchaseofthesubjectproperty.Actualcontributionisnotrelevantindetermining
whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes
communityproperty.
Article91oftheFamilyCodethusprovides:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the
communitypropertyshallconsistofallthepropertyownedbythespousesatthetimeof
thecelebrationofthemarriageoracquiredthereafter.
Theonlyexceptionsfromtheaboveruleare:(1)thoseexcludedfromtheabsolutecommunitybythe
FamilyCodeand(2)thoseexcludedbythemarriagesettlement.
UnderthefirstexceptionarepropertiesenumeratedinArticle92oftheFamilyCode,whichstates:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruitsaswellastheincomethereof,ifany,unlessitisexpresslyprovidedbythedonor,
testatororgrantorthattheyshallformpartofthecommunityproperty
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse however, jewelry shall
formpartofthecommunityproperty
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendantsbyaformermarriage,andthefruitsaswellastheincome,ifany,ofsuch
property.
AsheldinQuiaov.Quiao:34
G.R.No.209370,March25,2015FORTBONIFACIO
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
VALENTINL.FONG,Respondent.
A.C.No.8776,March22,2015ANTONINAS.SOSA,
Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA,
Respondent.
G.R.No.209283,March11,2015CECILIARACHEL
V. QUISUMBING, Petitioner, v. LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V. CARDONA AND
NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRPERSONANDMEMBERS,RESPECTIVELY,OFTHE
COMMISSIONONHUMANRIGHTS,Respondent.
Ch a n Ro b le s Vir t u a la wlib r a r y
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spousebringsintothemarriage,andthoseacquiredduringthemarriage(exceptthose
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's
properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originallyowned.
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Art.92.Thefollowingshallbeexcludedfromthecommunityproperty:
SincethesubjectpropertydoesnotfallunderanyoftheexclusionsprovidedinArticle92,ittherefore
formspartoftheabsolutecommunitypropertyofShirleyandRogelio.Regardlessoftheirrespective
contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name
appearsintheTCTasowner,thepropertyisownedjointlybythespousesShirleyandRogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and without the
consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed of Absolute Sale
datedDecember29,1992orduringthesubsistenceofavalidcontractofmarriage.UnderArticle96
of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said
dispositionofacommunalpropertyisvoid,viz.:
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
subjecttorecoursetothecourtbythewifeforaproperremedy,whichmustbeavailed
ofwithinfiveyearsfromthedateofthecontractimplementingsuchdecision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administrationofthecommonproperties,theotherspousemayassumesolepowersof
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuingofferonthepartoftheconsentingspouseandthethirdperson,andmaybe
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorizationbythecourtbeforetheofferiswithdrawnbyeitherorbothofferors.35
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the subject
propertywithoutthewrittenconsentofrespondentortheauthorityofthecourt.Withoutsuchconsent
orauthority,theentiresaleisvoid.Ascorrectlyexplainedbytheappellatecourt:
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c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject property to defendant
appellant Josefina on 29 December 1992 or during the existence of Rogelio's marriage
toplaintiffappelleeShirley,withouttheconsentofthelatter.Thesubjectpropertyforms
partofRogelioandShirley'sabsolutecommunityofproperty.Thus,thetrialcourterred
in declaring the deed of sale null and void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters
representing the onehalf (1/2) portion of plaintiffappellee Shirley. In absolute
communityofproperty,ifthehusband,withoutknowledgeandconsentofthewife,sells
(their)property,suchsaleisvoid.TheconsentofboththehusbandRogelioandthewife
Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null
and void including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio
who contracted the sale with defendantappellant Josefina. Since the Deed of Absolute
Sale x x x entered into by and between defendantappellant Josefina and defendant
Rogelio dated 29 December 1992, during the subsisting marriage between plaintiff
appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was without the written consent of Shirley, the said Deed
ofAbsoluteSaleisvoidinitsentirety.Hence,thetrialcourterredindeclaringthesaid
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DeedofAbsoluteSaleasvoidonlyinsofarasthe1/2portionpertainingtotheshareof
Shirleyisconcerned.36
LOLITABENIGNO,Respondent.
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015 ROSARIO
BANGUISTAMBUYAT, Petitioner, v. WENIFREDA
BALCOMTAMBUYAT,Respondent.
G.R.No.202943,March25,2015THEDEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY ENRIQUE
T.ONA,ANDTHEFOODANDDRUGADMINISTRATION
(FORMERLY THE BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS),
REPRESENTEDBYASSISTANTSECRETARYOFHEALTH
NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, OFFICERINCHARGE,
Petitioners,
v.
