-c

\

e*-.poT> *>si VhC.

e.c\ cl.v»WA

\^uA

*£~c\ e&- V A

noV

C< No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28: NLC-10-14-5-13-6
4

t

MEMORANDUM
v

I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
August 25, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

NORTH/SOUTH

SUBJECT:

Evening Report

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Daily Activities (Erb)
North-South Initiatives. Garten chaired a session last
night at which s/p staff and some private consultants reviewed
possible North-South policies and actions that might be
taken in a climate that is hostile to major initiatives.
No conclusions yet, and further meetings and drafting will
take place over the next few weeks. (C)
Senate Consideration of foreign assistance bill. At different
times today and last week I discussed the aid bill with
Beckel, Bergsten, Albright, and Owen.* Two possible approaches
Beckel favors acceptance of Senate approval of the House aid
levels and elimination of the Cuba and Viet-Nam amendments as
well as the inevitable middle ground, emerge. Owen favors
a strong effort to restore half of the cuts made in the
House, plus elimination of the two amendments. Bergsten's
consultations with Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members
indicate that Inouye will strike the Cuba and Viet-Nam
amendments but the situation regarding aid levels is unclear.
Inouye apparently favors cuts in the IDB, but he will restore
Asian Development Bank levels, and Schweiker may support an
increase in IDA. No one in the Senate showed any enthusiasm
for a large restoration of the House cuts*
(LOU) - The situation has been complicated by the possibility of IMF
and World Bank action to give cost-of-living salary increases
to their staffs and by pending IMF action on an arrangement
(that the Executive Branch accepted) with the new IMF Managing
Director to raise his salary to roughly $140-150,000 before
taxes. McNamara would follow suit, a development that has
incensed Congressman Long who feels that he was misled. He
wasn't, but he can do some damage on the .Senate side.
Bergsten has seen the British Executive Director, Dale, and
others in an attempt to postpone IMF/World Bank action on
these delicate issues. Sam Cross will follow this up next
week.
(C)
NSA, DOE, DOS reviews
completed.____________

Not referred to DOC. Waiver
applies._________________

CONriDENTlALA,Dg~

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

No Objection to Declassification in.Part.2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14^5-13-6........................ ..........

POMPIDENTI&L/GDS
MTN. Alan Wolff and I reviewed various MTN issues today.
He agreed that we are doing better with the LDCs in the
negotiations on tariffs than in the talks on codes. Getting
the major LDCs in the trade codes will be difficult, but
critical to success of the negotiations and Congressional
approval of the MTN package. Wolff has also made what I
feel are unpalatable proposals regarding LDC;graduation:.
from the Generalized System of Preferences. He proposes a
TPRG discussion of the Preferences issue and I suggested
that he add LDC code negotiations to the agenda. (C)
Colombo Plan.
Possible high-level participation in the
December Colombo Plan meetings here in Washington and the
central place to be given at the meetings to basic human
needs policies add significance to that forthcoming event.
Because of the moderation of..the NAM's statement...in. Belgrade
on bhn we may be able to advance toward greater LDC understanding
of a broad BHN approach. I will provide BHN material and
guidance regarding last year's PRC decision to those who are
preparing for the meeting.- fC) - -........... 1--Hunger Commission. Lynn Daft, Peters, and DuSault (0MB),
and I discussed NSC/DPS cooperation in back- stopping the
Linowitz Commission on World Hunger. Daft and I agreed on
an approach to the statement , announcing the .Commission'.and
on the means of managing the transition from Peter Bourne to
Henry Owen as White House "point man.” (U)
f

jCONFIDBNTIAfi/GDS

f

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28: NLC-10-14-5-13-6

4

«

rgQP—6BCRET/C0DEW0RD
Significant Intelligence (Erb)
The G-77 and the MTN. At a meeting in Geneva earlier this
month a G-7? subcommittee began to lay plans for criticism
of the MTN, not within the framework of the negotiations,
but at the May '79 UNCTAD V meeting in Manila. Comment:
Such an approach would detract from LDC participation in the
closing stages of the MTN and contribute to the likelihood
of a confrontation at UNCTAD V. (SECRET/XGDS-2/Noforn)
Steel.

25X1

f

Comment: The United States continues to
push for ldc participation in the steel group. In a conversation
with Barraclough, OECD Secretary General Van Lannep has
suggested that OECD members be required to object to the
participation of particular countries if they wished to
limit the steel group's membership. OECD Secretariat staff
and some USG officials doubt that- this "negative consensus"
method will work.
(TOP SECRET/Codeword-XGDS-2)

I

*

1
CLASSIFIED BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER. 11658 .
i-XEilPTIOH CA.ftCURY■ r rr2
V"
'
■'
AUl’OMAiICALLX ^JLASSXITED 03 IMP TO PET-'

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD XODC 2
< v.

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28*: NLC-10-14-5-13-6
A.

«

Daily Activities (Pastor)

August 25, 1978

Yesterday, I attended the organizing meeting for PRM-41 on Mexico.
The level of attendees was quite high, and all clearly under­
stood the importance of our relationship with Mexico and the
need for developing a coherent strategy. Also met with Benson
Ford and his colleagues and gave them a briefing of our policy ____
to Latin America with special emphasis on: Mexico, where Ford ..
is very interested in investing.
Last night, I attended a seminar involving Gen. Lanusse, former
President (1969-73) of Argentina. Lanusse urged the largely
American audience to understand the "Argentina reality," and
to loosen up the human rights policy or risk a nationalist
reaction. Qne Professor of Argentina history used a marvelous
quote from Lanusse himself that you cannot beat terrorism with
government-sanctioned violence.- Lanusse'admitted Argentina had
"gone wrong somehow;" he did not have*any kind words for Videla.
Vaky thinks that Videla is currently debating whether to receive
him, and he believes we shouldn't push at this time. I urged him
to try to put together an overall strategy paper on U.S. policy.
On Nicaragua, I relayed the message from Reg and Bill Odom to
Vaky that we should go in quietly to the Panamanians and State
our concern with the Sandinistas-within the-overall context of
our global anti-terrorist policy. Perez and Torrijos have
both publicly tried to justify their involvement by stretching
the principle of non-intervention beyond its legitmate limits.
After hearing some, other diatrubing reports aboutthe-Sandinistas.
and speaking to David, I have set up a CIA briefing on this
subject on Monday and an inter-agency meeting on U.S. policy on
Tuesday. Jonathan Steele of the Manchester Guardian and
Richard Valeriani of CBS called for background briefing on the
Nicaraguan situation. I saw Valeriani on CBS/s-raorning show,
and he got the story right.
Vaky recommends at least a one week delay on a.Presidential
response to Mrs. Chamoro's letter, .and IKconcur.
Puerto Rico is causing concern. Cleaned off with Henry on a
press release which Andy Young may issue on Monday re­
stating our full support for self-determination. The problem
is that the Committee looks about evenly splitour": Puerto
Ricans may hold the balance in their hands, but they're
playing hard ball. They told USUN that if we continue to
aim for deferral, we will hear the word "colonial" all day
long. They may be prepared to compromise on ’a consensus
statement — not necessarily inscribed — which urges the
Committee to continually review the issue. I will follow
this closely over the weekend.
rONFTPHNTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

work on the Humphrey Scholarship Program. We are selecting
universities with an eye for excellence .and for certain ..Congressional
districts. I will send a memo on that, next week. Also met
with Barry Sklar who is writing the Latin America, .part of . a study
being prepared for the Senate* Foreign Relatione ;epinmittee on
the effectiveness of U.S. human rights policy. Also worked on
Cuba and on the Presidential message to the UN Conference on
Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries.

*

«

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

Significant Intelligence;

(Pastor)

Ecuador:

Embassy Quito's
assessment indicate that plotting to eliminate* Roldos -as a
potential candidate continues. The Embassy indicates that
their soundings have confirmed the existence of a plot to
establish sufficient fraud in the first round voting tortry
to convince Poveda to cancel the,follow-up elections. At
the same time, however, they have encountered enough doubt
and dissent to possibly undermine tfhe scheme. The decisive
moment may be reached during the week of September 4 when
the Guayas province results are scheduled for review.
(S XGDS-2)
Mexico: Scretary Schlesinger briefed Ambassador Margain on
progress of US natural gas legislation and our desire to
resume negoitations with the Mexicans. Schlesinger emphasized
that we understand the importance of the price to Mexico and
that there are various ways to meet Mexican political interests
without disrupting our own. Margain was impressed and
promised to raise the issue with Lopez Portillo during his
consultations in Mexico.
(C)
Haiti: The Haitian Foreign Ministry informed our Embassy that
they will not seek the return of Lucien Rigaud and had been
looking for a way to get rid of the problem posed by his
presence in the Mexican Embassy.
(C)
OAS; A special OAS session called to deal with human rights
commission issues was diverted to a discussion of commodity
problems and concern over US protectionism. Sugar and
copper were the concerns with-Peru, Chile-/- and-Jamaica ■ ■ ■■
speaking out forecefully. Jamaica^characterized consultations
with the US in all forums, including the OAS, as an "exercise
in futility."
(U)
Ecuador: Press reports indicate that Natural Resources
Minister Semblantes announced that GOE favors an oil price
hike of no more than 5%. The Embassy comments that while
Ecuador usually follows Venezuela's lead, it will diverge
in its own interest and usually follows suit-;-when ari- OPEC
consensus develops.
(LOU)
Mexico and Nicaragua: Our charge^briefed Foreign Minister
Roel on the Nicaraguan situation. Roel indicated that the
only long term solution was the removal of Somoza'and held
forth on the need for the US to stop supporting Somoza.
Roel expressed interest in receiving further information
on the Nicaraguan situation.
(S XGDS 1)

COHHW.

t

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE.

7attno?j.
■ubjecti.

to.

JUly

3,

memorandum

1980

PPC/PDPR/CP, J.onathan
Weekly Report
AA/PPC, Mr. Charles Paolillo (Acting)

To undeAAtand Argentina.'* economic. hUtoAy, the
approach oh a pAychiatnic social. ujonken might be
1
moAe uaej[uZ than that oh an economist... .
f
Con&ideAabZe. px.ogA.eA6. has been made, in 6ta.biLi.zing v
both the. economy and iociety in the 6 hoAt nun,
although at a ca6t in tenmA oh yet another Ahanp
dnop in h.eat unban uxcge& and 6ome Zoaa oh poiitical
hAeedom.
Report:

15

News and views

Case 2662 - Alberto - Samuel FALICOFF

The Commission heard public testimony from the wife of Dr. Fallcoff,
denouncing the detention, Imprisonment and torture of Hr. Fallcoff by the
Security Forces. ^ The arrest took place In his residence, In the presence of
his wife, who was'also detained and later released.
Mrs. Fallcoff signed the
testimony.
Doctor Fallcoff, a physician,- was practicing In the C6rdoba
Hospital and was a member of the Medical Association of that city.
The Commission considers
Fallcoff's testimony:

pertinent

the

complete

Children's

transcription

of

Mrs.

On Thursday, November 25, 1976, at 18 hours, the bell rang .
In the apartment where I lived with my husband, Dr. Alberto
Samuel Fallcoff and my son, Alfredo Fallcoff, who was then two
years of age.
I saw through the peephole four men In civilian
clothes standing against the wall.
When they realized I was
there, they knocked the door, and told me to open it or they
would shoot.
Since the baby was sitting watching television In

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL. FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-70)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) I0t-l I .*

soio-na

line with the door, I opened it.
They quickly entered and
grabbed me by the arms.
I was frightened and screamed.
They
said "Keep quiet, for the baby's sake-' and asked me where my
husband was.
I replied that he worked at the Clinic.
Then
they began to search the house, locking me and my son in his
room.
They searched the living room and dining
room,
dismanteled the stove and the Venetian blinds, and removed the
pictures from the walls.
I saw this being done because the
baby asked to go to the bathroom and they let me take him.
After half an hour, they ordered me to prepare the baby's
supper. They were courteous to me and told me they knew that I
had done nothing.
They said they had come looking for my
husband. After a while, they brought the janitor in and locked
him in the apartment also.
They said they had' done this to
keep him from warning my husband. They did the same thing with
a neighbor, who came in because he thought that thieves had
broken in.
The janitor, who was a very old man, was very
frightened, tfy husband arrived at about 2 o'clock and unlocked
the door with his keys.
When they heard the elevator, they
again sent me to my son's room.
They Immediately locked
themselves up with' my husband in our room and I began to hear
the sounds of a struggle, pushing and blows. Later, an officer
of the Army Intelligence Service arrived along with another
officer.
They were all well dressed, in suits and ties and carrying
a walkle talkie.
They came in and out quietly and, on one
occasion, brought sweets and toys for the baby, who behaved
very well
with
them because
they let
him
touch
their
revolvers.
The^ told me to prepare clothing for the baby,
since they had decided to take me with them.
I asked them to
let him say goodbye to his father and they did so.
I then saw
my husband with his hands tied with a cable.
I explained to
the child that they were going to take him to his grandmother's
house and I begged them to do so.
I gave them the address of
my mother in El Chaco and her telephone number. Then they took
us away.
They took the money we had in our pockets and any
jewelry they found.
They said that if I was taking any
medicine to bring it with me, and I did so.
I went down in the
elevator with my husband and three of them.
They put
sunglasses on me with paper pasted on the inside of the
lenses.
My husband's hands were tied.
It was 2130 hours.
They took us in separate cars. I was taken in a bright yellow
car.
I sat in the back of the car with one of them.
The ones
in the front seat had not entered the apartment.
They asked,
quietly, why my hands were not tied.
The one in the back
answered: "That's no problem".
While we were driving down the
first streets, I tried to see the road; from Fatriclos, we

-3-

turned on Martin Garcia and then on Almlrante Brown*
Then they
realized 1 was watching the road, so they pressed my head down
on the legs of the one alongside me, and pointed a revolver at
me.
After travelling at high speed for about 20 minutes, we
arrived at our destination* The car stopped and they made me
get out and walk about 30 meters*
Others came and asked why
they did not
bringthe
car In. They answered the lights
weren't working and that the hlghbeams-were on and they were
hot going to enter with
the hlghbeams on.
We entered a
building with a very large door (a garage door, or perhaps,
much bigger).
From the little I was able to see, there was a
very large room with no one in It.
They took me down a spiral
staircase to a basement.
There they told me to close my eyes
and they put a very tight blindfold, with elastic In the back,
on me, which Immediately gave me an Intense headache.
They
handcuffed me and shackled my feet together
by a chain with
padlocks on both shackles.
Thy were very tight and had sharp
edges.
Then they took me to a kind of cell.
The place was
full of these cells.
In other words, they were small rooms
made of pressed board or cardboard, with chairs and a small
desk in them. They left me there for a while, and I could hear
that they were Interrogating my husband in the cell on one
side, but I could not hear what they were saying.
The interrogation and the detention:
I was soon taken to
another room much further away, and they told me to remember
that my number was 103.
After half an hour, someone entered
and asked me whether I was going, to say anything or whether I
preferred to have them take me in.
I said that I knew
absolutely nothing.
They began by asking me my name, I.D.
number, the name of my parents, brothers, and my husband, his
parents and brothers, and the date and place of my birth. They
left and after a while they returned and asked me to tell them
what my husband was doing In C6rdoba.
I answered that, because
of his work as a physician, he had been in contact with
patients whose parents were prisoners, and a short while ago,
they had begun to ask him to help them with money, samples of
milk, etc. and I knew that he had only done that because he
always brought home cans of milk, used clothing, books and
other food for the prison.
Then we decided to move to Buenos
Aires.
At that point In the interrogation, other persons
entered.
They attached no importance to me, and all of them
left.
I began to feel totally exhausted and I slept sitting
up. When they returned, they asked me again for my I.D.
number.
I actually couldn't remember because .1 felt so
.exhausted and I told them so.
Then they left.
After a while,

-4-

I began to hear, coming through one of the walls of pressed
.board, the sound of a lot of running water, and then the cries
of my husband Insulting them and repeatedly calling them
"murderers". This is repeated approximately every hour, or
perhaps less*
Obviously the torture room is next door.
On the
following day
— I . guess—they took me out and led me to a
corridor on the same floor.
My legs are so swollen that the
shackles begin to cut into my skin..' A nurse came who loosens
the shackles and put cotton around my legs'.
A guard asked him
"Why are you doing that?" and the nurse replied "So... we don't
have to treat her afterwards".
He asked me why, I, a doctor,
had gotten into this, and he said he didn't understand how,
with all the money we could earn, we had ended up here.
He
added that if I needed anything to ask to speak with Pedro, the
nurse, since there were other Pedros there.
There were chairs
against the wall on each side, in the passageway, very close to
each other. They told me to close my eyes.
Then they took the
mask off and ordered me to
open,my eyes.
I could not see
anything
because
they
were
taking
photographs
and
the
flashbulbs blinded me.
One of the ones who. had been to my
house approached me and put a hood of thick white cloth over my
head.
He explained that with that hood they would not bother
me.
That was because they were taking people to the torture
room according to the order of their chairs.'. I could see that,
because the door was nearby and every time they took someone
out, the noise of running water and the desperate screams of
pain could be heard, despite the fact that a record player was
constantly playing very loud music.
There were certain songs
that they played more frequently, an^ despite the fact that the
tapes were worn, I could hear the lyrics which went roughly:
"and now what are they? where are they? what are their Ideals?
etc."
I wondered why my legs were so swollen.
I said that I
had a weak heart and therefore bad circulation.
They put
another chair In front of me to put my legs up on.
One asked
me if I recognized his voice, and I said he was one of the ones
who had been at my house.
I asked for my child and he said
"Relax", we have notified your family and they are coming to
get him." Afterwards I noticed that they brought my husband to
the chair alongside me, because I recognized his pants and
shoes.
During the entire time I was there, I heard the same
sound; the loud record player, screams of pain, running water.
The guards wore rubber boots.
I suppose I spent an entire day
and night there because the music was Interrupted twice when
they brought food to the guards and their superiors.
They
drank a lot of wine asking the guards to bring more.
I could
smell the wine.
The Chief came and asked how things were
going.
They answered that three persons had died, two men and

-5-

one woman.
The Chief told them to be more careful because that
was too many for one day. That day they ;took my husband away a
number of times, and I recognized his screams.
Twice I heard
his difficulty breathing and it sounded as though he had
swallowed his tongue.
The music stopped and an urgent call for
the doctor came over the loudspeaker.
I heard people running,
and I heard the doctor say, if they wanted him alive, that was
enough for now, and not to go further.
Then they took me to
one of the rooms.
This time they took off the hood, and I saw
that several of the ones who had' been to my apartment were
there along with one 1 did not know. They now spoke harshly to
me and again asked, me for Information.
A torturer entered
wearing jeans, a red jacket and rubber boots.
He was blond,
with a red face, and he told them "I will give to her". To me
he said:
"All right, I'm in a hurry, tell me whether you know
anything, or I will give you the 6 pointed cattle prod." The
others wanted to hurry me.
I cried and said I was telling the
truth; I knew nothing; I was not a militant; and since I did
not like such things I consciously knew nothing about them.
They asked me what mbney we were living on, and 1 told him
ours.
They took me again to the corridor.
After several
hours, they made many of the people line up, each with his
hands on the shoulders of the person in front of him.
There
were probably about ten of us, and they made us walk, climb
stairs, and then take an elevator. He probably went up about
five floors, and there they made us squat down and told us to
stretch out on a mattress. Alongside of me there was a man who
did not comply well, and they kicked and punched him for about
an hour.
I immediately fell into a deep sleep.
I was
completely exhausted, and I no longer cared what happened to
me.
I was so exhausted that, while they were taking me there
they pawed me and I wasn't even startled.
When I awoke they
served sandwiches. They made me sit up, but I could eat only a
few
mouthfuls.
I continued to sleep, I believe, the entire
day, I cannot be sure.
I woke up in the morning and they were
distributing a little food to each person in turn.
I felt
rested, and tried to find out what was going on.
I heard those
with me calling the guard to go to the bathroom.
I did the
same thing.
Soon one of them made me stand up, and I hit my
head on a beam. I realized that the roof was very low.
In the
bathroom, the guard took off my hood.
He asked me how old I
was, whether I was married, and whether I had any children. He
was a kid about 17 years old.
He was very kind to me and told
me to read what was written on my hood.
The words "possible
release" were written on the cloth in throad.
I asked .what it
meant, and he told me they were going to release me.
I asked
him why I was there, and he said it was a mistake.
His only

-

6

-

job was to'see that the prisoners did not speak, did not take
off their hoods, and those who did so, he could beat at will
until he knocked them out.
He and - the others were taught
karate and self defense.
They were made to read books like
Paplllon and to hate the. prisoners, about whom the only thing
they knew was that they "are enemies of the country, who want
to destroy It, by destroying the army”.
They were kids 15 to
20 years old.
Sometimes they were called kids, but usually
they were called by their first names.'
At night they were
given bottles of wine, and then ttyey became very violent.
This
guard told me that some of them were taken oh raids, and
sometimes they were given special
commendation or merit
awards. They were very proud of that. For example, he told me
that the previous day he has been assigned to go to a house
that someone had denounced.
It answered the description, and
when the owners tried to escape, they had to shoot them:
a
young woman with a child two or three years old.
Later they
learned that the people were not. involved.
He had felt bad
about that, but the persons Who denounced Innocent people were
to blame.
He took me to my place again, and there I continued
to spy.
I could see that It was a large "L" shaped room.
It
was of make-shift construction on the terrace of the building,
since the outer walls were only one meter high.
A peaked roof
came down to there.
Its highest part was in the middle of the
room, which is where the guards go.
In the angle of the. "L"
there is a large table where they eat and a medicine chest and
a small file.
We, were on both sides In sort of pressed board
cubicles about 1 meter high.
The cubicles where I was were
make-shift so I was able to move them carefully. The rectangle
was made up of four separate "L" shaped parts.
I think that
this detail is very important because of what I am going to
tell further on.
That day I realised that they brought someone
to the cubicle oh my left, and I heard him barely complain, as
though he were very 111.
I thought It was my husband.
So I
moved over, displaced one of the walls and changed position (we
were lying on the floor on a mattress ahd a blanket.
That is
all we had).
I managed to see my husband, shirtless, with
marks everywhere from the cattle prod.
I realized that he had
no more than two centimeters In a row of unmarked skin.
He
breathes heavily and asks for "water, water", but his voice is
very weak and It is hard for him to move his tongue so the
words do not come out.
A guard came, and told him not to
bother them, that they could not give him water because if they
did he would die.
They sat us down and gave us a sandwich and
a small bottle of water and a cup of broth.
I hid the small
bottle and, when they caqe back to take It away, they did not
realize it was missing.
Then, carefully watching out for the

-7-

guards, I put my hands through Into my husband's cubicle and
was able to touch him*
I felt that he had a fever*
He tried
to touch my hands* Then I passed the water to him and he drank
it all.
The same thing happened the next day*
A few days
later,, they let him eat and gave him water*
Little by little
he began to recover.
Once when the guards were not watching,
we spoke a little*
He told me he had gone out in a car with
them, telling him that he was going to take them to a
rendezvous near the Italian Hospital.
When they were not
paying attention, he jumped out of the car and a bus ran over
his body.
He succeeded in yelling his name so that people
could notify his family.
They immediately put him back into
the car and when they brought him back they tortured him more
than ever.
He tried to encourage me and told me that he was
very proud of me. Every day of the month I spent there was the
same, stretched out on the mattress and constantly shackled.
Sometimes they took the handcuffs off for a few days, and they
took the hood off permanently.
The electric light was always
on and the music was always playing loudly.
Once a day, after
much begging,
they took me to- the bathroom.
On three
occasions, I was able to take a bath and change into clothing
they gave me.
While I did so, the guards would open the door
whenever they wished.
I had to undress, bathe and dress again
in three minutes.
For the bath they took off our handcuffs,
chain and shackles.
Meals were always the same:
in the
morning, a cup of stew, at noon a meat sandwich and sometimes a
cup of broth, and at night the same.
On some days, one or two
meals were omitted.
I don't know exactly how many people were
there, but I estimate that there were about 50.
The pregnant
women—and there were many of them—were given special meals;
in the morning coffee with milk, at noon and at night, meat
with mashed potatoes, and in the evening coffee with milk.
Sometimes they were given vitamins.
Every day the guards
punished two or three persons.
They did so for any reason;
because they removed their hoods while they were sleeping,
because they were not lying right; It because the guards
suspected them of spying; or for any other reason. The
punishments consisted of kicks and punches for hours until they
were left unconclous.
The panic is constant.
Only once was
the situation reversed:
the lights went out and the guards
were frightened and rushed out.
Then they realized how
ridiculously they were behaving and they returned, with their
weapons in their hands, saying: "Everybody quiet, don't move";
but even their voices were trembling.
Another time, the lights
went out—It must have been about December 20th—and we' could
hear troops marching past.
In the first days they called roll,
asking for the name and number of each person.
My husband was
on one side of me, with the number 104.
I was number 103; at

8-

-

my other side was number 102, a lawyer !whom they had taken from
his office in the Palermo area the same day. they took us.
I
could see him as well as I could see my husband: he was
olive-skinned, had black wavy hair and a beard and was of
average build. He wore a mask. Later I overhead that he was a
veterinarian, and that his sister, a teacher who had been
brought in a month before, had—according to what I've heard—
recently married a widower with children.
They were going to
hold her until her brothers appeared and she did not know where
they werd.
They took her from the room a few days before I
left, and I suppose they released her.
They called one of the
prisoners "peg-leg."
He was very near me, and 'by his voice
seemed to be an older person and very weak.
One night the
guards got drunk and began to bet that they could make him
stand on his peg-leg.
They brought him into the middle of the
room and ordered him to do it.
He begged them, said it was
impossible, that he was going to fall. Then they began to kick
him, punch him, and they stood him up.
Of course, he fell.
They stood him up ajgaln, he fell again, and so on, throughout
the night.
It was a most macabre spectacle.
The guards went
crazy, they beat him without interruption and the poor man was
begging them to stop.
There was the sound of blows to the
lungs, the abdomen, the noise of broken bones.
They stopped
when he fell unconscious.
Afterwards he was delirious for two
or three days until they called the doctor. The doctor said he
had many broken bones and ordered him to be taken away.
I
didn't hear him again.
In early December, a transfer occured.
Apparently they were taking away those who had been there the
longest; however, they included among them the lawyer who was
next to me; in all, some 40 persons.
They adjusted the
handcuffs, the shackles and the hoods.
They assembled them
together, were taking them out when the noise of an airplane
was heard that seemed to be landing nearby.
(I shall explain
that the sound of airplanes was very frequent.
I also heard a
train, and a helicopter, two or three times every day).
After
a time, the sound of an airplane was heard again, then nothing
more.
A guard asked another where they were being taken, and
he answered: "Fishfood". They were very few people left in the
room, and they changed our places. Fortunately, my husband and
I continued to be next to each other with the same consecutive
numbers.
But I shall explain that there were three or four
with the number 100, others with 400, 700, 900, etc.
On the
following day, they began to bring in a large number of new
people and this continued for succeslve days, until they had to
put us on the floor, in the guard's passageway.
Many of them
were taken out at night and were ordered to get dressed.

-9-

Apparently they were released* Also, when It rained very hard,
(I heard the rain In spite of the noise because the roof was
over our heads) they took, out people to release them.
They
were careful to have the people well dressed and, In the case
of women, to tie them up as much as possible*
I could not see
my husband now, nor speak to him because my new cubicle was
completely made of wood.
However, he made friends with an
occasional guard-—that Is, one who,did not work there but came
to fill In because many of them were on vacation.
The boy was
really very good, and taking a risk himself, he took us to the
bathroom and let us speak to each other without hoods.
Of
course he was present, so that we could only speak about
ourselves. My husband'had a very small hematoma but the doctor
said that the dislocation was not going to be set because a
general anesthesia would be needed to relax the muscles and
that could not be done' there.
To do that he would have to- be
transferred, and transfer was impossible.
He explained that
the nurse came by evjpry two or three days, but never touched
anyone; however,
they usually gave some medicine, mostly
laxatives, antlspamodlcs and eyedrops, because we all had
conjunctivitis because of the hood and the mask.
The guards
had the eyedrops; sometimes when somebody said that he needed
them, the guard himself Inserted the drops.
I began to feel
bad.
I had nightmares about my son every night because despite
their having told me that my parents had him, I did not believe
them.
All of this was due to the fact that they had taken off
the white hood and given me a gray one like all the others.
Also, because of the time that had elapsed. I realized that
there was very little possibility that they would release me,
because the ones* they released only stayed a very short time.
I mentioned this to my husband, and he always tried to
encourage me.
I spent the day thinking about how to get out, I
began by trying to get to know the place, telling the guard who
took me to the bathroom that with the little water they give us
we were dying of thirst (which was true) and I offered to carry
the bottles as often as necessary and to do any kind of work,
cleaning, etc.
I said that from lying down so much I was
beginning to feel weak, and I was afraid that I would not be
able to walk when they took me to my house the following week
(that was pure fabrication).
The guard began to take me to
wash the dishes, to the bathroom, and let me go without
handcuffs, to carry water bottles, to clean up the bathrooms.
Some of the trays and dishes had the seal of the Argentine
Army.
So the days passed.
There were no windows In the
bathroom, but there was a door locked with a key, which was the
guard's closet.
1 found It opened one day, and I saw the
guard's civilian clothing and that the closet had a window

10

-

-

cove red with a blanket.
I lifted the blanket and saw thick
grass and a heavy metal screen outside of it.
I could see many
tall trees, and at the end, high woven wire, a pick-up truck
and a kind of garage.
It would be possible to escape by
breaking the window and cutting the metal screen.
We were not
very high up, surely the fourth or fifth floor.
Blankets would
be needed to climb down.
But was the woven wire electrified?
And what lay beyond? I could not see.
Furthermore, we had to
take our chains off.
They they took us to bathe, they unlocked
the padlock with a master key that the chief of the guards had;
he gave it to them only on those occasions.
I realized that my
husband was very weak because of everything that had happened,
and that he also had a dislocated shoulder.
However, it would
be a question of giving it more thought.
One day, while I was
washing the plates, they took me to wash diapers and rubber
pants.
This Impressed me
very much because I realized that
there were children on the other, side from where we were.
At
that time I heard the voice of children about 4 years of ages,
asking the guards why their fathers had those things on their
heads..
I asked the guard how it was possible for children to
be there.
He said that they were the only ones and that they
had been brought with their parents because there was no place
to leave them.
However, they were going to be taken away the
next day. Another day I was taken to the linen room to arrange
the clothing they were taking to the laundry, by sex and size.
Again I saw children's .clothing in those places, I heard the
voices of women who were working in the kitchen and sewing torn
clothing.
When the guards finished their shifts, they said
that they were going to the swimming pool.
One day they took
me down to one of the boxes. They took off my hood and left me
alone for a moment.
I looked at the walls of the box and was
impressed by the number of bloodstains.
Some of them were very
high.
I don't know how they' did it but since the stains are
very large and there are small splattered stains around
them-monstruous.
He came back and told me to talk to him about
something.
I told him that I did not know anything and that
the only thing I was thinking about at that time was my husband
and my child; that I had nightmares about my son and that if
they did not release me, I would take off my hood and that I
knew very well that that meant that the guards would kill me;
that they should release me, that I did not know why they were
keeping me there.
He told me that it was very likely that I
would leave.
They told a guard to take me upstairs again.
On
one occasion when the guard was not watching, I told my husband
that I would probably leave and that he should be on the
lookout for times When the guards were not watching so that we
could talk.
But there were watching us, especially from that

-

11-

night until the time of my departure* -The following night, the
Chief guard came, told me to sit up; he handcuffed my hands
behind me*
They picked up my mattress and searched my
cubicle*
They felt my breasts and between my legs; they shoved
me around and moved me to another cubicle* During the previous
interrogation, I had
been told, that, while they knew that I
had not taken part in the activities that led to my arrest,
considerable time had passed since my arrival at the place of
detention, and under such circumstances, I could not leave.
I
■ told them that they could not commit another injustice added to
the injustice of my arbitrary detention, and after an exchange
of opinions among themselves, they proceeded, to interrogate me
exhaustively on all the circumstances that- I might have
observed during my detention*
Thus, I was Interrogated on what
my
opinion
was
about
the
treatment
the
prisoners
were
receiving, whether I felt that they were tortured there,
whether I had-any idea of where I-was, and under what security
authority the procedure there were conducted*
To all of these
questions I answered; that I was totally ignorant of the details
they were asking of me, and that I felt the treatment was
adequate*
They
asked me what I knew of my husband and I
answered that I knew that he was alive, that I had recognized
his voice when he ■ spoke with the guards, and I denied that I
had seen him.
I was led again to my usual place where the
guards handcuffed my hands behind me, and they watched very
closely to see whether I tried to communicate with my husband*
That evening, they sent me to bathe and to change my clothes.
The one who told me that I was go^ng to be released appeared
and told me that I was going to Reslstencia, to my mother's
house.
He was so drunk that he threatened me and they
handcuffed my hands behind me and sent me to a cubicle* On one
side was a girl having an asthma attack and she was also
handcuffed with her hands behind her*
She was frantic because
with the hood she was choking even more.
She had an oxygen
mask beside her, but with her hands tied she could not put in
on and she asked the guards to do it*
They didn't listen to
her.
After a while, they got me up and took off my handcuffs
and shackles.
The drunk guard came and took me downstairs.
Soon I realized from the fresh air that I was outside.
A car
approached and they put me in it.
It was raining.
They put me
in the front seat. The car went round and round many times. I
suppose it was going around in the park of the same building
because I- noticed that the road was muddy and the car was
skidding from side to side.
Also, it seemed to me that it was
turning in the same places. This went on for a while. Then we
went on to an asphalt road and drove for several hours until
they took off the mask that they had put on me to replace the
hood before we left.
We were on General Paz Street.
I was

12-

-

__

alone with, the drunken guard. He- told me that I was completely
free but not to communicate with my In**laws, never to go to
C6rdoba, and not to come out In Buenos Aires for several months.
He repeated that all of my movements were going to be
carefully watched and to remember that they still had my
husband.
I told him that I was going to leave the country, and
he told me not to, to let a long time pass; otherwise I would
have problems.
It was 5 o'clock In the morning of December 24,
1977.
He gave me a document, a’Federal Police I.D., with one
of the photos they'd taken of me, but with a number other than
my real one, and a forged■signature.. He told me.to burn It as
soon as I reached El Chaco and to get a duplicate of my real
I.D.
He gave me three million pesos, told me to go to the
Austral window, and said that I had passage reserved In the
name of Mrs. Ramos; that If there was no room they were going
to take me in the pilot's cabin and that I should buy my son a
cart for Christmas,
He left me at the airport entrance*
My
plane left at 9.20 pm.
I realized that there were two men, an
18 year-old youth and a man around 40, who watched me until the
airplane took off.
In El Chaco there were almost always
several pairs in cars along the street of my mother's house and
I never noticed anyone following me.
Although I hardly went
out of doors for months.
After my release I lived at my house In El Chaco.
When I
went to the police headquarters to arrange for my passport, I
was told after lengthy proceedings and psychological harassment
that they had received' a denunciation of my disappearance.
When they asked who had made it, I replied that It was my
mother.
Then they made me sign <a statement that I had been
absent from my home voluntarily and for private reasons.
After
signing the statement, I was issued a passport with the
warning:
"With this record, you can't leave the country unless
you sign this statement.”

At its 46th session, the IACHR approved a resolution on this case.
The
government, in a note dated October 8, 1979, presented its observations
denying any responsibility for the facts denounced.

The Commission undertook a study of the resolution it had adopted, In
view of the fact that the Argentine Government, In its request for a
reconsideration, had submitted new evidence.
It decided however, to maintain
all of the above-mentioned Resolution, having found no evidence to discredit
the allegation made by the claimant.

OAS, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights In Argentina, 11 April
19&0, pp. 75-84 (English edition).

2^0

I) E N T I A

l*****##E

COPY

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
UTS083
BE RUESBA #7776/1 2701915
0 R 261841Z SEP 80
FM AMSMSASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6907
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA 3683
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: AH, SHUM
SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR ARGENTINA
REFs STATE 224684
FOLLOWING IS DRAFT ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
FOR ARGENTINA: 1
............. .—•
BEGIN TEXT:
OVER THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE TEARS ARGENTINA HAS PASSED THROUGH
SEVERAL CYCLES OF ALTERNATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY RULE j
SINCE 1955, THERE HAVE BEEN SIX MILITARY AND SIX CIVILIAN
PRESIDENTS. BEGINNING IN 1969, VIOLENCE MOUNTED PROGRESSIVELY
FROM THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT AS GROUPS WITH WIDELY DIFFERENT
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTIONS STRUGGLED FOR POWER.
AS A RESULT, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAVE
MAINTAINED A "STATE OF SIEGE" FOR SOME NINE OF THE PAST TEN
YEARS. AT THE HEIGHT OF THIS VIOLENCE IN 1975-1976, TERRORISM
HAD TAKEN ON BROAD DIMENSIONS: BOMBINGS, ROBBERIES,
KIDNAPPINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS WERE
COMMON OCCURRENCES. ORGANIZED TERRORIST GROUPS ON BOTH
SIDES OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM NUMBERED SOME 5,000-6,000
PERSONS, WITH SYMPATHIZERS ESTIMATED AT AN ADDITIONAL
15,000.
BY 1976 THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA HAD DETERIORATED
SHARPLY. COURTS AND POLITICAL LEADERS WERE BEING INTIMI­
DATED* INFLATION APPROACHED 800 PERCENT AND MANY ESSENTIAL
PUBLIC SERVICES HAD BEEN DISRUPTED. AT THIS POINT, THE
ARMED FORCES AGAIN TOOK CONTROL OF THE STATE, WITH THE
AVOWED GOALS OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ENDING
TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION. THEY PROMISED THAT DEMOCRACY
WOULD ULTIMATELY 3E RESTORED. THE ARMED FORCES MAINTAINED
THE STATE OF SIEGE IMPOSED IN 1974 BY PRESIDENT MARIA

i/J
0
H «
i T7>
i

Q

a

cS-j "r

w‘8 9

33J 3
Q1U"j\■'V
Q

S'

'C!

at**#*'#****#***# *vhsr COMMENT ###**#>!«##*#*#**
EOB:MOLAND,THORN
PSN:039411

PAGE 01

TOR:270/21:43Z
ONFITTENT I—A

DTG:?61841Z SEP 9?

l**#****®

COPY

*******0-^0- NFIDENTI A—t*******E COPY
ESTELA PERON, CLOSED CONGRESS, DEPOSED THE PRESIDENT, AND
REPLACED ALL MEMBERS OP THE SUPREME COURT. ELECTED STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS WERE REPLACED BY MILITARY
OFFICERS, AND POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE
EIGHT OF ASSEMBLY, WERE PROHIBITED. MOST TRADE UNIONS WERE
"INTERVENED," AND ALL STRIKES WERE BANNED. '
THE SECURITY FORCES EMBARKED ON A WIDESPREAD COUNTERCAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AIMED AT TERRORISTS AS WELL AS
ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY THEY CONSIDERED SUBVERSIVE?
MANY KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, AS WELL AS MANY
PERSONS WITH NO SUBVERSIVE RECORD, DISAPPEARED. CONDITIONS
OF DETENTION WERE OFTEN CRUEL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT
ASSETTS THAT TORTURE WAS NEVER AUTHORIZED, THERE ARE MANY
REPORTS THAT IT WAS EMPLOYED DURING PRELIMINARY DETENTION.
MANY OTHERS WERE DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE WITHOUT ANY
SPECIFIC CHARGE UNDER THE "STATE OF SIEGE . POWERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
BY 1978 SPOKESMEN FOR THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED TEAT TEE
WAR ON TERRORISM HAD BEEN WON. AS DESCRIBED IN LAST YEAR'S
REPORT, 1979 SAW IMPORTANT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE REDUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. IN 1980 THE
TRENDS ESTABLISHED THE YEAR BEFORE CONTINUED AS THE HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION IMPROVED, BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN:
— ELEVEN CASES OF DISAPPEARANCES WERE REGISTERED IN
ARGENTINA? HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ASSERT THAT THE TOTAL MAY
BE CLOSER TO 22. IN CONTRAST, DISAPPEARANCES NUMBERED
MANY THOUSANDS IN 1976 AND 1977, OVER 600 I'N 1978, AND 44
IN 1979. THE BULK OF THE DISAPPEARED LAST YEAR SEEMINGLY
INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS AND WHO MAY HAVE ENTERED THE COUNTRY CLAN­
DESTINELY.
— THE NUMBER OF DETAINEES HAS BEEN REDUCED. EIGHT
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DETAINED UNDER THE
SPECIAL EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT SINCE 1974.
ABOUT 1,800 PRISONERS ACCUSED OF OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMES
BT

PSN:039411

PAGE 32

OF 02

TOR:270/21:43Z

aitafcaicakafc&afcfi amtittiumwt

a

t

.

DTG:261841Z SEP 80

afcakafcakalcsiejirP

r>nnv

f) M y

212

r, e i>[

t

r a

t

x******»t:

COPY

OP IMMED
STU009
DE RUESBA #7776 2701903
0 261841Z SEP 80
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6908
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA 3684
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
REMAINED IN DETENTION AT THE END OF 1980. ABOUT 750
WERE BEING HELD EITHER WITHOUT TRIAL, SOME FOR MANY
YEARS, OR AFTER SERVING THEIR SENTENCES. ABOUT 600
HAD BEEN TRIED AND CONVICTED IN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN
COURTS. ANOTHER 400 WERE IN TRIAL STATUS.
— UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SUPREME COURT, HE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM HAS INCHESIN6LY ASSERTED ITSELF. THE
SUPREME COURT HAS, IN EFFECT, ORDERED LOWER COURTS TO
INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES. HOWEVER, THE COURTS HAVE NOT
YET BEEN ABLE TO CLARIFY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANY OF THE
MANY DISAPPEARANCES BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION.
— TERRORISTS REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO'REINFILTRATE THE
COUNTRY BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THE FACE OF ACTION 3Y
THE SECURITY FORCES. THERE WERE NO NEW MAJOR TERRORIST
INCIDENTS IN THE COUNTRY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE MONTONEROS IN 1980.
— PRISON CONDITIONS IMPROVED. COMPLAINTS IN THE PAST
FOCUSED MOST HEAVILY ON OVERCROWDING, LACK OF MEDICAL
TREATMENT, INADEQUATE FOOD, AND RESTRICTIONS ON VISITS.
TODAY, SUCH CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY RELIEVED
AND SUCH CONCERN AS IS EXPRESSED FOCUSES ESPECIALLY ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS, PARTICULARLY ARBITRARY USE OF
AUTHORITY BY GUARDS.
— THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL
LIBERTIES EXPANDED THOUGH FREEDOM REMAINS CIRCUMSCRIBED
BY THE PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND DE FACTO
LIMITS ON THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. WITHIN UNCERTAIN
LIMITS POLITICIANS AND THE PRESS INCREASINGLY VOICED
CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AND PLANS. OCCASIONALLY
POLITICIANS WERE DETAINED ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THEY HAD OVERSTEPPED THE LIMITS OF THE LAW.
— THE MILITARY DESIGNATED THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PERIOD

PSN:039418

TOR:270/21:50Z

PAGE 01
********

f\

»1

n

r

*n

n

t

*

•*

DTG:261841Z SEP 80

JUJU J..I.IUJ.

»»«****c 0 N ? I D E 'N Tl A i»******E COPY
1981-84 WHILE REITERATING- ITS COMMITMENT TO RETURN THE
COUNTRY EVENTUALLY TO CIVILIAN RULE. NO DATE HAS BEEN
FIXED FOR THAT DEVOLUTION. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED A
FORMAL DIALOGUE WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AS PART OF THE PROCESS
THAT IS INTENDED TO LEAD TO THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY.
AT THE INVITATION OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, THE INTERAMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISITED ARGENTINA IN
SEPTEMBER 1979, TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. IN
ITS FINAL REPORT THE COMMISSION RECORDED A' PAST PATTERN
OF VIDE SCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND MADE AN EXTENSIVE
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES FOR
CORRECTING THE SITUATION.
ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS REMAIN ACTIVE AND WELL
ORGANIZED. THOUGH OCCASIONAL HARASSMENT CONTINUED, IT
VAS AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN IN THE PAST.
1. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING
FREEDOM FROM:
A. TORTURE
THERE HAVE BEEN FEW REPORTS FROM PEOPLE DETAINED
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS DURING 1990. EXISTING
REPORTS SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT
CONTINUES TO BE USED AS PART OF THE INTERROGATION OF
SUCH DETAINEES. IN THE PAST TESTIMONY FROM FORMER
DETAINEES INDICATES THAT MISTREATMENT TOOK THE FORM OF
ELECTRIC SHOCK, IMMERSION OF'HEAD IN WATER, MOCK
EXECUTIONS, SEVERE BEATINGS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE. MOST
OBSERVERS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH TREATMENT CONTINUES
TO BE METED OUT TO NEWLY DISAPPEARED INDIVIDUALS. THE
ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS TORTURE AND THE GOVERNMENT
HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT HAS NEVER AUTHORIZED ITS USE.
B. CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PUNISHMENT.
IN APRIL, 1979, THE GOVERNMENT DECREED UNIFORM PRISON
REGULATIONS WHICH HAVE LED TO A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN
PRISON CONDITIONS. WHILE CONDITIONS REPORTEDLY IMPROVED
SIGNIFICANTLY FOR A TIME AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE,
THEY AGAIN DETERIORATED IN SOME RESPECTS THEREAFTER. IN
MAY, 1980, A NEW DECREE WAS ISSUED AIMED AT UNIFORMLY IMPROV­
ING CONDITIONS, PARTICULARLY ARBITRARY USE OF AUTHORITY,
AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT, ACCESS TO READING MATERIAL,
WORK AND EXERCISE. INITIAL REPORTS SUGGEST THERE HAS BEEN AN
IMPROVEMENT IN THESE AREAS SINCE MAY. HOWEVER, HUMAN
RIGHTS GROUPS REMAIN CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE
BT

PSN:03941S

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:270/21:50Z
D E N T I

DTG:261841Z SEP 80

r-L*******E

COPY

213

*******0^-3- N F

~1

D U N T I A L*******E COPT

OP IMMED
STU019
PE RUESBA #7776 2701916
0 261841Z SEP 80
EM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6909
INFO AMEMBASST LIMA 3685
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 3 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING PRISONERS. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS MAINTAINS A
REGULAR PROGRAM OF PRISON VISITS.
C. DISAPPEARANCES
THE ARGENTINE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAS
RECORDED ELEVEN REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE VICTIM WAS PROBABLY TAKEN BY THE
SECURITY FORCES. THERE ARE REPORTS BY HUMAN RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS ASSERTING THAT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE PEOPLE
DISAPPEARED — PERHAPS TOTALING AS MANY AS 22. MOST
QUALIFIED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL OF THE PEOPLE
WHO DISAPPEARED HAD ACTIVE LINKS TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
SOME OF THE DISAPPEARED SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED WHILE
SEEKING TO ENTER THE COUNTRY, WHILE OTHERS-HAD ENTERED OR
WERE LIVING IN THE COUNTRY CLANDESTINELY. AT THE SAME TIME,
THERE WERE A FEW INSTANCES OF FORMER TERRORISTS WHO AFTER
CAPTURE WERE PLACED BEFORE THE COURTS, WHEN IN THE PAST
SUCH PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE SIMPLY DISAPPEARED. AS A RULE,
HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT CAPTURED TERRORISTS ARE NOT
BEING BROUGHT TO A A PROPER TRIAL BEFORE EITHER MILITARY OR
CIVILIAN COURTS.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A WIDELY PUBLICIZED ALLEGED ABDUCTION
AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINES IN LIMA, REMAIN OBSCURE.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
CHARGE THAT ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES PARTICIPATED IN
THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION IN PERU. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
HAS STATED THAT THE THREE WERE MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS
BUT HAS DENIED ANY ROLE IN THEIR DISAPPEARANCE, POINTING
TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE BODY OF ONE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS
IN A MADRID APARTMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGESTING THAT SHE
WAS LIVING THERE AFTER HER REPORTED DISAPPEARANCE.

PSN:039424

TOR:270/21:55Z

PAGE 01

!

d

jji-N

ip

DTG:?61841Z SEP 90
copy

*******E N T I Ar-E*******E COPY
TO DATE THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO PROVIDE AN
ACCOUNTING OF THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE WHO ALLEGEDLY DIS­
APPEARED IN THE PAST. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE SUGGESTED
THAT THE BULK OF THE DISAPPEARED ARE DEAD. BASING THEIR
CONCLUSION ON THE STATEMENTS OF FORMER DETAINEEES WHO REPORT
THAT MOST OF THEIR FELLOWS ARE EXECUTED AS-WELL AS THE
DEARTH OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY, MOST
OBSERVERS HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THE GREAT BULK OF THE DIS­
APPEARED ARE INDEED DEAD. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH
THIS WITH CERTAINTY, HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE.
D. ARBITRARY ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT.
THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE 23, ESTABLISHES
THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DETAIN AND HOLD
PRISONERS UNDER A "STATE OF SIEGE" (WHICH HAS BEEN IN
EFFECT SINCE 1974). THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE
REFERRED TO AS THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER ( PEN
FOR THE SPANISH WORDS PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL). THE
EXECUTIVE HAS INTERPRETED THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PLACES
NO EXPLICIT TIME LIMIT ON THE DURATION OF THE PEN
DETENTION, AS MEANING IT CAN HOLD PRISONERS UNDER THE
PEN POWERS INDEFINITELY. THE SUPREME COURT, OVERRULING A
NUMBER OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS, HAS UPHELD THIS VIEW,
ACCEPTING BRAOD AND UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES OF ASSOCIATION
WITH SUBVERSION AS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR DETENTION. SOME
PEN PRISONERS HAVE BEEN IN JAIL WITHOUT CHARGE FOR SEVERAL
YEARS — INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER DETAINED BEFORE 1976.
IN 1980 THE GOVERNMENT REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEN PRISONERS
TO ABOUT 1,200, FREEING SOME, BRINGING SOME TO TRIAL, EX­
PELLING OTHERS, AND PLACING OTHERS ON SUPERVISED LIBERTY.
APPROXIMATELY 750 PEN PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD WITHOUT
TRIAL, SENTENCING OR AFTER SERVING SENTENCE. THE REMAINDER
ARE EITHER IN TRIAL STATUS, OR SERVING SENTENCES AFTER
MILITARY OR CIVILIAN TRIALS. IN ADDITION TO THE PEN
PRISONERS, APPROXIMATELY 600 INDIVIDUALS ARE IN JAIL ON
OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMINAL CHARGES. THUS THE TOTAL PRISON
POPULATION OF OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMINALS IS APPROXIMATELY1,800 COMPARED TO THE APPROXIMATELY 8,400 THAT WERE
ARRESTED ON SUCH CHARGES SINCE 1974.
A 1979 GOVERNMENT LAW SHORTENING THE PERIOD FOR COURT
FiNDING OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH HAS ALLEVIATED SOME PERSONAL
HARDSHIPS IN LEGAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS FOR THE SURVIVORS
OF THE DISAPPEARED. THE LAW DREW SHARP CRITICISM FROM
ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, RELATIVES AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BECAUSE OF FEARS THE GOVERNMENT
BT .

PSN:039424

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:270/21:55Z

DTG:261841Z SEP 90

*******COPY

214
«

*******n n

7-x T E N m T A

t.*******tt.

COPY

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
UTS984
DE RUESBA #7776/4 2701935
0 R 261341Z SEP 80
EM AMEM3ASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5310
INEO AMEMBASSY LIMA 3686
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 4 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
WOULD MISUSE IT TO ARBITRARILY CLOSE THE CASES OF DIS­
APPEARANCES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS THAT THE LAW WAS
IN FACT ABUSED BY THE AUTHORITIES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW
RESTRICTED THE TERMS OF THE LAW IN A WAY WHICH EXPLICITLY
SHOULD EXCLUDE ITS POSSIBLE MISUSE.
E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL"
THE TRIAL OF THOSE ACCUSED OF SUBVERSION OR TERRORISM
MAY BE HELD IN CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COURT. CIVILIAN
COURTS FOLLOW THE CUSTOMARY LEGAL PROVISIONS REGARDING
OPEN AND FAIR TRIALS. ARGENTINA LAW, HOWEVER, REQUIRES
WRITTEN RATHER THAN ORAL TESTIMONY, SO TEAT OPEN" HAS A
DIFFERENT MEANING AND DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES FROM THOSF
IN OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS. THE LAW PROVIDES THAT THE CIVILIAN
COURTS ARE INDEPENDENT. MILITARY TRIBUNALS, BEFORE WHICH
CIVILIANS MAY BE TRIED, CONDUCT THEIR PROCEEDINGS IN
SECRET. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE ACCESS ONLY TO A MILITARY
DEFENSE COUNSEL WHO IS USUALLY NOT A LAWYER. DEFENDANTS
LEGALLY MAY BE KEPT UNAWARE OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM,
IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROCEEDINGS.
ALTHOUGH USED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS, THE SYSTEM OF
MILITARY TRIBUNALS USUALLY DOES NOT NOW DEAL
WITH NEWLY CAPTURED TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORTERS.
LAWYERS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN RELUCTANT TO ASSUME THE
CASES OF PEOPLE CHARGED WITH TERRORISM OR SUBVERSION FEAR­
ING HARASSMENT OR REPRISALS. THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
ASSOCIATION FOLLOWING ITS VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN APRIL
1979 CONCLUDED THAT IN 1975-1978 SOME LAWYERS DISAPPEARED
OR WERE DETAINED IF THEY DEFENDED CLIENTS OR CAUSES UN­
POPULAR WITH THE GOVERNMENT. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, NO
LAWYERS DISAPPEARED OR WERE DETAINED FOR SUCH REASONS,
AND IT APPEARS THAT THE PROFESSION IS OPERATING MORE

PSN:039431

TOR:270/21:57Z

PAGE 01
»»*****^

q n-t-t

DENT

DTG:261341Z SEP 8£
COPY

p J p-g N T I . jrH*******E COPY
SECURELY THAN IN THE PAST.
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COURTS IS ESTABLISHED IN THE
CONSTITUTION. IN 1976 HOWEVER, THE JUNTA REPLACED ALL
MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND REMOVED A NUMBER OF
JUDGES IN LOWER COURTS, THOUGH MOST WERE RETAINED. SOMEOBSERVERS HAVE ASSERTED THAT THESE CHANGES.COUPLED WITH
THE PRESSURES INVOLVED IN TRIALS OF SUBVERSIVES -AND
TERRORISTS MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE COURTS TO MAINTAIN
THEIR INDEPENDENCE. INDEED, THE COURTS HAVE OFTEN UP­
HELD EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF LAWS OF THE CONSTITUTION?
AND THEY HAVE NOT SUCCESSFULLY CLARIFIED THE
FATE OF ANY OF THE DISAPPEARANCES BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTEN­
TION. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHEN THE COURTS
SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTER­
PRETATIONS OF ITS POWERS. THE MOST CELEBRATED OF THESE
CASES TOOK PLACE IN 1979 AND INVOLVED THE SUPREME COURT
ORDERING THE JUNTA TO RELEASE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER JACOBO
TIMERMAN. IN 1980 THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE COURTS TO
FULLY INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES WHEN THERE IS EVIDENCE
SUGGESTING GOVERNMENT FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.
F. INVASION OF THE HOME.
THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN PRO­
TECTED BY ARGENTINE LAW, CUSTOM AND PRACTICE. THE SECURITY
FORCES, HOWEVER, HAVE OFTEN VIOLATED SUCH SANCTITY DURING
THEIR ANTI-TERRORIST AND ANTI-SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS.
THOUGH THE NUMBER APPEARS TO HAVE DROPPED OFF SHARPLY
DURING 1980, AVAILABLE INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT VIOLATION
OF THE HOME'S SANCTITY WAS EMPLOYED ON SOME OCCASIONS.
2. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD THE FULFILLMENT OF SUCH
VITAL NEEDS AS FOOD, SHELTER, HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION:
ARGENTINA IS ONE OF THE MOST DEVELOPED OF THE NATIONS
IN LATIN AMERICA. ITS STANDARD OF LIVING IS HIGH. IN
1978 PER CAPITA INCOME IN CURRENT DOLLARS WAS $2,331 AND
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS HAVE—WITHIN THE ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
OF RECENT YEARS—SOUGHT TO CONFRONT SOCIAL NEEDS. INFANT
MORTALITY IN 1970-79 WAS 5^ PER 1,000 BIRTHS. IN
1977 93PCT OF THE ADULT POPULATION WAS LITERATE. OFFICIAL
UNEMPLOYMENT IN ARGENTINA WAS ONLY 2.0PCT IN 1980 BUT SOME
OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A HIGHER LEVEL OF HIDDEN
UNEMPLOYMENT. THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME HAS BECOME
LESS EQUAL IN RECENT YEARS, IN PART AS A RESULT OF GOVERN­
MENT POLICIES DESIGNED TO REDUCE INFLATION AND REVITALIZE
THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVE SECTOR. TOWARD THAT END, THE
GOVERNMENT HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO OPEN THE ECONOMY TO
BT

PSN:0394=31

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:270/21:57Z

DTG:261841Z SEP 30

j—j- DENT I—A-It*******E COPY

215

»»«»»»»p

n

M T?

T_B. Til M

*P

T -A

T.*******?.

COPY

OP IMMED
UTS955
DE RUESBA #7776 2701930
0 261841Z SEP 80
EM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6911
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA 3687
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 5 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
EXTERNAL COMPETITION BY LOWERING TARIFF PROTECTION, RE­
DUCING SUBSIDIES, AND LIMITING STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE
ECONOMY. INFLATION, HOWEVER, IS STILL HIGH, RUNNING AT
ABOUT 75 PCT FOR THE YEAR.
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND TRANSACTION IS A RIGHT OF THE
CITIZENS. THE TAX SYSTEM IS PROGRESSIVE AND TAX COLLEC­
TIONS ARE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE, THOUGH COMPLIANCE RE­
MAINS A PROBLEM.
EDUCATION HAS BEEN FREE AND IS WIDELY AVAILABLE, THOUGH
THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW MOVING TO REQUIRE TUITION FOR
UNIVERSITY-LEVEL EDUCATION. HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS ACCOUNT
FOR A MAJOR SHARE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET. GOVERNMENT,
PRIVATE AND TRADE UNION MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS MAKE TREAT­
MENT AVAILABLE AND AFFORDABLE TO MOST OF THE POPULATION.
THERE IS A SERIOUS HOUSING DEFICIT IN ARGENTINA, MOST OF
IT ATTRIBUTABLE TO NOW DEFUNCT LEGISLATION THAT SUSTAINED
RENT CONTROL GUIDELINES.
3. RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:
A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY
IN 1980 THE MARGIN FOR EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY, PROVIDED FOR BY THE ARGENTINE CON­
STITUTION, EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY. IN EARLIER YEARS
THE CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION MADE MANY
ARGENTINES FEARFUL OF ASSERTING THESE FREEDOMS. THE
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY FOR POLITICAL GROUPS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED
SINCE MARCH 1976, AND MARXIST PARTIES TO THE LEFT OF THE COMMUNISTS
BANNED.
THE PRESS IS NOT SUBJECT TO PRIOR OFFICIAL CENSORSHIP FOR
POLITICAL — AS OPPOSED TO MORAL — CONTENT. GOVERNMENT
IMPOSED GUIDELINES AND SELF-CENSORSHIP DO PLAY AN IMPORTANT

PSN:039434

PAGE 01

TOR:270/21:59Z

DTG:261841Z SS?

»»»#»»»r~D~T~# T I A IhL$*****E COPY

*******o-jq—»mp—r u

e~~n t-i—&--4A*^*ie***E copy

ROLE. NEWSPAPERS, HOWEVER, ACTIVELY CRITICIZE' THE GOVERNMENT
AND REPORT THE REMARKS OF OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. COVERAGE
OF SUCH SENSITIVE ISSUES AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DISAPPEARANCES
INCREASED OVER THE COURSE OF 193*. MOST FOREIGN PULICATIONS ENTER
ARGENTINA WITHOUT CENSORSHIP ALTHOUGH OCCASIONALLY SOME ISSUES
ARE CENSORED FOR POLITICAL OR MORAL REASONS.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS TOLERATED A LOW LEVEL OF ORGANIZED POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES BY ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES.
PARTY LEADERS MEET AND PUBLICLY CRITICIZE THE CONTINUATION
OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND
ACTIONS INCLUDING 50TH THE FCONOMIC SITUATION AND SUCH
SENSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AS ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIS­
APPEARED. ON OCCASION INFORMAL MEETINGS OF PARTY LEADERS
ARE PROHIBITED OR SOMETIMES DISRUPTED BY THE POLICE AND
THE PARTICIPANTS DETAINED, USUALLY FOP BRIEF PERIODS.'
POLITICAL LEADERS STILL RISK ARREST IF THEY OVERSTEP THE
UNCERTAIN AND UNDEFINED BOUNDS OF PERMITTED POLITICAL ACTIVITY
AND STATEMENTS.
THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE PRESIDENT
BE A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND THF MAJORITY OF
ARGENTINES PROFESS THIS FAITH. OTHER RELIGIONS ARE
REQUIRED TO REGISTER WITH THE'GOVERNMENT? ALL BUT THE
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ARE PERMITTED TO FUNCTION, AND
THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS, INCLUD­
ING A 300,000-4=50,000 MEMBER JEWISH COMMUNITY.
THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY CONDEMNS RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE.
ARGENTINE JEWS HAVE WELL DEVELOPED COMMUNITY ORGANIZA­
TIONS, EXERCISE THEIR RELIGION WITHOUT RESTRAINTS AND
PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ARGNNTINE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS CORRECT RELATIONS WITH
THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL
ANTI-SEMITIC POLICY. DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE "DIRTY
WAR" THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF ANTI-SEMITIC BEHAVIOR
IN THE SECURITY FORCES. VIRULENT ANTI-SEMITIC LITERATURE
REMAINS ON SALE IN THE COUNTRY. IN 1980, SEVERAL JEWISH
SCHOOLS WERE BOMBED IN JULY AND AUGUST AND MORE RECEIVED ■
ANONYMOUS THREATS. THOUGH THE CULPRITS WERE NEVER FOUND,
IN THE FACE OF THESE ATTACKES THE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO REASSURE
ARGENTINE JEWS.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESFUSED TO PERMIT THE LEGAL REGISTRATION
OF THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES WHO NUMBER APPROXIMATELY
30,000 IN ARGENTINA. THEIR PROPERTIES AND MEETING
PLACES HAVE BEEN CLOSED, AND WITNESS CHILDREN HAVE BEEN
EXPELLED FROM PROVINCIAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS FOR REFUSING TO
SALUTE THE FLAG AND SING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM. THE
SUPREME COURT HAS NOW RULED IN TWO CASES THAT PRIMARY SCHOOL
CHILDREN'SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO SCHOOL.
SEVERAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, UNITING ACTIVISTS
AND RELATIVES OF THE DISAPPEARED, HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIGICANT'
PSN:039434

PAGE 02

TOR:2?0/21:59Z

DTG-.261841Z SEP 80

******* ft JD--N. p 1—p E N T I A-Pi*******E COPY

*******c ONFIDENTIA I»******E COPT
ROLE IN ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST SEVERE TEARS. SOME
LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS WERE SEVERELT HARASSED AND
BT

PSN :039434

PAGE 03

OF S3

TOR:270/21:59Z

PV--M-jP-'T T)

in-H

fP_T

DTG:261B41Z SEP B0

t T.»*»*»**ir COPY

?16

**»**»»o-e-N F~I D E N T I A

l*******E

COPT

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
UTS914
EE RUESSA #77?6/6 2701950
0 R 261841Z SEP 80
EM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6912
INFO AMEMBASSST LIMA 3688
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 6 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
THREATENED IN THE PAST AND SEVERAL ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED.
IN 1980 IT APPEARED THAT THE ORGANIZATIONS WERE OPERATING
IN A CLIMATE OF ENHANCED SECURITY THROUGH THERE CONTINUED
TO BE OCCASIONAL HARASSMENT.
B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN
TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION.
THE ARGENTINES ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WITHOUT RESTRICTION
WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO LEAVE WITHOUT RESTRICTION. THEY
ARE FREE TO EMIGRATE. THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION PERMITS
PERSONS HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION (PEN) TO CHOOSE
SELF-EXILE. EXERCISE OF THE "RIGHT OF OPTION" WAS
DENIED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT UNTIL 1978 AND IS STILL
RESTRICTED THROUGH THE USE OF AN EXTENSIVE SCREENING
PROCESS FOR ALL APPLICANTS. MANY APPLICATIONS WERE DENIED
DURING 1980, EVEN THOUGH TEF APPLICANTS HELD DOCUMENTS
AUTHORIZING THEM TO ENTER OTHER COUNTRIES.
ARGENTINA HAS ACCEPTED ABOUT 300 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES.
THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM HAS GONE REASONABLY WELL FOR
MOST OF THESE. SOME, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN VERY DISCONTENT,
PARTICULARLY ABOUT JOB CONDITIONS AND HAVE SOUGHT TO
LEAVE THE COUNTRY. ARGENTINA HAS ALSO ACCEPTED 11 CUBAN
REFUGEES. TWO PEOPLE WHO REPORTEDLY DISAPPEARED IN 1980
WERE PARAGUAYAN COMMUNISTS LIVING AS REFUGEES IN ARGENTINA.
MARRIED WOMEN LIVING IN ARGENTINA MUST RAVE THE PERMIS­
SION OF THEIR HUSBANDS TO TRAVEL ABROAD WITH THE CHILDREN
IF THE HUSBAND IS NOT ACCOMPANYING THEM.
C. FREEDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.
MOST ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS REMAINED
LEGALLY SUSPENDED IN 1980. TEE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION
IS TO RETURN THE NATION TO FULL DEMOCRACY BUT IT HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED A TIMETABLE FOR REALIZING TEAT GOAL. AS

PSN:039440

TOR:270/22:(?2Z

PAGE 01
frfrttgfragfr.-Q-fl y i

d

DTG:261S41Z SEP 80

E N T 1 X~L^**>!e***E COPY

»»»«»»»[J n

H 1?

T

H

Z

jj f I

)1

plt&ait*»!mt:fcfl COPY

PART OF THE PROCESS OE REDEMOCRATIZATION OTHE GOVERNMENT
IN LATE 1979 PROMULGATED A "POLITICAL PLAN” CONTAINING
VERY BROAD GUIDELINES FOR THE EVENTUAL RETURN OF TEG
COUNTRY TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. IN 1980, UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTER OF TH£ INTERIOR, THE GOVERN­
MENT BEGAN A "DIALOGUE" WITH MANT OF THE NATION'S POLI­
TICAL LEADERS. THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE DIALOGUE WAS
TO DEVELP IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE POLITICAL
PLAN. AS OF SEPTEMBER 1980 THIS IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION
HAD NOT EMERGED AND THE DIALOGUE WITH POLITICAL LEADERS
CONTINUES. IN THE MEANTIME, THE JUNTA DESIGNATED AN­
OTHER MILITARY PRESIDENT TO SERVE UNTIL MARCH 1934.
PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS DURING THE YEAR PUBLICLY CON­
DEMNED THE EXCLUSION OF TEE PUBLIC FROM PRESIDENTIAL
SELECTION PROCESS•
ARGENTINE WOMEN ENJOY EQUAL JURIDICAL STATUS WITH MEN.
WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE NOT A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN ARGENTINA,
AS JOBS AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, ALONG WITH
SUPPORT SYSTEMS THAT FACILITATE THE SIMULTANEIOUS HANDLING
OF JOB AND FAMILY, ARE READILY AVAILABLE. SEX DISCRIMINATION
IS PROHIBITED IN EDUCATION, POLITICS AND EMPLOYMENT.
TRADITION AND SOCIAL CUSTOMS STILL DICTATE THAT A WOMEN'S
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO HUSBAND AND HOME AND LIMITS
WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORE FORCE.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS INTERVIEWED MAJOR TRADE UNIONS, REPLAC­
ING HIGH LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL,
AND STRIKES HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED. IN 1976,.AND AGAIN IN
MID-1979, THE GOVERNMENT DETAINED A NUMBER'OF IMPORTANT
LABOR LEADERS (ALMOST ALL HAVE SINCE BEEN RELEASED).
STRIKES FOR WAGE INCREASES HAVE NEVERTHELESS OCCURRED AND
NEARLY ALL HAVE BEEN SETTLED WITHOUT VIOLENCE. IN LATE
1979, AFTER MORE THAN THREE YEARS OF STUDY, THE GOVERN­
MENT ISSUED A NEW TRADE UNION LAW WHICH SETS THE GUIDE­
LINES FOR TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION AND LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR LIFTING THE SUSPENSION OF UNION ACTIVITIES WHICH HAS
BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE TEE ARMED FORCES TOOK POWER IN
1976. IT IS NOT CLEAR WEEN THE GOVERNMENT WILL LIFT
THE SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND TO BARGAIN
COLLECTIVELY. FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW, THE
NEW LAW IS DESIGNED TO INTRODUCE MORE GRASS ROOTS DEMO­
CRACY AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION FOR THE WORKERS THAN
EXISTED IN THE PASTJ LABOR LEADERS, ON THE OTHER HAND,
SEE IT AS AN EMASCULATION OF UNION POWER, AS IT PROSCRIBES
ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND GREATLY RESTRICTS CONTROL OVER '
SOCIAL FUNDS. THE PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
BT

PSN:039440

PAGE 02

OF 32

TOR:270/22:Z2Z

DTG:261841Z SEP 30

N F I D liPN' T 1 A x,»*8Mt***T COPY

227

******* C-Q-JJ F I■ D £ N '$ I 4Hb***»***E COPT

OP IMMED
UTS961
DE RUESBA #7776 2701950
0 261841Z SEP 80
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6913
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA 3689
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 7 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
OF THE NEW LAW WILL NOT BE CLARIFIED UNTIL THE MINISTRY
OF LABOR ISSUES DETAILED REGULATIONS, WHICH MAY TAKE UP
TO ANOTHER 120 DAYS TO BE DRAFTED. THE ICFTU CONDEMNED
THE LAW AS A VIOLATION OF UNION RIGHTS.
ALTHOUGH ENJOYING NO OFFICIALS STANDING OR RECOGNITION BY
THE GOVERNMENT, SEVERAL LABOR GROUPINGS ARE ACTIVE IN MAYING
THEIR VIEWS KNOWN. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY OPPOSE THE
GOVERNMENT'S TRADE UNION LAW ON GROUNDS THAT IT RESTRICTS
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AS DEFINED
IN CONVENTIONS 87 AND 98 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BABOR ORGANIZA­
TION AS RATIFIED BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO
OPPOSE THENEW LAW'S PROHIBITION AGAINST POLITICAL ACTION
BY TRADE UNIONS.
4. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE AND RECORD REGARDING INTERNATIONAL
AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
IN LATE 1978, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INVITED THE
INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC) TO VISIT
ARGENTINA. THAT VISIT TOOK PLACE FROM SEPTEMBER 6 TO 20,
1979. THE COMMISSION MET WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER
HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL
AND LABOR OFFICIALS, TOOK TESTIMONY FROM FAMILY MEMBERS
OF DISAPPEARED PERSONS AND FROM FORMER PRISONERS AND
VISITED SEVERAL PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS. THE IAHRC
RECORDED A PAST PATTERN OF WIDE SCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES,
INCLUDING VIOLATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT RE THE RIGHT TO
LIFE, TO PERSONAL SECURITY, TO PERSONAL LIBERTY, TO DUE
PROCESS, TO FREEDOM OF OPINION, EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION,
THE IAHRC ALSO OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, FREEDOM OF RELIGION PREVAILS ’

PSN:039449

PAGE 01

TOR:270/22;09Z
N -p-T D E N T I A

DTG:261841Z SEP 80

l***»***E

COPY

*#*****j&.q-H p i-D ENT I--A l»***»**E COPT

IN ARGENTINA.' IT REPORTED THAT THERE IS NO OFFICIALS POLICT
OF ANTI-SEMITISM, THOUGH IN SOME INSTANCES JEWS HAVE BEEN
THE SUBJECT OF DISCRIMINATION. THE IAHRC FORMULATED A
SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FOR
CORRECTING THE ABUSES IT HAD OBSERVED. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS
INCLUDED AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISAPPEARED?
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF HABEAS CORPUS 'PROCEDURES?
RELEASE OR TRIAL OF THOSE BEING HELD UNDER PEN? IMPROVE­
MENT IN PRISON CONDITIONS? ESTABLISHMENT OF DUE PROCESS?
ALLOWING THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES TO EXERCISE FREELY
THEIR RELIGION AND TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST JEWS? AND TO ASSURE SECURITY AND FREEDOM FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS.
ARGENTINA HAS NOT SIGNED THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS MAINTAINS
AN ACTIVE PROGRAM IN ARGENTINA, WITH REGULAR PRISON
VISITS.
END TEXT.
RUSER
BT

PSN:039449

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:270/22:09Z

******ȣ-g N F I -B-E N T-

DTG:261S41Z SEP 80

L*******& COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

#

34-

20520

BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
January

JO

19 80

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield

FROM:

Patricia Deria

SUBJECT: Human Rights Country Report
I

I

I*

I

Attached is the completed Human Rights report on:
■ j
I

AOtr&UT/AJfl
The report is mainly based on extensive reporting from
our mission abroad, research and analysis in the Department
of State and review of current non-governmental organizations'
statements, such as Amnesty International. The report is
prepared according to a standard format and guidelines.
The report has been approved in the Department of State
by the appropriate geographic bureau, the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, the Policy Planning Staff, the
Office of the Legal Advisor, the Office of Congressional
Relations, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs and thr TTfffiiiin ur n'll rijjTrlj niiTr-n^-rir
If
appropriate, it has also been cleared by AID.
The report is not to be shown to, or discussed with
representatives of any foreign government. This not only
applies to this report, but to reports on other countries.
As you know, all such reports are by statute required
to be submitted by the Secretary of State to the Congress by
January 31, 1980. The Department is providing this
completed report to you for your information. Should you
notice any factual errors, please, let me know directly
within three days.
This report has been cleared by the Secretary of State
personally.

■This wor+ has betr* e^Vtrfe*
bo,
ARGENTINA

T»»« See. of

ibrsei^i ■

jftR

Over the*past twenty-five years Argentina has passed
through several cycles of alternating civilian and
military rule; since 1755/ there have been six military
and six civilian presidents.
Beginning in 1969, violence
mounted progressively from the -left and the right
as groups with widely different political objectives
and conceptions struggled far power.
As a result,
both civilian and military governments have maintained
-a "state of siege" for some nine of the past ten years. At the height of this violence in 1975-1976, terrorism
had taken on' broad dimensions:
bombings, 'robberies,
kidnappings and ‘assassinations for political reasons
were common occurrences.
Organized terrorist groups
on both- sides, of the political spectrum numbered some
5,000-6,000 persons, with sympathizers estimated at
an additional 15,000.
By 1976 the situation in_Argentina had deteriorated sharply.
Courts and political leaders were being’intimidated;inflation approached 800 per cent; and many, essential
public services had been disrupted.
At- this point,
the Armed Forces again took control df the state,
with the avowed goals of promoting economic recovery
and ending terrorism and corruption.
They promised
that democracy would ultimately be restored.
The '
Armed Forces maintained the state-qf siege imposed
in 1974 by President Maria Estela Peron, closed Congress,
deposed the President, and replaced all members of
the Supreme Court.
Elected state and local governmental
officials were replaced by military officers, and
political party activities, including the right of
assembly, were prohibited.
Most trade unions were
intervened.and all strikes were banned.
The security forces embarked on a widespread counter­
campaign of violence aimed>at terrorists as well as
elements of the society they considered subversive;
many known or suspected terrorists, as well as many
persons with no subversive record, disappeared.
Many
others were detained by the Executive without any
specific charge under the "state of siege" powers
of the Constitution.
The most carefully recorded and documented list of
unexplained disappearances, compiled by the Permanent
Assembly for Human Rights- in Buenos Aires, contains
about 6,5G0 cases for the period 1976 to 1979.
Some .
estimates, however, run considerably higher.
The
Mission of the New York.City Bar Association, which
visited Argentina in 1979, considers a figure of 10,000
as more accurate, while Amnesty International asserts
that 15-20,000 persons have disappeared.
There is
substantial evidence that most af these persons were
abducted by the security forces and interrogated under
torture; as most have not reappeared, many observers
believe that they were summarily executed.
There
have been reports, difficult to verify, that some
missing persons have been seen alive in detention
centers.
9

As regards use of the Argentine Executive's "stateof-siege” detention powers; some 8,200 persons have
been arrested under these provisions since 1974, both
by the present Government and its predecessor.
While
many of those so detained have been released, others
a ^

•1 4

•t£

^

u •• j m i

Cnv

*j s ^ C

k Vi

q

•» J ay

of the Executive, the Argentine constitution places
no specific time limit on detention under the "state
of siege".
Several courts (first-instance and appellate)
held -.that such prolonged detention is in essence an
imposition of punishment without due process, and
hence unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court! however,
has overruled these lower court-decisions and upheld
the Executive's position.
Conditions of detention were often cruel, and serious
problems of mistreatment, overcrowding, and insufficient
medical care often existed. . Although the Government
asserts that torture was never, authorized, there is
extensive evidence that torture was routinely used
during interrogation by the security forces.
_____

Beginning in early 1978, Government spokesmen declared
the war on terrorism to have been won.
Conceding
that excesses had been committed, the national authorities,
through a variety of directives and personnel transfers,
have sought to tighten control over the operations
of the security forces.
At the invitation of the
Argentine Government, the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission visited Argentina in September 1979 to
investigate human rights abuses.
The Commission interviewed
many government, human rights, religious, political
and labor officials, and had access to several prisons and
detention centers.
A mission of the New York City
Bar Association was also permitted to visit Argentina
in 1979.
Since late 1978, the incidence of disappearances has
declined significantly.
They numbered' many thousands
in both 1976 and 1977, and over 500 in 1978; since
then such occurrences have been sharply reduced.
In 1979 there were 44 known disappearances, most of
which occurred in the first half of the year.
There
are indications that the Government has committed
itself to end this practice.
The number of prisoners held without charge under
the Executive's "state-of-siege" has been reduced
substantially; about 1,300 remained in late 1979.
The Government has released large numbers of these
detainees.
An estimated 1,000 others have been tried
and convicted and are still serving prison terms.
About 500 more are currently on trial.
A review board
is working actively on cases of the remaining prisoners.
A presidential decree in April regularizing prison
rules led to significant improvements in many prison
facilities.
Terrorist activities in Argentina have largely ceased.
There are reports that small numbers of terrorists
are being trained in third countries and are returning
to Argentina. In three separate instances, terrorists
attempted to murder high officials in late 1979.
The GOA has declared that the incidents of the past
year are isolated events which do not signal a major
resurgence of terrorism.
Political party activity continues to be prohibited
and labor unions remain narrowly circumscribed; Government
1 * -i ■' i.

r\£

avnrpeq' nr ,

Cqt*B

t-

The law has been criticized by Argentine and international
labor organizations as a Government.attempt to curtail
organized labor's political and economic power.

In late 1979, the Government promulgated a "political
plan" containing broad guidelines for an eventual
return to civilian rule and a promise to develop specific
proposals in 1980, following a dialogue between military
leaders and diverse civilian.groups.
Argentine human rights groups are active and well
organized, although their leadership has been subject
to severe harassment and arrest.
1.
Respect for the Integrity of the Person,
Freedom from:
a.

Including

Torture

There is extensive evidence, primarily the statements
of former detainees, that torture has been routinely
used by the security forces.
It has been most frequent
during the first days of interrogation and, according
to numerous reports, has taken such forms as the use
of electric shock, immersion of the head in water,
mock executions,'and other types of severe physical
and psychological abuse.
There are also credible
allegations that such practices continued in 1979,
with new detainees.
The national Government has publicly
stated that it has never authorized the use of torture.
b.

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment

There is an extensive body of evidence indicating
that summary execution was a common practice during
the years when large numbers of people were being
detained by the security forces.
Before early 1979, conditions of imprisonment were
poor, and medical services rudimentary.
In April
1979, the government decreed uniform prison regulations
which have led to a general improvement in prison
conditions.
There are some reports of continued abuse,
but in general over-crowding has been reduced, medical
care is better, and visits by family and legal counsel
assured, as is the receipt of educational and.writing
material.
The International Committee of the Red
Cross maintains a regular program of prison visits.
c.

Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment

The Argentine Constitution, in Article 23, establishes
the power of the Executive Branch to detain and hold
prisoners under a "state of siege" (which has been
in effect since 1974).
The constitutional provisions
are referred to as the National Executive Power ("PEN"
for the Spanish words Poder Ejecutivo Nacional).
The Executive-has interpreted the Constitution, which
places no explicit time limit on the duration of the
PEN'detention, as meaning it can hold prisoners under
the PEN powers indefinitely.
The Supreme Court*,
overruling a number of lower court decisions, has
upheld this view, accepting broad and unsubstantiated
charges of association with subversion as sufficient
grounds for detention.
Some PEN prisoners have been
in jail without charge for several years — including

a significant number detained before 197S.
Since January 1, 1979, 44 persons, who have not since
been located, have disappeared under- circumstances
suggesting that they were taken by security forces;
most of these disappearances occurred in the first
half 'of the year.
There have also been charges that
persons are being held clandestinely by the security
forces.
While there is no evidence that large numbers
of persons are thus being held, hopes have been nourished
by the experience of some prisoners who "disappeared",
were presumed to be dead, and later — in some cases
months or years later — reappeared as officially
acknowledged prisoners held under the "FEN".
Reports
of the existence of clandestine camps have diminished
in the last several months!
In September 1979 the Government approved a law shortening
the period required for a court finding of presumptive
death; it gives the Government as well as relatives
the right to initiate proceedings.
The law has alleviated
some personal hardships in legal and financial matters;
however, it has drawn sharp criticism from Argentine
human rights organizations, relatives, and the European
Parliament because they feared the Government would
use the law-to arbitrarily close the cases of the
disappeared.
In 1979 the Government reduced the number of prisoners
being held under the "PEN” from 3,400 to about 1,300,
freeing some, bringing some to trial, expelling others
and alloving still others to leave the country.
Perhaps
another 1,000 are serving sentences after trial and
conviction on charges of terrorism, or "subversive”
'political activity or associations.
About 500 more
are still in trial status.
d.

