Zionists and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry during the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)

Author(s): Blent Kemal ke

Source: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1980), pp. 364-374
Published by: Pluto Journals
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Zionists and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

during the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)

Blent Kemal ke
By the late 1800s, Palestine had become the focus of the European
Zionists who were offering to deliver their followers to the Promised
Land. Palestine, however, was neither empty nor free of an existing
sovereignty. It was part of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire,
inhabited by the Arab subjects of the Sultan. Having elevated the Zionist

movement from a disunited collection of philanthropic societies to an

actor in international relations, Dr. Theodore Herzl admitted that the

"decision is in the sole hands of His Majesty the Sultan."1 In order to win
Abdulhamid II to his plan of establishing a home for the Jews in Palestine,
he made five journeys to Constantinople between 1896 and 1902.
During his stay at the Ottoman capital, he was summoned to the Porte as
well as to the Palace, negotiated "from Power to Power," as he described
it, with various dignitaries of the State, including the Grand Vezir, and
was even granted an audience with Abdulhamid II.
Herzl was soon to discover that the Sultan of Turkey was vehemently
against the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine.2 At a time when the
Macedonian uprisings in the West and the Armenian revolts in Anatolia
were threatening the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the
Turkish Government had no desire to nurture another nationality problem
within its domains. Thus, the Ottomans took the Zionist movement seriously from its inception and devised their policies to deal with it accordingly. It was Abdulhamid II himself who laid the cornerstone of the
Ottoman reaction toward the Zionists. He was determined that the Turk-

ish Government should prevent Jewish immigration and settlement in

Palestine to the best of its efforts.3 The Sultan, in turn, asked the Cabinet
to carefully discuss the entire question at its meetings and work out
detailed policies to cope with the Zionist phenomenon both at home and

Blent Kemal ke is Lecturer in International Politics , Institute of Political Science ,

University of Istanbul.

1. R. Patai (ed.), The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (London, 1960), iii, p.

909.

l. Diaries , i, p. 5 lis.

3. A. Osmanoglu, Babam Abdlhamid (Istanbul, 1960), p. 46.

364 ASQ Volume 2 Number 4

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Ottoman Foreign Ministry 365

abroad. The final program, as formulated b

approved by the Sultan, entailed four sets of
different ministries were responsible.4 Whil

try was asked to persuade the Powers not

Zionist movement, the Ministry of the Inter

venting the Zionists from entering the count
ministries concerned, some Jews managed to

up to the Grand Vezirate to ensure that t

protection and become entitled to capitulato

was the task of the Department of Land R
acquisition of land in Palestine and its envir
The Ottoman Foreign Ministry came to b
decisionmaking in Turco-Zionist relations. Abdulhamid II and his advisors' image of Zionism was shaped by the way Turkish diplomats
abroad perceived Zionism and by the way they communicated this phe-

nomenon to Constantinople. Second, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

proved to be highly influential in the formulation of definitive policies
toward the activities of the Zionists, both in the diplomatic field and in
Palestine. Third, the Foreign Ministry, compared with the other Ottoman
ministries, bore the heaviest burden in the implementation of the Turkish
Government's anti-Zionist regulations.

When Zionism came to the forefront of Jewish affairs with the congregation of the First Congress at Basle in 1897, the Ottoman representatives
abroad did not lose any time in feeding the capital detailed information
concerning the development of the entire Zionist movement. While the
detailed reports and newspaper cuttings were readily dispatched to Con-

4. Tahsin Paa, Abdiilhamid ve Yildiz Hatiratari (Istanbul, 1931), pp. 7-9.

5. Public Record Office, London (later to be cited as PRO), Foreign Office Files
(later to be cited as FO), 78/5479, no. 71, Dickson to Bunsen, Jerusalem, 29
December 1900; no. 34, O'Conorto Lansdowne, Constantinople, 27 January 1901.
6. Foreign Relations of the United States (later to be cited as FRUS), (1886),
no. 445, Cox to Bayard, Constantinople, 5 January 1886; FRUS (1893), end. to

no. 3, Mavroyeni to Gresham, 22 November 1893, Therapia.