PHILIP
MORRIS
PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING,INC.,Respondent.
G.R.No.160914,March25,2015MARCELAM.DELA
CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO AND HIS
WIFEREMEDIOSHERMANO,Respondent.
G.R. No. 189296, March 11, 2015 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,PlaintiffAppellee,v.RECTOANGNGAOY
MAKAY AND ROBERT CARLIN Y PECDASEN, ACCUSED,
RECTOANGNGAOYMAKAY,AccusedAppellant.
G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015 COMGLASCO
CORPORATION/AGUILAGLASS,Petitioner,v.SANTOS
CARCHECKCENTERCORPORATION,Respondent.
c r a la wla wlib r a r y
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with petitioner
andacknowledgedreceivingtheentireconsiderationofthecontractundertheDeedofAbsoluteSale,
Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of her payment for the
purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of
propertyshallonlybe"liableforxxx[d]ebtsandobligationscontractedbyeitherspousewithoutthe
consentoftheothertotheextentthatthefamilymayhavebeenbenefitedxxx."Ascorrectlystated
by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio
redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent cannot be made to reimburse any amount to
petitioner.37
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thepetitionisDENIED.TheassailedDecisionandResolution
oftheCourtofAppealsdatedMay14,2010andJuly21,2010,respectively,inCAG.R.CVNo.70235
areAFFIRMED.
Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
c h a n r o b le s v ir t u a la wlib r a r y
Velasco,Jr.,(Chairperson),Peralta,Reyes,andJardeleza,JJ.,concur.
Endnotes:
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=317
1Rollo, pp. 3052. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. LibreaLeagogo with Associate
JusticesRemediosA.SalazarFernandoandMichaelP.Elbiniasconcurring.
2Id.
rollo,pp.33,96.
6TSN,December9,1997,pp.29&34.
7DeedofAbsoluteSale,records,pp.309&363.
8SocialSecuritySystem.
9Records,p.303.
10DocketedasJDRCCaseNo.2510,FolderofExhibits,pp.1820.
11Rollo,pp.7981.
12RenderedinJDRCCaseNo.2510,FolderofExhibits,pp.2124.
13Id.at24.
14Rollo,p.32.
15 Entitled "Shirley B. Nuega v. Josefina V. Nobleza and Rogelio Nuega" and docketed]
asCivilCaseNo.96274MK,rollo,pp.8487records,pp.2427.
16Rollo,p.102.
17Id.at49.
18Id.at14.
19Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong, 553 Phil. 480, 495 (2007), citing Eastworld
Motor Industries Corporation v. Skunac Corporation, 514 Phil. 605, 613 (2005).
Emphasissupplied.
20Id.,citingPotencianov.Reynoso,449Phil.396,410(2003).
21SiaTio,etal.v.Abayata,etal.,578Phil.731,747(2008).
22PNBv.HeirsofEstanislaoandDeograciasMilitar,526Phil.788,796797(2006).
23Records,p.49.
24Id.at51.
25Supranote19.
26Id.at496.
27490Phil.179(2005).
28Id.at191.
29Id.at191192.
30Palonv.Nino,405Phil.670,682(2001).
31Rollo,pp.7981.
32Id.at79.
33FolderofExhibits,p.24.
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G.R.No.193038,March11,2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.:MARCH2015PHILIPPINESUPREME
34
G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 642, 667. Emphasis and underscoring
omitted.
35Emphasissupplied.
36Rollo,pp.4546.Citationsomitted.Underscoringintheoriginal.
37Id.at4849.
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G.R.No.197115,March23,2015REPUBLICOFTHE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, Petitioner, v. FEDERICO DACLAN,
JOSEFINA COLLADO AND HER HUSBAND FEDERICO
DACLAN, TEODORO DACLAN AND MINVILUZ DACLAN
AS SURVIVING HEIRS OF DECEASED JOSE DACLAN,
Respondents. [G.R. NO. 197267] FEDERICO
DACLAN,JOSEFINACOLLADO,TEODORODACLANAND
MINVILUZ DACLAN AS SURVIVING HEIRS OF
DECEASEDJOSEDACLAN,Petitioners,v.REPUBLICOF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY
OF AGRICULTURE AND PROVINCE OF LA UNION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR,
Respondent.
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2012
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G.R.No.193038,March11,2015JOSEFINAV.NOBLEZA,Petitioner,v.SHIRLEYB.NUEGA,Respondent.:MARCH2015PHILIPPINESUPREME
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