Denial of Fair Public Trial

The trial of those accused 6f subversion or terrorism
may be held in civilian or military court.
Civilian
courts follow the customary legal provisions regarding
open and fair trials.
Argentine law, however, requires
written rather' than oral testimony, so that "open"
has a different meaning and different consequences
from those in other legal systems.
The lav provides
that the civilian courts are independent, but the
pressures accompanying trials involving subversion
and terrorism make it difficult for the courts to
maintain independence.
Military tribunals, before
which civilians may be tried, conduct their proceedings
in secret.
The defendants have access only to a military
defense counsel who is usually not a lawyer.
Defendants
legally may be kept unaware of the evidence against
them, in both military and civilian proceedings.
An adequate defense in cases of terrorism or subversion
is also difficult to ensure because many attorneys
are reluctant to assume cases of this nature for fear
of harassment and reprisals.
The New York City Bar
Association, in its report on the visit of its mission
of lawyers to Argentina, concludes that some lawyers
disappeared or were detained as the result of defending
clients and causes unpopular with the Government,
resulting in the intimidation of other lawyers.
While the courts are constitutionally independent,
in 1976 the Junta replaced all members of the Supreme

Court; it also removed a number of judges in lower
courts, though most judges were retained.
The courts
have often upheld Executive interpretations of laws
and the Constitution.
However, there have been instances,
when the courts challenged Government actions and
interpretations of its powers.
The most celebrated
of these cases revolved around detained newpaper publisher
Jacobo Timerman — who was ordered released by the
Supreme Court in an opinion the Junta upheld despite
the reported objection of some members of the military.
*
The Bar Association's report also highlights other
problems associated with the lack of due process,
but does state that "the ingredients for progress
are present" in Argentina.
In its report the Association
cited the decline in abductions, the Government's
commitment to expand procedural safeguards, and certain
Supreme Court efforts to exert pressure in the direction
of due process.
The report recommends the removal
of all detainees from executive detention, new trials
for those convicted in military courts, an accounting
for the disappeared, the termination of restrictions
on the exercise of the right -of option (see Section
3b) and the reestablishment of the rule of lav and
constitutional guarantees. *
e.

Invasion of the Home

The sanctity of the home has traditionally been protected
by Argentine law, custom and practice.
The security
forces, however, have often violated such sanctity
during their anti-terrorist and anti-subversive operations.
Though the number of intrusions dropped off during
1979, information available suggests that violations
of the home's sanctity in the form of raids and unauthorized
searches remains a practice of these forces.

2.
Government Policies Toward the Fulfillment of
Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care and
Education:
Argentina is one of the most advanced of the newly
industrialized nations.
Indices of Argentina's
standard of living are high.
In 1978 per capita income
in current dollars was $2,331 and Argentine governments
have — within the economic constraints of recent
years — sought to confront social needs.
Unemployment in Argentina was only 1.8 percent in
1978; the distribution of income has become less equal
in recent years, in part as a result of government
policies designed to reduce inflation and revitalize
the country's productive sector.
Toward that end,
the Government has made an effort to open the economy
to external competition by lowering tariff protection,
reducing subsidies, and limiting state involvement
in the economy.
Inflation, however, is still high,
running at about 160 percent for the year.
*

^The tax system is progressive and tax collections
•'are increasingly effective, though compliance remains
a problem.
Education has been free and is widely available, although
the Government is now moving to requ-ire tuition for
university-level education.
Illiteracy is virtually

private* and trade union medical care programs
make treatment available and affordable to most of
the population.
There is a serious housing deficit in Argentina* much
of it-attributable to now defunct legislation that
sustained rent control guidelines.
Corruption in
the public sector has declined significantly under
the current government.

3.

Respect for Civil and Political Liberties, Including:
a.

Freedom of Speech, Religion, and Assembly

The Argentine Constitution provides for these freedoms,
but under both civilian and- military governments they
have been circumscribed since the imposition of the
”state of siege" in November 1974.
The climate of
violence and repression in Argentina in recent years
has made many Argentines fearful of exercising freedom
of speech.
Since 1976 the Government has intervened or confiscated
a number of newspapers, notably La Opinion, edited
by Jacobo Timerman.
Journalists have been among the
Argentines who "disappeared".
Although the press
is not subject to prior official censorship, Governmentimposed guidelines result in self-censorship.
Newspapers
have, however, actively criticized the Government
on economic policy and have discussed political issues
including, especially in recent months, human rights.
Most foreign publications enter Argentina without
censorship although occasionally some issues are censored
for political and sexual content.
The Argentine Constitution requires that the President
be a member of the Catholic Church, and the majority
of Argentines profess this faith.
Other religions
are required to register with the Government; all
but one are permitted to function, and there are substantial
minority religious groups, including a 450,000 member
Jewish community.
There are credible reports of- antiSemitic attitudes and behaviour in the security forces,
but the Government publicy condemns religious prejudice
and maintains officially correct relations with the
organized Jewish community.
The Government has refused
to permit the legal registration of the Jehovah's
Witnesses who number approximately 30,000 in Argentina.
Their properties and meeting places have been closed,
and Witness children have been expelled from provincial
school systems for refusing to salute the flag and
sing the national anthem.
Although the Supreme Court
has now ruled in one case that primary school children .
should be allowed to return to school, the Witnesses
still report instances at the local level where children
are expelled from school for failure to respect national
symbols.
Several human rights organizations, uniting activists
and relatives of the disappeared, have played a significant
role in Argentina over the past several years.
Some
leaders of these groups were harassed and threatened
during 1979, and a police raid on the headquarters
of three of the organizations in August raised questions
about the future.
The police action was ordered by
a federal judge.
The files of the organizations seized
during the raids had not been returned to them by

December, when this report was prepared.
The "Mothers
of the Plaza de Mayo" — relatives of disappeared
persons — who used to assemble in front of the Ministry
of the Interior in the Plaza de Mayo, were forcibly
prevented from using the Plaza late in 1978 and early
1979 ;and were not permitted to return in 1979.
Some
of the "Mothers" themselves disappeared, including
at least one during 1979.
b.
Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel and Emigration
Argentines are free to travel without restriction
within the country and to leave without restriction.
They are free to emigrate.
The Argentine Constitution
permits persons held under executive detention (PEN)
to choose self-exile.
Exercise of this "right of
option" was denied by the current government until
1978 and is still restricted through the use of an
extensive screening process for all applicants.
Many
applications were denied during 1979, even though
the applicants held documents authorizing them to '
enter other countries.
c.

Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

After the March 1976 coup d’etat, the Government restricted
or suspended most elements of the democratic political
process.
It has expressed its intention of moving
the country back toward normal constitutional, democratic
processes but has not established a timetable for
reaching this goal.
In December 1979, the Government
promulgated a "political plan" containing broad guidelines
and a commitment for an eventual return to civilian
government.
The plan promises implementing legislation
in the second half of 1980 following a dialogue between
military leaders and diverse civilian groups.
The right of assembly for pblitical groups has been
suspended since March of 1976, but the Government
has tolerated a law level of organized political activity
by established political parties.
Party leaders meet,
spokesmen criticize a variety of government policies
and actions, and proclamations are Issued in .the names
of specific parties.
Some informal meetings of party
leaders have, however, been disrupted by the police,
and the leaders detained for brief periods.
c.

Argentine women enjoy equal juridical status with
men.
Women's rights are not a contentious issue in
Argentina, as jobs and educational opportunities,
along with support systems that facilitate the simultaneous
handling of job and family, are readily available.
Sex discrimination is prohibited in education, politics
and employment.
Tradition and social customs still
dictate that a woman's primary responsibility is to
husband and home and limits women's participation
in the work force.

The government has intervened major trade unions,
replacing high level union officials with military
personnel, and strikes have been prohibited.
In 1976,
and again in mid-1979, the Government detained & number
of important labor leaders (almost all have since
been released).
Strikes for wage increases have nevertheless
occurred and nearly all have been settled without
violence.
On November 15, after more than three years
of study, the Government issued a new Trade Union

lav which sets the guidelines for Trade Onion organization
and lays the groundwork for lifting the suspension
of union activities which has been in effect since
the Armed Forces took power in 1976.
It is not clear
when the Government will lift the suspension of the
right to strike and to bargain collectively.
From
the Government's point of view, the new law is designed
to introduce mare grass roots democracy and freedom
of association for the workers than existed in the
past; labor leaders, on the other hand, see it as
an emasculation of union power, as it proscribes all
political activity and greatly restricts control over
social funds.
The procedural steps for the implemention
of the new law will not be clarified until the Ministry
of Labor issues detailed regulations, which may take
up to another 120 days to be drafted.
The XCFTU has
condemned the law as a violation' of union rights.
In September 1979, two major groups of union leaders
merged to form the United Leadership of Argentine
Workers (CUTA), a provisional committee which purparts
to speak in the name of the organized Argentine trade
union movement in the absence of an officially functioning
national central body.
Although enjoying no official
standing or recognition by the Government, CUTA is
active in making its views known.
For example, CUTA
opposes the recent trade union lav on grounds that
it restricts freedom of association and the right
to organize as defined in conventions 87 and 98 of
the International Labor Organization as ratified by
the'Argentine Government.
It also opposes the new
lav's prohibition against political action by trade
unions.

4.
Government Attitude and Record Regarding International
and Won-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human R-ights:
In late 1978, the Argentine Government invited the
Inter-American Human Right's Commission to visit Argentina.
That visit took place from September 6 to 20, 1979.
The Commission met with President Videla and other
high-level government, human rights, religious, political,
and labor officials, took testimony from family members
of disappeared persons and from former' prisoners,
and visited several prisons and detention centers.
The Commission vill submit its formal report to the
OAS in 1980.
Argentina has not signed the American
Convention on Human Rights.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
maintains an active program in Argentina, with government
approval, on behalf of imprisoned persons.
The ICRC
also monitors prison -conditions.
The Government has
usually received and facilitated the efforts of various
groups and individuals seeking to investigate allegations
of human rights abuse. ___
____

2Z/6
7906540
\

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
n c

kis’o

April 10, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Mrs. Rische
M. Timerman
Mrs. Rische M. Timerman, the wife of a prominent
Argentine publisher who has been the victim of human
rights abuse by the GOA, has written to President
Carter to express her deep appreciation for the Presi­
dent's efforts on behalf of her husband. The letter,
which was delivered to our Embassy in Israel where
she resides, also expresses appreciation for Ambassador
Castro's work on this case and Mrs- Timerman's hope
that these efforts will lead to her husband's release.
The GOA has recently reconsidered Timerman's case
and the Junta has discussed whether he might now be
released. While this review was underway the Argentine
Foreign Ministry asked our Embassy in Buenos Aires what
our quid pro quo might be for Timerman's release. The
Embassy offered no specific suggestions and reiterated
our position that Timerman should be released on the
merits of his case. In his most recent discussion of
the Timerman case with Army Commander Viola, Ambassador
Castro again urged that Timerman be released. General
Viola told him that this is not likely to take place in
the immediate future.
We recommend that the President sign the attached
reply to Mrs. Timerman.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Suggested reply
2. Letter from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman to President
Carter
1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526

C'f'-irruij
f:a_I£______Date

~U'^

1

GDS -4/6/85

""F
jP

I —B—it—*4 T'"I

8 T*** + ***E cnPY

IMMiO

lie kJF-.C #2832 3071651
u1 031643Z i■ V 77
Fm S L: C .> T A T .

WaS-DC

Id AM-MliASSY BU’-NOS

AlRrS

C il N P

A L

I

) -

N T

I

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
t.u. 11652: GDS
TAGS:

P'o

SUBJECT:

1.

state

IMHFUIaTE 8694

262832

AR
LETTER TO PRESIDENT VI DEL A FROM PRESIDENT CARTF.R

PLtASc PASS FOLLOWING TEXT TO PRESIDENT VIPELA ASAP.

BEGIN 9U0TE: OE'R MR. PRESIDENT:' LET ME SAY AGAIN HOW
PLEASED I WAS Tr. MEET WITH YOU DURING YUUR VISIT TO WASH­
INGTON FOR THt SIGNING OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES.
OUR CO'nV-RSATIMn GAVE MF A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR
CDnCERhS AND THOSE OF THE argentine PEOPLE* WITH WHOM WE
*ISH TO HAVE THf- BEST OF RELATIONS.

2.
I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR COMMENT THAT WE
BOTH HAD THE SAHE ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA — HUMA'N RIGHTS AND
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION — AND THAI YOU SAW OPPORTUNITY FOR
PROGRESS On BuTh.
I SHARE THE SAME HOPES.
3.
W: BrirH rfFrOGNIZE THAT ARGENTINA IS FREOUtNTLY
CHARGED WITH S=;IOUS VIOLATIONS nF HUMAN RIGHTS.
YOU WERE
CERTAINLY CORRECT IM STATING THAT TERRORISTS HAVE SOUGHT
TO ISOLATE ARGENTINA IN THEIR PROPAGANDA.
HOWEVER* I AM
CuriF I Or NT THaT SUCH PROPAGANDA WILL LOSE ITS FORCE IN THF
court

of

international

opinion

as

your

government

DEMijNST-JaT'.-S PR iGRESS I\ HUMAN RIGHTS.
AND I CAN ASSURE
YijU TH/ i THF united STATFS WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO
ACKNOWLtOG: SUCH IMPROVEMENTS•

4.

I

wAS

ALSO PL:-ASED

tij

WtAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT ORJECT

♦ ♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦ + *♦*♦ * Ji»*fFrs r c ctwsf nt ** + *♦♦♦**■“**♦*
BAP TH

I HD VP P^TOR Tl)C• *

^S*l: 023389

/17 :10 Z

P’GE 01
***** + *f—l',--R- f—f—H

N I

I

OTG:03164BZ NOV 77

TT>******E COPY

***+**%r

n r.--F—i—4

-NHF-

V:

copy

r L- VISITS 3Y HU AN RIGHTS S P-C 11L I STS FROM RFSPF.CTEf.
1 NT:: RNAT I U*'.AL IK GAN I Z AT I r*NS .
SUCH VISITS WILL PE AN
IMPORTANT Yeans uF EDUCATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION
UN IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA.
P.
In THIS REGARD, LET ME KENT 1 ON THE VERY IMPORTANT
RULE PLAYEu 3Y .-UN-GOVERNMFNTaL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGAN I Z AT IHNS,
AMO MY H H PTHAT TH~Y WILL CONTINUE TO CONTk I BUT t Tn THF
ADVANCEMENT OF nUMAN RIGHTS AND MY FIRM RELIEF THAT THEY
SHOULD Ri-TMN lutlR CONSULT AT IV- STATUS AT THE UNITED
NAT IONS.

5.
I WELCOME YOUR EXPRESS IUN nF HOPE THAT THL DETAINEE
PROBLEM MIGHT 8'- RtSiJLV^O BY CHRISTMAS THIS YEAR.
A5 I
IGLD YJU, THERE IS GREAT INTEREST AND CONCERN IN THF
UNITED STATES OVER THE RATE OF PEOPLE DETAINED IN ARGENTINA
UNDER THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE PUWFR.
THE CLARIFICATION OF
THEIR STATUS WQi.'LD BE WELL RECEIVED, I BELIEVE* THROUGHOUT
THE INTERNET ION :.L COMMUNITY.
LIKE YOUR GOVERNMENT 1S RECENT
ANNOUNCEMENT UF THE RESTORATION OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION AND
* PAROL- F-jR JcTAlNrfcS, SUCh A CLARIFICAITOU WUULD RE
another import* 'T step r«> demonstrating Argentina's
C..-MM IT
*T TL’ T-b PRQTbCTIf'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

7.
I /MS MOST GRATIFIED AND PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOUR
GOVERNMENT I n T t ■: D S T-.i R.-.TIFY THE TREATY UF TLaTELOLCO.
I
R fc A L IZ ■- THAT TH- TIMING OF YOIJR GOVERNMENT'S RATIFICATION
IS DEPENDENT UP.lN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS* RUT I HOPE THAT
YJU WILL FIND It PJSSI3L
TO RATIFY THE TREATY IN THF NEAR
PUTIJRE.
A'sGcNT | NA ' S FULL ADHERENCE TO THF TREATY WDULD
HAVE GR-AT IMPG.<TANC-.
IT WOULD NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATE
ARGENTINA'S CUMfITmcmt TO TH- PFACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR
-NESGYJ IT 'UiUL ■ ALSU, I AM CONVINCED, GIVE A SIGNIFICANT
IMPETUS TU w'lPL'.-W IDE ACCEPTfcNCF OF THE TREaTY AS AN
IMPORTANT MCAnS OF AVOIDING WAR.

B.
I WAS Vr '< Y PLEASED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATED
IN THE NUCLEAR -UF.L CYCLE FVALUATIUN CONFERENCE. IN
WASHINGTON.
I 81L 1 hVF IT WILL PROVIDE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY
FijR OUR NATIONS TU WUPK WITH OTHrRS IN MIXING NUCLEAR
LNfcRGY an important and saf;- means of meeting our. energy
RtOUlRi-.Hcf'-T s .

S.

MR.

p-.hS I D.-NT,

PSn : 0P3389

THc

pFES-JNaL

RELATIONSHIP WHICH wF

Pi. Gt n?_
♦ »»**•■»*& 0 N r

T,"|D : 307/17 : lOZ
I

DTG:0316^3Z NJV 77

D~<—COPY

■*t- T Hi—j L****+**E COPY

■h-f t n

tSTA6LlSh-J IK - ASHlNGTf vi PROVIDED '1? THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
'iRITL YOU.
I V RY "MJCH nrip1- THAT WF CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE
VIEWS 'iITH FRANKNESS AND CANDOR Sn A S TO STKPMGTHFN
:<ELo.TI":\i bETWt-vi
T«i- GREAT PEOPLES.

10.
In THIS R-GAkO, I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE- YOUR
LtTTER a i.i F SEPTEMBER 28 A NQ riCTTlRER 11j 1977, AND THP
i n FORK A T 101*1 WHICH YOU RELATED IM THE SECOND LETTER
CONCERNING THc hEUTSCH FAMILY.
AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE;
iHtRE IS C-.NSID-RABLE AnO CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL AND
PUBLIC CONCERN '"'N THIS MATTER IN MY COUNTRY.

11.
IN HIS MEETING WITH YOU IN NOVEMBER, SECRETARY
VANCE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE.

12.
I WANT TO THANK YOU AND MRS. VIDELA FUR THE VERY
KIND INVITATION TO ATTEND YOUR SON'S WEDDING, AND REGRET
THAT H= WERE UNABLE TO ATTEND.
PLEASE GIVE flUK
CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES TO YOUR SnN AND HIS
3RI0E.
SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER.
END UUOTE. VANCE
BT

.’S '1: 023389

P GE *■>,

OF 03

¥ * + + $ * >ML._LL_£i_&■

TiH :307/17:10Z
+> ■-

T

I

A L

DTG:0316A32 Nnv 77
COPY

11/11/77

TO:

Ms. Loretta Braxston

FROM:

Julie Jacobson, State Secretariat
Attached is cable to post concerning
October 11 letter on Deutsch family
we discussed yesterday. Please take
off our suspense.
Thanks.

OU! UO s:;K

LtotllElMfrr-l-fMM-.u.'T
OepartniPn; of Sunn
PAGE 31
STATE 2o'.'S32
ORIGIN 6H=_-_U
,iifo ocr-a:

isc-cn

gs-is

'3iv;

HW
ksc-f-i'P

sse-ss fks-ei /:.;i

r

DFRFTEB SY TOT seif IVEO FSCM i-JiiiE ROUGE:U
A'rsi'.EB ey Aiin-ECA-Rucir.i.Ei.iiAt.ii
afa. eg;-jsmft.’us
S/S-3- JETS(GEN
--- -- - - - --- .'ESlGi 3317352 ;E5
C 331S43I !IO!r 77

Fli SEC-STATE UASK.OC
TO AHE.-BASSY CUESOS Slf-S IK.-EDIA'TC

7.- I was : "7
if iE3 ;>is .'lEaie.-! t: leaf,■!'Thai
G0VE‘:!.r.C!K I;.??'.;-: :: :iy ;»r 7r-:r
ilj-elci
i
FiL'aliingj ■ : i:/1:::; a
c:.■■iei.t s ?;t:ri::-ti
IS E-IPE'li'iN'. cm- 1 11 .CAE L.'■!S'E:•
rjl : HCi- • ;•
YOU V.-:Li -!!.■■ i'i FCUl-lE 72 r'HI-Y :-lt TREAT. |*; Ui I;*
FUTUK-E. A’C:I■ F."l \Znl*Li £ 1G T«E TREATY Y.^-,2
NAVE CHEAT i.-'CTT.-'l-.E. IT yCGiB -10! CllY SrcfiS^SATE
ARGENTINA'S LA:.Tn 1>;i TO IU PcAC-.FUL UCE fir" WJlE-R
ENERGY-; !1 Vi.'.C . 2, I Ail CUNY l ML 3, CI YE A S-I.GHIF IC.VNi
m’ET'JS 10 ISRlil-'.iOL I CSET-.'lCE «F 7:'! l-’EATY AS f'.f:
w.;-o' Tc.-it

llhllED OFFICII'. l.E Si ATE IGJCST

<s';:-.j2

t:-..

I. I VAC
‘1LMF7 ! HA’l YCi1'1 GOVE R! HE Hi l!a-',7 ICPA'CB
IN i'if UUrilA'- IEEE S-=.F E VALU-11 S'! GUM EVINCE in
WASHINb;CM. I E.ELIFVF IT wee ppsvice a cre-at OPPaF.'iGNi’.Y
ror our «ai!(.■:■ to v-:r>. with ci■:a3 in r;..::.kg se:si;.t
ei-e-rgy an iNr- safe he
i:.i cja cnergi
RESUIREIIEN'iS.

e.o. mgs:; g.:s

TAGS; Pll, SR
SUBJECT: UTTER iO PfttClDEliT VIDElA FROM PRESIfiEKT CARTER

S.
I.

Up. Pcrsir-M, Tit PERSONAL FILAT lOiiitllr WHIGR VI

PLEASE PASS fCLLOVt'IG TEA1 (.0 I'RFSIBEIIT VI.CEU ASAP.

Bid! O'JOLEAR ITS PRESIDENT EE1 HE SAY AGAIN i'O'..1
FlEA-ED I '-‘A 3 TO rTE-T Vi IH vtll' DOiliNi TUUE VISIT TO V1S1I ■
l.'iGTOII it.. T|!? SIGNING Of IP: N:.'-' PAIUMA CAN A l IflJTIlS.
CUV CCi.'.'sr-Shl !C'I SA.l I-.E A BETTER '.li.SC RSIPHO IhG Oi \0\i\i
CBN'C-ERNS AMU -TRCC'i OF THE RAGE'.;
l-EOKf, Wiiil UV.O". WE
WISH TC IIAV.E' IRE EE ST GF EELS' IONS.
I WAS rASFICUl n'!LY Ifll'RCSSEU IIY YAUA CUIi.“.r:i f 111 AT WE
COTK RAP T|iE CAVE iirr.S Oi. C.'“. AG: Ur. -■ HEWN EIGHTS AN"
■iiucLij'-: fsji.ei:;.:-- a-ib tn.-,i you saw sppoftvmt'y fc;
! rtOGR.LSK CN 111)-'. f 3Pa»E IN! Si.ML HOPES.
:■
ve tilli re;a inr. ws-miu is freoneuiy
CHAP uEO Vi TH S-FIGm-G VIC! STIC:; S OF iIUHA'I AIGnIS. 1CU Vi EE
ECRIAIrlli CCRFEC1 IN SLATING ir.ET TERRORISTS HAVE GEUC.-IT
10 I SOL ME AilGCMISP IN IhEIK !,R3?A'jtliDr. HOVEUR, I All
COI.T IJSCM THAT SUCH PRCI i.G>KCA 11-L LOSE ITS f.G-'CE III IKE
COUNT SF UlTEI.NAllG.iAi 3iT:i!CH AS YOUR Gl'VERIiliENT
1.

estabeisueo. :h
u,:ton pscvirre he iris o??:F.rv;.iTY to
write tcu. i
iigpe that w cc-ntikje :o e'E-kaiice
view: li'Ti: ir.■•-:_= .>.3 canos-r so as to eisengt/;!;
Rcuricis *eiw::m ip two cheat pcgnles.

10. 1H TRiS VEi-.'-O, I PART ISULAKLY nFIT-ECIATi YOUR
LETTERS or SEPll".:■'? L-7 AND OCIC'LK 11, iS77, A.NU 'TFy
I .NF'CRIIAT ! ON G-.'-a TO.. ■' El NTE1!
1.1: GCCSUB lElT'-R
CONCERIIIHG Tii? CE'.'LSCif rf.NILY. AS I f.K SURE VOJ AW AW.?-'..
THERE IS C" ■'.■ ■E.-'.-'-.E :’NB GC-:.-'NLiil.v (L'lGFESSII-iAi A',.i
PUOLIC COHCE'G .-. liili HATTER I" !l: f'/j'.lRY.
11.
iH n:s per:.;-: : it-: you in novem/ir, -s'eirei.'?'.
VANCE WELL PAli T.:i (■r-’l'niUlinY 10 C6-;f I HUE. G'/i DlAiC'.E'f.
12. I WAN! 10' [■.-■Ml YOU AND WW. VIDEiA f" The' V?"■
kino t'HVitaiicn
tCup con's veobii.g, t;;S nmi.:
11:AT WC i/E-S-r U„'-f.-i Ti- “TIENO. PEEP'.i fl'JS' 0U5
COli'jRAlULAT IONS
Tiii VUlil'S 1C TOTS Oil ANO. KljS
I.KIOC. SII.'CEI.ELY, Ji!.,1Y CARTER i .if CUOU- VANCr

O-nOKSTRAlLS PROGRESS IN HEWN RIGHTS.. AND. I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT 'THE UNITED FTATS'S Will A.'C'AYS li.E REACT 10
RCPKOVLEDtt SUCK l,-,?r.O-.-.HEIi:S.
I WAS A'LiG riE.r-SC-' 70 HF/R ’K.'T YCU WSULO : GT OAJCC.l
io Visits g? rchi;.' rigs:: GrEn;.: ists '.r.oi: fespect-ib
INWRUPC.'iAI OACFKiTaIIEH:. GUSH VISITS VILE EL Hi
i

iMPORUNf r.F.a;;: of educamnc inierha;iohal f-nsiic opinio.t
ON UlPROVf "FJiTi IN KO'iiSN RICHIS IN ARG'.K'TI.NA.
S. IN THIS KEGARB, LET HE HEH1I3N THE VEPY IHP'IPIAHI
'SCI: FEPTEI. El I.C!i-COVE?Nli:NTf-l HL'HAil RIG,ITS IIRSWHT.A71E'llG
'■■.0 r.t HOPE THAT 1-i'i WILL CO'ITk-HE 'C CGNTNiLU'E 1(1 <lie
ACVlnCEI'.CM G? A01RIG“TS ANO
FIT.:' EL- IEF T'.-.Ji T'i:TY
S-CUUI RE77 Ii. TrcIF CONSULTPTIV: STA-G3 AT IN- i'N'.UO
NA'iCNS.
A. I VS EC 2 HE -CUJ EXPRCSSICN CF lu?E HA1 Til: E'EIAiNFL'
PROBEEn .1IGHT- F- RE COL '.'ED 6Y CiiPISiNAS TNiS Yi-IF. AS I.
TOLO YOU. THERE IS GREAT INTEREST iv.D COliCERN IH THE
UHI.TFO 5-liliS OVER THE FATE Cf UCPIE {It'TAlllf D IN ..RGFN1INA
UKOTR THE 1-iT ICtlAE EPECUTIVC POWER THE CLAR If li'.f T IC.N CF
lili.ii 3.1 '-US WC-.-LG PE VEl! i.-:-7: - HrK I ffliE;1., I'^T.'Si'V.if
THE IhlERNA'llCAii CCW.NKI 1YOUR GS/riMTAI S SECEAT
ahnourcehent c;
n-si.-rati'Ii a. the right of c»r,o:.- .v.o
.« PAPOIE F il.R C-T.'i-.E:--, -GuCIi A C ,R|f KAITO1. V.Oi'iO HE
mOTil-S IKY'ORTAliT S1EP IN OEHON'.ISaTIHS ARC:'!,TINA'S
COIITI! THE 111 TO THE PRCIlC'IIO'I Of IIL'IIAH RIGHTS.

L-HmcD crn&tALM

NSC 6879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20506

October 19, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Peter Tamoff
Executive SecretaryDepartment of State
SUBJECT:

Letter from President Videla of
Argentina, dated October 11, 1977

Attached is a copy of a letter to the President from
President Videla, which has just been received.
Please provide a translation and comments as Boon
as possible. We plan to incorporate the President's
response into the draft the Department haB already
provided.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

r

rr/'/t/s/ta.
BUENOS AIRES,

n de octubre de 1977.

Excelentisimo Senor Presidents de los
Estados Unidos de America
D. James E. CARTER
WASHINGTON D.C,
Estimado Senor Presidents:
De acuerdo con lo que amigablemente convinifiramos durante nuestra reunion en Washington, en el sen
tido de mantener canales de comunicaci6n directos e
informales, me place enviarle estas llneas motivadas
en uno de los temas que abordSramos en nuestro encuentro. Me refiero al caso de la familia Deutsch.
Como conclusifin de las investigaciones efectuadas por los organismos competentes, se ha podido es
tablecer que:
- El Sr. Daniel Deutsch y .su esposa, que abandonaron
ilegalmente nuestro pals, son activos miembros del Par
tido Comunista Revolucionario.
Su funci6n, dentro de la citada organizacifin ilegal
era la de efectuar tareas de Informaci6n e Inteligencia, vinculadas a la actividad de los grupos terroristas que acttian en el pais.
- Su hermana Liliana pertenece a la misma organizaci6n
subversiva, desempenindose como activista en el Smbito
estudiantil.
- El Sr. Alejandro Deutsch, padre de los anteriores,
encubrifi las actividades ilegales de sus hijos.
- Por tales razones, tanto Alejandro como Liliana Deutsch
se encuentran detenidos a los efectos de ser sometidos,
prdximamente, a los Tribunales Militares competentes.

-2-

///
- En cuanto a la senora de Alejandro Deutsch y sus hijas Elsa y Susana Silvia, han sido puestas en libertad al constatarse que no tenian conocimiento ni
vinculaci6n alguna con las actividades ilegales del
resto de la familia.
Quiero, al presentar a V.E. mi mSs afectuoso sa
ludo, asegurarle el profundo y cordial interns con que
acompano su actuaci6n y, una vez m£s, reafirmar la frater
na amistad de los argentinos por el pueblo de los Estados
Unidos de America.

r

/

\

t>oc
FT'

3C CORRSSPONDENCF PROFILE
|

LOG NUMBER

It

■776W79

/0 tt

kz:sski_

_____

//

IMIT.AL ACTION O
—_

I

ec:

STiVi.:! K/.SLC

____

1frJei^ , (jlQ'lY
_

1

&

PA£S- ,H0'M

P/IU

AUV CVS 3'f:.v,<:/AA*w

CQNCVX/
COKKiMS

i;

iOU

hO FONN

NOO>S jj

C

EYES CM.V

EXO s

S

CCOiV#A-0

I'.

SENSITIVE

^

’ t

/lCUlU Qj t/SUhLshO^a

'S

| ACTION

J !

_S^INCLA5 LOC IS'L.
i

r»C![i srcsii.T^
SECOor _

to:
» -■

:ia

RECO
MO OA Ml

J

ACTON PFQUIWgQ
: cv
j FOR
mEHO FOR WZFMSSSfT
1 ■*! MEMO FOR ia Buczzxsxz--- r REPLY FOR
i
j APPROPRIATE ACTION
MEMO _ _ _ _ _ TO .
1
RECOMMENDATIONS. . . .
JOINT MEMO . . . . . . . .
8 REFER TO_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ poR:
Aiyr'ACTion necessary* .

INFO

LA57IRN rLW-TSTtW £,.7.C?:/i'.'«OA
?U ZAJ7 (-.'.SC/P'IC'
?.?.c. b f. c.r.
«TD »AJT/ SO..OH1CA

san/si. nsrrs: w
W/S: SO. ASIA

rcosaaRz;:c£

s.'3: ur;» jw
!«/S: AT».!CA

or cokexis

. . .

DUE DATE.
i
COMMENTS tiNCLUOlNO SF1CIAL. INSTRUCTIONS!

S/S: 3"V.IC2'lC-:CS

1

HCRS 27 A/aICA*SPECIAL
G1C?A*. TSSITCj
szc.irrr

analysis

ECOCKSCS

{i^n
csnc^i:s:j^l/?s£SS

5c:n>rcr:c
:vcr«jf

rstn

FROM

TO

.

5
]

N

Ca

1

'‘STATUS

SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED IGH TAKEN!-

7)
a-

lk>d*»K /wf. Mi 'A? 'T&'lw//

CV TO

DUE

S

v+ t

\'fiT
1
i
1

<
• J-

>€-2.^ y y J',..

c ,1—-^y-

cxzoi

ii
r"□
- ; i.irja-

,m

m

«i F11 I

K

t*\

BY _ _ _ _
r»p"CiAL ui'sp.^s!riG*i _ _ _
j ■jJr.cin. i'<j:;i.inc —_ _

I*_ _ _

0ȣh______
/

NS ,OV
YkN .5* FP
PA

I

e-a

J—!—J; _;'_ i'j

""
"■

’ o .. ' : iff:
M r-!.f

••

■■':■

i\\ v

/ 5MC '-'M '.

MF-M;'-

\

MMA

V/OIN-’no or.,i

r ?■

r-

?•>

tom sky rzi

v-

.■

r •

■■ v

a

oi-;—

c::.

;

a

>

.!

MX mu ov KTUi AL USA ? :r, ri y 1 v
■'.0.
/a
V ««?■!■: SUM'. UK
''■.fkj'F’Cm lft:.m arch wiyj:

VMM: 4

n

or j>icobo

?pmrh.;-:- to

??:?! P-7JSM0S SIPT.S 23^3

T 7.1 T,

— fcti

loo

?.
EMBASSY SAS RECEIVED BY MAIL ’HU FOLLOW* LOTTERr
T'A'F'MA.RCF “:. 1, ?JrO« ■ VITL OF JACOBO TIMlftW.N:
OHOTF BE As?' fl'ji - UAB.TF.R :
iMir<C. TKB WTFB OF TRE .JOURNALIST JACOLO Tim MAN AUD
OOTUP. OF “I .: TUiiAF SONS, I tfOULL' L’lM: TO siXP'rlKSF3 MY
"MiMFST TWANGS fOK I OUT PItOCZEDIHGS «TTT? Tii? P?.m5>E*T
OF' THE AHOE'NTINE REPUBLIC IN BKKAL? OV fflT aU SLANTS
MMEfiSM
F'i IS ?T!U jMING " BETA IU F D A N S) ISOLATED TtNMR
■nrr
lx rf ..IT OUP JiUFMOS A *HES tiOMV,
r^~r;'R.Fr.:'03Ff;t I 3 005,;'* L p P TO LET ”00 TM0* TSA? TEL
aft 0.:
ofORs 0? bs, castso, y'ouf?
-m? ft.!??,?. ROE TO AROi'OO; TU.A , ?0tL0«IH5 YOUR INSPIRATION Pi
'■'DM
ly: MAC AO IN 'PE HALF- 0:' UUMfiN HIJKTO, IAS
IA !;U:' ■'"Oh,,:rMAO T>;:: 'TO PR OS 1:’!R V S UNIT A MOV?
LU3RAMS'?

• a‘Ouar'",j"-

TAn.O/iO
'■'■■ ■ MOMum'
■■'0 :'TT1A ;- or
'i;l

OOP

IS ONLY MUTT OF UAVPG I’OS’I.VTROT::'
A O' A ..iOO'AM.AL i3fr, IN ■■ lO'HTIFO FOB DPIomM
TO,
-On' F ?' IS STILL SRIMfi M:?T t. ■ ? PI S'AN'■;'■■
I-iO-A ;
J •■

A OK F ,

: -0 '00.:- .

A !" A 1!'?'!?'V

y. f;y
' A

■ \ i:

r:'.

r;.

TF"
p.*;:
?• ...
................. t

;■]!■': 1
.;■

v

.'■VI

-V

■■;«

Ti-

v

•,■

3-.

fiorp ■■

.V

;:•■

M;LP
■'.!•

O'-

AOt;,

v/’.’1'!

rv'.l T

■■■yir'i-ii; >■;

IA

nflN'XFNx

M<,

!.:A.,y.

i ■-.l,i

-i'

•'.'

•?

■"

i

MO V.
-'■”■■:■

TO:- il'MS/P. :.S*'Z
0

-*}—y ■

7

. ti

•■;

j-j

i?»-. j—,■

MO:, ■■-']'i IT'/, fif 7y
1
i;.) j-A'

.

y -* t»* - ,y

i';.

"I, J

Vri##* WV .£?.V,'’‘V

?:io :ut:,-:a;3t

to

:

T, .'ST PPATT^’T.r 1RAH.-: 5.
HSCPP;.

a

IKFki’IA^ , SLOW I.HOS '?.? ,

'

f fT],

TS •

• . .

, .

. -

'r'-

Vin

r

uns ?>$;;■•;" '•’

-q?

: Ti'WIOiv. VZTI'. TT .

'

i:

i

P

■!i

!;ii

mii m

j^^ap'=iv0—0—’ 7

'TOR: 035/1

—fr ~3

B?G.:20l?iTr’TAB

f—i—COPY

7<

, '■
-

i

*

= "V/

*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

*9

V

s/sV
/

TO:

The Secretar y
The Deputy £ ecretary

FROM:

ARA - Viron P. Vaky
,
HA - Patrici a M. Deri an

V

fL-

J

Current Hume n Rights Situatic
(D) The folic wing is a summary of the human rights
situation in Argent ina. A more detailed review of
current conditions is set forth in the attachment.
(C) Disappear ances: . Seventeen since February
1? three have turn ed up arrested by the GOA, one was
released, and 13 re main unresolved. The last reported
disappearance occur red May 13.
In 1978, 55 persons
disappeared per mo r th in 1977, 180; in 1976, 300.
(C) Accountirg for the Disappeared: The GOA is
preparing new legi sjlation to shorten to six months the
time period for dec laring presumptive death. Army
Commander and Junta Member Viola has spoken publicly
for the first time of the disappeared as "those who
will be absent forejver"" and told the Embassy he thii
thinks,
with rare exceptior s, most of the disappeared are dead,
The GOA has so far refused to provide individual
accounting.
PEN Prisoners
The GOA announced on June
(C) _____
29 it now holds 1, •3 23 persons under PEN (executive
detention).
It is not clear how many former PEN detainees
have been freed anc how many have continued in prison
after civil or mill tary trials, but the Embassy and
the ICRC estimate tjhe total number of political prisoners
GOA
at just under 3r00C in all of these categories.
officials plan to educe the PEN category to 800-1,000
by late 1979; the Hatter will continue to be held for
In early 1978, the GOA acknowledged
an unstated period,
that it held about 3,500 PEN prisoners.
secret—*
GDS - 7/31/85

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13S26 ^
Authority

MtRfl

*&■

rwti

•*

SEPR^T
-

2

"

-

(S) Clandesti ne Prisoners; The question of whether
clandestine prisone rs exist in significant numbers remains
unresolved.
If the re are, they could number up to a
few hundred as an o utside limit; our Embassy considers
it unlikely that th e number would be that highj- We
have no firm eviden ce. Fragmentary data, however, suggest
the existence of at least some unacknowledged prisoners
and of some small s cattered clandestine detention centers
about to be closed.
(C) Right of Option: Moving at a slow pace, with
only 18 GOA approva Is so far for PEN prisoners seeking
to come to the U.S. The GOA has approved approximately
170 applications si nee September 1977 for all countries.
(C) Prison Cc nditions: The GOA issued nationwide uniform prison regulations in late April and consolidated
PEN detainees in si x facilities.
In February, there
were reports of twe beatings (one fatal) and a disappearance
in prisons and, in May, of. a number of beatings and
robberies among a c roup of prisoners in transit. The
ICRC has told us th at it believes prison conditions
have improved over last year, when it criticized the
GOA for poor prison conditions.
(C) The Judic iary: The NYC Bar Association mission
noted that the Exec utive continues to be uncooperative
in responding to he beas corpus petitions. The Judiciary
has made some atten. pts to force greater cooperation,
but its effective bower remains limited.
(C) Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights
Issue: Videla and Viola appear to be trying to carry
out commitments to us to end disappearances and reduce
PEN detentions. H rdliners such as General Suarez Mason
and General Menende z have recently stepped up calls
for a new GOA offer sive to root out "intellectual subversion."
A political test o strength between these two points
of view is shaping up for year’s end.
(U) The NYC 3ar Association mission noted that
progress is possib e but would come much faster if the
Argentine legal pre fession would take a more active
interest in return to rule of law.

SECRET-

(U) The Church and some elements of the press
have become more outspokenly critical in dealing with
human rights.

Attachment:
Detailed Revie

w

of Current Conditions.

{-L
Drafted:

;/

HA/HR:PF1bod:ARA/ECA:CHBrayshaw:mas
8/1/79

Clearances:

X21966

INR/RAR:JBuchanan
!
*-(

lc) This reco qd since February compares to previous
years when disappeaij ances averaged about 55 per month
..

t

mn

Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina
(D) Following is a description of key human rights
developments since the Task Force completed its assessment
in early February:
Disappearances
(C) We have received reports of- seventeen
disappearances for the period since February 1. We
immediately communicated these reports to high GOA
authorities and asked for information on their
whereabouts. The GOA has provided us with information
that three of the persons were arrested and charged
in the courts. One person was briefly detained and
then released. The GOA has been unable to provide
information on the thirteen other cases.
In three cases,
however, the disappeared persons have contacted relatives
by letter or telephone call to advise that they were
well and would eventually reappear. The last disappearance
took place May 13. A list-of unresolved disappearances,
including those three, is attached.
(C) The victims of these abductions/disappearances
have no confirmed connection with terrorist groups.
Some, such as members of the Socialist Workers’ Party,
and the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives
of Disappeared and Detained Persons are related to the
nonviolent political left.
(C) This record since February compares to previous
years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month
in 1978, 180 per month in 1977, and 300 per month in
1976.
In mid-May 1979 the Argentine Permanent Assembly
for Human Rights published a list of 5,465 disappearances
since 1975; in the month following publication, the
Assembly received reports of an additional 105 previously
unreported cases. An earlier Assembly report contained
80 1978 disappearances unknown to the Embassy and one
from 1979.
Accounting for the Disappeared
(S) The GOA has not yet taken any public step
to account for the disappeared. The Government has
addressed the broad issue internally and is seeking
solutions to specific aspects of the problem, such as

shortening the period for legal presumption of death.
There are also indications that it is seeking to estab­
lish what documentary evidence exists throughout the
security apparatus.
(C) Foreign Minister Pastor briefed EC-9 ambas­
sadors in Buenos Aires recently on the terms of new
legislation and said that relatives will be able to
petition the Government for assistance and information
three months after the occurrence of a disappearance.
The Government will have three months to establish
the whereabouts of the missing person and, if no informa­
tion is developed, relatives will be able to claim
survivors1 benefits and regularize their legal status.
Although he did not supply details, Pastor said rela­
tives will be able to claim indemnization.
(C) General Viola reiterated to Ambassador Castro
on June 25 that the -GOA does not have information
on the fate of the disappeared and in view of the
extended periods of disappearance he doubted any of
these people were alive. He said a few of the-disap­
peared may reappear, but these would be rare exceptions.
In a public speech delivered on Army Day (May 29)
Viola referred obliquely to the fate of the disappeared,
calling them "those who will be absent forever."
Argentine human rights groups have interpreted this
tacit statement as an admission ■’ that many of the disap­
peared were killed by Argentine police and military
forces.
(C) The Embassy concluded in a recent trends
report (May 31) that "we are reasonably certain that
the apparatus for disappearing people still exists
although, even considering a small upsurge of disap­
pearances in the past several weeks, it appears less
used than in the past."
PEN Prisoners
(C) The GOA has continued to release detainees
from PEN. The Embassy estimated in mid-June that
the political prisoner population in this category
is now at about 2,200. The GOA announced June 29
that there are now 1,723 PEN prisoners. At the end
of 1978, this figure stood at about 2,900 and at the
beginning of 1978 at about 3,500.
It is not clear

how many of those removed from PEN are at liberty
and how many remain in custody under some form of
charges in judicial processes, or after having been
convicted by either military or civilian tribunals.
The Embassy and ICRC estimate the total current prison
population of persons confined because of the GOA's
counter-subversion campaign at just under 3,000> including
those held under PEN and persons who have been tried
and convicted in civil or military courts. We have
been told by a source on President Videla's staff
that the GOA will continue to review the status of
PEN detainees and plans -to have the number down to
800 to 1,000 by the end of this year; these prisoners
would continue to be held indefinitely under PEN since
the "Campora amnesty1' of 1973 makes it impossible
to prosecute them. Other high-level Argentine officials
have said that a certain number of persons will continue
under PEN since the GOA considers them committed subversives
although it lacks evidence that will stand up in court.
(C} Foreign Minister Pastor said the GOA has
augmented its legal staff .reviewing PEN detention
from four to 30.
Clandestine Prisoners
(S) The Embassy has received fragmentary but
credible data which suggest the GOA may continue to
hold a number of prisoners that it has not publicly
acknowledged.
In a recent case a woman, who had disappeared
in late 1978, was released by the authorities.
It
appears that most of the persons being held clandestinely
are either the "disappeared" in process through the
security apparatus or former terrorists who are cooperat­
ing with the authorities. As the number of new disap­
pearances has dropped, there is little reason to think
that there are still substantial numbers "in process."
The Embassy believes that if clandestine prisoners
exist, their number could not be more than a few hundred
as an outside limit, and it considers it unlikely
that the figure be that high. There are fragmentary
data supporting, in the Embassy's view, that some
small, scattered clandestine detention centers still
exist, each holding no more than perhaps 25 persons.
It is believed
the arrival of

that such centers would be closed
the IACHR in November.

before

Right of Option
(LOU) Argentine Government action on the right
of option program continues at a slow pace.
The GOA
has given permission for 18 detainees to travel to
the U.S. under the right of option program; 13 entered
the U.S. under our parole program. The Embassy'has
issued 95 certificates of eligibility. General Viola
assured Ambassador Castro again that, approval of right
of option cases would proceed more quickly. GOA officials
announced that about 170 persons have been released
under right of option for travel to all countries.
Prison Conditions
(LOU) The GOA has published uniform regulations
for the treatment of detainees in a move designed
to end variations in treatment at different facilities.
The ICRC urged this step and has called the rules
a significant improvement for the treatment of detainees.
We have reports, however, that the regulations have
not yet been fully implemented in all facilities.
The GOA has consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities.
(LOU) According to reports reaching ICRC officials
from other prisoners, in February one person disappeared
from prison, another was tortured, and a third died
as a result of beatings by guards.
In early Hay,
the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights .reported that
some of the 200 prisoners moved from Resistencia prison
to the La Plata prison were beaten and robbed during
the transfer.
The Judiciary

(U) As the NYC Bar mission noted in its report,
the executive power continues to decline to provide
information in response to habeas corpus petitions
filed by the relatives of disappeared persons. Regarding
PEN detainees, the Executive response is that "links
with subversives" constitute sufficient grounds for
continued detention, invoking its alleged power to
hold individuals without charge under the Constitutional
state of siege authority. The NYC Bar mission report
was sharply critical of the lack of professional objection
to the denial of due process and deterioration in
the executive power of the judiciary in recent years.

SECRET
(U) The courts have recently tried a number
of persons on pre-1976 subversive charges and sentenced
them to prison terms. Three police officers were
recently prosecuted for abuse of prisoners.
Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue
(C) President Videla and Army Commander Viola
are maintaining their leadership position within the
GOA on human rights policy and appear to have begun
carrying out commitments made to us repeatedly in
the past to bring disappearances to an end and reduce
PEN detention. Hardliners in the Argentine military
still favor repressive policies directed at a broad
range of political dissidents. Army Chief of Staff
General Suarez Mason, for example, recently proposed
to the Cabinet a broad offensive against political
subversives which clearly would include groups
unrelated to the terrorist movements of the past.
General Menendez, Third Corps Commander, has called
for continued strong efforts to battle "ideological
subversion."
(U) The prestigious daily La Prensa has joined
The Buenos Aires Herald in championing human rights.
However, no paper has agreed to publish the Permanent
Assembly's latest list of disappearances. The Catholic
Church addressed an appeal to President Videla on
May 4 on behalf of disappeared persons, PEN detainees,
jailed labor leaders, and lower income groups adversely
affected by present GOA economic policy.
(U) The New York Bar Association's report on
human rights conditions in Argentina noted that
ingredients are present for future progress in human
rights observance, but that the support of the Argentine
legal profession is essential for a quick return to
civilized legal practices. The New York Bar Association
exhorted its Argentine colleagues to take a more active
role in this area.

c
HUMAN RIGHTS:

AHGr.HTINV.

Political terrorism of the left and tl:i- right has
wracked Argentina since the late sis'lil- jih! was
partially responsible for the economic and political
breaS-.dotn precipitating the March 3 97G coup.
The
Junta's efforts to eliminate leftist terrorism led to
a massive counter-terrorist campaign, unciertol.cn lay
the security forces.
Although the Government has publicly stated that
terrerism has largely been defeated, the anti-terrorist
campaign of the last few years has continued and has
resulted in severe violations of human rights. Recently, however, instructions have been-issued by thcMinister of Interior to the police, and reportedly to
the military, to curb excesses in counter-tcrrorist
operations.
At present, the Government of Argentina acV.now1 edges approxin.ately 3,400 state of siege prisoners
detained under executive power (PEN).
The state of
siece powers, invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a
wide variety of persons for long periods without
formal charges.The USG reports an additional SQO pris'::.er_
in military camps...

Arrests continue but have decreased considerably
from the level of the past twoycars. From January to
August 1978, 347 were added to PEN and 446 released.
Security personnel and prison officials use torture
routinely during the interrogation process.
In addition, thousands (estimates range between
3,(i£.0 and 20,000) have been abducted by security forces.
These cases, known as the disappeared, include a broad
range of people, such as labor leaders, workers, clergy­
men, human rights advocates, scientists, doctors and
political party leaders. A movement is growing, led by
human rights organizations and the Mothers of the
Qisappcared, with.the support of some elements of the
Church, to trace the missing people.
The Government,
however, has not accounted for the vast majority of
the disappeared, many of whom are presumed to be dead*
At present, disappearances and summary executions arc
reported to continue on a reduced scale of 16-45 permonth.

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13528

The GOA in late.- 1977 reinstituted a limi toil "right of
option” for political pri iionti::, 1 it-1 ■] iimif-r tSi'i/ut i vtdetention, to request exile.
However, from January to Aug­
ust, only 5fi. were allowed to leave under this program.
The GOA for the first time in rebruary 1978 published
lists of those detained under the state of siege.
Once again permission has been granted for the JCP.C to
visit non-military prisons.
Responsive action has been taken or. a few cases in
which the U. S. has expressed special interest. .Newspaper
editor and Jewish leader Jacobo Timermnn was transferred from
PEN detention to house arrest, Alfredo Bravo, Co-chairman ot
the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, was paroled,
Guillermo Vogler was released to the U. 5. under the right
of option, and four of the five Deutsch family members were
released.
Also placed on parole was Perez Esquivel, leader
of Paz y Justicia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee.
Official harassment of selected religious groups
continues.
The Jehovah's witnesses have borne much of the
arunt. Reports of anti-semitic incidents targeted at members
of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners have decreased.
Severe restrictions remain on civil and political
freedoms, among these trade union rights, fair judicial pro­
cesses, and the activities of political parties.
Press free­
dom continues to be curtailed although some restrictions were
recently lifted.
There appears to be little concerted or
effective effort to date to check fund..mental abuses or
revitalize the legal and institutional barriers that would
prevent human rights violations in the future.
Ke had hoped that the Argentine Government would have
been able to accept a visit by the OAS Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IA1IRC).
However, the conditioned
invitation issued by the GOA was not acceptable to the
Commission.
Negotiations are continuing.
ACTION TAKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS
— On October 27, 1977, the U. S. voted no on a gas pipeline
loan in the 1DB. -We followed this up with "no" votes on a
cellulose plant on December 1 and a petrochemical complex on
December B.
On November 3 we did, however, support an IDE
loan for potable water on the grounds that it meets basic
human needs.

CON*

NTIAL

COM'

CTT1AL

3

-- Early in 197B, we abstained on an industrial credit and
a grain storage loan, both in the World Rank.
Wo abstained
rather than vote no to signal to the Argentine Government
that we had noted limited improvements in r.o.i>c .'ir-.-.iE, and to
"encourage further positive developments.
We followed this
by an extension of a $60 million agricultural credit loan in
April and abstained on three IFC loans.
-- L:.i mbenk is currently holding bad ui. uv'.r 7600 million
in transactions for Argentina because of human rights
considerateons.
— Argentina rejected FMS credits for TY ' 7B.
The
Administration declined to sign the FY '77 IMS agreement and
is not requesting r.MS credits for Argentina for FY '79." All
arms transfers (FMS sales and commercial sales of items on
the munitions list) are being reviewed on a case-Ly-easc
basis; only very few selected new items with no apparent
relationship to humanriRhts have been approved.

— On various occasions, ve have discussed our human rights
concerns with the GOA at the highest levels, including trips
by two Assistant Secretaries, an Under Secretary and the
Secretary of State. When Under Secretary Newsom visited
Argentina in late May, he made clear to the Argentines that
we want better relations with that country, but that there
would have to be improvements iii the human rights.area. He
specifically asked for movement on: an invitationto the IAHRC
establishment of a mechanism to inform the families of disap­
peared persons of their whereabouts; and trial, release or
exile for the 3,400 PEN prisoners held without charge.
-- The Department has submitted over 1,000 names of
individuals who are either detained orhave disappeared to the
Argentine Government and have requested that they furnish
informationon these individuals.

MEMORANDUM ON TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES IN
ARGENTINA
The Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately
3,^00 state of siege prisoners detained under executive
power (PEN). Arrests and disappearances currently con­
tinue although not on the massive scale of the past
two years.
In May 1978, the US Embassy reported that "physical
torture continues to be used regularly during the
interrogation of suspected terrorists and so-called
'criminal subversives' v>ho do not fully cooperate."
It
reports that if there has been a net reduction in reports
of torture, this is not because torture has been fore­
sworn but "derives from fewer operations" because the
number of terrorists and subversives has diminished.
Torture used to intimidate and extract information
is described by the Embassy to include "electric shock,
the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium
pentothal, severe beatings, including 'El Telefono' in
which a simultaneous blow is delivered to both ears with
cupped hands.”
A 1978 Amnesty International report
in addition describes "cigarette burns...sexual abuse,rape
...removing teeth, fingernails, and eyes...burning with
boiling water, oil and acid: and even castration."
The Embassy reports firsthand accounts of physical
torture at La Perla Interrogation Center, outside
Cordoba, in September 1977. It further reports reliable
information about a case in late December 1977, and in
the past few weeks credible information about another
case. Most incidents reported to the Embassy took place
in 1976 and 1977.
One well-known case of physical abuse was Jacobo
Timcrman. Another well-publicized case by Amnesty Inter­
national was that of Elizabeth Kasemann, a 29 year old
West German citizen who died three months after her
arrest by security forces in May 1977. Amnesty and our
Embassy have numerous documented examples.
The International Committee of the Red Cross reports
"guard brutality" in the jails, knd "beatings and assaults"
during "transfers from jail to jail." The Embassy reports
that "clandestine seizure, hostile interrogation, and
summary adjudication remain basic operating procedures
for Argentine security forces." These procedures are

expected to continue at least until after the World
Cup Soccer matches in June.

Our Embassy further notes that, while penalties
exist for police maltreatment of common criminals, they
do not for political detainees. Furthermore, no such
charges have been made publicly against members of the
Armed Forces which carry out much of the counter­
subversive operations, although internal disciplinary
proceedings have reportedly taken place for some
"unauthorized excesses."
Interior Minister Ilardindcguy
in May called for an end to police use of terrorist tactics,
and it was reported that the military received similar
orders.
However, no progress has been reported in deed.
Disappearances
Reports of torture do not of course deal with the
thousands (estimates range in the tens of thousands) of
Argentine citizens who were abducted by security forces
and summarily executed. These cases, known as the disap­
peared,.
include not only suspected terrorists but
encompass a broader range of people— including
also
labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates,
scientists, doctors, and political party leaders. A
recent dramatic occurrence was the abduction in December
of five "mothers of the disappeared" and two French nuns,
whose bodies were reportedly discovered washed ashore.
There is a growing movement led by human rights
organizations and the Church to trace the missing people.
In La Prensa of May 7, an open letter to President Videla
was printed as a full page ad listing the names of 2,592
disappeared and urging an accounting.
It was sponsored
by three Argentine human rights organizations - and paid
for by contributions from large numbers of Argentine
citizens.
Editorials in Argentine newspapers this month
further called attention to the "political timebomb"
of the tragic disappearances. The Buenos Aires Herald
declared “Every effort must be made to trace missing
people.
It is the only way to .convince the world, and
to prove to ourselves, that we do care about human
rights.
If anxious relatives are ignored or treated with
callousness, they will become symbols as victims pf a
totally brutalized society."
Innumerable.- letters are
received by the US Government from the relatives and friends
of the disappeared calling for an accounting.

SEO&1
ifly, hu
Internationally,
human rights organizations are
also supporting this campaign. Amnesty International,for
example, on May 18 launched a major drive against political
imprisonments, torture, disappearances and executions in
Argentina.
Both the internal and external pressure building seek
to generate an impact on the GOA to render a public account­
ing.

SECJ»ET

3

MflftUFN FIAL
Department of State
PAGE II
ACTION NEA-U

TEL AV 22920

II OF 12

28I404Z

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

TEL AV 22921

4321

11 OF 12

2I1414Z

NOT TO RENT I OH COA IN ANY ARTICLES.
INFO

KT-11 ARB-11
SS-1S CIAE-I3

ADS-II HA-BS PN-CG .HSC-Di SP-I2
0C0E-3I I MR-13 NSAE-OI PA-11 /067 W
................................... 161431 2I1423Z /23

I 2S1S1SZ OCT 79
FN AMEMBASSY 'EL AVIV
TO SEC3TATE WASHDC 4307
INFO USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY IUENOS AIRES
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 11 OF 12 TEL AVIV 22921
STATE FOR NEA/ARA VARY; HA FOR OERIAN
USICA FOR AR
E.O. 12B6S: RSS 11/25/99 IDIETERICH, W.J.) OR-O
TAGS: PEPR, P'NR, PINT, IS, AR
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE FKIIF JACHBfl TI HERMAN
1.
(C - ENTIRE TEXT!
/
2. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE 9IETER1CH, WHO
KNEW HIM IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1972-74 TOUR THERE,
TIMERMAN DISCUSSEO INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY
POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM SN THE
ARGENTINA MILITARY RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL DILEMMA AS TO
WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT "IS EXPERIENCES, AN3 THE
FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TIMERMAN WILL BE IN THE
UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARO FROM THE AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMITTEE ON SATURDAY, CCT. 27. AFTER THAT HE
PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TS SEE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OERIAN. THEN HE WILL CO T3 WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL. AT THE*TfrPARTHENT.
AND ATJKE WHITE HOUSE.

6. TIMERMAN ALSO MENTIONED 'HAT HE BELIEVES THE RIGHTWING AND VERY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CAB IL 30 IS FINANCES
■Y 01 ANA OE NASSOT, PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PROVIIICIA IN
1AHIA BLANCA.
INI: HRS. NASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE
EMBASSY, AND IF MEMORY SERVES, RECEIVED A MARIA .ICONS
CABOT OR IAPA AWARD IN 1973 SR 1974.)
7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, TIMERMAN
SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MOOERATE AND RIGHT WING
ELEMENTS' IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOR PERCNIST
' SUPPORT, WHICH MAY CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERCH
WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA.
B. IN CONVERSATION WITH TIMERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A
CHILL IMS IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING
WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES
THE ARGENTINE HILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN
ANO ANTI-SEMITIC.
9. TI HERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV
DAILY MAARIV ANO SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT,
ALTHOUGH HE SAIO HE NIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME
TIME AT All ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED COLUMBIA. THUS FAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON
LATIN AMERICAN MATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE
WILL 8RANCH INTO 8R0A0ER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL HATTERS. HE SAIO THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH
HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HUMAN RIGHTS
AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EIGHTIES, AND ADDED THAT THE US

"

3. TIHERHAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF SUESTIONING
DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS SOLE AS THE ARGENTINE
'LEADER' OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND
THAT THERE WAS VERY .ITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR
TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURES IN LA
PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED
ZBIGNIEW SRZEZINSKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON
ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TCLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN
BECAUSE HE HAS SARES TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS
IN A CONVERSATION Wl'H ASSISTANT SECRETARY CERIUM, THE
OBJECTION APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAO SLANDERED FASCISM.
HE WAS ALSO QUESTIONED CONCERNING SUPPOSED CONTACTS
BETWEEN MENACiEM BEGIN AND THE MC.HTO.VERO 3UERILLAS
CURING A BEG.N VISIT TS ARGENTINA IN 1979. TIHERHAN
BELIEVES THESE GUEST IONS STEMMED 'ROM THE FACT THAT
BEGIN*S BOCK 'WAR III THE HOLY LANS* HAS BEEN FOUHO AMONG
MATERIALS USES BY THE M0N10IIER0S. TIMERMAN WAS BROUGHT
FROM PRISON TO All iNTEPVtE'J WITH GEN. HARGUINOESUY IN
THE CASA RCSAOA PRIOR TO A SERI 411 VISIT. THE GENERAL
INFORMED HIM THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE
THAT PATT OERIAN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE
WAS HIS COUSIN.

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.13S2B
NARA_JL>1_ n«t»

4. TIMERMAN (LSD REBORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LAHUSSE'S EX'
PRESS SECRETARY EDGAROO SAJOM DIES OF A HEART ATTACK
DURING TORTURE 8Y ELECTRIC SHOCX. SINCE HE WAS A
RELATIVELY YOUNG MAH, THE MIlITARI DID NOT SUSPECT THAT
HE HAO A HEART CONDITION.
TIMERMAN IS HOW PFIUSTAilT TO
lieilT WIT FYPCRLETICE5 111 ARGENTiUA SEC-USE HE FE4.RS REPRISALS BY THE
MILI*AaiL>'J4:'.ST »H. i.'.SS ST\L :ll .AGENT i.iA. >5 AN
5.

EXAMPLE OF THIS HE "EIITICNES ‘'■AT ROBERT COX. EC, TOR OF
THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAO SENT A MESSAGE r0 HIM
THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY III BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM

, .

.

-

authority

Lo>V

--------

Department of State
PAGE 31
ACT.! ON NEA-11

TEL AY 22923

32 OF 32

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

28B434Z

INFO

OCT-31 ARA-11
ADS-33 PM-B6 NSC-35 SP-32 5S-15
CIAE-3B DOOE-33
1 NR- 13 NSAE- 33 PA-31 HA-35 /067 W
06 3 4 4 1 2 8 0 4 2 4 Z /23
R 2 5 1510Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4308
INFO USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CONF IDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 32 TEL AVIV 22920
WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
FOR YEARS TO COME.
TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC
APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL
AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA.
HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS
HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND
Wl S

4324

t
^-SECRET-"
ARGENTINA
1980/1981 PLAN OF ACTION AND OTHER ISSUES
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 29 the Interagency Group for Latin America
developed a strategy, subsequently approved by the
President, to achieve better balance in our relations
with Argentina. Before the strategy could be fully
implemented, Argentina became heavily involved in
supporting the new Bolivian regime. Imminent GOA
recognition of the Bolivian regime and continuing
reports of Argentine involvement led to the postponement
of Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit. The visit
was to have been the major vehicle for implementing
most of the initiatives to improve U.S.-Argentine
relations in 1980.
Argentina continues to be heavily involved in
supporting financially and militarily the Bolivian
regime. There is some indication that because of
the strong USG reaction and the effect on our bilateral
relations, Argentine leaders are willing to counsel
moderation to the Bolivians, but there is no clear
indication as yet the GOA is in fact exerting needed
pressure to end the more repressive and corrupt practices
of the Garcia Meza regime. Over the longer term,
we would hope that Argentina would encourage a return
to civilian rule and avoid a polarization in Bolivian
society.
Argentina is unlikely to cooperate further in
the West's partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union.
Although we had been told earlier that cooperation
was possible and depended on the size of the 1980/1981
harvests, our Embassy was informed last week that
Argentina would sell as much grain to the USSR as
is available.
The U.S. continues to have a significant stake
in maintaining and furthering improved bilateral relations.
We continue to seek Argentine support on East-West
and Hemispheric issues, in international fora and
on non-proliferation. We also seek to influence Argentine
internal developments on human rights and on an eventual
return to democracy, as well as to limit the potential
increase of Soviet influence there. Other strategic
interests include its size, geographic location, natural
resources, and relatively advanced economic, scientific,

-SECRET
2
-

-

and cultural development. Argentina has the most
advanced nuclear program in Latin America and potentially
one of the world's richest oil-bearing areas in its
vast continental shelf. Argentina*s.port facilities
and coastline could play an important role in the
protection of critical sea lanes.

The U.S. also has major commercial interests
in Argentina. U.S. exports to Argentina more than
doubled in 1979 over 1978 (from $704 million to $1.5
billion). In the first nine months of 1980 exports
increased 59.3% over the same period in 1979 to $1.8
billion. Of particular interest to U.S. industry
are the potentially large exports related to the huge
hydroelectric projects being undertaken by the GOA
with Paraguay. Potential sales in one project alone
could total up to $350 million. The U.S. Government
has been actively supporting the bids of U.S. firms
in these projects.
The U.S. faces a potentially serious confrontation
with Argentina at the’ OASGA beginning November 19
on the issue of the IAHRC's human rights report.
Failure to reach agreement could affect our other
national interests. In addition, we need to consider
the U.S. approach to President viola during his planned
visit to Washington, particularly with regard to the
GOA's interest in resuming arms purchases and the
Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment barring such sales.
II.

STATUS OF 1980 ACTION PLAN

A.

Continuing or Early-Action Initiatives;

— Meeting of the U.S./Argentine Mixed Economic
Commission. The meeting has been scheduled for April
1981 (the earliest mutually convenient time frame).
The agenda will include discussion of bilateral trade
issues and seek to expand commercial relations.
— Bilateral Income Tax Treaty.
the Treaty is in the final stages.

— Consular Convention.
a proposed text.

Conclusion of

Both parties are reviewing

— Human Rights. We have continued the dialogue,
most recently through high level bilateral discussions
at the UNGA. We are continuing discussions at the
OASGA.
-SECRET

_SEGRET--3-

— Nuclear Relations. We are continuing negotiations
aimed at resolving the remaining safeguards issues
to permit the delivery of highly and moderately enriched
uranium for Argentina's nuclear research program as
well as components for its power program. We hope
negotiations will be completed this year. We continue
to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
most recently during bilateral talks at the UNGA.
B.

Initiatives where the Timing is Undecided;

— Visit by the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs to Buenos Aires. Assistant Secretary
Bowdler's visit to Argentina was postponed following
Argentina's support of the Bolivia coup and recognition
of the new Bolivian regime.

.1

— The first round of periodic security consultations
focusing on security of the South Atlantic. These
talks will highlight the critical' strategic implications
of the South Atlantic and create interest in cooperation
for its defense.
— Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric
issues. We would exchange views on global issues
and explore ways to promote mutually beneficial policies.
The agenda would include an-exchange of views on human
rights policies and Argentina's evolution toward democracy,
East-West and Hemispheric cooperation, and international
issues such as law of the sea and .the transfer of
arms and technology.
— Signing the Agricultural Cooperati

Agreement. ^

We have withheld signing the agreement until GOA participation
in the partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union
is resolved.
"—1
— An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor
to the U.S. Army School of the Americas. H reports
that consultations with the Congress are completed
and have been favorable. HA disagrees as to the scope
of the consultations.
— A high-level military visit. We told the
President we will keep under review the desirability
of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader,
such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.

SBeRET---

-SECRET-4-

A final decision, including timing, would take into
account continued improvements in the observance of
human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.
C.

Issues To Be Discussed;

1. In view of the GOA's continuing involvement
in Bolivia and its policy of non-cooperation on grains
restriction, which initiatives should be rescheduled
and which should be deferred for later decision? '
III.
A.

ARGENTINA AT THE OASGA
Background;

One of the most controversial issues at the OASGA
will be how to handle the IAHRC's human rights report
on Argentina. If Argentina perceives it is unjustly
or harshly treated by the OAS in general or the U.S.
in particular, it may ..make good on its threat to walk
out of the OAS. GOA officials have also implied that
the U.S. position at the OAS will be taken into account
in considering the award of contracts for hydroelectric
projects such as Yacyreta.
Following USG representations, Argentina allowed
the visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(IAHRC) in September 1979. The Commission's special
report was severely critical of Argentina, calling
on the GOA to inter alia account for the disappeared
and bring to trial and punish those responsible, lift
the state of siege, release or grant the right of
option to depart Argentina to those persons held under
Executive detention, investigate and punish those
responsible for torture, and restore due process guarantees.

Consideration of the IAHRC's report on Argentina
may be the most divisive issue in this year's OASGA.
Many human rights groups and representatives from
the Argentine exile community plan to visit Washington
during the meeting and will push for Assembly condemnation.
Argentine Nobel laureate Perez Esquivel also plans
to be in Washington during the meeting. While these
activities will heighten publicity over Argentina's
case in the U.S., they will serve even more to focus
public attention on the Commission's activities in
Argentina. The Argentine Government believes harsh
awt.on by the OAS will establish precedent for similar
treatment in other lnterimL^w—1 fora, and it is seeking
• SECRET-—

-SEGUE?—
-5an omnibus resolution which would not name specific
countries. Mexico, Venezuela and Peru are strong
supporters of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(IAHRC) and, in varying degrees, favor an activist
stance by the OAS in the human rights' field.
U.S.-Argentine bilateral discussions could be
crucial to achieving a satisfactory outcome. We are
working informally with Argentina and other interested
countries to develop an OAS resolution which, while
not calling for condemnation o£ Argentina, will recognize
the work of the Commission, take note of the human
rights situation at the time of the report, note the
improvements since, and call on the GOA to take into
account the report's recommendations for improved
human rights observance.
B.

Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Should the U.S. back off on its position
calling for a country-specific resolution and accept
an an omnibus resolution which would make some specific
mention of Argentina, if that is the consensus of
the other OAS members?
2. Should we accept an omnibus resolution not
mentioning Argentina?
V.

U.S. MILITARY SALES TO ARGENTINA

A.

Background:

i

At the May 14 Policy Review Committee meeting
on Argentina, it was decided that it would be premature
to consider rescission or modification of legislative
restrictions on military supply to Argentina this
year. In 1981, legislative modifications to permit
training and perhaps other actions concerning military
supply might be considered if the human rights situation
in Argentina continued favorably. The current human
rights situation is described in the attached summary.
IMET Training Programs, the sale of training
under FMS and military supplies to the GOA (FMS and
Munitions List items) are prohibited by the HumphreyKennedy Amendment. In addition, under current policy,
the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List
items to the Argentine military and the police through
the Commerce export control licensing system. In
SECRET

^SECRET
6
-

-

order to permit the sale of these items, either:
— the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment would have
to be rescinded or modified;
— a Presidential determination that a proposed
sale was in the U.S. national interest would have
to be evoked (At present, the President has no such
leeway for Humphrey-Kennedy; however, legislation
is pending in this year's FAA which would give the
President this authority); or
— the Congress would need to pass specific legislation
permitting a particular sale.
DOD has identified strategic and economic interests
which support the sale of military aircraft in the
near term:
— There is a strategic need for the sale of
ocean surveillance P-3., aircraft to the GOA to counter
the Soviet buildup in the South Atlantic.
— Argentina plans to embark next year on a $3
billion modernization program for its Air Force.
The GOA has told us that it prefers U.S. equipment
and that it is committed to making a decision by June
1981. If the U.S. is unable to respond by that date,
Argentina will turn toward European suppliers.
i

The U.S. proscription of military sales toward
Argentina, while not affecting the availability of
military equipment to the GOA (European suppliers
have been more that willing to fill the gap), have
considerable political significance as a tangible
expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights
violations. Modification of our posture must take
into account the implications for our stance toward
other countries with human rights violations, as well
as the message this would send to human rights groups
in Argentina and internationally who have joined us
in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.
U.S. arms sales policies toward Argentina must
also take into account the strategic balance in the
Southern Cone. Chile already sees our improving relationship
with Argentina as threatening in the context of the
Beagle Channel■dispute. Major U.S. arms sales to
Argentina while we maintain our present cool and distant
relationship with Chile would further tip the balance
GECRET-

^BECHET
-7of power in favor of Argentina; this plus the political
signal renewed arms sales would convey to both parties
could encourage Argentina to seek a military solution
to the Beagle Channel dispute, if the current mediation
fails.
B.

Issues To Be Discussed;

1. Has there been sufficient-improvement in
the human rights situation to change our position
on military sales?
2. What specific human rights improvements would
be required for us to change our position?
3. Are there strategic or economic consideration
which would cause us to seek approval of specific
sales?
4. What are the ramifications of a resumption
of sales to Argentina on the military balance in the
Southern Cone? On our stance toward other countries
with human rights violations?
IV.

PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

A.

Background;

Argentine President-designate'Roberto Viola tentatively
plans to travel to New York December 5 to address
the Council on Foreign Relations and U.S.-Argentine
Chamber of Commerce. According to the Argentine Embassy
here, he may also visit Washington December 6-7.
Viola is a moderate within the Argentine military
hierarchy, friendly to the United States, and sympathetic
to U.S. views. His visit would provide an opportunity
to influence future Argentine policies on Bolivia,
grains, human rights, and Tlatelolco. On the other
hand, coming to Washington in the middle of a Presidential
transition is awkward. The Carter administration
will not be in a position to discuss policy beyond
January 20. Whether the President-elect or his advisors
would want to see him to review U.S.-Argentine relations
is problematical.
B.

Issues To Be Discussed;

1. Whether Viola should be encouraged to come
to Washington.
SECRET

tSEeBET
8
-

-

2. In the event of an affirmative answer, who
should see him?

Attachment:
Status of Human Rights in Argentina.
Drafted:ARA/SC:GJWhitman:mas
11/10/80

V_SE€RET

STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA
The human rights situation in Argentina has improved
over previous years, but remains serious. Most seriously,
fundamental, internationally recognized rights of
the integrity of the person have been violated through
the application by the security forces of the tactic
of disappearance. The number of confirmed disappearances
registered in Argentina this year.total 11, but there
are unconfirmed reports of 22 or more. This total
is in contrast to the many thousands who disappeared
in 1976 and 1977, more than 600 in 1978 and 44 in
1979. There continue to be reliable indications that
individuals detained as suspected terrorists or subversives
are subject to torture. There has been no accounting
for past disappearances.
The number of detainees on other than common criminal
charges has been reduced, although the numbers remaining
are still significant. Since 1974, 8200 people accused
of terrorism or subversion have been detained under
the special executive powers of the President. By
September 1980, prisoners accused of other than common
crimes totaled 1,700 to 1,800. Of these about 750
were being held without trial, some for many years
or after having served their sentences. About 600
had been tried and convicted in military or civilian
courts and another 400 were in trial status. The
right of option program, which allows qualified prisoners
to choose self-exile in lieu of detention, has been
greatly restricted by Argentine Government regulations.
As a result, of the 277 prisoners who have qualified
for the U.S. Hemispheric Parole Program, only 82 persons
have been able to travel to the United States.
Prison conditions have improved, although there
is still concern over psychological conditions which
may have been a factor in a number of suicides. Earlier
complaints regarding overcrowding, lack of medical
treatment, improper food, and restrictions on visits
have been largely resolved.
The opportunities for the exercise of political
freedoms remain circumscribed by the prohibition on
political activities and de facto limits on the freedom
of expression. Within uncertain limits, politicians
and the press increasingly voiced criticism of the
Government's actions and plans. Occasionally politicians
were detained on the grounds that they had overstepped
the limits of the law. The military designated the

-SBeKfff
10
-

-

President for the period 1981-1984, while reiterating
its ultimate commitment to return the country to civilian
rule. However, no date has been fixed for that devolution.

SECRET-

11-

-

Cleared:AHA/SC:REService
ARA:JABushnell .
ARA/RPP: GJones ■..
ARA:WGBowdler

/

NSU-l/II

'HE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON

March 21, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
. i

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to

I understand that you are considering changing our approach
to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in
human rights.
I have read the INR report on the human rights
situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering
document.
The human rights situation in Argentina may just
be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach
the United States Government should take to Argentina, I
believe we should address two questions:
(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina
to encourage them to respect human rights?
(S)
(2)
What approach will permit us to sustain in’ the U.S.
our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward
Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only
enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business
sector and the media in the U.S.
This doesn't mean that we
shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they
are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully
and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience — in the
U.S. and elsewhere — before taking any steps, least we
jeopardize our overall human rights policy.
(S)
Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an
impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never
as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our
human rights policy.
(S)
The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us
at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige
and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the
Argentine military government is legitimate.
Such legitimacy
would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina
and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutional­
ization of the military government.
The Argentine government
has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the
U.S.:
(1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they
have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
SECRST-~

Review on March 20, 1985

-

2

-

policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human
rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue,
still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners,
they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who
remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority
individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they
have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

(S)

The last —the invitation— may well be the most important.
It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to
the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate
basis on which we and other countries should make decisions
on human rights to Argentina.
(S)
I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and
correct until such time as the human rights situation
dramatically improves and the government has begun to move
toward democratization. I believe.that we should continue
to use every opportunity both directly and through third
countries to encourage them to improve their human rights
situation.
They will continue to try to lure high-level
visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident.

(S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as
punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and
conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their
support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would
be effective vis-a-vis Argentina.
(S.)
Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would
recommend that you delay implementing this approach until
after the Commission has completed its report.
I realize
that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the
wait is justified.
(S)
In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on
Argentina.
I think we should continue to maintain a strong,
cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress
in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to
move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back ExportImport Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report
and then adjust our policy appropriately.
(S)
Onr oc

Wm.

6*

JU

ZBIGN]
^SECRET

EZINSKI

1£5

*******G 0 M F I B

ft

I~~A £*******£ COPY

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
STU408
DE RUESBA #7745/1 2701320
0 R 260900Z SEP 80
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRFS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5883
INFO USMISS ION
AMEM3ASSY LIMA
AMEMBASST ROME
USMISSION USUN

GENEVA 1344
3678
891
NEW TORT 1151

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 7745
EXDIS
ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE
DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOR INTAFF
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/86 (RUSER, CLAUS W.J OR-M
TAGS: SHUM PINT AR
SUBJECT: THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE
REF: BUENOS AIRES 7578

2. SUMMARY: DISAPPEARANCE IS STILL THE STANDARD TACTIC
FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH CAPTURED
TERRORISTS. THE MILITARY'S COMMITMENT TO THIS METHOD IS
PROFOUNDLY ROOTED IN ELEMENTS THAT RANGE FROM EFFECTIVE­
NESS THROUGH EXPEDIENCY TO CULTURAL BIAS. WE DOUBT WHETHER
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPPROBRIUM WILL, IN THEMSELVES, CAUSE
THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE TACTIC AND GRANT CAPTURED TERROR­
ISTS DUE PROCESS. GETTING THE AUTHORITIES TO ABANDON THIS
TACTIC WILL BE AN UPHILL BATTLE. WE MUST TRY.
TEE VATICAN MAY BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATE IN THIS
EFFORT WHICH SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THE LEADERSHIP THAT
TRERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM—ESPECIALLY
THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COURTS. END SUMMARY.