7. FRUS (1898), no. 78, Angeli to Sherman, Constantinople, 5 January 1898;

FRUS (1906), no. 1370, Jay to the Secretary of State, Constantinople, 25 April
1906; PRO, FO, 195/1765, no. 35, Dickson to Clare-Ford, Jerusalem, 30 December
1892.

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366 Arab Studies Quarterly

stantinople,8 Turkish diplomats tried t

even sent agents under disguise to their
Turkish diplomats did not perceive the
In 1898 Ali Ferruh Bey, the Turkish mini
Zionism 4 4 vitally concerns Turkish sove
sador in Berlin, Ali Tewfik Pasha, wrote
that "we must have no illusions about Zio
the Congress dwelled upon vague gener
Jewish people, the Zionists, in effect,
Jewish state in Palestine which would also
countries."11 Two years before this mess

Turkish ambassador in London, Antopu

the Porte that 4 4 with the increase in the

Palestine, the Zionist colonizers would not be content to live under
Ottoman municipal law."12 He added that the Zionists, contrary to what
they had said at Basle, would press for international recognition under the
law of nations.

After analyzing these reports, the Sultan, as the principal decision

maker of the Ottoman Empire, admitted that he 4 4 understood their
[Zionists'] evil projects, and as much as he protected his Jewish subjects,

he was still an enemy of those Jews who entertained certain chimeric

ideas about Palestine."13 Abdulhamid II thought that the immigration and

settlement of the Jews in Palestine were harmful to the interests of the

Ottoman Empire insofar as they would lead to the emergence of a 4 'Jewish

Question," and were especially dangerous at a time when the Turkish

Government had the Armenian troubles on its hands.14

Having communicated to the Porte the emergence and the development

8. These were all kept in a dossier entitled "The Question of Zionism,"

catalogued under 332/17 of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archives (later to be

cited as OFM).
9. OFM, 332/17, no. 1205/30, Missak Effendi to Tewfik Pasha, La Haye, 17
August 1907; no. 23600/182, Mahmud Nedim to Tewfik Pasha, Vienna, 21 July

1898; Yildiz Palace Archives at the Porte, Istanbul (later to be cited as YPA), C

11/67/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 20 May 1898; 6 11/4849/54/136,27 April 1898.
10. OFM, 332/17, no. 9597/81, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 23
July 1898.
11. OFM, 332/17, no. 1683/136, A. Tewfik to Tewfik Pasha, Berlin, 17 August
1900.

12. OFM, 332/17, no. 23598/216, Antopulos to Tewfik Pasha, London, 8 June

1898.

13. Abdlhamid, Siyasi Hatiratim (Istanbul, 1975), pp. 76-77.

14. C. R. Atilhan, Ittihat ve Terakki nin Suikastleri (Istanbul, 1973), pp. 200-1.

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Ottoman Foreign Ministry 367

of Zionism as they perceived them, the mem

ic corps were also enthusiastic in advising

ways to cope with this movement, which, ac
the territorial integrity and political soverei
vember 1903 the Turkish ambassador in Berl
rate the existing special regulations prohibit

ing land in Palestine and preventing the c

activities which, according to him, aimed at the establishment of an
independent State within the domains of the Ottoman Empire.15
As early as 1898, Ali Ferruh Bey wrote a letter to the Sultan - a copy of
which he also sent to the Foreign Ministry at the Porte16 - suggesting that
the "time has come for the Government of His Imperial Majesty to take
certain measures to repair the fault which their ancestors had committed
by allowing the non-Moslem communities to settle in Palestine. As the
journey of the German Emperor to Jerusalem clearly showed, Catholics,
Protestants, Orthodox and Jews prepare the ground for the Powers to