RECLASSIFIED

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. THOUGH DRASTICALLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS FROM PREVIOUS
LEVELS, DISAPPEARANCE CONTINUES TO BE THE STANDARD TACTIC
FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH PEOPLF
THEY BELIEVE TO BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
DISAPPEARANCE IS A EUPHEMISM FOR TEE UNACKNOWLEDGED DETSNg###*###*##**** *VJHSP. COMMENT **************

PSN:039393

PAGE 01
*******£ CT-N F-I D E N T I A- L****sit#*E COPY

»*****»^LjO- N 7 I—D-S K' T r~A

l**#****E

COPY

TION OF AN INDIVIDUAL BY SECURITY FORCES. EASED ON EVERY­
THING WE KNOW, WE 3SLIEVE THAT DETAINEES ARE USUALLY
TORTURED AS PART OF INTERROGATION AND EVENTUALLY EXECUTED
WITHOUT ANY SEMBLANCE 0? DUE PROCESS. AS WE UNDERSTAND
IT, THE CURRENT GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY FORCES ARE TO
USE THIS PROCEDURE ONLY AGAINST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF TERROR­
IST ORGANIZATIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN' THAT VIRTUALLY
ALL OF THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED THIS YEAR hAVE PROBABLY
BEEN MONTONEROS.
4. THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES WON TEE "DIRTY VAR"
AGAINST THE TERRORISTS TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE THAT TIME THE
MONTONEROS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT ONLY ISOLATED, IF
OCCASIONALLY SPECTACULAR, ACTS FOR WHICH THE TERRORIST
ACTCRS HAVE OFTEN EVENTUALLY PAID WITH THEIR LIVES.
THUS, EVEN IF ONE WERE TO CONCEDE THE CASE BEFORE, NECESSITY HARDLY
CAN BE INVOKED BY THE MILITARY TO JUSTIFY THE USE OF DISAPPEAR­
ANCE AS A COUNTER-INSURGENCY TECHNIQUE. ON THE OTHER
HAND, THE CONTINUED USE OF DISAPPEARANCE HAS A VERY HIGH
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST FOR THE -GOVERNMENT. IT IS
ON THE DEFENSIVE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE STRAINED 3Y THE
ISSUE. TEE PROBABLE INVOLVEMENT OF ARGENTINE SECURITY
FORCES IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINE MONTONEROS
IN PERU FORCED PRESIDENT VIDELA TO CANCEL A TRIP TO LIMA
THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TO SYMBOLICALLY
EXPRESS HIS GOVERNMENT'S DEMOCRATIC INTENTION.
AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN THIS GOVERNMENT,‘OUR CONTACTS,
EVEN AMONG THE MILITARY, RECOGNIZE THESE COSTS AND EXPRESS
TEE HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY DISAPPEARANCES WILL CEASE.
5. BUT THEY DON'T THIS UNWILLINGNESS DOES NOT REFLECT
SIMPLE EL00DY-MINDEDNES5 BY UNTHINKING MILITARY MEN. IF
IT DID THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE MORE SOLUABLE. RATHER THE
ARGENTINES HAVE RECORSS TO DISAPPEARANCE BECAUSE:
—IT WORKED. MORAL AND LONG TERM POLITICAL COSTS APPEAR
LESS IMPORTANT THAN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS TO THE GOA.
ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DEFEATED ONE OF THE LARGEST
TERRORIST ASSAULTS ON A MOBFRN SOCIETY USING THIS
TACTIC. THE EXPERIENCE OF WEST GFRMANY AND THE UNITED
STATES IN USING THE LAW TO MVET A TERRORIST THREAT MAKES
LITTLE IMPRESSION HERE SINCE THE MILITARY ACCURATELY
EVALUATE TEE THREAT THAT THEY BESTFD AS BEING MUCH LARGER
THAN THE ONE THE UNITED STATES AND THE ERG FACED. RATHER,
ARGENTINES INVOICE ITALY'S CONTINUING TORMENT AS WHAT
THEY MIGHT HAVE FACED IF THEY HAD STUCK TO THE LAW.
—IT CONTINUES TO BE EFFECTIVE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS YI~I.D
UP INFORMATION UNDER TORTURE. DISAPPEARED PREISONERS CAN
BE TURNED AGAINST THEIR FORMER COMRADES. DISAPPEARED
PSN :039390

PAGE 02

TOR:270/21:29Z

»»»»»»E yji E N T I A

DTG:260900Z SEP 80

l*******E

COPY

QMTE’T^KM

TTJi

T.*******TB

COPY

PRISIONEP.S ARE BELIEVED TO BE A FRIGHTENING EXAMPLE THAT
INHIBITS THE MONTONEROS' ABILITY TO RECRUIT NEW PERSONNEL.
3T

PSNi039390

PAGE 03

OE 03

TOR:270/21:29Z

DTG:260900Z SEP 50

*******C"0 NT I~*P E~fTT l-^lr-b*****^^ COPY

198

*#*###$Cc^^^-iL-I----B--3"ir'T

X"X^*******! COPT

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
UTS551
DE RUSS3A #7745/2 27K1330
C R 260900Z SEP 30
FM AMEMEASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6893
INFO USMISSIOH
AMEMEASSY LIMA
AMEMEASSY ROME
USMISS ION US UN

GENEVA 1345
3679
892
NEW YOF.T 1152

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 771:5
EXDIS
ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE
DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOP. INTAFF
—THE MILITARY ARE UNlflLLINC- TO USE CIVILIAN COURTS TO
PUNISH ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THEY ARGUE ThAT THE COURTS
WOULD SIMPLY LET THE TERRORISTS GO. IN VIEW OF THE
STIFF SENTENCES HANDED OUT RECENTLY TO TERP.ORISTS
CAPTURED IN EARLIER YEARS, THIS ARGUMENT IS NO! CONVINCING.
WE EFLIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM IS FOUNDED FIRST IN THE
INABILITY OF TEE MILITARY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE FOR USE
IN THE COURTS AC-AINST MEN AND WOMEN FANATICALLY DEDICATED
TO THEIR CAUSE—OTHER THAN THAT EXTRACTED FROM THE
DETAINEES UNDER TORTURE. SECONDLY, THE SECURITY SERVICES
ARE UNWILLING TO SURRENDER THEIR COMPLETE CONTROL OVER
THE DETAINEES.
—THE MILITARY DOES NOT HAYS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE.
THEORETICALLY A SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE WOULD
HANDLE THE TERRORISTS, METING OUT CAPITAL SENTENCES 17
THAT WERE TO ITS TASTES. HOWEVER, FOR SUCE A SYSTEM
TO WORK, THERE WOULD HAVE TO EE OFFICERS OF RECORD '"HO
IN THE FUTURE COULD 3? HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
ACTIONS. AS ONE MAN, HIMSELF A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE MAJOR
SECURITY FORCES, TOLD US, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO
ARGENTINE OFFICER WHO WANTS TO HAVE HIS NAME ON RECORD
AS ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST. UNDER THE
CURRENT SYSTEM, THE MILITARY ARE RESPONSIBLE AS AN
INSTITUTION BUT TEE INDIVIDUAL IS FREE FROM ACCOUNTABILITY.
—AT BEST, THE RULF OF LAW IS A WEAK AND FRA"ILF CONCEPT IN
ARGENTINA. THE MILITARY POES NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM AND ITS

PSN:339398

PAGE 01

TOR:270/21:31Z

DTG:260S00Z SEP 80

*»*****£_- 0—N—F—I D £ N f I—A_J^*******]j; COPY

AftAsjcAfrftff—Q NFIDgMTT a

t*******^

COPT

DISREGARD FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF DUF PROCESS REFLECT
WIDESPREAD ATTITUDES IN THIS SOCIETY. ARGENTINES WHO
GENUINELY RELIEVE IN THE RULE OF LAW, SOME IN THE GOVERN­
MENT AND OTHERS OPPOSING IT, REMAIN A MINORITY.
—FORCING THE SECURITY FORCES TO A3NADON THE TACTIC WOULD
INVOLVE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF
THE GOVERNMENT AND VERY POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN THE -SECURITY
FORCES. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF SUCH A CONFRONTATION MAKE
IT A VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH
MUST COUNT ON A MILITARY INSTITUTION THAT IS MORE OR
LESS UNIFIED.
—INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPINION ARE GIVEN LESS
WEIGHT BY THE MILITARY THAN THE NEED TO CLEAN UP THE
REMANANTS OF TEE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR. THEY WILL NOT
EASILY CHANGE THEIR TACTICS TO MOLLIFY CRITICISM.
6. TEE USE OF DISAPPEARANCE IS NOW RESTRICTED, WE RELIEVE,
TO ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THUS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH DISAPPEAR­
ANCES OCCUR DEPSNIS SOLELY ON THE NUMBER OF MONTONEROS WHO
ARE ACTIVE AND GET CAUGHT. AS TEF NUMBER OF ACTIVE
MONTONEROS HAS DECLINED, SO HAVE THE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES.
THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE IF TEE NUMBER OF ACTIVE MONTONEROS
CONTINUES TO TROP, BUT DISAPPEARANCE AS AN ACCEPTABLE TACTIC
WILL NOT END SOON.
7. AS THE VAR BETWEEN THE TERRORISTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES
GOES ON? HUMANITARIAN VALUES AND US RELATIONS WITH THIS
COUNTRY ARE CAUST IN A CROSSFIRE. WE OBVIOUSLY CAN DO
LITTLE TO AFFECT THE TERRORISTS' CHOICE OF WHETHER OR NCI
TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE
GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON TACTICS IT WILL USE IN THIS FAR
IS NOT MUCH GREATER. IT WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUS
AGAINST ARGENTINE "SUCCESS" IN ITS UNDELCARED WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM AND PARA-MILITARY GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. BUT WE
BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE OBSTACLES WE MUST MAYF THE EFFORT.
WE SHOULD:
—MAKE IT CLEAR TO GOA OPINION MAKERS THAT WHILE WE HAVE
NO SYMPATHY FOR THE TERRORISTS WE CANNOT CONDONE EXTRALEGAL ACTIONS GAINST THEM. SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES TO FMPLOY SUCH TACTICS THERE WILL BE AN
IMPORTANT IMPEDIMENT TOMORMAL RELATIONS.
—ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO PONDER SERIOUSLY HOW THIS
POLICY IMPEDES ITS EFFORTS TO MAKE ARGENTINA A RESPECTED
MEMBER OF THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS.
—STIMULATE THE GOVERNMENT TO THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVES TO
THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISH­
MENT OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE MAY BE
THF BEST ANSWER. IF THE MILITARY COULD BE SHAKEN OUT OE
THFIR BELIEF THAT DEATH IS TEE ONLY REASONABLE PUNISHMENT
PSN:039398

RAGF 02

TOR:270/21:3iZ

*****»»C 3Hnn N T I A

DTG:26O900Z SEP 8
COPY

******* C_q NFIDEM^Tfl

COPY

FOR TERRORISTS, TRW ARMED FORCES MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGES
IN USING THE MILITARY COURTS. TEE BRAZILIANS RFLIED ON
THEM DURING THEIR SUCCESSFUL BOUT WITH TERRORISTS. THIS
EXAMPLE MIGHT HELP CONVINCE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY
SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS ALTERNATIVE.
—ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN AND POSSIBLY THE ARGENTINE CHURCH
TO INTERVENE WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. THE
PAPAL NUNCIO HERE UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES AND IS ALREADY
INVOLVED IN TRYING TO GET THE GOA TO EXAMINE THE MORALITY
AND WISDOM OF THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE (SEPTEL). THE
CHURCH AND THE POPE HAVE FAR MORE INFLUENCE HERE THAN
THE USG AND CAN BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATES OF A
FULL RETURN TO THE RULE OF LAW. WE WILL OF COURSE
CONTINUE TO FOSTER RETHINKING OF THE POLICY OF DISAPPEAR­
ANCES WITHIN TEE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT.
RUSER
BT

?SN:039393

"RAGE- 03

OF 33

TOR:270/21:31Z

DTG:26030ZZ SEP 80

»*»»*** c QNFTPFNTTA T,*******F.

COPY

i
/

DRAFT
-SECRET {Entire Text)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

Warren D. Christopher

Subject:

Steps to Improve U.S.-Argentine
Relations

-.Pursuant to ycrur instructions, the Inter-Agency
Group for the Arne rican Republics has prepared a plan
9

of action for 198 0, which I am submitting for your
approval.
£
*

I.

OBJECTIVES
-

Our principc 1 objective will be improve our relationships so as to fc ster Argentina's identification with
the West; to seel assistance on appropriate East-West
issues (e.g. grai ns); to foster increased sensitivity
among Argentine ] eaders to global nonproliferation
concerns; to encc urage further specific
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
NARA

<tr£-

E.0.1352B
Dato

.

0

^ -I

"(W-SW---------

-

2-

improvement in current human rights practices (e.g.
due process for a+1 persons suspected of subversion
thus to contain Soviet political
and economic influence.

We also wish to encourage

continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal Mediation
of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial
limits in the Beat le Channelj a dispute that very nearly

led to war betweeik the two countries in late 1978.
Finally, we wish

:o encourage Argentina to play a

constructive role with respect to developments in
Central America and in other Hemispheric issues.

II.

1.

ACTIONS FOR 1980

The Consul tat:. ve Process

We will cont nue the process of political and
economic consults :ions begun with General Goodpaster's
visit to Buenos A res in January.

We contemplate:

—A visit by the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs iio Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1.

-3-

—A meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic
Commission in October, the U.S.

delegation to be

chaired by the Un^er Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs.

—Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric
issues, with the

irst round of such talks to be held

during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs.

2.

Nuclear Relat ons

We want to .kiiiep open the door for such cooperation
as Argentina may flesire for its nuclear program, as
a way to maintain influence for the longer-term,
In particular, we should try to meet our commitment
to provide highly and moderately enriched fuel for
Argentina's resea :ch program.

We should:

—Try to res Dive promptly, in accordance with
D.S. law, the rem Dining safeguards issues to permit

-4-

delivery of the research fuel and the licensing of
U.S. components;

—once this is done, undertake a review of the
advisability of modifying U.S. policy to facilitate
greater participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's
nuclear program.

(The principal case currently at

issue is an export license permitting the sale of
a high-pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

3.

Human Rights

We would continue the dialogue on human rights
with Argentine leaders, through'Ambassador Castro
and dtrring the visit by the Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs.

In these consultations we

will attempt to obtain assurances that:

—the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which
encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina
and which maintains the integrity of the OAS Commission
on Human rights;

-5-

— there be no new disappearances,

(i.e., extra-

legal abductions of persons suspected of association
with terrorism or subversion, including persons believed
to be active terrorists);

—all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive
activities be processed through normal judicial channels,
thus ensuring due process to such detainees; and

—there be substantial progress in advance of
the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners
held without charges through release, trial, or exile
(during his recent .visit, Ambassador Smith-was assured
that half of these prisoners—1,300 at the time—would
be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting
of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed
in UN fora, and concluded that this should not be
a central requirement for improving our bilateral
relationship.

6

-

4.

-

Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased
contact and consultations, while stressing that further
progress on human rights will'be essential to the
more fundamental improvement in relations (including
a modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment,
as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting).
We plan to:

—begin periodic security consultations with
Argentina;

the fir-s’t round,

to be held this year in

Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in
the South Atlantic;

— invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make
a return visit to Washington later in the year to
discuss global defense issues;

— invite Argentina to send a guest instructor
to the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

(The Executive

Branch will consult with members of Congress on this
initiative.)

-7-

Other issues are:

—High-Level Military Visit.

We will keep under review the desirability to
proceed with an invitation to a senior Argentine military
leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine
Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington
this year.

A final decision on this (including the

question of timing) should take into account the implica­
tions of such a move on the selection of the next
Argentine president now under way within the Argentine
Armed Forces, as well as developments in human rights
and D. S.-Argentine’ relations.

—Sale of P-3 Aircraft.

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for
the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft .to the GOA.
We see no possibility, however, to seek special legisla­
tion to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina
this year.

5.

Other Cooperative Steps

In addition, we would:

—Sign the pending P.S.-Argentine Agricultural
Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant
Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs;

— Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral
income tax treaty;

— Seek to negotiate a consular convention.

6.

Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether
and in what form the Administration should consult
our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern
such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives
toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere.
•We believe recent Soviet activities are a subject
for the NATO experts group on Latin

8

America and should be addressed in that forum.

Human

rights are discussed by the WEO group in the appropriate
UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission.
A majority of the Inter-Agency Group recommended against
any new bilateral approaches to our Allies on these
issues.

7.

Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and

Chile

_ The Group also-considered the implications for
>

neighboring countries, especially as regards security
consultations.

As a general point, the Group noted that many
of these steps will merely restore a better balance
in U.S. relations with the two countries since the
U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process
with Brazil (including*, most recently, security consulta­
tions).

There was agreement that Brazil would not

respond favorably to a proposal for trilateral security
talks at this time.

9

Not addressed by the Group, but a problem of
some consequence, nonetheless, is the Chilean perception
that we have "tilted" toward Argentina.

Chile sees

our warming relationship with Argentina as being directly
threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute.
We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what
we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with
Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel,
which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of
Papal mediation and avoid war.

However, the Chileans

seem to fear that the Argentines, enjoying improved
relations with the U.S., and seeing Chile increasingly
isolated, will be encouraged toward adventurism.
This'problem of art imbalance in our relationships
in the Southern Cone, and of the dangers that this
could pose to peace in the region, will need to be
looked to in the not-too-distant future.

ABA/SCsCWRuser:Is
Disc 1

****#»

.332 *

n M y j

n »:

t*******^ COPf

0? IMMED
STUPP9
T)^ ■RUUSEA #0928/1 02915535 *13X357033 - PCS SVCD; PROCESS
0 291417Z JAM ^0
TW ’AMFMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE VASEDC IMMEDIAPE 00?0
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF

3828

MODIS
E.O. 12055: XDS-1 1/28/10 (CASTRO, RAUL r ■ . ) OR-M
TARS: PFPR, AR
SUBJECT: (C3 DRA^T MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S
VISIT TO />ROENTlnTT'S!!!^5U!, 'P'OtiynTAt ‘I'OFll'b ; JlWUAKr*g3-------------------1.

(C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
*. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA:
GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS
4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARGOS PASTOR,
FOREIGN MI MISTER
DR. JOS51 ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE FOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY
COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
MR. VICTOR R’EADGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER)
GENERAL ANDREv; J. GOODPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY
RAUL H. CASTRO, U .S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA
CLAUS «V. RUSER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/ECA)
WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, Cf.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (NOTETAKER)
c. PLACS AND TIME: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1953J TiE MINISTRY
Qtp FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RUENOS AIRES
c.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMA.U. GENERAL GOODPASTER
ON TV70 CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS.
TOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS
COMCFRNS, POLITICAL-MILITARI AFFAIRS AND MATTERS
HAVING TO DO vITH NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IT T*AS HIS
GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AM ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTAND­
INGS TROUBLES U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, AND TEAT U.S.

mut

PBN:ff54527

PAGE

?■!

TO 1:0 50/01:30Z

DTG:291417Z JAN 30

****»**&-q N F I D 5 i\H T I -A-4ASy****E COPY
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13S2B
Authority K>UC.

maf}a__£SL___ Dsto

n\-as\\\j.

*»*****_&. Q M JP

I-inTT

1 I A i,***»*yyE COPY

MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCAL­
CULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS
BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION. IN HIS SECOND PRESENTATION, ON JANUARY 24,
BRTGAUIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR
^FS^RING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.
7. A S^ARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS
ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ OE ROZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR
WORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS
SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AT EARLIER EXISTING
LEVELS. END MEM CON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
P. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S
T’IRST PRESENTATION.
PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTEK'S EXPLANATION
0* PROBLEMS RISING FBQM THIS SOVIET INVASION OF
AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GENERAL'S PROPOSED AGENDA FOR
DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROL5 IN THESE, WITH THE WISH
AT SOMF POINT TC COVER TEE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL
PROBLEMS EXISTING UEWEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED
STATES.
°. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL
QUESTION: IF GRAINS SHIPMENT COOPERATION IS SO IMPORTANT
JUST NOW IN 00R BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS W.E ADMIT
THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL —
PQW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE DELATIONS ON SUCH
BASIS T^AW IN s’A?. MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR
EXAMPLE, ’’’HE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND

TOG^TPER?
IB. wp CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT"
DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT WE
ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARI AND OTHER QUESTIONS.
UNFORTUNATELY. PASTOk CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR BAD RELATIONS
ARE THE ”NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE II.S. THE UNITED
SPATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTIMF REALITIES, AND
BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMS.MJ HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF
U.S. POLICY, AND "INADMISSIBLE U.S.G. ACTIONS.
1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR FAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT
ARGENTINA FOUGHT A ''7AP AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT
TASTED BETWEEN T>*0 AND THREE Y REARS. AND ARGENTINA WON
vAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S.
SHOULD BE PRO'JU OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS —
RATHEH T^AN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION" WAS
TFT! HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS THIS
SYMBOLISM, PASTOR «'FNT ON, THAT H4S BEEN TAXHN SO
PSN:<?54?S?7

PAGE HZ

TOR :030/21 :30Z

DTG:291417Z JAN *40

gyyggttgc QNPIDE'WJIA •k$**»*y»E COPY

__Q—N—g—T T\ A M 'H-J—COPY

*

SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES —
RATHER AS TROUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD
CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES,
WEN THE U.S. HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT
INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET CF CIRCUMSTANCES.
12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OF
ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNFAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE
R'UMP^REY—KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF
.ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
OT^FR INTERNATIONAL FORUMS — EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED,
TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR. DEVELOPMENT.
13. COITL3 "RE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1932
ARGENTINA .-'AS FIRS" TO SEND SHIPS TO REL*3 THE FREE
,,fORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ("WE DIDN'T EVEN GET \
TFANK-YOU NOT'7.") ARGENTINA BACA ED Til U.S. IN
PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA j THIS COUNTRY HELPED
DEFEAT AN UNFRIENDLY MOTION ON PUERTO RICO AT THE
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFF iENCEJ WE WERE THE FIRST
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES J
WE VOTED VITfl THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS;
'■•TF ALIGNED WITH THE iJ.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A
RESOLUTION ON AEHGANISTAN.

PSN:354S27

PAG?1 33

QY 33

***»*»»£. n li

TOR:030/01:33Z
T TH ft-AL ’P

DTG:291417Z JAN 82

T ft T.»******E COPY

.333 *

****»*yjL-0—tl -J-I-B-B N T I-&r L*******E COPY

op IMMEP
F*U271
D* RU?SBA *2323/2 0291724 AOX057033 - *Z H STOP; PROCESS
0 291417Z JAN 93
ttm ‘am-pmMSSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECS*ATE '.'ASHDC IMMEDIATE f?000
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 082B
NOD IS
14. U.S. LACS OF APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE
TO THE ARGENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," 'REN RE LEARNS
*PR EXAMPLE TRAT YOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAKE IN TEE
S^AB OF IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANGE, BUT ARGENTINES
RVMEMRFP all these PROBLEMS.
15. FOR
IS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, GOA MUST ASK
NOW FOR PROFOUND CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US,
PASTOR SAID. AND NOT ONL? MUST ATTITUDES TOWASD ARGENTINA
HE CHANGED, BUT ATTITUDES TOWARD MOST OF LATIN AMERICA.
THESE CHANGES OP ATTITUDES IN POLICY HOPEFULLY WILL BE
reflected at *re white house, in thf. congress, at interMATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASKED THAT THE U.S. STOP_PRESSING
ARGENTINA SO SAPP IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ( IN RESPONSE TO"WHICH WS__
in)*fW-Ct3rSSI3S^.^SCOMt«NW9LG_MAT- 1HE-PRESIDENT POSTPONE A TRIP TO
^ THE gQVIF.T UNTON HE PLANS TO MAKE LATE?. THIS YEAR'"').
10. (AT THIS POINT PASTOR TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OTHER
SPECIFIC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
Hp DEVELOPED MORE FULLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE
RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.)
17 PASTOR T^E.M ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATEGORIZE US
AS JUST ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
TWIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL
DEMOCRACY — AND NO* OF TfU LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF
*PF IAS* PTRQNIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH TRAT "DEMOCRACY”
BOASTED A CONGRESS AND OTHER TRAPPINGS. IT WAS THAT
GOVERNMEN* WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED BY CUBAN
PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLEMDEJ
TTS LATER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND
KIDNAPPINGS. NOW !//E nAVE NO HUNGER, RACE PROBLEMS OR
PPRTOUS CRIM?. "rfE WANT TO 9E CONSIDERED AS A SERIOUS

PSW:054532

PAGE, 4l

TOR:030/01:32Z

n ■ M- IT

T

n in -ftl—T

T

a

DTG:29141?Z JAM 30

x********: COPY

amugijc

n N V

1}

T

d

i‘

T

COP if

p -y.

COUNTRY" PASTOR SAID.
IP. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TC A PULL ALLIANCE; TuS
FKIS'i’ING COURSE WILL LEAD n A "NEW NEUTRALITY" WITH
WWICK NEITHER THE TT.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES "/ILL FEEL
COMFORTABLE, PASTOR CONTINUED. THE CONSEQUENCES
■?ILL BE "UNCERTAIN." THEN wg ADDED: ifOUR REVISIONS
OF THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA — ALL O'*' LATIN AMERICA
N*EDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH STB MAY APPRECIATE
YOTTR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER
TROUBLE SPOTS.
19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED PASTOR
r"JAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED
NATIONS, AND THAT WE S HOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING
WI^H ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. w5 UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S
TRADITIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY — IT IS PART
C7 OUR SHARED HERITAGE — AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO
RTSTORE THIS SITUATION.
23. FURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTIN-JED, PRESIDENT CARTER
"AS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE
IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PAST JVIT.ED STATES ERRORS.
IN NUCLEAR Affairs FOR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OF ARGENTINA'S
LACK OF INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE
PROGRESS — BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. </E MADE
THE POINT OF PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS
NOT TC DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN
OBJECTIVE SHARED WT ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WILL RECEIVE
A LETTER PROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OF
FUEL FOR RESEARCH REACTORS.
21 . RECOGNISED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING
AUTHORITY AMO SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER WENT
ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE
DISCARDED AS TEE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LESS
HTTRAORDINARV. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND
POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVF.N RIGHT OF OPTION.
(COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TER* "POLITICAL PRISONER"
■GO BY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON THE
FOLLOWING DAT. you WERE REFERRING TO TERRORISTS
AMD GUERRILLAS", RE SAID.)
22. FTTRTRPRMORE, GENERAL GJODPASTER SAID, WE ARE
MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT
AREAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA .-.'ILL B l REVIEWED
PSN:354532

?AGi 42

TOR:330/31:32Z
tv-M p

T

Ti

T

T

u

DTG:291417Z JAN B0

T*J******Ti'

COPY

*******(>_£_ N

fid njus-^t-nj******^ copi

•T TRU HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. " I TAL-.CED WITH
SECR^TAR7" VANCE ABOUT SOME OT THIS THE DAT 37"'ORE
LEAVING WASHINGTON. H'H IS CONCERNED FOR BASIC
LEVELS 0? HUMAN TREATMENT, BOT KNOWS TOO OF YOUR
^AgT DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE
L^GAL PROCESSFS." (COMMENT: GENFR&L GOODPASTER
ADDRESSED OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS. THESE TOO ARE
INCLUDED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSA­
TION.)
23. GENERAL GOODPASTEfl REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR
'T’IMELY CONSULTATION, AMU RECALLED WHAT THE LACT OF IT
CAN DO TO AN ALLIANCE. HE SPOKE OF BETTER COORDINATION
AND USING the EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE. HE
CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT TEE RIGHT OF CITIZENS
TO RE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT,
AND WR FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING
THIS. TRR ttniteD STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS — BUT YOU
MUST UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE
MADE THE O.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS,
VITAL *0 OUR SOCIETY EVEN .-'RILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS
TO 'ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE.'*
24. (COMMENT: THIS CONCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS
ON JANUARY 2^. SEPTEL "7ILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S
PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES ON
JANUARY 24.)
CASTRO
T^T

°SN:054/532

PAGE 43

Of '43

#****#*0 ..Q N -T

TOR:03Z/Z1:32Z
v——a_m

t

DTC:291417Z JAN H0

ft T.*»*****ii! COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
Department
PAGE 01
ACTION NEA-11

TEL AV 22920

01 OF 02

290404Z

of

State
TEL AV 22920

4320

INCOMING
TELEGRAM
01 OF 02

!/■'

200494Z

NOT TO MENTION COX IN ANY ARTICLES.
INFO

OCT-01 ARA-U
SS-15 CIAE-00

ADS-00 HA-05 PH-06 NSC-05 SP-02
DOCE-00 I MR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 /067 W
................................... 060430 290425Z /23

R 25151OZ OCT 79
FH AHEHBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 4307
INFO USICA WASHOC
ANEH9ASSY BUENOS AIRES

6. TI MERMAN ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE BELIEVES THE RIGHTWING AND VERY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CABIL30 IS FINANCED
BY DIANA DE MASSOT, PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PRCVINCIA IN
BAHIA BLANCA.
INB: MRS. HASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE
EMBASSY, AND IF MEHORY SERVES, RECEIVED A MARIA MOORS
CABOT OR IAPA AWARO II. 1973 OR 1974.1

STATE FOR NEA/ARA VARY; NA FOR DERI AN
USICA FOR AR

7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, TI HERMAN
SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MODERATE AND RIGHT WING
ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOR PERONIST
SUPPORT, WHICH MAY-CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERON
WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA.

E.O. 12065: RDS 10/25/99 (DIETERICH, W.J.) OR-O
TAGS: PEPR, PI NR, PINT, IS, AR
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE EXILEJA£QBQ,.TJ11ER>UIN
1.
(C - ENTIRE TEXT)

B.
IN CONVERSATION WITH TIMERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A
CHILLING IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING
WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES
THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 22920

AND ANTI-SEMITIC.
2.
IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE DIETERICH, WHO
KNEW HIH IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1972-74 TOUR THERE,
TI HERMAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY
POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM ON THE
ARGENTINA MILITARY RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL DILEMMA AS TO
WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE
FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TINERNAN WILL BE IN THE
UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARD FROM THE AMERICAN
JEWISH CCNNITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 27. AFTER THAT HE
PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN. TH^iy^WILL JSD.TO WASH­
INGTON FOR VARIOUS MEET jN.G.j_ ON THE HIlT/V ThTTWMTMENT,

9. TIMERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV
DAILY MAARIV AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE VITH THAT FACT,
ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME
TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN ThE US. HE SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED COLUHBIA. THUS FAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON
LATIN AMERICAN NATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE
WILL BRANCH INTO BROADER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL MATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH
HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HUMAN RIGHTS
AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EIGHTIES, AND ADDED THAT THE US

AND AT THE WhTtE-HOUSE~— "
V" *

3. TIHERMAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING
DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE
’LEADER* OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND
THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR
TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA
PLATA IN A ROOM WlTh AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIIISKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON
ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN
BECAUSE HE HAD DARED TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS
IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN, THE
OBJECTION APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAD SLANDERED FASCISM.
HE WAS ALSO QUESTIONED CONCERNING SUPPOSED CONTACTS
BETWEEN MENACHEM BEGIN AND THE HOHTONEKO GUERILLAS
DJRING A BEGIN VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN I97G. TIMERMAN
BELIEVED THESE QUESTIONS STEHHED FROM THE FACT THAT
BEGIN'S BOOK ’WAR IN THE HOLY LAND" HAD BEEN FOUND AMONG
MATERIALS USED BY 1HE MONIONIKOS. TIMERMAN WAS BROUGHT
FROM PRISON TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GEIi. HARGUINDEGUY IN
THE CASA ROSADA PRIOR TO A DERIAH VISIT. THE GENERAL
INFORMED HIH THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE
THAT PATT DERIAN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE
WAS HIS COUSIN.
4. TIMERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LANUSSE'S EX­
PRESS SECRETARY EDGARDO SAJCN DIED OF A HEART ATTACK
DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A
RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN, ThE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT
HE HAD A HEART CONDITION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority M LC. -Le "4-1-,2-1
NARA—Data
u

5. T IME.BMM ^S.NqW,RU.HST^HJ JJ) .VfclEOBfl^iSJ.JJPERIENCES III ARGENTINA BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS BY THE
MiL IfXRUJlJ*IHST FRTeIICs'STILL III TrGENT'ihT "AS ’aN
EXAMPLE 0F~ IlTls’ HE PiEilTI'OMED "THAT“ROBERT COX, EDITOR OF
ThE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO HIM
THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IH BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of Stati.
PAGE 01
ACTION NEA- 11

TEL AV 22920

02 OF 02

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

280404Z

INFO

OCT-01 ARA-11
ADS-00 PM-06 NSC-05 5P-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 OODE-00
I NR- 10 NSAE-00 PA-01 HA-05 /ff 6 7 W
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 0 44 1 2804 2 4 Z /23
R 25 1510Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4308
INFO US ICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CONF

IDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 22920

WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
FOR YEARS TO COME.
TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC
APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL
AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA.
HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS
HIS G R AT t T U DE_ TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND
T H E wh'i jTjiui&C -lIw I S
__ _

CONFIDENTIAL

4324

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
6275

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL
S53N59

November 2, 1979

ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Jacobo Timerman (U)

Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine newspaper editor and publisher,
who was recently released from house arrest and expelled from
Argentina, has asked to see you. He has been in New York
since October 29 to receive the Hubert Humphrey Freedom Award
from B'nai B'rith. In light of your personal intervention
with President Videla on behalf of Mr. Timerman, the Department
of State believes you should meet with him.
(C)
Timerman last week told our Press Attache in Tel Aviv that he
is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina
because he fears reprisals by the military against friends
still in Argentina. For a similar reason, I believe a meeting
could be counterproductive to our efforts to encourage human
rights improvements in Argentina. Timerman's release was the
culmination of such a vicious struggle between moderates and
hardliners in the Argentine military that it provoked a coup
(which was unsuccessful) by the hardliners. I believe that
the moderates would consider your meeting with him as an un­
friendly (rather than an appreciative) gesture, and they would
be less likely to be accommodating to future cases.
(C)
RECOMMENDATION:
That in liew of a meeting, you sign the attached letter to
Timerman conveying your congratulations.
Approve

Disapprove

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters

CONFIDENTIAL
Review 10/30/85

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority

COtFIDEHTtAL

. A*

MEMORANDUM

5601

THE WHITE HOUSE
-CQNFIDENTIA Er~

WASHINGTON

(L
INFORMATION

August 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

An Update of Human Rights
Developments in Argentina

I.

1

$

Hopeful Developments
Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of
342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that
we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and
that we do not yet know what proportion of those released
have actually been £reed without charges and what proportion have
been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks
since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and
77 releases.
Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will
restore a limited form of the "right of option", whereby state of
siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an
important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

rT -5

§1

O
J
J±i ID j P
E w ;j

%

Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President
Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater
ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. ThiB has
prompted Argentina's oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the
government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of
engaging in politics by the government, but rather than Bummarily
punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts.
The lower courtB ruled against the government, and the matter is
under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah' b
Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the
court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

353
D

t-V
. \j
&

'll
<sC Z

IL

Negative Developments
Eight lawyers or their wiveB were kidnapped at a sea resort near
Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered
brutally. It appears the others were later released. It seems
likely that the security forces were responsible.

-GGNFIUEJSI TJA L/GDS

EMBfflftr

I *.

2

.iCQNEIDENTJLAU
In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was
kidnapped -in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet.
It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military
resentment against President Videla, who made a very
successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper,
which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of
human rightB, is being held by the government on economic
charges at a secret place of detention; he waa tortured.
At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to
leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish
leader fled to the United States after being threatened.
III.

Conclusion

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the
very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embas
Buenos Aires recommends that we should await developments befo
further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully
informed as events unfold.

-GeWl* mElsi ITAJLi/GDS

-men

o

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now
taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The com­
mander of the region. General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard­
liner, and is viewed as one of Videla'a principal rivals for power.

September 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE HONORABLE TERENCE A. TODMAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
CongrvifSMn Heavy Wanmaxt «I CaUierai* baa brought to our attention
the bet that a relative ei eee of hie aeaetltutat^ Alejenro Seateh,
wee allegedly HUtaapped by the Argentine secret police along with his
eatlre family (hie wife, Helene, and three daughter#). According fee
Cwgttttnan Waaoaaa, AJtejeare Deuteh ie art political it any way*
but ie Jewish. He i« aa air conditioner manafeeturert hit wife is
a pediatrician. Mr. Denteh is reportedly a diabetic which leads his
family to have great concern about his health.
Congressman Waaman wanted the subject raised with the Argentinian
delegation during their visit here. Z understand that Pat Darien has
also been informed of tisds case. We believe it would be useful if
you could pursue it at aa appropriate level with the Argentinian dele­
gation. and we would appreciate receiving a report of their response
so that Congressman Waxman could be appropriately Informed*

David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
act Pet Darien
Coordinator for Human Right* sad
Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the
Deputy Secretary of State

^CONFHMBWTT/^f

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.1352B
Authority
NARA__^l£— Dst° —^

HSSua.—

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
” ffONF T DENT X T i—mr~ HP R

August 9, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Argentina:

l/*

Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina:
(1) current status
of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S.
policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the
Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the
NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President.
The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions
are answered below.
I.

Argentina's Human RightB Situation

Argentina is still one of the worlsLlS-fflOat—serious human
rights problem countries. Just tnis monthTAfflTSTTr^TKiTfernational launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at
focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which
includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000
political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been
charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented
stories of arrest and torture.
(One report from our Embassy
is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion
always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to
correct that.
While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere,
there has been some improvement in recent months. We under­
stand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police,
and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under
executive power have decreased and lists of those detained
have been published; and a limited right of option for political
prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number
of cases in which we have expressed special interest — Jacobo
Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family —
the Argentine Government has released them.
II.

U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting
"no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.
declassified

CONFTDENT3EAIt-=u,GDS

E.0.1352B .

ionty7 ^

Dste

l\

-------

„ CONFIDENTIAL - GL»d

-2-

We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related
munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another
group of requests.
We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach
agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human

rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to
them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two
major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the KennedyHumphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal
amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come
into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps
which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be com­
mitted before then.
(There are over 75 pending FMS cases for
$50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.)
There are also funds for military training, which are being
held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had
a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.
Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the
IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRC's regulations;
(2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re­
arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain
those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule
of law.

(

everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement
with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the
other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance
with various legislative requirements, was made by State without
consulting NSC.
------- III.

Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its
effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and
jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify
the repression?
The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all.
President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the
war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was
working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left
Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And
Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just
encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless,
a central tenet of our human rights policy is that governmentsanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in
his' OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism
is to promote justice. . . Justice that is summary undermines
the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more’
violence..."
--CQNFIDENT-IAi—- GDS

„ GONg^EBEWTlSir - GDS

-3-

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits
and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union,
there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue.
Indeed,
it is even more difficult to change direction than with the
Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate
that with respect to Argentina we tie oiir X-M credits, oppose
bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales.
Anything
less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find
ourself, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as
surely as a different decision on Dresser.

Personally, I am most disturbed abo<jj£11JJa&jjjifi£i5£on not to
11 finance $270 millign worth of Export-Import Bank credits.
■ B2 qorfflESygFLev^tEat this is either a legitimate or an effective
Vinstrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us
little choice. The decision did have an unintended positiveimpact in that it has finally aroused the business community
(there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending
in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected
them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive
amendments to the X-M bill last week.

|V

I had sensed that we wete approaching the brink when Newsom
told me he had decided to hold everything up until the
Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission.
Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought
Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and
still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking
into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if
it is we who blinked first.
It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first.
For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March,
and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion
is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and
the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half
dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least
$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image.
Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time,
is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward
on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps,
I will make sure that we are quick to respond.
So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy
to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have
to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around,
and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.
IV.

The Southern Cone:

Are We Winning.or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy
around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against
t£0NFIDENTTAIi

- GDS

eeWFTDENTiMr - GDS

-4-

us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977,
'the Southern Cone countries — led by Brazil but including
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — tried to establish
a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these
governments distrusted each other more than they despised
President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and
indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big- countries with extremely
narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The
narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things,
the pettiness of their international disputes with one another.
Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle
Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations
almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.
Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been
at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can
be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate
chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have
tried through the working groups and the visits by the President
and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will
have to await Brazil's new government next year.
What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with
the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy
Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans;
no other American President in this century has done that.
Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected
in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the
Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is' clearly viewed as a man of
great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the
young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately,
sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military.
Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike any­
thing the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at
the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America,
which we had almost lost.
The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern
Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that
the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our
relations. They use every opportunity and every channel —
including Kissinger — to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty,
twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would
ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would
have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.
The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed
by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

CONF IDENTIfttr - GDS

-5-

than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape­
goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt,
and r will take care that we don't cross them, but I think
it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy
around at this time.

ATTACHMENTS

1

-

HUMAN RIGHT'S

2

- KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT

3

-

4

- UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT

5

- NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION - ARGENTINA

6

- CONSULTATIONS

7

-

8

- BIOGRAPHIC DATA

HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES

ARGENTINA - GENERAL BACKGROUND

President-Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla
Foreign Minister - Vice Adm. Oscar A. Montes

CONHDENTIM.

commit'
HUMAN RIGHTS

'The 1978 human rights record of the military junta
led by President Jorge R. Videla is demonstrably better,
than it was in mid-1976 or even mid-1977. • Serious
violations still occur, however, raising questions about
the significance, scope and effectiveness of measures
that Argentine officials insist be recognized as
"fundamental improvements,"
There is no evidence available to us that would
indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the
treatment of political-security cases is in sight.
On the positive side:
— An apparent, although unverifiable, decline
in the rate of disappearances has occurred since
mid-1977.
Both Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine
human rights, activists believe that the rate has
declined.
If true, this is the most important
development listed here,
— Over 300 prisoners were released in a Christmas
amnesty.
Subsequently, the government undertook
serial publication (nine lists to date) of the
names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige)
prisoners acknowledged as detained,
i

-- The "right of option" program has been implemented,
enabling executive detainees to petition for exile
in lieu of continued imprisonment.
Less than 50
prisoners have so far departed under this
procedure, however,
— Responsive action has been taken on cases in
which the U.S. has expressed special interest,
e,g,, Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and
the Deutchs,
— Attempts reportedly have been made by some
security authorities to regularize detention
procedures, return counterterrorist troops to
normal military activities, and demilitarize
the police,

'CQWrefflAb—GDS

-

2

-

On the negative side of the ledger:
— Disappearances continue, with one of the several
security entities probably responsible in nearly
every instance.
Victims have included not only
suspected terrorists but also labor leaders and
workers, human rights advocates, scientists and
doctors, members of radical political parties,
and others whose specific vulnerability remains
unknown•
— Despite President Videla's professed desires,
renegade security elements continue to operate
with apparent impunity because they act with the
toleration if not under orders of Borne military
officials.
At least in cases involving suspected
terrorists, clandestine arrest, torture, and
summary execution are standard practices.
— There are five reasonably documented cases
(which occurred in February and March) in which
political prisoners were released and almost
immediately assassinated, presumably by security
officials.
There have been reports of other
caseB like these.
— A particularly shocking incident, which
occurred last December, was the abduction
by unidentified security personnel of 13
members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,
a group that pressures the government for
information on disappearance cases.
According
to reports, the bodies df seven of the group,
including two French nuns, later washed ashore.
— Official harrassment of selected religious groups
continues.
The Jehovah's Witnesses have born
much of the brunt.
Problem of the "disappeared." Estimates vary widely,
but at least several thousand people have disappeared since
the March 1976 military coup.
Security personnel have
been responsible in most cases, and it is during illegal
detentions and subsequent interrogations that the most
egregious violations tend to occur.
In mid-1977 there was
some fear that the gradual reduction in the number of
terrorist combatants would be fallowed by a sweeping and
systematic effort 'to eliminate so-called "intellectual authors

-3-

of terrorism" and others who, for whatever reason, ran
afoul of military hardliners.
To our knowledge, no
such sweeping attack was initiated, although,
as indicated above, individuals not terrorists and
representing a variety of sectors and interests have been
abducted.
Many are reported or presumed to be dead.

OTOENTIAL

Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment
On October 1, 1978 the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act will enter into effect and
prohibit the sale of items on the Munitions Control List
to Argentina*
The amendment was passed by Congress in August
1977 because of the serious human rights problems in
Argentina, but was drafted to allow approval of license
requests before October 1, 1978 if the situation in
Argentina merited*
Based on this amendment, and-more general legislation,
the Department has held back most license requests for
Argentina -- over 200 are now pending.
This has created
a most adverse reaction among the Argentine military and
triggered their turn to European arms suppliers.

^-eeNFioemAt—GDS

KENNEDY—HUMPHREY ADMENDMENT

ft

Drafted: ARA/ECA : JNBuz^nis : jma
9/1/197B x 29166
Clearance:ARA/ECA:CWRu

HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS
The United States has taken the following
restrictive aptions in response to human rights
violations in’Argentina.
* The International Financial Institutions
— IBRD - We have abstained on three loans
valued at $265 million since June 1977.
— IDB - We have voted .no on three loans worth
$123 million since October 1977.
-- IFC - We have abstained on $33 million of loans
since March 1978.
The Export-Import Bank
By law, the Export-Import Bank must take human rights
into consideration when considering new transactions.
Because of this legislation, there are 11 loan requests
for Argentina valued at $683 million held back by the
Bank.
One of these bases, a request by Allis-Chalmers
for $270 million for electrical generating equipment for
a hydroelectric project, caused considerable negative
reaction in Argentina.
The Bank announced that it could not
give Allis-Chalmers a letter of interest, which would have
strengthened the company's hand in the international
bidding for the contract because of the human rights
situation in Argentina.
The Argentines called in our
Ambassador and presented a Note of Protest over what they
considered this intervention in their domestic affairs.
The Boeing Corporation, which has requested
Export-Import Bank financing for the sale of $196 million
in airplanes to Argentina, has had to turn to private
banks in the face of the Export-Import position.
The
company may lose $100 million of the potential $196 million
order•
Military Sales
— There are over 200 Munitions Control List cases
valued at $145 million pending.
Mainly spare parts, some
cases have been held back eight months or more.
-- 101 requests worth some $25 million for Foreign
Military Sales letters of authorization are pending action
by the U.S.
They will not be acted upon unless there is
positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina.

GDS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICSTIVE PRACTICES

Drafted:ARA/ECA:JNBumpu
9/1/1978 x 29166

Clearance : ARA/ECA: CWRus.

ma

Under Secretary Newsom Visit
Under Secretary Newsom's late May visit to Argentina
was made with the hope of eliciting same positive movement
in the human rights area.
Newsom made clear to the Argen­
tines that our basic concern was for the rights of the
person and promised that the U.S. would respond if the
Argentines moved in any one of the three following areas :
— Reach mutual agreement with the Interamerican
Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the OAS for a
visit by the Commission to Argentina
— Try, release, or allow exile for the 3500 prisoners
held without charge.
— Establish a mechanism to inform the families of the
disappeared of the fate of these people.
Specifically, Mr. Newsom promised that the U.S. would
1} recommend approval of the Aliis-Chalmers and Boeing re­
quests for Export-Import Bank financing and, 2) approve sale
of military training if the Argentihes would agree to a
mutually acceptable IAHRC visit (President Videla had
expressed to Mr. Newsom his government's intention to invite
the IAHRC).
The Argentines were elusive on the actions they would
take, but the conversations were generally positive in
tone •

p**

rw'i*.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.I352B

UNDER- SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT

Drafted: ARA/ECA: JNBu:
9/1/1978 x 29166

us:jna

Clearance ARA/ECA:CWRus

Nuclear Non-Proliferation -- Argentina
Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive
nuclear energy program in Latin America.
It seeks to
become self-sufficient in nuclear energy, find to become
the first exporter of nuclear technology in the hemisphere.
It has based its power program on reactors fueled by natural
(unenriched) uranium in order to avoid dependence upon
suppliers of enriched fuel.
Natural uranium reactors
require heavy water to operate, and while Argentina can
produce small quantities of this material, it cannot
produce heavy water in the amounts required to support
its ambition of complete independence.
Acquiring heavy
water production technology is therefore of critical
importance to Argentina, and adequate technology is avail­
able only from the U.S. and Canada.
However, -technology
of a lower order might be available elsewhere.
Beyond self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy
program option, the ultimate intentions of the Argentine
leadership in the nuclear field are not clear.
Argentina's
decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents
a limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions
on its freedom of action. At the same time, Argentina is
continuing with its plan to construct a sizeable repro­
cessing plant, and maintains that it is not prepared to
forego this program unless parallel action is taken by
Brazil.
This plant would give Argentina an ample source
of safeguard-free plutonium to support a weapons program
as early as 19B1.
There is no evidence of a decision by
the government to carry out such a program, but the capa­
bility is there.
Our most important lever in Argentina is the possi­
bility of eventual transfer of heavy water production
technology.
We have made clear that the supply of heavy
water production technology to Argentina is conditioned
upon the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the can­
cellation or deferral of the Argentina reprocessing
project.
The Argentines have repeatedly attempted to
distort the U.S. position to obtain this technology
without foregoing reprocessing.
They maintain that since
they have now ratified Tlatelolco and have indicated
their readiness to accept full scope safeguards, the U.S.
is obligated to supply this technology.
But, we under­
stand that in fact they have not deposited their instrument

GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

**■*'' '.^rW

2

•’•J^

V

Vi wUM

-

of ratification in Mexico City.
We are uncertain whether
this is in retaliation for U.S. human rights initiatives
or simply bureaucratic laggardness.
Both Governments have thus far managed to keep our
nuclear dialogue apart from the human rights issue, but
this is becoming increasingly difficult.
In an effort
to keep nuclear cooperation from becoming linked to the
deterioration in other aspects- of'our relationship with
Argentina, we are sending a delegation to Buenos Aires in
October to discuss some next steps in expanding our cooper­
ation in this area.

c

Vrifr M

i

\ v. v

3

Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Argentina
Drafted:OES/NET:RDeming:deh
9/1/78

Clearance:PM:ALocke (substance)
S/AS:RKelly (substance)

uuni

CONSULTATIONS

We have attempted to convey to the Argentines
our interest in maintaining continued contact and
cooperation in areas other thap those directly related
to human rights.
Joint US-Argentine Economic consultations are
scheduled for September 18-22 in Washington.
The
talks will touch most areas of economic concern,
including discussion of the MTN, countervailing duties,
investment and tourism.
We are also scheduling an October visit to
Argentina by a nuclear group which- will discuss possible
ways of expanding cooperation in this field.
We hope
that sandwiching the tWo meetings -- nuclear and economic —
around the October 1 military sales cutoff dates will make
it clear to the Argentines that we are desirous of improved
relations and that the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment is not
a unilateral declaration of hostility by the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.13526
..
WARA-

-eem*-GOS

ARGENTINA

GENERAL BACKGROUND
Argentina is Latin America's most European state.
Its highly literate population of 26 million is Latin
America's best trained.
The first Latin American
state to build a nuclear reactor (1958-}, it is the
first "Third World" state to export a reactor to another
country - to Peru in 1978.
In agriculture, its
potential remains vast.
It is already the fourth
largest wheat exporter in the world as well as the
fourth largest cattle producer.
At the time of the military takeover in March 1976,
the civilian government of Maria Isabel Peron had disin­
tegrated.
Fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terror
ists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly
bankrupt and inflation exceeded an annual rate of 600%.
Order has been imposed but at a heavy price in terms
of human rights.
The three man Junta which came into power in 1976
has managed to maintain stability for 2 1/2 years, and
prospects are for a continuation of relative internal
peace for the foreseeable future.
President Videla, recently elected in his retired-or
civilian-status constituting the "fourth man" in the
junta, projects a cautious image, suggesting a preference
for acting by consensus within the army rather than risk
dissension within the senior ranks.
Civilian politicians
and Church leaders perceive Videla as a moderate whose
objective is to restore democratic rule.
The ambitious Navy Commander, Admiral Massera, wants
to circumscribe the Presidency's as yet unclearly defined
powers.
Massera himself will retire soon and has his
lines out to civilian politicians and labor leaders in
a cl-ear bid for the Presidency at some future date.
Massera, who distinguished himself as a tough counter­
terrorist, is now championing human rights.
The political parties, whose activities were suspended
when the Junta came to power, discreted themselves by
their ineffectiveness before the 1976 coup and have

-

2-

shown little effective resistance to the military gov­
ernment.
They have few attractive candidates or issues
to offer the voters.
The PeroniBtas, a coalition of
populist and minor labor elements won over 50% of the
vote in the last election in 1973, but ard divided over
who should inherit Juan Feron's mantle.
The middle class
Radlcales are making some effort to revive their party
and stimulate public support, but seem.to be making
little effective headway.
In the next few years, there appears little possi­
bility of a return to civilian rule, provided the Junta
is able to bring about improvements in the economic lot
of major sectors of the population.
Although the Junta
has been successful in rationalizing the economy and
restoring business confidence from the chaotic pre-revo­
lution conditions, serious problems remain.
The government has built up foreign exchange holdings
of over $5 billion, increased exports to over $5 billion
annually and is attempting to balance the budget and
has held unemployment to 4%.
However, the government
has not been able to control inflation, which is still
running at over 100% per year.
Expectation of runaway
inflation is the main obstacle to private enterpriseoriented Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz's plans for
economic recovery. * Given credit for the economic progress
made by the Junta, the Minister could lose his military
backing if the situation does not improve soon.
Most
serious is the decrease in the salaried employee's living
standards.
Real wages have declined by as much as 30%
in some sectors in the last two years and popular dis­
content is increasing.
The United States has $1.4 billion in investments
in Argentina and $3 billion in loans from U.S. commercial
banks.
U.S. companies and banks have continued to show
interest in Argentina, but are awaiting assurances that
the country is politically and economically stable before
making new long term investments.
The U.S. has traditionally enjoyed trade surpluses
with Argentina.
1977 exports to Argentina were $383
million.
The Argentine trade deficit with the U.S. for
the First Quarter of 1978 was $42 million.

-3-

Organized terrorist: movements have been largely
brought under control*
The once powerful Hontonero
revolutionaries and the Trotskyite People's Revolu­
tionary Army (ERP) have been decimated*
Assassinations
and bombings attributable to the left, however, do still
occur occasionally.
The American business community,
which numbered approximately 1,200 in 1973, plunged to
50 business representatives in 1975 but has now increased
to somewhere over 100.
The human rights situation remains bleak.
While
the government did acknowledge in February that it is
holding some 3,400 prisoners without charges, there
has been a reluctance to free or charge those detainees.
Meanwhile, disappearances and torture continue.
We have
made it clear to the Argentines that we do want better
relations, but that there will have to be improvement
in the human rightB area before this is possible.

^CONFIDENTIAL,
United States - Argentine Relations

The human rights situation in Argentina bedevils
our relations. This memorandum reviews our interests
in Argentina, discusses the question of terrorism and
human rights violations, and reports on steps we have
taken to promote human rights. This latter category
includes the use of our voice and vote in the interna­
tional financial instituticns, a subject which the
Argentine Minister of Economy .surely will raise with
you.
United States Interests
- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights
are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We
seek an end to such abuses and restoration of legal
processes.
- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most
advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America
and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and pre­
sumably unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity.
(The
Department is currently considering possible strategies
to inhibit this trend.)
- Petroleum:. The U.S. Geological Service has esti­
mated that Argentina's vast continental shelf may con­
tain more than double existing proved reserves in the
Western Hemisphere.
- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the
production of grains and meat.
- Economic: U.S. private investment stands at $1.4
billion; our banks are owed $3 billion; and we have a
$250 million trade surplus.
(Prospects for greater trade
and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals
and agricultural fields.)
- Scientific: Argentina is important to our
Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar
resources.
- International Influence: Argentina is an almost
wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial
and cultural leader in Hispanic America.
.CONFIDENTIAL

^eeNFTDESTRAL
-

2

-

•Political Violence and Human Rights
The Argentine military inherited an almost impos­
sible situation when they took over the government of
Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and. inflation were
rampant. Even the Peronist Parliament and unions stood
aside to permit the military to do their job. Now,
well over a year later, the military have largely
accomplished their initial security goals but are not
moving to restore legal forms and political peace. On
the contrary, they are polarizing society. The govern­
ment refuses to acknowledge the names of thousands of
political prisoners; torture, disappearances, prolonged
periods of incommunication, summary executions, intimida­
tion of lawyers, journalists and foreign refugees are
undeniable. While not directly attributable to the
government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However
battered, the terrorists, who are a mixture of anarch­
ists and Marxists,1, continue to murder military per­
sonnel, policemen and businessmen but at a reduced rate.
Notwithstanding, President Videla's aircraft was almost
blown up upon takeoff earlier this year, and Foreign
Minister Guzzetti very narrowly survived an assassina­
tion attempt, last month.
Promoting Human Rights
The United States raised the question of human rights
with the Argentine military even before their welladvertised coup in March 1976. Since then we have
pressured Argentina progressively, unfortunately with
little to show in return.
(Historically, Argentina has
been the Latin American state least susceptible to our
influence.)
- In February 1977 the Secretary announced that 1978
military sales credits were being halved as a result of
the human rights picture. Argentina reacted by turning
down the balance. Before then, we had advised the Argen­
tines that $36 million in 1977 credits could not be
signed as a result of the human rights situation.
- Commercial arms purchases with direct applicability
to internal security are now denied routinely. Other
munitions licenses are also being held up although we
have not yet decided how extensively to restrict commerical arms purchases.
- A $700,000 grant military training program has
survived Congressional efforts to eliminate it although
this program's demise seems likely in 1979.
CONFIDENTIAL

-€QNFIDENTI£Ir
- 3 - In the international financial institutions,
since September, Argentina has tried to keep loans out
of the Inter-American Development Bank which might
trigger a negative vote under the Harkin Amendment.
In March we raised our human rights concerns orally in
the World Bank before voting for a $105 million highway
project.
Most recently we have been faced with the problem
of how to vote on $265 million in five loans soon to
come up for Argentina in the Inter-American Development
Bank and the World Bank.
This issue was raised by
Secretary Blumenthal with Minister Martinez de Hoz on
May 31.
The Secretary said the Administration is as
a matter of its own policy and conviction committed to
the advancement of human rights.
He suggested that it
might be advisable for Argentina to postpone applications
for loans until it could show a definite improvement in
human rights.
Martinez stated that this might be possi­
ble in the case of two Inter-American Bank loans, but he
was anxious to move ahead on a $100 million World Bank
project.
The Secretary noted that the World Bank loan
was particularly difficult for us (because it may be
hard to argue that it benefits the needy).
Suggested Talking Points
Martinez de Hoz may well Jnake a plea for greater
understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and
raise the question of our votes in the international
financial institutions.
You might wish to:
-- Compliment the Minister for his achievements to
date m restoring Argentine economic stability (notably
through the raising of foreign capital and promotion of
Argentine agriculture).
-- Inquire about the health of the former Foreign
Minister who is now recovering from an assassination
attempt.
-- Ask why it has not been possible for the govern­
ment to begin to restore legal processes after it has
acknowledged publicly that it has all but finished the
guerrillas.
— Note the Administration's overall commitment
to human rights and the great difficulty we are en­
countering with respect to Argentine projects in the
international financial institutions.
-U3QNFIDENTTAL

.CONFIDENT I Air

- 4 -- Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion
that it would be help fill if Argentina deferred loan
projects in the financial institutions that do not
clearly benefit the neediest sectors of society.

^CONFIDENTIAL-

JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638
dMNFIDENTIAL--J&GNFIDENT1AL
FACE- 01
BUENOS 04638 01 OE 02 222034Z
ACTION ARA-14
INEO OCT-01 ISO-00 Ei-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04
H—01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00
10-13 ( ISO ) V
----------------- 051032 230357Z /64
R 221858Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE VASHDC 1040
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638
E.O. 11652: CDS
TACS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, EFIN
SUBJECT: COA NOTES HUMAN RICHTS IMPROVEMENTS
REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS AIRES 4483
SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN
BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN
WASHINGTON (REFTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A
NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN
RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE
OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST
1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS,
POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES
OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. VHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN
THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE
GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS -RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR
ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
END SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z
1. AS NOTED IN REFTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S)
PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS‘DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY
FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA
OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN
RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. TEE
LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE.
AS ANTICIPATED, THE'GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED
JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED’IN JUNE 15 PRESS.
2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS
NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS
CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY
THE INTERIOR "MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY ' IMMEDIATELY
TO VERIFY THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED.
(MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS
LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM
DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES’.)
CONFIDENTIAL
/
; PAGE
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13S2B

Authority <SVja-v^.
MARA___ Sr. Sr.__ Dato —^ \

_
----

JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES. 4638
GONJIDENTIAIr3. AS TOR SPECIEIC CASES, THREE OF THE NAMES-VERB Elf
DAVID DIVINSKY AND HIS WIFE ANA MARIA MILER, BOOK PU1
LISTED AS RELEASED TROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY FOR SUBVERS
CRIMES; AND JUAN CAR!OS ROUSSELOT, LISTED as releasei
CUSTODY TOR ECONOMIC CRIMES. AS OF JUNE 16, NEITHER f
DIVINSKY HAS YET BEEN RELEASED ACCORDING TO FAMILY FI
ARE TRYING TO VERITY THESE CASES AS POSSIBLE INDICATC
USUAL TATE'OF LISTED PERSONS. SINCE THE LISTS BEGAN1 1
PUBLISHED VEEKLI IN JANUARY, WE HAVE VERIFIED-AND REI
SEVERAL ACTUAL RELEASES, ALTHOUGH MANY EMBASSY SOURCJ
INCLUDING VISITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCH AND
RIGHTS GROUPS, CLAIM THAT THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS LIS
IN DETENTION. (THIS COULD RESULT PARTIALLY FROM DEFIi
INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDERS, AND PARTLY FROM BUREAUCRAT]
INCOMPETENCE OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY PRISON AUTHORIT]
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z
PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAMP (WHO HOS1
PATRICIA DERIAN'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOI
ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED
WESTERKAMP'S SON IN SIERRA CHICA PRISON WHOSE NAME SI
TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF PF
NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS
INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND B
AS A DETAINEE UNDER.STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN
REMAINED UNCHANGED FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.
CONFIDENTIAL

JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638
JWHFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL
PACE 01
BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035-Z
ACTION ARA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-0i PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00
10-13 ( ISO ) ¥
----------------- 051019 230354Z /64
R 221858Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1041
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUEN.OS AIRES 4638
4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 SUBVERSIVE CASES
HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES
PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL.
(WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS
WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND
SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE-PRESS OR
INDEPENDENTLY. CONFIRMED BY. EMBOFFS , WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
5. PRESIDENT VIDELA'S REPORTED INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORITIES
TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF ..THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL
OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A
COMMISSION CHAIRED BY INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY TO REVIEW
THE SUSPENSION LAST APRIL. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMISSION'S
DELIBERATIONS AT THAT TIME, LEGISLATION WAS PASSED TO EXTEND
THE SUSPENSION FOB ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT
IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MEAN THE
OPTION WILL BE CONSIDERED MORE FAVORABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR
WILL ACTUALLY BE REINSTATED BEFORE THE PRESENT 150 DAYS SUSPENSION
IS UP IN SEPTEMBER.
6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, -AND CIRCULATION OF
THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z
WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT IN
OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES." THE DECREE FURTHER
PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE’JULY ISSUE AND
"ANY OTHER THAT ATTEMPTS TO REPLACE IT." THE BAN DOES NOT,
HOWEVER, AFFECT THE MAGAZINE'S ADMINISTRATIVE OR PUBLISHING
CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT'TERM SUSPENSION
DOES LITTLE TO UNDO THE STRIDENT ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC OF THE
APRIL CABILDO, ISSUE NO. 7. IT WAS THIS WHICH PROMPTED PROTESTS
BY JEWISH GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OCCASIONED LOCAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631).
7. COMMENT: THIS FLURRY OF STATEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS
WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U.S.
VOTE ON TWO LARGE BANK LOANS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS
COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16
FLATLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTIONS WERE
—CONFIDENTIAL
/
PAGE

3

JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638
CONFIDENTIAL"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM
IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMMAGE OVERESEAS". {NO OTHER PA
COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMEN
OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING ?
WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WB
NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS' IN T£
OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVILENCE"OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B—IS THAT TB
INITIATIVE IS HOLLOW FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, BUT I
AND ENCOURAGING IN WHAT IT DEMONSTRATES ABOUT RISING
BUREACRATIC SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS 01
RIGHTS POSITION.
CHAPLIN
CONFIDENTIAL

*

35
S/S 7720657

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1977

..CONFIDENTIAL"
MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

Warren Christopher, Acting ^"2!

SUBJECT:

The President's Interest in Argentine
Human Rights Improvements

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has now responded to
the instructions sent to it concerning the President's
interest in human rights improvements in Argentina. The
exchange of messages on this subject is attached. The
Embassy concludes that recent steps have some substance,
but recommends caution with respect to associating the
President with any specific favorable developments.
Nevertheless, our Charge in Buenos Aires did call the
attention of the Minister of Economy, the key civilian
in the Argentine government, to the President's state­
ment at Yazoo City. According to the White House
transcript of July 21, the President said, "We have
seen recently in Argentina 342 political prisoners, who
had been there for a long time, released."

I.
We can point to the following hopeful human rights
developments:
— Prisoner releases. While the announcement of
the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive
sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm
categorically that there have been four releases, and
that we do not yet know what proportion of those released
have actually been freed without charges and what propor­
tion have been charged formally and must face trial.
In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has
reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13528
Authority

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

napa

r.V n«tn IXaMu

T^\S

■£ONP-IDENTISir
2
-

-

— Right of option. It seems likely' that the
Argentine government will restore a limited form of the
"right of option," whereby state of siege prisoners
may seek voluntary exile. This will be an important
measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.
— Political tolerance and the courts. There are
signs that President Videla may be gaining support
from other generals for a greater ventilation of
political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted
Argentina's oldest party, the-Radicals, to criticize the
government's human rights record. The Radicals were
accused of engaging in politics by the government, but
rather than summarily punish the politicians, the govern­
ment took the case to the courts. The lower courts
ruled against the government, and the matter is under
appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's
Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope
that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.
II.

On the other hand, the human rights situation
remains very unsatisfactory in Argentina, particularly in the
Buenos Aires region.
— Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at
a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one sub­
sequently was found .murdered brutally. It appears the
others were later released. It seems likely that the
security forces were responsible. ■ (It is noteworthy that
Argentina's most important newspaper, La Nacion, which
has not distinguished itself on behalf of human rights,
called unequivocally on July 18 for the Argentine govern­
ment to protect lawyers from barbarism.)
— In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela
was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found
yet.
It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line
military resentment against President Videla, who made
a very successful state visit to Venezuela in Hay.
— The publisher of the only major
paper, which has demonstrated consistent
behalf of human rights, is being held by
on economic charges at a secret place of
was tortured.
•CONFIDENTIAL

Argentine news­
courage on
the government
detention; he

CQNP-IDENTI Mr~
-3-

T” At least five labor leaders havp been warned
recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a
prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after
being threatened.
Nearly all serious violations of human rights in
Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires
military region. The commander of the region, General
Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed
as one of Videla's principal rivals for power; Suarez
is seconded by a retired general who acts as governor.
These men are being held responsible by many for the
latest round of violence.
Given the delicate political situation in Argentina
as well as the possibly hopeful but very uncertain human
rights situation, I believe that we. should await develop
ments before further public comment. We will remain
alert for favorable developments, as the President has
directed, and for appropriate opportunities to express
his gratification.

Attachments;
1.
2.
3.

State 162292, dated July 12, 1977.
Buenos Aires 5303, dated Ju;ly 18, 1977.
Buenos Aires 5522, dated July 27, 1977.

CONFIDENTIAL

J*

PAGE II
ACTION ARA-14

BUENOS 06656

01 OF 13

jaMrf+irttrnit,

iiiCui...;.G

Department of State

TELEGRAM

212226Z

INFO

OCT-BI ISO-OB HA-SS TRSF-BB CIAE-OB DODE-BO PH-D6
N-Bl I HR-1B L-03 NSAE-8B NSC-05 PA-81 SP-B2
ss-is- ICA-11 AID-BS /B7B V
.................................... B21372 22BS27Z /64
R 212114Z JUL 7B
FN AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTA7E WASNDC 6628
INFO AMEMIASSY ASUNCION
AHEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

5763

BUENOS BSSSS

II OF B3

31222bZ

HAVE REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IN MID-JUNE A FEMALE
PSYCHOLOGIST WAS ABDUCTED BY SECURITY FORCES AND HELD FOR
16 HOURS. DURIHG HER DETENTION, THE PSYCHOLOGIST, A
POLIO VICTIM CONFINED TD A WHEEL CHAIR, WAS REPORTEDLY
INTERROGATED WITH ELECTRIC PICANA REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS
AND ACTIVITIES OF ONE OF HER PATIENTS.
LOCAL LAVYER WHO ACCEPTS HUHAH RIGHTS CASES REPORTED
TO EMBASSY ON JULY IS THAT THE MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS,
DANIEL ALBERTO EGEA, WHO HAS BEEN UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION .

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USCINCSO OUARRY NTS

SINCE EARLY 1S76, WAS ABDUCTED FDR FIVE DAYS IN EARLY JULY
BY MEH CLAIMING TO BE FROM THE SECURITY FORCES. ^ MAS. EGEA
WAS BEATEN AND THREATENED DURING HER INTERROGATION WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 6666

FOCUSED ON HER SON'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AHD FORMER
FRIENDS. DURING THE LAST .TWO DAYS OF MER CAPTIVITY
SHE SAID SHE WAS TREATED KI HOLY AND RELEASED WITH APOLOGIES,
BUT WITH AH ACCOMPANYING THREAT TO REMAIN OUIET.
(WE ARE
CHECKING FURTHER AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPORTED
INTERROGATION OF ALLEGED 'POLITICAL ACTIVITIES'.)

l

E.O. 11662: GDS
TAGS: SHUH, AR
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDUP
REF:

BUENOS AIRES 4734
NEW DRUG REPORTED INTRODUCED

PART I

- NEV EVENTS AND INDICATORS

(THE FOLLOWING IS NOT A COMPLETE REPORT OF ALL NEV
EVENTS SINCE OUR LAST REPORT OF JUNE 16, 197B. A FOLLOV-UP
SEPTEL WILL IE SUBMITTED NEXT WEEK.)
DECISION REPORTED IHHINENT ON PERSONS HELD UNDER
INSTITUTIONAL ACT.
SENIOR MILITARY CONTACTS CONTINUE TO REPORT THAT A
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED
BEFORE AUGUST 1 REGARDING THE 36 PLUS PERSONS PRESENTLY
BEIHG HELD UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL. THE JUNTA
EVIDENTLY IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNEASY ABOUT
THE ACTA WHICH INTER ALIA DETAINS INDEFINITELY A NUMBER
OF SENIOR PERONIST LEADERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC CHARGES OR
TRIAL. ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES, THE JUNTA HAS "

A HUHAN RIGHTS SOURCE CONTACT IN THE MEOICAL
PROFESSION WHOSE REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST
INFORMED THE EMBASSY IN LATE JUNE THAT TERRORISTS AND
SUBVERSIVES SELECTED FOR ELIMINATION WERE HOW BEING
ADMINISTERED INJECTIONS OF "KETAIAR", WHICH SOURCE
DESCRIBED AS A POWERFUL ANESTHETIC, INSTEAD OF CURACE.
ACCORDING TD SOURCE, KETAIAR IS ADMINISTERED IN AN INTRA­
MUSCULAR INJECTION TD THE PRISONER AS A PREVENTIVE HEALTH
MEASURE, THE SUBJECT RAPIDLY LOSES CONSCIOUSNESS AND
VITAL FUNCTIONS CEASE.' SOURCE ALLEGES THAT SUBJECTS ARE
THEN DISPOSED OF IN RIVERS OR THE OCEAN.

DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE THAT BEFORE AUGUST 1 ALL PERSONS
BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA SHOULO RECEIVE SPECIFIC
SENTENCES AS ACTS OF ’REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE' OR BE TURNED
OVER TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR CRIMINAL PROSECTUION OR
SET FREE. ONE NAVY CONTACT IN EARLY JULY ADMITTED THAT
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN EACH CASE WAS PROVING TO
BE VERY DIFFICULT, BUT HE WAS OPTIMIST THE DETERMINATIONS
WOULD BE MADE AND APPROVED BY THE JUNTA.
MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS REPORTED
A NUMBER OF THE EMBASSY'S HUHAN RIGHTS CONTACTS HAVE
REPORTED THAT RECENTLY CATHOLIC PAROLED PEACE ACTIVIST
AOOLFO MARIA PEREZ EOOUIVEL WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BY PRISON
GUARDS IN LA PLATA PRISON SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO HIS
RELEASE. A NUHBER OF HIS RIBS WERE BROKEN. SAW SOURCES
REPORT THAT ANOTHER PERMANENT ASSEMBLY LEADER (SEPARATE
HEHCOH) WAS SEVERELY TORTURED DURING HIS INITIAL INTER­
ROGATION.
(WARNING:
XGDS-4. LEAKAGE OF THESE REPORTS
IN WASHINGTON HAY PUT THESE HEN IN GRAVE DANGER.)
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS I ITTHE LAST SEVERAL
HOHTHS THAT SOME PEN PRISONERS TRIOR TO THEIR RELEASE
FROM LA PLATA PRISON NAVE BEEN BRUTALLY BEATEN BY
PRISON GUARDS. RED CROSS AUTHORITIES (PROTECT) HAVE

UtCiASSIRED
E.O. 13526
Authority
^9.^
NARA._S;.?L-_- Dato__r3A2S^3c___

i

EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO EMBASSY'REGARDING THE
PHYSICAL ABUSE OF PRISONERS IN LA PLATA PRISON.

i

i

MATERIAL
WITNESSES REPORTED TORTUED
i

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY AND NUNCIATURA SOURCES (PROTECT)


1

U

' 4^

-CMfHJtifrrffT

Department
PAGE B1
ACT'OK AAA-14
, INFO

BUENOS B5656

12 OF 13

212254Z

of

Stal
BUENOS B565S

5767

OCT-II

ISO-11 HA-15 T1SE-11 CIAE-11 OOOE-B1 PH-15
INI-11 L-I3 NSAE-BB NSC-15'. PA-11 SP-12
SS-15 ICA-11 AID-15 /B7I V
................................... 121341 22B12IZ /64
R 212114Z JUl 71
FH AHEH1ASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE VASHDC 6623
INFO AHEHBASSY ASUNCION
ANEIUASSY MONTEVIDEO

iTTi

! N w U MIH G
TELEGRAM
B2 OF 13

212Z54Z

INTERVIEWED ALMOST EVERY PEN PRISONER IN ARGENTINA.
HE NOTED THAT ABOUT SB PERCEHT HAD BEEN TORTURED. SOME
KAO MERELY BEEN BEATEN UP BUT THE LARGE MAJORITY HAD
1EEN SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SHOCK OR THE SUBMAR I HE. THE
ICRC REP WAS HOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE RED CROSS WOULD BE
ABLE TO INFLUENCE ANY CHANGE IN THE WIDESPREAD PRACTICE
OF TORTURE IN ARGENTINA. THE REP STATED THAT NO GOVERNMENT
IN THE WORLD ADMITS THAT TORTURE TAXES PLACE AND A GOVERNMENT
CANNOT CORRECT A PROBLEM WHICH IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE.
THE DELEGATE RECOGNIZED THAT PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT OF

AHEHBASSY SANTIAGO
USCINCSO OUARRY NTS

PEN .PRISONERS IS INFREOUENT AFTER THEY HAVE PASSEO
THROUGH THE INTERROGATION PHASE, I.E., AFTER THEY HAVE
PASSED OFFICIALLY TO THE PEH. HOWEVER, VARIOUS FORMS
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE PERSIST IN THE PRISONS.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5656
II - JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES PROBLEMS CONTINUE

ESTIMATED PRISON POPULATION AS OF JULY 1, 1171:
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES' LEADER INFORMED EHBASSY OH
JUNE 21,THAT GOVERNMENT ACTION HAS RESULTED IN THE VIRTUAL
EXPULSION OF EVERY JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES CHILD FROH THE
ARGENTINE SCHOOL SYSTEM. THE WITNESSES ABEL I EVE THAT MORE
THAN A THOUSAND CHILDREN HAVE RECENTLY BEEN EXPELLED.
ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN, HAHY SCHOOL SYSTEMS
USED THE WITNESSES REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELABORATE
JUNE 28 FLAG DAY EXERCISES AS THE PRETEXT FOR THE EXPULSIONS.
TO THE WITNESSES PARTICIPATION IN FLAG DAY
CEREMONIES IS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND IS FORBIDDEN.

PRISON
LA PLATA PRISON
DEVOTO PRISON
SIERRA CHICA
CORONDA
RESISTENCIA
RAWSOJI
CORDOBA
CASEROS MUNICIPAL
MENDOZA

THE ARGENTINE WITNESSES HAVE SUBMITTED A OETAILEO
ARTICLE ON THE REPRESSION OF THE LOCAL CHURCH FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES MAGAZINE,
AWAKE. THE ARTICLE IS EXPECTED TO BE PRINTED IN ALL THE
WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES'
SPOKESMAN, THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP PLANS TO DISTRIBUTE
COMES OF THE ARTICLE TO ALL SENIOR EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL
OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA, AS WELL AS TO EACH ARGENTINE.
AMBASSADOR ABROAD.
THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN COMMENTED THAT THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORXSHIP HAS STILL HOT ISSUED THE
FORMS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF RELIGIONS IN ARGEHTINA UNDER
LAW 21,745. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS HO POSSIBILITY OF
THE WITNESSES REGISTRATION BEING APPROVED, GIVEN THE
CURRENT DECREE BANKING THE WITNESSES FROM PUBLICLY PRACTICING
THEIR FAITH. HE NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
IS NOW REFERRING TO THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AS AN
‘.ORGANIZATION WITH RELIGIOUS COLORATIONS* (TIHTE RELIGIOSJU.
ON JUNE S, THE LOCAL PRESS REPORTED THAT THE PROVINCE
OF SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO HAD ISSUED A DECREE PROHIBITING
ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY BY THE WITNESSES. THE DECREE ORDERS
THE SEIZURE OF ALL WITNESSES MATERIALS AND THE CLOSING OF
ALL WITNESSES' FACILITIES WHERE ‘PUBLIC OR PRIVATE*
MEETINGS ARE HELD.
RED CROS5 ACTIVITIES:

TORTURE REPORT

SIX RED CROSS SWISS NATIONAL DELEGATES AND TWO SWISS
OOCTORS ARE CONTINUING TO VISIT ARGENTINE NON-CRIMINAL
PRISONERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. THE RED CROSS PLANS TO
VISIT ALL THE MAJOR PENAL FACILITIES IN ARGENTINA THREE
TIMES DURING 1S71 AND THE SMALLER INSTITUTIONS TWICE.
ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) STATED THAT AT PRESENT SIERRA CHICA
WHICH HOLOS 53B PEN PRISONERS AND TINY LA RIOJA PRISON
APPEAR TO BE THE COUNTRY'S WORST.
IN GENERAL, THROUGHOUT
ARGEHTINA PEN PRISONERS ARE UNDERFED, HAVE LITTLE OR NO

PEN*
B5I
751
53B
451

DAM*
2B TO 5B (MULTISOURCED)

351
25B
151
41 -

21 (ICRC)
S (ICRC)
51 PLUS/MINUS (ICRC)

UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF OVER 101

22

I ICRC ESTIMATES (PROTECT)
• UNRECOGNIZED PRISONERS HELD AT THE
DISPOSITION OF HILITARY AUTHORITIES.
(ACCORDING TO SECURITY FORCES THERE HAY BE UP TO 5B1
AROUND THE COUNTRY AT ANY GIVEN POINT IN TIME.)
VILLA DEVOTO FIRE UPDATE
ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBASSY RECENTLY
THAT FOUR PRISONERS HELD UNDER PEH WERE INVOLVED IN THE
MARCH 14, 1S7I VILLA DEVOTO RIOT ANOFIRE.
ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ALL FOUR WERE BEING HELO ON DRUG
CHARGES BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDER PEN AS WELL, AS THEY HAD
FALSE ARGENTINE PASSPORTS WHEN ARRESTED, WHICH PUT THEM UNDER
SUSPICION OF BEING POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVES AS WELL.
THREE
OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS DIED IN THE FIRE. THE BADLY BURNT
SURVIVOR TOLD THE ICRC THAT HE AND THE OTHER PEH PRISONERS
HAD NO CONNECTION WITH SUBVERSION BUT WERE DRUG ADDICTS
AND TRAFFICKERS WHO HAO OBTAINED FALSE PASSPORTS TO USE
IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES.
WITH .REFERENCE TO A HAY 4, 1371 LETTER TO THE
SECRETARY IN WHICH COHA DlkECTOR LAURENCE R. 8IRNS ARGUES
AGAINST EXPORT LICENSES FOR THE SALE OF THREE TROOP­
CARRYING BOEING' CH-47 HELICOPTERS ALLEGING THAT
‘HELICOPTERS SIMILAR TO THE ONES BEING SUPPLIED’ WERE USED
IN PUTTING DOWN THE VILLA DEVOTO PRISON RIOT AND CRUSHING
LABOR STRIKES, VE NOTE THE FOLLOWING BASED OH DISCREET
INQUIRIES OF SECURITY SOURCES:

MEDICAL ATTENTION AND NO HEAT IN THE WINTER.
THE RED CROSS DELEGATE STATED THAT ICRC REPS HAD

-mmrntft-

V SfcRVlCE

MAILGRAM service center
MIDDLETOWN, VA, 22645

W5HA

’ 1-085003U20I025 07/20/78 ICS WA05272
00029 MLTN VA 07/20/78

72fc-* F^Jirlv
K„Jz. Q.'iUJ'sfiJ

«"

-V

'■

ROBERT PASTOR
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OLD EXEC OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON DC 20506

V

\ I -

N

1.
THE FRONT PAGES OF ARGENTINE NEW8PAPERS REFLECT THE DECISION
OF EXIMBANK TO DENY A S270 MILLION FINANCING OF U,S, EXPORTS BY
ALLIS-CHALMERS FOR THE YACIRETA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT IN LINE WITH
THE U.8, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.
2.
THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ARGENTINA, REPRESENTING
OVER ONE THOUSAND BUSINESS ENTITIES,1 AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING TODAY
VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO CONDEMN THIS ACTION,
ASIDE FROM THIS CASE
COUNTLESS OTHER U,S, CORPORATIONS HAVE OR WILL BE PREJUDICED BY THIS
POLICY IN FAVOR OF OTHER CORPORATIONS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES,
OUR ESTIMATES IN THIS REGARD RUN INTO THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS,
IT
MEANS THE LOSS OF COUNTLESS JOBS IN THE UNITES STATES AND THE
IRREVOCABLE DISAPPEARANCE OF UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN THE' ARGENTINE
MARKET AND A FURTHER WORSENING OF THE OVERALL UNITED STATES BALANCE
OF TRADE POSITION,
LASTLY IT CAN ONLY RESULT IN UNNECESSARY BAD
WILL IN A NATION WHERE BILLIONS OF U.S, DOLLARS ARE ALREADY
INVESTED,
3.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THIS ACTION BE REVERSED BEFORE FURTHER
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IS DONE,
THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ARGENTINA
ALEXANDER PERRY,
20»27 EST
MGMCOMP

.<?

PRESIDENT

MGM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 'i 3526
Authorityj

'

f ta.JtVJ-a-v. T-CB

'

Datn

NAHA__ 1

Tn

OCDI V

DV

MAIir*DAA«

C*cc ncwrnrr

fir%r r*%n

mpr»Trnn

,

-rm i

&U '

(

0

i i F i u l iiT I / \\

'1'1

-TELEGRAM

Department of Stale
P-uE ci

e^E'.os

e;;3‘

j; c;

;;

2:2:13;

32:1

euenos

*111; 1,1

z-S1
-'

;i

c:

22

2:2113;

ACT 1 C N An A -14

HA*B5

nCT-31

'FSE'Dl .-1005 EE~CS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - CC753L

/J37 A
2722C7: 773

P 272212Z OOi 7S

FM AMEMEAGSY ElE

C 0 N F I 0 E N T 1 A l SECTION 1 OF 2 E^ENOS A i R E S 4337
E.0. 11652: GD3
TAGS- Q71P
SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VIS’T TO ARGENTINA
SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL 7C DEPARTURE HENRY KiSSIN'GER AND HIS
FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA
LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE
TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS - - FROM BANKERS TO GAUCH03. IN MOST
INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERORISTS BUT
HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT
JSTIF1A6LE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED
HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WiTH A
FEW EXCEPTIONS.

COMBATTING TERRORISM BUT H: ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED
IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS hAD NO PLACE I N_ ARGE I JlNA TODAY,
7, THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDE.A SEEMED RELAYED AND FRIENDLY.
HE TENSED UP ONLY -WEN ARGENTINA'S PRCSPECTS IN THE WGFLD
CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT U3G.

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY
WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT B (
A FONQFF REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER
WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW
WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS
FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT
A SPOKESMAN FOR U3G.
2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY HAS TC LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT
VIDELA, CCL. MALLEA GIL (INTERPRETER! AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO
AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA
PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET
WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR EcFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL.
IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL.AT_ 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED.
3
KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THKT DURING PRIVATE
SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN ^IG^IS WERE D.SCU3SED. ALLEGEDLY
VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTiON3 FROM D?. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WiTH U3G. THE AMBUSS.DOR W3 NOT INFORMED
WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.
4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOP HIS VIEWS ON LATIN
AMERICA
FORMEd_:ECRE7^/ RESPONDED THAT NOA NOPE Ti-O E7E =
w-s TIME TO BE CONCERNED -£C.T DEFENSE C-PAB-.'T'ES C- WECE'iV
HEM'-SPHEPE
HE added LN
C-'-STiCN -MONG t-E LA COUNTRIES
IS REQUIRED IF ALi Aftt2 • C-fi CC'JNTPiES -PE TO SURVIVE
HE
STRESSED THAT CURING HIS TENURE AG CECRETARr OF STATE, LATIN
AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY
HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE
BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW
KISSINGER POINTED
OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT ME -N~ TC BE a REFLECTION ON ANY

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

Authority
NARA

S>A-<Ss3gL VA.
St2x:___ Date___

■3-Qi C

■GttttftUtli f I f [

inu'-,::.,-'
• TELEGRAM

Department of State

i CCNGEP’ C' AMEMS’in; TC ."PLEM'NT -jMA.-. = i3-’3

, -E LA :

»

........ i-’i-:

■■

-EE': af-:: - ; c:-.:. *;
t=-a-

! E'E-LL' PEF3C.-.E..
j E"L:' *C G .E

:■

: : n ' . c e n t

r.s

i.
s et;cel,
'■JCh :.E.S CS.E'AGE.

/ iz ■.:■=

«■.*- :f .l=ge

-.e fzv a-.; .f.'-r. ■■ ; ==:-"e:
L«TER !>: CAT r .331 •.:£= AND

OEPAR'EC nI Ti ■ MS’ES OF ECONOMY r-ABT | -.£t
vGf!: a* a-. egtan:,a

fa?.-...

Zi

‘■3Z T0 CVE'-

-« s -as -lcl' a 3:: a. e.e"

Cli HIS RETURN FRCR THE FJFM, -H1 S31 fiGER SPOKE TO Er,EA33f
he “iAiE a pep ’alts tc a-er.c.n fc'E’Gn service
PERSON'.'. A3 -E. . AS .CCA.S. -£ NASRA’SC SOME
- S
EXPERIET.CES Wfll.E «N uSG SERV.CE. nIS hIMORO'JS APPROACWAS WELL RECEIVES BT A.L.

IB. C'i FRIDA' E/EI.I.G A RECEPTICIi '.AS GVEI. AT ErEASSi
RESIDENCE HC'IOPIIIS KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO
K'JNDPEC PE = 3CNS ATTENCED. GCA TCP OFF ' C: ALS WERE JELL
REPRESENTED.
LI. AFTER THE RECEPTION, XiSS>USER ATTENCED A O'HUER GI JEM
E' “IN'S’ER D: ECC.G-1 MAR"iI.EZ CE “CZ. 'rIS GRCLP WAS
COMPOSED OF EA'RERS, ECCIIC"..:': AIIS ! NC.G*= ; AL .STS. THE KAMI
DISCUSS'OII CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND
CTHFR N;ES'*-EN’ *: A = SENT NA. 'HE LCNS "ERM LALH OF PCL.TICA.
s'AB-.i'f an:
c. seemed "c ee the
concern :f
THE GRCJP. little ElSE DEVE.CPEC f=0(1 Tat CiN.NER.
12. c, .jne 2; hiss.ncer papt.c pa’e:
an off "-E >e::r:
PRESS CONFERENC: Af.C WAS MACE AN ROI.CRAR- "EMSEr CF ARGENT.NE
COUNCIL 01. ,:ITEA,IATICN:AL RELATIONS. THIC GROUP 'S COMPRISED
CF fcr,-:r
;i, - •, STER3, N-C -O.C ’HE“CE..EG .■» 'C 'JE
pfEL C AS ThE EL’"E G=Cu’" C. FC=E GN A”A,:j ;f k SS.NSER
GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TAlK. r.E STRESSES T-.'-T THERE WAG :.C
C'.ESTICN EJ" T-AT A"f:':;-;s CACHED '’.C-.ES3E ABOUT
*=sen* na s especf. .HFR.iic^AVE:
. ap •
-■ *H t?SEN" NA 3 E.•■=•'' E’lCf-'.' r. CJT_: NC .TEiiCi.IN HE E *?. A;NED
-IS
jP1 !i!C‘. GCA HuD CONE hN OUTSTANDING JCB^ i1. UIP.'C
c.”e=fc= c 'C"e: e.* ;l:c
•‘'-'’~r-zzz .:^c
F C-;NG
-:z’ NC* EE »F5»E' ,-f;
■.£:
a mdyemei.: tc.-=cs'nCfmaicy i"js: t«ke p.ace if cemccr.t::
3EA.3 -RE 'C "REVA ..
13. CR. h 1 S3 NGER A.:c APPEARED .'I A 0,EC"CN ANC ANC.-F
PER'CC j-TH CNE OF ARGENT.NAS»OPLLAR .NE'.: COMMENT ERG.
:.R.'.G --E ■■'•'G E. ■■ -:-:4i.AAA
V"” TTT .RA' C ;
CF T-E GREATEG' ..C.«'LSC CF - -i i- C
T .AG
.HFCRTjNATE 'hA.'^'T LLME TITLTiTNT::3~TflM1A.'. FiGhTC WAS
ee.n: .:e: a: a
aga.ns: .ts fri'e'vlT"
■ GG.NGEF FA“

-.he=e -e -a:
A»E -E -A3 .... 5:;:

-"ENCEC - FCO’t,.. GA“E

ntrcclce:

E. >:

"-E s:e..c

N

c.s
A”E'GEL

"jO C'-ER G--EL N E-EnCS A =E3 AS A 3.E” CF "EL LEN*
.iDElA. THE AR'GENT.NE mED.A GAVE FA.CFAB.E AND heavy
LO.ERAGE TC

K.3L '-GER

3 T.

lcm-en'

;r. • -s.-.GEs
t«e a-BhGG-ccf -.e
CR I *i CUE ’HE CAR":? A3M,, N iL’RAT 1CN 3G iGNG AS «E HAS CVERGEAC. -E £ =
- 3-.' CF PFEi.:'1.’ CAF-'F s :;=r
a:_ ;(

■c

the a-bas:.::r, e.t felt he

sp--

ala.ns-

--=a-

hEAGS.

CESfi'E h.3

::3:.a'me=s t-a* ’-e “E'-::3 -.:e: -i • s-* -z te==:=.:“ m.lt
NC EE =E"E".A'E: ■■■:: C ZZ“-. TA LE- ’-A" A';.'.' NEC
“A' ICE K.SSINGER'3 .A.CA’D3' STATEfEN" A3 .-3T ■ F I CAT I C.N
FOR HARDENING THE-R HJMA.N RIGHTS STANCE
CAS'RC

personnel.

LC.M-EN'.

CCl.3 OERAEI.E ECE.-.T TC •■S HC3TV

9.

fcsaf'c.

al-

PI ONL' CGNLEAN is T-A’ < Si-NCER'S REPEATED -: G> ”J.3E
tc: ;=:•■•
z a;* ?. ■. , »■•.;
••:::= zr an: - 3
ST'ESC
'-E M=:?-A\:- ;f
'.A
-A.F
•; 33“E

. se::.:-. : cf : b.ei.ls a ses ;se;

a

. --

T.[. -E = E LCTC C.EL'C
".LE i.E = Y
-E = E
EM LEAF EC :f

:.■■■■,- .1

i

"!■ ame-ea-g.
; -eg
tc se:gtate vac-:: =; cr.ty s:j4

• ::

'.-e

€-0HFIDEItf4^

* - * * * * * c r._jf i_ _y_

■«—r- f~~s l+***+++*• rrih y

L'.p I MM •'.■
Jfc KjFv-fC #3947 ?C1Z11^
■i 2021G7Z J-.jL 7."

pM SEC^TAT

w..s DC
I M ME H .. T - 1383

f Cl AHF^duSSY -U-NflS

lK':S

CON11

l

a L SUT*

. I

mo,

t.lJ.

I

: •

11&S2:

Tags :

N T

1*3947

GOS

aR>

rTkf.i,

f

fin

SUBJECT:
PR-SS GUIDANCE UN EXIM «4N< DENIAL OF
LETTER nF InTER'ST.
1. FOLLUWING PR-SS GUIDANCE CnNCFRNIMG EXIM BA«*K HAS
BEEN APPROVED F'lR US? BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN:
<j:

HAS

7H

AUMlNIsTSATI'iN CUT OFF - X PORT-I MPO* T

TRANSACTIONS vITH -RG'-NflNA?
a:

THAT OUtSTIQ-. SHOULD BE REFERRED TO EXIM.
HOWEVER*
I CAN TvLL YOU THAT IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE
STATUTORY REO-i I EMr.NT* THE FXPOPT-IMPGRT BANK
CUNSULT-D aITw the DEPARTMENT WITH RESPECT TO fHfc
PENDING APPLICATION BY 4LLIS-CHaLME^S FOR ARGENTINE
PROJECTS aT ThIc TIME.
*.t RfcCQMMENOED TO THE
EXPORT-IMPORT B-.NK AGAINST PROCEEDING WITH THE
TRANSACTION In THE ABSEnCF CiF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS
IN the ARGc-NTifc- HU*.\N plGHTS SITUATION.
OtPARTM-NT OFFICIALS
th-t

HAVE ADVISCD THEIR ARGENTINE

DESIRE FOR

united states *as a sinc re
IMPRiVED RELATIONS WITH THE AP.GENTI.NE

governm-nt

but

counterparts

the

the

persistence

PROBLEMS TRijiJ'-L. S ‘JS DEEPLY.

of

human

eights

THESE PROBLEMS

INCLUDE:

NUM? ROUS DVTUN-tS BEING HFLU WITHOUT CHARGES* ThE
DISAPPEARANCES ••■F INDIVIDUALS, WHO IN THF PAST HAVE
INCLUDED CHURCHMEN, L ABTR LEADERS ANn MEMBERS UF HUMAN
RIGHTS I RGAnIZAT IO‘:S. An': THF FAILU&F OF THE GUVERNMtNT o1- nRl.:-MT l . A TO WORK fJUT WITH THE INTER A-F.RI CAi-j
*********

*******<-SR

comm;

N1

*v + + + ****

******

P
tORrPAST

0 M. L-■ H

P S N: 0 41 510

P G

«il
*• * * * * *-C—0—w—F—1

O201/21:25Z

DTG:2D21077

W—A—b-** + * + * + r. COPT

JUL

78

*>****+<-

i>

f_i

i-^—r

L******+t- cn

<

C.-.M>'IS> I.IN IK ri,i»A ; ^.IG.-TS '■‘UTUALL Y ACCEPT ABLE TERMS
PHk A VISIT T=: • P G< KT I'M ,
THE DfcP*-PTi'i-NT -.ILl CflNTIMJ:. TG RFVlt.-W CLOS-LY GUR
P.TL1CI.-S RvGAPD f ,;G ARGENTINA IN THt HOPE THAT -'t ASURAPLF
1 M P if Q V: ■ M E N T I 'j THt
RIG-iTS S I TU ■ T K.ifJ T^ER
WILL
ALLOW THE US Gi.1vFP.^F!NT TIT AijnPT A >--"lRv FnRTHC1 >'A 1NG
ATT I TUDt Ik T -it Nf. it FUTURE.

2.
-iT

QUcSTI:jN has N.jT sees ASKED AT PRESS RRlEFlNG.

PSN:0A1S10

P • G‘

+

)?

?F

ri

Tf-K:201/21 «2**z

02
’t

f

I

—K-rT

CHRISIUPHER

D T G : 2 ? 10 7JUL 78

L****** + F CO1'Y

7904941
DEPARTMENT OF 5TATE

April 7, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject:

Status Report on Progress in Human
Rights in Latin America

In accordance with your request of March
14, there are attached human rights progress
reviews on Latin AmericanAand Caribbean countries.

P<
Executive Secretary

Attachments
As stated

(GDS

4/4/S5)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
ARGENTINA
Human Rights Conditions in January, 1977
Ten months after having carried out a military
coup that removed President Isabel Peron from power,
the Argentine Armed Forces were at' the height of an
anti-subversive campaign to put an end to urban and
rural guerrilla movements. The campaign was conducted
under a state of seige and the security forces of
the police and the military ruthlessly pursued all
suspected subversives, detained them clandestinely
and abused them severely. Prisoners were subjected
routinely to torture during interrogation and general
abuse during detention.
In January 1977, approximately
280 persons per month were being detained (both legally
and otherwise) by the security forces and throughout
the anti-subversive campaign an estimated 15,000 persons
disappeared.
Most were probably summarily executed.
The Government eventually acknowledged the detention
of over 3,000 persons. Many of these persons had
no connection to subversive movements.
2. Major Human Rights Events Since January 1977
1.. February , 1978
The Government published the first in a series
of lists that purported to list all PEN detainees.
2.

February-March 1978
There were reliable reports concerning the
surfacing of mutilated bodies on beaches.
None were subsequently identified, to our
knowledge.
Similar credible reports circulated
in December.

3.

April 17, 1978
Jacobo Timerman was transferred to house
arrest where he still remains despite a July
20 Supreme Court finding that there were
no grounds for his detention.
-CONFIDENTIAL GDS - 4/4/1985

CQNFWENTTAL
2
-

4.

-

May 7, 1978
A 3-page ad appeared in La Prensa j^pn-s^ st i ng
of a .4-e-fe-fc&r to yidela and the names of 2,59 2
disappeared persons— .JC.Jt .was....funded by the
PAHR, tfe£...League_on Human Rights, and the
Ecumenical Movement.
Tt symbol i
*-j^p I'r^rpacp
inactivity, bv those grouP5-an.d-^hfi_lacjL£asing
willingness of the—press to address the issue
either In thisform or through reporting
and editorials.

■?.&£

5.

October 17, 1978
The Government announced that the IAHRC had
been invited to Argentina.
An earlier conditioned
request made in June was rejected by the
IAHRC.

6.

December 1978
The Plaza de Mayo was closed to the Mothers
as their regular meeting and demonstration
site.

7.

December 1978
Politically-inspired abduction and murder
of Argentine career diplomat Elena Holmberg
causes widespread shock and concern among
influential circles who had previously ignored
problem of disappearances.

8.

December 25, 1978
A Christmas amneRt-y-h^np^j,ted_ 193 persons
of whom we know 186 were actually released.

9.

Early 1979
Preliminary evidence suggests a decrease
in vinJLajtions. of category one . rights with
few reports of disappearances or torture
having been received.

10. March 1979
The local ICRC representative stated that
COnfidf-NTt y.

e-eWFTPgNflAL
-3-

prison conditions had clearly improved and
he expected further improvements both because
of the IAHRC visit and because government
officials now seemed to want the improvements.
There was probably some quantitative improvement
in 1978 with respect to 1977, but the qualitative
aspect remained little changed with disappearances
continuing at a high rate and torture and prisoner
mistreatment common.

CONFIDENTIAL

mmm
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Arns Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

20230

MAY 13 1980

Philip M. Klutznick

SUBJECT:

PRC Meeting on Argentina:
Consideration

Bilateral Trade Factors that Merit

The PRC is scheduled to meet to review U.S.-Argentine relations in light of
recent Soviet initiatives in Argentina. Such a review would not be complete
without consideration of the significant developments in U.S.-Argentine trade.
Thus, I am attaching a memorandum summarizing this bilateral trading relation.
The following points bear highlighting:
1. Argentina now has a very free market with substantial potential for U.S.
exports. At the recent trade fair in Miami and in several other contexts
the Argentine officials have made clear their interest in improving trade with
the U.S.
2. Bilateral trade with the U.S. is strong and improving. Continued improve­
ment would have both political and economic benefits for the United States.
(We are, of course, not unaware of the conditions relating to human rights
and other factors which have slowed such improvement in recent years, and
which must still be considered.)
a.

Continued improvement in bilateral trade would help offset the Soviet
Union's vigorous effort to expand its trade with Argentina and then
exploit its trade position politically.

b.

It would help demonstrate to the Argentines the tangible value of
improving their relations with the U.S.

c.

The strengthened economic interchange would have substantial benefits
for the U.S. For example, the Yacyreta hydroelectric project, if
awarded to the U.S. bidders, would create 18 million hours of work for
U.S. workers.

3. In the proposed October meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission it
would be in the U.S. interest to respond affirmatively, to the extent possible,
to Argentine concerns on bilateral trade issues.
AUa6te&SIFIED
E.O.13526

WfBFNTf#

CLASSIFIED BY Munip_lo_SourcHS
DECLASSIFY ON 5/13/2000.

e
)T‘

ATTACHMENT
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
(U)

U.S. Trade with Argentina. Argentina is the fourth"!angest market for U.S.
exports in Latin America, after Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil, and ranks
twentieth in the world. Following Argentine trade liberalization measures
of the late 1970s, particularly reduction in customs duties, U.S. exports
to Argentina registered impressive gains. A striking 124 percent increase
in U.S. exports was achieved in 1979 over 1978, with total sales of nearly
$1.9 billion resulting in a U.S. trade surplus with Argentina of $1.3
billion. The resumption of Eximbank lending to Argentina in the autumn of
1978 has also stimulated U.S. exports.

(U)

Argentina is an important supplier in the international market as well as a
significant U.S. import market. The country's exports exceeded $6.5 billion
in 1979; imports climbed to over $5 billion, nearly $2 billion of which was
supplied by U.S. exporters. West European suppliers and Japan represent the
major foreign competition for U.S. suppliers to the Argentine import market.

(U)

The major items imported into Argentina from the U.S. include aircraft,
organic chemicals, construction and other heavy duty earthmoving equipment,
automotive parts, and telecommunications equipment. The best prospects for
U.S. manufacturers in the future include, in addition to the items previously
noted, machine tools, electric power generation, transmission and distribution
equipment^ and chemical and petrochemical machinery. The prospects for
increasingly larger volumes of U.S. exports to Argentina appear quite promising.

1

(U)

Argentine imports may be up by 20-25 percent in 1980. In all likelihood the
Argentine market for industrial and raw material imports will be even larger
in 1980 than the boom market of 1979. As noted previously, U.S. exports t"
Argentina more than doubled in 1979, despite aggressive European and Japanese
competition.

(U)

Although the U.S. is Argentina's largest single trading partner, the Soviet
Union represents an extremely important market for Argentine suppliers.
Argentine exports to the USSR increased nearly 83 percent in 1978 over 1977.
Currently, the Soviet Union receives more than 6 percent of total Argentine
exports, a considerable amount of which is grain. Argentina's balance of
trade with the USSR in 1978 ran a surplus in excess of $370 million.

(U)

Bilateral Trade Issues of Concern to Argentina. For the past two months the
Department of Commerce has reviewed with the Argentines the current bilateral
trade issues of concern to them. Recently decisions favorable to Argentina
have been made by the USG on several of these issues. Argentina was redesig­
nated a beneficiary country for the United States Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) on several products, including sugar and corned beef, and
a number of new items of interest to Argentina were added to the GSP list.
(Several import-sensitive items which Argentina wished to have included were
not added during the recently completed GSP review.) In addition, President
Carter announced on March 24 that he had decided not to grant import relier
to the U.S. leather wearing apparel industry, despite a finding by the ITT
that the U.S. industry wi: being injured by increased imports. Twenty
million dollars in Argentine exports would have been affected if import
relief had been granted.

UNCI WIED
2

(U)

Among the other issues raised by Argentina are the U.S. insurance industry's
claim that Argentine maritime cargo insurance requirements are discrimina­
tory, and the Food and Drug Administration's study erf nitrite^ in foods that
could affect Argentine exports of corned beef to the UVS. These two issues
are currently being reviewed in the U.S. Government.

(U)

The Argentines also raised the issue of countervailing duty actions the U.S.
has taken against Argentine products. Argentina has not signed the MTN Sub­
sidies Code, although it has indicated its intent to do so. Argentine acces­
sion to the Code would improve the prospects for removal of these duties.

(U)

The Argentines questioned sanitation requirements administered by the Depart­
ment of Agriculture which are applied to unwashed wool and cooked ground meat
imported from Argentina. These requirements are designed to protect against
hoof and mouth disease.

(U)

The Argentines asked for an increase in the cheese quota and for the addition
of a quota for Mozzarella cheese. Argentina has been informed that it will
not receive a quota for Mozzarella cheese. The procedure for redistributing
other unfilled cheese quotas is well established and any future redistribu. tions will be handled as in the past. Argentina would be given a similar
~ opportunity to fill such a shortfall.

(U)

The Argentines also asked that the U.S. not reimpose import restrictions on
specialtyJsteel and not increase sales of quebracho extract from the strategic
reserves. Neither of these actions is expected to be taken by the U.S.

(U)

U.S. Investment in Argentina. Argentina's foreign investment laws are among
the most liberal in Latin America and do.not exclude foreign investment from
any sector. U.S. foreign direct investment in Argentina as of yearend 1978
totalled $1.7 billion, up from $1.5 billion in 1977 and $1.0 billion in 1970.

(U)

As a host country for U.S. foreign investment, Argentina ranks 19th in the
world and 5th in Latin America (excluding tax havens in the Caribbean), after
Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The hydrocarbon, automotive and
financial sectors are the primary attractions, although investments are also
being made in the machinery and equipment, drugs and cosmetics, chemicals,
and food, beverages and tobacco sectors. The mining sector is also emerging
as a potential focus of major new MNC activity. International investor con­
fidence is definitely on the upturn as a result of the apparent stability
and economic achievements of the military government, attractive investment
guidelines, and a government drive to inform businessmen of opportunities.

(U)

OPIC. From 1959-1970 OPIC had an inconvertibility agreement with Argentina,
but from 1970-1976 experienced a great many claims of inconvertibility and.
therefore, stopped issuing guarantees. Any plans to arrive at a new agree­
ment (covering inconvertibility or expropriation) after the new government
assumed power in 1976 were shelved as a result of the human rights proble-”.
In addition, OPIC's new fecus on lower income developing countries would
further reduce any OPIC rctivity in Argentina even if the human rights issue
were to be resolved.

UNCLASSIFIED

3

The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project
A joint Argentina/Paraguay undertaking, Yacyreta is the largest jnfrastructure project and the most potentially lucrative U.S. e>^5ofj; opportunity in
Latin America. Currently at stake are contracts for turbines and generators
and civil works services having an export value of $830 million. Bid sub­
missions are due th's June, and contract awards are expected in October or
November (turbines and generators) and next January (civil works).
Competition is intense -- primarily from a Japanese consortium, Argentine
and Spanish firms, and a consortium of West German, Italian and Russian
entities. The U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay advises that the latter consortium
is favored. When asked by an Argentine envoy, President Stroessner reportedly
raised no political objections to the possibility of the turbine generator
contract going to a group which includes the Russians.
The
The
140
The

Soviets have previously supplied hydroelectric equipment to Argentina.
Soviet enterprise Energomachexport was awarded the contract for twelve
MW hydraulic turbines at Salto Grande in 1974 for the price of $40 million.
U.S. company was the. next lowest bidder for $58 million.

There have also been press reports and reports from other sources that the
Soviets received oral commitments from Argentina to purchase Soviet hydro­
electric generating equipment during the recent visit of the Soviet mission
to Argentina .y This commitment appears to be a general commitment for future
purchases of‘Soviet equipment and does not relate specifically to the Yacyreta
project.
Morrison-Knudsen has requested OPIC insurance coverage for construction equip­
ment and bonding for the Yacyreta project. A meeting of the Interagency Groun
on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (Christopher Committee) is scheduled
to consider this request on May 15.
Human Rights Issue and the IFIs
The Harkin Amendment requires the U.S. representative to the IBRD and IDB not
to support (i.e., either to abstain or oppose) loans by these IFI's to gross
violators of human rights, except loans that directly meet Basic Human Needs.
The policy is administratively implemented so that the beneficiaries of the
loan must be the poor or disadvantaged. Since 1977, the U.S. representative
has abstained on 19 IBRD and IDB loan proposals to Argentina and voted in
favor of two. (Note: Eximbank financing is permissible under current policy,
although with reservations from State's Humanitarian Affairs Bureau.) Eleven
loan proposals are now in the IBRD and IDB pipeline for Argentina.
How our trade interests in Argentina are affected by human rights policy is
difficult to characterize wi'h any precision. Exporters claim it has poir--,nH
the commercial atmosphere for U.S. products, and that the exporters are tK?:vselves made uncertain by the apparent U.S. policy struggles and inevitable
delays. No doubt some busin-ss has been consciously diverted to U.S. competitors
by the Argentine authorities and private sectors.
Multiple, Sourcesi

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, O.C.

20506

CONFIDENT! ATT
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE:

Monday, March 7, 1977

PLACE:

Organization of American States
Washington, D. C.

PARTICIPANTS:

Secretary General Alejandro Orfila
L. Ronald Scheman, Sub-Secretary for
Management
John Ford, Special Assistant to the
Secretary General
Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff

U.S. Policy on Human Rights
Secretary General Orfila told me that he had recently returned from a
trip to the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay,
and he explained to them that they were dealing with a new kind of
Administration in Washington. He told them that the Carter Administration
would unquestionably demonstrate a concern for human rights that was
not evident in the previous Republican Administrations. And Orfila
warned them that they had better be prepared for this change. All
three governments were rather slow to adjust, but they have come to
understand its importance.
Uruguay, however, does not quite understand why the U.S. currently
attacks it for human rights violations while several years ago it encouraged
the Uruguayans to suppress all forms of subversion. They are parti­
cularly confused because the human rights situation in their country has
definitely improved in the last year.
In Argentina, there is a fascinating debate between the moderates and
the hard-liners, and the question which Orfila feels we should address
is: how can we strengthen the hands of the moderates? not, how do
we drive the Argentine Government to the wall? He believes that we
should be careful not to put the government on the defensive least we
strengthen the hard-liners . The result would be even worse violations
of human rights .
declassified

. GON FI DENTI Air

E.0.13526
i A

rA \ i

roxnDBrHrttr

-2-

Orfila said that he was concerned that the United States policy on human
rights may get so heavy-handed that it would strengthen the hard-liners
and lead to an alliance among the military governments. He said he feared
that Latin America would be divided in half with the Southern Cone countries
on one side, and Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica on the other.
He himself had encouraged Argentine officials to make special efforts to
establish good relations with Venezuela and Mexico, and apparently the
Government of Argentina accepted his recommendation and will be sending
Hector Campora as its Ambassador to Mexico.
I asked whether the division between a repressive Latin America and a
democratic Latin America would necessarily be a bad thing. It seems to
me that it might introduce a constructive tension whereby the military
governments would be encouraged to join the ranks of several of the more
democratic governments . It would also provide an opportunity to deal
with real issues rather than to maintain an artificial facade of Latin
American unity. We both agreed that "Latin America" was a myth, and
that the discussion of substantive issues in which the U.S . and Latin
America were always on opposite sides of every issue was not constructive.
Orfila said that the U.S. would increase its credibility if we were more
evenhanded. For example, when the Congress held hearings on human
rights violations in Argentina, he encouraged Congressman Fraser to
hear from people from both sides, but instead the hearings were very
one-sided.
Belize
On his most recent trip to Central America, Orfila met with officials in
the Guatemalan Government as well as in the Mexican Government about
the issue of the future status of Belize. Mexico urged him to get involved
in the issue. Guatemala said that it would be willing to accept only twothirds of the southern province of 3elize, which amounted to about onefifth of all of Belize. This represents a considerable compromise on
Guatemala's part, since the country has been demanding total annexation
of Belize. Orfila will be going to Great Britain on April 4, to negotiate
with Ted Rowlands, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on this issue.
He will try to convince Rowlands to convince Prime Minister Price of Belize
to accept the Guatemalan offer. He thinks that if the United States mentioned
to Great Britain its interest in Orfila’s effort that Great Britain would be
moved to persuade Prime Minister Price. (Comment: This is a particularly
important issue only because if it is not solved in the next year, it could
conceivably lead to war between Guatemala and Belize. It would most
definitely lead to a very significant split between the Caribbean countries
which support Belize, and the Latin American countries which support
Guatemala.)
-GONFfBEfmAfc-

-3-

E1 Salvador
The Secretary General was very pleased with his success in getting the
President of El Salvador to sign the mediation agreement with Honduras.
The border has been closed since 1969, and the economies of both countries
have suffered greatly as a result. He is hopeful that the appointment of
a Moderator will lead to a more lasting peace between the two countries,
lasting
OAS
Orfila was very frank in his assessment of the almost hopelessness of the
present OAS . He said he had tried to bring the staff level down to a mangeable one, but that he couldn't fire anyone. When he tried, everybody
ganged up on him, and the U.S . remained silent. The Permanent Council
of Ambassadors to the OAS was also, in his opinion, a hopeless body. In
fact, he called it "a joke.11
"I need your help to change this place," Orfila said. Orfila would like
to see the OAS concentrate on peacekeeping, human rights, and political
issues. He thinks it would be desirable for the OAS to get out of the
economic and social field. He blamed the United States for the massive
structure that had been built up since the early years of the Alliance.
In 1961, there were only 300 staff people in the OAS; there are presently
1,500. He would like to cut the staff down to only the Secretariat, and
deal only with those issues which it could do well. He would like to do
away with the Permanent Council, and only have Latin American Ambassadors
to the U.S. attend occasional meetings. (Scheman later called me and
said that the Assistant Secretary of State would be the appropriate U.S.
delegate to these occasional sessions, rather than a Special Ambassador
to the OAS . )
Orfila expressed his frustration at trying to do these kinds of reforms
without any support. If only the United States gave him support, he said,
he could assure us a majority of the delegates and fundamental reforms
in staffing, in the organization of the OAS, and in the issues that it
addresses could then be taken. A good example he used was the designation
of Grenada as the site of the June General Assembly meeting. The Grenadan
Ambassador to the OAS forced the issue at the last OAS meeting in Santiago,
and no one raised any objections. The Peruvians seconded the motion,
and that was it. Grenada was the site.

G0Nffl5E.\TIAL

-4-

(Commcnt: Orfila's remarks were very encouraging, particularly on the
structural reforms necessary to make the OAS into a body worth paying
attention to. The real source of the OAS's problems right now is the state
of international politics in the hemisphere. At Latin America's insistence,
the L’.S. has retreated from its predominant position in the OAS , but the
Latin Americans themselves have been reluctant to take any initiative in
this regional forum . Any international leadership on the part of the Latin
Americans has been in global fora like CIEC, as well as at UNCTAD in the
United Nations. The result is that the OAS is rudderless, and the quality
of representation there is one indication of the low importance which
countries attach to it.
The image of the OAS as a bureaucratic morass is no help. So Orfila's
attempt to prune the OAS, cut its staff and its tasks, would be a very
healthy sign, and we should definitely encourage such a move and support
his efforts.
Orfila's efforts in the El-Salvador-Honduras and in the Belize disputes
represents one path that the OAS could constructively travel. Indeed,
no one else can really play that kind of role in the hemisphere at this
time except the OAS Secretary General, and we are fortunate that Orfila
is both energetic and intelligent. We should encourage his efforts in
the peacekeeping field, and encourage the OAS's efforts in human rights.
We should also encourage the OAS to leave the economic and social
fields to other institutions which can do those tasks much better.)

■CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1979

^Gow-i-'iLitvriAr

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

CONGRESSIONAL (Albright)

SUBJECT:

Evening Report (U)

Rhodesia. Have spent quite a lot of time talking to Hill
staffers about the Rhodesia sanctions situation. There
seems little question at this time that we would lose a vote
to retain sanctions. The best intelligence we can get now
is that Helms is going to offer an amendment to lift on the
first legislative day after the British elections, i.e.,
May 7. At this point, if we are going to avoid a total loss
we need to do some heavy lobbying at least to get time for
the SFRC to hold hearings. This is the strategy that worked
on the House side. Funk and I will be sending you a separate
memo assessing the situation.
(C)
Panama. I don't know what Rick is doing up there but Church
is becoming more difficult. Today he voted against aid to
Panama, stating that toll revenues would be high enough to
take care of any development problems. The language in the
bill is not a prohibition — the funds were cut, however.
(C)
In addition, funds were cut for El Salvador and Paraguay.
The overall aid levels are $10 million below last year —
and we can expect more on the floor.
(C)
Chile and Argentine Restrictions. Spent a ridiculous amount
of time working out language to respond to Zorinsky's proposal
to add a Presidential waiver to language prohibiting aid to
Argentina and Chile. State human rights was concerned lest
we give the wrong signals about our human rights policy. At
the end of the day, with David's help, I think we have it
resolved. We recommend removing all country specific
restrictions.
(U)

CQNFIDENTIMT
Review on May 1, 1985.
'

•/«

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.I352B
Authority
\
NARA_£r_____ 0=aiJtirLV\^

v"'.rayT»*~:

cnN^pgyyEAij-

ARGENTINA

A.

Human Rights Information
I.

Political Situation

Argentina is a federal republic headed by President
Jorge Rafael Videla, who came to power on March 24, 1376,
after a coup overthrew the administration of President
Isabel de Peron.
The March 1976 coup was precipitated by serious political
and economic instability which fed upon each other.
In March,
the Consumer Price Index was increasing at a 5665 annual rate
(on an accelerating curve).
There was deepening recession,
and an external payments crisis threatened default on foreign
debts. Violence was rampant. In the three years of the
Faronist administration (1973-76), over 2,000 Argentines died
as a result of left and right-wing terrorism. Since March,
political violence has claimed at least 1,000 lives.
The current cycle of violence in Argentina began in the
late sixties with the formation of the People's Revolutionary
Army (ERP) and the Montoneros, both terrorist organizations
dedicated to violent, revolution and working closely with
guerrilla groups in Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia. When guerrilla
organizations were defeated or ousted in these three countries,
many of their members fled to Argentina, beginning in the early
lS70’s with the defeat of the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Significant
rightist counter-terror commenced under the Peron regime and
with the sponsorship of his confidant Lopez Rega.
2.

Legal Situation

The Argentine Constitution of 1853 is in effect. In
practice, however, the decrees and Jaws promulgated by the
military government take precedence in case of conflict. This
principle has been consistently upheld by the Argentine
Supreme Court.
The Argentine Constitution is closely patterned after
the United States Constitution and provides most of the same
legal guarantees.
The major exception is a "State of Siege"
precision contained in Articles 23, 67 and 86 of the Constitution.
Thsoo articles provide for the suspension of habeas corpus
temporarily, the detention of suspects indefinitely and the
moving of accused cersans from olace to olace- within the country

CLASSIFIED
COW F It>BM TIA11

_
it.

J

\J _____

■■
lit

ca&m:;;;TiA^

2.

without their consent.
!i State of Siege was invoked by the Peronist
muni: end has beer, in effect since November 6, 1974.
B.

{i'^^rvancc of

Internationa lly-Recognized Hunan Righ18

;<?.grit:v oir the Person
•tide 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights:
The rights of life, liberty and security of
perron are violated regularly by terrorists at both
ends of the political spectrum.
Both the.current
rm-d predecessor administrations have reportedly
acquiesced in violations attributable -to persons
associated with the government; the legal security
forces have reportedly killed detainees suspected
of terror-ism.
Right-wing terrorism or counterterrorism has been carried out by vigilante squads
operating with apparent irapunity.
Active duty and
retired military and police personnel are reportedly
members of such squads.
Their victims have included
a wide -variety of individuals, suspected terrorists, other
leftists, priests and foreign political exiles.
There
are no reliable statistics on the nuir.ber of victims
of these groups, but a reasonable estimate would be in
the hundreds. The most notorious episode took place
on August 30, when 30 leftist prisoners were allegedly
’’executed'5 in Pilar, in part as retaliation for the
murder of a retired general, and in part apparently as
■ c. warning to leftist extremists.
(The Amnesty Internet! on a ]
Report 1975-76 attributes 2,000 political assassinations
siacc 1973 tc che AAA, Argentine Anti-Conr.umis t Alliance,
a vigilante organization initially associated with the Peron
Government.)
It should be noted that reported visible
instances of rightist violence have declined in recent
week;;, but it is too early to draw any conclusions at
this time.
Leftist terrorism, though weakened, continues and
has been responsible for hundreds of political assassinations
end kidnappings.
Many policemen, military personnel and
businessmen have been murdered at random.
Argentine executives
of Ar;triean business firms have been frequent victims in 1976,
Amoricar. and foreign executives in considerable mn'befs
have left Argentina to escape kidnapping and/or murder.
In 1973, tha A-orL can Consular Agent in Cordoba..
1 knar.. was murdered bv the Mon cone res , while
Jo an i C.i «.
1
ipred and narrowly
aim, was kienap:
CI
fr' •

CQ&k£B£nttal

3

Article 5: While torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or "’mishrrent have not been a
general practice in At£
ina, such methods are
rtrar.’tcdly used by the s«__urity forces to extract
information from sane prisoners, particularly suspected
or proven terrorists. After initial questioning,
prisoners of this type apparently receive more or less
normal treatment.
Olga Talanante, an American released
shortly before the March coup, has stated that she was
tortured; the same charge was made by American Gwenda
I'eo Token Lopez, who was held from April to September
1376.
(Father James Weeks, who was imprisoned in
Argentina, iron A.ugust 3-17, testified about the
mistreatment of prisoners in Argentina on
September 2S, before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations
of the House of Representatives. Father Weeks said "most...
atrocities are carried out by right-wing extremist groups
made up of police and para-military personnel." Amnesty
International *s 1976 , Testimonies on Persons. Torture
and Detention in Argentina, describes several cases of
reported torture.)
Article 8: Legal redress for governmental abuse of
basic rights is normally available in Argentina but may
well be denied in cases involving charges of subversion.
Article 9: The security forces have detained numerous
persons for investigation and questioning under the
provisions of the State of Siege or other laws, e.g., arms
controls laws.
Some are held indefinitely, others are
freed altar a short time, and still others are passed on
to the regular courts or to military courts as prescribed
by law. An accurate estimate of parsons detained under
the State of Siege is impossible to calculate. At tho.ti-e
of the March coup, the Amnesty International Ronort 1^75-76
estimated that over 4,000 people were under detention
withe-3*: trial for unlimited periods. The figure is
currently lower in all probability.
In October 1976,
during a visit to the United States, the Argentine
Foreign Minister told the press dure were 1,000
prisoner's as of that date.
He reportedly said that 300
jvsrrons had been released a few days earlier. We have
no independent information to corroborate any of the
abeve sieristica.
Aj.jlj r. l ? 10
Argent in':, pro i
judge.-.
The ri

cares tri : ins

right to a £ :i.r hearing.
In
ir.7.--:ti
'\-r> are conducted by
.
. j' not honored in

■rnNFTnrNTiftir

6.

and with most members of the Cabinet, including the
Minister of the. Economy and the Minister of Interior.
In addition, Embassy officers and visiting American
officials discuss human rights regularly in conversations
with their Argentine counterparts. Officials at the
Department of Defense, including the Director of the
Inter-American Region, have discussed the subject with
resident and visiting Argentine military officers. Our
military attaches in Buenos Aires also consistently raise
the problem of human rights' with their Argentine
counterparts in an effort to make them aware of U.S.
views.
In these discussions, the following topics have
been raised repeatedly by American officers.
;

— Access to and the treatment of American
prisoners held on political charges.
— Deep concern over reports of officiallytolerated mass murders, and the indiscriminate
killings of political refugees and priests.
The urgent need to control vigilante groups
and punish terrorism of both the left and the right.

The safety of political refugees.
Anti-Semitism.
The need to bring to trial or release alleged

SVifc.'VG’JCSi VGS *

The need to publish the names of prisoners.
Thu Ceverr.mant of Argentina has stated that the current
.'situc.t5.cn is temporary and that normal conditions will be
restored within a short time.

ft

At the behest of Congress and American citizens, we
or.ve also inquired about Argentine and other non-American
n .'.t:.c.:cs held in detention. While most of our diplomacy
iC.n been private, the Ambassador did raise the subject of
nvj-ie-n rights in ar. interview published in July by Argentina's
leadii'.g business publication, "Mercado". The*Ambassador r.c
that human rights violations had disturbed U.S. relations w
■other countries and expressed the hope that this would nor
happen with Argentina, noting President Videla's promise to
.respect human rights.
gewnDBifflASr -

COMFIDttKTTftL"

7.

The United States Information Service reprinted in
pamphlet form and distributed to Key Argentines and to the
media Secretary Kissinger's speech in Santiago last June.
USIS also provided all media with copies of then Assistant
Secretary Rogers' speech on "Human Rights and U.S. Policies
in Latin America".
"La Opinion", one of the most important
Argentine newspapers, published the complete text of the Rogers'
article. Our Embassy also sent the text of both the Secretary's
speech and the Rogers' article to the Foreign Ministry and to
the Office of the Presidency. In addition, USIS officers
have given numerous briefings to Argentine journalists in an
effort to explain the U.S. position on human rights.
2.

Disassociation of U.S. Security Assistance from
Violations of Human Rights

’i

In September, our Embassy in Buenos Aires outlined
the human rights provisions of the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to high-level
Argentine officials, giving a copy of the law to the
President and Foreign Ministry on September 12. The
Commander of the U.S. Military Group at the same time
raised the subject with the Minister of Defense and
provided*him with a copy of the same legislation.
Argentine leaders have stated that as a matter of
policy they do not condone and are seeking to curb
violations of human rights, but that in the present
atmosphere of terrorism, they cannot yet control the
situation.
D.

U.S. Security Assistance Program
1.

Justification for Continuation of Program

United States security assistance to Argentina for
Fiscal Year 1977 consists of $48.4 million in foreign
military sales credits and less than $700,000 in grant
military training.
These sums were justified to Congress
and approved soon after the Videla Government came to power.
The United States does not extend aid to the Argent in-*
police, except to control and interdict the flow of narcctl:
U.S. military credits are used almost exclusively
for major investment items, such as ships ar.d aircraft. The
have little :r no bearing on the counterterrorist capability
of the arm.a forces.

rCQMP tor. -.VTT.TC

8.

Security assistance demonstrates our desire to
cooperate militarily with a country which has 1,000
miles of coast-line on the South Atlantic reaching
to Cape horn. Our assistance orients the Argentine
military professionally toward the United States,
exposing them to our technology and methods.
In
return, it offers the United States easier access
to the Argentine military who have-always influenced
events in their country and are now the dominant
sector.
It also gives the Argentine military a certain
vested interest in good relations with the United States
This hftlps promote and protect our various interests
and helps ensure that we will get a hearing on matters
of concern to the U.S.
Argentina, it should be noted, is already a
middle power in terms of development. It has a high
rate of industrialization and is one of the world's
leading exporters, of foodstuffs.
In addition, it has
substantial uranium deposits, well-trained physicists
and ambitious plans for nuclear power development. U.S.
direct investment in Argentina totals §1.4 billion;
U.S. exports were $623 million in 1575; our imports were
$215 million; and we have a credit exposure of about
$2.7 billion, of which almost $600 million is owed to
the Exlm Bank and the balance to commercial banks.
2.

National Interest Determination

In order to preserve a professional relationship
with the Argentine Armed Fi"'ces and demonstrate our
interest in constructive c\ »rc.ii relations with Argentina,
thereby promoting the U.S. r :licy objectives outlined
above, the Department of Ft.v a is of the opinion at
this time that it is in the r ricnai interast of the
United States to provide conf. cad security assistance to
Argentina. The Department is or.itoring the situation
closely.

■ -

'•'4-.,

.)

OP IMMlst'

STUBBS

'• :V-

'''■.■■■

'■

?>■-?—$—i----r-h—-a—!-----«.

"

:

-

.

-U—• .

T

-

'

1)1 ROES'? I. -*5442/1 Z?*‘?M£0 122232Z AUG lW
IM AMEWM3ST QUITO

L
'

...

'

. •,........; ,....... -•

TO SECBTATi? .WASKDC MEDIATE '7f:45 ■

IKFOBUESGT/AMCONSUl GUAYAQUIL 4oU<
PSOINCSO 0Hit HR! HTS BAHAMA
CON? I 0

% n

2 I

K

L SECTION 1-OF 2 QUITO 5442

DEPARTMENT PASS .ALL ..ABA POSTS'
............ ; ’
0. 12065: OP? a/12/eS (PIMBPES,. ROPY V.V 03-M‘ •
TAOS: SOliM, E€
SUBJECT: (O^ HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE ? TH? FLAVOR OF .TIE

l.

REP: .QUITO 5325^ (NOTAJ-}

1, G - ENTIRE' TEXT.'

,

V

-

'

\ .

.

/*

''

. . * .

2. SUM HAST:' AT T 3 MID SB BY miHINQWN POLITICAL AML HUMAN
RIGHTS- PISTEES FROM TWENTY AMERICAN' .COUNT.RIIS»■ THIS SI-CONT
LATIN AMERICAN- HUMAN RIGHTS;-CQIfFEREKCS, OPENED IN QUITO
AUGUST 11. THE- CONFERENCE'S' PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: IS fFK
ORGANIZATION 0? A LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOP -SWAM ’
SIGHTS J A .SECONDART PURPOSE ' I3-. A .REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA. THE'OVERALL '
TENOR 0?' THE' CON FUSE MCE IS LIFT 1ST. ALTHOUGH ANTXrO.S. •
SENTIMENTS WERE • EXPRESSEDf CONDEMNATION OF U.S.- POLICIES,
VHIII NOT ABSENT, DID NOT DOMINATE THE FIRST SESSIONS.
END SUMMARY.
3. SPONSORED BY THE FILED RICH iMJtfr FOUNDATION FINANCEDINSTITUTO LATIN..) AMERICANO M INVESTIGACiO^IS- SOCIA1FS
{ILDIS) AMI' THE GOB, A LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
CONFERENCE IS BEING HELD IN QUITO AUGUST 11-13. AfKNDK)
BY PROMINENT- LATIN POLITICIANS AND ■ HUMAU RIGHTS. FIGURES,
SUCH AS ARGENTINA'S RECTOR CAMPORA, BOLIVIA '.S . JAIME' PAX • .
ZAMORA , COLOMBIA'S ALFREDO YA.2QTJP2, COSTA SICK' :■. UNJ BL
0RUBER, CHILE'S FA3IOLA LFTELIIH ,- EL SALVADOR'S GUILLrAM--'
UNGOf MEXICO'S GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, NICARAGUA'S PA DRY
ERNESTO CA KDI-NAL AND’ VENEZUELA'S 'CARLOS ANDSSfr. PEREZ, •
THE‘CONFER SN CP PROPOSES . TO OBGAN'I-ZG A PERMANENT LATIN • ;
E.0.13526

Authority £>

NflRfl

C c M • & % rJ C A >.

r

ki <tMC i

'•

PAGE 01

Toil: £2f./14: IP-5

X*’

Date

l * S1/223'

7% I9- a

i

* ■>!? -fr t r Y “ T, T f- J **&»****■? COPY

s_

----------

si a &0

*i. '*• "

*

r> w ?

ji***#**$f/ OQPT

t p y

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 'JO?, - .HUMAN RIGHTS'." ■ A SECONDARY
:.
PURPOSE IS 'TO SEVtEW THE" HUMAN- EIGHTS SITUATION IN LATH
AMERICA. THE' BOLIVIA A' SIT* 'A T ION, AMD AEGTivT

—----- —■ -

DOLE TREES IK, ARK LIXFi-Y TO RECEIVE THE -MAJOR ATTENTION
ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION WILL ALSO BEADDRESSED. THE CONFERENCE IS DEGIEELY -LEFTIST A ML TRY /
U.S.UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CONTINU? UNDFF CRITICISM.. .
4-. THE FIRST.FAT'S SESSION DEMONSTRATED TUX ’LEFTIST
AND S 0 NEWS AT- A NT I-U. S. FLAVOR 0? THE CONFEHEHCB^J?.RS:-_--_^-.:.. •••...
OPENING' SPEAKER, DR. ALFREDO VASQUE-Z CARR I SOS A, "FX-FQNMIX
OF COLOMBIA, SPENT AP.FRG-XtMATEfcY FIFTEEN MINUTES-OF AN .
HOUR LONG SPEECH CONDEMNING THE-'U.S. FOR THE FALL 0?
CHILE'S ALLENLE, ARGUING THAT "NIXON-tlSSIN3ER~CIA POLIOS
OF DESTABILIZATION WAS ACTUALLY SATAMIZATION." UF 4ENTON TO CASTIGATE -U.5. .SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ASHAVING TEE RESULT OF POLITICIZING LATIN AMERICAN- ARMED FORCES, ERGO,' THE ARMED FORCES WERE. MORE PRONE TO
TAKE CONTROL 0? THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.
5. THE SECOND SPEAKER, JOSE FRANCISCO PENA GOMEZ,
. .
SECRETARY GENERAL OF TET DOMINICAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTYAND PRESIDENT OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BEGAN BY QUOTING THE OPENING
PHRASES OF TIE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND SPENT
MOST Of HIS HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTE DISCOURSE ON THE
ROLE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AS-- HE CAME TO THE CON­
CLUSION OF IIS REMARKS, HE MADE APOLOGIES TO SIS GOOD ■
FRIEND THE REVEREND JOE ELDHIDGE OF TIE WASHINGTON
OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, WHO HE KNEW TO BE * A TRUE
FIGHTER FOR HUMAN. RIGHTS" (APPLAUSE),-THEN LAUNCHED .
INTO A SCREAMING, FIST SHAKING, BOLT'SHAKING, FOOT'
STOMPING TIRADE AGAINST THE- "IMPERIALIST- UNITED STATES"
(STANDING OVATION).
t". BOTH MORNING AND AFTERNOON SPEAKERS- MADE REFERENCE '
TO EXISTING PROBLEMS IN ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND CHILE, ..
LOT THEY STUDIOUSLY IGNORED MENTIONING, POSITIVE ASPECTS - AND RESULTS OF U.S. HUMAN EIGHTS POLICY. ALTHOUGH
EL SALVADOR HAS NOT YET BEEN MENTIONED,.. BOLIVIA AND THE
GARCIA MEZA COUP HAVE COME UNDER SHARP ATTACK. O.V
SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE ANDEAN PACT STAND AND- NICARAGUA/$
-CALL FOR AN MFM VPIE LAUDED, BUT WITH THE RICE?:ION OP
JAIME PAZ ZAMORA , SIDES ZUAZO'S RUNNING MAT-S- MONF • CHO5F
ira-o-m the u.s, credit for its role in defense of
Bolivian democracy, armando vi-i-lanufva, Peruvian
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN TIP’ R1CFHT‘ ELECT TONS r ..-t ARNES .
THE DELEGATES. TO .BEWARE OF PAN AM'EB, I CAN I.$M
INTEGRATION.

FSN:&378*5

PAGE

$2

tp:22fi-'Unsr

n .?

k

, 'll0:12R2$<

T I A !***»***& !CO-PI

X »:<»!< >£###

iv,

V

v

T'

1

M-

__ !-» i^

»9< ajeijej®c a?f

a«cori?m;g :k>

tht , :u*£b s-r*?'
PA NAME HICA NISH -A Ml'. THT TRASSN-i ? IQK.AI C;T
TEE I HI) INTEGRA.TI DM'.
TT

J

PSN1037845

PA&K

Of

T0R;226/WM32'
S P

T'l

2 !< r I A !,*♦**♦*'*£! COPT

lj:,i

A#.»»»’3—ff—f

I" ' .l’

* # ** F

QP IMMED
LTUU04
BE HUE SO'I #5442/2 225231H •

0 122232Z AUG 82
FM AM EMMSSY QUITO

'

.-'

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IHMSDI AT E 7246 •'
INFO AMCGSiSUL GUAYAQUIL 4533
I’SCIKCSO QUARRY HTS'PANAMA

•■

■i
C 0 H ! I. H H T I A, I: SECTION. 2 'OF

II TO .5442

DEPARTMENT PASS ALL AHA POSTS .
PRESIDENT ROLDOS ADDRESSED THE EVENING SESSION .-OF
CONFERENCE, IN A SHORT WELCOME,.HE EXPRESSED HIS HOP
THE MEETING WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE' AND If THERE PE RE ANT
CRITIC ISMS O f ECUADOR, 7HI .DELEGATES WOULD NOT HESITATE
TO DISCUSS THEM. ,
»

'pv
1

IA f

i.£

8. AN INDICATION OF TSI ONE-SIDEDNESS OF THE CONFERENCE
WAS CARRIED IN EL TIEMPO ON AUGUST 12. ARGENTINE, JORGE
CESASSET , CLAIMED THAT EE WAS .EXPELLED FSOMTHS SEMINAS
WREN HE OBJECTED TO FORMER PRESIDENT HECTOR CAMPORA'S
PRESENCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EX-PRESIDENT CREATED
AND DIRECTED A BAND OF ASSASSINS THAT EXECUTED -THOUSANDS
OF ARGENTINES. CESARSXY ALLEGED THAT A SECOND REASON FOR
HIS EPULSION WAS BIS' DESIRE TO REMIND THE ASSEMBLY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TAXING PLACE IN CUBA.
CISARSKY CHARGED .THAT THE ASSEMBLY'S OBJECTIVE IS TO
CONDEMN HUMAM RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF ONE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
AND OVERLOOK THOSE OF OTHER IDEOLOGIES. CSSARSKY'S
NAME DOES NOT APPEAR ON, ANY OF THE PUBLISHED LISTS OF
INVITEES, THUS, OUR INITIAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT' HE 3IMPLY
SHOWED UP AT THE CONFEREMCF.
,
'
I-. THE CONFERENCE HAS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY.
PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE WAS AN EL" COMERCIO EDITORIAL
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE CREATION OF k NEW .HUMAN EIGHTS
ORGANIZATION 0 THE BASIS THAT LISTING ONES HAD BEEN
DISCREDITED BY EXTREMISTS'WHO HAD CO-OPTED THEM. TH1
.EDITORIAL NOTED TEAT HUMAN RIGHT?. ARE'OBSERVED ONLY IN
DEMOCRATICALLY GOVERNED COUNTRIES, AMD -W.W. IS ED

SN:.E37846

01

TOR-: 3 26/14; 197

r-TG: V '223? Z
>. -j

V

; :i;

*

V*

■ £' i' t /■■•£ .* -•'<

: A.1- nr HANTS

"^7 T-r HJORI .V ■:* "

p•?0i* *'N IT-MOC -A l" ' T T r: 0 JR C’-vH TH I
I Ml * NT $U "-G tiT
T AT
an;, -ins.'
V 101 AT IONS
DOTH T'-:,

'.oNiT^-V *10
■v :le;

!■■ . COMMli : NOT -*1 Th ST.\ Hr I NS tl C OMiRCIO'? CCM.V"-DTr-?
Gv T.T DEMOCRATIC LEADINGS 07 Tfil COD* "HENC :• A:■ ;'ICT?c'J-.T-.
ANTIC IF ATI THAT ONLY HUMAN RIGHTS 710 L.r.T' IONS 0: Til'
RIGHT WILL PE T;: PATIO. CJFAN AND IFSSORTSfVIOLATIONS
WILL COMPLETELY IGNORhl WHILE ALLEGET U.S. IDL AT'IONS
“ILL FE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PROMINENCE. ANTT-U.S. STATTMFNTS DURING THE FIRST DAY'S SESSION WIRE
- MUTED THAN
aE RAD IXPFCTSBJ ROVEVr’.R, MOST OF TEr SPEAKERS »rE?E
POLITICIANS. IT IS LIKELY THAT TH? VCRE RADICAL PRINCES
WILL HAVE THEIR TURN TODAY ANT TOMORROW AND WT FFIIVVF
IT LIKELY THAT SOME WILL TAX K THAT OPPORTUNITY TO
LAUNCH A FI*1 P ARBS AT THE U.S.
GONZALEZ
FT

; t*»

•/. ’■■.■ d r..

r'il

TO A :DR‘- /i-.DrG ' 1
_3 »?

;l -}_’■

l

[»■'—£—j—$—£ Q .

AJ-

V

I

"

.

•!

7

;

ft

j {■■tfififififif J

’] j

T

U.' •■ o j :■ .
nTT^’i"'
:'. :;T,>:37i
52V-/1 e?*1.'!’l?
0 :■■ lr;l?3;'S! ?j; 3 <!£

■-* >>ir^Ai-SY orin,o

. •": "‘■CfT AT ■> a'A!: i'LC I MM"LIA1
•’MCOKSOL GUAYAQUIL 4 5{-«.*

r- .■ « 1 \j n yp

■ y;p c p y

.1

■. r -

j, 6

7^7

^... y

: A

. invi-L or^civ. use -action i o» ? out to *m-:
IFPT T--'ASc. TO ALL. ASA POSTS

!?re«.: Na
:! AOS: B-'UM, FC

;> OBJECT: < TTM A fi '■' T c t *>. f'OMTTPPMPV m OUT TO: A
OFF: (A) UlTO w2b, 1?) PtTlf'l? Vl3i V

RAP-TIP

1. SUMPARY: THE GOE-IS3TITUTO LATINO AMERICANO H;’.
IKYPSTIGACIONES SOCIALES (ILDISj' SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS
CONFEREECF ENDED AUGUST 13 AFTER ESTABLISHING A NEW
UTIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. A NUMBER OF
RESOLUTIONS—CONDEMNATION OF THE COUP IN BOLIVIA, RECOG­
NITION OF tl SALVADOR'S TRENTS DLMOCRATICO RFVOLUCIONARIO
AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE., AN
EXPRESSION OF SOI ILARITY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO
RICO, AND CONDEMNATION OF THE 'DICTATORSHIPS U ARGENTINA,
CHILE, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY—OF INTEREST TO THE USG fcERS
ADOPTED. M.OST OF AUGUST 13 WAS SPENT IN ’WRAPPING UP
THK DERATES AND AGAIN A FEW TOMATOES WERE FLUNG
AT TSF USG, RUT POSION DARTS i ERL ABSENT. IN PP.5 LATE
AFTORNOOK SESSION, ECUADOR TOOK. ITS LUMPS .iS VARIOUS
HFFRFSEMATIVES OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND ORGANISATIONS
TOO. THE PODIUM. END SUMMARY.
.?. 4 LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
*HICH '■•-'ILL BE HEADQUARTERED IN QUITO, OFFICIALLY CAMP
IKTO BEING AUGUST 13 AT THE CONCLUSION OP THE T3REE-DAi
CQ'.-ILDIG SPONSORED BUUAN RIGHTS CONFER!'NC - . HORACIO
SFvILLA 30BJA, FORMER GOP CHARGE IN WASHINGTON AND
"ULS'TtivnTLT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT
Cl. DOS, WAS name: EXECUTIVE secretary of the K&v
■;'■17f\7JC.V . ?.-■ "SID J.NT ROLPOS AND aFRNAS ILLS ZUA70
•V

i.

if

* * * w

*!«v.r‘i5f} COMM FNT * * *

* * -■e

0- :PLOCr!, i:AiTOV ,nAC
•'••AC703

PA::" '1
*** **:

TOR: 2'J,:11Z

0—fci—?=—1—n

j. %« • J

•.1

k c•

COPY

'1

r-j J. f: fj f ft

...

-QP /

C? BOLIVIA Wt:!?s. NAM.iD FT-OFFICIO PRESIDENTS . FORMER
PPVsi IjP^T OP VENEZUELA CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ WAS NAMED
ftC^raL prfsid^. .tajmi paz zamora, Lionel prizzola,
OF'flAT.DO 30 AY At AM I N , ALFREDO V A SOUSE CARPI SO Z A, JOSE
FRANCISCO PENA, GUSTAVO CARTAJAL, DANIEL ODUBER,
MANUEL UNCO AND RUBEN BERRIOS MARTINEZ '.’FRF NAMED TO
T:i5: EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. ?CTJA DOR SANS OSWALT-O GUAYASAMIN
ANr BISHOP LEONIDAS PROANO, ARGENTINIANS HECTOR CAMPO?A
i'-XT EMIL 10 MICtNONS, RPTIV1AN JAIME PAZ ZAMORA,
■U:’ZILIANS DOM HSI. DXP CAMARA AND I SONET, BPIZZOLA, ■
CCLOMI-IANS ALFRETO V A SOU I? CARRISOZA AND APOLINARIO
DIAZ CALLKJAS, COSTA RICAN DANIEL ODUBER, CHILEAN
S ABIOLA LET FLIER , EL SALVADOREANS GUILLERMO MANUEL
UNGO AND ROBERTO LARA VEDADO, JAMAICAN JOHN THOMPSON,
MtlllCAN GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, NICARAGUAN ERNESTO
CARDENAL, PANAMANIAN GERARDO GONZALEZ PERUVIAN
ARMANDO VILLANFUVA, PUERTO RICAN RUBEN BERRIOS,
DOMINICAN JOSS FLA NCISC-0 PS NT. GOMEZ AND URUGUAY AN
JUAN FERREIRA 'VaU-F NAMED TO THE COUNCIL 0? DIRECTORS.

■ "V.
L/'
/I

;/•

. TRD RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE CONFERENCE WERE:
— A DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR "THE COPE 0“' CONDUCT

PROPOSED by i'RF.S. jdfnt roldos and a do pet dd by thv
AND PAN PACT FORk ’ C-K MIUI FT.FRS J
— AM TNEHGV.TIC CONDEMNATION 0?

-ii; GARCIA MEZA

COUP AND ?£«' CON SEQUEL * SYSTEMATIC AND CTrfJ: T. VIOLATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TA.ilhG PL AC F IN U CL I VIA I
— RECOGNITION ON THE CLANDESTINE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL
UNITY GOVERNMENT AS TS7 ONLY CONS IITIJI ON V-'. GOVERNMENT;
— RECOGNITION CF THE ? I 3 NT I' D EMC C RATI CO P F V 0 L U C10 ■ A R10
AS THI LEGITIMATE
}«•■=.<? SIC!-' OF THE WILT 0? T F
,

'■

LI SALVADORAN FT-OP Li f

-- CONDEMNATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1 TOLATTO'-S IN FT

SALVADOR;
-- CONDEMNATION 0? h~MAN RIGHTS ’-IC r,tTlO‘'L' TN
■'» °G FM'P If!A , r-IT ID , PA RA 'HAY A ND U:i uGUAY J
-- i? ITERATION OF Ttifc ASSOCIATION'S SUI £

:-T":iITO ICO IK ITS 710 T FOR INDEPENDENCE; AND
— DOUT1;: in AT 10Cl D "SPOTIo RFGIM. : ?VR\, GUTICi, 07
07 Tu ” ?- EiSb .
■\0 PROVISIONS fco •: IM F ? M;!' NT A T 7 0 N
■■-■Tr" CISCUS'!-■ ] /- I’tir. UULFGA-'Db.

F T:l« ■' fe RfiSCL'.UIOHS

rF.IAT'e ■■UP. I NO 7.!F L A Si DAY'S SESSIONS FOT-LOWFD THE
•ATT7RN S7T T« T1-/ PREVIOUS TWO DAYS. ATTACKS CM THE
US Wl? NCI DOM IM? VT. CM 7. FRENCH SOCIALIST WARNED
'•."at t;:f. ecu? ri-o:.tvia would pc the first in » series;
THAT SOUTH A MLR I Ca V. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS 'v ERF. .AWAITING
,rr,';' ELECTION 07 U; MS 1 NTIAL CANDIDATE RONALD REASON TO
a.

Jj/ZL

ir*J. J :2iM 'lb: 11

i
flay

j_

-Sr—v-

T

\

t.#****#*

’0:1
v.

v;0 [J I

.1

V

-

--T

Y

;

*

'

r

-AJttoAA-:.

s
(-••./,

LAUNCH ? ;:d IH ATTACKS .OB' ■ B RMOSft ACT. AS COAL'D KA7* '«E%h
PUERTO .RICAN -SELF GATE RUBEN BPPRIOS &TTA.C/I..P
rm US CLAIM I Nil TEAT POTATO' RICO WAS TR? FWOHT LIN'.."
IN TBS' BATTLE’ AGAINST PS IMPERIALISM. " <•
“T

■ ■

' - '

S

PSN:040791

PAGE 03

OF 03'

'

*★****£$■.0 N f "I

T0R:228/15:11Z

DTG:151230Z AUG 30

COPT

frgr n

OP- IMMSD /ROUT IN F.
-t
STU387
I* ROESOI #5516/2 2281414
0 R 151230Z AUG 80 .

EH AM E HR ASST QUITO '

k;

?

t

m

T

T

5jt ;|c ?jC

Tjv

t' q ^ Y

•-

-TO SIC-STATE WAS HOC . IMMEDIATE 7274. ■
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4594 ■
” .
U8CINCSO QUARRY HTS PANAMA .
OONFIDEN f I A I,

ti

--

,,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 QUITO 5516
DEPT PASS TO ALL ABA. POSTS
£.. THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATE, ARCHBISHOP TEOTONI DOS
SANTOS, PROPOSE!) THAT THE CONFERENCE PASS A RESOLUTION.
WHICH WOULD URGE THE US TO GRANT GENERAL AMNESTY - TO
ALL UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS. ARCHBISHOP DOS SANTOS ARGUED
TEAT BY MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH THE MILLIONS OF
UNDOUCMINTED ALIENS RESIDING IN‘'THE UNITED STATES, THE
ASSOCIATION COULI) BEGIN BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF A
POWERFUL AND EFFECTIVE PRESSURE GROUP. THE RESOLUTION
WAS NOT ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE, BUT W5 ANTICIPATE, THAT THE IDEA WILL SURFACE AGAIN.
.
; . .
6. IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, PRESIDENT ROIDQS WHO IN HIS
WELCOMING SPEECH EXPRESSED HIS1"HOPE THAT IF THE
DELEGATES FOUND GROUNDS FOR CRITICISM IN ECUADOR
THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DO SO, GOT HIS WISH. SOME
SIX ECUADOREAN CITIZENS, REPRESENTING VARIOUS NATIONAL
UNIONS, THE PEASANTS' ORGANIZATION AND PROVINCIAL
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEES, ROSE TO DENOUNCE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN ECUADOR. THE PRIMARY FOCUS'OF THEIR
DENUNCIATIONS WAS ECUADOR'S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, WHICH
PERMITS THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUIONAL '
GUARANTEES. PRESIDENT ROLDOS SPOKE ON THE CONTINUING
NEED FOR THIS LAW SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, AND THE...CONFERENCE
DELEGATES, WHO REPEATEDLY LAUDED ROLDOS, DID NOT- PASS
ANY RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE LAW. ECUADOR WAS ALSO
CITED FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN AND LABOR RIGHTS DURING
TEE RECENT TRANSPORT WORKERS STRIKE. OTHER ECUADOREANS
SPEAKERS CASTIGATED THE SUMMER INSTITUTE FOR LINGUISTICS
•(5IL), A PROTESTANT MISSIONARY GROUP WHICH WORKS IN

DSMi040789

PACE 01
*g- N T—P—D

TOR:228/15:032
■£.

M

DIG: 1.51230Z AUG

C0 PT'

L*#***#:?:*;

.'tjjesfcrt jfr J1*:!

■h

nQ p .

' AMAZON REGION. fHF S PfcA-lFR S' CHARGES THAT ]
rfcsraoiiNS Indian c'JLTnar: and their iv-mants

I rt -s

DC.* AM; HRC LUNCHED WITH CONFERENCE BLLFGATFS
ILLRIUGE AND LAURIE WISEBSRG ON AUGUST 13. BOTH

FT WITH EMBASSY'S CONCLUSION THAT THERF SEEMED TO

:f a conspiracy of silence neither to give credit to
Ini UNITED STATE 3 MO R TO CRITICIZE CUBA. HL DR IDG 3
POINTED OUT THAT THE DELEGATES POLITICAL LEANINGS MADE
SOME CRITICISM OF THE US MANDATORY, PUT THAT THERE
APPEARED TO BE A GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO HOLD IT TO A
MINIMUM. ACCORDING TO ELDSIDGE MOST OF TEE DELEGATES
V.SRE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY, BUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXPRESS PUBLICLY
•HAT GRATITUDE.
r.. COMMENT: IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN THE DELEGATES'
CRITICISMS CF ARGENTINA, MORE WAS NOT SAID ABOUT THE
ARGENTINE ROLE IK BOLIVIA? IT IS ALSO UNFORTUNATE THAT
DELEGATES CONFIN FT THEMSELVES TO CRITICISMS OF
r.lGaTWING DICTATORSHIPS. HOWEVER, ALL IN ALL THE
CONFERENCE WAS MOT BAD FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. THE EVENT
'.’AC QUITE OBVIOUSLY V'FF. WELL FINANCED. ILDIS PICKED UP
Thr. TAB FOR AIR FARES AND HOTEL BILLS ANr PROVIDED
TRANSLATORS FOR PARTIO IPANTS AND OBSERVERS WHO DID NOT
CPEAX SPANISH. Y r.T AT NO TIME WAS PHF FUTURE FINANCING
OF THE ORGANIZATION DJ SCUSSED. FOREIGN Ml MISTRY OFFICIALS
i'A'.V: TOLD US THAT HO RA­CIO SEVILLA WILL MOT EE RETURNING
TO THE FOREIGN MINISTR ‘f AND THAT. THE MINISTRY WILL NOT
:F PAYING HIS SALARY ’-': r.ILF HI SERVES AS EXECUTIVE."d'CRETARY OF TUT ASSOC imON. WE DO NOT NOW IF T-.IS
rS TO PT A FUT.T. TIME J 0T< AND IF IT IS, WHO IS 10 PAY
1.?: SILL. rONSrQ UENTLT , THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF Z nK
GUEST ION.
‘.SSCCIATION IS 0 TEN
TONS: AX. EZ

Tr

(; •. r\ T‘

0 N V r--) ^

A L 7*

p C C p'

■;2iv

(

MEMORANDUM

u

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
gqnf

-rtr

i.a

July 11,

1978

INF0RMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR f j/A\}

SUBJECT:

Kissinger on Human Rights in
Argentina and Latin America

.s?j

The attached cable summarizes Kissinger's visit to Argentina
for the World Cup. His praise for the Argentine government
in its campaign against terrorism was the music the Argentine’
government was longing to hear, and it is no accident that his
statements were played back to us by the Southern Cone countries
during the O.A.S. General Assembly. His other comments on the
security problem in Latin America and the Soviet/Cuban threat
surprise me only in that they are about 15-20 years out of date.
What concerns me is his apparent desire to speak out against
the Carter Administration's human rights policy to Latin
America within two weeks of his return—which is soon.
Frankly, I think it would be a mistake from a political point
of view for him to make such a speech since he will only open
himself to criticism for being anti-human rights since clearly
Latin America is one of our success stories. On the other
hand, we don't want to get into a public argument with him
on this subject when we will need his help on SALT, etc.
You may want to call him and ask how he enjoyed his trip and
whether he would mind if a member of your staff—me—debrief
him on his trip. That would provide me with an opportunity
to see whether he is really concerned enough about our human
rights policy to launch a campaign and also to give him some
information on the effectiveness of our human rights policy
in Latin America.

CC !

«.< CSS JLCci .-la *z.r.GW3

declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

I-

.irtcofl

5601

MEMORANDUM
GONFIDE?JTIALi
ACTION

.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
August 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

JESSICA TUCHMA

SUBJECT:

Human Rights -- Argentina

The President's positive remarks at Yazoo City on the Argentine
human rights situation caused something of an upset at State which
does not view recent events in Argentina in the same positive light.
This was apparently the origin of the memorandum to you at Tab A.
Its message is that the human rights situation in Argentina is still
very bad, notwithstanding recent announcements, and that therefore the
President should not make favorable comments until we know more about
what's really going to happen. Ampng other things, the memorandum
points out that while the GOA announced the release of 342 prisoners, we
can only confirm that 4^ have so far actually been released.
In case you feel that the President would be interested, a shortened
version of the State memorandum is at Tab I.
RECOMMENDA TlON:
That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Bob Pastor concurs

C ON PIPEM TIA L/GBS
DECLASSIFIED

:i

b

5601

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE

C ON FIDE?? TIA'T:

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

An Update of Human Rights
Developments in Argentina

i

I.

Hopeful Developments
Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of
342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that
we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and
that we do not yet know what proportion of those released
have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have
been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks
since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and
77 releases.

U,\tMu*

Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will
restore a limited form of the "right of option", whereby state of
siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an
important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

Data

Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President
Yidela may be gaining support from other generals for a greater
ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has
prompted Argentina1 s oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the
government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of
engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily
punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts.
The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is
under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's
Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the
court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

€. ^

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q. 13526
VjOtUAXA

l-Mv'b

--

IL

Negative Developments
--

Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a.sea resort near
Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered
brutally. It appears the oLhcrs were later released. It seems
likely that the security forces were responsible.

oxinfidfntiawgps

-GONFif'llJLN T1AL,
»»

Inmid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was
kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet.
It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military
resentment against President Videla, who made a very
successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper,
which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of
human rights, is being held by the government on economic
charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.

. --

HI,

2

At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to
leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish
leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

Conclusion
Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now
taking place in the Bue.nos Aires military region. The com­
mander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard­
liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power.
Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the
very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embassy
Buenos Airds, recommends that we should await developments before
further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully
informed as events unfold.

^en-riDEN ti a l/gds

4140
.VKMOUANI.U M

Tin: wnrn: noi sr.
\\ AMII.N 1.1 OS

INFORMATION'
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Your Remark That Argentine Improvements
in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A) assessing
the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on
June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission
in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps — the release
of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of
the right of exile — should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the
Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge
and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and
other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The
State Department also requested further information on whether the
announced steps have been taken.
A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears
to reinforce the conclusion that we should-be more cautious about
accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military govern­
ments at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his
visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and
instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation
of a democratic form of government.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.13S26

4140

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
■ SECRET

July 7, 1977

ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT A. PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Human Rights in Argentina

6^

We have just received a short paper (Tab A) from State responding to
your memorandum of June 27 asking that State acknowledge the improve­
ment in the Argentina picture. ARA, which probably drafted the
memorandum, is not exactly known for its reluctance to compliment
Latin American governments when given the chance; and therefore,
their note of caution carries great credibility. I have attached at
Tab B the cable, which I recommend be sent to the post, and at Tab C,
a cable on the meeting between Videla and Mendez of Uruguay which
lends support to State's conclusion.
I recommend you send the memorandum at Tab I because the President
raised the point about acknowledging the Argentine case a second
time during his conversation with President Perez of Venezuela.
RECOMMENDATION
1.

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve___________

2.

Disapprove___________

That you instruct me to clear the cable at Tab B.
Approve___________

Disapprove___________

■V<

Jessica Tuchman concurs'.!.

SECRET----- &BS-

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority vAsc.
fc-vData
NARA__

UVaUig---------

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

ARGENTINA:

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

(C) Parameters and problems. The following assessment
covers the Argentine government Is 1978 performance and the
current situation with respect to category-one human rights.
Inevitaoly, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US.
Government.'s limited capacity for monitoring human rights'
events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive
or negative developments.
i

(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical
material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many
people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being
held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We
are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose
credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance amonggroups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights
developments.
(C) We do not believe, however, tnac timely, precise
and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the
assessment offered below. 1
The record of Argentine human
rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing
cumulative picture of the government;s performance. And
while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative
dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would '
remain unchanged.
(C) Current situation. With respect to category-one
rights, conditions can be summarized as follows;
(C) — Political
purportedly guilty of
at the disposition of
state-o£-siege powers
(PEN prisoners).*

prisoners: Approximately 2,9Q0 persons
security violations are being detained
the national executive branch under
provided for in the Argentine constitution

(CJ
“ The current state of siege was instituted on
November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the
state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain
prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish
detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that
the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention
DOS review(s) completed.

MORI/CDF C0321B601

PECRET/NOFORH/NO CONTRACT
l

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
E.0.13526
'
_
Authority__~ -3 ^ ~
^

NARA

^

No Objection_To Declassification 2008/1J/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

__natn

La\\la \\

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3
-

2-

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which
is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is
being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAH
prisoners) and proDably includes about 500 persons. According
to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are ■
either former terrorists now cooperating with security units
or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore,
listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners
who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by
the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the
program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most
a few hundred persons.
m

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to sub­
stantially reduce the-number of political'prisoners• by (1)
releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of
terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2)
trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting
political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights
to choose exile over imprisonment (rignt-of-option). The
right-of-option program initiated inlate 1977 has resulted
in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.
(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent
rumors that thousand's of political prisoners are being
held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.
(C) — Torture, and prisoner mistreatment; Physical and
psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment
for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have informa­
tion about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners.
However, the Executive does not always respond to court
order. While we have little information that would permit
categorizing detainees according to ty£>es of offenses, the
PEN list probably includes few if.any terrorists suspected
of having committed violent acts against persons or property.
Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely
killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations
of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include
sucn things as (a) non-violent -actions undertaken in support
of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings
contrary to the military's conception of social order)
groups, e.g., poster and pampnlet distribution and a variety
*f Ff R frT/HQf OKM/rcO rONTHftC.T-

No Objection JTo Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 i_-—-j.-:.-. ~.~:r—r.
i

No Objection lo Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

officials.
Torture generally occurs ,during interrogation,
prior to official listing of a detainee as a FEN prisoner, or
his or her summary execution.
International Committee of the
ked Cross {ICRC) representatives who have interviewed most of
the PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in
August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured
during interrogation.' "w

(C) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage '
and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending
upon such factors as the prisoner?s alleged offense, the
proclivities of the regional military commander, and the
character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment
(beatings, -denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise,
etc.) are most often associated with specific military
jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of
prisoners.
In at least five reasonably documented instances
in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata .
jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably
by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented
recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978
an ICRC official reported to the Embassy - his belief that
prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during
the year.
(C) — Disappearances: Reports of disappearances continue
to accumulate.
In the vast majority of cases, responsibility
almost certainly lies with one of the many security units* In
the absence of evidence-of clandestine camps bousing thousands
of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead..

of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived .
by the authorities as directly having supported subversion.
(the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered-national interests;
(c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftis-t"; or
(d) actions that contributed. to an intellectual-cultural
environment conducive to the growth of ?subversion" (herein
lies the clanger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing
artists, etc.).
Thus, the term "security violation? has no
specific meaning.
Its operative definition is largely left
to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest
powers.
'
■ "
(C)
** Reports received from released prisoners tenet to
substantiate the ICRCjs observations on the frequency of torture.

• QECRET/NOFOiRN/hO. CONTRACT

------->— ...

nq

Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 -------- -----------'• —

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3
(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend
to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the'
past 3-4 years. Argentine groups shar§ that estimate and
have presented the government with documentation on almost
5,000 cases.
In truth, however, no one knows precisely
how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why
specific individuals were victimized.
.
*
(C) Few who have disappeared since about, mid-1977, '
and on whom we have any information, could be considered
terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either .
eliminated pr living in exile, the security forces have made
a significant shift in their targetting practices to draw
into tne security net a range of non-terrorists associated
with the vague and expansively defined political left. The
decision as to which specific individuals will be picked
up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, .
depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities
constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may
only have involved past membership in a group that was
entirely legal at the time, insofar as there is a discernible
pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance
or persons wi-th a common association past or present; e.g.,
graduates of the same high school or university faculty,
memoers of a political party or youth {group, etc. However,
tnere are many cases that make no apparent sense and for
which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than
in any specific act of the victim.
(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with
few known exceptions, generally not been considered by
authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing
or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen,
and other professionals have criticized the government.'s economic
political and human rignts policies without suffering
retribution at the hands of the security forces.
(C) There, has been no significant official effort to
collect and publish information on persons who allegedly '
have disappeared.
When queried about-disappearances by non-:
governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines
standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts

t
6gC*fcBT/NOrOItN/NO CONTKACT-

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

ino

UDjection 10 ueciassincation 2UUU/n/U4 : NLU-2b-b-i-y-3

regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged
disappeared persons, but they have recused to accept'
jurisdiction in such cases.
(i:) The Mothers of the Plaza ae Mayo (relatives of
disappeared persons,} one of the most persistent and cohesive
groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has
recently been prohibited from conducting what had oeen a'
weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government Bouse in down­
town Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become
too large and potentially disruptive in tne judgment of
government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands
for information.
The Mothers are now holding their gatherings
at smaller and less conspicuous sites.
(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has character­
ized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that
any government agency either has collectea or will be able to
collect definitive files on alleged: disappearance cases. The
various security units have an obvious interest in withholding
or destroying information on cases for which their operatives
have been responsible.
(C) "Reappearances" emerged as a new.and possibly under­
reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are
no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probaoly
quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances.
As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15
cases ana by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placec
tne figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting
it might oe as high as 300. During 1978, the government
published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who
hao allegedly reappeared*
In most cases, however, the
individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing
persons" cases. Their .names did not appear on the lists of
disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine
human rights organizations.
(CJ — Fair public, trial. All who have been detained by •
official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have
obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges
against them.
g

MDCft£T/NOFOnM/HO CONTRACT

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

no

UDjecnon 10 ueciassmcation 2UUb/n/U4 : NLU-^d-o-i-y-a
-o-

(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged
ana tried in civilian or military courts, xxx there are two
notable problems: the often extended period between de­
tention and judicial processing and the reported predominance
of convictions based on confessional evid'ence extracted
through torture- Professional legal groups such as the
ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional
evidence.
(C) — Invasion, of the home. The detention practices of
operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal
invasion of the home.
In addition, there are numerous reports
of arresting officers ransacking private residences and
stealing ttie personal property of the detainee.
(C) Trends.
1978 produced no substantial quantitative
improvement or deterioration in category-one. terms. The year
featured a variety ot positive and negative factors, hut the .
net result was to leave the situation little changed. 2
Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official
security personnel were, frequent throughout the year, and
there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government
effort to halt the abuses.
(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to
reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds
of abuses because the available statistical material is not
always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a
good example.
In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and
Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances
during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequeny
(about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977- by later in

(C) *xx The status of PEN prisoners with respect to
judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner
nela under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on
charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted,
serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half .
or more of the current PEN detainees are either being
tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities.
Tnis is significant because, among other reasons, PEN
detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction
of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition,
for exile under the right-of-option program.

-SE6HET;

..............

'NO- CONTRACT-

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 .

no

:

UDjection 10 ueciassmcation 2UUd/n/U4: NLU-28-b-l-y-3

-7-

the year, however, additional information .forced upward.*
adjustments in the figures, interior Ministry records showed
a rate ot 40 per month for January to October (as compared to
150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978} and a Foreign.
Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at aoout.
80 per month. By November, the Embassy had repdrts of disappearances averaging aoout 34 per month for the Jaauary-April
period. The Embassy has since concluded that a-figure of*
55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978. .
*

(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion
that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative
frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations
reflecting tactical consioerations rather than policy
aecisions. In essence, the situation changed little
duriny 1978. 3
(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism, uncontrolled. The
conclusion tnat conaitions did not improve in 1978 is
cased, in part, on evidence that the security forces
continued to operate without effective central control.
Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence
sources stated that:
— President Videla and his moderate supporters
were attempting to establish rigid command and
control over security operations;
— new orders had been issued with respect to con­
ducting police and military operations within •
the bounds of the law; or
— police and military operativesj had been dis­
missed or disciplined for abuses.
(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken.
Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in
areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward
reform.
Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent
that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted
in accord with orders issued by regional and local military
authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the
law or the directives of national authorities. In late
October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities
in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that
there was almost no central control over operational
counterterrorist units.
-ftEteKgT/NQronN/MO CONTRACT

l
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

No Ubjection I o Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3
-g-

a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment
with the general economic and political performance of his
government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the
beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official
attention during the last quarter of the year,' created highly
improbable circumstances for bold human rignts initiatives on
Videla's part.
(C) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment
cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms.
Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander
Viola now may be., in a position to exert more effective control
over the service. Particularly notable changes involved
the following officers;
— Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I
commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His
new post is a prestigious one from which he
might be able to advance to the Commander in
Cnief^s slot. Nonetheless; since he no longer
has a troop command nor, mure importantly,
direct control over counterterrorist units, his
promotion is probably a net' short*-term, human
rights gain..
4
— Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has
replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander.
Galtier! most recently commanded Corps II
(Rosario) where he established a reputation for
reasonableness and restraint in human rights
matters.
It has been in his geographic jurisdiction,
for example, that the most progress has been
registered with respect to the judicial processing
of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same
tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a
needed improvement over Suarez Mason.
— Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another
officer notorious for his permissive attitude
toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from
his sensitive buenos Aires command (Military
Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.
— Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros.
A Videla-Viola loyalist, Mohtes ctauld combine with
Gaitieri to give the moderates? the potential forcurbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of
-SEL’RtiT/NOFOKN/NO. CONTRACT

DOS review(s) completed.