enhance their respective spheres of political and religious ambitions

(within the Ottoman lands)."17 Ali Ferruh Bey, whose father had been the
governor of Jerusalem, further informed the Sultan that on a recent visit
to Palestine he had seen the way the Zionists were plundering the riches of
the country, to the detriment of the local Muslim population. In order to
rectify this state of affairs, he suggested that the Government facilitate the

immigration of Muslim communities into Palestine to leave fewer places

for the Jews to settle. Abdulhamid II must have shared Ali Ferruh Bey's
anxiety, for he declared: "We must forget the idea of allowing Jewish
immigration into Palestine. Otherwise, as they would in due course muster all the power in their hands wherever they settle, we would sign the
death warrant of our religious brothers."18 On another occasion, Abdulhamid II said, "we could only open our borders to those who belong to
the same nationality and religion as we do. We should try to buttress the
Turkish element in our body politic."19 When Muslim Turkish refugees,

in the face of growing repression in the Balkans and Russia, fled to

Turkey, Abdulhamid II settled them in the valley of Hauran, Palestine.
When it came to implementing the Turkish policies, the Foreign Minis15. OFM, 332/17, no. 3309/178, A. Tewfik to Tewfik Pasha, Berlin, 31 November 1903.

16. YPA, C 11/48-49/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 27

April 1898.
17. OFM, 332/17, no. 9550/63, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 29
April 1898.
18. Abdiilhamid, op. cit., p. 76.
19: Ibid., p. 68.

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368 Arab Studies Quarterly

try was asked to persuade the Powers not

Zionism. Since Germany was the European Power most sympathetic
toward Turkey, the Ottoman Government thought that it should first win
the support of the Kaiser for its anti- Zionist policies. It is curious that of
all the Powers, Germany was the country most favorably disposed toward
the Zionist movement. The Kaiser had admitted that the 4 'fundamental

idea of Zionism has always interested [me] and even aroused [my] sympathy."20 In September, 1898 Count Evlenburg, the German ambassador
in Vienna, wrote to Herzl that 4 4 His Majesty has declared himself ready to
intervene with the Sultan and prepared to undertake the protection of the
Jews in the Orient."21 When the German Emperor attempted to discuss
the matter with the Sultan and told him that the Zionists were 4 4 not

dangerous to Turkey, but everywhere the Jews are a nuisance of whom

one should like to be rid," Abdulhamid II was reported to have replied

that he was quite satisfied with his Jewish subjects.22 Tewfik Pasha, the
Turkish foreign minister, told Wilhelm II on his tour of Jerusalem that
4 4 the Sultan would have nothing to do with Zionism and an independent

Jewish Kingdom."23 As a result, Wilhelm II, anxious not to arouse the

suspicion of his host over such a project, lost all his enthusiasm for
Zionism. Biilow was extremely pleased to see this change in the Kaiser
and further convinced him that since Zionism was a serious threat to

Turkish sovereignty, Germany's support of Herzl' s plans was incompati

ble with the traditional German policy of maintaining the integrity of th
Ottoman Empire.24 Turkish authorities used the same line of argument
with the Powers which had a vested interest in the preservation of Tur
key, namely, that they 4 4 should renounce the idea of introducing the
Jewish people into the international community as a state, because this
project, by creating a state within a state at the center of the Ottoman
Empire, would assure the ruin of Turkey."25 Turkish propaganda in thi

connection was so powerful that the Allegemeine Zeitung wrote on

11 August 1900 : 44Live and let live; this is the policy of the Great Power
not only towards the Jews, but also towards the Turks."26
It appears that Germany played a pivotal role in the shaping of other
20. I. Friedman, Germany , Turkey and Zionism 1897-1918 (Oxford, 1977), p.
65.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid., p. 68.
Diaries , iii, p. 770.
Friedman, op. cit., p. 79.
Biilow, Memoirs (London, 1931), ii, p. 250.
OFM, 332/17, no. 1683/136, A. Tewfik to Tewfik Pasha, Berlin, 17 August

1900.