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

no

UDjection 10 ueciassiTication 2UUb/n/U4 : NLU-2b-b-i-y-b

f

counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires
area.
brig. General Juan flautists Sassjain’s appointment
as Chief of the National Police is an ominous
move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist
expert, Sass'iain is reputedly rough and cruel.
Major General Luciano B. Menenaez, a fanatic*on •
suuversion who has condoned human rights violations
by those under his command, • remains the Corps III
commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez.'s retention
may _ be attributable to the need for his services
in the event of hostilities with Chile over
the Beagle•Channel. In human rights terms,
however, it means that the situation in Cordoba
is not liable to improve in the near futureIn all likelihood, the army command shifts will not
result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements,
but the political context appears to be more favorable than .
it has been since the March. 1976 coup.5
Much will depend
upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise
the necessary- leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether
the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over
continuing aouses to' demand change.
(C) IABRC visit.
Prom the Argentine government Vs
perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29
when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will
begin a week-long on site investigation.
It is questionable, however, whether'the prospect of
the IAHKC visit will lead to- fundamental changes in the tactics
employed by the security forces ana, thereby, open the way to
long-term human rights advances,
in this critical area, the
army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than
the IAHRC visit.®

■tiJBCRDy/NOPQRN/NO- CONTBAfc^

i
*

___ _

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

r

No Objection Trrftn-ln nifinntinn in full 2013/02/04

NLC-24-91-4-1-9

TELEGRAM J+,3r

D^nnrtmpnt. nf State

.DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-~2bT0: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL;
at
ACTION HCA-ll
page

TEL AV 22921

II Of <2

TEL AV 22111

4321

ZGG404Z

n

or 12

2II4I42

NOT TO KENT I ON COX IN ANT AXTICLEI.
INFO

OCT-11 ANA-11
SS-li SIAE-fl

AOS-II HA-15 PN-IG NSC-BS !H1
DOOE-IN INN-11 NSAE-II PA-11 /K7 V
-............................... 111431 2114152 /13

N 2515HI OCT 79
FN AMEHSASSY TEL AVIV
TO 1ECXTATE WASHOC 4317
INFO IISICA WASHOC
AHEHBASSY BUENOS NINES

eUOT OB IAPA AVAIO IN 1973 ON 1974.1
7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARDENTINE POLITICS, TI HERMAN
SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MODERATE ANO RIGHT WIHI
ELEMENTS IN THE HILITAXT WILL COMPETE FOR PERONIST
SUPPORT, WHICH MAY CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERM
WILL IE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA.

mnniiiit section 11 of n tel aviv iisii
STATE FON NEA/ANA VAXY; NA FOB DERIAN
IISICA FOR AN
E.O. 12115: RDS 11/25/99 DIETERICH, W.J.) OH-0
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PINT, IS, AR
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE FRILF
1.
X - ENTIRE TEXT)

TiHumv

2. IN CONVERSATION VITH PRESS ATTACHE DIETERICH, WHO
KNEW HIM IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1971-74 TOUR THERE,
TIMERMAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION IY
POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM ON THE
ARGENTINA MILITARY RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL DILEMMA AS TO
WETHER TO WRITE ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE
FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TIHERNAN WILL BE IN THE
UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARO FROM THE AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMITTEE OH SATURDAY, OCT. 17. AFTER THAT HE
PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OERIAN. THEN HE WILL GO TO WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT THE^fefARTMENT.
ANO AT THE WHITE JlPUSE.
i

,

I. TI HERMAN ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE BELIEVES THE NIGHTWINN AND VEIY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CAB IIDO IS FINANCES
AY 01AHA DE HASSOT,v PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PROVING IA IN
BAHIA BLANCA.
Mil IWS. HASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE
EHIASSY, ANOjlF NEHORY SERVES, RECEIVED A HARIA ItOOIS

I. IN CONVERSATION WITH TI HERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A
CHILLING IHPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING
WAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES
THE ARGENTINE MILITANT RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN
AND ANTI-SEMITIC.
9. TIMERMAN IS HOW EMPLOYEO BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV
DAILY HAAIIV AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT,
ALTHOUGH HE SAIO HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IH SPENDING SOME
TIME AT AN ACADEMIC IHITI TUT IOH IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY
NEXT I OREO COLUMBIA. THUS FAN HE HAt WRITTEN ONLY ON
LATIN AMES I CAN HATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE
WILL BRANCH INTO BROAOER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL NATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH
HE WILL GIVE IH THE UNITED STATES WILL IE HUMAN RIGHTS
AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EIGHTIES, AND ADDED THAT THE US

--------- -

-

3. TI HERMAN SAID TRAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF MISSIONING
DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE
'LEADER* OF AN ALLEIED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, ANO
THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANT LEFTIST OR
TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA
PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED
ZBIGNIEW BIZEZIRSXI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON
ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN
BECAUSE HE KAO DARED TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS
IN A CONVERSATION VITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OERIAN, TIE
OBJECT I ON APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAO SLANDERED FASCISM.
RE WAS ALSO OUESTIOXED CONCERN I HD SUPPOSED CONTACTS
BETWEEN HEHACHEH BEGIN AND THE HONTC.YERO GUERILLAS
DURING A BEGIN JISIT TO ANGEMYI’IA IN 1975. TI HERMAN
BELIEVED THESE C'JEST13NS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT
BEGIN'S ROCK 'WAR IN THE HOLY LAMO* HAD BEEN FOUND AMONG
HATER IAL 9 USED BV THE HONTONEROS. TIMERMAN WAS BROUGHT
FROM PRISON TO AH INTERVIEW WITH GEN. HARGUINDE6UY IN
THE CASA ROSAOA PRIOR TO A DERI AM VISIT. THE GENERAL
INFORMED KIM THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE
THAT PATT DERI AN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE
WAS HIS COUSIN.

l

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority V-fC-- NIX.
MARA

vE. F

Date

U\r\\vi»

4. TIMERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LANUSSE'S EX­
PRESS SECRETARY ECGAROO S4J0N OIEO OF A HEART ATTACK
DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A
RELATIVELY VCUNG HM. THE MILITARY DID ROT SUSPECT THAT
HE HAD A HEART CONDITION.

i
TI HUMAN IS
REL'JCiAHT *B u»!TF i»ei:t HIS EXPERIENCES IH ARGEHTIHA BECAUSE he FEARS REPRISALS GY THE
HIllfAlL.AtAiIKT PRlChbS STILL IN ARGENTINA. AS AN
5.

EXAMPLE DF THIS HE MEIITICNEO THAT ROBERT COX, EDITOR OF
THE aUEHOS AIRES HERALD, HAO SENT A MESSAGE *D HIM
THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IH BUENOS AIRES ASXIHG HIM

POMCinCMTI Al

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

Department of State
PAGE 01
ACTION NEA-11

TEL AY 22920

02 OF 02

TELEGRAM

280404Z

4324

INFO

'
,

OCT-01 ARA-11 AD5-00 PM-06 NSC-0.5 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 DOOE-00
I NR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 HA- 05 /06 7 W
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 0 4 4 1 28 0 4 2 4 Z /23
R 25 1510Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASH0C 43 08
INFO USlCA WAS HD C
(
AME MB ASSY BUENOS AIRES
C 0 N F

I -o E N T 1 A L- SECT I ON 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 229 20

WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
FOR YEARS TO COME.
TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC
APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL
AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA.
HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS
HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS A'T THE DEPARTMENT AND
THE WHlTF HOILSF- IFJWIS

----------

I

nmic incuTHH---------

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2C513/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

No Objection To Declassification in F'^ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

*******C ONFIDBNTIA L*******E COPY

187

-£7

LK

OP IMMED
DE RUESBA #8154 2641610
0 101603Z OCT 80
FM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7695
THE-WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5231
AMEMBASST BRASILIA 4323
AMEMBASST CARACAS 4611
AMEMBASST LA PAZ 4068
AMEMBASST LIMA 3718
AMEMBASST MONTEVIDEO 6800
AMEMBASST SANTIAGO 4966

,0^-S

x.

‘CONPIDENTI A £~~SECTION 1 OF 2
'EXDIS
/

t

JENOS AIRES 8154

t

\Y

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR INTAFF
EO 12065: RDS-4 10/8/96 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAG'S: AR
SUBJECT: DELI VERT OH^PRES IDlTmALs. "MESSAGE
REF: (A) WHITE H0USEy?397 (NOTALjT (B) BUENOS AIRES 8098 (NOTEL)J
(C) BUENOS AIRES 7652

*************** +VHSR COMMENT ***************
VP

l

PSN1004066

PAGE 01

T0R:294/16:52Z

DTG;101603Z OCT 80

*******0 ONFIDENTIA L******»E COPT
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

LtVnVvu

Authority
M Lr
NARA_. fe-frf____ Date

2. CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL VIOLA
OCTOBER 8 (REF A}. GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND
APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS. HE STATED
THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE REPLYING IN WRITING. IN THE
MEANTIME HE WOULD WISH TO SAY THAT HE FULLY RECIPROCATED
THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING
US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. "MY GOVERNMENT", HE SAID, "WILL
SEEK TO MAKE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AS PRODUCTIVE AS
POSSIBLE. HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME AT VARIOUS POINTS
IN THE CONVERSATION STATING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS HIS
(BELIEF THAT THE CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN ARGENTINA, WHICH
IN AN EARLIER MEETING HE HAD ENUMERATED AS BEING BOLIVIA,
■ GRAINS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUC.LEAR MATTERS, ARE THE PRO­
DUCT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WILL "ONE WAT OR ANOTHER"
BE REOLVED. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON BASIC
INTERESTS. HE SAID, ALSO, THAT HONESTY AND FRANKNESS
.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

****♦*&€ QNFIDENTIA !**»*♦*»E COPT
'WERE REQUIRED FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO PROSPER.‘
t
'3. VIOLA, AS USUAL OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE, MADE IT CLEAR
THAT HE WANTED TO USE THE MEETING TO EXPLORE OTHER MATTERS
—IN EFFECT HE SAID "ASK ME QUESTIONS." THE CHARGE IN­
QUIRED WHAT GENERAL VIOLA SAW AS TEE AGENDA FOR HIS
GOVERNMENT. VIOLA RESPONDED BT LISTING WHAT HE CALLED
THE "PROBLEMS". GIVEN TO SCHEMATIC RESPONSES, HE STATED
THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY -WAS IN THE POLITICAL
AREA WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE
LEGISLATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES
TO RENEW THEIR LEADERSHIP AND "FUNCTION NORMALLY." IN THE
ECONOMIC AREA, HE SAID, THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO
REVITALIZE THE ECONOMT, BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE
IN THE SOCIAL AREA, HE SAIB IT WAS NECESSARY TO CORRECT
THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY
OPPOSED TO THE BROAD INTERESTS OF MOST ARGENTINES. HE
SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EFFECTIVELY
IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION AND INSTITUT­
ING OTHER, UNDEFINED, MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL FIELD.
VIOLA STOPPED WITH THESE PRIORITIES. BUT WHEN QUERIED
ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS
.FOUR OBJECTIVES: TO INCREASE THE "PRESENCE" OF'ARGENTINA
IN THE SOUTHERN CONE (HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE COUN­
TRY WAS NOT SEEKING REGIONAL HEGEMONY); TO REBUILD
ARGENTINA'S TIES TO THE ANDEAN PACT; TO REPAIR.AND EXPAND
RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE; AND TO RESTORE AND
STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
4. VIOLA THEN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPELL OUT SOME
OF HIS THOUGHS ON THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S BASIC GOALS.
HE SAD THAT THE MILITARY TOOK OVER IN 1976 WITH ONE OB­
JECTIVE: TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURE AND GENUINE
DEMOCRACY. THE MILITARY WANTED TO FINALLY END THE CYCLE
IN WHICH INEFFECTIVE AND UNSTABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
ALTERNATE WITH MILITARY REGIMES. GETTING THE MILITARY
PERMANENTLY OUT OF THIS GAME BY BUILDING A HEALTHY
DEMOCRACY WAS STILL THE- MILITARY'S OBJECTIVE AND ONE
THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FAITHFULLY PURSUE, HE SAID.

i

5. THESE THOUGHTS LED'TO A QUESTION ON PERONISM BY THE
CHARGE. VIOLA SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT
WANT TO LEAVE POWER KNOWING THAT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS
THE COUNTRY WOULD AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE OPTIONS IF
BT
. <
k
*■

PSN:004066

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR!284/16:52Z

DTG:101603Z OCT S0

*******0 0 N F I D -B -N- -! I A L»******E COPY
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9
■"

188

i

****»»*c o n n i n i i i»*»***»£

copy

OP IMMED
DE RUESBA #8154 2841615
0 101603Z OCT 80
FM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7696
,THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
■INFO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5232
AMEMBASST BRASILIA 4324
AMEMBASST CARACAS 4612
AMEMBASST LA PAZ 4069
AMEMBASST LIMA 3719
AMEMBASST MONTEVIDEO 6801
AMEMBASST SANTIAGO 4967

!

PAGE 01

TORs284/£7:11Z

v

- A -\- q

: NLC-24-91-4-1-9

NARA__f^g____ Data

Lf

u \ ^ \ l t.

3 V l- cV

BTG:101603Z OCT 80

No Objection To Declassification in Full" 20T3/62/04
.

NA

Aiii'nnrity

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, VIOLA ELABORATED ON THE

PSN:004090

.

:

E.Q. 13526

UcClassifie

EIDIS
DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR INTAFF
HAS HAD SINCE 1946—PERONISM AND ANTI-PERONISM. STATING
THAT HE WAS CHOOSING HIS WORDS WITH GREAT CARE BECAUSE
THE SUBJECT IS A PARTICULARLT SENSITIVE ONE, VIOLA SAID
THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT EVEN TODAT PERONISM IS A
MAJORITT. PERONIST SENTIMENT RUNS DEEP AND STRONG. IN
ARGENTINA. BUT PERONISM HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED AROUND A
LEADER AND LACKED A WELL DEFINED IDEOLOGICAL BASS; THE
MOVEMENT NOW NO LONGER HAD SUCH LEADERSHIP. THE PROBLEM
FOR THE MILITARY WAS HOW TO SHAPE THIS FORCE TO DEMO1CRATIC PURPOSES. HAVING RAISED THE ISSUE, HOWEVER,
'VIOLA DID NOT OFFER A CLEAR SOLUTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT
'ON THE ONE HAND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE "AN
ALTERNATIVE" WHICH WOULD APPEAL TO SOME SECTORS OF PERON­
ISM. HE ALSO SAID THAT EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION ON PARTY
ORGANIZATION COULD HELP SHAPE PERONISM TO DEMOCRACY. IN
DISUCSSING THE POLITICAL FUTURE, VIOLA SEEMED TO DISMISS
THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN OFFICIAL PARTY FOR EVENTUAL
ELECTIONS. AT LEAST THAT APPEARS TO BE THE IMPORT OF HIS
REMARK THAT IT WAS’"TOO LATE" TO FOLLOW THE POLITICAL
-v
PATH TAKEN BY THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN STRUCTURING THAT1COUNTRY'S PARTY LIFE. VIOLA SAID THAT "IF WE WERE GO­
ING TO DO WHAT THE BRAZILIANS DID, WE SHOULD HAVE
STARTED FIVES YEARS AGO.

l

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 8154

No Objection 1 o Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

**»*»*»G ONFIDENTIA L*****»»E'COPY
ECONOMIC ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE SEES NO CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN POLICIES TO FIGHT INFLATION AND POLICIES TO
.PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE TWO GO TOGETHER. HE
ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
•HAVE POLITICAL STABILITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING
LONG TERM RECESSION. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED
THF POLICY OF TRIMMING BACK THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S PARTICI­
PATION IN THE ECONOMY. HE SAID THAT PARTICIPATION IS
DIVIDED INTO THREE AREAS * INFRASTRUCTURE (TELEPHONES,
ELECTRICITY, WATER, ETC.); STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES
(FABRICACIONES MILITARES, THE STEEL INDUSTRY); AND
INDUSTRIES AND OPERATIONS.WHICH THE STATE TOOK OVER IN
THE PAST FOR SOCIAL OR POLITICAL REASONS. THIS LAST
GROUP COULD BE SPUN OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE STRATEGIC
INDUSTRIES WERE "COMPLICATED" AND THERE WAS LITTLE
POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIV­
ATE SECTOR. WATER, GAS, TELEPHONES AND THE LIKE COULD
BE TURNED BACK IF INVESTORS COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD BUT
THEM OUT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND INVESTORS, HE SAID.
7. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE:
A. VIOLA'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. VIOLA STATED
THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD-BEEN MADE FOR HIS TRIP TO THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. HE SAID THAT IF" HE SHOULD
TRAVEL IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER OR
'EARLY DECEMBER. HE SAID HE. APPRECIATED THE EMBASSY'S
OFFER TO HELP WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS. AS HISS OWN FLANS
DEVELOPED HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT.
VIOLA THEN SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD TRAVEL TO
WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE .CAPACITY AIMING AT BETTER RELA­
TIONS WITH THE US.
B. THE OASGA: THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROS AND
HE ON MONDAY HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IAHRC REPORT
AT THE OASGA * THE CHARGE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE,
AS ROS HAD POINTED OUT, DIFFERENCES THAT BETWEEN THE
US AND ARGENTINA ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ADVERSLY AFFECT
THE CLIMATE FOR GENERAL VIOLA'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON.
VIOLA STATED THAT EE *HAD TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE WITH PRESI­
DENT VIDELA FOLLOWING THE CHARGE'S LAST MEETING WITH HIM
(REF C). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR VIDELA, AND
GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO INVOLVE
HIMSELF IN THE MATTER ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.
RUSER
BT

(

*

t

PSN:004090

PAGE 02

OF 02

T0R:284/17:11Z

***»*»»C QNFIBENTIA

DTG:101603Z OCT 80

l*****»*E

COPY

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

no

V ■

UDjection 10 ueciassmcation 2uuy/uu/u4 : NLU-24-ij4-b-i-y

MEMORANDUM

>

-CONFfBENTIAtT
State Department rev.ew completed
Dn file DOC re'ease instructions
appiy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 5, 1979

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

I

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor).

SUBJECT:

Evening Report (U)

Mexico. With Erb and Owen, I worked o^a a letter on GATT for the
President to send to Lopez Portillo. Secretary Vance met with
Mexican Finance Minister Ibarra, who was very positive about the
President's visit. He also was relatively encouraging about the
MTN, and after the meeting, Bergsten met with Ibarra for a coupleof hours to discuss the codes. Negotiations will continue next
week. Ibarra also said that Mexico would be prepared to consider
contributing to IDA if the U.S. provided assurances that we
didn't intend to phase them out of the MDB's.
(C)
Worked on the NRC decision with Jessica and State. The problem
was pretty much resolved by Askew, who postponed his trip to
Mexico. The decision will be conveyed in a routine manner, (c)
I talked to Frank Weil of Commerce on their closing the Trade
Center in Mexico City. The reason the decision was disclosed on
February 14th was because of a Congressional hearing. He said
that Commerce is closing all its trade centers abroad, and there­
fore is not discriminating against Mexico. He gave a good defense
of his decision, and I will just leave it at that. Discussed with
Owen and Poats the prospective decision by X-M on a loan to
Chrysler for a plant in Mexico. We believe X-M should be en­
couraged to go ahead, provided we are not over-ruling everyone
else. Also met with Rich Nuccio, a professor from Williams who
is interested in Mexico, (c)

I

Nicaragua. Met again with our Ambassador Solaun, and agreed that
the best posture at this time to Nicaragua is cool and correct —
low-key to GON and looking for appropriate occasions to underline
our continued support for the democratic process, (c)
Argentina. Re-worked a memo on Argentina after discussing it
witTT Jessica.
(C)
General Viola, Commander of the Argentine Army, gave assurances
(again) to our Ambassador that Argentina's human rights record
will improve, viola deplored the hundreds of disappearances and
frankly admitted this was their "nightmare." "The deal will not
reappear," he said. He could not guarantee a complete cessation
of disappearances but promised they would drop dramatically as
would tortures, the use of the electric prod, etc. Viola asked
•CCWFIDDNTIAT,
(

Review on 3/5/85
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 :*NLC-24-54-6-1 -9
i

■- ,-gAc. M

'g.T-

~T

aaoJik^L-

r.nNF’Ti No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 ^NLC-24-54-B-1-9

that the GOA not be judged by the past, but by the present and
the future. (C)
Costa Rica. Initial spaDing between the U.S. and Costa Rica over
positions on the upcoming tuna negotiations occurred last week
with Costa Rica's Minister of Economy firing the first volley.
He informally placed on the table a 57 per cent minimum for
coastal state allocations, but was told that our formal maximum
was 45 per cent. In spite of what appears to be inflexibility
on the paifft of both Costa Rica and Mexico, we are still planning
to hold the scheduled tuna talks in Washington March 7-8. (C)

* i

i

CONFIDENTIAL

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 : NLC-24-54-6-1-9

^

V ,No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

Q.

744
DOS REVIEWED 12
rp IMMED
UTS418
HE HUESBA #5172/1 1772122
C 262017Z JUN 7?
VM AMEMBASSY BUiNOS AIRES

y ■ I .p g ft -[I J A ;,***COPY

VIAY 2010 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE l\ FULL,

70 SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1252
C -0-N MU N-T-f A It SECTION 1 0? 2 3-JENofc AIRES 5172
v-0. 12065 XDS-1 6126109 (CASTRO, RADI H) CR-M
TAGS .«R, SHUM
SUBJECT (C) AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS WITH GENERAL 7ICI-A
REE: A BUENOS AIRES 47215 B STATE 163322
1.

(C-FNTIRE TEXT)

?. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA
ON JACOBO TIMERMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE
LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE.
VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE
^EDUCED SUBSTNATIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT
IN RIGHT OE 00PTI0N CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT
CONEIDENCE IAHRC WOULD FIND IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD. BUT OFFERED NO HOP 5 FOR "DESAPARECIDOS."
HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING
r.OA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH USG IN ITS OBJECTIVES.
^ICLA IELT AN OAS MILITART PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED
HUT NCT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY
i

*■
7. APPRECIATION ECR MEM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERT0 VIOLA,
Junta president and army commander, requested i meet
with HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFICE.
DUE TO MY BEING OUT.OF COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL
VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. EE *E'j. ME WITH THE
TRADITIONAL "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT f.OW THINGS STOOD
IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINESS BUT YET
SHCWEr CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS.

Q
uVrvVvu.

1

4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS
DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OA'uS
AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASPI-'GTON POST
FRITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. RE HOPED
.-yjis#**^***#*#*#* *WHSR COMMENT

•J

$

it

sic $ # $

FOB :PASTOR,BLOOM
FSN:004421
.

PAGE 01
TOR:17?/21s3iZ
DTG:262017Z JUN 7S
*****»«C ONFIDENTll L*****»*E COPY
Nn Dhinrtinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2013/01/17 : NI.C-24-35-7-9-0

.i\o UDjection ! o ueciassitication in hull 2Ui a/un/i f : NLU-24-bb-/-y-u

*******C 0 N F I B- tr \ ? p- A x,*******]S COPT
Ul‘FARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEFT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO",
RECOGNIZING SOME MERIT TO PORTIONS OF REPORTING. I MADE
IT CLEAR TC VICLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT
AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OP DEPARTMENT.
FT ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND
STATE! NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOUL! 5E M£DE TO USG.
VIOLA'S CONCERN WAS TEAT DUE TC IMPORTANCE 0? NEW I OR'A
TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CAVE IN
ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS POSTURF TOWARDS GOA.
I ALLAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING HIM DEPARTMENT AND
USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIFW ON ARGENTINA.
I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUE TO HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT USG WELCOMED IMPROVEMENTS. I
EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT"ND IMPROVED
RELATIONS WERE CONTIGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS.
HE ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT.
5. IAHRC VISIT: VIOLA BFMINLTD ME IA5RC WOULD BE VISIT­
ING ARGENTINA
g, H*1 STATED THIS
PATE WAS CBOSEN BY IAFRC AN! NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE
BEEN ANTICIPATING ITS VISIT SINCE LATE MAY. VIOLA
STATE! PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY
AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. RE SAID ALL
OF GOA IS BEING GEARED FOR IAHRC VISIT RESULTING IN
VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TORTURE AND NO IRREGULAR
ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS
£S OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS a’AS -A BLACK
MARK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY
VEFCRTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION.
p.

DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1S78 THERE WAS AN
AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT
PE LOCKED AT HE WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN — FROM EAR TO EAR
— JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURSNS, AS IF
THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "l TA^S YOUR FIGURES
OF FITTY PER MONTH LAST YEAR. LOOK AT THE RECORD THIS
YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARED IN SIX MONTHS."
I INTERRUPTED EIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED TWENTYTWC DISAPPEARANCES. HF SAID EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT
THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLHGED THE
IMPROVEMENT BUT TOLD HIM HE WOULD NOT GET MUCH SOLACE
FPOM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS
TEAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY
TIME IAHRC .ARRIVE! GOA WOUID REACH THE ZERO STATUS.
VICLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE DESPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT
RFTURN. I INQUIRE! ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HF REPEATED
IN HIS OPINION THE DISAPPEARED WOULD NOT BE SURFACING.
AGAIN, I ASKED ON WHAT HE BASED HIS OPINION. VIOLA'S
REPLY
WAS THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION CN THE DISAPPEARED
i

l

PS N:304421

PAGE 592

TOR :177/21:51Z

DTG:26£0l?Z JU‘‘ 7

*******0 a-H M D i H' I-A L******»e COPY

Nn OhiRntinn Tn npnlassifinatinn in Full ?ni3/01/17 : Nl C%?4-3H-7-9-0

u

■No Objection I o Ueclassitication in hull 2U13/U1/1 f :

»»*****C 0 N F I B-R-N T t- A

l******»E

NLU-24-;ib-/-y-i)

COPY

AND IN VIEW OP THE EXTENDED PERIODS CF DISAPPEARANCE
PE DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE
MIGHT BZ A FEW CASES SURFACING - THOSE UNACCOUNTED
TOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THIS! WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS.
VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME STATEMENT ON
DISAPPEARED WHEN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAIL IT WOULD'BE A
STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT HOPEFULLY WOULD BE
PALATABLE TO SOCIETY.
7. RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION
PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. HE JAS REMINDED
GOA — THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — E AD NOT GIVEN
TMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD
RAISED ALL KINDS CE BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED
WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OE OPTION CASES
WOULD BE MOVING FAST FROM NOW ON. HE SAID TEESE CASES
WERF HIGH ON THE AGENDA.
PT

t

FSN:004:421

PAGE 03

OF 03

TOR :1?7/21:31Z

DTG:262017Z JUN 79

#*#+#**& 0- N~F I D 3 H J I A L*»*»***E COFY
<

Nn Ohiartinn Tn nadaRsifinatinn in

ill 7013/01/17 : Nl C-74-3S-7-9-0

. No Objection I o Ueclassitication in Hull ^013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-U
i

»

i
34c

0

i) n

d

* ij •? n !,■*******£

copy

CP IMMEL
VTS434
L'F RUESBA *5172/2 1772115
C 252017Z JUN 79
TM AMFMBASSY RUFNCS AIRES
TO S"CSTAT' WASHEC IMMEDIATE 1252
C C N E IDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5172
2. TI HERMAN CAS*: RECENTLY "CONVICCION", NA'f f ORIENTED
NEWSPAPER, AND THE 3UENCS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMERICAN
NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED 1IMZRMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE.I
TOLD VIOLA USG HOPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE ACCURATE.
HE DENIED ANY TRUT'T TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMERMAN
WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN EE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING
RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELF ET STATING
IE IT WERE LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN
RELEASEE A LONG TIME AGO, IN A JESTING FASHION, I SUGGESTED
*0 VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE
JUNTA HE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD
THE WAY. HE SMILED AND REPLIED HIS OCSIACLCS WERE
W*LL KNOWN TO i*IE. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE
PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMER MAN CASS WITH GENERAL SUAREZ
MASON, CPIYF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I
EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION CN THIS SUGGESTION FOR A5
LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA HE HAS NFVER ADMITTED
SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONI OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO THE
CONTRARY, VIOLA LOWERED HIS VOICE AND TOLD ME HE STRONGLY
RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE UTH SUAREZ MASON.
I TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED
PIMSEIF TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - "GAUCHO
BARBECUE . IT WAS SUGGESTED BY VIOLA THAT DURING THIS
BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED
FVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE
IS STIII SOME HOPE.
9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OF RENEWED AND
CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON TEE FORACIO SARAGOVI
CASE. BE APPEARED NOT TO EE FAMILIAR WITH -THE .CASE.
I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN BIS LAP AS IT WAS A
MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP ""OR REVIEW EY
HIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO LOO'* INTO THE. MATTER.
12. SOCCER GAME: LAST NIGHT ARGENTINA, WORLD CHAMPIONS,

PSN5004423

PAGE 01

TCR:17?/21s33Z .■

ETC *2*23173 JI N 7Q

*******0-0 NF-IDENTI A -fr>***»**]P COPY
Nn Ohiantinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2013/01/17 : Nl C-74-35-7-9-0

- »No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

*******C 0 N F- I D £ M T I A L»******E COP?
FLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OP OUTSTANDING PLAYERS
FRCM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 'TO 1 WITH A
FUIL STADIUM OE OVER 75,000 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME.
I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OP THE "COMMON HERD"
RUT AS I WALKED INTO THE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN
SPOTTED ME AND TOLD ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DF
T'’ONOR" (VIP BOX 1. I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT
TT1E VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY
DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTELMAN WAS qOITE STERN IN TELLING
ME I BFLCNGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S BOX. I WAS n’HS ONLY
AMBASSADOR IN THAT SFECIFIC AREA. THERE VI7.T SEVERAL
AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS TIEONLI ONE PERMITTED
TO SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS
vAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED
RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES PROM USA.
11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING 71 OLA 'EP TELLING
"E HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TC SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS
NICARAGUA. WE DID DISCUSS NICARAGUA, BUT I FELT IT WAS
ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE
SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USS ON NICARAGUAN
POLICY, BUT FEARED SENDING A MILITARY PEACE FORCE WOULD
NOT BF ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING
';jAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS .AND EACH
COUNTRY FEARED A PRECEDENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SENDING
MILITARY UNITS TO SETTLE BASIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.
YIOIA SAID THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM WAS NOV UEYOND DIALOGUE
AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL
AND TRCOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. VIOLA
RATIONALIZED THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH A MILITARY
FFACb FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC vOOLD NEVER BUY IT.
IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GRCPING OR 'iO-I'T, FCR ME'TO GIVI
FIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO
NICARAGUA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA.
12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING
VIOLA' OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MASSERA, .vRO -TAS
COMING TO REPORT TO VIOLA ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MEXICO.
VA SSERA WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME A3 I WAS TO
SEE HIM. THE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT
HAD PLANNEE IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT
APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD BS*K WITH HIM.
IT'S JUST THE CASE OF THE OID ARGENTINE INTRIGUE JUST
AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO SNOW Tt-AT I WAS HAVING
AN "ASACO" WITH HIM.
CASTRC

?S N:004423

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR :1?7/21:33Z

DTG:262217Z JUN 79

~»»»****G”0-4>»P I D-E H I A1 !*******£--COPY

Nn Ohinrtinn Tn DfidaRsifinatinn in Hill 2013/01/17 : Nl C-24-35-7-9-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1-9-1-2-8_
____

MKMORANDL'M

^

_

_

t-

ft

THE WHITE HOUSE
BFCRET-BF.NSITIVE

Washington

December 21, 1978

X

\SS_Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DOS -11/13/12

1.

Beagle Channel Conflict Looms Closer; General Viola
called in Ambassador Castro this morning to advise
him that in view of Chile's latest communique, Argentina
had no other option but to resort to military action.
The general went on to ask that the U.5. help explain
to the world why Argentina had no other recourse.
Castro recommended patience and pointed out that papal
mediation was still a possible option. Viola, however,
did not desist from his line that Chile's response
had terminated any prospects for further diplomatic
(Buenos Aires 9958, PSN 54104)
movement.

DOS REVIEWEdTTJan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION]

2.

Meeting with Von Staden on Cruise Missile Definition;
During a meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher
yesterday, Ambassador Von Staden expressed his govern­
ment's serious concern with the possibility that the
D.S. might consider agreeing that ALCMs on non-heavy
bombers would fall under the same limits as nuclear
ALCMs as a solution to the cruise missile definition
issue. He said the Germans would see serious problems
with such a solution, since a non-nuclear element would
be introduced into the SALT negotiations for the first
time. Von Staden asked whether such a solution would
create precedents for the Soviets to demand that other
non-nuclear elements be included in future negotiations
and whether the U.S. would share German concern that
the whole non-circumvention question would have to
be seen in a different light, with non-circumvention
applying to non-nuclear weapons. He also asked whether
the new U.S. language in the "Declaration of Intent"
could lead to a situation in which the Soviets could
demand nuclear elements not subject to the negotiations
be taken into account. Christopher assured Von Staden
that his questions and comments would be transmitted
to the U.S. delegation before .they left, and also pointed
out that if an agreement was reached, the President
would take great pains to make clear that what was
in the agreement and the protocol would not constitute
precedents for future negotiations.
(State 320329
TOSEC 150002, NODIS Cherokee, PSN 54076)
(S)

gnrnrT—

uc0tA2SRE.

REVIEW ON DECEMBER 21, 2008
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

ELO. 1352b
Authority TlftC. NmC--\-VN>~3rr_
NARA_JeJL__ Data

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1-9-1-2-8

5.
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-8-6-18Mr.MOR-WDLWl
W
W

JUS REVIEWED Z1 Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

"“TjHCWli'l1—

November 28, 1978

NSS Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DOS -11/9/12

1.

Embassy Tel Aviv Comments on the Egyptian-Israeli Talks:
Ambassador Lewis believes that indications be slowing
down the pace of negotiations raises the question of
how the U.S. should proceed following Khalil's visit,
especially if it turns out that the'Egyptians want
to reopen the text of the treaty* and continue negotia­
tions on the linkage issue. If Egypt accepts the
treaty, there is some chance of persuading Israel to
find a formula on linkage; however, if Egypt equivo­
cates, the hope of getting the cabinet to accept some­
thing further on linkage will shrink to about nil.
Lewis also has "the gravest doubts" that a slowdown
by Sadat will produce what he wants from the Israelis;
it will have the opposite affect. Lewis adds that
Begin agreed to only a ninety day settlement freeze
and that, with the conclusion of this period In midDecember or January, Begin might renew settlement
activity. The U.S. cannot afford an extended delay
and Lewis recommends that a new U.S. initiative, ob­
viously required to break the impasse, be launched
no later than mid-December.
(Tel Aviv 18266 NODIS,
PSN 24694, 24695)

2.

Somoza Discusses His Difficulties; A Nicaraguan official informed Ambassador Solaun today that Somoza,
for the first time, openly admitted to his cabinet
on Monday that he was under tremendous pressure. Somoza
allegedly characterized the plebiscite proposal as
a means to "kick him out of the country" and raised
as alternatives the calling of a national constitutent
assembly or simply his resignation.
Solaun comments
that, if true, the apparent change of attitude by Somoza
could augur well for a resolution to the Nicaraguan
problem.
Somoza is apparently starting to believe
that the U.S. means business.
(Managua 6156, PSN 24866)

3.

Beagle Channel-Ambassador Castro Talks with General
Viola: General Viola told Ambassador Castro yesterday
that, although there were still serious problems ahead,
the Argentine government intended to negotiate in good
faith and would strive to settle the channel dispute

i

'
ft^iinrifu
l’ iAK/-—tJr

tiXM352^0 Objection To Declassmcation In Full 2UT3/01/16 : NLC-1 -8-6-18-7
-V? -~T
Pnto leAnVu______

BECRE1?-

-2-

by peaceful and honorable means, viola emphasized
that Argentina wants a peaceful solution and not a
confrontation and indicated that the recent troop move­
ments were carefully controlled so as not to place
them close enough to the border where "temptations"
could cause an incident. Viola again stressed the
defensive nature of the troop deployments and made
the suggestion that, during the negotiating or mediation
period, there should be a mutual freeze on troop move­
ments or even perhaps a withdrawl.
(Buenos Aires 9361,
PSN 24704, 24706)

l

i

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 :

NLC-1-8-6-18-7

-

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

1

DOS REVIEWED'1 D-Vlar-~2D11: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj

PAGE

SENSITIVE
l
SITUATION^) H|$SA0E(S) LISTING

36

DATE 01/2S/BO//OZ3

SITUATION!
. AFGHAN
SUBJECT CATAQORYI SIT IV
MESSAGE / ANNOTATION!
MESSAQEI
PLASH
Z 1I1B17Z JAN BO ZFP4
PM 3ICSTATS MASHOC
TO

AMIMBASSY BUENQS AIRES PLASH 6975
008295

BXDIS
E,0. 120611

N/A

TAGS!

E5TC# ITRO# AR

SUBJECT!

ARGENTINE COOPERATION 4n GRAIN EMBARGO

1, C - ENTIRE TEXT
«

2. CHARGE REQUESTED URGENTLY TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING
PERSONAL* MESSAGE PROM AMBASSADOR CASTRO TO GENERAL VIOLA!
QUOTE!
TENENTE GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA
DOMICZL10 CONOCIDO
BUENOS AIRES# ARGENTINA

A

PSSPUES DE SACUDARLQ EN UNA PORM* MUY ATENTA# SE CE
SOLICtTA SU 1NTERVENCI0N PERSONAL CON SUS CDMPANBROS
DEL GOlUftNO ARGBNTINO# MUY ESPECIALMENTE AL SSNQR
PRESIDENT! VIDELA Y LOS INTBGRANflS DE LA JUNTA#
REFERENTS 1A LO POSIBLE COCABORACION CON E.E'.U'.U. IN
EL* CONTRQI DE LA EXPORTACtON DE GRANOS A LA UNION
SOVIETICA# QUISIBRA ACLARAR QUE BSTA COCABORACIQN NO
CONTEMPLA LA SUSPENSION D| CQNTRATOS YA PlRMADOS BIND
MAS B1BN LA IMPORTANCE DE NO BNTRAR IN JWEVOS CONTRAtOS
QUE TINDRIAN EL PROPOllTO OB COMPBNSAR POR EL* EMBARGO
DE MI OOBlIRNOi
t

1
1/3
i

ri A
\

a

1

§5^

l

a3* □
Q

4!

\v
£IS

WHSR COMMENTS
eobideal#thorn#brsm

PSNI02867B

r

jSco J Q
fs? -- '

DTOl111B17

T0RT0lll9l2

SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

. ’N

SENSITIVE
PACE

1?

SITUATION'S) MISSAOE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/21/80//021

SITUATION!
AFGHAN
SUBJECT CATAOQRYl SIT IV
MESSAGE / ANNOTATION!

*

RECUIRDO MUY CLARAMENTE CUE DURANTE SU PARTICIPACtON
BN LA JUNTA UST6D SJEHFRB Ml MANIFESTO SU APQYO AC
CONCIFTO PE NQ INTERVENCION Y SU GDIO HACIO AQUELLQS
PAIIIS QUf tOMABAN PASOS E INCURflONES A0RE5IV0S CONTRA
OTRDI PAI||$, TAMBIEN RECUIRDO SU ADHESION Y
RESPltQ A:'AQUiLL‘OS PRINCIPIQS QUE PREVALECEN EN
DERECHO INTIRNACIONAL.
TOMANDO IN CUINTA LA RECIINTB LLAORANtE INDEBIOA
AGRIIlQN PS LA UNION SOVlITICA HACIA AFGANISTAN# Cl
SUPLICO HUY 8NCAR8CIAMENTI BJIRZA SU INFCUENCtA CON
LOS MANDATOR IQS DE SU GOBlIRNO PARA QUE PRESTBN S(J
COLABORACION |N EL SINTIDQ MANIFISTADQ EN LOS PARAFOS
anterior!*,

SIIHPRE hi AGRADICIDQ SUS EXFRISIONES DE CARINO; HACIA
MI PAIS YILA MISHA VIZ RfcCQNOZCQ QUE DURANTE SU llTANCIA
COMO MIIMMO DC LA JUNTA Y GDHANQANTE EN JEFE DEL
EJERCITQ <U ACTUACION SIEMPRl PU| UNO DE HAC|R TODD
LO POSSILf PARA CONTINUAR HEJORANDO LAS YRADICIONALES
BUENAS AMSSTAOIS ENTRE E9l,UfU» Y ARGENTINA.
AQRADBCIBNCQ |U AMISTAD Y 6ENTILBZA# RECIBE LAS
SBCURZDAQII 0| MI AT|NTA CONllDERACIDNj REGRESARE A
BUINOI AIRIS |L PROXIMO JUEVIS# P«RO ANTES DE ESQ LI
AGRADBCIRIA SUS COMBNtARtOS SOBRE EL TEMA AQUt pUnTADD'.
END MISSAQI.
VANCE
BT

!

SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2
I

i

SENSITIVE
PAGE

75

SltUATIQNlS) HISSAGE(S) LISTING

DOS REVIEWED 10-Vlar-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN

DATS 0i/2iyB0//025

full;

TUATTWi
APQHAN
BJECT CATAOORYT SIT IV
MESSAGE f ANNOTATION!
messaoei

IMMEDIATE
Q iUBATZ.JAN 80
PM AMEMBAtSY MOSCOW
TO SfCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6411
INPO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 5156
G-O- NPlBBNTIAf SECTION 02 Qft 04 MOSCOW 00607
EXDIS
PNGED SO PAR AS PUTURE ASSIGNMENTS WERE CONCERNED'.
Ei KORNIYENKO RRUQlNBD THAT IP WE WERE IN PACT {NStStING
THAT THE NYAP PEOPLE COULD NOT BE TRAN$PERRBD TO ?ILL
VACANCIES.WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN WASHINGTON OR SAN PRANCISCO
THAT IN IBPBCT WOULD AMOUNT TO PNG ACTIQN--AND WOULD* OP
COURSE# BE AN EXTRA COMPLICATION FOR BOTH SIDES. KOKNIYBNKQ THEN ADDED THAf BOTH COUNTRIES AT THE MOMENT POUND
THEMSELVES WITH THEIR AMBASSADORS AT HOME'. IP Wl WERE
TO DECIDE TO PREI2E EMBASSY StAPPS AT PRESENT LEVELS#
WOULD THAT MEAN THE AMBASSADORS COULD NT RETURN* CHARGE
COMMENTED HE THOUGHT IT CLEAR THAT TKAt WAS NOT THE IN­
TENTION OP THE U.S. POSITION# AND KORNIYENKO HASTENED TO
ADD THAT IN MENTIONING THE AMBASSADORS HE INTENOED NOTHING
MORE THAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OP THE U.S. POSI­
TION,
10, KORNIYENKO ONCE MORI MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT
WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER IN LANGUAGE
SUCH AS THAT USED BY THE U.S, IN UNILATERALLY DETIRHXNING
HOW THE ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED, .AS WA£ STATED IN THE
SOVIET NOTES# HE ADOEO# THE SOVIETS RESERVED THE RIGHt
TO RETURN ‘TO tHE QUESTION OP MATERIAL* DAMAGES REgULfXNG
PROM THE U.S, ACTIONS WHICH WIRE IN VIOLATION OP SPtClPlC
AGREEMENTS.
11. CHARBE REPEATED THAT HE WQUL'D SEEK RESPONSES TO
K0RNIYBNKQ1S QUESTIONS ON LEGAL AND PRACTICAL' MATflRS#
BUT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OP THE REASON

PSNf 0IIVB2

DTOl 111B47

TORT0UZ219

SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

SENSITIVE
PAGE

76

SrtUATZON'tS) MMSAOCtSI LISTING

DATS 01/2S/BO//OZS

SITUATION!
. AFGHAN
SUBJECT CATAGORVl SIT IV
MES5AGE / ANNOTATION!
FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN, THEY HAD {JOT BEEN
TAKEN FRIVOLOUSLY! THEY WERE SERIOUS MEASURES WITH
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES# TAKEN FOR THE REASON StATEQ BY tHE
PRESIDENT.
IS. KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE
PRESIDENT PROVIOBD NQ BASIS FOR tHE MEASURES TAKEN AND
THAT THERE WERE IN FACT NQ GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTIONS UNDER
ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW OR AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET IlDE# HE
CONTINUED* COULD SAY A GREAT DEAL AQBUT THE POLITICAL
aspects op The hatter and could find explanations no Less
HARSH THAN those USED BY U.S, OFFICIALS# BUT Hi THOUGHT
tHERS WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THOSE ASPECTS AT THIS TIME.
CHARGE AGREED,
la. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF NOTE concerning
BT

*

SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

SENSITIVE
PAGE

85

SXtUATI0N'(S) MeSSAOE(S) LISTING

DATE Oi/2»/80//02S

SITUATION!
AFGHAN
SUBJECT GATAGQRVl SIT IV
MESSAGE / ANNOTATION I
t
MESSAGE!
IMMEDIATE
D IUS47Z,JAN BO
pH AMBMBAfSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTAtl MASHDC IMMEDIATE 8412
INFO AMCDNSUL LENINGRAD BEST
•la N F I D I N T 1 H SBCTION OS OF 04 MOSCOW 00807
EXDIS
CLOSURE OF KIEV AND NEW YORK ADVANCE PARTIES!
BEGIN TEXf,
THE ^SlSfRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR; REFERRING
TO THE NOffi OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OP
JANUARY T| 1980* CONSIDERS IT NECBSSARY tO STATS THE
FOLLOWING,
THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING THE
SUSPENSION OF THE OPENING QP THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF
THE USSR IN NEW YORK AND tHE WITHDRAWAL FROM THERf OF THE
SOVIET ADVANCE PARTY IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE RILE*
VANT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES* INCLUDING THAT
REACHED OlfRlNG THE SOVIET-AMBRICAN MEETING AT THE HIGHEST
LEVEL. IN JULY 1974, THE SAID UNILATERAL' ACTION OF THE
AMERICAN SIDE TESTIFIES TO THE FACT THAt IT IS ACTIND IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OP ITS OBLIGATIONS WHICH ENSUE FROM
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH It CONCLUDES, THE lOVllt
SIDE RESOSuTELY CONDEMNS tHBSC ILLEGAL ACTIONS BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA AS DIRECTLY HOSTILE TO THE INTERESTS
OF THE DIEELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRACTICE OF
THE MAINTENANCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. IT MUST BE.
CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CON­
CLUSIONS.
THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES AL'C RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSE­
QUENCES OF THE SAID ACTION ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA,

t
PSNI0IB99E

DTGUUS47

TQR70U2225

SENSITIVE
Nn Dhip.r.tinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

SENSITIVE
PAGE

8*

SITUATIONtS) MESSAGES) LISTING

DATE 0l/2»/BO//O2i

SITUATION!
AFGHAN
SUBJECT CATAQORY! SIT IV
MES5A0E / ANNOTATION!
RE5ERVJN0 TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO PULL RESTITUTION OF
MATERIAL OAMAfiE CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE AMBRI*
CAN SIDE# THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE POSITION THAT
PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE GUARANTEEING QP tHI
SECURITY AND THE PRESERVAtlQN OP THE PREMISES AND PROPERTY
QP THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL IN NEW YORK WILL BE AGREED
UPON IN THE PROPER MANNER,
1
IN THE LIGHT OP THE SAID UNILATERAL* ACTIONS OP THE USAj
THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDS TO DETERMINE AT A FUTURE TIME ITS
GENERAL POSITION TOWARD THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT ON THE
QPBN|NO Of CONSULATES GENERAL QP THE USER AND THE USA IN
NEW YORK AND KIEV# RESPECTIVELY.
MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980, END T|XT,
14. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OP THE NOT! CONCERN­
ING AEROPgQT FREQUENCIES!
BEGIN TEXT,
NO, 2/QSOOA
THE MINISTRY OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS OP THE USSR REFERS TO THE
NOTE OP THE DEPARTMENT OP STAtE OP THE U$A OF JANUARY 1i
1980, AND'CONSIDERS XT NECESSARY TO StATI THE FOLLOWING,
THE DECISION OP THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USA TO POSTPONE FOR
AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD THE CONDUCT OP BILATERAL ?!VH
aviation Talks# which haq been proposed by the amGrican
SIDS itself; AND unilaterally to reduce the number dp
REGULAR PLIGHTS TO THE USA QP AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT IS COM­
PLETELY ILLEGAL AND is A FLAGRANT VIOLATION BY T0| UNITED
STATES OP THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH IT HAS ACCEPTED; INCLUD­
ING THOSE RESULTING PROM fHE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED
IN AN EXCHANGE OP AIDE-MEMOIRES tN MARCH 1979, gUCH
PROVOCATIVE CONDUCT CAN ONLY RE VIEWED AS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES;
THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U|A ACL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OP THE SAID MEASURES
PDR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND RESERVES TO ITSELF
THE RIGHT TO DEMAND PULL RESTITUTION OP MATERIAL DAMAGE.
MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980, ENO T|XT,
15. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OP THE NOTf CONCERN­
ING FISHERY ACLOCATXONST
BEGIN TEXT.
NO, l/OSSHA
THE MINISTRY DP FOREIGN AFFAIRS QP THg USSR, REFERRING TO
THE NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OP STATE OP tHE USA OP JANUARY 7
1980, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY tO STATE THE FOLLOWING,
BT
SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

r

SENSITIVE
PAGE

87

SITUATION*$) MESSAGE!S) LISTING

DATE 0i/2»>f0//023

SITUATION!
AFGHAN
SUBJECT CATAGOftVI SIT IV
MESSAGE / ANNOTATION!
MESSAGE!
IMMEDIATE
Q IIIE47Z fJAN BO
PM AMEM1ASSV MOSCOW
TO SBCSTAtl WASMOC IMMEDIATE 6413
INFO AHCQNSUL LENINGRAD 8X98
CON F—I D B- N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 00607
BK0I8
.
. ’ f
THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING A
SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF tHE QUOTAS CUSTOMARILY ALLOCATED
TO THE SOVIET UNION PQR FISH CATCH IN COASTAL' WATERS OF
THE USA CANNOT BE QUALIFIED At ANYTHING QTHER THAN AN
ILLEGAL AflttON IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE USSR. THIS STEF IN
REALITY SIGNIFIES THE INTRODUCTION OF A IAN ON tHl
FISHERY OF SOVIET SHIPS AND WILL LEAD TO A PREMEDITATED
WRECKING OF THE MUTUALLY PROFITABLE COOPERATION {N THIS
FIELD WHICH HAS DEVELOPED..HfWEEN THE CORRESPONDING SOVlEt
AND AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS* THE SAID ACTIONS BY tHE
AMERICAN SIDE ARE THUS A OIRICT VIOLATION OP THE AGREE* ,
MENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USSR AND THE gOVERNMENf
OF THE USA CONCERNING FISHERIES OFF THE COASTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF NOVEMBER 16/ 1976,
THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GQVENRMINT OF THE U*A ALL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A UNILATERAL
STEF ANO RESERVES TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DEMAND FULL COM*
PENSAtlON iP0R DIRECT AND INDIRECT DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH
IT.
MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980,
END TEXT, GARRISON
BT

PSNI0IB99S

t

DTGU11S47

TORlOllZZZS

SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

No Objection To Declassification in ;-ull 2012/11/21

NLC-1 -17-240-6

ur ^

Ml MORANDUM

‘Or:

T

THE WHITE HOUSE
wA.sinxtncjN

SECRET SENSITIVE

October 10, 1980

THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST
1.

Kaunda Concerned by Possibility of a Reagan presidency;
During private discussions with Ambassador Wisner today.
President Kaunda expressed deep concern over the possibility
of a Reagan presidency. He said he was not confident about
Reagan's views on South Africa or the Middle East — two
issues which were immensely important to him personally.
In addition, Kaunda said his recent visit to Eastern Europe
had brought home the critical state of detente and rein­
forced his belief that the President would be better in
dealing with the Soviets than Reagan. While admitting that
American policies do not vary greatly between presidencies,
Kaunda said he nevertheless wanted to warn us of his deep
concern should Reagan be e'ccted, and he asked that his
prayers for the President be communicated.
(Lusaka 3928,
PSN 4260)
(C)

2.

Presidential Message to Viola: In response to the President's
congratulatory message, General Viola expressed his "profound
appreciation" and said he fully reciprocated the President's
belief in the importance of strengthening U.S.-Argentina
relations. Viola said his government would seek to make
U.S.-Argentine relations as productive as possible. He
returned to this theme several times, stating that he believed
the current issues between our two countries were the product
of present circumstances and will "one way or another" be
resolved. The Argentine leader went on to describe the
agenda of his government as one which would seek first to
produce legislation that will allow the political parties
to renew their leadership and "function normally;" to revitalize
the economy "both industry and agriculture;" and to correct
the impression that the government was essentially opposed
to the broader interests of most Argentines. Viola added
that his government had four objectives in the foreign
policy arena, which were to increase the "presence" of
Argentina in the southern cone, •ebuild Argentina's ties
in the Andean Pact, repair and cr-.pand relations with Western
Europe, and restore and strengthen relations with the U.S.
(Buenos Aires 8154, PSN 4066, 4090)
(C)
SlFIEEi
E.Ou/iSiio

ceciuw REVIEW ON OCTOBER 10, 2000
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

t
i

_ *

,.afl

V. VnN\H—.----

r-------- -

Nn Objection Tn Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-17-2-40-6

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-17-24Q.-fir *

M

■CT^CRRrP-

3.

tt.

* * ;

f,.-PRC Gra in negotiations: According to Ambassador r,7oocc j!;,
tli^ substantive v'ork on tlu- grain negotiations appears to
be near completion. Ke .adds hoover, that the U. S. dele­
gation faces considerable '.•.■.certainty with regard to the
timing of the formal concl
'on of the agreement and its
announcement. At the dele-^ .ion’s request, VJoodcoc'r: has
agreed co intervene with th foreign ministry to seek initialing
permitting announcements
of the agreement on Monday, thereby
__--~.£ c~in both capitals immediately afterwards, flood ;ock
that the Chinese are deeply disturbed about wire se-v'.oe
reports from VTashington on the agreement and have svingly
emphasized that there should be no public announcemj ■ before the agreement is formally concluded.
(Beijing 10015
N033IS, PSW 4030 ) (S)

i

i

Nn Ohiectinn Tn Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-17-240-6

'

No Objection To Declassification in part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1 -13-8-31 -4|

H

H

"w i j - I

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

■6-EGRET

1.

January 17, 1980

Afghanistan Expels All American Journalists) Embassy Kabul
was informed today by the foreign ministry that all American
journalists have been ordered to depart Afghanistan on the
first available aircraft. The Afghan official stated that
this action had been taken because of the "American journalists'
interference in the internal affairs of Aghanistan and their
biased reporting." Our embassy estimates that there are
30 to 50 American journalists and cameramen in Afghanistan,
and it is now in the process of informing the journalists
and assisting them to exit the country.
(Kabul 175, PSN
36409)
(C)
,
S

2.'

Christopher/Genscher Meeting: Christopher outlined to Foreign
Minister Genscher yesterday our strategy toward Iran, explaining
the need to implement economic sanctions and requesting
FRG assistance. He clarified that we hope sanctions will
obviate the need for other, more risky measures, and stressed
the importance of European support. Genscher expressed
an FRG willingness to help as much as possible bn sanctions,
indicated coordination with the other Europeans, and promised
an early decision.. The foreign minister stressed the need
to consider our decisions and the developments in Iran carefully
to ensure that European nationals are not taken hostage.
The foreign minister stated it is important that Iranian
leaders not see the conflict with the U.S. as more important
than the Soviet threat; therefore, Western public statements
should not diminish the Soviet conflict with the Islamic
world.
Genscher proposed that the Western reaction to the
events in Afghanistan be incorporated into an overall political
strategy, and outlined some steps the EC is considering
in this regard, including new arrangements with Yugoslavia
and consideration of a possible political arrangement with
the Gulf states and Iraq modeled ion the EC-ASEAN cooperation
agreement.
Genscher further stressed the need to reach
a comprehensive Middle cAst peace settlement, and described
Israel's security concerns as small compared to the threat
now posed by the Soviets to all countries of the region.
(Bonn 916, PSN 35795, 35800, 35802, 35806, 35810)
(S)

CECRBT
REVIEW ON JANUARY 16, 1990
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13526

^

Authority

NAHA.
i"*

.nr*.
■:

D8tO...

»»«

-s—i—

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-8-31-4

------

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-8-31 -4’'’

SE€ftSTL

-

j

2

-

3-

Cooper Meeting with French Economic Officials: On Iran,
the French identified legal problems in applying the Security
Council resolution in the face of the Soviet veto, and recom­
mended we consider putting the Soviets in a corner tactically
by pressing them on what "measures" they would be prepared
to take under Resolution 461. They questioned the tactical
advisability of countries other than the U.S. imposing further
measures at this time, but conceded that they probably have
the legal ability to take some additional actions. Cooper
proposed three areas where concrete support from our allies
would be extremely useful in the Soviet/Afghanistan situation:
no undercutting of U.S. actions; no new official export
credits; and, strict application of COCOM criteria. The
French will not undercut U.s. measures; will continue normal
commercial relations, will not cut off official credits,
and will take a tough line but act slowly in renegotiating
the Franco-Soviet credit agreement. On COCOM, the French
did not know what cases they might be submitting and promised
to get back to us soon.
(Paris 1739, PSN 3576B, 35772,
35776, 35780)
(S)

4.

U.S./Argentine Relations: Ambassador Castro met on Tuesday
with former Junta member General Viola, who is expected
to succeed videla as president in 1981, for a genreral review
of U.S. Argentine relaitons. viola appeared deeply perturbed
about the adverse turn of events in our bilateral relations,
and attributed this to the lack of communication between
the executives and foreign ministers of both countries.
He feels it is imperative that a dialogue be established
as soon as possible between the President and President
Videla and also between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister
Pastor. Viola stated that both countries should see each
other on the basis of conditions as they exist on and look
into the future rather than base their policy on past acts.
The general expressed serious concern over the State Depart­
ment's human rights report on Argentina and felt the wording
of the report could precipitate a wave of emotionalism and
anti-Americanism if Argentines felt the report was an unfair
evaluation of their country. Viola agreed to do whatever
he could to get the government's cooperation on the restriction
of grain sales to the USSR.
(Buenos Aires 472, PSN 35961)
(C)
S

r~ 2_

-v j> ’j"

V.

X3

No Objection To Declassification in aart 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-8-31-4

*■

»

No Objection T{rBecte»sifieatioajo_Eull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

.- - - =—Thonnrtmpnt. nf State

[DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]
PA(£ n
1

TIL HV 11111

II Of il

2SJ4X4Z

MM

TELEGRAM

*

j Tft« Mill

ft OF SI

1IMI4Z

ACTION NEA-11
NOT TO HENDON COX IN ANT ARTICLES.
INFO

OCT-11 AAA-11
IC-ll CIAE-II

ADS-IN HA-OS PR-1* NSC-H1 SP-N1
DOOt-U INI-11 NSAE-IN PA-11 /N7 V

------------ NKH 1IKUZ /U
N 1S1S1DZ OCT 71
FH AHEMHASSY m AVI*
TO SECSTATE WASKOC Air
INFO USICA VASNOC
AflE WAIST IUEN01 AI AES

7. U TO THE FUTURE OF AASEITINE POLITICS, TIHERMR
SATI HE SEES'A SITUATION IN MICH HOOERATE AND SIGHT WIND
ELIKNTS IN THE HILITART WILL COHPETE FOR PEAORIST
SUPPORT, MICA MT CREATE A SITUATION IN MICH IIAIEL PERM
WILL IE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WO RUNS ARDENT IRA.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION II OF 11 TEL AVIV 2H1I
STATE FON NEA/AIA VAST; AA FOX DEII AN
UIICA FOI AA
E.O. 12ICS: ADS 11/19/19 OIETERICH, V.J.) DR-0
TASS: PEPS, Pill, PINT, IS, Al
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE ™" *
1.

(C - ENTIRE TEXT)

I. TIHEIHAN ALSO NENTIONEC THAT IE IELIEVES THE RIGHTUIM AW VEIT ANTI-SEHITIC NEWSPAPER CAUL DO IS FINANCED
IT DIANA DC MASCOT, PUILISNER OF NUEVA PAOVINCIA IN
UIIA HAMA.
Mi Wl. HASIOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE
EHSASIT, AW IF HEHOAT SERVES, RECEIVED A IUIIA HOMS
CAIOT OR I AM AWARD IN 1S73 OR 1174.)

rmrimii

r"

S. IN CONVERSATION WITH TIHERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A
CHILLINC IMPRESSION THAT RE IS SIHPLT REPORTINS
WAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AID RELIEVES. HE CHARACTER I EES
THE AROEXTINE HILITART RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN
AND ANTI-SEHITIC.

,

1

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACIE OIETERICI, MO
KNEW HIH IN ARGENTINA OURIHI A 1171-74 TOUR THERE,
TIHERMAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA MIS INTERROGATION IV
POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEHITISA ON TNE
ARGENTINA HILITART RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL OILEHHA AS TO
WETHER TO MITE AROUT NIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE
FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TI HERMAN WILL RE IN TNE
UNITED STATES TD RECEIVE AM AWAXO FROM THE AMERICAN
JEWISH CCMHITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 17. AFTER THAT HE

S.

PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERI AN. THEN HE WILL CO TO WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT TKETWMTMENT,
AND AT THE MHITE -HOUSE
—————

I

TIHERRAN IS NOW EMPLOYED SY TNE IHPORTAIT TEL AVIV

DAILY HAAS IV AND SEEKS COHFORTASLE WITH THAT FACT,
ALTHOUGH RE SAID HE NIGHT RE INTEXESTED IN SPEN0IN6 SOME
TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED eOLUMIA. THUS FAR HE HAS MITTEN ONLY ON
LATIN AMERICAN HATTERS, IUT IT IS TO RE EXPECTED THAT HE
WILL BRANCH (INTO SIOAOER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL HATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH
HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL RE HUMAN RIGHTS
AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE DUTIES, AND AOQED THAT THE US

1. TI MERMAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING
DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE
'LEADER* OF AX ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AM
THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS OR ANY LEFTIST OR
TERRORIST CONNECT I US. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA
PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGAN HAT I OH CHART MICH SHOWED
ZSIGNIEW SRZEZINSXI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON
MOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS REINS HEATER
RECAUSE HE HAO DARED TO USE THE TERR LEFTIST-FASCISTS
IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN, TNE
UJECTIOH APPARENTLY HE I NO THAT HE HAO SLMDEHED FASCISM.
HE WAS ALSO QUESTIONED CONCERNING SUPPOSED CONTACTS
GETWEEX HEHACXEH BEGIN ARD THE HONTCNERO GUERILLAS
DURING A SECIN VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN 1S7S. TIHENHAN
BELIEVED THESE CJESTIONS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT
BEDIN'S SOCK ‘WAR IN THE HOL* LAND* NAD SEEN FOUNO AMONG
MATERIALS USED IY THE H0N10NER0S. TIHERMAN WAS BROUGHT
FROM PRISON TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GEN. HAROUINOEGUY IN
THE CASA ROSADA PRIOR TO A DERI AN VISIT. THE GENERAL
INFORMED HIH THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE
THAT PATT DERIM WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE SECAUSE SHE
WAS HIS COUSIN.

t

4. TI HERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE RELIEVES LANUSSE'S EX­
PRESS SECRETARY EOGARDO SAJOH OIEO OF A HEART ATTACK
OURING TORTURE SY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A
RELATIVELY YCUNG MM, THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT
HE NAD A HEMT CONDITION.
9.

TI HERMAN IS NOW

rn mirr a.ihit mt

.

IEMCES IN ARGEHTIHA BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS GY THE

HECLASSfREn
£-0.

Authority

HiiifmtlMimT PlflEHM ^till iw abgenTIHA. as Ail
EXAMPLE OF THIS HE MEIITIUED THAT ROBERT COX, EOITOR OF
THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAO SENT A MESSAGE TO HIM
THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM

nnunnriiTui
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

, r '.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

Department of State
PAGE 01

TEL AV 22920

02 OF 02

TELEGRAM

28O404Z

4324

ACTION NEA-11
INFO

OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 PM-96 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 DODE-00
I MR-Iff NSAE-00 PAf-0l' HA- 05 /06 7 W
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 044 1

280424Z /23

R 251510Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4308
INFO USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 22920
WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
FOR YEARS TO COME.
TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC
APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL
AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA.
HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS
HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND
THFJNlfrrF

HOUSE-

I F wil

'

‘---------------

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

.*■

^

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

^

*******$ 0 HM 1) B-N T-—I 4_£*******e COPT

18?

OP IMMED
DE RUESBA #8154 2841610
0 101603Z OCT 80
FM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES
TO 5SCSTATE VASHDC IMMEDIATE 7695
THE*WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
.INTO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5231
AMEMBASST BRASILIA 4323
.AMEMBASST CARACAS 4611
AMEMBASST LA PAZ 4068 .
AMEMBASST LIMA 3718
AMEMBASST MONTEVIDEO 6800
AMEMBASST SANTIAGO 4966
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2
EXDIS
DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR IfyfAFF
EO 12065: RDS-4 10/8/96 (RUSER, CLAUS V.) OR-M
TAG'S: AH
_______ _
i
SUBJECT* DELIVERY OSHPRESIDllffTTM^ESSAGE
REF: (A) WHITE H0USEV7397 (NOTALlT (B) BUENOS AIRES 8098 (NOTEL)i
(C) BUENOS AIRES 7652 ‘
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL VIOLA
OCTOBER 8 (REF A). GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND
APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS. HE STATED
1 THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE REPLYING IN WRITING: IN THE
MEANTIME HE WOULD WISH TO SAT THAT HE FULLTiRECIPROCATED
'THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING
US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. "MY.GOVERNMENT", HE SAID, "WILL
SEEK TO MAKE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AS PRODUCTIVE AS
POSSIBLE. HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME AT VARIOUS POINTS
IN TEE CONVERSATION STATING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS HIS
BELIEF THAT THE CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN ARGENTINA, WHICH
IN AN EARLIER MEETING BE HAD ENUMERATED AS BEING BOLIVIA,
GRAINS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR MATTERS, ARE THE PRO­
DUCT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES* AND WILL "ONE VAT OR ANOTHER"
BE REOLVED. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON BASIC
INTERESTS. HE SAID, ALSO, T&AT HONESTY AND FRANKNESS
**************** *tfHSH COMMENT ***************
VP

PSN1004066

PAGE 01

TOR:284/16:52Z

DTG:101603Z OCT 80

****»**CsJ0uN -F-fDBHTIAr i,***»**»e COPT
No Objection To Declassification in Fill 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

**»***ftC ON-F-IDENTIA

COPT

WERE REQUIRED FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO PROSPER.
3. VIOLA, AS USUAL OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE,' MADE IT CLEAR S
THAT HE WANTED TO USE THE MEETING TO EIPLORE OTHER..MATTERS
—IN EFFECT HE SAID "ASK.MI QUESTIONS." THE CHARGE IN­
QUIRED WHAT GENERAL VIOLA SAW AS THE AGENDA FOR HIS
GOVERNMENT. VIOLA RESPONDED BY LISTING WHAT HE CALLED
THE "PROBLEMS". GIVEN TO‘SCHEMATIC RESPONSES, BE STATED
THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS IN THE POLITICAL
AREA WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE
LEGISLATION THAT WILL,ALLOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES .
TO RENEW THEIR LEADERSHIP AND "FUNCTION NORMALLY." IN THE
ECONOMIC AREA, HE SAID, ,TH£ FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO
,
REVITALIZE THE ECONOMY, -.BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE;
(IN THE SOCIAL AREA, HE-‘RAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO CORRECT
THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY
•OPPOSED TO THE BROAD INTERESTS OF MOST ARGENTINES.. HE
SUGGESTED THAT THIS COBLt BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EFFECTIVELY
IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION AND INSTITUT­
ING OTHER, UNDEFINED, MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL FIELD* .
VIOLA STOPPED WITH THESE PRIORITIES. BUT WHEN QUERIED
ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS
FOUR OBJECTIVES: TO INCREASE THE "PRESENCE" OF ARGENTINA
IN THE SOUTHERN CONE (HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE COUN­
TRY WAS NOT SEEKING REGIONAL HEGEMONY}, TO REBUILD- •
ARGENTINA'S TIES Tti THE ANDEAN PACTS TO REPAIR.AND EXPAND
RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPES AND TO RESTORE AND
STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
j

1

.

4. VIOLA THEN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPELL OUT SOME
OF HIS TROUGHS ON THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S BASIC GOALS.
HE SAD THAT THE MILITARY TOOK OVER IN 1976 WITH ONE OB*
JECTIVE: TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURE AND GENUINE
DEMOCRACY. THE MILITARY WANTED TO FINALLY END THE CYCLE
IN WHICH INEFFECTIVE AND UNSTABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
ALTERNATE WITH MILITARY REGIMES, GETTING THE MILITARY’
.PERMANENTLY OUT OF THIS GAME BY BUILDING A HEALTHY :
DEMOCRACY WAS STILL THE-MILITARY'S OBJECTIVE AND. ONE ..
.THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD. FAITHFULLY PURSUE*, HE SAID.
5. THESE THOUGHTS LED'-fD A QUESTION ON PSRONISM BY THE
CHARGE. VIOLA SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT
WANT TO LEAVE POWER SNOWING THAT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS
THE COUNTRY WOULD AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE OPTIONS IF
bt

PSN1004066

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:284/16:S2Z

DTG:101603Z OCT S0
COPY

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9
f. .« •« * ••

S

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04:. NLC-24-91-4-1-9

%
188

t

**♦♦♦**■€-0-N F I D B •' WI T I A L**.****^ COPT

OP IMMED
PE RUESBA #8154 2841615
0 101603Z OCT 80
EM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE VASHPC IMMEDIATE 7696
THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5232
AMEMBASST BRASILIA 4324
AMEMBASST CARACAS 4612
AMEMBASST LA PAZ 4069
AMEMBASST LIMA 3719
AMEMBASST MONTEVIDEO 6801
AMEMBASST SANTIAGO 4967

'CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS 4I1IS 8154
.EXDIS
»
DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR INTAFF
HAS HAD SINCE 1946—PXRONISM AND ANH-PE10NISM. STATING
THAT HE WAS CHOOSING HIS WORDS WITH GREAT CARE BECAUSE
THE SUBJECT IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ONE, VIOLA SAID
THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT EVEN TODAT PSRONISM IS A
MAJORITT. PERONIST SENTIMENT RUNS DEEP AND STRONG IN
ARGENTINA. BUT PSRONISM HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED AROUND A
LEADER AND LACKED A WELL DEFINED IDEOLOGICAL BASS; THE
MOVEMENT NOW NO LONGER HAD SUCH LEADERSHIP. THE PROBLEM
FOR THE MILITARY WAS HOW TO SHAPE THIS FORCE TO DEMO­
CRATIC PURPOSES. HAVING RAISED THE ISSUE, HOWEVER,
'VIOLA DID NOT OFFER A CLEAR SOLUTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT
ON THE ONE HAND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE AN
ALTERNATIVE" WHICH WOULD APPEAL TO SOME SECTORS OF PSRON­
ISM. HE ALSO SAID THAT EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION ON PARTY
ORGANIZATION COULD HELP SHAPE PSRONISM TO DEMOCRACY. IN
DISUC5SING THE POLITICAL FUTURE, VIOLA SEEMED TO DISMISS
THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN OFFICIAL PARTY FOR EVENTUAL
ELECTIONS. AT LEAST .-THAT APPEARS TO BE THE IMPORT OF HISREMARK THAT IT WAS-'"TOO LATE" TO FOLLOW THE POLITICAL
1 PATH TAKEN BY THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN. STRUCTURING THAT**
COUNTRY'S PARTY LIFE. VIOLA SAID THAT "IF ¥5 WERE GO'ING TO DO WHAT THE'BRAZILIANS DID, WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED FIVES YEARS- AGO'.
6. IN RESPONSE TO A .QUESTION, VIOLA fc£AB0RATED ON THE

PSN:004090

PAGE 01

TOR:284/17:11Z

DTG:101603Z OCT 80

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

******* n 0 H * I H 1! N T I ft i,*******Ti-mpT
ECONOMIC ISSUES. EE SAID THAT HE SEES NO CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN POLICIES TO FIGHT INFLATION AND POLICIES TO
PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE TVO CO TOGETHER. HE
ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
HATE POLITICAL STABILITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING
LONG TERM RECESSION. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED
THE POLICY OF TRIMMING BACK THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S PARTICI­
PATION IN THE ECONOMY. HE SAID.-THAT PARTICIPATION IS
DIVIDED INTO THREE AREAS* INFRASTRUCTURE (TELEPHONES,
ELECTRICITY, HATER, ETC.)! STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES
(FABRICACIONES MILITARES, THE STEEL INDUCTRY)S AND
INDUSTRIES AND OPERATIONS.WHICH THE STATE TOOK OVER IN
'THE PAST FOR SOCIAL OR PO&TTYCAL REASONS. THIS LAST .
GROUP COULD BE SPUN OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE STRATEGIC
‘INDUSTRIES VERS "COMPLICATED" AND THERE VAS LITTLE
POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD .BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIV­
ATE SECTOR. WATER, GAS, TELEPHONES AND THE LIKE COULD
BE TURNED BACK IF INVESTORS COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD BUY
THEM OUT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND INVESTORS, HE SAID.
?. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE:
A. VIOLA'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. VIOLA STATED
THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD-BEEN MADE |0R HIS TRIP TO THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. HE SAID THAT IF HE SHOULD
TRAVEL IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER OR
EARLY DECEMBER. HE SAID HE. APPRECIATED THE EMBASSY'S
OFFER TO HELP WITH ANT ARRANGEMENTS. AS HIS OWN FLANS
DEVELOPED HE WOULD BE BACK .-.IN TOUCH ON THI8 SUBJECT.
VIOLA THEN SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD TRAVEL TO
WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE -CAPACITY AIMING AT BETTER RELA­
TIONS WITH THE US.
B. THE OASGA: THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROS AND
HE ON MONDAY HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IAHRC REPORT
AT THE OASGA. THE CHARGE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE,
iAS R05 HAD POINTED OUT, DIFFERENCES THAT BETWEEN THE
US AND ARGENTINA ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ADVERSLT AFFECT
•THE CLIMATE FOR GENERAL VIOLA'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON.
VIOLA STATED THAT EE-HAD TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE WITH PRESI­
DENT VIDELA FOLLOWING THE CHARGE'S LAST MEETING WITH HIM
(REF C). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR VIDELA, AND
GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO INVOLVE
HIMSELF IN THE MATTER ONE WAT OR ANOTHER,

:-;j

huser

BT

PSNt00*090

--I

PAGE 02

**»»*»*s

OF 02

.

r •..'

■■■

T0R:284/17:11Z T

o n rm min

DTG:1016032 OCT 80

copy

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9
i

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -4-4-7
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Waihlnftton. D.C.

-GBNFENflAt-

20520

y.
April 10, 1979

pos REVIEWED 22-Jun-2P10: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR DR, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Mrs. Rische
M. Timerman

E .0 . 13528

We recommend that the President sign the attached
reply to Mrs. Timerman.

^

Qjnri*hr
Peter Tamoff
rnoxf
Executive Secretary

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -4-4-7

n
ni
t
t
,
"r
i
*y

WIHUl

i

Attachments:
1. Suggested reply
2. Letter from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman to'President
Carter

^

\

NARA_£iE ____ Date

y~*7

The GOA has recently reconsidered Timerman's case
and the Junta has discussed whether he might now be
released. While this review was underway the Argentine
Foreign Ministry asked our Embassy in Buenos Aires what
our quid pro quo might be for Timerman's release. The
Embassy offered no specific suggestions and reiterated
our position that Timerman should be released on the.
merits of his case. In his most recent discussion of
the Timerman case with Army Commander Viola, Ambassador
Castro again urged that Timerman be released. General
Viola told him that this is not likely to take place in
the immediate future.

------

Mrs. Rische M. Timerman, the wife of a prominent
Argentine publisher who has been the victim of human
rights abuse by the GOA, has written to President
Carter to express her deep appreciation for the Presi­
dent's efforts on behalf of her husbahd. The letter,
which was delivered to our Embassy! in Israel where
she resides, also expresses appreciation for Ambassador
Castro's work on this case and Mrs. Timerman's hope
that these efforts will lead to her husband's release.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-54-8-39-5

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 5, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR;

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor,

SUBJECT:

Evening Report.(U)

<:!

Bolivia. Faced with the alternative^ of increasing repression
or negotiating a face-saving exit. Col. Natusch 1b apparently
considering surrendering power to the Congress on the condi­
tion that Guevara not be reinstalled as President. At Natusch's
request, the Congress has been called for a meeting. Guevara
said he will not step aside,and there is no readily available
consensus candidate in the wings. Stay tuned. (C)
Central America and the Caribbean. Worked on the FY 81 budget
with Poats and others trying to get it to reflect the kind of
priority which the President attaches to the region. Also worked
on a paper suggesting U.S. policy guidelines to the Caribbean
for use at the PRC meeting on Wednesday, (c)
Guatemala. Met with Dr. Gallardo, a leader of Guatemala's Social
Democratic Party. He recounted in great detail the efforts by
the military government to assassinate
Christian Demo­
cratic and Social Democratic political leaders. He also talked
about the extensive corruption in the military, and asked the
U.S. to withdraw our aid to the government. On Sunday, I spoke
before a group of country directors of the AFL's labor organiza­
tion in Latin America. Several thought that the situation in
Guatemala was much more urgent than r had thought. They attribu­
ted part of the social crisis to the union-busting activities of
right-wing U.S. businessmen in Guatemala. (C)
You Don't Look Jewish. Last week, Jacobo Timerman, the
Argentine editor whothe military recently released after a couple
of years in prison, told me that much of the Argentine military
believe that a world-wide Jewish conspiracy is at the heart of
the terrorist problem in Argentina, and that you are the head of
that conspiracy; Linowitz is your deputy, and Timerman was the
director in Argentina. He said ..that this organization chart can
be seen in a number of Argentine prisons. When Timerman pointed
out to his captors that you are a Pole and a Catholic, they said
that was only your alias. They "know" you are Jewish because
they studied the New York City phone book and found that a number
of "Brzezinski's" had Jewish first names!
(c)
Press Contacts.

None.

(U)
DECLASSIFIED

-’■'E.Oi 13S2S

""cSNFTBQBILIAL

Review onll/57ff5

Authority.

NUL-

____ __________________________________________ tNARA_gP

pa.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-2-47-4

Eos REVIEWED 26-Jan-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

IM"HAS'81®$

WASHINGTON

- ‘Trrnrr

December 3, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:

Cyrus Vance^
t

1. Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Dlnlcz - Ambassador
Dinltz came to see me this morning to tell me he will be leaving
Monday evening to join Begin at the close of Begin's visit to London.
I informed Dtnitz of my Middle East trip, stressing that we see our
role as supporting Egypt's and Israel's efforts. Dinltz assured me
that Israeli press criticism of the U. S. in no way reflects the views
of the Israeli Government. Begin is very interested in continuing
the intimate dialogue with the U. S. and wants us to be very much
involved in whatever Israel does, since he knows that Israel will
need American help and advice in the future. I also informed Dinltz
about Phil Habib's trip to Moscow.
Dinltz raised ihe F-16 question. I asked him to look at how
procurement and payment could be spread out so as not to take up
all of Israel'8 military funding in a single year. Dinltz is anxious
to have the F-16 problem resolved before Defense Minister Welzman's
visit early next year. He also raised the question of the length of
time required for negotiations on new U4S. military technology and
indicated that the Israelis will want to talk further with us about
this. I said that in the light of recent developments we might want
to take another look at the question of F-5s for Egypt. Dinltz
reiterated Israel's standard concern about lethal weapons for Egypt
but said there might be some new thinking now in Jerusalem. I will
pursue discussion of this issue with the Israelis during my trip.

Dinltz spoke with considerable satisfaction about the
dinner Barbara Walters Is arranging for' him and Ghorbal on Sunday.
He is obviously looking forward to it.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133^6-2-47-4

5
DECLASSIFIED

On Dinltz' inquiry, I related my efforts with the
Argentines regarding the Timerman case. Dinltz expressed
appreciation for this, and for our help in the UN in the vote on the
Center of Palestinian rights.

1

■Hi.