26. Ibid.

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Ottoman Foreign Ministry 369

Powers' attitudes toward Zionism. In her withd

Herzl, Russia followed Germany's example. Pleh
of the interior, had written to Herzl in August
Zionism consisted of wanting to create an indep
. . . , the Russian Government could be complet
seems that the Russians gave their support to th
from German sails. Suspicious as it was of Wilh
the Near East, St. Petersburg must have thought
of a Jewish State were unavoidable, it would be better to have it under
Russian rather than German protection. Once the Germans backed down
from fostering the Zionist cause in Palestine, the Russian Government
must have realized that there was no need to complicate international
relations with another nationality question. Thus, it placed the Jewish
Question in cold storage.

With respect to the French, it must be said that Paris was always
against Herzl's project. "It was clear," Bodenheimer, who accompanied
Herzl in his Middle Eastern tour, wrote, "that Paris watched suspiciously
over events in Palestine. Any incautious declaration of a protectorate or a
Jewish State would have led to dangerous complications. Should the
French fleet, alerted at Toulon, have anchored off the Syrian coast,
trouble would certainly have ensued."28 Having recognized the potential
danger to world peace, Britain was content to offer Herzl and his followers less sensitive spots, like Uganda and Cyprus, to fulfill their irredentist
aspirations.
II

Having done its homework in the diplomatic field by convincing the

Powers to withdraw their support from the Zionist movement, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry turned its attention to another facet of the Turkish
Government's anti-Zionist policies. The Ottomans wished to make world
Jewry believe that, from the point of view of the Jewish people, Herzl's
plans were neither feasible nor desirable. They hoped that if they were
successful, there would be a drop in the number of Jewish converts to the
Zionist ranks. This would indeed deprive the Zionists of their main source
of strength. A typical method used by the Turkish Foreign Ministry was to
27. OFM, 332/17, no. 3309/179, A. Tewfik to Tewfik Pasha, Berlin, 31 November 1903.

28. H. H. Bodenheimer (ed.), The Memoirs of Max Bodenheimer: Prelude to

Israel (New York, 1963), pp. 124-5.

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370 Arab Studies Quarterly

contradict the optimistic speeches about

notables of the Zionist movement gave at
Foreign Ministry declared: "although Dr.
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, he was b

settle the Zionists in Palestine."29 Such

discourage the Jewish people's involvement in plans about Palestine,
sometimes carried an element of threat. Noting that the Jews "in Turkey
have always been, and they are, free, happy and prosperous," Ali Ferruh

Bey overtly told the news media: "It did not seem wise that they
[Zionists] be encouraged to create difficulties for the Turkish Government
by attempting to put chimeric ideas into execution. I am afraid that the
only results which would flow from this attempt would do harm to their

peaceable and happy co-religionists in Turkey." He also added, in this

connection, that the harmony and happiness which governed relations
between the Ottoman authorities and their Armenian subjects were disturbed by a handful of rebels who "commited the folly of listening to the
Machiavellian advice of outsiders and lived to regret their action without
obtaining any result."30 The Turkish minister's explicit statement was
very effective. On 17 June 1898 the Jewish Messenger reported with some
relief that the speech had a "salutary influence on our Don Quixotes."31
Indeed, a year later the president of the New York Federation of Zionists,
J. Bluestone, complained that it was "becoming increasingly difficult to
attract new members or even to hold on to the old ones."32

Establishing an alliance with certain anti-Zionist groups to form a

common opposition was another precaution in which the Turkish Ministry
sought refuge. It was again Ali Ferruh Bey who established contact with
Muhamrned Webb, the president of the American Muslims, in May 1898;
he asked Webb to aid the Caliph in the anti- Zionist crusade of the Ottoman Empire. Webb interceded with Richard Gothel, the chairman of the
American Federation of Zicnists, to persuade the latter not to pursue any
endeavors concerning Palestine.33
Turkish diplomats also hoped to recruit some Jews into their efforts to
29. OFM, 332/17, unnumbered, to all the Ottoman delegations abroad, 1899.
30. YPA, C 11/85-86/54/136, Ali Ferruh to the Palace, Washington, 15 June
1898; OFM, 332/17, no. 9597/81, Ali Ferruh to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 23 July
1898.