No Objection To Declassification in Fifll 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-2-47-4

-SECRET"
17=

2, Congressional Consultations on Trip Announcement As we had discussed, Hodding will announce the Middle Iiast trip
at noon on Monday. We will inform the leadership and key members
of the Foreign Relations and International Relations Committees of
the fact Ehat 1 plan to make the trip before the announcement is made.
1 plan eo talk personally to as many of these people as I can on Sunday
evening and Monday morning. I will explain our objectives and ask
for their public support.
3, Panama Treaty Passage - On Thursday, I reported
that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff believed the
Committee's resolution would link Panama treaty ratification to
the passage of enabling legislation by both* Houses. 1 think we have
succeeded for the time being in forestalling such an amendment.
The Committee will not push for this amendment, although it is
conceivable that we will face it on the floor.
Bob Byrd has confirmed that he has asked that the treaties
be reported by January 23th, with floor action to begin in the first
week cf February. He expects floor action to take three weeks,
so final passage could come in late February or early March.
The State Department has a substantial task force working
on all aspects of the Treaty ratification process. I find that it is
functioning well. Doug Bennet, Frank Moore and our legislative
staffs seem to be meshing smoothly and doing the necessary planning.
1 conclude that we are reasonably well prepared for what will be an
extremely difficult and subtle legislative struggle.
4, Presidential Mail - I am glad to report that the State
Department backlog of responses to Presidential mall referred to
us for answering has been eliminated and* we are now in compliance
with the nine-day limit for processing such correspondence. We
have ale@ taken steps to solve the long range problem by organizational
steps within the Department and by contracting with a high speed
correspondence processing service.
-SECRET—

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-2-47-4

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/1.2/.12.;NLC-133-6-2-47-4

TJ*T"

—=s=~
5. Lawsuit Against Transfer of Crown of Sc. Stephen -.
Senators Curtis and Hay akawa and Representatives kemp and Do man
have sued to enjoin the transfer of-the Crown of St. Stephen. They
claim the U. S. has title, presumably as trustee, to the Crown and
that it may not be transferred without authorization of Congress. We
see no merit in this claim. Judge June Green has scheduled a hearing
at 2:00 Monday on Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining
order. But this may be postponed. We are working to develop a
strategy that will permit the matter to be adjudicated without Interfering
with the transfer of the Crown on January 6.
We are proceeding to discuss arrangements with Hungary,
including an exchange of letters and public announcement of Cardinal
Lekai’s particlp atlon and will give you our advice promptly concerning
the timing of a Joint announcement.
6. Jim Wright and the Middle East - I met yesterday with
Jim Wright and six other members of hts delegation which visited
the Middle Hast. The group was optimistic about (he prospects for
peace, interested in remaining close to the peace process in which
they feel they have participated at a critical and historic moment.
Jim and his colleagues were especially encouraged by popular reactions
in Israel to Sadat's visit, the Israeli government's interest in Sadat's
West Bank formula of confederation or federation with Jordan, , and
in the West Bank mayors' acceptance of demilitarization of a West
Bank entity.
7. U. S. /Japan Economic Negotiations - I mentioned a couple
of days ago that I would provide some additional background on our
trade relations with Japan.
We are satisfied with the progress of our trade talks so far.
Our current approach results from a thorough USG Interagency con­
sensus. No agency thinks we have pressed too hard. Our Intent is
not to escalate the pressure — only to maintain the present level
consistently. The danger Is that, If we flinch or wobble now, the
Japanese will be quick to judge this as indecisive and vacillating.
We are adjusting our position to Japan's political and economic
realities as we progress.

■SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-2-47-4

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-2-47-4

—SEOftET

—hT”
The level of pressure achieved successfully galvanized
Japan's bureaucracy lnco urgent consideration.of our suggestions.
Fukuda's recent cabinet changes improve ^he potential for responsive­
ness and cocperation. Both Ambassador Mansfield and our Japan
experts urge that, if we apply sustained, even pressure, we are likely
to get some trade concessions at little expense to US/Japan relations.
More than with previous issues, such as Tokal Mura, how firmly and
consistently we handle this matter will determine how Japan responds
to future issues with this Administration. If we ease off, we lose
respect, prospective concessions and undermine future Japanese
responsiveness.
Our aim is for a successful visit by Bob Strauss at the
end of the year, followed fay a unilateral Japanese announcement of
measures to eliminate its payments surplus and help us blunt
protectionist pressures.
8. Uganda - We have taken a number of steps to terminate
the training of :he Ugandan police helicopter pilots and mechanics.
We have telephoned and written to each of the schools involved request­
ing that they not go forward with the training. ..The,results were mixed.
Warren then wrote asking the Federal Aviation Administration
to advise the two Texas schools involved that the official certifications
toward which the training la directed will not be Issued. The FAA has
done so, and we have Informed the Uganda Embassy here of this step.
The FAA action, which will quickly become public knowledge, will
put pressure on the schools to end the training. (We considered and
rejected the possibility of cancelling the trainees'visas, in part
because the legal appeals might have prolonged their stay, which
is scheduled to end before January L
We have also decided to deny visas to officially connected
Ugandans for any training or education in this country. We would
only review a decision in the event of exceptional circumstances (UN
sponsorship, obvslous UN benefit, etc.).

SECHET—
f

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12? NLC-133-6-2-47-4

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-5-8

I

SUE!:

i

a

PLEASE SEND THIS ALONG TO DENIS CLIFT AT CAf1P DAVID
FOR HIS CLEARANCE.
ALSOi WOULD YOU PLEASE VERIFY WITH *DCLIFT — DOES THE
REFERENCE TO "VAKY VISITING ALONE” MEAN NO ACCOMPANYING
PERSONNEL OR JUST A VISIT TO THE COUNTRY OF ARGENTINA?
THANKS*
LOUISE
SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR VAKY

5=55 P-M.

.t

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
* -AnHwHy NJ L/° NARA g-Pn.pfn

t

n

c3

C

i

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-5-8
Atk

MEN

01G

SIGNAtUEE

i
■i S.L C. N*

1

•„i

1

aviii

.<"a:icin

ZZ

*-■ 1 LHARofr*

1

.....

...

.

....

...

....................................................... -

\

JARA/ECA: CURUSER:DEH
txr; 20^13
...

_____

................................ •

name

m Fxr__________

1
£
.'.V 1

..

»

S/S-0

-

MR.

THYDEN

name

J
*

3

i

CLEARANCES

VAKY

ARAr,C£ AMB.

NAMl

h

.

CLEARANCES

ft

i
L

-

7

oiS'Kto

j

d swiumon

.fluam jusls.,

ACHON APP.ffk^S

t

inro

aodsesses

r 1""

w»»«rnn«»

E.O. UbS2: CDS

w

1

[-1-

TAGS: OVIP, PGQVi PDIP-, AR
SUBJECT:

MIS

MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESI­
DENT VIDELA

1- SUMMARY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE VICE PRESI­
DENT’S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA-. SEPTEMBER S-. AT THE
RESIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME- YOU ARE
REGUESTED TO MAKE A FOLLOW-UP INGUIRY TO PRESIDENT
VIDELA OR DR- YOFRE-. IN ACCORDANCE WITH .PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW.
END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED THAT HE FULLY CONCURS IN
PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS- THE WESTERN
WORLD MUST BE UNITED AND THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD THE
ATION

18S-101
ft u.«,

V

JT ,

0 TpvW
:

&

|V

£
«?
*•».

L .

’’
i-

5. IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE VICE PRESIDENT
STRESSED THAT WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS BUT THAT HUMAN
RIGHTS ARE A CENTRAL CONCERN. WE WISHED TO uIORK WITH
ARGENTINA IN HAVING GOOD RELATIONS- IT WAS IMPORTANT
THAT VIDELA RECEIVE THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION CIAHRO, ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSIONUE WOULD NOT LINK -ARGENTINE ACTIONS WITH OUR OWN- PRO­
GRESS ON CASES SUCH AS JACOBO TIMERMAN WOULD ALSO BE
HELPFUL.

CWRU37;

!-

fc-

yi

Full 2012/12/12 :

{

NLC-133-57-B-5-8

'No Objection To Declassification in
:

re.

TeT“T~

iXA

gaesgaBEBCThfflg

WESTERN WORLD. ARGENTINA WAS WITH THE UNITED STATES
»
AND NOT TROUBLED BY OBJECTIVE CRITICIS/1. HE WAS CON­
CERNED-. HOWEVER-. BY CRITICISM WHICH HAD THE APPEARANCE
OF INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS- SUCH
CRITICISM HAD COMPELLED HIM TO POSTPONE AN INVITATION
TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION- HIS CON­
CERN WAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE GOV­
ERNMENT PLANE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OR
POPULAR ISSUES-

*

L.i
t-Si

$

$
its!
THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT-. TO PUT RELATIONS ON ■J

4.
A MORE POSITIVE COURSE-. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO
ARGENTINA TO MEET WJTH VIDELA OR A PERSON OF HIS CHOICE
A REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS. VIDELA ASKED WHETHER
tHE VAKY VISIT WOULD BE AFTER THE IAHRC OR BEFORE. THE
VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE-

1

5- PRESIDENT VIDELA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGEN­
TINE GOVERNMENT SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
CARTER {DURING THE PANAMA CANAL SIGNING!, WHICH HE SAID
SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS BY HI* GOVERNMENT IN
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA- VIDELA CONFIRMED THAT HE- WOULD
RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. HE SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION
TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE OCTOBER 1, THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, BUT DID NOT
THINK IT COULD BE DONE BEFORE SEPTEMBER IS- CAT AN EARLI­
ER POINT, HE SAID THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A
VISIT OF THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER.} ASSISTANT
SECRETARY VAKY COULD VISIT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
WSr;
VIDELA SAID HE PREFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ALONE AND
REQUESTED THAT THE USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE
i OBJECTIVES OF THE VAKY MISSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID
WE WOULD COMMUNICATE THESEk. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, THE VICE PRESIDENT
4 NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE EX-IM BANK REACH A DECISION
ON ALLIS-CHALMERS BY SEPTEMBER IS, THE DATE OF THE BIDS
FOR THE YACYRETA POWER PROJECT. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF
THE COMMISSION’S VISIT BEFORE OCTOBER 1 MIGHT ENABLE
US TO ACT ON A LETTER BY EX-IM IN.SUPPORT OF THE ALLISCHALMERS BID BEFORE SEPTEMBER IS.

►.-.yT

t.

I:.-??

.•1

. ?• ACTION REflUESTED. VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES
THAT HE INTENDS TO RECEIVE THE COMMISSION- YOU ARE RE. GUESTED TO FOLLOW UP IN LOU KEY FASHION WITH PRESIDENT
©VIDELA HIMSELF, IF POSSIBLE, OR WITH YOFRE {WHO WAS PRESENT J
. AT THE MEETING} MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: O! WE ARE
I DELIGHTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK .
PLACE', {2} WE WANT TO REITERATE THE U-S- DESIRE TO BRING
i1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SftttTT... in
U. «« UPVRRKMRNI MtNTIItft Q» » 1C*.* I«»t — |H-M|

c3

Objection To Declassification in Full

J

.

2012/12/12: NLC-133-57-8-5-8. _

_

No

U.S^RRGENTINE RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE U£ICH SHOULD
EXIST BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS*! C3> YOU HAVE BEEN AS
TO BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON .THE MONDALE-VIDEl.
CONVERSATIONS; CM} WE ARE NOW TAKING A LOOK AT WHERE WE
STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE TRIP TO. ARGENTINA BY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY VAKY WHICH LIAS DISCUSSED IN ROME; AND CS> NOW
THAT VIDELA IS BACK! DOES HE HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE
TIMETABLE WHICH MIGHT BE LIKECY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND
THE VAKY TRIPf

t

I

1
*

• «

6

.•

!•:.

\

O

n
*

I

t*£t

t

i

■ r

I
•> lit • . •»»>* -

f*nit<riti«» a* r»crj:

No Objection To Declassificalioft-Hrf ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0

ARGENTINA
PARTICIPANTS
ARGENTINA

US

President Jorge Rafael Videla
(HORhay RAFAIel VeeDEHleh)
Vice Admiral Oscar Montes,
Foreign Minister
(OHScar MOHNtes)

The President
The Secretary
□r. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
ChargeL Maxwell Chaplin Mr. Robert Pastor

Checklist POS~REVIEWED

02-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED

FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

— Courtesy Point - We want to thank President Videla
for his warm reception of Assistant Secretary
Todman on his recent trip to Argentina.

t

— Human Rights - We want to impress on the Argentines
our concern over their continuing gross violations
of basic human rights. We understand that they
inherited a chaotic mess, but terrorism is now
largely controlled. Human rights violations con­
tinue however. We think now is the time to move
ahead. We are heartened to hear of releases of
prisoners and the reinstatement of the "right of
option".
— Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco We want to impress on the Argentines the danger
of nuclear arms proliferation; full safeguards
are a necessity. We also want them to ratify the
Treaty of Tlatelolco to indicate Argentine dedication to peaceful uses of atomic energy.
— Malvinas/Falkland Islands - We want to stay out of
this Argentine—UK dispute. We are pleased that
conversations are going on between the two govern­
ments to resolve the questions.
— Helicopter Sale - (If raised by President Videla) We limited theequipment which will be supplied
on the eight commercial Model 212 Bell helicopters
because of present problems in the human rights
field.
— Trade - Point out that current US health and cus­
tom regulations will not allow Argentine freBh
meat to enter the US.

declassified

EA13620
AUttlC
NAHA.

INn Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0

ARGENTINA
I. Setting
President Jorge Rafael Videla came to power in a
March 1976 coup d'etat. Economic instability and rightwing and left-wing violence were rampant. The new
government took the form of a Junta composed of the
chiefs of the three armed services with Videla (Army)
as President. It had two primary goals: elimination of
terrorism and restoration of the economy.
The struggle against terrorism from the left is now
largely won, but the excesses of counterterrorism remain
a serious problem. Some of the security forces are
running out of control. We believe that President Videla
is a moderate who probably would constrain such rightwing terrorism if he could, but pressure from hard-line
military officers restricts his freedom to act. Some
progress in human rights has been made, however. Prison­
ers have been released and the Argentines have announced
they will soon reinstate the "righ- of option".
The once powerful trade unions are under tight wraps
and many of their leaders have "disappeared". The govern­
ment is considering a plan for incorporating civilians
into political process, but no action has yet been taken.
In the security field we are concerned that the
Argentines $350 million favorable trade balance with the
Soviet Union, may lead them to seek Russian weapons. Our
restrictions on arms sales for human rights reasons pushes
them toward the Russians.
In the economic field, the Videla government began to
reverse the populist programs of the Peronist years by
reestablishing a free market economy. The results have
been generally very successful; but inflation remains a
continuing problem and labor has been^squeezed. The U.S.
had a $250 million favorable trade balance with Argentina
in 1976.
*
U.S.-Argentina difficulties relate to the excesses of
pnnnfpr-ferjrirlgiTi and our general concerns regarding nuclear
proliferation.
(The latter issue is now coming to the fore.)

CONFIDENTIAE

iNr^hifintinr^R^eclassificatiornn Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0
W^l1 4.X/U1* X XAij

II.

----

Issues
I.

Human Rights

The human rights situation in Argentina is the
principal obstacle to closer relations. There have
been some improvement^ including the release of some
prisoners and an announcement that the "right of option"
will soon be reinstated. However, the Argentine govern­
ment continues to refuse to acknowledge the names of
thousands of political prisoners. Disappearances,
summary executions, torture, and instances of antiSemitism also occur.
As the result of human rights violations, we pro­
posed a reduced FMS credits program for FY '78.
Argentina rejected the proposal but kept the door open
to FMS sales and training. We have not signed the FY *77
FMS agreement for human rights reasons. We are now
refusing all military items for internal security use.
All other requests for military items are reviewed on a
case-by-case basis.
The Argentines will not participate in this years
joint US-Latin American fleet exercise (UNITAS). Their
stated reason for nonparticipation is "difficulty in
obtaining small parts" for their ships. We believe it is
a protest of our arms sales policy.
The Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to this year'B sec­
urity assistance bill will virtually eliminate military
ties to Argentina on October 1, 1978.
We have abstained, voted against and pressed the
Argentines to withdraw loan proposals in the international
financial institutions. There is no AID program in
Argentina because of its high per capita income.
Talking Points
— The United States recognizes that Argentina has
been victim of a brutal terrorist campaign.
— The Argentine government has decisively mastered
the security situation, but it does not appear to
be moving with sufficient speed and determination
to abolish lawlessness by security forces and
others.
— We are concerned that peopLe are being repressed
simply because they dissent. ‘Lawful opposition
should not be confused with subversion.

iNoObier:tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0

— We strongly urge an end to the state of siege and
the public listing of all prisoners Bhowing their
place of detention and the charges against them.
Due process Bhould be restored and all future ex­
cesses punished.
— Reports of continued torture and disappearances
are distressing.
— We want to express our concern over the case of
Jewish publisher Jacobo Timmerman of the respected
daily La Opinion. He is bain^ held without char­
ges. Should an outbreak of anti-semitism occur it
would be most harmful to US-Argentine relations.
— We do recognize the partial steps taken by the
Argentine government to assure basic human rights.
The May release of prisoners and the recently
announced intention to restore the "right of
option" are positive indications of such Argentine
movement.
(The "right of option" allows Argentine
citizens to leave country if held under State of
Siege provisions.)
— We think it essential for the government to recog­
nize its unquestioned strength. It should begin
to gamble on the side of returning the country to
the rule of law.
— Human rights concerns will not permit us to sign
the FY 1977 FMS credits.
n

— We regret the Argentine nonparticipation in the
UNITAS exercise but appreciate their offer of
logistic support. We look forward to their re­
joining UNITAS in the future.
2.

Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Argentina has the most advanced nuclear capability
of any Latin American state and the greatest potential for
an autonomous fuel cycle. The Argentine government has
stated that it seeks nuclear technology in order to satisy
its energy needs and for strictly peaceful purposes. We
are concerned, however, because of Argentina's apparent
progress toward acquiring an independent, unsafeguarded
reprocessing capacity. We are considering the transfer of
sensitive heavy water technology to the Argentines if they
will forego reprocessing and accept full scope safeguards.
The Argentines recently signed a limited safeguards agree­
ment with Canada covering previously purchased nuclear
fuel. They are now discussing with the Canadians the poss­
ibility of accepting full scope safeguards in return for
further Canadian technical assistance in the nuclear area.
-CONFIDENTIAL-

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0
-

4

Talking Points
— The United States is concerned over the possible
spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. We
feel the world community must take steps to re­
duce this growing danger.
— At the same time, the United States recognizes
the need for states to expand and diversify
their energy resources on a secure basis.
— We applaud the recent Argentine-Canadian limited
safeguard agreement.
— Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would
demonstrate Argentine committment to the peace­
ful uses of nuclear energy.
— The US is considering Argentine requests for
technical assistance and nuclear cooperation.
Specific requests relating to nuclear fuel are
also under study.
3.

The Malvinas/Falkland Islands

Argentina has disputed British possession of the
Malvinas (Falkland Islands) since 1833. The 2,000
inhabitants of the islands want nothing to do with
Argentina. The issue is further complicated by possibly
large oil reserves in the Falkland Island shelf. In July,
the UK and Argentina began another round in a series of
conversations about sovereignty of the islands. The US
has not taken sides in this dispute.
(In talking with
Videla you should use the Argentine name, Malvinas.)
Talking PointB
— We are pleased that Argentina and the UK are
carrying on conversations directed toward re­
solving this question.
4.

Sale of Helicopters (If raised by GOA)

We have agreed to sell the Argentine military eight
Bell 212 commercial model helicopters, two of which will be
used to transport President Videla. However, we did not
agree to the original configuration requested by the
Argentines. Machine gun mounts were eliminated on all of
the eight, and armor plating was permitted only on those two
aircraft to be used for President Videla's security.

-G8NFIUENTXAL

INo Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-B-47-1-2-01

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0

-CONFIDENT TAX
- 5 We requested assurances from the Argentines that the heli­
copters will not be used for internal security purposes.
Talking Points
— Concern that the helicopters might have internal
security uses caused the US to request assurances,
Retention of the armor plating on two of the heli­
copters will help to guarantee the safety of
President Videla.
5.

Trade

Argentina's continuing recovery from past economic
difficulties should stimulate demand for US goods. The
already large trade deficit with the US will worsen;
Argentina will want to rectify the balance by exporting
fresh meat products to the United States. US sanitary
regulations do not permit importation of fresh meat from
countries with endemic foot and mouth disease/ such as
Argentina.
Talking Points
— We recognize Argentina interest in exportation of
fresh meat. But we do not foresee the possability of removing sanitary restrictions un-til
adequate safeguards against transmittal of foot
and mouth disease can be assured. Argentina has
suggested export from disease-free areas, but
USDA has ruled that the Tariff Act of 1930 pre­
cludes exceptions for parts of countries.

■CONFIDENTIAL.
iNn Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01

No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2012/11/21 : NLC-4-43-6-27-5

l MCIN I

ur SS 1

A r k.

.

BRIEFING PAPER

■CONFIDENT IAL (Entire text)
BILATERAL PAPER
ARGENTINA«
Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor
I.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Vaky

II.

Carlos Washington Pastor
(Phonetic: pahsTOR)

INTRODUCTION

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the
Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level
bilateral exchange with us during the course of the
Ecuadorean inauguration. We want to encourage Argentina
to continue its efforts to end human rights abuses.
The Foreign Minister will note that progress has been
made. Pastor may suggest that we should take some
public action to bolster President videla's and General
Viola's prestige and authority.
III.

ISSUES
-------

t

A. Human Rights. There has been some progress
on human rights in Argentina. Disappearances have
declined from the 55 per month average in 1978. There
have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1,
the last occurring May 13. The GOA continues to release
prisoners held under Executive Power. The ICRC reports
that prison conditions have improved. There is, however,
still little information on the fate of disappeared
persons.
Legal efforts to force the Government to show
cause for holding alleged subversives havq not been
successful.
Points to be Made
— We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances,
and urge the government to continue to investigate
recent cases and definitively end the practice.
— We hope families of the disappeared will
receive information that they request.
— We are pleased with the release of prisoners
held under Executive Power, and hope that all
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS - 8/6/85

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13S26

Authority N
NAflA E-f—

~
~if" ■
rflata- l\^W----- -

No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2012/11/21 : NLC-4-43-6-27-5

-2

-

prisoners will be given fair trials or be freed.
— We remain deeply concerned over the
continued detention of Jacobo Timerman,
and hope that he will be released without delay.
-- We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners
released under the Right of Option Program.
*

B. Nicaragua and Central America. The GOA was
most helpful in supporting the United States and the
Andean countries in the OAS vote and has already moved
to recognize the new Government. However, the GOA
supplied arms to the Somoza regime.
It cannot be
expected to have much influence with Nicaragua.
Point to be Made
— We appreciate the GOA's support on the Nicaragua
Resolution in the OAS and hope that the GOA will
support the Andean countries in their efforts
to assist Nicaragua.
i

C. Beagle Channel. The Papal mediation of the
Beagle Channel dispute is still in progress.
Point to

be Made

— We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed
to mediation of the Beagle dispute and hope that
both will continue to work with‘the Vatican.
t

D. Nuclear Technology. We are discussing with
potential suppliers (Canada, the FRG and Switzerland)
safeguards and other conditions they will require
for the sale of a heavy water plant.
(We would have
preferred that Argentine deferral of reprocessing
be a condition, but Canada is unwilling to require
deferral and the FRG will follow Canada's lead.) We
are also dicussing with the GOA the additional U.S.
safeguards requirements, effective in March 1980,
needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We
do not wish to take the initiative on this.

Point to be Made (If raised)
-- We want to cooperate with Argentina in the
transfer of nuclear power equipment and technology.
Our cooperation must be consistent with the nuclear
export law and policy.
August 1979
-GaNirmENTiArr"

*

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-5-6-5
*N; —

4

t

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
-SEGRET-

March 21. 1977

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
NORTH-SOUTH
Evening Report

Daily Activities
(Hansen)

^

Continued preparation for PRM 8.
(Thornton)
Met with Gene Kramer, who will represent AP in New Delhi, for general
background discussion.
In the afternoon, attended the South Asia Working Group meeting for
PRM 10 'at the State Department.

(Pastor)
1.
On Friday night I attended a dinner with the Argentine Ambassador,
and with two Ministers of his Embassy. We spoke about many issues, but
the two which we spent the most time on were the current political situation
in Argentina and U ,S . policy on human rights . They told me that they were
well aware of President Carter's great concern for human rights, that they
were presently undergoing a serious political problem in Argentina, and
they hoped that the United States would understand, and that they wanted
to continue to have good relations and a dialogue with the United States.
Privately one Minister told me that he personally hoped that the U ,S .
commitment to human rights would not waiver.

SECRET------declassified

E.Q.13S28

Authority
uana

Ml C -'PH-g-I^S~
__Pete

"A ^"*4---------

No Objection 10 Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-5-6-5

■SECR1ST-

2

-

-

2.
Attended a discussion where there were? two delegates to the Cuban
mission to the United Nations present. I discreetly overheard one conversation
where one delegate expressed his concern that jurisdictional problems
preventing terrorist actions by Cuban exiles.
3.
Lunched with Sergio Motta Mello, a journalist with O Estado da
Sao Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper, and discussed the current state
of U .S .-Brazilian relations . He said that Brazilian politics were in turmoil
at the present time, and it was not clear to him whether the forces of
moderation or the forces of repression would win. He said that in the
short term, U.S . policies on human rights may cause some problems,
but he thought that in the long term it would be beneficial both to Brazil
as well as to the United States. Like me, he expressed uncertainty about
how the nuclear problem would work itself out, but he suggested a cooling
off period might be in order.
4. Met with Eugenio Velasco, one of the two Chilean lawyers who was
exiled recently because they were defending political prisoners in Chile,
and discussed the current political situation in Chile.

»

5.
■ Worked on Pan American Day speech, letter to Echeverria, back­
ground memo for credentials ceremony (Chilean Ambassador), and
various memoranda.
Significant Inforroation/Intelligence
(Thornton)
My batting average slipped to 500 as Mrs. Gandhi went down to crashing
defeat at the polls. There are other unfortunate implications of this, also,
but they will require detailed analysis. It is not completely certain yet
that the Congress could not form a government, but given the trend, it
seems highly unlikely. The opposition has yet to organize itself and is
much of an unknown quantity although we know the individual leaders
very well.
In Pakistan, the violence over the weekend has abated somewhat, but the
Embassy now believes Bhutto's days to be numbered.
a

SBeSET-------

t

No Objection To Declassification in :rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-5-6-5

The situation on the ground in Zaire shows no marked change. Nigeria
has apparently taken on responsibility to mediate. This is obviously the
most desirable outcome. Nigerian Foreign Minister Carba was here today
and has left for the UN. Bill Schaufele tells me that the meeting was
productive, and a report is on its way over. I am aware of nothing further
in the military supply front since the SCC Working Group met on Saturday.
The Turnhalle Conference being held in Southwest Africa has ended.
It has produced the basis of a constitution which leaves all real power
in the hands of the South African Government and provides for an interim
government that may be in place by summer but will be subject to consensus
procedures and hence very limited in what it can do.
SWAPO remains unreconciled, and the results of Turnhalle do not look
like a basis for building a Namibia settlement .

Mn Hhiortinn Tn naHac^ifiratinn jn -nil 9ni3/fl9/n4 ■ Nl P.-94-QQ-fS-fi-S

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-3-9-4

■SECRET
WASriiNoTCN

_____________ _____ Ocrsber 18.
8. 1980_____
1980
DOS REVIEWED 06-Jul-201D: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL,

MEMORANDUM FOP.

TE~ ?PSSIDrn^T
cmund 5. Muskie . - "

Subject:

U.S. Policy Toward Argentina

On May 29 the Inter-Agency Group for Latin
America developed a strategy, subsequently approved
by you, to improve our relations with Argentina
during 1980.
However, following the IG meeting two events
occurred which have caused us to reassess the timing
of our initiatives:
— The Bolivian military, with Argentine sympathy
and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant
Secretary Bovdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed
as a result.
— Argentina thus far has not agreed to continue
cooperation beyond October on grains export restrictions
to the Soviet Union.
I emphasized both of these issues, in addition
to our human rights concerns, in my recent meeting
with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor at the UN
General Assembly. Under Secretary Cooper in a subsequent
discussion with the Argentine Minister of Economy
received the impression that continued cooperation
on grains is possible but much depends on the size
of the 1980/81 harvests.
We plan to qontinue our
efforts through further discussions in Buenos Aires,
Washington, and at international meetings.
Argentine decision-making is influenced by
the nearness of our presidential election and by
their own presidential transition. General Viola
will replace President Videla March 29, 1981.
Under these circumstances, we believe that,
while it is important to proceed with as many of
the proposed 1980 initiatives as possible, it would
be inappropriate to proceed this year with some
of the steps earlier contemplated. However, we
should maintain private dialogue and avoid public
confrontation that would make this dialogue difficult.
The steps we intend to proceed with this year and
those we plan to defer until next year are as follows:

Mn Ohinrtinn Tn npHaQciFiratinn in ri;ll 9013/09/04 ■ Nl P—94-QQ-3-Q-4

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-3-9-4

I.

Continuing or Early Action Initiatives:
f
— We will pursue our significant commercial
anc economic interests in preparation for the meeting
of the D.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission
to be held in Buenos Aires, prob.ably in March or
April (the earliest mutually convenient timeframe).
The meeting will include discussion of bilateral
trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations.
We also would use this occasion to continue dialogue
over the issues that may be current at that time.
-- We will move forward on negotiations to
arrive at an agreement on the assurances required
for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. We continue
to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco
as they had earlier promised you.
— We will seek to conclude the negotiations
for a bilateral income tax treaty and a consular
convention.
II.

Initiatives Postponed Until Next Year:

— The first round of periodic security consultations,
focusing on security of the South Atlantic.
— Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric
issues.
— Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement,
unless we can obtain a renewal of the Argentine
decision to limit grains to the Soviet Union.
— An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor
to the U.S. Army School of the Americas until consulta­
tions with the Congress are completed and we are
satisfied as to the timing of the initiative.
— A high-level U.S. military visit, although
we should keep under review the desirability of
an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader,
such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.
%

f

Mn Ohiontinn Tn nprla«;«iifir'at,irm in -nil 9r)13/n9/fM • Nl n-94-QQ-3-Q-4

No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-92-1-7-5

-SECRET
WASHINGTON
October 18/ 1330
MEMORANDUM FOR:
From:

Edmund S. Muskie . ^^

Subject:

U.S. Policy Toward Argentina

On May 29 the Inter-Agency Group for Latin
America developed a strategy, subsequently approved
by you, to improve our relations with Argentina
during 1980.
However, following the IG meeting two events
occurred which have caused us to reassess the timing
of our initiatives:
— The Bolivian military, with Argentine sympathy
and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant
Secretary Bowdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed
as a result.

Nn Ohiprtinn Tn nprla^^ifiratinn in -nil 2013/(12/04 ■ Nl (T-24-P2-1-7-fi

E.0.13S26

L C .-3 l4 - 9 a '\

-X F

M

Under these circumstances, we believe that,
while it is important to proceed with as many of
the proposed 1980 initiatives as possible, it would
be inappropriate to proceed this year with some
of the steps earlier contemplated.
However, we
should maintain private dialogue and avoid public
confrontation that would make this dialogue difficult.
The steps we intend to proceed with this year and
those we plan to defer until next year are as follows:

Authority
NAHA

Argentine decision-making is influenced by
the nearness of our presidential election and by
their own presidential transition. General Viola
will replace President Videla March 29, 1981.

DECLASSIFIED

*

Onto

-~7 -ST

I emphasized both of these issues, in addition
to our human rights concerns, in my recent meeting
with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor at the UN
General Assembly. Under secretary Cooper in a subsequent
discussion with the Argentine Minister of Economy
received the impression that continued cooperation
on grains is possible but much depends on the size
of the 1980/31 harvests. We plan to continue our
efforts through further discussions in Buenos Aires,
Washington, and at international meetings.

n \4 \u .

— Argentina thus far has not agreed to continue
cooperation beyond October on grains export restrictions
to the Soviet Union.

No Objection To Declassification in “uli 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-92-1-7-5

I.

Continuing or Early Action Initiatives:

— We will pursue our significant coronercial
anc economic interests in preparation for the meeting
of the U. S.-Argent!ne Mixed Economic Commission
to be held in Euenos Aires, prob.ably in March or
April (the earliest mutually convenient timeframe).
The meeting will include discussion of bilateral
trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations.
We also would use this occasion to continue dialogue
over the issues that may be current at that time.
-- We will move forward on negotiations to
arrive at an agreement on the assurances required
for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. We continue
to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco
as they had earlier promised you.
— We will seek to conclude the negotiations
for a bilateral income tax treaty and a consular
convention.
II.

Initiatives Postponed Until Next Years

— The first round of periodic security consultations,
focusing on security of the South Atlantic.
— Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric
issues.
— Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement,
unless we can obtain a renewal of the Argentine
decision to limit grains to the Soviet Onion.
— An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor
to the O.S. Army School of the Americas until consulta­
tions with the Congress are completed and we are
«
satisfied as to the timing of the initiative.
— A high-level O.S. military visit, although
we should keep under review the desirability of
an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader,
such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.

-SECRET
Nn Dhiortinn Tn Dprla^ifirptinn in -nil 9(113/02/04 • Nl r.-24-99-1-7-h

□uc

No Objeclion To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-3-8

OP THrtXD
REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]
STU269
DE HUESE* #0828/10291505 ADX057038 - MCN SFCDJ PROCESS
0 2914172 JAN 80
PM AMEM1ASSY BUENOS AIHES

&3H

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
828

UOniDINTIAL SUCTION 1 OP

NOBIS
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/28/10: (CASTRO, RAUL fli) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AR
SUBJECT: (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOOD PASTER'S
VISIT TO ARGEdTIWTS
WiTTOH tOPlUfrt JIWU'A'RI 23
-- -

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION
3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODRfSSR'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA:
GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS :.
4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS* BRIGADIER (RET) CARDQkS PASTOR,
FOREIGN MINISTER
DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINI*-BE HOZ, MINISTER iOF ECONOMY
COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLJ, DEPUTY FOREIGN.MINISTER
MR. VICTOR BEAUGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFflfftiS (HOTETAXER)
GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODBA&ER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY
RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA).
CLAUS V. RUSSR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/S^L')
WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.9.EMBASSY BUENOS AIRIS (NOTESAIER)
Co
5. PLACE AND TIME: JANUARY.20 AND 24, 1980| THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS ACRES

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOOBPRSTER
MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DRlS AT THE MINISTRY OP.\I0IEIGN
AFFAIRS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL PW3ljtI|AL
DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA,. INCLUDING HUMAN RXSMF
CONCERNS, POLITICAL-MILXVARY AFFAIRS AND MATTER*?
HAVING TO DO WITH NUCLEAR': COOPERATIONS IT WAS HIE',
GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AMU ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTAND­
INGS TROUBLES U.S .-ARGENTINEQUATIONS., AND THAT .B.S.
i
: i
■ IV«

PSN:054627

PAGE 01

TOR:030/01:30*

DTGi291417Z JAN 80

ONIIDENTTA L*»>—>*■ COPY.

Nn nhiortinn Tn Dpr.la^ifinatinn in .riill 7(113/07/04 ■ Nl r.-74-Q1-3-3-R

” No Objection To Declassification in .rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-3-8

MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCAL­
CULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS
BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OE ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION. IN HIS SECOND PRESENTATION, ON JANUARY 24,
BRIGADIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR
RESTORING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.■
7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS
ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR
EFFORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS
SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AT EARLIER EXISTING
LEVELS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

81. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S
FIRST PRESENTATION.
PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTER'S EXPLANATION
OF PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION CF
AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GENERAL'S PROPOSED AGENDA FOR
DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROLE IN THESE, WITH THE WISH
AT SOME POINT TO COVER THE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL
PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED
STATES.
9. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL
QUESTION: IF GRAINS SHIPMENT COOPERATION IS SO IMPORTANT
JUST NOW IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS WE ADMIT
THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL -HOW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE RELATIONS ON SUCH
BASIS THAT IN FAR MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR
EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND
TOGETHER?
10. WE CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT*
DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT VS
ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AND OTHER QUESTIONS.
UNFORTUNATELY. PASTOR CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR’BAD RELATIONS
ARE THE NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. THE UNITED
STATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTINE REALITIES, AND
BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMENT HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF
U.S. POLICY, AND INADMISSIBLE U.S.G. ACTIONS.
1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR WAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT
ARGENTINA FOUGHT A VAR AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT
LASTED BETWEEN TWO AND THREE TREARS. AND ARGENTINA VON
THE WAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S*
SHOULD BE PROUD OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS —
RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION* VIS
THE HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS iTHIS
SYMBOLISM, PASTOR VENT ON, THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN SO
PSN:054627

PAGE 02

TOR:030/01:30Z

***»**»0 0 N F~~I DENT I A

DTG:29l4l7Z JAN 80
COPY

1

Nn Ohiortinn Tn Dpr.la^ifir.atinn in riill ?fl13/n?/n4 • Nil T.-74-91-3-3-8

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-3-8

SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES
RATHER AS THOUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD
CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES,
WHEN THE U.S. HAD POUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT
INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET OP CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OP
ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNPAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE
HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF
ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS
EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED,
TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.
13. COULD THE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1962
ARGENTINA WAS FIRST TO SEND SHIPS TO HELP THE FREE
W.ORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ( WE DIDN'T EVEN GET A .
THANK-YOU NOTE.") ARGENTINA BACKED TH U.S. IN
PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA? THIS COUNTRY HELPED
DEFEAT AN UNFRIENDLY MOTION ON PUERTO RICO AT THE
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE? WE WERE THE FIRST
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES?
WE VOTED WITH THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS?
WE ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A
RESOLUTION ON AFHGANISTAN.
BT

PSN:054627

PAGE ^3

OF 03

TOR:030/01:30Z

DTG:29141?Z JAN 80

»***»**-C-fr-N T TV E N-T I A-L»*»»*»»E COPY

*

l\in Ohiortinn Tn Hpr.la^ifiratinn in ^-uil 2013/02/04 • Nl (%24-91-3-3-B

■I

__ ‘

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-3-8

»
ofc IMMED
STU271
DE RUESBA #0328/2 0291720 ADX057083 - MCN SVCD» PROCESS
0 291417Z JAN 80
PM AMEMBASSY B0BN0S AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
B E -N-g -I- A- L -SECTION 2 01 2 BUENOS AIRES 0828
NODIS
14. U.S. LACE 07 APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE
TO THE AR&ENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," WHEN HE LEARNS
70R EXAMPLE THAT TOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAXE IN THE
SHAH 07 IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANCE, BUT ARGENTINES
REMEMBER ALL THESE PROBLEMS.

C

15. 70R THIS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, COA MUST ASX
NOW 70R PROPOUND CHANCES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US,
PASTOR SAID. AND NOT ONLY MUST ATTITUDES TOWARD ‘ARGENTINA
BE CHANCED, BUT ATTITUDES .TOWARD MOST 07 LAT}N AMERICA.
THESE CHANCES 07 ATTITUDES IN POLICI H0PE7ULLY WILL BE
REELECTED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, IN THE CONCRESS( AT INTER­
NATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASrEP THAT THE 0.S. STqP PWlSSlNfl
ARCENTINA SO HARD fN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ("IN RESPONSE TtTWHTCH ¥E
trm^--fgTwgTT1tB BurnMMUHnTMfi twat tri:
POSTPONE A TRIP TO
THTT-ggyiET TTNTON HE PT.ANS TO MAXE LATER THIS TEfiFT;
~
16. (AT THIS POINT PASTOR TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OTHER
SPECI7IC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
HE DEVELOPED MORE BULLY THE 70LL0WINC DAY. THEY ARE
RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.)
17 PASTOR THEN ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATESORIZE U$
AS JUST ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
THIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL .
DEMOCRACY — AND NOT OF THE LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF
THE LAST PERONIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THAT "DEMOCRACY"
BOASTED A CONGRESS AND OTHER TRAPPINGS. IT WAS THAT
GOVERNMENT WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED BY CUBAN PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLENSI?
ITS LATER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND
Kidnappings, now we have no hunger, race problems or
SERIOUS CRIME. "WE WANT TO BE CONSIDERED AS i( SERIOUS

PSN:054632

PAGE 01

TOR:030/01:32Z

DTG:2B1417Z JAN 30

»»♦»»»*(; ON FIDE" NT I -&-L*»*****E COPf

Nn Dhiprtinn Tn Dpr.la«;«;ifir.atinn in -nil 2013/02/04 ' Nil H-24-91-3-3-8

'No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-3-8

COUNTRY** PASTOR SAID.
IP. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TO A PULL ALLIANCE; THE
EXISTING COURSE WILL LEAD TO A NEW NEUTRALITY WITH
WHICH NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES WILL FEEL
COMFORTABLE, PASTOR CONTINUED. THE CONSEQUENCES
WILL BE UNCERTAIN.** THEN HE ADDED.* YOUR REVISIONS
07 THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA — ALL 07 LATIN AMERICA
NEEDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY APPRECIATE
TOUR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER
TROUBLE SPOTS.
19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED RASTOR
THAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED
NATIONS, AND THAT WE SHOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING
WITH ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE
ALLIANCE 7OR PROGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S
TRADITIONAL CONCERN POR HUMAN DIGNITY — IT IS PART
07 OUR SHARED HERITAGE — AND CURRENT REPORTS TO
RESTORE THIS SITUATION.

20. TURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, PRESIDENT CARTER
FAS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE
IS AN UNDERSTANDING 07 PAST UNITED STATES ERRORS.
IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS POR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OP ARGENTINA'S
LACK OP INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE
PROGRESS — BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. WE MADE
THE POINT 07 PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS
NOT TO DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN
OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WILL RECEIVE
A LETTER PROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OP
FUEL POR RESEARCH REACTORS.
21. RECOGNIZED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING.
AUTHORITY AND SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER WENT
ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE
DISCARDED AS THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LEES
EXTRAORDINARY. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND
POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVEN RIGHT OP OPTION.
(COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TERM “POLITICAL PRISONER*
GO BY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON TIE
FOLLOWING DAY. YOU WERE REFERRING TO TERRORISTS
AND GUERRILLAS", HE SAID.)

22. FURTHERMORE, GENERAL GOODPASTER SAID, WE ARE
MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT
APEAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA WILL BE REVIEWED
PSN:054632

PAGE 02

TOR:030/01:32Z

**»**»»G 0 N P- I-D nil

DTG:291417Z JAN 90

r,E»*»**»*E

COPY

i

t
Nn Dhinrtinn Tn Dprla^ifinatinn in -nil 9013/02/04 • Nl (%94-91-3-3-R

No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-3-8

AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS Of GOVERNMENT. "I TALKED WITH
SECRETART VANCE ABOUT SOME Of THIS THE DAT BEFORE
LEAVING WASHINGTON. HE IS CONCERNED TOR BASIC
k
Levels o? human treatment, but knows too of your
PAST DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO'RESTORE
L^GAL PROCESSES." (COMMENT: GENERAL GOODPASTER
ADDRESSED OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS. THESE TOO ARE
INCLUDED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSA­
TION. )
23. GENERAL GOODPASTER REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR
TIMELY CONSULTATION, AND RECALLED WHAT THE LACT OF IT
CAN DO TO AN ALLIANCE. HE SPOKE OF BETTER COORDINATION
AND USING THE EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE. HE
CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS
TO BE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT,
AND WE FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING
THIS. THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS -- RUT YOU
MUST UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE
MADE THE U.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS,
VITAL TO OUR SOCIETY EVEN WHILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS
TO 'ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE.'
24. (COMMENT: THIS CONCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS
ON JANUARY 23. SEPTEL WILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S
PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES *ON
JANUARY 24.)
t
CASTRO
BT

i

t

PSN:054632

PAGE 03

OF 03

TOR:030/01:32Z

DTGs291417Z JAN 30

♦»*♦*»*€ 0 N F I U-E- N T I A L»»*****E COPY

\)n Hhinrtinn Tn Hprla^ifiratinn in :nil 2013/02/04 ■ Nl (%24-91-3-3-R

i

* 2vfEWORANDUM

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-12-8
* fj ■ r
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1979

& '- *■
?

MEMORANDUM FOR:

.ZINSXIM
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINS£I„

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I
mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading
it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we
should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From
October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loanB to Argentina
in the IFI1s. We changed our position to abstention in
February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that
would induce some improvement in the human rights situation.
Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher
now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the Ifl^s,
"IOUby ULLD &ouAtrie6 td rollow our exarivbie; and assess
wn^trier rurtner action in X-M and QPIC shouia oe raxenT""** (S)
Assessment
The report was prepared by INK—not HA— and it is a sobering
document.
The human rights situation in Argentina is the
worst in the hemrspnere, and despite repeated promises
rn
oy tne Argentine government, it has not improved.
Let me summarize the report:
There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners;
probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are
held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilir
tated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce
this number.
(S)

"Physical and psychological torture apparently
remain standard treatment.” The Red Cross estimated that
90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are
executed.
(S)
Disappearances — probably by security units —
continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978.

(Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while
—eRETIGI1TAL CL **

R- Pastor-----

DECL 2 HEW OflMaynh

CT ETivD 6 YZU3 '££_

g,

1 OJA

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.13526
NARA_E£____Date

--------

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8
A

the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy
estimates, 55.)
Increasingly, the people who disappear
have vague associations with the "political left" rather
than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and
Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have
been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

Illegal invasion of the home — including theft
by security units — remains as commonplace as fair public
trials are infrequent.
(S)
The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even
using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina’s
Federal Security Service estimated that there were only
about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even
Videla has admitted that the war is over.
INK concludes
that the explanation fnr rnntirmed official terrorism is_
army politics.
(S)
Policy
While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw
different conclusions than State as to what policy we should
adopt.
I understand that Vance and Christopher approach
the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged
in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the
law requires that we vote "no” on non-basic human needs
loans.
(Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.)
The
law only requires that we "oppose" such loams, and "opposition"
has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative
votes so I believe we have some flexibility.
(S)
In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address
two questions:
••
(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to
encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)
(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S.
our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps
toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues,
we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S.
This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps
if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we
should move carefully and explain ouit position to a wide-range
audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our
overall human rights policy.
(S).
An Effective Policy
What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud
and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government
.SLECKST

SECRET*

No Objection To Declassification in *-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8

decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want.
This is the case of our human rights policy. (S)
The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us
(1) our historical., reasonably close
for three reasons:
relationship;
(2) the D.S. under Carter has the prestige and
the morality which could contribute to*the idea that the
Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such
legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats
in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the
institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine
government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer
to the U.S.;
(1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S.,
they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights
area at home.
I think our cool and correct posture has been as
effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as
State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina,
and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S)
In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct
posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every
opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage
them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure
high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is
evident. (S)
But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher dc, that we
should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage
delay. (S)
One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what
will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting
a bit longer:
(1) The Argentine1'government has been paralyzed by
the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that
it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move.
(2) Several of
Argentina's most hard-line Generalb have been transferred, and
Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before.
(3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there
is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front
over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission is going there in Hay. We should wait and gear any
new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six
months or more.
RECOMMENDATION:
Vance has apparently decided to change our policy.
I therefore
recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider.
ii He
remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision
pending the IAHRC report.

Approve______

Disapprove

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8

SSGRETcc:

4

Jessica Mathews Views:

Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with
Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't
worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change
anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Chanel dispute is over. On
the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect
that in the near term nothingvj&^vork until and unless Videla gets
much* more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion.
However, there is one Important consideration missing here, namely the
relationship of Argentina to the rest of our Human rights policy. As
Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere
and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the
terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is Impossible
to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, ve do have to struggle
to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards
there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer atand
toward the GOA.
If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the
GOA, ve should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights
policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

'No Objection To ngrlggQifiratinn in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-3-6-6) <■ - "

>

..! ii

memorandum

i i inu

^

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

if

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT' PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Mrs. Carter's Meeting with the Argentine
Nobel Peace Prize Winner (c)

As per our conversation, I have prepared a short memorandum
for Mrs. Carter's meeting tomorrow (.Thursday) morning at
11:30 with the Argentine.
(.c)
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

t
Authority

NARA.

Review 11/19/86

~

2>-Vg

Data

mmm.
Mr» /''lhinntinn Tn noolaceifinatinn in -nil 901‘l/fl'J/flA ■ Ml r*_'9/l-Qn_'}-fi-K

\jt

______

' No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-3-6-6
iw*-1

'

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HCf USE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MRS. CARTER

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Argentine Nobel Peace
Prize Winner
(C)

I understand that you will be meeting with Argentine Peace Prize
winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel. In 1973, Perez Esquivel, a
sculptor and Professor of Architecture, established the Ecumen­
ical Movement of Peace and Justice, an organization of Catholics,
Protestants and others opposed to violence by both right-wing and
left-wing political forces in Argentina. „ In 1974, he became
Secretary General of the Peace and Justice Service, a Buenos Airesbased network of human rights activists throughout Latin America. (C)
He has been very complimentary of the President's human rights
policy, and of our former Ambassador to Argentina, Raul Castro, but
as the attached UPI report indicates, he said that he was "gravely
concerned" about the human rights movement because of Reagan's
election. The Argentine government is unhappy that he received the
Nobel Peace Prize, and the government has suggested indirectly that
he may have contributed to terrorism. Our Embassy is aware of no
information that would substantiate the charge. Indeed, he is a
strong advocate of Gandhian non-violence.
(C)
Perez Esquivel has also criticized military aid to the Junta in
El Salvador, and there is some question about whether he cares as
much about condemning left-wing terrorism as he does about govern­
ment repression and right-wing terrorism. The President alluded
indirectly to the point in his speech to the OAS on Wednesday,
where he said:' (c)
"The cause of human rights will be all the stronger if it
remains at the service of humanity rather than at the
service of ideological or partisan ends — and if it
condemns both terrorism and repression." (U)
I suggest you make the following points:
— The President and I both wanted to personally congratulate
you for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
— As you know, the President has placed great emphasis on
the importance of human rights for the U.S. and the world. Your
award is symbolic of the importance which the entire world attaches
to human rights today.
(U)
Review on 11/19/86

-mfmmr-'

Mo OKiontinn To nanloecifinotinn in -nil

* Ml f*-OA

’ No Objection To Declassification in =-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-3-6-6

.

-z-

— We believe very deeply that for the human rights movement
to remain strong it must be credible and to do it has to be per­
ceived as separate from ideological or partisan political groups.
We must support a free and just political process but not a
political crroup. We must seek balance in our compliments and in
our criticism; we should condemn the terrorism of the left as
strongly as the repression of the right. If we fail to maintain
that balance, we will fall victim to one side or the other. And
the cause of human rights will suffer. (U)
— I have heard that you may visit El Salvador. As the Presi­
dent said, we have supported the Junta in its effort to implement
fundamental reforms and to resist efforts by the right to restore
an old tyranny and of the left to create a new one. We have tried
to use our aid — both economic and non-lethal military aid — to
encourage the Junta to curb human rights abuses. Bob Pastor is
prepared to discuss the situation there at greater length if you
so desire. (U}

t

. -mFffimt-

Mr» Ohinotinn Tn nanlaccifinatinn in i— i ill 901 9/H9/04 ■ Ml f"‘_9/l_Qn_9_fi-R

No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-2-6-7^'
\<r

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy^ to Argentina (S)

At your request I have taken the main points in my memorandum
to you and included them in a memorandum from you to Secretary
of State Vance. Still, I recommend that you use the memo­
randum as talking points with the Secretary rather than send it.
I am gun-shy — not to say paranoid — about sending memos
from here to other agencies.
(S)
RECOMMENDATION:
Therefore, I recommend that you not send the memorandum at
Tab I, but rather phone Secretary Vance.
Approve

cc:

Disapprove

Jessica Mathews

SECRET
Review on March 20, 1979
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

Authority NLC-- 3*4 — 8*1 ~ 3
NARA

rtetb

U - ~1

________

‘•ftEjgRBT

No Objection To Declassification in ^art 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-2-6-7

HE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H ! IMG “ON

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach
to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in
human rights.
I have read the INR report on the human rights
situation in Argentina, and I agree that it' is a sobering
document. The human rights situation ir* Argentina may just
be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach
the United States Government should take to Argentina, I
believe we should address two questions:
(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina
to encourage them to respect human rights? .
(S)
(2} What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S.
our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward
Argentina, which are interpreted aB punitive, we not only
enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business
sector and the media in the U.S.
This doesn't mean that we
shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they
are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully
and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience — in the
U.S. and elsewhere — before taking any steps, least we
jeopardize our overall human rights policy.
(S)
Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an
impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never
as direct or as much as we want. This is -the case in our
human rights policy.
(S)
?
The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us
at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige
and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the
Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy
would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina
and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutional­
ization of the military government. The Argentine government
has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the
U.S.:
(1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they
have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
SffGRE?—
Review on March 20, 1985

No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -2-6-7

.SEGRBTt
policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human
rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue,
still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners,
they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who
remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority
individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they
have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

(S)

The last —the invitation— may well be the most important.
It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to
the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate
basis on which we and other countries should make decisions
on human rights to Argentina.
(S)
I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and
correct until such time as the human rights situation
dramatically improves and the government has begun to move
toward democratization.
I believe that we should continue
to use every opportunity both directly and through third
countries to encourage them to improve their human rights
situation.
They will continue to try to' lure high-level
visitors but we should resist that urttil progress is evident.

(5)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as
punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and
conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their
support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would
be effective vis-a-vis Argentina.
(S.)
Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would
recommend that you delay implementing this approach until
after the Commission has completed its report.
I realize
that this may mean six months to one year, but 1 think the
wait is justified.
(S)
In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on
Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong,
cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress
in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to
move to negative votes in the IFI1s or to cut back ExportImport Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report
and then adjust our policy appropriately'.
(S)
t

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
■SECRET-*

Objection To Declassification in 3art

2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-2-6-7

1

i

1

NATIONAL SE.CURITY

I

i*

10 ENT1AL'
flAIT
NOTE TO:

Marc
t
ZBIGNIEV BRZEZIN

FROM:

JESSICA TDCHMAN

SUBJECT:

Argentina and Human Rights Policy

*

i

i
i

I
I
t

Bob's recommendation is that we delay a change
in policy until after the-.TATIt,',
—i report,
and Indicates that the dei
few
months. In fact it will pi
h longer.
It took. 13 monthB after tbi
Salvador
to get out the final repor1
ke at least
as long to do the controve:
e report.
So we are talking about a ;
until
June 1980 at least.

cc:

Bob Pastor

1
<

i

■CnNFTUFWTTrtL
Review on March 9, 1985

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-73-6-2-6

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIN&KI

FROM:

ROBERT A. PASTO

SUBJECT:

President's Request far Information on
Letter from Videla

Rick Inderfurth asked me to provide this information very quickly
for you. I am working on the letters. but I expect that I will not
be able to send them forward until I return from Panama — which
will not be until late Thursday night because of very poor flight
connections.
A memorandum from you to die President is provided at Tab I.

t

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

>

,
Authority

declassified

E.O.13526
~~

NARA_£i:------Date

^——

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-73-6-2-6
UUIll IUL.I1I IttU

MEMORANDl'M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL - CDS

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIN3KI

SUBJECT:

Your Question About the Letter from Videla to You

The letter from President Videla of Argentina to you was dated October 11.
1977, but it was received by Bob Pastor at approximately 5: 00 p.m. an
October 18, 1977. Videla had asked the Embsisay to deliver the letter
directly to the National Security Council for delivery to you, but we
informed the State Department immediately of its contents.
The letter referred to the case of the Deutsch family, which you raised
in your discussion with President Videla. In the letter, Videla made
several points:

First, that Daniel Deutsch and his family had fled Argentina
illegally, and that they were active members of the Communist
Revolutionary Party. (According to our files, Daniel Deutsch
and his wife left Argentina legally and are currently in the U.S.)

That Daniel Deutsch1 s sister, Liliana, is also a member of the
organization, and is in jail in Argentina.
a

That their father, Alejandro Deutsch, Covered up for both of
his children.
That for these reasons Alejandro and Liliana Deutsch are being
held.
And that the other three members of their family have been released.
Videla closed the letter by reaffirming the friendship between die
Argentine and American people and Baying that he would like to continue
to have direct communication with you. We are incorporating a response
to this letter within the context of a longer letter from you to President
Videla which we are drafting referring to other important points in
your conversation with him.

CQMHBEHTIAL

GET

CONFIDENTIAL

i
t

\

No Objection To Declassification in --ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-73-6-2-6’ /0;‘
t

fapcran S^'AaenA\
^
TUX'
BUENOS AIRES,

n de octubre de 1977

Excelentlaimo Senor Presldente de los
Estados Unid08 de America
D. James E. CASTER
WASHINGTON D.C.
Estlmado Sezior Presidents:
De acuerdo con lo que e&aigablemente convinifiramos durante nueBtra reunite en Washington, en el sen
tldo de mantener canales de comunlcaclte dlrectos e
informales, me place envlarle estas lineas motivadas
en uno de los temas que abordlramos en nuestro encuentro. He reflero al caso de la famllla Deutsch.
Casio conclusion de las lnvestlgaclones efectuadas por los organlsmos competentes, se ha podldo es
tablecer que:
- El Sr. Daniel Deutsch y su esposa, que abandonaron
llegalmente nuestro pals, spa actlvoa mlembroa del Fax
tldo Camunlsta Revoluclonario.
~
Su funclOn, dentro de la cltada organizaclte llegal
era la de efectuar tareas de Informacldn e Intellgencla, vlnculadas a la actlvldad de los grupos terrorlstas que actdan en el pals.
- Su hermana Liliana pertenece a la mlsma organlzacidn
subversive, desempendndose ccftao activists en el flmbitfr
estudiantil.
- El Sr. Alejandro Deutsch, padre de los anterloreB,
encubrid las actlvldades ilegales de sue hljos.
- Por tales razones, tanto Alejandro como Liliana Deutsch
se encuentran detenidos a los efectos de ser sometidos,
prdxlmamente, a los Tribunales Hilltares competentes.

//.

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-73-6-2-6

\
2-

///
- En cuanto a la senora de Alejandro Deutsch y sue hljaa Elea y Sueana Silvia, ban sldo puestas an liber"
tad al conetatarse qua no tenlan conocimlento ni
vinculaeidn alguna con las actlvidadea llegales del
reeto de la familia,
Qulero t al presenter a V.E. mi mfia afectuoso sa
ludo, asegurarle el profundo y cordial InterSa con que
aconpafio au actuacldn y, una vez mis, reafirmar la frater
na ami a tad de los argentinoa por el pueblo de loa Eatadoa
Unidoa de America.

\

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04
Weekly Report - March ir, ivn

Reporting Items

NLC-24-69-1-4-4
* J

(Pastor)

Human Rights
Guatemala and £1 Salvador have followed the path blazed by Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in renouncing U.S . foreign military
assistance because of the way in which aid was tied to human rights.
Peru's Prime Minister also said that a country's (i.e., the U.S .) policy
on human rights should not interfere in the internal affairs of another
country.
Chile has also tried to spread rumors of an impending conference
among military regimes to coordinate a response to the U.S., but her
efforts have been resisted, particularly by Argentina, because (I think)
the governments are waiting for additional indications of the direction
of U.S. policy.

Panama
Our initial strategy to hold the question of the termination date of a
treaty in suspension while we explore Panama's position on neutrality
and post-treaty defense arrangements has apparently failed. The
President's reference on March 6 to the year 2000 as the date after
which we will be concerned with the Canal's neutrality was.taken by
the Panamanians as an indication that the only issue worth focusing
on is neutrality, and we have been thrown on the defensive.
Torrijos was ill this past week, but yesterday told an Italian newspaper
that he wanted the United Nations to control the waterway. Unless he
accepts a special role for the U.S. within this guarantee-system, we
are back to the beginning.
t

Negotiations promise to be difficult in the months ahead unless we can
convice Perez and Lopez MichelBen to get Torrijos to accept our require­
ments on neutrality.

Cuba
A Presidential Directive was sent out on Cuba on March 15 directing
the State Department to begin direct and confidential talkB with Cuban
officials . Such direct talks began on March 10 in New York to Bet a
time, place, and agenda for talks.

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.13S26
Authority
MARA

t

£Jr

.

nwta l\°\V\to--------

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 • NLC-24-69-1-4-4

-SECRET
Early Warning Signals

(Pastor)

Panama
The Negotiators are planning to make a trip to Venezuela and Colombia
next week to discuss the status of the negotiations with the two Presidents.
Those visits , coupled with erroneous press reports of the testimony of
Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz before the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, may conceivably evoke a negative reaction in
Panama. Public opinion there might interpret the visits as an attempt
to pressure Panama to accept a Treaty permitting us some form of
perpetual rights on neutrality — not an inaccurate interpretation.

Cuba
The Cuban community in Miami is likely to begin heating up with the
increase in press reports andrumors about U.S .-Cuban discussions.
Terrorism in any form should be met with an immediate and sharp
Presidential response. Otherwise, the terrorists will succeed in
frightening all those Cubans (and there are great numbers), who
believe there is a need for a new U.S. policy.

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-69-1-4-4

Critical Observation and Recommendation (Pastor)

Public Diplomacy
To an extent that few people would ever believe, the U.S. has been
conducting its diplomacy publicly. There is relatively little that
an astute reader of the best newspapers in the U.S. does not know —
that I do — about the current state of negotiations on Panama and Cuba,
for example. And the rest will probably be in the newspapers in a
matter of days or weeks .
I personally think that this new development is a good one and clearly
in line with President Carter's objective of greater openness (though
not in line with his objective of restricted confidentiality on some
issues) . But I do not believe that we have thought through the
implications of public diplomacy or its difficulties . For example,
on those relatively difficult negotiations like Panama and Cuba
where you are dealing with two constituencies who are headed in
diametrically opposite directions, a public statement in one's own
country may set back negotiations with the other. I am not sure there
is any easy way to cope with this problem. Certainly, I do not
believe that an attempt to keep better control of secrets will work,
but the entire question of how public diplomacy related to private
negotiations, and whether secrecy is irrelevant is something which
should be explored at greater depth.
Human Rights
The new Administration has succeeded in credibly projecting a concern
for human rights abroad which is at least as sturdy as that of Congress.
There is no question that the American people feel better about U.S.
foreign policy than in any recent period.
Therefore, the time has come to begin a second phase in our human
rights policy — this one focused on alleviating the repression abroad.
We must begin, of course, by realizing that the U.S . cannot determine
events in less developed countries, but we can influence the debate
between moderates and hard-liners in different governments. The
question is: how? And I have.been tasking the bureaucracy on this
question with no success .
Part of the reason for the lack of success is the difficulty of the question.
Another part may be that I am very skeptical? when the bureaucracy says
we cannot do anything. The first step, I believe in getting good answers
to the question is in choosing new Ambassadors who share our objectives.
But in the meantime, we should re-focus our approach to this issue from
projecting our own interest to weighting the debate in foreign governments.

No Objection To Declassification in i-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-69-1-4-4

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Key Foreign Reactions

(Pastor)

Venezuela
Venezuelan President Perez praised the President in his March 11
annual address to the Congress. Specific references in the three-hour
presentation included:
reference to the President's February 2'i letter as a "categorical"
refutation of the assertions in the New York Times of CIA payments,
and indicative of the President's "noble moral stature";
a description in glowing terms of the "tremendous progress"
being made in the Panama Canal negotiations and of the President's
emphasis on the global observance of human rights and effort
to bring a halt to nuclear proliferation.
The praise reflects the extent to which Administration initiatives have
struck a responsive chord with Perez. The Venezuelan leader not only
refrained from criticizing us, an action always popular in nationalistic
Venezuela, but showed himself willing to take international flak — Brazil
reportedly has already postponed a May Foreign Minister visit over his
nuclear proliferation remark — in order to identify ideologically with
specific policies of the Administration.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

No Objection To Declassification in ?-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-68-6-6-8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON,

D.C. 20506

'CONFIDENTIAL'
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE:

Monday, March 7, 1977

PLACE:

Organization of American States
Washington, D. C.

PARTICIPANTS:

Secretary General Alejandro Orfila
L. Ronald Scheman, Sub-Secretary for
Management
John Ford, Special Assistant to the
Secretary General
Robert A. Pastor, ^NSC Staff

U .S, Policy on Human Rights
Secretary General Orfila told me that he had recently returned from a
trip to tli- Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay,
and he explained to them that they were dealing with a new kind of
Administration in Washington. He told them that the Carter Administration
would unquestionably demonstrate a concern for human rights that was
not evident in the previous Republican Administrations. And Orfila
warned them that they had better be prepared for this change. All
three governments were rather slaw to adjust, but they have come to
understand its importance.
Uruguay, however, does not quite understand why the U.S . currently
attacks it for human rights violations while several years ago it encouraged
the Uruguayans to suppress all forms of subversion. They are parti­
cularly confused because the human rights situation in their country has
definitely improved in the last year.
*■
In Argentina, there is a fascinating debate between the moderates and
the hard-liners, and the question which Orfila feels we should address
is: how can we strengthen the hands of the moderates? not, how do
we drive the Argentine Government to the wall? He believes that we
should be careful not to put.the government on the defensive least we
strengthen the hard-liners . The result would be even worse violations
of human rights .

mNFTDFiNTT AT

i

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-68-6-6-8
f
CONFIDENTIAL

2

-

-

Orfila said that he was concerned that the United States policy on human
rights may get so heavy-handed that it would strengthen the hard-liners
and lead to an alliance among the military governments. He said he feared
that Latin America would be divided in half with the Southern Cone countries
on one side, and Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica on the other.
He himself had encouraged Argentine officials to make special efforts to
establish good relations with Venezuela and Mexico, and apparently the
Government of Argentina accepted his recommendation and will be sending
Hector Campora as its Ambassador to Mexico.
I asked whether the division between a repressive Latin America and a
democratic Latin America would necessarily be a bad thing. It seems to
me that it might introduce a constructive tension whereby the military
governments would be encouraged to join the ranks of several of the more
democratic governments. It would also provide an opportunity to deal
with real issues rather than to maintain an artificial facade of Latin
American unity. We both agreed that "Latin America" was a myth, and
that the discussion of substantive issues in which the U.S . and Latin
America were always on opposite sides of every issue was not constructive.
Orfila said that the U .S. would increase its credibility if we were more
evenhanded. For example, when the Congress held hearings on human
rights violations in Argentina, he encouraged Congressman Fraser to
hear from people from both sides, but instead the hearings were very
one-aided.
Belize
On his most recent trip to Central America, Orfila met with officials in
the Guatemalan Government as well as in the Mexican Government about
the issue of the future status of Belize. Mexico urged him to get involved
in the issue. Guatemala said that it would be willing to accept only twothirds of the southern province of Belize, which amounted to about onefifth of all of Belize. This represents a considerable compromise on
Guatemala's part, since the country has been demanding total annexation
of Belize. Orfila will be going to Great Britsyln on April 4, to negotiate
with Ted Rowlands, Secretary of State for External Affairs, an this issue.
He will try to convince Rowlands to convince Prime Minister Price of Belize
to accept the Guatemalan offer. He thinks that if the United States mentioned
to Great Britain its interest in Orfila's effort that Great Britain would be
moved to persuade Prime Minister Price, (Comment? This is a particularly
important issue only because if it is not solved in the next year, it could
conceivably lead to war between Guatemala and Belize. It would most
definitely lead to a very significant split between the Caribbean countries
which support Belize, and the Latin American countries which support
Guatemala.)
CONFfDENTTXi:

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-68-6-6-8

• ■

|

CONFIDENTIAL—
- ------

- ■ -

-3-

'

I

El Salvador
The Secretary General was very pleased with Ids success in getting the
President of El Salvador to sign the mediation agreement with Honduras.
The border has been closed since 1969, and the economies of both countries
have suffered greatly as a result. He is hopeful that the appointment of
a Moderator will lead to a more lasting peace between the two countries.
lasting
OAS
Orfila was very frank in his assessment of the almost hopelessness of the
present OAS . He said he had tried to bring the staff level down to a mangeable one, but that he couldn't fire anyone. When he tried, everybody
ganged up on him, and the U.S . remained silent. The Permanent Council
of Ambassadors to the OAS was also, in his opinion, a hopeless body. In
fact, he called it "a joke."
"I need your help to change this place," Orfila sai4> Orfila would like
to see the OAS concentrate on peacekeeping, lyiman rights, and political
issues. He thinkB it would be desirable for the OAS to get out of the
economic and social field. He blamed the United States for the massive
structure that had been built up since the early years of the Alliance.
In 1961, there were only 300 staff people in the OAS; there are presently
1,500. He would like to cut the staff down to only the Secretariat, and
deal only with those issues which it could do well. He would like to do
away with the Permanent Council, and only have Latin American Ambassadors
to the U.S . attend occasional meetings. (Scheman later called me and
said that the Assistant Secretary of State would be the appropriate U.S.
delegate to these occasional sessions, rather than a Special Ambassador
to the OAS .)
Orfila expressed his frustration at trying to do these kinds of reforms
without any support. If only the United States gave him support, he said,
he could assure us a majority of the delegates and fundamental reforms
in staffing, in the organization of the OAS, and in the issues that it
addresses could then be taken. A good example he used was the designation
of Grenada as the site of the June General Assembly meeting. The Grenadan
Ambassador to the OAS forced the issue at the last “OAS meeting in Santiago,
and no one raised any objections. The Peruvians seconded the motion,
and that was it. Grenada was the site.

CONFIDENT!Air

i

i

l
I

*-

I

V

•1

No Objection To Declassification in hull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-68-6-6-8

fDNEIDBNTIAI

-4r

(Comment: Orfila's remarks were very encouraging, particularly on the
structural reforms necessary to make the OAS into a body worth paying
attention to. The real source of the OAS's problems right now is the state
of international politics in the hemisphere. Ajt Latin America's insistence,
the U.S . has retreated from its predominant position in the OAS , but the
Latin Americans themselves have been reluctant to take any initiative in
this regional forum . Any international leadership on the part of the Latin
Americans has been in global fora like C1EC, as well as at UNCTAD in the
United Nations. The result is that the OAS is rudderless, and the quality
of representation there is one indication of the low importance which
countries attach to it.
The image of the OAS as a bureaucratic morass is no help. So Orfila's
attempt to prune the OAS, cut its staff and its tasks, would be a very
healthy Bign, and we should definitely encourage such a move and support
his efforts.
Orfila's efforts in the El-Salvador-Honduras and in the Belize disputes
represents one path that the OAS could constructively travel. Indeed,
no one else can really play that kind of role in the hemisphere at this
time except the OAS Secretary General, and we are fortunate that Orfila
is both energetic and intelligent. We should encourage his efforts in
the peacekeeping field, and encourage the OAS's'efforts in human rights.
We should also encourage the OAS to leave ttfe economic and social
fields to other institutions which can do those tasks much better.)

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 23, 1977
*

TO:

THE SITUATION ROOM

FROM:

NORTH-SOUTH

Attached is this Section's submission
jfor the President's Weekly Report.

POSREVIEWED Q7-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASETnTOlQ

*

I

»
~r

i

t

.

*

fcfe-srjisir-iu
£JASiA_j££_...?^%.„3iahk______

No Objection To Declassification in Foil 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

1f

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

t
—CONFIDED1 AT,

Alert Items

(Pastor)

Belize. President Laugerud Garcia of Guatemala reportedly has
hardened his position with respect to how much Belizean territory
is necessary for any settlement with the United Kingdom. Meanwhile,
border tensions have intensified. The Guatemalan Government is
conducting military exercises involving personnel and aircriit in
the Peten District! and
British troops have gone on alert.
Although this development probably should be interpreted as a
case of sabre rattling, the possibility exists that the so-called
"exercises" may be a smoke screen to cover preparations for some
sort of actual military operation against Belize. UK and Guatemalan
representatives will be meeting in Washington on July 6 and 7.
Venezuela. The Perez State Visit is scheduled for June 28-Z9. The
Venezuelan President is prepared to discuss human rights, non­
proliferation, energy, the Caribbean, Belize / Cuba, the OAS, NorthSouth relations, conserv&tion^nultinational corporations and illicit
payments . Additionally, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister has
informed our Embassy in Caracas that Perez or someone in his
party will wish also to bring up agriculture and food, cooperation
in cancer research, experimental drugs, and Puerto Rican control
of its "patrimonial sea."

wl *

CONFIDENTIAL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

•CQNEIDKNfTraL

Recent Developments (Pastor/Trachtenberg)
OASGA. The issue of human rights dominated the seventh OAS General
Assembly from the opening speech to the las/ rebuttal. Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay, Chile, Guatemala and £1 Salvador opposed the human rights
position, with Uruguay far out in front as a harsh critic of U.S. politici­
zation of the IAHRC. Thanks largely to Mrs. Carter's trip, Ecuador
and Peru lined up alongside traditional human rights supporters like
Costa Rica and Venezuela. These countries, joined by the U.S ., formed
the core of a group which defended a strong resolution commending the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for its work and recom­
mending that the OAS allocate greater resources to the Commission.
Ultimately, four human rights resolutions were approved. The key
victory involved the resolution to ratify the Inter-American Human
Rights Convention3which eventually passed with key additional support
from Peru, Ecuador, and Haiti. The efforts of Argentina and Chile
to persuade the General Assembly to call for "reform" of the commission
to meet the challenge of terrorism were defeated. Venezuela, which
emphasized that human rights have been violated for centuries by
nations who use terrorism as their justification, played the leading
role through the entire conference.
Panama Canal Treaty. The negotiations for*a new treaty' broke
down briefly this week. General Omar Torrijos called his negotiators
home because he felt the U.S. delegation displayed too little flexibility.
Talks resumed June 23. Torrijos reportedly instructed his negotiators
last weekend to remain firm on the question of compensation by the
U.S . for use of military bases in the Canal Zone and on the issue of
Panama's freedom to select its own representatives to the Canal
entity's governing council.
Hopes persist that we will have a Treaty by this summer.

CONFIDENTIAL

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3....

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

2

■CONPIDEN-T-fcAfc-"

Sit-in at EGLA Headquarters in Chile.
The group of 24 women and
two men who began a sit-in at headquarters of UN ECLA in Santiago on
June 14, and whose demands included (1) the disclosure of information
as to list of "disappeared" Chileans, and (2) the entry into Chile of
a special UN representative, peacefully evacuated the building at noon
today.
t

Upon learning of the incident, UN Secretary General Waldheim had
cabled President Pinchet asking that reassuraVices be given as to
the fate of the detainees and Btating that - an unconditional agreement
to receive a visit from the Ad Hoc Working Group on Human Rights in
Chile would be a constructive move. Although die U.S . had indicated
its hope that Pinochet would be as responsive as possible to Waldheim's
request, the Chilean President initially had described the UN effort as
an "interference."
Eventually, however, the Chilean Government agreed to "forgive" the
demonstrators and provided the Secretary General with what information
it could find about the cases of the relatives of the persons occupying
the ECLA building. In addition, the Chileans have invited the Secretary
General himself to visit Chile.

<

CONFIDENTIAL

N_? Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3
t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

SIT-IN AT ECI.A HF.ADQUAnTEKS IN CHILE

On June 14,

a group off 24 women and two men repre-

scntlng families of individuals^dcLaincd by Chilean
authorities began a oit-in at the headquarters of the
UN's Economic Commission for Latin America
in Santiago, Chile.

-

(ECLA)

The whereabouts of the detainees

— >r%Cv
. —fj,
.tfTHig J

a

is unkpown^ond~£h«r’dcmonaLraLorB arc demandings
(1)

information on the

welfare and whereabouts

of a list of individuals who have disappeared,
(2)

entry into Chile of a special representative

of the UN Secretary Ccncral, and

(3)

assurances of

their own enfety.
Upon learning of the demonstrat Ion,

Secretary

Ccncral Waldheim sent a cable to Chilean President
Pinochet asking that reassurances be given as to the
fate of the detainees.

He also stated that an

GSfrOsntAJr •

unconditional q^ument to roccivo a visit from the
Ad-Hoc Working Group on Human Eights in Chile would be
a constructive move.
In response to a request for support from Waldheim,
our Embassy in- Santiago toJ.d the Chief of Staff of the
Presidency that we hoped that Pinochet's response to
the Secretary General would be as forthcoming as
possible and that it would be considered in the context
of our recently initiated dialogue with the Chilean'
Government
«

Pinochet's- initial reaction, as viewed by our

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

-

2

-

Charge'

in Santiago, was to describe tho Waldheim
f
initiative as "interfcrence".
Latent reports indicate,

however,

that the Chileans have agreed to "forgive"

the dcmonatrolora and provide Waldheim with what infor­
mation it can find about specific eases of relatives of
the demonstrators.

In addition, the Chileans have

issued an invitation to the Secretary General, himselft
to visit Chile.

Waldheim is considering sending.an

emissary to Chile, and the Chileans seem receptive —
on the condition that the frame of reference for the
visit be broadened so that not only the fate of thomissing Chilcann would ba discussed, but other human
rights conditions as well.

1

rt«.s

t* &y°- ^

/7o0/v

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9
Weexiy Keport - March U, 1977.

'

Reporting Items
Human Rights

(Pastor)

Olu i \

DOS REVIEWED 07-Jun-2010: D£CLASSTfTeD

f6r"RELEASE

l\ FULL.

Guatemala and El Salvador have followed the path blazed by Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in renouncing U.S . foreign military
assistance because of the way in which aid was tied to human rights.
Peru's Prime Minister also said that a country's (i.e. , the U.S .) policy
on human rights should not interfere in the internal affairs of another
country.
*
Chile has also tried to spread rumors of an impending conference
among military regimes to coordinate a response to the U.S ., but her
efforts have been resisted, particularly by Argentina, because (I think)
the governments are waiting for additional indications of the direction
of U.S. policy.

Panama
Our initial strategy to hold the question of the termination date of a
treaty in suspension while we explore Panama's position on neutrality
and post-treaty defense arrangements has apparently failed. The
President's reference on March 6 to the year 2000 as the date after
which we will be concerned with the Canal's neutrality was taken by
the Panamanians as an indication that the only issue worth focusing
on is neutrality, and we have been thrown on the defensive.
a

Torrijos was ill this past week, but yesterday told an Italian newspaper
that he wanted the United Nations to control the waterway . Unless he
accepts a special role for the U.S . within this guarantee-system, we
are back to the beginning.
Negotiations promise to be difficult in the months ahead unless we can
convice Peres and Lopez Michelsen to get Torrijos to accept our require­
ments on neutrality.

Cuba
A Presidential Directive was sent out on Cuba on March 15 directing
the State Department to begin direct and confidential talks with Cuban
officials. Such direct talks began on March 10 in New York to set a
time, place, and agenda for talks ,

M L.C- *a‘4-(#"7-e)-3-4V

ftPP.RFT'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

Early Warning Signals

(Pastor)

Panama
The Negotiators are planning to make a trip to Venezuela and Colombia
next week to discuss the status of the negotiations with the two Presidents,
Those visits, coupled with erroneous press reports of the testimony of
Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz before the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, may conceivably evoke a negative reaction in
Panama. Public opinion there might interpret the visits as an attempt
to pressure Panama to accept a Treaty permitting us some form of
perpetual rights on neutrality — not an inaccurate interpretation.

Cuba

I

The Cuban community in Miami is likely to begin heating up with the
increase in press reports andrumors about U.S .-Cuban discussions.
Terrorism in any form should be met with an immediate and sharp
Presidential response. Otherwise, the terrorists will succeed in
frightening all those Cubans (and there are great numbers), who
believe there is a need for a new U.S . policy.

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

Critical Observation and Recommendation

(Pastor)

»
Public Diplomacy
To an extent that few people would ever believe, the U.S . has been
conducting its diplomacy publicly. There is relatively little that
an astute reader of the best newspapers in the U.S . does not know —
that I do — about the current state of negotiations on Panama and Cuba,
for example. And the rest will probably be in the newspapers in a
matter of days or weeks .
I personally think that this new development is a good one and clearly
in line with President Carter's objective of greater openness (though
not in line with his objective of restricted confidentiality on some
issues) . But I do not believe that we have thought through the
implications of public diplomacy or its difficulties . For example,
on those relatively difficult negotiations like Panama and Cuba
where you are dealing with two constituencies who are headed in
diametrically opposite directions, a public statement in one's own
country may set back negotiations with the other. 1 am not sure there
is any easy way to cope with this problem. Certainly, I do not
believe that an attempt to keep better controltf secrets will work,
but the entire question of how public diplomacy relates to private
negotiations, and whether secrecy is irrelevant is something which
should be explored at greater depth.
Human Rights
The new Administration has succeeded in credibly projecting a concern
for human rights abroad which is at least as sturdy as that of Congress.
There is no question that the American people feel better about U.S.
foreign policy than in any recent period.

^

Therefore, the time has come to begin a second phase in our human
rights policy — this one focused on alleviating the repression abroad.
We must begin, of course, by realising that the U.S . cannot determine
events in less developed countries, but we can influence the debate
between moderates and hard-liners in different governments. The
question is: how? And I have been tasking the bureaucracy on this
question with no success .
f

Part of the reason for the lack of success is the difficulty of the question.
Another part may be that I am very skeptical when the bureaucracy says
we cannot do anything. The first step, I believe in getting good answers
to the question is in choosing new Ambassadors who share our objectives.
But in the meantime, we should re-focus our approach to this issue from
projecting our own interest to weighting the debate in foreign governments.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Key Foreign Reactions

(Pastor)

Venezuela
t
Venezuelan President Perez praised the Presi dent in his March 11
annual address to the Congress. Specific references in the three-hour
presentation included:
reference to the President's February 22 letter as a "categorical"
refutation of the assertions in the New York Times of CIA payments,
and indicative of the President's "noble moral stature";
a description in glowing terms of the "tremendous progress"
being made in the Panama Canal negotiations and of the President's
emphasis on the global observance of human rights and effort
to bring a halt to nuclear proliferation.
The praise reflects the extent to which Administration initiatives have
Btruck a responsive chord with Perez . The Venezuelan leader not only
refrained from criticizing us, an action always popular in nationalistic
Venezuela, but showed himself willing to take international flak — Brazil
reportedly has already postponed a May Foreign Minister visit over his
nuclear proliferation remark — in order to identify ideologically with
specific policies of the Administration.
*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-3-9

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-3-4

X

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 19, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

JESSICA TUCHMAN ’
ROBERT PASTOR^,-

SUBJECT:

Nuclear Talks in Brazil and Argentina

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from State laying out a proposed strategy
for nuclear proliferation talks with Brazil and Argentina during Secretary
Vance's forthcoming trip. It arrived after Nye ai^d Smith had already
arrived in Argentina for preparatory talks, f
The memo says little about Argentina—only that we will seek a decision to
ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but may have to settle only for a declaration
of intent to ratify (judging from recent intelligence reports, we may not even
get that much).
With regard to Brazil, State believes that time is on our side (growing
Brazilian dissatisfaction with the German deal; the next Brazilian President
seems to be more flexible on this issue; and increasing French pressure on
Pakistan) and that "Geisel is likely to reject cut of hand any package of
proposals we present at this time". State concludes therefore that we should
not present our proposal on the FRG/Brazil agreement and instead confine
these discussions to a general discussion of the "hemispheric security
problem".
We believe that this is a mistake. Since the Brazilians know that we have
already presented the proposal to the Germans, and since the President's
letter to Geisel made reference to Smith's presenting the details on this trip,
the Brazilians might be understandably offended if, after inviting Smith at
Carter's request, they find he has little to tal& about.
We also believe that the proposal should be sweetened by the addition of a
proposal for joint US-Brazil cooperation in non-nuclear energy R&D projects.
This is the proposal you approved in Pastor's recent memo.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Authority ^
NAHA £•?=•

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

~~ 3>vA-L»~l-M-2> -*4
Data

No Oojection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-2-4-5

BRIEFING PAPER

(Entire text)
BILATERAL PAPER»
DOS REVIEWED 08 Jun 2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL:

............... .

“ARGENTINA '

Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor
I.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Vaky

II.

Carlos Washington Pastor
(Phonetic: pahsTOR)

INTRODUCTION

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the ^
Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level
bilateral exchange with ub during the course of the
Ecuadorean inauguration. We want to encourage Argentina
to continue its efforts to end human rights abuses.
The Foreign Minister will note that progress has been
made. Pastor may suggest that we should take some
public action to bolster President Videla's and General
viola's prestige and authority.
III.