31. YPA, C 11/98/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 23 July
1898; OFM, 332/17, no. 9597/81, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 23
July 1898.
32. M. Feinstein, American Zionism (1884-1904) (New York, 1965), p. 150.
33. OFM, 332/17, no. 9557/66, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 12
May 1898.

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Ottoman Foreign Ministry 371

halt the development of Zionism. Certain se

nity, such as the 4 4 Orthodox" and the "re
helpful. Orthodox Jews believed that only a
Jews into Palestine; thus Dr. Herzl, who app
task, was a charlatan. He was not only inter
but also promising the Jews a mission whic
powers, could not fulfil.34 Reformists also di
Reformist Jews of Western Europe thought
nation, but a religion. Instead of migrating t
the hope of establishing their own State, the
the nations among which they lived. They w
could convince the Turks, then their positio
sudden upsurge of anti-Semitism, as their
leave their countries and migrate to Palestin
desire to leave Western Europe, where, apar

like the Dreyfus Affair, they lived in pea

Ferruh Bey found the reformist Jews in th

tive. Reverend Stoden, the grand rabbi of W
large section of the Jewish community belo
and had no sympathy whatsoever with Zion
As a last measure to prevent the Zionists fr
Ottoman Foreign Ministry ordered the Turk
give visas to those Jews who belonged to th
who had hoped to evade the Turkish restr
their journey without visas were surprised
toms' authorities were already alerted about
police more often than not knew the homela
as well as the number of Zionists aboard a sh
shores of Haifa or Jaffa. The Turkish representatives abroad had no
inhibitions about spying on the Zionists. Once they learned that a party of

Zionists was on its way to Palestine, they immediately informed the

Turkish authorities at home with a cipher telegram.38 It was indeed

34. OFM, 332/17, no. 60, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 23

April 1898.
35. OFM, 332/17, no. 23598/216, Antopulos to Tewfik Pasha, London, 8 June
1898.

36. YPA, C 11/35-37/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 22

April 1898; YPA, C 11/48-49/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Pasha, Washington, 27 April 1898.
37. YPA, C 11/275-276/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 24
January 1899.
38. YPA, C 11/226-229/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 1
October 1898; C 11/218/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, 15 September 1898.

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372 Arab Studies Quarterly

remarkable that the Turkish Foreign Minist

Interior achieved such a state of coordina

Ill

Despite Ottoman intransigence, the Zionists managed to penetrate the

borders and to settle thousands of their followers in Palestine. By 1909 the
Jewish population of Palestine had risen to eighty thousand, three times
the number in 1882, when the first entry restrictions were imposed; the
Zionists had acquired some 156 square miles of land and set up twenty-six

colonies.39 The wide gap between the theory and practice of the Ottoman policies and its results was attributable to the intervention of the
Powers on behalf of the Jewish colonizers.

Thanks to the efforts of the Foreign Ministry, the Ottomans were b

and large successful in persuading the Powers not to lend any support
the Zionist cause. The Powers did not mediate between the Turks and the

Zionists. If the Zionists lost on the diplomatic front and failed to obtain a
charter for a home in Palestine, they won in another way. On their arrival in

Palestine, the Jewish settlers were not naturalized as Ottoman subjects,

but preferred to acquire foreign nationality in order to enjoy the privileges
accorded to the Powers under the Capitulations. As the immigrants obtained certificates of protection (by very doubtful means), the European

consuls in Jerusalem were compelled to recognize them as their sub-

jects.40 The Powers made it clear to the Porte that the right of their
subjects to travel and to settle within the Ottoman dominions was secured
by the Capitulations; therefore, anti-Zionist regulations were considered
to be ipso facto null and void as far as they concerned persons enjoying

their protection.41 Thus, the delegations of European (and American)

Powers did not hesitate to intervene with the Turkish officials on behalf of

the Zionists. As a result, each regulation of anti- Zionist legislation of the

Ottoman Government was evaded.

Seeing that its efforts to check the establishment of a Zionist strongho

within the Ottoman Empire were wasted, the Foreign Ministry made a l
desperate demarche. It tried to explain to the Powers that the Jewish
migrants were fraudulently acquiring certificates of protection and that

39. N. Sokolow, History of Zionism (London, 1919), ii, pp. 326-31.

40. PRO, FO, 78/1692, no. 218, Finn to Russell, Jerusalem, iy June 1862;

195/2028, no. 408, Dickson to O'Conor, Jerusalem, 21 November 1898.

41. PRO, FO, 195/1575, White to Moore, Therapia, 19 October 1887; FRUS
(1888), no. 1083, Straus to Bayard, Constantinople, 19 May 1888.

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Ottoman Foreign Ministry 373

they were using them to evade the anti-Zion

Believing that the protg system constitute
abuses," Said Pasha, the foreign minister of T
1887, asked the Powers to withdraw their pro
Although Britain agreed in principle, London
to the actual persecution of the Jews in Russ
matter of policy to deprive the Jews in Syr
British protection."43 The Porte did not find
cooperative either. Both countries had genuin
tion of Zionist policies. As Herzl told the Kai
of the Jews from these countries meant that the Socialist movement would

be deprived of its leaders and supporters on the one hand, and antiSemitism would be sapped of its impetus on the other.44 With respect to
external considerations, both the Germans and Russians must have

thought that these Jewish elements, once placed under their protection,
would prove themselves agents for their increased influence in that part of
the Ottoman Empire.
As a last effort, the Foreign Ministry turned to the United States. The
U.S. stand vis--vis the Zionists was left to the discretion of the U.S.

minister in Constantinople, Oscar Straus, who was favorably disposed

toward Zionist aspirations.45 As a result of Straus' continuous attempts to champion Jewish rights, Ali Ferruh Bey wired the Sultan that

Straus was blocking America's acquiescence to the Turkish policy of

restricting the stay of American Jews in Palestine.46 Abdulhamid II had
him removed from his post in Constantinople. On 28 August 1893 the
Turkish minister in Washington appealed to the State Department that the
question of Zionism was an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire, and
Americans should abide by the principles of the "Monroe Doctrine,
namely no one should mix himself either directly or indirectly with the
affairs of others."47 These protests, however, fell short of changing the

American attitude toward the Zionists in Palestine.

In 1911, seeing that all his Government's efforts had been in vain,

Abdulhamid II, deposed and exiled by then, admitted to his private

42. PRO, FO, 83/1723, enei, to no. 394, White to Salisbury, Therapia, 10

September 1891.

43. PRO, FO, 195/1510, no. 14, Elridge to Granville, Beirut, 25 May 1882.

44. Diaries , ii, pp. 669-671.

45. FRUS (1888), no. 1101, Adee to Straus, Washington, 6 November 1888.

46. YPA, C 11/275-276/54/136, Ali Ferruh Bey to the Palace, Washington, 24

January 1899.

47. FRUS (1893), Mavroyeni to Gresham, Washington, Correspondence with

the Legation of Turkey, 28 August 1893.

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374 Arab Studies Quarterly

physician that the achievements of the

introduction, preparing the groundwork
goal: "I am sure that with time they ca
lishing their own state in Palestine."48
48. Atif Hiiseyin Bey, Hatiralar, Turkish Historical Association Library,
Y-255, p. 18.

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