ISSUES

t

A. Human Rights. There has been some progress
on human rights in Argentina. Disappearances have
declined from the 55 per month average in 1978. There
have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1
the last occurring May 13. The GOA continues to release
prisoners held under Executive Power. The ICRC reports
that prison conditions have improved.
There is, however,
still little information on the fate of disappeared
persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show
cause for holding alleged subversives have not been
successful.

-- We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances,
and urge the government to continue to investigate
recent cases and definitively end the practice.
— We hope families of the disappeared will
receive information that they request.
— We are pleased with the release of prisoners
held under Executive Power, and hope that all

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-2-4-5

DECLASSIFIED

Points to be Made

'■

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-2-4-5
-

2

-

prisoners will be given fair trials or be freed.
— We remain deeply concerned over the
continued detention of Jacobo Timerman,
and hope that he will be released without delay.
— We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners
released under the Right of Option Program.
B. Nicaragua and Central America. The GOA was
most helpful in supporting the United States and the
Andean countries in the OAS vote and has already moved
to recognize the new Government. However, the GOA
supplied arms to the Somoza regime.
It cannot be
expected to have much influence with Nicaragua.
Point to be Hade
— We appreciate the GOA's support on the Nicaragua
Resolution in the OAS and hope that the GOA will
support the Andean countries in their efforts
to assist Nicaragua.
«

C. Beagle Channel. The Papal mediation of the
Beagle Channel dispute is still in progress.
Point to

be Hade

— We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed
to mediation of the Beagle dispute and hope that
both will continue to work with ‘the Vatican.
t

D. Nuclear Technology. We are discussing with
potential suppliers (Canada, the FRG and Switzerland)
safeguards and other conditions they will require
for the sale of a heavy water plant.
(We would have
preferred that Argentine deferral of reprocessing
be a condition, but Canada is 'unwilling to require
deferral and the FRG will follow Canada's lead.) We
are also dicussing with the GOA the additional U.S.
safeguards requirements, effective in Harch 1980,
needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We
do not wish to take the initiative on this.

Point to be Hade (If raised)
— We want to cooperate with Argentina in the
transfer of nuclear power equipment and technology.
Our cooperation must be consistent with the nuclear
export law and policy.
August 1979
■CONFIDENTiftE-t
No ODjection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-2-4-5

'

No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1/

UGS~REViEWED'08-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

*»**»*■*■(»■

884

qntidbndia

L***»***E COPY

OP IMM.ED /ROUTINE
UE RUEHC #2082 2262315
0 R 142220Z AUG 79
EM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC FOST.S
XMT AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
T
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
■CONFIDENTIAL STATE 212082
EXDIS
E.O. 12065:

GDS 8/10/85 (VARY, 7IRON ?.)

GOV , PINT, PORS, PARM, XK, XM, AR
THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

1.

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY: SECRETARY VANCE HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS WITH FONMIN PASTOR IN QUITO. PASTOR EXPRESSED
CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AND THE "DANGEROUS
CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION. HE SAID TBAT ARGENTINA
HOPES TO PROCEED TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN NEAR tFUTURE BUT
NOT UNTIL IT GETS ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE APPEALED FOR
BETTER TIES WITH USG AND ASKED THAT ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
NOT 3F SOLE CRITEHIA IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY
VANCE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ARGENTINA'S VOTE IN
OAS ON NICARAGUA, AND NOTED THAT U.S. VALUES HIGHLY
ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND CONSIDERS IT A
FRIEND — AN ALLY. HE CHARACTERIZED HUMAN RIGHTS
PROBLEM A "FESTERING SORE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ON
NICARAGUA, SECRETARY VANCE STRESSED NEED TO PUSH NEW
GOVERNMENT INTO DIRECTION OF BEING IND .PENDENT, UNALIGNED
COUNTRY. WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, HE POINTED
*************** *^4 SR CO MENT ***************
DEN
FOB :PASTOR,BLOOM,COCH
PSN:007520

PAGE 01

TCR:227/02:37Z

DTG:142220Z AUG 79

****»»*{■ 0 N F I D E N T I A»L*******E COPY
t
Nn Ohinrtinn Tr» rjpr.lpqqifirptinn in pnll

9013/02/04 • Nl n-94-87-1-19-7

3

ii

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1-12-7
t

>

Q N j I- p E N -T- I~-rT?»****»*E COPY
"0 NEED TOE COLLECTIVE HEMISHPERIC EFFORT TO PERSUADE
THESE COUNTRIES TO MOVE IN A RESPONSIBLE VAT. TURNING
TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED PASTOR HARD
ON THE URGENCY OF ARGENTINA RATIFYING TREATY OF
TLATELOLCO AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT
CARTER WOULD BE THE CASE, PASTOR RESPONDED THAT
TLATELOLCO WOULD BE RATIFIED AFTER GOA COMPLETES
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF HEAVY WATFR PLANT AND
"FEW OTHER STEPS." END SUMMARY.
3. DURING RECEPTION AT NATIONAL PALACE IN QUITO AUGUST
10, SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
VAKY AND MR. PASTOR OF NSC (WITH DCM FIMBRES AS NOTETAKER)
HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTER PASTOR. FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF "CONVERSATION
OF THAT MEETING FOLLOWS:
t
CENTRAL AMERICA
THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE GOA &Ai TFE CENTRAL
AMERICAN SITUATION AND WHAT STEPS THE FOREIGN MINISTER
BELIEVED SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS AREA.
IN RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE AN HISTORIC
SKETCH OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM, BEGINNING WITH ITS
BIRTH IN 1917 AND ITS EXTENSION TO CHINA AND EASTERN
EUROPE. HE ASSERTED COMMUNISM HAD REACHED NICARAGUA
AND NOW THREATENED SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE
CHARACTERIZED THE CENTHAL AMERICAN SITUATION AS VERY
DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT
IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM CUBA TC LAY LOW AND
TO SEEK AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE FROM AN ARRAY OF SOURCES.
AS NICARAGUA RECOVERS ON THE BASIS OF THIS ASSISTANCE
IT WILL BECOME A SEVERE MENACE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. AGAIN,
BROADENING HIS PERSPECTIVE, HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS
AWARE THAT IN COLOMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM IS BOILING
UNDER A CALM SURFACE. THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF GREAT
INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA, AS WELL AS IN PERI*.
IN SYNTHESIS, A RED STAIN IS SPREADING OVER A LARGE
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
ARE "INTENSE PINK". HE CONTINUED THAT ARGENTINA KNOWS
THE PROBLEM BETTER THAN OTHERS BECAUSE OF ITS INTERNAL
STRUGGLE. THE GOA KNOWS THE TECHNIQUES THAT COMMUNISTS
USE IN SUBVERTING GOVERNMENTS. TO COUNTER COMMUNISM
ARGENTINA IS TAKING STEPS IN AREAS SUCH AS THE
UNIVERSITIES AND IS REVAMPING ITS ECONOMY. THE GOA
HOPES IN THE NEAR FUTURE TC PROCEED ALONG THE DEMOCRATIC
PSN:007520

PAGE 02

TOR:227/02:37Z

DTG:142220Z AUG 79

*******C .0 N F I D E N T I A L*******E COPY
Nn Ohifv'tinn Tn npr.la«i«;ifir.ptinn in Pull 2013/07/04 ■ Nl rt-?4-fi7-1-1?-7

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1-12-7

******ftp.. Q

I p E ;; If I

*******E COPT

PATH HUT NOT UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE iPROBLEMS THAT
BEFELL PERON WILL NOT REVISIT THE COUNTRY.
HE MAINTAINED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THAT
THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE U.S. AS THE
LEADER OF THE WEST. ARGENTINA, ESPECIALLY, HAS A SIMILAR
CONSTITUTION TO THAT OF THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BE TREATED
AS AN ALLY. THE GOA DOES NOT WANT THE ONLY THING TO
MATTER IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO 3E THE ISSUE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS. IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS
DONE EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER: FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS INVITED
A VISIT BY THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.
IF THIS COMMISSION APPLIES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, IT WILL
SEE MARKED PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE TREND
IS ONE OF IMPROVEMENT. THIS MATTER OF HUMAN HIGHTS
SHOULD BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPOSED
AS A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
ARGENTINA RECENTLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN THE OAS
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OF
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY DO NOT COMPLETELY
COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE U.S., THESE COUNTRIES ARE
THE U.S.' TRUE ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE, fAFTER THE
U.S., THE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ARE MEXICO,
BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. IF THIS GROUP CAN
ESTABLISH BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S., INDEED
THEY HAVE A HEALTHY DESIRE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE
U.S., THEY CAN SERVE TO GUIDE THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES.
THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATED
ARGENTINA'S RECENT VOTE IN THE OAS. ARGENTINA IS
CONSIDERED A FRIEND — AN ALLY. THE U.S. VALUED HIGHLY
ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND EXPECTED THIS TO
CONTINUE INTO THE FUTURE. HE FRANKLY CHARACTERIZED
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES AS A FESTERING SORE. THIS
AND OTHER ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS FRIENDS AND
ALLIES. THE U.S. SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW
REGARDING ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BUT, TBE SECRETARY CONCLUDED,
THE U.S. CANNOT IGNORE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FESTERING
SORF IN OUR RELATIONS.
TURNING TO NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DOUBT
THERE ARE SOME MARXIST/LENINISTS IN TH NEW GOVERNMENT
AND THAT CUBA SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL
RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MODERATE ELEMENTS
IN THE GNR? CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNTRY CAN GO EITHER
WAY. NICARAGUA HAS TO BE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION THAT
PSN:00?520

PAGE 03

TOR:227/02:37Z

*******0 0 N F -f~ D"E K

DTG:142220Z AUG 79
COPY

Ivin Dhipptinn Tn Dprla^ifiratinn in -nil 9013/07/04 ■ Nl r.-?4-fi7-1-1?-7

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1-12-7

t
x-B- -x-« I I A i,»»**»**E COPY

WE WANT, TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AND INALIGNED COUNTS!.
THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION ALSO AFFECTS ITS NEIGHBORS
WHO ABE ALSO UNDER POLITICAL TENSION. TflF U.S. FEELS
THAT COLLECTIVELY THE HEMISPHERE HAS TC HELP THESE
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FACE THEIR PROBLkMS. IF THESE
TENSIONS ARE NOT EASED AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE
SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS, THERE WILL LIKELY EE AN EXPLOSION
OFFERING CUBA NEW OPPORTUNITIES. THE LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES SHOULD SEE VHAT THEY CAN DO ABOUT THIS AND
TRY TO MOVE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY SINCJ WE ALL HAVE
A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GOOD OF THE HEMISPHERE.
THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HIS ANDEAN GROUP
COLLEAGUES HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT NICARAGUA WILL NEED
A LONG PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL ABSORB ALL
THE ENERGIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE MO TIME TO THINK GF EXTENDING ITS
MARXIST VIEWS. BUT, THE MINISTER WONDERED WHAT THE
RESULT WOULD BE IF IT IS THE SANDINISTAS WHO
DISTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN AID AND CHANNEL RECUPERATION
ASSISTANCE. WHO WILL GET ALL THE CREDIT FOR THIS EFFORT,
RE ASKED, BUT THE SANDINISTAS. THE RESULT CAN ONLY
BE THAT THE LEFTISTS WILL END UP ENLISTING THE MAJORITY
OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR BEHALF SO THAT IN TWO OR THREE
YEARS, SHOULD THE GNR ACCEDE TO
FLECTIONS, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE THI LOGICAL WINNERS
AND COMMUNISM WOULD TAKE OVER.
THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE
HAD AN ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER
REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE AN ANSWER. HE WENT ON
TO COMMENT THAT NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS LACKED FAITH IN
THE U.S. HE ASSERTED THESE NEIGHBORS WANT AND NEED
THE U.S. TO BE FORTHCOMING IN ASSISTANCE TO THEM TO
ASSURE THAT NICARAGUA OVER TIME WILL NCT BE ABLE TO
TOPPLF THEM. THE MINISTER SAID EE PERCEIVED THIS IN
"IS TALKS WITH HIS CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. HE
FELT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER COMMUNICATION ON IDEAS
OF HOW TO STOP NICARAGUAN ENCROACHMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE FELT HONDURAS HAD A
GOOD CHANCE TO SURVIVE ANY THREATS. BUT WITH RESPECT
TO SALVADOR, THE TIME IS SBORT TO RESPOND TO THAT
COUNTRY'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE
FELT THAT UNLESS SALVADOR RESPONDED QUICKLY ITS GOVERNMENT
WAS IN PERIL.
THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED
*>SN:007520

PAGE 04

TOR:227/02s37Z

DTG:142220Z AUG 79

***»**»C 6-N F I D-E N T I A L******»E COPY
Nn DhiprHnn Tn Dprla^ifiratinn in =nll 7013/09/04 • Nl r.-?4-R7-1-1?-7

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1-12-7

H-g i

h

H I ft L»******E COPT

AT NEWS THAT THE U.S. IS SERIOUSLY STUDYING PROVIDING
MILITARY AID TO THE GNR. HE THOUGHT THE EFFECT WOULD
PE INDIRECTLY TO ARM CUBA.
THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION
HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS
AND TEAT IS WHERE THE MATTER NOW STANDS. THE U.S.
WILL CONTINUE TO TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH FROM
A MORAL NECESSITY AND FROM THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE IT
COULD GIVE THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE THROUGH EXTENDING
A HELPING HAND. THE U.S. ALSO HOPES TC CHANNEL ANY
RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE THROUGH THOSE MINISTRIES RUN
BY MODERATES. FRANKLY, EE OBSERVED, SHORT-TERM AID
AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXTENDED BOTH TO
MEET IMMEDIATE HUMAN NEEDS AND TO SERVI OUR LONGER-RANGE
OBJECTIVES.
THF TERRITORIAL SEA
THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT A WIRE SERVICE
ACCOUNT REGARDING A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WATERS
BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL THREE MILES. REPORTEDLY, THE
TT.S. WOULD DELIBERATELY EXERCISE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND
THE THREE MILES AND WITHIN THE 2i)0 MILES TO AFFIRM ITS
VIFVS ON THIS ISSUE.
t

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE NEWS ACCOUNT
AND WAS NOT AWARE WHAT IT MIGHT REFER TO. HE COMMENTED
THAT IT MIGHT BE A GARBLED STORY COMING OUT OF THE LOS
NEGOTIATIONS.
-TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM
THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PREDECESSOR THAI ARGENTINA WOULD
MOVE ON TLATELOLCO, AND HE ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF
IT .
THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID EE WANTED TO BE FRANK.
ARGENTINA HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENERGY, AMONG THEM
NUCLEAR PLANTS SOLELY INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE }COUNTRY, AND TO COMPLEMENT THE
COUNTRY'S HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY. ARGENTINA HAD NOW
REACHED THF STAGE OF BEING ABLE FULLY 10 IMPLEMENT ITS
ENERGY PLAN. AN OBSTACLE TO THIS IS THE STRONG PRESSURE
BEING APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS. HE BELIEVED
T*E GOA'S POINT OF VIEW IS A JUST ONE. IF ARGENTINA CAN
COMPLETE ITS ENFRGY OBJECTIVES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO
FULL AND COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS. ARGENTINA IS FULLY DETERPSN:00752?

PAGE 05

TOR :227/02:37Z

DTG:142220Z AUG 79

*******0"0"N-F I D I N T I A L?*.*****E COPY
Nn Dhiprtinn Tn npr.ln«5«;ifir;atinn in ^iill 9013/09/04 ■ Nl rU94-R7-1-19-7

*

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1-12-7

*******£..0

d

e

a T' I A-

l****»**F

COPT

MINED TO SIGN TLATELOLCO BUT WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION
TO TA*E A FEW STEPS TO FULFILL ITS ENERGY PLAN. IT
HOPES TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A HEAVY WATER PLANT IN
THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. ONCE THESE MEASURES ARE ACHIEVED,
ARGENTINA PLANS ADHERENCE TO THE BAN ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AMD TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO.
THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THERE
’■'ERE CONDITIONS IN THE PREVIOUS JOINT ."OMNUNIQUE.
THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AT THE TIME THE
CIRCUMSTANCES HE REFERRED TO HAD NOT EXISTED.
TEE SECRETARY AGAIN ASKED WHEN ARGENTINA COULD
SIGN.
THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPEATED THIS COULD BE IN
A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER ARGENTINA HAS ARRANGED PURCHASE
OF THE HEAVY WATER PLANT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT
HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGENTINA WAS PRESSED ON
THE MATTER SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT ARID' BY THE COMMUNIOUE.
FE ASSUMED ARGENTINA'S STATED INTENTION WOULD BE CARRIED
OUT AS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIOUE. THE FOREIGN
MINISTER'S RESPONSE WAS THE FIRST INDICATION OF A
DIFFERENT VIEW PREVAILING IN ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT
VIDELA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT ARGENTINA WOULD
RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE
COMMUNIQUE.
'
THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THI "CENTRAL CONCEPT"
HAD NOT CHANGED,* WHAT WAS DIFFERENT WERE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH ARGENTINA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE SIGNING.
VANCE
RT

PSN :007520

PAGE 06

OF 06

TOR:227/02:37Z

DTG:142220Z AUG 79

******,feG 0 N—p I D g-N T I A>L&$*****E COPY
Nn Ohiprtinn Tn npriasssjifinatinn in Full 9013/07/04 ■ Nl T.-94-R7-1-19-7

i.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-5-3''- / ; * ■1'
4140
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
IteOBJST - GPS

July 7, 1977

DOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT A. PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Human Rights in Argentina

We have just received a short paper (Tab A) from State responding to
your memorandum of June 27 asking that State acknowledge the improve­
ment in the Argentina picture. ARA, which probably drafted the
memorandum, is not exactly known for its reluctance to compliment
Latin American governments when given the chance; and therefore,
their note of caution carries great credibility. I have attached at
Tab B the cable, which I recommend be sent to the post, and at Tab C,
a cable on the meeting between Videla and Mendez of Uruguay which
lends support to State's conclusion.
I recommend you send the memorandum at Tab I because the President
raised the point about acknowledging the Argentine case a second
time during his conversation with President Peres of Venezuela.
RE COMMENDATION
1.

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve

2.

_______

Disapprove___________

That you instruct me to clear the cable at Tab B.
Approve

Disapprove

t

Jessica Tuchman concurs

GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority
NARA_3L5c__ Date

La -5 ~ S
------

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-5-3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-1-53-5
MEMORANDUM

DOS REVIEWED 01-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 30, 1980
INFORMATION

t

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT:

Evening Report

(U)

Bolivia/Argentina.
The Bolivian Junta la trying desperately to convey an appearance
of normality In La Paz; but It la falling.
Resistance by mlnerB, curfews, shortages,
and the omnipresence of the military make It impossible.
Resentment of the
Argentine presence and involvement is also increasing.
The evidence is pretty
clearly that Argentina's 30-man military advisory mission in Bolivia planned and
directed the coup, and is now directing the repression.
Argentina is also considering
a $200 million credit (in the form of higher prices for Bolivian gas).
Even the
Brazilians have been surprised by the Argentine involvement.
The Argentine Charge
informed the State Department that the cancellation of Bawdier's .visit was a serious
setback.in. US-Argentine.relations.
They deserve more of the same.
(S)
Peruvian Inauguration.
Despite the fact that there were nearly 10 heads of state
at the Peruvian inauguration, Bawdier informs me that Mrs. Carter was the focus
of attention, with Belaunde making special gestures of friendship and appreciation
to her during his addresses and at all of the occasions.
I spoke to Mrs. Carter
at some length, and she was pleased with her discussions with all of the heads of sr v
who were there.
She was pleased with the extent to which the Venezuelans were
playing a large role in the Caribbean and Central America, and encouraged the
Colombians to do the same.
Bawdier will go down to see Turbay to discuss this in
greater detail in a couple of weeks.
By the sounds of her readout, she clearly did
an excellent Job conveying our policies and persuading the various heads of state of
the President's deep interests in a wide range of Latin American problems.
(C)
Cuban Sugar Sales to Japan.
In response to indications that Cuba will seek to
double its current annual sugar saleB to Japan (300,000 tons worth $200 million)
in connection with an upcoming Trade Mission, our Embassy in Tokyo has discretely
approached the GOJ and urged that the Japanese consider alternate sources such as
Brazil for additional supplies.
Japanese officials told us they believed current
negotiations between Japanese companies and the Cubans over a contract to replace
the current five-year pact were stymied.
The Japanese preferred a three-year
deal at present levels while the Cubans sought a five-year deal with considerably
higher annual sales.
It was not known whether agreement would be reached.
(S)
Press Contacts.

None

(U)

t

DECLASSIFIED
E.G.H3526
SECRET

Review 7/30/86

- ■a'4 -SS - V

f E- Drtn

-A^Vvj

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-1-53-5

3

&i

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 29, 1980
INFORMATION

□OS REVIEWED 01-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT:

Evening Report

(U)

Argentina/Bolivia.
This morning's press carried the news that the Argentine Government
•had 'resumed normal relations" with Bolivia, thus becoming the first country to extend
recognition to the new regime. We had already take! the decision to postpone Bowdler's
visit to Buenos Aires, and had instructed the Embassy to so inform Argentine officials.
Judging from the strongly negative reactions of Argentine officials yesterday when postpone­
ment was still only a possibility, we are probably in for another severe chill in our
relations.
While the degree of damage limitation, which will be required is not clear,
much of the slow improvement since the Gaodpaster visit may be in jeopardy.
Similar
decisions on recognition can now probably also be expected shortly from Bolivia's other
neighbors (Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay).
(S)
Bolivia.
La Paz appears to have returned to normal, with the exception of certain areas
such as the university which remain dosed and guarded.
The Embassy has picked up unconf i.r: '
reports from several sources that Hernan Slles, who won a plurality in the June 29 voting,
is setting up an underground government and intends to announce on August 6 (the scheduled
Inauguration day for the new President) that he is the legitimate President of Bolivia.
The Papal Nuncio has made representations to the new authorities in favor of humane
treatment for detainees, but has received no response.
It is reliably reported that the
regime is shaking down businessmen for contributions.
(C)
At the OAS the Nicaraguans withdrew their request for a Permanent Council meeting to
decide whether to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Bolivia.
They were apparently
responding to advice from those who backed last week's resolution that the time was not
propitious for another session on the Bolivian situation at this time.(C)
I

*

Cuban Refugees.
A personal sweep by USINT personnel of the Mariel Harbor area yesterday
failed to turn up any evidence of large numbers of US boats or detect any unusual movement
of people into the area.
Meanwhile, in San Jose, statements by Evelio Estrella to the
effect that "all" refugees remaining in Costa Rica would be permitted to enter the US
legally have raised expectations in the Cuban community and greatly increased crowds at
the Consulate.
(C)
El Salvador.
Senior officers of the IMF, IBRD and IDB have told State in confidence that
they were visited by an FDR delegation recently and advised not to continue operations
with the current GOES.
All'three institutions took the approach as a direct threat to
their personnel.
State has suggested that the Embassy talk privately with trhsted GOES
officials to pass on above information and suggest that quiet and inconspicuous security
measures be instituted for IFI personnel.
(S)
Cuba.
Castro's three hour speech to the faithful on July 26 is characterized by USINT as
a curious mixture of revolutionary fire and cool pragmatism.
On the one hand, Castro
praised pluralism in Nicaragua, including private sector participation and aid from capitalis1
countries.
Yet at the same time he returned to themes from the sixties by citing armed
revolution as the only way open to oppressed peoples.
From available reports it appears
that Castro did not mention the refugee situation, but did lambast the Republican platform
and candidates.
I am getting the full text and will reserve further comment until I've had
a chance to study it in detail.
(C)
footer
SECRET

Family business

(a delayed arrival) kept me out of the office most of the day.

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-1-52-6

(U)

No Objection To Declassification 2009/03/02 : NLC-24-54-7-2-7

MEMORANDUM

INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
-SECRET-’

State Department
review completed

May 8, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

,

SUBJECT:

Evening Report (U)

,

Argentina. The U.S.-Argentina Conference was very informative with
frank and useful exchanges on human rights, democratization,
economic problems, the NAM, etc. The Argentines have clearly passed
through a national trauma, and the memory of the civil war will
unquestionably have a salving and moderating influence as they
begin the task of re-building a more democratic society. There is
a feeling among them that they have just turned the corner, though
they are not in a hurry to re-discover politics. Today, the human
rights officer from our Embassy in Buenos Aires stopped by, and
while agreeing that disappearances have declined sharply, encouraged
us to press the Argentines on three concerns: Timerman, torture,
and an accounting of the disappearances. He also provided an
interesting statistic on the civil war: (559 Argentine soldiers or
police were killed (according to GOA sources) and 10-15,000
civilians. (S)

,
i

JCS Review
Completed

Caribbean. Called a meeting of representatives from Treasury, AID,
State, World Bank, IDB, and OMB to discuss the U.S. position at the
donors' meeting of the Caribbean Group (CG) in Paris next week.
Given the changed political circumstances in the Caribbean, it is
essential that the donors have their act together when the full CG
meets in June. The World Bank has set a^target of $650 million for
the region's requirements this year for project aid and for the
Caribbean Development Facility (CDF). We are going to have to come
up with some more money if we will be able to maintain our 1978
level of 30% of the CDF. (S)
Two ofEicers from the JCS stopped by to discuss their study of the
security implications of Cuban military modernization and of the
PRM on Central America.
I asked them tc do some work on the
implications of the Cuban build-up on the "basin" countries and cn
NATO. (S)

r

Mexico. STR is sending a team down to Mexico to try to complete
i
negotiations.
The tomato issue is looming ominously on the horizon.
rt i
Treasury is supposed to make a preliminary determination by July 17
on anti-dumping charges, and we are looking for ways to avoid that.
tn*P
Talked to Frank White of DPS about a joint memo from Stu and you to
w.._ H
the President on the undocumented workers issue. (C)
tA v-TT

a

adni
r-

X1
i

•SECRET..

j
May 3. 19 8 5
....... ...... *_____________
No Objection To Declassification 2009/03/02 : NLC-24-54-7-2-7 _

2 Vl
r, rv*

-*£STno Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 : NLC-24-54-6-4-6

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION

~

J

April 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT:

Evening Report

Ch_:_]^.
Attended a meeting at State chaired by Christopher
to discuss whether there should be a Presidential determination
in accord with the Chafee amendment on the Export-Import Bank
to lift the $750,000 ceiling on loans to Chile.
The decision
needs to be made before April 22nd because of an application
to Export-Import and this is on the eve Of the Chilean govern­
ment's decision on Letelier. It is ap extremely tough decision.
The human rights situation in Chile does,not in my opinion,
justify a Presidential determination, but then our interest
in combating terrorism as reflected by the Letelier case
might justify such action. My inclination would be not to
make a determination, but also to make clear to the Chilean
government (and to the American people) that our concern over
the Letelier case remains very strong.
(C)
Inter-American Commission
today and decided to hold
Inter-American Commission
will permit someone other
lead the Commission in its

on Human Rights.
The OAS met
an early election for the new
on Human Rights.
Such an election
than a hard lineBrazilian to
visit to Argentina.
(C)

I
Bob Pastor went to Cambridge to give a speech at Harvard
University on the United States' Human Rights Policy
to Latin America.
(U)
f
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

. _____ _
State Department review
completed

DECLASSIFIED

E.0.13526

EGRET—
''TI^LYAL CL EY__ R_. Pastor
E777 C:r April II, 19H5
t.' ey:zi
-JiAEOlf

fTv -~

Authority wr

NARA__Je£L_ Dato

---- —

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 : NLC-24-54-6-4-6

---

i.

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 : NLC-24-52-8-3-7
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET-

May 16, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

NORTH-SOUTH

SUBJECT:

Evening Report

Daily Activities

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
instructions APPLY

T

State Department review
completed

CP as tor)
1.
Friday night I spoke at the American University on U.S . human
rights policy to Latin America, and met with a somewhat skeptical but
quite knowledgeable audience. Questions were raised about our policies
in Argentina, Uruguay, and particularly Chile. One person asked me
whether or not the President would meet with Eduardo Frei, or whether
our policy was to deal solely with the military junta. I begged off answering
those, questions.

2.
Met with Diego Aria, Minister of Communications of Venezuela, and
his special assistant Antonio Hererra, to discuss President Perez' trip.*
In particular, we focused on the agenda of the trip, and Aria listed the
obvious issues with the exception of human rights. Aria said that the U.S .
has now suddenly discovered human rights, but Perez has been advocating
a more forthright policy on human rights for many years. In addition, he
said that he thought that the idea of a Western Hemisphere Energy Institute
in which the U.S ., Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and perhaps
Argentina, could pool their technology in or Jer to increase the production
of petroleum and alternative energy resources was a good one.
3.
The informal and small interagency meeting involving people from
Treasury, CIA, State, and Jessica Tuchman and I from NSC, to discuss
future U.S . policy to Chile and in particular the question whether the
President should meet with Eduardo Frei went very well. Frei has served
us a very difficult decision. If Carter doesn't meet with him, some will
analogize the snub with Ford's decision not to meet with Solzheintsyn.
If he does meet with Frei, the Pinochet regime will unquestionably take
it as an afront with the likelihood of harsh consequences. Q will send
you a memorandum on this shortly.)
4.
Prepared and attended Mrs . Carter's briefing an Latin American, and
worked on briefing book.

-SECRET-

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority
^
* 14 2
3
NARA_&E------ Data n

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 :tNLC-24-52-8-3-7

;--------- --------

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 :tNLC-24-52-8-3-7

^SBGREf*

,

2

5.
Representative Dante Fascell called me this morning and said that
he was hearing reports from many Latin Americans that they were confused
about the purposes of Mrs . Carter's trip. He asked whether the trip would
in fact be substantive. I answered that I thought the distinction between a
substantive trip and a goodwill trip may be a bit artificial. Mrs. Carter
was going to Latin America to convey a sense of what the new Administration
stood for , what its goals and priorities were. She would be talking about
the President's speech at the OAS and seeking comments from the hemisphere's
leaders on the new directions sketched out by the President. And following
from the President's pledge to consult with Latin America, she would be seeking
to elicit from the Latin Americans ideas on ways in which our countries can
cooperate on the issues — particularly human rights — that concern all of us.
He said that he thought the list of purposes which I mentioned was appropriate
and correct for her trip, and he urged me to make sure that these purposes
would be conveyed to a larger audience so that the Latin Americans would
not misinterpret her trip.
g

I

(Hansen)
V/ill spend most of the week writing a major paper ("Basic Human Needs")
for PRM 8 Track II. The paper will be longer than necessary for PRM 8
meeting purposes , but will attempt to develop a set of propositions and
proposals on the subject that may be of use to the Front Office in a variety
of ways (speech material, ideas for your own consideration, etc.) . If
Hormats is correct in his assumption that little if anything will result
from the PRM 8 process (in terms of a PRC paper of any interest); and
if Thornton is correct that the PRM 8 process is more of a "sensitivity­
raising11 exercise than anything else; then this paper may end up serving
as a first draft paper from me to the Front Office on one possible North-South
set of initiatives.
Significant Information/Intelligence
(Pastor)
i

*

Panama. Apparently, Torrijos is reasonably satisified with our new position
on the Canal Treaty negotiations. He is sending his negotiators back tomorrow,
and negotiations are expected to resume on Wednesday.
Venezuela. In a conversation with Assistant Secretary Todman, President
Perez of Venezuela expressed great support for the U.S . position on non­
proliferation, and said that he would raise the issue of ratification of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco with President Videla when he visited Argentina soon.
. Perez also spoke about the Caribbean and the problem of Belize, and the
need to stem Soviet influence in Africa.

^SECRET

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 : NLC-24-52-8-3-7

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 : NLC-24-52-8-3-7

-SECRET
i

3

--------

i

»

f

Cuba. On Friday, the Treasury Department announced that it is allowing
travel agents in the U.S. to make group hotel reservations in Cuba and pay
the Cuban Government or businesses directly.
El Salvador. The situation in El Salvador is quite tense after the assassination
of the Foreign Minister. Rightist groups are said to be merging to avenge the
death of Borgonovo.
Ethiopia and the Soviet Union granted each other most-favored-nation status.
25X1

Zaire. The Nigerian mediation effort has been dropped reportedly because
of Angola's unwillingness to discuss reopening of its border with Zaire.

i

T

CWhite)
Sudan. While demonstrations agains both Ethiopia and the USSR continue in
Khartoum, the government decided to reduce Soviet presence in Sudan.
Only those Soviet nations who are attached to the Embassy will be allowed
to remain.
Somalia. Somali President Siad announced that Somalia would go to war'
if Ethiopia invades the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

i

.^SECRET-

. _ No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 : NLC-24-52-8-3-7

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0(\,
^

-eftWFTDEWTTnT.

*

Argentina

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DOS REVIEWED 19 May 2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL.

DATE :
TIME:
PLACE:
SUBJECT:

September 9/ 1977
9:00 am
White House

President Carter/President Videla Bilateral"

PARTICIPANTS:
ARGENTINA

*

Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla
President of Argentina
Oscar A. Montes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship
Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador
to the United States
Julio Cesar Carasales,
Ambassador to OAS
Enrique Quintana,
Chief of Protocol
Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid,
Aide-de-camp

US
President Carter
Vice-President Mondale
Secretary Vance
D*r. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert PaBtor, NSC
Charge Maxwell Chaplin

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing
his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President
and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope
for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was alBo pleased that it
provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have
conversations about issues of common concern.
President Videla expressed his satisfaction over the
opportunity to witness an event of such ipajor importance as
the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to have
a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed
that the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of
one era but opens a new one in which the United States has
demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin America.
He added that the Argentine presence was his government's
effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed
that while US-Argentine relations have had their ups and
downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances which
impeded close relations have always been overcome 'by the
basic identity of interests of the two nations.
GONFIDENfriAL/GDS
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

-

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

■^ewrrnMfiAL

2.

As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed
to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest
to understand he had ever heard - the President either
chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of
expressing himself.
He found this typical of Argentina
which he and his wife had visited some years previously.
President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality
that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary
Todman during the latter's recent visit to Argentina.
President Carter said he hoped to have a frank dis­
cussion of two major issues with the objective of improving
relations between the two nations.
Non-Proliferation
President Carter considered the threat of nuclear ex­
plosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere.
Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear
technology - which is a great credit to Argentina - he hoped
that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a
nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of intro­
duction to nuclear explosives.
He observed that all hemi­
spheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had Bigned and
ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil
had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina's
ratification and acceptance of it.
He expressed the hope that
Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide unre­
stricted use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction
of nuclear explosives.
President Carter said that the United States, the
European Community, Canada and Australia were now evolving
a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safe­
guards. On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on
this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be
represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing
common policies with regard to the export of nuclear tech­
nology heavy water and enriched uranium.
He said this
policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to
countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation
effort. President Carter said he understood that Argentina
was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safe­
guards but stressed the importance the United States places
on the Tlatelolco and the NPT. Thisjis very serious to the
United States, and it would remain of constant concern.
JSGNPIDENTI-ftI7
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

CflMF-TDENTl-Air

3.

President Videla responded by observing that the two
countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact
that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not
perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for
progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in develop­
ing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power
reactor is currently in use, a second under construction
and a third in the planning phase. Hfe understood President
Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said
Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those
which were really needed. However, he understood that even
this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and
the world.
president Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying
the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter
must be aware of the great need for proper political timing
of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from
its gravest national crisis, so the government must be
particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward
normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions
permit - perhaps before the end of the year - he would give
proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation
by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this
reassured President Carter.
President Carter said it did, and stated that if the
GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle confer­
ence it would be particularly exciting if it would be
possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty
at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on
the best political timing. With Argentine ratification,
the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba,
and the United States would be raising this issue with
the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratifica­
tion would also remove our concerns about technology and
heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States
and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very
issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the
interest of establishing a common export policy.
Human Rights
The political changes in Argentina have been given
careful study by the American government, and recent de­
velopments there said President Carter, have impressed
me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated
his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's
mNFTDFNTT**No Objection To Declassification in F*ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

£flMf-IHENTIAIr

4.

government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and
the reconstruction of the Argentine economy. He said the
study of the achievements of President Videla's government
led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great
strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the secur­
ity and the strength of the government would lead to the
alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the obser­
vation of human rights in Argentina. The President stated
he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human
rights violations and noted the particularly high press
interest in this subject in the United States. Certain
cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that
of editor Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have
many relatives in the California area? He said that a Wash­
ington group concerned with the subject of human rights had
provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina
without public notice of their arrest or charges against
them. The President acknowledged that some of these allega­
tions may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the
privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the
state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list
available so the State Department could provide it to Presi­
dent Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt
that the friendly bilateral relations of over a hundred years
were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue
could come between the two countries. He felt that more
progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said
he had great admiration and appreciation for what President
Videla has been able to do for his country, and asked
what additional steps could be taken to alleviate the con­
cern in the United States (which, indeed, may have been
exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina.
President Videla recounted the situation in which
Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic,
political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which
led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take
over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring
values and human rights of which President Carter spoke.
Those who recognized that man was created in God's image
must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists
wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced
what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their
undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military
man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these
misfortunes of war.

■CONF-IDENTI-AL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

CONFIDENTIAL-

5.

President Videla said that the war, while virtually
over in a military sense, continued in the political arena,
both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish
to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges
were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terrorism
and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democ­
racy. Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity
abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla
said there were incidents for which the government was
responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them
and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power. He
said, however, that he could not accept the image of a
brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate
his country from those other nations which shared its basic
values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to rees­
tablish order and control, and meanwhile he needed the
understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural
friends such as the United States.
With the war almost over, President Videla felt that
the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within
a short period the negative consequences of the repression
would be eliminated.
He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were
reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity
to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter
that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with
dealing with subversive elements. He1was not detained because
of his name - there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection
to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of
the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of
possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons.
President Videla Btated that 1,990 persons had been de­
tained under the national executive power in the first year
of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months.
Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the
civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and 370 in the military
courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300
persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have
been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give
a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees
might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major
effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understand­
ing.

COHFlublimMo^'objection To Declassification in F*ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in Filill 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

-gONTTBENTIAIr-- -

6.

President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine
judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns
expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no
announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the charges on
which they were being held. He asked if this is customary.
President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are inde­
pendent institutions and operated beyond the control of the
executive.
In cases dealing with subversives and their deten­
tion as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of
the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investi­
gated it was turned over to the military or- civilian.. courts
or the individual was released. While for security reasons
it is not convenient to provide public information on deten­
tions at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged
with providing information to relatives about the possible
detention and charges against family members. President
Carter expressed his desire to help r&store world apprecia­
tion of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped
that President videla would give the United States the oppor­
tunity to do so. As President, he said he knew how much
opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citi­
zens. He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas,
it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the
UN to visit Argentina, not to check on you but to certify
the progress made by the GOA.
President Videla said he was pleased to respond with
the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed
that facts were infinitely more important than words.
The visits of Hr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and
the Senators are the best way to show that Argentina is
not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for
sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees.
He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina
for four reasons: first, when an Individual joins the sub­
versive underground; second, when a terrorist is killed by
his associates who may suspect betrayal; third, terrorists
were killed in battle; and fourth, people were killed by
excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this
fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsi­
bility to eliminate it. He said he was not troubled by
visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which
can testify to the facts in Argentina.
President Videla regretted that xt was necesesary to
to devote the short time available to discussion of the
two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number
of important remaining bilateral issues, which should be
covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to viBit
Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the' consul­
tations.
-CONFIDENTIAL ■
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

CONFIDENTIAL-

7.

President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the
invitation for Secretary Vance to vis^.t Argentina. Presi­
dent Carter said he regretted that the two items had domi­
nated this discussion, which would have to be ended because
the President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should Presi­
dent Videla wish, he said that Vice President Hondale could
meet with him now, or the conversations could be continued
during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed
his hope he could return to Argentina before long and pre­
sented President Videla with his book and a collection of
satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated
with expressions of mutual goodwill.

f

t

J.nNFTDF.NTIAL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-25-4-5-8

b'PS REVIEWED 16-Apr-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL.

{RATIONAL. SECURITY COUNCIL

February 16, 197?
TO:

DR.

Attached a:
starving u:
live the Zb
Memorial/

nemo for the
gston. Long
ineki
Wetbacks!

t

declassified

E.0.13526
Authority

NARA—

\i~ r\u:

t~

rv

M LX- -

Date

i* c. .it on4 0/n4Me .

mi

n nA ntz

a e o

No Objection To Declassification in

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JESSICA TUCHMAN
ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Security Assistance

1. While I agree with State that security assistance to Uruguay should
be eliminated and t-Ec Argentina reduced by half, I also agree with
OMB's assessment that Congress will regard that as "tokenism" . I
think the best way to reconcile the two positions, however, is not
in asking State for alternatives but in asking it for a framework to
justify these cuts, Since Argentina and Uruguay have two of the
worst human rights records of all those Latin American nations
receiving security assistance, I don't believe it should be especially
difficult to justify these as opposed to other cuts.
2. Jamaica Assistance. $31.5 million in supporting assistance will not
be sufficient to realize the extravagant claims made by'the State Depart­
ment like relieving their economic crisis or reversing the leftward drift
of the government. But some assistance from the new Administration is
essential to send a new signal to Jamaica, to other Latin American and
Caribbean countries. and to the international community about Jamaica
and about the U.S. It will indicate a new tolerance in U.S. foreign
policy for ideological pluralism which will be well-received in the
Caribbean and in the developing world. (And we should remember that
Jamaica has a democratic government.) The U.S. does not need $31.5
million to send a signal, however,' half of that would be sufficient.
If the U. S. were interested in improving relations with Jamaica,
the worst thing it could do is begin a bilateral assistance program
because before too long, we would raise unrealistic expectations in
the U,.S. that we could transform their government at the same
time that we aggravated nationalistic predispositions in Jamaica.
Even worst would-be to use the money to try to get Jamaica to
accept the IMF S t dsilization package because Jamaica will probably
accept the package anyway arid because $31. 5 bdllion is not su fficafcnt
to persu a;de them and would not be welcomed" as a reward for "good
behavior. " For the moment, then, I woultf recommend that the
President agree to grant only enough assistance to send a signal.
A soft loan for a new hospital in Kingston would be perfect. At the
same time, he should appoint a new Ambassador and make clear
that we are undertaking a compreh ensive review of U.S. policy to
h

I ' HI

|n.>ejni<n'iyr..H» H.JU! wy.

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/06/16 : NLC-24-1 -8-3-3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1

-SECRET—
INFORMATION

NSS Review Completed.

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1980
TIME AND PLACE:

10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions -— PRC Meeting
on Argentina (C)

PARTICIPANTS
State
Warren Christopher, Dep.
Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't.
Secretary

Energy
Woody Cunningham, Ass't.
Secretary for Nuclear Energy
Arms Control and Disarmament
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear
? Exports Div. Chief, Bureau
of Nonproliferation

Defense
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,
Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal
Dep. Ass't. Secretary

j
'

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General John Pustay

Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep.
Under Secretary

Central Intelligence
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin Americe.

Commerce
Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary
for Internet. Economic Policy
and Research

White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen
National Security Council

!

Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

>

The PRC met to discuss US-Argentine relations in light of your
concern about the development of closer ties between Argentina
and the Soviet Union.
It was. agreed that we should continue to
seek improvement in our relations wi^h Argentina, recognizing

•SECRET
Review on May 14, 2000
Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

r\u:

i

:x:

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

Authority

------- j

NARA_EE___ Date -A«\\\.yg---------------- i

i—. .ii on44inc/4o . ah r* ni a a n o

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/06/16 : NLC-24-1 -8-3-3

2

SECRET*

that probably no dramatic progress (or, for that matter, deteri­
oration) is likely until there is a new government in Buenos
Aires in early 1981.
In the next few weeks we may have to
show our displeasure over Argentina's likely failure to be
cooperative on the grain embargo; on the other hand, we can
justify some positive steps in the relationship by the improv­
ing trend of Argentina's human rights performance.
(S)
Looking to the longer-term, and assuming -continuing improvement
in human rights matters, we would propose a systematic effort
to strengthen our ties with Argentina. This could ultimately
lead to full normalization and perhaps repeal of legislative
restrictions on military supply.
(S)
This timetable should help deflect the Argentinians from too
close a relationship with the Soviets — a relationship that
is in any event probably self-limiting due to the nature of
the Argentine regime.
(S)
All agencies supported this consensus; both Commerce and Defense
however, made clear in the course of the discussions that they
want to press for more rapid improvement in the relationship
than do the other agencies. Defense was particularly concerned
that our human rights and nuclear policies were forcing Argen­
tina to draw close to the USSR. An interdepartmental Group will
be set up to provide an opportunity to fine-tune our policies to
meet the needs and concerns of individual agencies in line with
the broad policy structure agreed uppn.
(S)

t

r\u:

r. .ii nn* a ir\a ia n .

am

r* n jt

a

a n n

■’

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 *ri Add-on

MEMORANDUM

^3?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

-fineRET

t

INFORMATION
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1980
TIME AND PLACE:

10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT:

Minutes — PRC Meeting on Argentina

PARTICIPANTS

(C)
ON-FILE COMMERCE
RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

OSD Review Completed

"

'

State
Warren Christopher, Dep.
Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't.
Secretary

Energy
Woody Cunningham, Ass't.
Secretary for Nuclear Energy
Arms Control and Disarmament
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear
Exports Div. Chief, Bureau
* of Nonproliferation

Defense
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,
Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal
Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General John Pustay

Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep.
Under Secretary

Central Intelligence
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

Commerce
Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary
for Internat. Economic Policy
and Research
JCS review completed

White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen
National Security Council
Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

Bushnell began the meeting by discussing Argentinian relations
with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the current government
is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this provides a cer­
tain implicit limitation on the process of Soviet/Argentinian
ties. The Argentine Government is playing a short-term game in
the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area. The only point of
contact between the Soviet Union and Argentina that raises
longer term concerns is a possible fishing agreement although
SECRET

Review on May 14, 2000
Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

.State Department review
completed

NSC review(s) completed

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.13S26
Authority

L-C.

-

aA—'~2>

NARA_££___ Date..
k i«. nu:

.i

f—, ,ii nn-in/no/nn .

km

r* na Ann n -7 o

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 ,

£.3 1*. nuQ-on

1

■SECRET-*

2
OSD Review Completed

even here the Argentine Government is moving to limit its
impact on their people. In addition we are very much con­
cerned about Argentinian/Soviet cooperation in United Nations
organs. Originally the Argentinians only wanted to prevent
the Montaneros from mobilizing Soviet and Cuban support against
the GOA. Over time however this has developed into a cooper­
ative vote trade-off between the two* sides. In the coming
months, Bushnell continued, Argentina will have a hard time
taking any positive actions whatsoever due to the imminent
retirement of President Videla. This is certainly true until
the decision on a successor is made in September and probably
the period of inaction will continue until early next year
when a new government is in place. We will not be able to
force major decisions on them in this time. In the shorter
term the main issue is the Argentine fear of condemnation as
a result of the report of the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission. They might make some minor steps on the human
rights front to avert condemnation. The other important
short term consideration is the question of the grain embargo
where they have not been supportive of our interests.
Hodges asked whether Argentine human rights performance has
improved.
Bushnell replied that there has been a major improvement but
there are still gross violations and the system of repression
remains in place. One could say that they have probably killed
most of the people that they wanted to kill, but there are now
fewer political prisoners and in somia instances the rule of law
is being followed better.
Hodges reported that the Argentine Economics Minister had assured
him that the current economic policies would continue under a new
government next year. Hodges pointed out that we have a great
economic potential in relations with Argentina and we should do
everything we can to maximize that.
Owen, speaking of the grain situation, said that the Argentinians
have undoubtedly made their decision and will follow the same
policy next year as they did this year. They have almost cer­
tainly reached an agreement with the Soviets which would provide
only a floor, not a ceiling, on Soviet purchases. This in effect
will mean no limit on Argentine sales to the Soviet Union other
than that provided by crop conditions.

^SECRET

Mn

In nnrlnpplfimlinn in Ci ill

H/HQ/m • Ml

T/ ^ HO T T Q

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 i-on

.SECRET-

3

Starkey agreed with this conclusion.
Aaron said it was not clear from the paper what the issue is —
are we seeking a decision on overall tone or individual policy
decisions? He asked whether the wheat embargo will be circum­
vented .
Owen replied that once Argentinian policy is clear, and no doubt
the Canadians will be equally uncooperative, other countries will
not support us.
Christopher agreed and said that in any event the whole question
is irrelevant if the Soviets have a good crop. We may have to
find a way to announce a one-year policy success.
Aaron. Do we want to take some move against Argentina because
of this or simply forget it? Bear in mind that Martinez was
lectured at the highest levels of government here about the
need for Argentine cooperation.
Owen said that we should certainly take a tough line on Argentina
to match the warnings that were given to Martinez.
Aaron observed that it is clear that Argentina doesn't care very
much about its relations with the United States.
Christopher, discussing the purpose of the meeting, said that the
real decision to be addressed is one of tone. The paper should
then be submitted to an Interagency Group which could work out
the individual implementing decisions in line with the broad
decision on tone to be made by the PRC. Mr. Christopher also
observed that the Argentinians are not going to do anything to
court us.
Claytor said he did not blame them; our'policies are forcing them
to the Soviets.
t
Owen said that they are sensitive to our concern about being a
major supplier for their hydroelectric project. Martinez had
said that he would favor the United States if all other factors
were equal.
Hodges noted that OPIC insurance would be important in this regard.
Owen agreed and said this would be discussed with Deputy Secretary
Christopher tomorrow.
SSGRBT

i

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : N LC-24-102-2-7-3_ 3_on

•SECRET----------------

4

t

Keeny, discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what
the options are. The Soviets are interested in some nuclear
cooperation with the Argentinians but there has been minimal
activity to date. Thus there does not seem much to preempt
there. Our own relations with Argentina are another question.
We do not want to (indeed legally we cannot) expand these re­
lations unless they accept full-scope safeguards and ratify the
Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some flexibility though on whether
we should continue to cooperate in marginal ways within the law.
The question is whether we are willing to supply things that at
some future date might be related to a nuclear weapons program.
Bushnell said there is no problem because what we are supplying
is for their research program. The issue is whether we want to
break a nuclear dialogue with them completely and perhaps turn
them to the Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make
greater progress next year when there will be a new adminis­
tration and leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked,
should we break the dialogue now or continue to do "minor"
things.
?
Keeny said it depended on which items were involved.
Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation policy is bank­
rupt in general and that we should do absolutely everything we
can under the law to cooperate with Argentina.
Keeny inquired whether that would include the provision of
tritium. Perhaps the only thing the Argentinians want are
things that cause no problem for us. We should look at the
specifics.
Christopher pointed out that the President has certainly not
abandoned the nuclear non-proliferation policy.
Claytor countered that the policy had been ineffective and that
the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we are unable to
extend cooperation.
Bushnell observed that there were very few license requests pending from the Argentinians and there probably would be no problem
over the next six months or so.
{
Christopher, returning to the general topic, said he believed
that the group should support the middle option. We should
give due weight to positive trends in the human rights area
but should not try to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment
SSCIU3T-*

K In

O W • « nil

c. .ii on4n/no«nn .

kii

r* nil nnn n

*7

o

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08.02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3

■SECRET-

S

at this time since that would be impossible with the present
Congress and politically unwise.
This Option B needs fine
tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do
in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with
Argentina.
Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an
initiative on the military side, including training at
least.
Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher1 s summation, for
the trends in human rights are important.
The Commerce Depart­
ment also supports Option B.
Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our re­
lations.
The options as stated in the paper are too static.
Our goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship
that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco
Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that
we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third,
there is no possibility of changing the military legislation
now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we
react will be a signal to them.
We should relate that to the
policy issues.
Overall, we should have a tone that rests
somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time
being any change in our military supply policy.
The Inter­
departmental Group should set up an 18-month program with
benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance.
At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve
relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they
have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue.
We
should make clear our irritation with them at this time and
then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it
comes into office.
We will not be able to get very far with
Videla.
We should take the opportunity .of the new adminis­
tration, however, for turning a new page.
If we move to im­
prove our relations with them now we will simply not have the
respect of the Argentinians.
f

Claytor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less
the repeal of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment which would be
impossible.
We should do all that we can with the Argentine
military to restore relations between our two armed services.
At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets.
The Soviets
are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small
things interfere with our dealing with this problem.

-6eeRET—*

ki_ r>u:

i"..ii nnxn/nn.nn .

k

ii

r* n a

a

nn n *? n

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 d-on

6

Pustay supported Claytor1s statement* and noted that we now have
a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine
military and JCS would like to pursue them. He noted for instance
the Galtieri (sic,r) invitation which is being held up in State
Department. Pustay said that Galtieri is prepared to come.
Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his
own political purposes, would like to receive the invitation but
not actually accept it until after the Presidential decision is
made in September in Argentina. Whatever we do we are likely to
become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether,
following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want
to give this signal of reward to them.
Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the
Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is
conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the
Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not
take reprisals against them until they publicly announce the
content of their agreement with the Soviets.
Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much
in all likelihood.
In any event thet reality will depend on the
Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some six
months.
Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on
the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them
undermine us.
Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us
either next year.
Pustay, returning to the question of General Galtieri's visit,
said that it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been
instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on
the Olympics.
Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship
but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits
if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere.
Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there
seemed to be no stark alternatives that' need to be put to the
President.
It was generally agreedithat:

SBGHET

Mr* OhirtMinn frs r^r»/*loe»r»ifio«-i+i«n in Ci ill 0010/00/00 • Mi C* 0>! 1 OO O T O

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3

2S/2 Add-on

SECRET--

7

1.

There is enough human rights progress to justify movement
towards improvement in our relationship.

2.

Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the
electoral situation in Argentina.

3.

We will also have to see whether* we need to react to the
Argentinian decision on grain.

These are short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group
can review as it goes along. On the longer term:
4.

If there is continued improvement in the human rights situ­
ation in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations
with the new regime.
The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this
improvement might involve.

_SE€£ET

k i

^i

r-

ii ah

m

iaa

i

11

^ n 4

4 nn n m n

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5
MEMORANDUM

9

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR:

June 10, 1980

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Zbig,
I gather that Secretary Muskie will ask approval for Gerry
Smith's exploration with our allies of ways of meeting
their concerns regarding nuclear power at tomorrow's meet­
ing with you and Harold Brown. Gerry would then talk quietly
about this issue with our allies at an international energy
meeting he is attending at Vienna next week.
(c)

I

Substantively,
believe that Gerry is on the right track:
This exploration will help to reduce bitterness between Europe
and the United StatBS about this issue, and eventually produce
policies that will strengthen non-proliferation. It is the
intent to conduct this exploration in low key, so that it will
not arouse political controversy in this country before the
election.
(c)

NARA_££____ Data 7 )«?/>/.

Authnritv

N U L - n ~ /U l-

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q.13526

I recommend that you support Secretary Muskie's proposal to
allow Gerry Smith to begin these exploratory discussions next
week without fanfare in Vienna.
(c)

1

Procedurally, you will recall that this issue was discussed
at a PRC, where all the agencies concerned (except the Council
on Environmental Quality) supported Gerry's proposal, and it
was agreed that his paper should be revised, prior to being
discussed at a Becond PRC. Secretary MuBkie then concluded
that it would be better to launch Gerry'b exploratory dis­
cussions without the bureaucratic formality inherent in a PRC,
in order to preserve our flexibility and avoid leaks. If you
now decide that a second PRC meeting is needed before we do
anything, it will be impossible for Gerry to undertake these
discussions at the Vienna International Atomic Energy Meeting
for which he is leaving Saturday, and a major opportunity will
have been lost to begin this exploration before the Venice
Summit and in the right multilateral forum.
(C)

No Objection To Declassification in ;-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

No Objection To Declassification in :-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5
MEMORANDUM

3^

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 10, 1980
•GQNFIDENTIAIT
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THROUGH

CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM

THOMAS THORNT^^'''”

SUBJECT:

M-B-B Lunch - Hidalgo

I
(U)

We should turn off the Hidalgo atops in Argentina and Chile
for the following reasons:
1. We do not want to deflect attention from Bdwdler's visit
to Argentina in July. This will be the key step in our policy
execution in the area and the Argentines should get no mixture
of signals. Another "symbolic" visit will not impress the
Argentines.
2. It will be very hard to keep a visit to Chile from appear­
ing to be a gesture to make up for the UNITAS decisions. There
is no reason for us to apologize for that decision.
Note, by the way, that there is no substantive reason for
Hidalgo to go to Latin America and it diverts him from the
Caribbean area where such a visit could be useful . At least
the visit could be postponed.
If the decision is to go ahead, however, it is critically
important that Hidalgo be under close control from the
political side so that he correctly enunciates our policy.
Mechanically this would involve:
(
1.

Thorough briefings from State and NSC.

2.

No contacts with Senior Argentine or Chilean officials
or the local press unless in the company of the Ambassador
or DCM.

3.

Perhaps a competent, Spanish-speaking Department officer
along on the trip.

CONFIDENTIAL—
Review on June 10, 1986

No Obiection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

No Objection To Declassification in ?-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

CONI1 IDENTIKIT

2
t

What can we get out of the trip7
1.

There might be some mileage in showing that we have a
Spanish-speaking (albeit not Latin American) person in
this senior position, although thiB is not likely to be
the reaction in Argentina or Chile, which view themselves
as better than Mexicans.

2.

In Argentina, Hidalgo will be one more signal that we are
seeking to normalize our relations with Argentina and will
give their military something to be happy about since there
is no chance that we can move on repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey.

3.

In Chile, it is probably useful to give an occasional signal
that our ostracism of Chile is neither total nor permanent.
If there is to be near-term political movement within Chile
it will probably come from the military.

4.

HidaTgo should, in Argentina, ensure that the human rights
message is stated firmly and clearly. If he does this, it
may have added effect, coming from'a person of mixed politi­
cal and military credentials, t

5.

In Chile, this mixture of credentials could also be useful
in getting across the depth of concern here over the Letelier
case, even among people who are not rabidly opposed to the
current Chilean Government. If Hidalgo were diplomatically
adroit, he might even be able to convey the idea that we
could deal more readily with a military government under
some other leadership.

BUT,
what
look
much

I have no evidence that Hidalgo is adroit and I don't know
his personal views (if any) are on these matters. As I
at the balance of what good he could do as opposed to how
harm, the latter is clearly greater.
(C)

Why doesn't he stay home and campaign for the President?
This was coordinated with Pastor who will also write an additional
memo.

t

■CONFIDENTIAL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

No Objection To Declassification in :rull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141 -3-9-5

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

-SfiGRET-

June 10, 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Hidalgo's Visit:
MBB Lunch (S)

DOD and Latin America —

DOD's decision to press Secretary of Navy Hidalgo's trip to
Argentina and Chile is symptomatic of their continued efforts to
undermine the President's human rights and security objectives in
Latin America. I hope you will oppose Hidalgo's visit, and urge
Harold Brqwn to focus his department's energies on the Caribbean
area and on strengthening our ties to the military in democraticcountries in the region. (S)
There are two serious consequences, which follow from DOD's
persistent preoccupation on the Southern Cone: (1) our human
rights policies to the region are weakened; mixed signals of US
intentions are sent, playing into the hands of those who seek
proof of Carter's inconsistency; and (2) they have no time or
strategy for dealing with the real security problems in the
Caribbean area or for developing warm relationships with thee
military in democratic nations, like Venezuela or Colombia. The
President has repeatedly said he wanted us to reserve our warmest
relationships for the democracies in the area and have cooler,
more distant relations with military governments. We have been
reasonably successful in doing this, although DOD has not been help­
ful.
(S)
While I think it's a good idea to move gradually toward a more
normal relationship with Argentina, and this includes a military
dimension, I think it's practically obscene and definitely makes
us look wildly inconsistent for DOD to gallop off at such a quick
pace to a new relationship. The Inter-agency group has agreed to
more military measures for cooperation than I think is appropriate,
but a visit by Hidalgo will break the camel's back. The only
thing we will get out of his visit is grief. We've got enough. (S)
As we move toward an improved relationship with Argentina, it is
of the greatest importance that our two galloping horses —
Commerce and Defense — be encouraged to stress the continuity of
our concerns about human rights; otherwise, it will look like
another zig in our policy. DOD and Commerce will not even mention
human rights , except to say that we're o.k., you're o.k., unless
they are told to do so. (S)
cc: Tom Thornton/Linc Bloomfield
f

JSJSGRET
Review 6/10/90
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)
No Obiection To Declassification in -ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-15-3-2-2-8

4- *0

/

4*

~\Jll

> iri ..n.dum
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

•SECRET
INFORMATION
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE "MEETING
May 14, 198 ft
TIME AND PLACE:

10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions — PRC Meeting
on Argentina (C)

PARTICIPANTS
State
Warren Christopher, Dep.
Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't.
Secretary
Defense
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,
Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal
Dep. Ass't. Secretary
Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep.
Under Secretary
Commerce
Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary
for Internat. Economic Policy
and Research

Energy
Woody Cunningham, Ass't.
Secretary for Nuclear Energy
Arms Control and Disarmament
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear
Exports Div. Chief, Bureau
of Nonproliferation
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General John Pustay
Central Intelligence
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America
White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen
National Security Council
Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

The PRC met to discuss US-Argentine relations in light of your
concern about the development of closer ties between Argentina
and the Soviet Union.
It was. agreed that we should continue to
seek improvement in our relations with Argentina, recognizing
NSC review(s) completed.

■SECRET
Review on May 14, 2000
Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

?
MORI/CDF C03314786

□cCLASSIFiEL
E.0.13526

■ No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31

NAHA
-----Date_jml*------ILC-15-3-2-2-8
.

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-15-3-2-2-8
SB

2

that probably no dramatic progress (or, for that matter, deteri­
oration) is likely until there is a new government in Buenos
Aires in early 1981.
In the next few weeks we may have to
show our displeasure over Argentina's likely failure to be
cooperative on the grain embargo; on the other hand, we can
justify some positive steps in the relationship by the improv­
ing trend of Argentina's human rights performance.
(S)
Looking to the longer-term, and assuming continuing improvement
in human rights matters, we would propose a systematic effort
to strengthen our ties with Argentina.
This could ultimately
lead to full normalization and perhaps repeal of legislative
restrictions on military supply.
(S)
This timetable should help deflect the Argentinians from too
close a relationship with the Soviets — a relationship that
is in any event probably self-limiting due to the nature of
the Argentine regime.
(S)
All agencies supported this consensus; both Commerce and Defense
however, made clear in the course of the discussions that they
want to press for more rapid improvement in the relationship
than do the other agencies.
Defense was particularly concerned
that our human rights and nuclear policies were forcing Argen­
tina to draw close to the USSR.
An interdepartmental Group will
be set up to provide an opportunity to fine-tune our policies to
meet the needs and concerns of individual agencies in line with
the broad policy structure agreed upon.
(S)

CECIU5P

?

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-15-3-2-2-8

' No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-133-8-3-20-0

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

____

. _

___ __________

February 1. 1980

DOS REVIEWED 10-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT !
FROM:

Cyrus Vance C¥^

1. Harrlman Dinner for Fraser - l received a report
this morning about the dinner last night by Averell Harrlman for
Malcolm Fraser. Muskie made the observation that never
in his memory since the end of World War U had the country been
more unified behind the President as a result of die response
to the State of the Union. Glenn, while using more cautious language,
echoed the same sentiments.
2. Argentina - I received a cable from Buenos Aires
this afternoon which reports a meeting between Foreign Minister
Pastor and our Ambassador. The Foreign Minister went out of
his way to scotch the rumors that the Argentinians were
backing off of the understandings reached with Andy. He said
that he had heard some of these rumors but they were not reliable.
Pastor indicated he would probably call m& in the next day or so
to let ub know the Argentinians are not backtracking, and that they
want to support and be with the United States.
3. Rhodesia and the Security Council - In close cooperation
with the British, Don McHenry negotiated major changes in the
African draft resolution of January 31. Early this morning, London
requested a series of further changes and renewed its plea
that we vote '’No" if the UK does. McHenry reported that the
Africans are disposed to consider further alterations but that
they will remain firm on the paragraph condemning South African
intervention. We expect that something close to the present draft
will be tabled. Don believes that the text has been improved to the

—SECRET
RDS - 2/3 2/1/00 (Vance, Cyrus)
*

Authority

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
~

NARA__££___Data

Nn Ohiprtinn Tn Dprlasssifinatinn in Full 2012/11/23 ■ Nl P.-133-R-3-2D-0

------

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-133-8-3-20-0

• SEGREP*
2

-

-

point where we should support it. The BritishMission
in New York favors a UK abstention, but their instructions
are clear in insisting on deletions of the condemnation of South
Africa. I will talk to Don again in the morning and be in touch
with you. The vote won't come until tomorrow afternoon.
4. Summer Olympics - Within the past 24 hours we have had
a strong confidential message of support Jjrom the PRC, a public
statement from Japan, and evidence that public opinion is slowly
moving the French government in our direction. Equally encourag­
ing are the courageous public stands taken by the governments of
The Netherlands and Norway. Muhammed All's five-nation trip
to Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Liberia and Senegal, is now set.
Indications are that Ali will receive an enthusiastic welcome
even from nations inclined to go to the Moscow games. The impact
of his mission in Africa should be considerable. African and US
press interest is mounting and a number of reporters and a network
pool are expected to join the party in Dar-es-Salaam or Nairobi.
5. Greek Reintegration and Resumption of Base Negotiations Matt Nimetz met with the Greek Ambassador today to respond to
Prime Minister Karamanlis' message to me. He told the Ambas­
sador that we continue to attach great importance to Greek reinte­
gration, that we are willing to resume negotiations for a new
agreement on our bases in Greece, and that Bernie Rogers would soon
be in touch with Greek military leaders to discuss his latest proposal.
Matt urged the Greeks to cooperate with Rogers.
Karamanlis’ message urged that the base negotiations consider
a US pledge to maintain the existing ratio in our future military
assistance to Greece and Turkey. Matt told the Ambassador
we could not enter the negotiations with preconditions, but were
aware of the need to design our military assistance programs in
a manner which preserved the military balance in the region; our
legislation required this. The Ambassador thought Athens would
need some commitment on aid proportionality. We are considering
ways to meet the Greek concerns while not committing ourselves to
any fixed ratio.

-SEORET Nn Dhiprtinn Tn Dpr.la^ifinatinn in f-iill PD12/11 /?3 ■ Nl P.-133-8-3-20-0'

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-133-8-3-20-0

-SECRET
6.

FRG Proposal for International Assistance to Turkey German Finance Minister Matthoefer gave Ambassador Sloes sei the
following FRG preliminary thinking on the International assistance
effort for Turkey: The FRG envisions a five-year program subject
to annual review but with a "big start" the first year. The total economi
assistance the FRG is contemplating as its contribution for 1980
Is $290 million (US FY-81 request for economic assistance is
$200 million). The US would have to exceed the FRG (perhaps by
$50 million) but this could be in the form of military assistance.
The FRG is also considering making a commitment for $347 million
in military assistance in 1980 (US FY-81 request for military
assistance is $250 million FMS). The FRG believes that three times
the combined US and FRG contributions (fan be elicited in the total
program. This would mean $3.5 billion in economic and military
assistance from all sources in 1980. Matthoefer wants to complete
the program by April,
7. Victor Paknieri's Report - We have sent you Victor
Palmieri'B report on hts January trip to Southeast Asia,
which focuses on the Indochina Refugee program, and the
complex Kampuchean relief situation in particular. The report
makes clear that the food situation in Kampuchea is very likely to
take a major turn for the worse in early spring without more
effective distribution of the relief supplies now coming into the
country under the ICR C/UNICEF program. This could add to the
serious refugee pressures in Thailand. 1 commend the report to
your attention.

\ln nhipntinn Tn npnla«5«?ifir.atinn in i-nll 2D19/11/23 • Nl G-133-R-3-20-D

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/18 : NLC-133-43-6-4-6 J72
to

r -MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Hay 12, 1980
■ SECRETINFORMATION

1

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

THOMAS THORNT

SUBJECT:

Briefing Memorandum - Argentine PRC


(U)

*

State has generated a lot of paper for this meeting.
At Tab B
is a "discussion paper" that was written for the planned, but
cancelled, meeting on Argentina two weeks ago.
You can skip
it.
(U)
At Tab A is the issues paper for the current meeting.
Although
it makes reference to the earlier "discussion paper" it is
essentially self-contained. After a three-page discussion of
the setting, the paper goes into the mid-range issues in some
detail and then concludes with three broad options for policy
(pp. 10-11).
Not surprisingly, the middle of these options
is the policy that waB proposed in the old discussion paper.
The two surrounding options can be characterized as the "Pat
Derian Option" — a very cool approach to the Argentinians
and the "DOD Option" — which would press ahead more rapidly
than we are doing now.
There is an annex on Soviet-Argentine
relations that you can skip.
(S)
I would not recommend that you get involved in the discussion
effective by ensuring that some basic considerations are kept
in view:

1

— We are concerned about the growt^i of Soviet influence in the
Southern Cone, Brazil as well as Argentina.
We should avoid
forcing Argentina to turn to the Soviets, but our main thrust
(in private discussions as you did with Martinez, but also
publicly) should be to point out that Argentina is approacha basic choice in its orientation.
There iB only one way
that choice can go, given Argentine history and the anti­
communist rationale used to justify the regime's policies.
We should enlist the support of our allies in this.
(S)

3ECRET
Review on May 12, 1986

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

Authority
NARA__ £6___ Data.

^VvVwi

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/18 :J\ILC-133-43-6-4-6_ 72
*

t
KnnTiifT -

9IILXU& X

2

— Argentina has given us little to be thankful for on grain
sales to the USSR. Their exports have substantially weakened
the effectiveness of the grain suspension, and we have no
reason to believe they will be more cooperative in the next
crop year. Within our overall strategy, we should keep
strong pressure on them; attempt to elicit their support
(however unlikely); and not be apologetic about our own
actions (as State has tended to be).
(C)
— We should not gratuitously offend Argentina on human rights
and should pay attention to ways of rewarding improvement in
their behavior. We should not make a major shift in our poli­
cies, however, for their performance is still among the worst
in Latin America (see the summary on p. 2 of Tab A). We also
must keep the overall credibility of our policy in mind and
should not trade off human rights concerns against loosening
of their Soviet ties or a cutback in grain sales. Our focus
should be on improvement of current practises. The need for
an accounting of the "disappeareds" cannot be swept aside
although it should not be the prime focus of our approach.
(S)
— Military contacts are important and should be encouraged
in an inconspicuous way. They should be done in a way
that underscores, rather than weakens, our human rights
policy.
It would be foolhardy to seek any revisions in
the legislation at this time to permit us to sell mili­
tary equipment to Argentina. That would be too clear an
abandonment of our human rights policy. This is true
even for sale of training, as desirable as that may be
in itself.
(Madeleine agrees.)
(S)
Overall, the choice has to be for Option B. Much, however,
will depend on the manner of our presentation. We should be
tough with Argentina, not approach them as a suppliant.
Through the three visits to B.A., we have made a serious
opening bid and have gotten nothing in return except perhaps
their decision on the Olympics. If some of our human rights
people have been overly zealous they mety need to be reined in
a bit, but the essence of the problem is in Argentine perfor­
mance, not our reaction to it.
(S)
Bob Pastor points out that Argentina was not helpful to us at
San Jose, partly in deference to Cuha. Add to this their
failure to carry through on their promises to ratify Tlatelolco
and their other shortcomings and we have a picture of a pretty
-jjBCIlST—

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/18 : NLC-133-43-6-4-6

-SECRET

3

tough case. We should handle it th^t way, while trying to get
Argentina to shape up on issues of importance to us.
(S)
Addendum (I) : Our commercial relations with Argentina are not
part of the agenda but may be raised by Luther Hodges. The
most important pending item is OFIC guarantees for US involve­
ment in a hydroelectric project, affacting both Argentina and
Paraguay. The relevant human rights legislation is apparently
ironclad and precludes OPIC support. Yet Hodges has just com­
pleted a trip to Argentinta to promote US sales of hydroelectric
equipment! The Christopher committee will meet on this one
Thursday and Line and I will try to find a reasonable solution
to this silly situation. It lookB, however, like we may be in
a legal straight-jacket.
(C)
Addendum (II) i Brazil ±b also not specifically on the agenda
and although we are of course concerned about Soviet blandish­
ments there, I see no issue that needs PRC consideration.
Ambassador Sayre wrote to Harold Brown (who sent a copy of the
letter to you — Tab C) about exchange of military visits.
That, however, can be handled routinely.
(C)
\

Clearances:

Lincoln Bloomfield (in draft)
Tim Deal
("
" )
Jerry Oplinger
("
" )

t

SECRET

foos REVIEWED io-Jan^O'TlTDECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE INVuLffl16 '■ NLC-133-22-30-3-3

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOMl'11DliMTlAL/LIMDI S
XGDS-4

August 28, 1978
T

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT

Human Rights in'*Argentina

A.

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single­
spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-*
President and one of the founders of the Argentine Perma­
nent Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours
with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his
'imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police.
Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself
reading through the entire 14-page Memcon, though I had
intended only to skim it.
Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay
the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have pre­
pared below a short summary of that Memcon.
Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance"—plainclothosmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took
him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car.
Then begins, the horror.
Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers.
During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied
food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and
witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punish­
ment. He himself was:

_

I
>

N L^-~~

F-P

’CONTIDHHTIAL/L IMP.ES
XGDS-4
(Classified by Z. Brzezinski)

MARA

(

— subjected to "the submarine"—repeatedly being held
under water until almost drowned.

Authority

— subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were
held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and
then shoved into a bucket of boiling water;

E.0.13526

— subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged
electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed;

DetoJllSilk _________

— beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs;

DECLASSIFIED

*

XGDS-4

Objection To Declassification in <=ull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-3-3

J

Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological
horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to:
— As he was moved from detention center to detention
center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other
naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture.
— Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in
a circle of prisoners holding hands and Electricity was ap­
plied; a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by
and her boy friend shot when he objected; the group was beaten.
Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a
litany of questions about the activities and political affilia­
tions of people known and unknown to Bravo.
In the last session,
Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field
which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded,
heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired. Then
he and a few other prisoners we^e returned to the truck and
to detention.
Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on
an entirely different plane—as civilized people conducting
a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a "regular prisoner",
and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would
be found to have committed suicide. During his months in
La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his
own and worse.
In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he
was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other
man. He said he provided this information "to show you what
you are fighting for". He asked that the Embassy treat the
information carefully, "as my life is in your hands".

cc:

Jessica Tuchman

COOT IDENg-Iftfe/LIMBSS
XGDS-4

t

No Objection To Declassification in trull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
•fpflMF I DFN'T1 T a r. - GDS
August 9, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR ■

SUBJECT:

Argentina:

f

-

Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina:
(1) current status
of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S.
policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the
Southern Cone, and if so, how we got i^to it, and whether the
NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President.
The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions
are answered below.
i

I.

Argentina1s Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human
rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty Inter­
national launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at
focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which
includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000
political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been
charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented
stories of arrest and torture.
(One report from our Embassy
is at Tab B.)
On human rights-related matters, world opinion
always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to
correct that.
While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere,
there has been some improvement in recent months. We under­
stand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police,
and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under
executive power have decreased and lists of those detained
have been published; and a limited right of option for political
prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted.
On a number
of cases in which we have expressed special interest — Jacobo
Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family —
the Argentine Government has released them.
II.

U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting
"no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

declassified

E.0.13528
Authority.
NAHA_!£Jt-

.Doto

o

A

No Objection To Declassification in i-ull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4

VJUw)

Ct

We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related
munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another
group of requests.
^
We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach
agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights/ and there is no deterioration in the human
rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to
them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two
major credit sales.
The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the KennedyHumphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal
amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come
into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps
which would permit the enormous back-lcg of credit to be com­
mitted before then.
(There are over 7.5 pending FMS cases for
$50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.)
There are also funds for military training, which are being
held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had
a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.
Our current objectives are to urge the G0A-: (1) to permit the
IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRCl's regulations;
(2) to begin releasing large numbers oij prisoners (without re­
arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain
those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return .to the rule
of law.
Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement
with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the
other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance
with various legislative requirements, was made by State without
consulting NSC.
III.

Future U.S. Policy: who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its
effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and
jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify
the repression?
The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all,
President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the
war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was
working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not’ left
Argentina, but it is now the exception{ not the rule. And
Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just
encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless,
a central tenet of our human rights policy is that governmentsanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in
his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism
is to promote justice. . . Justice that is summary undermines
the future it seeks to promote,
rt produces only more
violence..."
CONFIDENTIAL-- -GDS

No Objection To Declassification in pull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4

COMrIDEMTIitt. - GDS

-3-

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the'■‘circuits
and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union,
there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue.
Indeed,
it is even more difficult to change direction than with the
Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate
that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose
bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything
less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find
ourself, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as
_ cjnr-piy as a different decision on Dresser.
Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to
finance $270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits.
I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective
instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us
little choice. The decision did have,an unintended positive
impact in that it has finally aroused the business community
(there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending
in' X-M), and they have descended on met and I have deflected
them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive
amendments to the X-M bill last week.
I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom
told me he had decided to hold everything up until the
Argentines agreed to a visit by the‘Inter-American Commission.
Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought
Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and
still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking
into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if
it is we who blinked first.
It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first.
For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March',
and they seem to be behind us.
Secondly, world public opinion
is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and
the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half
dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least
$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image.
Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time,
i-s in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward
on his own to restore the rule of law/ As he takes those steps,
I will make sure that we are quick to respond.
So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy
to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have
to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around,
and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.
IV.

The Southern Cone:

Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy
around to the Southern Cone soon,.we will have them allied against
rnNFTnENTTftr T- GDS

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4

‘JSQNF-fBENTTftL - GDS

-4V

us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short .time, in early 1977,
the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — tried to.establish
a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these
governments distrusted each other more than they despised
President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and
indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely
narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The
narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things,
the pettiness of their international disputes with one another.
Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle
Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations
almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.
Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been
at'any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can
be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate
chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have
tried through the working groups and the yisits by the President
and Vance to develop a cooperative relatiohship, but that will
have to await Brazil's new government next year.

t

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with
the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that ^Jimmy
Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans;
no other American President in this century has done that.
Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected
in the universities because'of his strong anti-Communism and the
Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of
great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the'
young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately,
sometimes infuriates .some of the conservatives and the military.
Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike any­
thing the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at
the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America,
which we had almost lost'.
The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern
Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that
the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our
relations.
They use every opportunity and every channel —
including Kissinger — to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty,
twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would
ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the m&ntle of legitimacy would
have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.
The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed
by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated
gOMriDEMTIAL— GDS

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4

-CONFiBENTTTCL - GDS

-5V

than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape­
goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt,
and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think
it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy
around at this time.

t

■CONFIDENTIAL— GDS

t

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/16 : NLC-133-144-5-2-7
Department

of

State

BRIEFING PAPER

Argentina
Delegation: Foreign Minister Carlos Washington
Pastor will head the GOA delegation. Other members
unknown.
A retired, 56 year-old, Air Force Brigadier
General, Pastor was appointed Foreign Minister
in November 1978 by President Videla. He had
no previous diplomatic experience, and his appointment
was attributed to his close ideological affinity
with Videla and his marriage to the President's
sister.
Pastor is not believed to be well versed
in foreign affairs and has not won wide respect;
he is regarded, however, as hard working and
conscientious. He is generally pro-U.S., but
strongly disagrees with U.S. human rights policy.
He speaks no English.
Indochina Refugee Policy: The GOA expressed
its intention to receive 100 Indochinfese in 1978
and recently announced that it woifld receive
300 family groups from Indochina. It also recently
doubled its financial contribution to the UNHCR
for assistance to Indochinese refugees.
Rescue of Refugees
instructed its Merchant
encountered at sea. We
incidents of rescue and
would be followed.

at Sea: The GOA has
Marine to rescue refugees
have no reports of specific
do not know what procedures

Likely Future Policy: The GOA can be expected
to continue its willingness to receive small
numbers of refugees, conditioned on its resettlement
experience with those it is already pledged to
receive.

Department of State
July 16, 1979

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q. 13526
GDS 7/16/79

Authority M
NARA—fib P___Date

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/16 : NLC-133-144-5-2-7

S-a -1

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/10 : NLC-10-20-5-5-8
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
■6ECHET.-JCS Review Completed

MORI 0)3316040

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

May 8, 1979
State Department
review completed

MEMORANDUM FOR

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT:

Evening Report (U)

*

Argentina.
The U. S.-Argentina Conference was very informative with
frank and useful exchanges on human rights, democratization,
economic problems, the NAM, etc.
The Argentines have clearly passed
through a national trauma, and the memory of the civil war will
unquestionably have a salving and moderating influence as they
begin the task of re-building a more democratic society.
There is
a feeling among them that they have juBt turned the corner, though
they are not in a hurry to re-discover politics.
Today, the human
rights officer from our Embassy in Buenos Aires stopped by, and
while agreeing that disappearances have declined sharply, encouraged
us to press the Argentines on three concerns: Timerman, torture,
and an accounting of the disappearances.
He also provided an
interesting statistic on the civil war: 659 Argentine soldiers or
police were killed (according to GOA sources) and 10-15,000
civilians. (S)
Caribbean.
Called a meeting of representatives from Treasury, AID,
State, World Bank, IDB, and 0MB to discuss the U.S. position at the
donors' meeting of the Caribbean Group (CG) in Paris next week.
Given the changed political circumstances in the Caribbean, it is
essential that the donors have their act together when the full CG
meets in June.
The World Bank has set d target of $650 million for
the region's requirements this year for project aid and for the
Caribbean Development Facility (CDF).
We are going to have to come
up with some more money if we will be able to maintain our 1978
level of 30% of the CDF. (S)
Two officers from the JCS stopped by to discuss their study of the
security implications of Cuban military modernization and of the
PRM on Central America.
I asked them to do some work on the
implications of the Cuban build-up on the "basin" countries and on
NATO. (S)
Mexico.
STR is sending a team down to Mexico to try to complete
negotiations.
The tomato issue is looming ominously on the horizon.
Treasury is supposed to make a preliminary determination by July 17
on anti-dumping charges, and we are looking for ways to avoid that.
Talked to Frank White of DPS about a joint memo from Stu and you to
the President on the undocumented workers issue. (C)

SSeRET

DECLASSIFIED

EYT T1Y1TD 6 YEARS BY

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/10 : NLC-10-20-5-5-8

E.0.1352B
\JL- (7- O-

Authority
naraJsE.

Dsto

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-10-1-7-2-0
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
•SBCRET-

March 21, 1977
a

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

&

*

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

NORTH-SOUTH

SUBJECT:

Evening Report

Daily Activities

instructions apply

ON-FII.E NSC RELEASE

(Hansen)
OSD REVIEW

Continued preparation for PRM 8.

cinU nlrJ

P9MPL_ETED

-------

(Thornton)
Met with Gene Kramer, who will represent AP in New Delhi, for general
background discussion.
In the afternoon, attended the South Asia Working Group meeting for
PRM 10 at the State Department.
(Pastor)
1,
On Friday night I attended a dinner with the Argentine Ambassador,
and with two Ministers of his Embassy. We spoke about many issues, but
the two which we spent the moBt time on were the current political situation
in Argentina and U .S . policy on human rights. They told me that they were
well aware of President Carter's great concern for human rights, that they
were presently undergoing a serious political problem in Argentina, and
they hoped that the United States would understand, and that they wanted
to continue to have good relations and a dialogue with the United States.
Privately one Minister told me that he personally hoped that the U.5 .
commitment to human rights would not waiver.
I
I

SEGRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority

NflRA

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-10-1-7-2-0

E.0.13526
^P

X -O

Dpte nW\\l#

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-10-1-7-2-0

SBCRET

2.
Attended a discussion where there were two delegates to the Cuban
mission to the United Nations present. I discreetly overheard one conversation
where one delegate expressed his concern that jurisdictional problems
^
preventing terrorist actions by Cuban exiles.
3.
Lunched with Sergio Motta Mello, a journalist with O Eatado da
Sao Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper, and discussed the current state
of U.S .-Brazilian relations. He said that Brazilian politics were in turmoil
at the present time, and it was not clear to him whether the forces of
moderation or the forces of repression would win. He said that in the
short term, U.S . policies on human rights may cause some problems,
but he thought that in the long term it would be beneficial both to Brazil
as well as to the United States. Like me, he expressed uncertainty about
how the nuclear problem would work itself out, but he suggested a cooling
off period might be in order.
4.
Met with Eugenio Velasco, one of the two Chilean lawyers who was
exiled recently because they were defending political prisoners in Chile,
and discussed the current political situation in Chile.
5.
Worked on Pan American Day speech, letter to Echeverria, back­
ground memo for credentials ceremony (Chilean Ambassador), and
various memoranda.
Significant Infbrmation/Intelligence
a

(Thornton)

t

My batting average slipped to 500 as Mrs. Gandhi went down to crashing
defeat at the palls. There are other unfortunate implications of this, also,
but they will require detailed analysis . It is not completely certain yet
that the Congress could not form a government, but given the trend, it
seems highly unlikely. The opposition has yet to organize itself and is
much of an unknown quantity although we know the individual leaders
very well.
In Pakistan, the violence over the weekend has abated somewhat, but the
Embassy now believes Bhutto's days to be numbered.

SBCHET-

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 ! NLC-10-1-7-2-0

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-10-1-7-2-0
i

REGRET"

-3-

The situation on the ground in Zaire shows no marked change. Nigeria
has apparently taken on responsibility to mediate. This is obviously the
most desirable outcome. Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba was here today
and has left for the UN. Bill S chaufele tells me that the meeting was
productive, and a report is on its way over. I am aware of nothing further
in the military supply front since the SCC Working Group met on Saturday.
The Turnhalle Conference being held in Southwest Africa has ended,
It has produced the basis of a constitution which leaves all real power
in the hands of the South African Government and provides for an interim
government that may be in place by summer but will be subject to consensus
procedures and hence very limited in what it can 4° ■
SWAPO remains unreconciled, and the results of Turnhalle do not look
like a basis for building a Namibia settlement.
CPastor)
Panama. In a discussion with Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander,
General Torrijos of Panama said that he was prepared to accept some form
of bilateral security assurance in a post-Treaty period if the United States
would be more forthcoming on disposition of lands and facilities to Panama
during the Treaty's life.
Chile. The Catholic Church in Chile reacted violently to the Government's
decision to dissolve the remaining political parties, and it feels that a return
to democracy almost impossible. The Chilean Government has apparently
given up on its interest in trying to influence the
Government, and
one indication of that is its support for the Panamanian Government in
international fora. Previously, Chile has supported the United States on
Canal-related issues, but because of our tough position on human rights
at the UN Commission and because Panama also voted against Chile, Pinochet
apparently thought it would be easier to gain the support of Panama.
Foreign Reaction to U.S, Human Rights Policy:
In Brazil, the recent silence by the government has given pro-human
rights elements an opportunity to voice their support for U .S . policy
on human rights. This is best seen in editorial pages of several
newspapers and among the congressional leadership of the opposition
party. MDB Deputy Carreira delivered a speech congratulating
Jimmy Carter and declared that the West owed Carter thanks for his
desire to give force to the idea of liberal democracy.

(

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 : NLC-10-1-7-2-0

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 . NLC-10-1-7-2-0

c:irr*nr.Trr

-4-

In Nicaragua! the Samoa a family newspaper, NovedadeB, included a
vituperative editorial page attacking Carter's hypocritical policy
on human rights.
In Costa Rica, Foreign Minister Fado, said that the Carter Admini­
stration's policy on human rights "was logical for the country that
proclaims to be a leader of the free worlti."

i

t
I

-SECRET'

I

t
No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 . NLC-10-1-7-2-0

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/15 : NLC-10-13-4-19-2

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
Daily Activities

(Pastor)

July 11, 1978

Met with our Ambassador to Argentina Castro today to diBcusB
the gamut of U. S.-Argentine relations Jt On Tlatelolco, he
explained the complex ratification process, but said that it
is virtually completed, and he expects the foreign ministry to
send the ratified treaty to Mexico.
On the Beagle channel
dispute, he expressed concern over the possibility of war,
said that we should make our interest in a peace settlement
known, but should stay away from the problem, and perhaps
recommend that the Canadians mediate.
On human rightB, he said
that Argentina had made a good deal of progress, and he ex­
pected it to complete agreement with the Inter-American Com­
mission for a visit soon.
After that, we could go ahead with
military training and creditB, etc.
He also plans to press
them on releasing prisoners ft)
With Mathews, I met with Governor Peabody and aide who were
lobbying on behalf of the Haitian government for a couple of .
small military assistance items.
Attended a session on Puerto Rico between Stu Eizenstat, Jose
Cabranes, and State people.
Henry and I will send you a short
memo on it.
*

Met with Jan Kalicki of Kennedy's staff and discussed a variety
of human rights issues.
He said that'he will try to get
Kennedy to work on the human rights conventions more.
Also
worked on a possible compromise on the Quito Sueno treaty
with Pete Vaky and Senate staff.
Sparkman has answered the
President's letter on the subject and I will send you a memo
on it.
Worked on letter to Dominican President-elect Guzman, the nonaligned cables, a memo on energy discussions with Venezuela.
At North-South meeting this morning wo discussed the Jamaican
Cooper trip and a possible address by the President on Northouth issues.

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
ffliithnritv NILC-1D-

~ 3,

CQNF-IDENTIAI* - GDS

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/15 : NLC-10-13-4-19-2

- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/19^: NLC-10-12-1 -16-9

■SECRET-- GpS

Daily Activities (Pastor)

May 30, 1978

At the North-South meeting, we discussed the future of Zaire
and agreed there wasn't much. Then attended, with Tom Thornton,
the interagency meeting at State on the new PRM on Cuban/Soviet
Involvement in Africa. Newsom chaired it, and Moose suggested
that we proceed by keeping our Africa policy, that we not keep
our head in the sand, but that we also don't run off halfcocked. (s)
Lunched with Paul Kreisberg, Tony Lake's Deputy, and talked
about ways to put the Cuban cat back in the bag. He raised some
interesting questions about my ideas on cutting European credits
and working through the NAM, and I will refine a memo on the
subject to you. Also talked about USr-Brazilian military rela­
tions, and I suggested that now was not the beBt time to formu­
late a grand initiative on the subject.
(In a later conversa­
tion with Mort Abramowitz, he told roe he would send DOD's idea
for a new "minimal military relationship" to the President
through NSC when it was ready.)
Met with Gregory Wolfe of American University who was Don
Fraser's representative observing the Dominican elections, and
he felt assured that outside pressure facilitated Balagu^r's
decision to respect the elections. He suggested that Guzman
might come to the U.S. to meet with U.S. business and Congres­
sional leaders to talk about the Dominican Republic's future.
I said that provided it was clearly understood by all that a
meeting with the President would not. occur, I thought the idea
seemed fine. Kirby Jones called and tried out the same idea on
me so something must be cooking. (C)
With Guy Erb, I met with Steve Lande and Jon Rosenbaum of STR
to discuss their latest round of consultations on the MTN with
selected Latin American countries. They met with mixed success,
but I think the fact that they discussed these issues with the
Central American Secretariat, the Andean' Pact, and several
Latin American countries is, in many trays, more iiSportant than
reaching agreement at this stage.
The President received a letter, dated May 10, from Luis Pinerua
Ordaz, the Presidential candidate from Perez's party in Venezuela,
thanking him for the President's letter of March 30 and for his
wonderful visit to Venezuela. The State Department recommends
that the President does not need to respond to the letter, and
I concur.
SECRET « GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority ^ L£,-\0 -ya. -N-\Yrf
NAHA_££__ Deto__

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/19 : NLC-10-12-1-16-9

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/19 : NLC-10-12-1-16-9
S3B€RET-=- 'GDS

Significant Intelligence:

(Pastor)

t

Argentina In follow-up to Newsom mission, Ambassador
CaBtro told President Videla that US would consult with
Congress and grant military training application if the
Argentines invite IAHRC visit in near future under
mutually acceptable ground rules. Videla was apparently
pleased and, hopefully, will take firm action to rally
support for an IAHRC visit,
Brazil; President Geisel's handpicked candidate Figueiredo
faces an uncertain future. The broad spectrum of opposition
is still divided: most likely opposition candidate at the
moment is Euler Bentes Monteiro—left, of center but
possibly attractive to Brazilian military. Figueiredo
meanwhile gave a series of interviews which emphasized
his inflexible support of current Brazilian foreign
policy and sought to justify his selection by Geisel—
on several issues Figueiredo came out so badly that his
staff decided he won't give any more interviews for a while
and then only in written form

.($J

m

Dominican Republic; In delivering the messages from
President Carter, Ambassador Yost met|. with PreBident-elect
Guzman, who was very pleased with supportive role of US
during the electoral crisis, and with Balaguer. Both
meetings provide a reasonable basis for the still potentially
difficult transition period. Perez of Venezuela also
sent congratulations to Guzman.
Chile; Reports from Chile emphasize that Pinochet's future
rides on the outcome of the Letelier investigation.
Belief is that Pinochet will be forced from joffice if
the investigation reveals DINA involvement.

(£■)

Peru: Although the details are not yet clear, the Peruvian
Government, in apparent response to the general strike,
exiled a number of individuals. This is a deplorable,
but understandable, regression in Peru's hitherto admirable
progress on human rights.CfJ

SECRET— GDS

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/19 : NLC-10-12-1-16-9

^

r .No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

744

*******0 0 'H I H H I ~A' L*»*»***E COPY

CF IMMED
DOS REVIEWED 12 VIAY 2010 DECLASSIFIED
UTS418
DZ RUESBA #5172/1 17721ZZ
C 262017Z JUN 7?
TM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

FOR RELEASE IN FULL,1

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1252
i

*

-CONF-IDEN-TiAT. SECTION 1 OF 2 BdENOp AIRES 5172
V.C. 12065 XDS-1 6126109 (CASTRO, RAUL E) CR-M
TAGS AR, SHUM
SIT EJECT (C) AMBASSADOR DISCD3SES HUMAN RIGHTS -/ITH GENERAL 7ICIA
REE: A BUENOS AIRES 4721} B STATE 1636Z2
1. (C-FNTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA

ON JACOBO TIMERMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE
LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE.
VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE
REDUCED SUBSTNATIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT
IN RIGHT OF OOPTION CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT
CONFIDENCE IAHRC WOULD EIND. IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN
FUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, BUT OFFERED NO HOP 5 FOR "DESAPARECIDOS
PE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING
nOA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH USG IN ITS OBJECTIVES.
"ICL-A FELT AN OAS MILITARY PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED
BUT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY

I

3. APPRECIATION FOR MFM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA,
JUNTA PRESIDENT AND ARMY COMMANDER, REQUESTED I MEET
WITH HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFIC.-S.
DUE TO MY 3EING OUT.OE COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL
VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. HE MET ME WITH THE
TRADITIONAL "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT HOW THINGS STOOD
IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINESS BUT YET
RTTCWEr CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS.
4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS
DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OAKS
AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASHINGTON POST
EDITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. RE HOPED

.-it##*#*#*#:):*#*## *WHSR COMMENT sfc*##:}'*#*#*#***#
FOB :PASTOR,BLOOM
FS N :004421

PAGE 01

TOR:177/21:312

DTG:262017Z JUN 79

i

=»****»*C 0 N F I D I—W-a I ft

l*****»*F

COPY

Nn Dhifirtinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2013/01/17 : Nl C-24-35-7-9-0

.No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

*******C ONFIDIX' TIA x.*******® COPT
UrFARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEFT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO",
RECOGNIZING SOME MERIT TO PORTIONS OF REPORTING. I MADE
IT CLEAR TC VIOLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT
AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT.
”E ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND
STATED NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO USG.
VIOLA'S CONCERN WAS THAT DUE TC IMPORTANCE OF NEW YOR'A
TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CATE IN
ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS POSTURE TOWARDS GOA.
I AILAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING EIM DEPARTMENT AND
USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIFW ON ARGENTINA.
I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUS TO HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT USG WELCOMED IMPROVEMENTS. I
EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT"ND IMPROVED
RELATIONS WERE CONTIGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS,
ftp ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT.
I
~. IAHRC VISIT: VIOLA REMINDED ME IAHRC WOULD BE VISIT­
ING ARGENTINA
™gag are g, ^ STATED THIS
DATE WAS CHOSEITbY IAHRC AND NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE
BEEN ANTICIPATING ITS VISIT SINCE LATE MAY. VIOLA
STATED PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED'TREMENDOUSLY
AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. HE SAID ALL
OF GOA IS BEING GEARED FOR IAHRC VISIT RESULTING IN
VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TCRTURF AND NO IRREGULAR
ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS
AS OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS jfAS A BLACK
MASK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY
EFFORTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION.
*. DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1978 THERE WAS AN
AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT
FE LOCKED AT HE WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN — FROM EAR TO EAR
— JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURSNS, AS IF
THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "i TA*”* YOUR FIGURES
OF FITTY PER MONTH LAST YEAR. LOOK AT THE RECORD THIS
YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARTD IN SIX MONTHS."
I INTERRUPTED EIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED'TWENTYTWO DISAPPEARANCES. HF SAID EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT
THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLEGED THE
IMPROVEMENT BUT TOLD HIM HE WOULD NOT GET MUCH SOLACE
FROM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS
THAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY
TIME IAHRC ARRIVED GOA VOUID REACH THE ZERO STATUS.
VIOLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE DESPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT
RFTURN. I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HF REPEATED
IN HIS OPINION THE DISAPPEARED WOULD NOT BE SURFACING.
AGAIN, I ASKED ON WHAT HE BASED HIS OPINION. VIOLA'S
HVFLY WAS THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION CN THE DISAPPEARED
PS N:004421

PAGE 02

TOR :177/21:51Z

#***#**c 0 H E I D H

DTG:2S2017Z JUV 7

i IA L*******E COPY

Nn Ohifirtinn Tn Hfidassifiratinn in Full 2013/01/17 : Nl G-24-3S-7-9-0

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

*#**#**c_0- N -F I—B-E -K--I A

l**+****E

COPT

ANT IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED PERIODS OF DISAPPEARANCE
HR DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE
MIGHT BE A FEW CASES SURFACING - THOSE UNQCCCUNTED
FOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THIS! WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS.
VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME SiATEMENT ON
DISAPPEARED WREN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAIL IT WOULU'BE A
STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT. HOPEFULLY WOULD BE
FALATABLF TO SOCIETY.
7. RIGHT OE OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION
PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. Hi WAS REMINDED
GOA ~ THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — EAD NOT GIVEN
EMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD
RAISED ALL KINDS OE BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED
WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OE OPTION CASES
WOULD PE MOVING EAST FROM NOW OR, HE SAID THESE CASES
WERE HIGH ON THE AGENDA.
BT

»

\

'

*\

..■4.

(
»

?SN:Pe4421

PAGE 02

OF 03

TOR:1?7/21:31Z

DTG:262017Z JUN 79

*******0 " " M F F H II L*******F COPY

Nn Ohipr.tinn Tn nenlafifiificatinn in Full 2013/01/17 : NI.C-24-3H-7-9-0

■ .■ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

*****»»0 0 N

F~r~P

? N T I - A-L*******E COPY

OP IMMED
UTS434
LE RUESBA *5172/2 1772115
C 262017Z JUK 79
TM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO S5CSTATY VASHDC IMMEDIATE 1253

f

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5172
TIMRMAN CAST: RECENTLY "CONVICCION", NAVf ORIENTED
NEWSPAPER, AND THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMSHICAN
NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED TIMERMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE.I
TOLD VIOLA USG ROPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE. ACCURATE.
HE DENIED ANY TRUTH TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMIRMAN
WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN HE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING
RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELF EY STATING
IE IT WERT LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN
RELEASED A LONG TIME AGO, IN A JESTING IASBION, I SOGGCSTED
TO VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE
JUNTA BE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD
THE WAY. El SMILED AND REPLIED HIS 0LS1ACLSS WERE
'■'!PLL KNOWN TO ME. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE
PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE *H IH GENERAL SUAREZ
MASON, CPIYF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I
EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION CN THIS SUGGESTION FOR A5
LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA Hi HAS NFVER ADMITTED
SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONE OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO-THE
Contrary, viola lowered eis voice and told me Hi strongly
RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE ITH* SUAREZ MASON,
f TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED
WIMSFIF TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - ”GAUCHO
BARBECUE . IT WAS SUGGESTED BY VIOLA THAT DURING THIS
BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED
PVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE
IS ST III SOME HOPE.
9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OE RENEWED AND
CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON THE PORACIO SARAGOVI
CASE. BE APPEARED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE .CASE.
I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN BIS LAP AS IT WAS A
MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP FOB REVIEW BY
DIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO L007 INTO THE, MATTER.
10. SOCCER GAME: LAST NIGHT ARGENTINA, WORLD CHAMPIONS,

??N*004423

PAGE 01
aa*****^

TOR: 177/21:33Z .■
ON”TUii~VTT n

DTGjR^PI 7Y JW. 7P

t*******T

COPY

Nn Ohipntinn Tn nfidassifiratinn in Full 2013/01/17 : Nl C-24-35-7-9-0

,No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

******

0 N I I JLI Js, iV” !TT A

COPY

FLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OF OUTSTANDING PLAYERS
FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 TO 1 WITH A
FULL STADIUM OF OVER 75,020 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME.
I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OF THE "COMMON HERD"
RUT AS I 'fALFED INTO THE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN
SPOTTED ME AND TOLL ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DF
pQNOR" (VIP BOX 1. I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT
Tr?E VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY
DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTELMAN WAS ^OITE STERN IN TELLING
ME I BFIONGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S EOX. I WAS THE ONLY
AMBASSADOR IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA. THERE WFP.F SEVERAL
AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS THEONLY ONE PERMITTED
TO SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT AND- THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS
WAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED
RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES FROM USA.
11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING VIOLA (EP TELLING
ME HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TC SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS
NICARAGUA. WE DID DISCUSS NICARAGUA, BUT I FELT IT WAS
ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE
SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USG ON NICARAGUAN
POLICY, BUT FEARED SENDING A MILITARY PEACE FORCE WOULD
NOT BF ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING
WAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS JtND EACH
Country feared a precedent would be established in sending
military units to settle basic DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.
Viola said the nicaraguan problem was now beyond dialogue
AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL
AND TROOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA SICA. VIOLA
RATIONALIZED THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH A MILITARY
PEACE FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC EOULD NEVER BUY IT.
IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GRCPING C-R SOWING FOR ME'TO GIVE
PIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO
NICARAGUA, WHICB WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA.
12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING
VIOLA' OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MAS SERA, ;-Z0 -’’AS
COMING TO REPORT TO VIOLA ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MEXICO.
VA SSERA WAS CON PLFTELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME AS I WAS TO
SFE HIM. TEE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT
HE HAD PLANNED IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT
APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD
WITH HIM.
IT'S JUST THE CASE OF TEE OLD ARGENTINE INTRIGUE" JUST
AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO XNOli TtAT I WAS HAVING
"ASATO" WITH HIM.
CASTRC
J IT

»

?S N:024423

PAGE 02

OF 02

-*******n-4> ■ N-Hfr- T

TOR:177/21:33Z

DTG:262017Z JUN 79

T tt- T T A--T.*******E--*nPY

Nn Ohiprtinn Tn nedaRRifinatinn in Full 7013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5,$*,

' A. **~

i w i •

V *

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL

November 18, 1977
DOS REVIEWED 25-Aug 2009: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL:

--------

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Al
U‘
I

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Trip of Secretary Vance

V*
^

Secretary Vance was trapped Into this trip by the request of Argentine
President Videla and the comedy of circumstances that followed—
announcement of President's trip, then postponement. Still, it could
be an important trip for several reasons:
In Argentina:
— A breakthrough on Tlatelolco is possible.
— The Secretary could strengthen die cause of human rights, and
the hands of the moderates.
in Brazil:

i

— He can help create an atmosphere where more solid achievements
would be possible,say during the President's trip in March.
— If he obtains agreement on Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco,
then the chances of gaining some agreement from Brazil Increase as
well. But I rather doubt this will occur.
In Venezuela:
— He can make a strong demarche on oil prices.
These are the principal points which could be accomplished on the trip.
I am not sure I know the best way to plug into this trip, but for your
benefit, while I am travelling, let me sketch some impressions.

CONFIDENT! AL-OTTS

i
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5

CONFIDENno Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5

Argentina
Clearly, Argentina's leaders are hungriest for U.S. recognition. That is
why Videla dared to make his request in the middle of the bilateral.
The political climate is confused in Buenos Aires. The Army and the Navy
seem caught in an explosive and dangerous struggle for power. Navy
Chief Massera has shown himself capable of extraordinary excesses to try
to embarrass Videla and enhance his own chance for leadership. He ordered
the bombardment and boarding of Chilean, Soviet, and Bulgarian ships;
he is said to have ordered the kidnapping of the Argentine Ambassador to
Venezuela when he was on home leave and several important labor leaders
when Videla was in Washington. Still, no one seriously believes that
Massera or any other Admiral can ascend to be head of the Junta.
The Argentines are still a very proud people, but'they are not as sensitive
to U.S. intrusions as they were in the 1940's,* or the Brasilians are now. •
The power to confer legitimacy on Videla is our most powerful bargaining
chip, and we should be careful how it iB done. The potential for improving
the human rights picture in Argentina is great, and we can press hard
there, as well as on non-proliferation.
Brazil
In Brazil we have three objectives, with die third being the moBt important:
— to state our policies on human rights and non-proliferation
clearly and forcefully;
— to restate our interest in good bilateral relations; and
— to try to clear up the atmosphere so that we can, in time, move
forward on the two previous goals.
One way to clear die atmosphere would be to approach the nuclear issue
differently. Instead of focusing on non-proliferation, we should concentrate
on developing arrangements for cooperative research on alternative energy
technologies. State and Energy Departments have set up pilot programs
with Egypt and Indonesia, but the concept seems perfectly suited to Brazil.
Jose Goldenberg, one of Brazil's most noted nuclear physicists, told
Jessica and I that much of the disillusionment which Brazil's scientists feel
towards the Brazil-German nuclear agreement is that it would transfer

2-

-

CONFIDENTIAL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5
CONFIDENT ial

,

technology but not science. Goldenberg said that., the U.S. would be much
more effective if we concentrated on positive $reas of future cooperation.
The two of us believe that it would make sense to negotiate an agreement on
the precise allocation of scientific work in the following areas: coal
mining technology, coal conversion and fluidized technology, bioconversion
(Brazil has done some work in this area), and solar energy.
There is currently a Joint US-Braeil Group in Energy Technology, which was
established under the Memorandum of Understanding, which has met several
times, but has never really obtained the kind of attention it deserves.
Secretary Vance'B trip provides an opportunity to probe about Brazilian
interest in this area. If you approve, I could relay this strategy to him
during the trip .
,

**

Approve

_______ Disapprove

or alternatively, you could bring it up with the Secretary directly.
Approve

Disapprove

I plan to prepare a detailed report, suggesting a step-by-step strategy
for US-Brazilian relations when I return. If {here are any other questions
you would like me to address on this trip, please contact me.
Venezuela
In Venezuela, our objective 1b quite Bimple: to state with considerable vigor
our concern that the price of petroleum should stay frozen through 1978.
There is little else which 1b necessary, but a full agenda to cover nonetheless
because Perez is such an important ally.

»
CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with Vice President
Mondale by Emilio Massera, Military Junta
Argentina.
*

1

On September 26, a private individual recommended
to Vice President Mondale that he meet with Admiral
Emilio Massera of the Argentine Military Junta who is
visiting the United States October 9-11.
Earlier on September 15, his last day as the Navy
member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral MaBsera
had written President Carter concerning relations between
Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with
the President.
Our recommendation on the latter is
attached.
Our recommendation on a presidential appointment,
and the reason for it, are fully applicable to the
Vice President as well.
Our Ambassador specifically
recommended that Admiral Massera not be received by the
President, Vice President, or Secretary of State.

(

As indicated in our earlier memorandum, we believe
that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet
with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant
Secretary Vaky.
*

Veldt-

5.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978.

declassified

(

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-B-10-2
> •
I

DEPARTMENT OF 5TAT&
WsihmglG*. D C

confidential
COPIES TO:
P
ARA
TMC
RF (jhw)
SUBJECT:

»
23&21

2,

October
19/8
—-^i> ;'
• 43
MEMORANDUM FOfC'DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio
Massera, Military Junta, Argentina

On September 15, his last day as
the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral
President Carter concerning relations
and the U.S., and requested a meeting

i

7818470

the Navy member of
Emilio Massera wrote
between Argentina
with the President.

The Admiral has now retired from military service and
is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented
opportunist, Massera will soon travel tb Europe and the
United States in an attempt to gain tinternational recognition
to further his domestic ends. Massera is viewed with
suspicion and some hostility by the Argentine Army, which
is the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in
Buenos Aires has been told that Argentine President Videla
and the Army would not favor a meeting between Admiral
Massera and President Carter. The Ambassador has personally
recommended against such a meeting, suggesting Instead that
Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The
Department agrees with -thiB view; we do not want to
antagonize the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera
and President Carter, but we do believe that Massera
should meet with appropriately high-level U.S. officials.
We believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral
Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and
Assistant Secretary Vaky.

F,eter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
-Suggested Draft Reply
*/aS/l*7S It

• -•CONFIDENTIAL’

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2
Admiral Emilio M^PSera,

Military Junta,
Argentina, Buenos Aires
□ear Admiral Massera:
*

f
I have been asked to respond to your September
15 letter to President Carter concerning relations
between our two countries.

As you suggest, there is a need for continuing
dialogue between Argentina and the United States
so that the problems which exist can be discussed
and resolved.

We are hopeful that the conversations held
between President Videla and Vice President Mondale
will lead to actions which will make it possible
to bring about closer cooperation and better under**
standing between our two countries.

*
»

Like you, we believe that it is essential for
all countries to work toward a world in which .the
dignity of all is acknowledged and observed.

President Carter's schedule is very filled in
the next few months but I would be pleased to have
an opportunity to talk with you when you visit
Washington.

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-

American Affairs Viron Vaky has also expressed a
desire to meet with you during your stay here.

With my best regards.

Si nee rely

____ Robert

Pniatnr

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

VhmmdrnnA M

d*

4

8^whh& ’

BUENOS AIRES, 15 de setlembre de 1978.

Excelentlslmo seRor Presldente de los Estados Unidos de America
Dn. JAMES EARL CARTER
WASHINGTON - ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA

SeRor Presldente:
A1 cesar ert mis fundones como mlembro de la Junta
MlUtar de la RepQbUca Argentina^ he creldo convenlente d1r1g1rme a usted para
hacerle partTdpe de algunas refiex1 ones sobre la sltuadfin de ml pals.
Asl como los argentlnos tenemos dlflcultades para
comprender en plenitud las acdones de la politics norteamericana, de la misma
manera debemos admltlr que por parte de su gobierno deben exlstir slmllares 1n^
convenlentes para vlsuallzar los reales problemas que nos aquejan a los argentj^
nos.
Elio, como es lflglco, produce dlferentes enfoques
de un pals con respecto a otro. Pcro es deber de los gobernantes vlsuallzar cual
es la verdadera Intendfin con que se 11 even a la prActlca esas 1nterpretac1ones
dlferentes, con el objeto de adecuar el acclonar proplo a los mejores Intereses
naclonales.

'

■•'r'-'T' '.>p" “

»

>
;

<

«
Tt r
1

y

l

En tal sentldo, me slento obUgedo a manlfestar que,
afln cuando personalmente he llegado a dlsentlr con algunos aspectos de la polity
ca exterior de su gobierno con respecto al mlo, jamfls abrlguA la menor duda de
que sus pasos estaban 1nsp1rados por un noble cuan genulno Interfis por el bienes
tar de la RepQbUca Argentina, en el contexto global de las naclones que tradlcvo
nalmente han sentldo y actuado como Integrantes del mundo occidental.
~
En mis frecuentes vlsltas a todos los palses sud amer1canos, he hecho especial hlncaplA en la necesldad de emprender la reconndsta
del esplrltu de Occldente por parte de todos los palses amerlcanos, como unico
camlno para salvaguardar nuestra Identldad continental. Es asl que he enfatlzado
hasta el cansando que a Occldente no hay que buscarlo en el maps, porque es hoy
una actltud del alma que no estS atada ka nlnguna geograffa, Occldente es el hombre protagonlzando la dlgnldad esendal de la v1da. Occldente es la Ubertad de
pensar y de hacer. Occldente es e> respeto al honor, al trabajo, al talento. Pero Occldente es tamdfin el amor, es la esperanza, y es la mlserlcordla.
Esta inslstenda en sacar a la luz ese esplrltu dormj_
do de Tiuestros pueblos, ha side acogldo slempre con beneplAdto. Results extraRo
entonces comprobar que, paradojlcamente, el tema central de las presentes diver­
gencies argentlno-norteameHcanas sea el mlsmo que nos ofrece la mayor pos1b1l1dad
de una comprenslfin total entre nosotros,
Comprendo que exlsten dlflcultades para promover una
generosa campaRa de promodfin de los derechos humanos en el mundo, que no roce en
algunos aspectos la sens1b1!1dad de los proplos amigos. Pretender que esto no ocu
rra serla cas1 utfiplco y falto de reallsmo politico. Yo mlsmo he sentldo la 1ncom
prenslfin de los esfuerzos por promover dentro de ml proplo pals un camblo de
outlook.

T?T*-?■ \

Ill

f

«

a a •

%

*i

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

. X•ft /•a . yf C*i

umanetonir tn

^ ^

Ofttfntu/a

-,.///2.
Es por tal razdn que interpreto debidamente -y en
tal convenclmiento se la agradezco- la generosa mencifln que usted hizo el 27 de
enero, ante un grupo de periodistas de la Nueva Inglaterra reunidos en la Casa
Blanca, sobre nuestro rol en la cuestifin de los derechos humanos,
. Esa actitud.nuestra que. mereciera tal. mencifin suya,
es firme y decidida. Puede usted tener la certeza de que no habrS desviacifin de
ese propdsito bajo la Comandancia de mi sucesor, el Almlrante Armando Lambruschini.
SeRor Presidente; al despedirme de usted como miembro del maximo firgano de poder de la RepQblica Argentina, lo hago persuadido de
que debo seguir bregando -desde el llano- por la consecusifln de los objetivos que
se propusleron las Fuerzas Armadas al hacerse cargo del poder, Como he manifestado recientemente ante la IX Conferencia Naval Interamericana, las Ideas no pasan a
retiro, Yo puedo asegurarle que las nrfas no lo harln y que por tal razfin seguirl
bregando para restablecer a breve plazo la estructura 1nst1tucional de mi pals,
His recientes conversaciones en Caracas con el Presj_
dente Carlos Andris Plrez y con los ex-Presidentes Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria y
LarrazSbal, han robustecido mi convencimiento sobre las posibilidades del afianzamiento democrfitico en la Amirica Latina,
Espero que en los prfiximos meses, oportunidad en que
tengo planeado "a brief sentimental return to Washington11 en donde v1vf por dos
afios en la dlcada del 60, pueda tener la ocasifln de conversar personalmente con us­
ted sobre la evolucifin de la situacifln argentina.
i

Slnceramente,

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

»

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LSNO. 69089
WD/BP
Spanish
Military Junta
Chief of Naval Operations
Buenos Aires, September 15,. 19 78
His Excellency
James Earl Carter,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
I

Mr. President:
Now that I have ceased to be a member of the Military
Junta of the Argentine Republic, I should like to share with
you some thoughts about the situation in my country.
Just as we Argentines have difficulty in fully understanding
United States policy actions, your Government must, of course,
have similar trouble in visualizing the real problems that
confront Argentina.

The natural result is that differences in

points of view develop between the two countries.

But it is

the duty of those in power to seek to understand the true
intentions with which those differing interpretations are put
into practice, in order that they may make their own actions
consistent with their countries' best interests.
In that connection I feel impelled to state that, even though
I have personally disagreed with some aspects of your Government's
foreign policy with respect to mine, I never harbored the slightest

No Objection To Declassification in i-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

2

...............

doubt that your course was inspired by a noble and genuine
interest in the well-being of the Argentine Republic as one

i

of the nations that have traditionally felt and acted as members
of the Western world.
On my frequent visits to all the South American countries,
I have laid special emphasis on the need for all the American
countries to recapture the Western spirit as the only way to
safeguard our continental identity.

I have thus repeatedly

stressed that the West is not to be sought on the map, because
today it is a spiritual attitude independent of geography.
The West is mankind acting out the essential dignity of life.
The West is freedom of thought and action.
for honor, work, talent.

The West is respect

But the West i*s also love, hope, and
t

compassion.
This insistence on bringing to light that sleeping spirit
of our peoples has always been favorably received.

It is there­

fore strange to note that, paradoxically, the central theme
of current U.S.-Argentine differences is the very one that
offers us the greatest potential for complete mutual understanding.
I realize that it is difficult to conduct a generous human
rights campaign in the world without occasionally bruising the
sensibilities of one's own friends.

To pretend otherwise would

be almost Utopian and politically unrealistic.

I myself have

felt the lack of understanding for-efforts to promote a change

in

outlook within my own country.

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

3

It is in that light that I interpret—and appreciate—
your generous reference, on January 27 to a group of New England
journalists gathered at the White House, to our role in the
matter of human rights.

(

We remain firm and determined in the attitude that inspired
your comment.

You may rest assured that there will be no depar­

ture from it under my successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini.
I take my leave of you, Mr. President, as a member of the
supreme governing body of the Argentine Republic, convinced
that I must continue to strive—from afar—for tJie attainment
of the objectives undertaken by the Armed Forces when they took
power.

As I recently stated before the Ninth Inter-American

Naval Conference, ideas do not retire.

I can assure you that

mine shall not and that I will therefore continue to strive
*

for the early reestablishment of my country's institutional
structure.
My recent conversations in Caracas with President Carlos
Andres Perez and with former Presidents Betancourt, Caldera,
Sanabria, and Larrazabal strengthened my conviction regarding
the possibility of assuring democracy in Latin America.
I hope that in a few months' time, when I am planning "a
brief sentimental return to Washington," where I lived for two
years in the 1960's, I may have the opportunity for a personal

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2
mm
H

4

conversation with you on the development of the Argentine
situation.
Sincerely,
[Signature]

f

»

• V'

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

7818470
DEPARTMENT OF S'fATE
W*iMn,lon. D.C. 20520

September 21, 1978

COPIES TO:
RF:WEB

.MEMORANDUM FOR-.
SUBJECT:

MS. CHRISTINE DODSON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Alerting NSC on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed -is a copy of a letter -to President
Carter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Military Junta, Argentina
which is transmitted for your information.
I
This document was received in -the Executive
Secretariat Information Management Section
on September 21, 1978.

Infi

S/S^I

iirector,
ition Management Section
Executive Secretariat
ext. -23836

I

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

^MARY TRANSLATION

7S38470
Letter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Member of the Military
Junta of Argentina to President Carter.
Admiral Massera notes that he is writing this letter on
%

the date of his retirement from the Junta.

He states that

he believes there may have been misunderstandings between
our two countries because of a mutual misinterpretation of
the policies that have been implemented.

He does not,

however, doubt the sincerity of the U.E. in adopting these
policies.

He believes there is a community of interest

between Argentina and the U.S., both of which are dedicated
to the dignity of human life.

He states that his successor

as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy also believes
in these values.

He hopes to speak with you personally

in the next few months when he visits Washington.
t

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 ^
hlUUSh UUL.UJMH.1N 1

Executive Secretariat

ACTION:

/f/9

X

E&A-

URGENT

INFO TO:

X

/

s

tofe*

7 f/pro-3
*/a 7/7?

Date.

D/LOS

.ACDA

.D

.M/DG

CA

P

M/CT

_CU

.AID

i

.E

.M/MO

EB

T

_T/D

H

,M

.UNA

.HA

.S/S

C

-INR

S/MS

.10

.S/S-S

AF

,L

.Team A

ARA

.OES

.Team B

EA

.PA

.Team C

S/CPR
. S/NM
S/P
S/PRS

.EUR

S/S-0

.Team D

PA/FOI

.NEA

.PM

I Remarks:

Action Requested:
______ Memorandum for the President
^ Memorandum for the White House:

Bureau Handling
Other
&J-

Due Date in S/S:

: confident

Authorized by:

~7~

«

f

No Objection To Declassification'in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-1^33-57-8-10-2
MBMOftANDU...
w
'
9
7&fg03
office of the

VICE PMESiDEN'r

WASHINGTON

ACTION
Memo No. 916-78

-CUNF JUifiUTIK’

September 2*>

ACTION(ARA)
COPIES TO:
S
D
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON
P
S/P
Denis Clift
FROM:
INR
RF (rs)
SUBJECT:
Proposed Meeting with Member of

Argentine Junta, Admiral Meaner* it has been recommended to the Vibe President by a private
individual tKat the Vice President agree to meet with.
Admiral Mmuera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11.
Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations#
I have questions about this recommendation. Z would greatly
eppreciate a S ta tn.-NST-. recommendation--on- thi-ar- gvapumX’i

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE NO.

CLASSIFICATION tG
(P** + i
fM
oV
(Extension)
(Name)

FROM

»V1

*

No. Pages

(Rortn number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

DELIVER TO:

TO(Agency)

Extension

Room No.

Pf^-er TflLrnn-^/________ ______

jCl K_______ biM1.-

REMARKS:---H

_____ Qdr_

____________________

t

i
Hhio^tinn Tn nQr>laecifir>atin

Cull *3019/19/1 *3 • Ml P_199_^7_R_m_9

No Objection To Declassification in mil 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2
^
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNcW*

REFERRAL,
Dates 9/27/78

MEMORANDUM FOR;
STATS SECRETARIAT

»

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION;
Xoi

Christitui Dodson

From:

DendLa.- Clift

Date:

September 26, 1978

Subject:

Proposed Mtg w/ Member of Argentine Junta, Admiral
Masaera

ACTION REQUESTED:
Draft reply for:

President's Signature
White Kousa Staff
OthesL-

T
_______ Direct reply

Furnish info copy

______ Dispatch

Tgauslation

xxxxx Recommendations/

Appropriate Handlin

Other
DUE DATE:

****

ZnferaatiaB
October 3, 1978

COMMENTS:

W • rjnff|pF|

^ fort CJSUSTI5C 3 CD SON

mnr seglstary

mkmorancNo

Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12m : NLC-133-57-8-10-2

OFFICE CF THE V.CE PRESiDEWT
WAIHINOTON

ACTION

CQOTIPBBWAfc-

Memo No. 916-78

SaptartWff- 2&» 1578^

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON
FROM:

Denis Clift

SUBJECT:

Proposed Meeting With Member of
Argentine Junta, Admiral Masses*

It has been recommended to the Vice President by A private

individual tHat the Vice President agree to meet with.
Admiral- Mtnraera when tne latter is in the D.S. October 9-11.
Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations,
I have questions about this recommendation. I would greatly
appreciate a StatR-NET-recowasadatioe -sn -thia- proposal.

(

»

i

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-6-6-9

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL "
5738
Of3tober 6, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR DENIS CLIFT
FROM:

Christine Dodson

SUBJECT:

Admiral Massera

The NSC staff concurs with the attached State Department
recommendation against a Vice Presidential meeting with
Admiral Massera.

NTIAL ATTACHMENTS

t

'

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Au:i-.crity Ki L£ - r?A-S"l - la NARA.

Date

*\\^\u#____

October 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM

Subject:

FOR DR. ZBZGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Request for Appointment

vAth Vice President

Mondale by Emilio Massera,
Argentina.

Military Junta

On September 26, a private individual recommended
to Vice President Mondale that he meet with Admiral
Emilio Massera of the Argentine Military Junta who is
visiting the United States October 9-11.
Earlier on September 15, his laBt day as the Navy
member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Massera
had written President Carter concerning relations between
Argentina and the U.S«, and requested a meeting with
the President.
Our recommendation on the latter i6
attached.
Our recommendation on a presidential appointment,
and the reason for it, are fully applicable to the
Vice President as wbII.
Our Ambassador specifically
recommended that Admiral Massera not be received by the
President, Vice President, or Secretary of State.
As indicated in our earlier memorandum, we believe
that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet
with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant
Secretary Vaky.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tarnoff/Brzezinski

Memorandum of October 2,

1978

Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-6-6 -9

STAT^P

DEPARTMENT OF
W*l»>i«E!on. 0 C

SONTIDENTIftfc
COPIES TO:
P
ARA
TMC
RF (jhw)
SUBJECT:

7818470 .

rOiM

Octonei 2, 19/8

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE
.Letter "to President Carter from Admiral Emilio
Massera, Military Junta, Argentina

On September JL5, his last day as the Navy member of
the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Emilio Massera wrote
President Carter concerning relations between Argentina
and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President.
t
The Admiral has now retired from military service and
is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented
opportunist, Massera will soon travel to Europe and the
United states in an attempt to gain international recognition
to further his domestic ends. Massera Is viewed with
suspicion and some hostility by the Argentine Army, which
i.s the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in
Buenos Aires has been told that Argentine President Videla
and the Army would not favor a meeting between Admiral
Massera and President Carter. The Ambassador has personally
recommended against such a meeting, suggesting instead that
Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The .
Department agrees with this view; we do not want to
antagonize -the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera
and President Carter, but we do believe that Massera
should meet with appropriately high-level U.S. officials.
We believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral
MasBera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and
Assistant Secretary Vaky.
«

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
-

Attachment:
SuggestedJDraft Reply
M

*

S'

C r M f 1 • 61 AS A ft C A SV9%m |>w a I J **
Jt/as/if7s ■ tmi iiTiiMii

. JeONTiPEMTIAL—
GDS

t

No Objection I u

Ueflabbifii. nlkin in full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

DOS REVIEWED 10-Jan-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE'lN FULLj

THE DYNAMICS OP ARGENTINE DECISION-MAKING
Conclusions
Our analysis of the Argentine decision-making mechanism
indicates that:
—emphasis is always upon the tri-service nature of
the government with the Navy and the Air Force
over-represented in an effort to maintain the degree
of military cohesion necessary for effective rule;
—nonetheless, the Army is the predominant service,
capable of forcing implementation of its preferred
policies if compromise is imposstible;
—each service formulates its own policy positions
based on service consensus, and differences are
ironed out at the top;
—compromise in the interest of unity is always sought
and usually achieved;
—while often slow and cumbersome, the process has
worked, and Videla is comfortable with it;
—the Army's potential power and the tri-service
arrangement will continue to be the significant
factors under the new junta-president formula; and
—outsiders seeking to influence the decision-making
process must seek access at the top through, in the
US case, the Videla-Viola channel.
*

*

*

Army predominance is the crucial element in the present as
in past Argentine military governments. The post-March 1976
government has been a tri-service affair in structure and
operation. The Army, Navy and Air Force have shared officeDECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
v ritj
CONFIDENT IAL/EXDI0
C Ui'rU-.J&r____ DatO
----No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

1

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 ; NLC-133-22-30-1-5
-

2

-

holding responsibilities as equitably as the manpower of the
two junior services permits, and all three services have
participated fully in the decision-making process.
All
participants, however, conduct themselves with the knowledge
that a unified Army is the "most equal" of the services,
capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies
if compromise with Air Force and Navy views cAnnot be reached.
Army willingness to accept a tri-service governing format
in which the other two services are, in fact, over-represented '
rests on the belief that armed forces unity is critical to the
viability of military government.
Past experience (especially
the 1966-73 Ongania, Levingston, and Lanusse governments) has
demonstrated that military governments dominated by one man or
one service run a high risk of alienating significant elements
within the armed forces and thereby, forfeiting the chance for
prolonging effective rule.
Establishing the Air Force and
Navy as equal parties in the governing process ensures that
they will have a stake in its success and presumably act
accordingly.
Within the tri-service format, the decision-making process
basically involves each service developing-its own policy
positions, with differences of opinion jaeing compromised through
discussion in one of several formal and ad hoc forums.
When
a tri-service consensus cannot be reached, the matter is
decided by majority vote in the junta (a president's selection
or removal requires an unanimous vote.)
At each step in the
decision-making process, votes are cast in representation of the
officer's particular armed force.
Within each service, the task of canvassing opinion and
drafting policies usually falls to the office of the Chief of
Staff or the Secretary General, insofar as that process is
formalized.
On political matters, the service secretaries
general (Army-Brigadier General Reynaldo Bignone;.Navy-Rear
Admiral Eduardo Fracassi? Air Force-Brigadier General Basilic
Lami Dozo) have shouldered much of the burden not only for for­
mulating policy but also for conducting inter-service bargaining
to compromise differences.
For example, recent negotiations
to delineate the power relationship between the junta and the
president after Videla retirement as army commander were
handled by the secretaries general.
In essence, the general
secretariat in each service has become a cabinet for the
service commander.
The secretary general is a trusted subordinate
of the commander, and the secretariat i^ staffed by carefully
selected officers, often at the colonel1level.

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIG—No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1 -5

- 3 -

|

When disagreements are not resolved prior to junta con­
sideration of the issue at hand, it is extremely important
for all three junta members to enter discussions with the solid
backing of their subordinates. Thus, important junta meetings
are often preceded by intra-service gathering chaired by the
relevant commander and attended by all senior.officers of the
service. These are closed meetings involving frank, extended,
and often heated discussions. Nothing beyond possibly the
topics discussed is disclosed to the public. Service dis­
cipline is usually strong enough to ensure almost unanimous
support for whatever service position emerges from senior
officer conclaves.
With the emphasis always upon compromising differences,
ad hoc decision-making instrumentalities are employed without
hesitation when the circumstances demand. In late April, for
instance, during the deliberations over the choice of a
president, the key meeting may well have been that of the "big
junta" on March 28-30. Senior officerS| from the services (9
Army Major Generals; 3 Vice Admirals; 6 Air Force Brigadiers)
met in ad hoc fashion, settled on Videla, and left the details
on the president-junta relationship to be ironed out by the
secretaries general. At that meeting, Army Major General and
Interior Minister Ablano Harguindeguy bluntly informed his
Air Force and Navy colleagues that the Army represented 70%
of the armed forces' power and therefore, like it or not,
Videla would be president. It was one of the few occasions of
which we are aware, that the Army has so bluntly wielded itB
recognized power advantage.
Decision-making centers outside the junta are also
characterized by the tri-service arrangement. The Legislative
Advisory Commission (CAL) advises the presidency concerning
armed forces' opinion on proposed legislation. The nine CAL
members (3 senior officers from each service) seek and reflect
the views of their own services, and votes are cast by service
with the majority deciding.
Should the presidency disagree
with the CAL, the matter is decided by majority vote in the
j unta.
The cabinet ministries are divided{ among the services (3
Army, 2 Navy, 2 Air Force, 2 civilian) and tend to become the
preserve of the presiding service. Navy control of the Foreign
Ministry, for instance, has led Videla at times to conduct
foreign policy outside Foreign Ministry channels. Even here,
however, the tri-service rule is evident in form if not in sub­
stance. Each service is entitled to place what are called
Junta Delegates in each of the ministries and presidential
secretariats, and in the government of the City of Buenos
Aires.
CONrTPENTIAL/EXDIS
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

»

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5
- 4 -

The apparent anomaly in this governing system lies in the
ability of the junior services to outvote the more powerful
Army two-to-one at almost every turn. jChat this has not
happened often, and never on a major issue on which the Army is
unified, can be attributed to:
»

—the wide area of inter-service and intra-service
agreement on the general parameters of the National
Reorganization Process, a crucial factor which lends
cohesion to the entire process;
—tacit recognition of the Army's strength in any
forced showdown; and
—the knowledge that schisms would be the harbinger of
a near-term end to military rule.
Generally, the Navy has been more prone to challenge the
Army on a variety of issues, often because of the personal
interests and ambitions of Commander Hassera.
Air Force
Commander Agosti has supported the Navy insofar as challenge
has been useful to maintain the independence and influence of
the junior services. But the Air Force has generally been
inclined to side with the Army when a confrontation looms.
Agosti has no desire to test the Army's^ power, nor does he want
to appear to be endangering the military's reconstruction pro­
cess by backing a navy boss whose motivation is suspect in most
military quarters outside the Navy.
It is a cumbersome decision-making process, often slow to
function, and almost bound to give the appearance of indeci­
siveness and, at times, of officials working at cross purposes.
The problem is complicated by the difficulty that the Army
often experiences in developing positions acceptable to senior
officers with varying political and policy preferences.
Moderates like Videla and new Army Commander Viola must work
carefully to ensure the continued support of hardline generals
like Suarez Mason (Corps I, Buenos Aires); Menendez (Corps III);
and Laidlaw (Planning Ministry.) Without a coherent Army
position on key issues, the whole tri-service pattern begins
to disintegrate.
However slow and seemingly inefficient the process may be,
it has worked. Tri-service support for the government remains
solid, and there is little indication of grumbling in the ranks
because officers or groups of officers feel their opinions are
not being at least heard. The system has the added virtue of
fitting neatly with Videla's personal style and temperament.
Cautious and reticent about acting without careful preparation,
Videla has not been uncomfortable with the tri-service arrange■G0NFIDENTIAL/EXDI3
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5
- 5 -

ment.
Argentines as well as Argentine-watchers have questioned
the viability of his low-key style in a country that has always
demanded and usually received strong presidential leadership.
Nonetheless, his success to date in preserving armed forces
cohesion argues the wisdom of his tactics.
Massera's machinations have often added a discordant note
to the governing process since the March 1976 coup.
Politically
astute and ambitious, the admiral has been" building a political
base that he hopes to parlay into the presidency, perhaps within
two or three years.
Seen in this light, Massera's criticisms
of Videla's and the Army's handling of affairs emerge as an
attempt to compile the basis for a subsequent Massera challenge
to military government.
He apparently plans to present himself
as a former junta member who dissented from unpopular policies
(e.g., human rights violations and labor repression.)
There is little doubt that Massera has complicated the
junta's governing task, but his experience reflects the two-key
characteristics of this military government, army predominance
and tri-service participation.
—Massera has never pushed Videla to the point of an
open confrontation that would force one or the other
from power.
Massera knows he would lose.
He cannot
obtain sufficient Army support to oust Videla in his
favor.
—Massera has been effective because he has maintained
the support of his own service.
I

Impact of the Fourth Man Scheme
Videla's August 1 assumption of the presidency as a retired
officer has necessitated changes in the decision-making process.
Some new guidelines have been established to regulate the
president-junta relationship, but little is clear beyond the
fact that:
—the junta will remain the supreme governing body,
setting policy guidelines and reviewing presidential
actions to ensure that they remain within those
guidelines; and
—the president will be responsible for daily govern­
ment operations, enjoying considerable powers of
appointment (often with junta consent.)

■SONFIDENTIMi/EXPIG

*

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5
-

6

-

Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy will
probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the coming months.
Critical to Videla's success will be the degree to which he
retains Army support through Army Commander Viola. The two
share moderate policy outlooks and have a close working
relationship. Viola, however, will have to work assiduously
to placate hardline Army elements and maintain their support.
If he can do so, the Videla-Viola alliance can be expected to
reflect, and wield when necessary, the Army's power edge. The Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, will be seeking to
guarantee continuation of the tri-service governing arrangement
by ensuring that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated
into a de facto government by the Army.
Pressure Points.
The only feasible tactic for outsiders
interested in influencing the Argentina decision-making process
is to attempt to gain access at the top. Since the US cannot
directly influence the number of officers in any service
necessary to create a consensus behind our preferred policies,
the alternative is to work through moderate leaders in the hope
that they will be able to sustain the support of their sub­
ordinates .
At present, the selection process is complicated by:
—the blurring of lines of authority that has accompanied
installation of the junta-president formula? and
—the imminence of the annual military promotion/retirement
cycle; it could alter the political complexion of the
armed forces, especially the Army.
Nonetheless, the most promising alternatives remain Videla,
Viola, and moderate army officers close to those two, particularly
Army Secretary General Bignone and Brigadier General Jose
Villarreal, Secretary General of the Presidency.
A possible pressure point may emerge in the figure of Vice
Admiral Armando Lambruschini who is expected to replace Massera
as Navy commander on September 15. A Navy chief disposed to
cooperate with Videla would simplify and expedite the governing
process. Most importantly from the US perspective, it might
obviate the Army's felt need to circumvent the navy-controlled
Foreign Ministry and thereby prevent the lack of communication
within the Argentine government that has complicated, among
other things, the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations.
Lambruschini will not indulge in the kind of political
machinations characteristic of Massera. However, his political
views are not well-known, nor is the extent to which he will be

rtAMTiTnn\Tm tut /mVnTr*

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5
- 7 -

susceptible to manipulation by a retired Massera.
Likewise,
we cannot judge the degree to which the brutal murder of
Lambruschini's daughter will be reflected in the new commander's
attitudes and actions.
IAHRC Visit.
We have no information on the Argentine-IAHRC
negotiations not contained in Embassy reporting (see appended
copy of Buenos Aires 6425 of August 18 for the most recent
account of Argentine attitudes.)
Timing is a crucial element.
The nationalistic response
to recent US actions (or at least how US actions were perceived)
provides a pretext for rejecting an IAHRC visit that can be
convincingly used by hardline officials who would not accept a
visit under any terms.
The current Argentine atmosphere makes
it extremely difficult for Videla to issue an invitation without
provoking charges of "vende patria" from disgruntled military
and aroused citizens.
The chances of a visit will increase if the IAHRC can
justify something less than a totally uncohditioned presence in
Argentina.
We understand that a precedent for a visit under
previously agreed guidelines may exist in the form of the
Commission's 1974 visit to Chile.
The Commission may also be
inclined to compromise because of the area-wide implications
of an on-site visit to any Southern Cone country.
By accepting
half-a-loaf, the IAHRC might fatally undermine the reported
mid-1977 agreement among Southern Cone governments to ban IAHRC
visits to the area.

Drafted:
Approved:

INR/RAR/OD:Hunter L. Estep
^OWFIDENTIAL/DXmS—
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5

I. •

1

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE

6275

WASHINGTON

£QNP£BENTIAL

November 2, 1979

ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Jacobo Timerman (U)

Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine newspaper editor and publisher,
who was recently released from house arrest and expelled from
Argentina, has asked to see you. He has been in New York
since October 29 to receive the Hubert Humphrey Freedom Award
from B'nai B'rith. In light of your personal intervention
with President Videla on behalf of Mr. Timerman, the Department
of State believes you should meet with him.
(C)
Timerman last week told our Press Attache in Tel Aviv that he
is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina
because he fears reprisals by the military against friends
still in Argentina. For a similar reason, I believe a meeting
could be counterproductive to our efforts to encourage human
rights improvements in Argentina. Timerman's release was the
culmination of such a vicious struggle between moderates and
hardliners in the Argentine military that it provoked a coup
(which was unsuccessful) by the hardliners. I believe that
the moderates would consider your meeting with him as an un­
friendly (rather than an appreciative) gesture, and they would
be less likely to be accommodating to future cases.
(C)
RECOMMENDATION:
That in liew of a meeting, you sign the attached letter to
Timerman conveying your congratulations.
Approve _____

Disapprove _____

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters.

’ -GQMriDENTIAL ■
Review 10/30/85
DECLASSIFIED
E.Q. 13526
i.wav-.

£-£

n~tn

-\\q\ui--------

5498

MEMORANDUM
CQNPjEBBNTlAir

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 25, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIEL

SUBJECT:

Department of State Request for Meeting
between Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Timerman

State has sent a rather half-hearted recommendation (which
was, however approved in principal by both Christopher and
Vance) that Mrs. Carter see the wife of the detained
Argentine newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman. ARA is opposed
but Patt Derian (who is after me in full cry) strongly recom­
mends it. Bob Pastor thinks we should give the Argentines
two more weeks to release Timerman, prospects being a little
brighter now. Patt insists that Mrs. Carter be asked to make
the decision. I feel the urgent need to pass the buck.
(C)
RECOMMENDATION:
Option 1. Mrs. Carter sees Mrs. Timerman tomorrow (evidently
the only possible day).
APPROVE ______________

DISAPPROVE ______________

Option 2. A visit be postponed to see if Timerman is released
(We recommend Option 2/)
APPROVE _______\/

A&Y'*

DISAPPROVE _______________

CONFIDENTIATT
Review on 9/15/85
declassified
E.0.13526

Authority
NARA—

MEMORANDUM
CONFitHLlV. i 1AI7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

•J

September 10, 1979
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Z3IGNIEW BRZEZ

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Admiral Massera (U)

At your suggestion, I called Boleslaw Wierzbianski about his
recommendation on Massera. Wierzbianski met Massera briefly,
but does not really know him. The suggestion of meeting with
you probably was made by Massera and conveyed to Boleslaw
Wierzbianski through a mutual friend. (C)
I would recommend that you not meet with Massera for the
* *
following reasons:
— When Massera was the Argentine Navy's representative
on the junta, some of the worst human rights viola­
tions occurred, and many then attributed that to the
rivalry he pressed against the Army in the junta. (C)
— I have not met Massera, but Vaky, Kissinger and many
others have, and their nearly unanimous impression
is that he should not be trusted, and that his prin­
ciples do not extend any further than his own
ambitions. (C)
— The Argentine government would probably be more
disturbed at a meeting between you and Massera than
by anything Pat Derian could do. Videla and the
Army Chief, Viola, view Massera as their most
dangerous rival, and would fear that a meeting with
you would endow him with more legitimacy than he
deserves. They would also probably fear the possi­
bility of Massera's conspiring with you. There is
little question that he would exploit such a meeting
for his own purposes. (C)
In short , I think that a meeting between you and Massera would
have the paradoxical effect of angering both the Argentine gcvernment and the human rights lobby in the US, and I don't
believe that anything you could learn from the meeting could
override that. (C)
CONFIDEN?Tm
Review on 9/10/85

declassified

E.0.13526
nara_££—Mc-tSiSVu*.

CONFIDENTIAL

2

RECOMMENDATICN
Therefore, I recommend that I respond to Boleslaw Wierzbianski's
letter on your behalf and express regrets that you will be
unable to meet with Admiral Massera on the grounds that a meeting
could be misinterpreted in Argentina as you trying to get
involved in domestic politics in that country at a delicate
moment in our relationship.
(I will also repeat our strong
and positive interests in promoting human rights in that country
and elsewhere.)
(C)
Approve __________

CONFIDENTIAL

Disapprove __________

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

?

March 5, 1979
DOS REVIEWED 22-Jun-2010: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE INPARTj

MEMORANDUM FOR:

IZINSKI
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSgl

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I
mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading
it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we
should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From '
October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina
in the IFI1 s. We changed our position to abstention in
February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that
would induce some improvement in the human rights situation.
Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher
now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's;
lobby OECD countries to follow our example; and assess
whether further action in X-M and OPIC should be taken.
(S}
Assessment

The report was prepared by INR—not HA— and it is a sobering
document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the
worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises
in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved.
Let me summarize the report:
There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners;
probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are
held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabili­
tated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce
this number.
(S)

"Physical and psychological torture apparently
remain standard treatment." |
lestimated that
90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are
executed.
(S)
Disappearances — probably by security units —
continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978.
(Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while
'::gi:TH<cl b*____R- Pastor
:L Q PZVV7 ONjipirch. 5, IPS5-

X7 BVKD G YBAH3 hf
SASOH____ _________

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

Authority
~~
NARA__5iJt—— Dato.

—--------—

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8

the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy
estimates, 55.)
Increasingly, the people who disappear
have vague associations with the "political left" rather
than with terrorists. Both international NGO's 'and
Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have
been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

Illegal invasion of the home — including theft
by security units — remains as commonplace as fair public
trials are infrequent.
(S)
The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even
using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina’s
Federal Security Service estimated that there were only
about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even
Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes
that the explanation for continued official terrorism is
army politics.
(S)
Policy
While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw
different conclusions than State as to what policy we should
adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach
the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged
in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the
law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs
loans.
(Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The
law only requires that we "oppose” such loans, and "opposition"
has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative
votes so I believe we have some flexibility.
(S)
In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address
two questions:
(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to
encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)
(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S.
our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps
toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues,
we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S.
This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps
if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we
should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range
audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our
overall human rights policy.
(S)
An Effective Policy
What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud
and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government
&BCRL.T
No Objection To Declassification in Part 2Q13/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8
t

6ECRKP«-

-

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

- •--------

decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want.
This is the case of our human rights policy. (S)
The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us
for three reasons:
(1) our historical, reasonably close
relationship;
(2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and
the morality which could contribute to the idea that the
Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such
legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats
in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the
institutionalization of the military government.
The Argentine
government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer
to the U.S.;
(1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S.,
they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights
area at home.
1 think our cool and correct posture has been as
effective as any policy could be.
I think negative steps as
State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina,
and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S)
t
In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct
posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every
opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage
them to clean up their act.
They will continue to try to lure
high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is
evident. (SJ
But even if you believe aB Vance and Christopher do, that we
should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage
delay. (S)
One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what
will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting
a bit longer:
(1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by
the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that
it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move.
(2) Several of
Argentina's most hard-line GeneralB have been transferred, and
Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before.
(3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there
is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front
over the next few months.
And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission is going there in May.
We (Should wait and gear any
new policy shifts to their report.
That may mean a delay of six
months or more.
RECOMMENDATION:
Vance has apparently decided to change our policy.
I therefore
recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider.
If he
remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision
pending the IAHRC report.

Approve_______
SECRET—

Disapprove

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8

4

■SECRET—»
cc:

Jessica Mathews Views:

Bob is right that our primary concern should b& what will work with
Argentina.
Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't
worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change
anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Chanel dispute is over.
On
the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either.
I suspect
that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets
much more secure or there ia a strong change in Argentine public opinion.
However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the
relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As
Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere
and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the
terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible
to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle
to make the policy consistent Insofar as we cart, and by these standards
there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand
toward the GOA.
If neither posture 1b likely to be much more successful vis-a-viB the
GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights
policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

t

4

^

t

^secret

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8'

ARGENTINA:

ASSESSMENT OP CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

(C) Parameters and problems. The following assessment
covers the Argentine governmentJs 1978 performance and the
current situation wirth respect to category-one human rights.
Inevitaoly, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US.
Government.'s limited capacity for monitoring human rights
events in Argentina and verifying reports*of either positive
or negative developments.
t
(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical
material.
Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many
people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being
held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We
are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose
credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among
groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights
developments.
(C) We do not believe, however, tnac timely, precise
and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the
assessment offered below. 1
The record of Argentine human
rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing
cumulative picture of the government;s performance. And
while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative
dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would
remain unchanged.
(C) Current situation. With respect to category-one
rights, conditions can be summarized as follows?
(C) — political
purportedly guilty of
at the disposition of
state-of-siege powers
(PEN prisoners

).w

prisoners: Approximately 2,9QU persons
security violations are being detained
the national executive branch under
provided for in the Argentine constitution

(C)
** The current state of siege was instituted on
November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the
state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain
prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punisn
detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that
the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

:

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of whicn
is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is
being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM
prisoners) and prooably includes about 500 persons. According
to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are
either former terrorists now cooperating with security units
or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore,
listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners
who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by
the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the
program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most
a few hundred persons.

<
1

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to sub­
stantially reduce the number of political prisoners-by (1)
releasing those against whom there exists' no evidence of
terrorist or criminal involvement nor ipending charges; (2)
trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting
political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights
to choose exile over imprisonment (r ig’nt-of-option).
The
right-of-option program initiated inlate 1977 has resulted
in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.
(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent
rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being
held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.
(C) — Torture and prisoner mistreatments Physical and
psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment
for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have informa­
tion about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners.
However, the Executive does not always respond to court
order. While we have little information that would permit
categorizing detainees according to types'of offenses, the
PEN list probably includes few if any {terrorists suspected
of having committed violent acts against persons or property.
Such individuals, when capturea by security units, are routinely
killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations
of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include
sucn things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support
of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings
contrary to the military.'s conception of social order)
groups# e.g., poster and pampnlet distribution and a variety
-sjb€«et;

Tro-gpNTllAC'J------

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8
i

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation,
prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEM prisoner, nr
^his or her summary execution. I
^
|reportedin
August cnac as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured
curing interrogation- **
(C) Prisoner treatment beyond tbe interrogation stage
and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending
upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the
proclivities of the regional military commander, and the
character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment
(beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise,
etc.) are most often associated with specific military
jurisdictions and prisons, or with tbe transfer or release of
prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances
in early 1978, tor example, prisoners released from a La Plata
jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably
by security elements.
Official actions appear to have prevented
recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978
an ICRC official reported to the Embassy..his belief that
prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during
the year.
.
*
(C) — Disappearances; Reports of disappearances continue
to accumulate.
In the vast majority of cases, responsibility
almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In
the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands
of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.

of other support activities; (b} economic actions perceived
by the autnorities as directly having supported subversion.
(the Graiver case} or otherwise endangered national interests;
(c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as “leftist"; or
(a) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural
environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein
lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing
artists, etc.}.
Thus, the term ''security violation" has no
specific meaning.
Its operative definition is largely left
to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest
powers.
Reports received from released prisoners tend to
(C}
substantiate the
on the frequency of torture.

-secke?

'NO. CONTRALT

No Objection To Declassification in Port 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8
............................................................. . vr____________________ :

No Objection To Declassification in Port 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

(ti) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend
to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the
past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share: that estimate and
have presented the government with documentation on almost
5,000 cases.
In truth, however, no one knows precisely
how many people hav<5 disappeared or, in many cases, why
specific individuals were victimized.{
(C) Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977,
and on whom we have any information, could be considered
terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either
eliminated or living in exile, the security forces have made
a significant shift in their, targetting practices to draw
into tne security net a range ot non-terrorists associated
witn the vague and expansively defined political left. The
decision as to which specific individuals will be picked
up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore,
depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities
constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may
only have involved past membership in a group that was
entirely legal at the time.
Insofar as there is a discernible
pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance
of persons wi-th a common association past or present; e.g.,
graduates of the same high school or university faculty,
members of a political party or youth group, etc. However,
tnere are many cases that make no apparent sense and for
which tne explanation may lie more in internal politics than
in any specific act of the victim.
t

(C)
Public criticism of government policies has, with
few known exceptions, generally not been considered by
authorities as grounds for detaining tne critics and abusing
or killing them.
Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen,
and other professionals have criticized the government's economic,
political and human rignts policies without suffering
retribution at the hands of the security forces.
(C) There has been no significant official effort to
collect and publish information on persons who allegedly '
When queried about-disappearances by non­
have disappeared.
governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines'
standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts

_&JS<a»ET7,NUf,UlCW7flQ -CONTRACT
t

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8

regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged
aisappeareo persons/ but they have reruseci to accept'
jurisdiction in suen cases.
(C) The Mothers of the Plaza ae Mayo Crelatives of
disappeared persons,) one of the most persistent and cohesive
groups seeding information on disappeared persons, has
recently been prohibited from conducting what had ueen a'
weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government Douse in down­
town Buenos Aires.
The demonstrations apparently had become
too large ana potentially disruptive in tne judgment of
government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands
tor information.
The Mothers ere now holding their gatherings
at smaller and less conspicuous sites.
(C) Given the diffusion ot authority that has character­
ized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that
any government agency either has collected or will be able to
collect definitive files on alleged, disappearance cases. The
various security units have an obvious interest in withholding
or destroying information on cases for which their operatives
nave been responsible.
CCJ> "Reappearances" emerged as a new.and possibly under­
reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are
no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probaoly
quite small in relation to the reported numaer of disappearances.
As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15
cases ana by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placea
tne figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting
it might oe as high as 300. During 1978, the government
published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who
hao allegedly reappeared.
In roost cases, however, the
individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular “missing
persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of
disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine
human rights organizations.
(C) — Fair public trial. All who have been detained by
official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have
obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges
against them.

4»DCItET/N0J?0RN-/ti0 CONXEACT

No Objection To Declassification in Port 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

(C)
Insofar as alleged security violators are charged
and tried in civilian or military courts, w*1** there are two
notable problems: the often extended period between de­
tention and judicial processing and the reported predominance
of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted
through torture.
Professional legal groups such as the
ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional
evidence.
(C) — Invasion, of the home. The detention practices of
operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal
invasion of the home.
In addition, tnere are numerous reports
of arresting officers ransacKing private residences and
stealing the personal property of the detainee.
(C) Trends.
1978 produced no substantial quantitative
improvement or aeterioration in category-one - terms.
The year
featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the
net result was to leave the situation*little changed. 2
Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official
security personnel were, frequent throughout the year, and
there was no evidence'of a concerted, effective government
effort to halt the abuses.
(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis .to
reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds
or abuses because the available statistical material is not
always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a
good example.
In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires .and
Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances
during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequeny
(about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. by later in

(C) *K* The status of PEN prisoners with respect to
judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner
nelci under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on
charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted,
serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half
or more of the current PEN detainees are either being
tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities.
This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN
detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction
of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition,
for exile under the right-of-option program.

feB€«eT/rJoroRN/wo

contra

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8
I

the year, however, additional information forced upward
ad’justiuents in the figures.
Interior Ministry records showed
a rate ot 40 per month for January to October (as compared to
150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) ana a Foreign
Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at aoout
80 per month.
By November, the Embassy had reports of dis­
appearances averaging aoout 34 per month for the January-Apr il
period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of
55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.
(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion
that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative
frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations
reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy
oecisions. In essence, the situation changed little
auring 1978. 3
(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism, uncontrolled. The
conclusion that conaitions did not improve in 1978 is
cased, in part, on evidence that the security forces
continued to operate without effective central control.
Numerous reports during the year from
variety of intelligence
sources stated that:
— President Videla and his moderate supporters
were attempting to establish rigid command and
control over security operations;
— new orders had been issued with respect to con­
ducting jjolice and military operations within
the bounas of the law; or
— police and military operatives had oeen dis­
missed or disciplined for abuses.
(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken.
Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in
areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward
reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent
that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted
in accord with orders issued by regional and local military
authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrainea by the
law or the directives of national authorities. In late
October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsioilities
in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that
there was almost no central control over operational
counterterrorist units.
-SECRET/ M U1- .URN'/ H

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

(C) The political context. The "dirty war*1 ary ament
so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights
aouses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted
by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there
were only about 400 active terrorists iri Argentina; no single
group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists,
ana no group was judged a serious and immediate security
tnreat. High government officials, including President Videla,
have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the
7war" is over, i.e, tnat there is no continuing high-level
internal security threat.
(C} The explanation for the continuing human rights
abuses lies' in armed forces, and especially army, politics
rather than in internal security problems. The army is
the predominant service, and its political heterogeneity
is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President
Vibela leads a group of military and civilian moderates who
woulo preter to see human rignts abusers halted. Videla.'s
priority concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree
of army and military unity, because the development of
irreparable internal splits probably would spell his own quick
demise and the end of the military's National Reorganization
Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed
to the military government's reform program and believes
his own role important. Thus, Videla's preferences give way
to his long-term political goals when his preferences
threaten military cohesion.
(C)
In the case of human rights anuses, neither Videla
nor any other significant military figure, has questioned
the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard
core terrorists. Videla's differences with the so-called
hardliners center on violations of the rights of non—terroristsThe hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined
to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment
as subversive. They oo not entirely share the moderates
perception tnat the "war" against suoversion is over.4
Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo
Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I", Buenos Aires) and
Ma^or General Luciano Benjamin Menendqz (Corps III, Cordoba)
continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics
that ensured human rights abuses.
(C) Other factors that diminished Videla.'s cnances of
achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August
retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Commander and

■SfiCKLT/HPrORH/HO. COWTKftCT-

No Objection To Declassification in Purt 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

'

-9-

a gradual increase in military ana civilian disenchantment
with the general economic and political performance of his
government.
Those conditions, plus ttfe degree ro whicn the
beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official
attention during the last quarter of the year, created highly
improbable circumstances for bold human rignts initiatives on
Videla‘s part.
(C) The results of the recent array promotion/reassignment
cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms.
Moderates politically in sympathy with Videlaana Army Commander
Viola now may be. in a position to exert more effective control
over the service.
Particularly notable changes involved
the following officers:
— Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I
commanoer slot to Army Chief of Staff. His
new post is a prestigious one from which he
might be able to advance to the Commander in
Cnief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer
has a troop command nor, mure importantly,
direct control over counterterrorist units, his
promotion is probably a net shorty—term, human
rights gain..
^
— Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has
replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander.
Galtier! most recently commanded Corps II
(Rosario) where he established a reputation for
reasonableness and restraint in human rights
matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction,
for example, that the most progress has been
registered with respect to the judicial processing
of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same
tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a
needed improvement over Suarez Mason.
— Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another
officer notorious for his permissive attitude
toward human rights abuses, has been snifted from
his sensitive buenos Aires command (Military
Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.
— Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros.
A Viaela-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with
Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for
cucuing the abuses heretofore "characteristic of
S£i:ftliT/NQFnr<lM/Kn PnNTPfcrT

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

*•

*'

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8

counterterrorist operations in the buenos Aires
area.
— brig. General Juan Bautists Sasslain* s appointment
as Cnief of the National Police is an ominous
move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist
expert, Sassiain is reputedly rough and cruel.
— Major General Luciano B. Mer.encez, a fanatic on
suoversion who has condoned hitman rights violations
by those under his command, remains the Corps III
commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez.'s retention
may_ be attributable to the need for nis services
in the event of hostilities with Chile over
the Beagle•Channel.
In human rights terms,
however, it means that the situation in Cordoba
is not liable to improve in the near future.
In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not
result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements,
but the political context appears to be more favorable than
it has been since the March 1976' coup.5
Much will depend
upon whether the Viaela-Viola tandem chooses to exercise
the necessary- leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether
the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over
continuing aouses to demand cnange.
(C)
IAHRC visit.
From the Argentine government's
perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29
when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will
begin a week-long on site investigation.

i

t

>

It is questionable, however, whetner the prospect of '
the IaHKC visit will lead to fundamental cnanges in tne tactics
employed by the security forces and, thereoy, open the way to
long-term numan rights advances.
In this critical area, the
army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than
the lAHkC visit.6

HliiCRLrl/NOPOKN/NO CONTRACT
(

t

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

FOOTNOTES
1.

HA Note:

HA prefers the following wording for
the text from sentence two of paragraph
1 tnrough first sentence of paragraph 3»
"Although it is difficult to quantify precisely
certain aspects of the situation - such as
the exact number of people killed and tortured
and the number being held in clandestine*
military camps - we receive a steady flow of
detailed information from a wide variety of
credible sources in Argentina about human
rights events and conditions. These sources
include our Embassy, international non-govern­
mental organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross ana Amnesty Inter­
national, Argentine Government officials,
Argentine human rights organizations,
victims of arrest and torture, eyewitnesses
to incidents of abduction and torture, and
relatives of victims."

2.

HA Note:

No overall trend of improvement in category one terms can be shown. There was substantial
qualitative deterioration in at least two areas —
the widening scope of the victims of dis­
appearance, and' the worsening of treatment
of political detainees. Tne simple passage
of time can also be reviewed as a negative
factor - another year of widespread violations
long after any terrorist threats has passed.

3.

HA Note:

HA would again emphasize that despite uncertainties
with quantitative materialr the shift in targeting
noted above is a significant negative development.

4.

HA Note:

However, Videla himself said last year that
"A terrorist is not ^ust someone with a gun
or boatb but also someone who spreads ideas that
are contrary to Western and Cnristian civilization"
(Reported in the London Times, January 4, 1978}INR and AKA view the inclusion of this statement
attributed by the press to Videla as potentially
misleading when used in the above context. The

■BUCKET

HO CONTACT

No Objection To Declassification in Purl 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-B1-1-6-8

quote invites tne inference that Videla
supports the application of extreme security
measures against those who have not committed
violent terrorist acts. There is no evidence
to support that contention.
5.

HA Mote:

6.

S/P and
11A Note*:

avmy

The
command changes present a mixed
picture from which it is not possible to conclude
that the overall political context for human
rights improvement is more favorable than in
the past.
S/P and HA would delete this last sentence
because it contradicts the assessment that
the command changes are “mixed".

i
X

i

x

sjb€*et; mi

TTO UJNTACT

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

Outsic

;he System

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 9, 1980
jeONFIDENTTAr

ACTION

/
MEMORANDUM FOR:

DECLASSIFIED
c.u. idaeo
E.0.13526

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

i

Authority

FROM:
SUBJECT:

i

NARA Ja£____ Dato
Visit to Argentina

----------

(U)

I enquired further about the possibility of your wife going to Buenos Aires
(see attached). I did this in a low key through State, so there are still
gaps. I don’t, however, want to be higher-profile unless you are more
firmly committed. (U)
Mrs. Mondale will definitely not go.

(U)

There would be no need to go to the other cities.

(U)

The host, as I wrote, would be the Mozarteum Argentino, the head of which,
incidentally, is Martinez de Hoz. The normal way this sort of thing is
handled (Nancy Kissinger is the modell) is lots of parties, concerts,
museums and receptions in B.A. followed by a couple of days on a ranch.
There would be no expenses involved in all of this; even if the Mozarteum
didn't pick up the hotel bill, that would be irrelevant since your wife
would probably stay with the Ambassador anyway. (U)
i'Vv/'I

-

\y

It is not specified who pays the air fare but that would be paid up by the
Argentine Government. (U)
^
I did not directly raise the question of taking one of your children along.
That is beyond the scope of the invitation. I have no doubt that the Argentine
Government would fall all over itself to broaden the invitation, but I recommend
that you not pursue this. That would make you too beholden to the GOA and open
you up to criticism from the human rights lobby here. (Indeed, even without
a child along, there will be some flak.) (C)
If you want to pursue this seriously, I will contact the Argentine Ambassador
and pin down the details. I think you should give this some further thought,
however, as to the political implications. (C)
GUIDANCE REQUESTED:
Shall I contact the Argentine Ambassador?

__

Or, wait for them to make another move?

_____

Or, drop the idea?

_____

CD^glDUNTiAtr-Review on June 9, 1985

_

s t ?t” Yi/sTO/S

■SOMPIDUNTIAfr

May 28, 1980

Or. Brzezinski Only (Thornton)

At lunch with the Argentine Ambassador, he pressed the point that Mrs.
Mondale should visit Argentina during the visit there of the National
Symphony Orchestra.
This would be at the invitation of the Moznrfmm
Argentine and would commemorate the 400th Anniversary of the founding
of Buenos Aires.
I said that this would probably result in US-Argentine
relations becoming an unwelcome campaign issue and that I thought it a
poor idea.
(I will check this out later with Dennis Clift.)
He then
wondered if your wife might like to come instead.
I made no comment.
The dates are July 24-26: the NSO then goes on to Uruguay and Brazil
for three more days.
Would she be interested? It is all expenses paid
and might be fun.
She would be less of a target for the human rtguts
lobby than Mrs. Mondale, but it would still come up.
reply if he asks again?
(C)

\

JjJ-

JUk

How should I

«-">*•

u. i Kf

*

•Jj

-OeNPinKSTTAL—

Declassify on May 28, 1986

\

toby

■No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

ft:
DEPARTMENT OP STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

s/s
bOS REVIEWED D7-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL]

TO:

The Secretary

FROM:

ARA - Terence A. Todmetn

f
Your Visit to Argentina November 20-22, 1977
I.

Objectives

O.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained.
Basic differences on human rights have led to a de facto
OS refusal to sell arms and to a "no" vote on an
Argentine loan application in the Inter-American Devel­
opment Bank. Meanwhile, Argentina's rush toward nuclear
reprocessing raises the spectre of its becoming a
member of the nuclear club.
President videla offers the beBt hope on the nuclear
issue, and the possibility, though by no means the certainty,
of the progress on human rights improvements basic to
other issues. But Videla's position is not secure,
and there are indications that the Argentines expect
to make some basic decisions on their relations with us
after evaluating their talks with you. *
In this context, our objectives tare to:
— strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military
elements who oppose him on human rights and nuclear
issues (the "hardline" nationalist constituencies
on these issues overlap);
— obtain Videla*s agreement to ratify Tlatelolco,
preferably at a date certain in the near future, and
to set the stage for possible movement on the reprocessing
issue;
— encourage Videla to follow through on his promise
of significant improvements in the Argentine human rights
situation through (a) release of detainees or affording them
due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture./^
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

'

CBCRBT
"Ads

nuVi' P, -aa-iji-u-Vv
Author!
frjfc
Date
--NARA
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

Argentina's objectives are twofold:
~ the government wants a clarification of what
Argentina may expect from us on issues on which they
would like our cooperation, including military sales; and
— President Videla will try to make the talks
appear cordial and substantive and hence* to demonstrate
to Argentine public opinion that .his 'government has our
ear and respect.
II.

Setting

Although Argentina is Latin America's moBt European
country, chronic political instability and exaggerated
economic nationalism have long impaired its otherwise
significant achievements. At the time of the military
takeover in March 1976 the civilian government had
disintegrated: fanatical qroups of leftist and rightist
terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly
bankrupt, and inflation exceeded 600% per year.
The three-man Junta, of which President Videla
is the Army member, came to power with two primary
goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of
the economy.
Organized terrorist movements are now largely under
control. The once powerful Peronist-inclined Montoneros have
been reduced to some 700 combatants, and* the Trotskyite
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to'only 120. Both
groups have been forced to confine themselves to low risk,
high visibility operations such as assassinations of military
officers and businessmen, and bombings of public buildings.
The defeat of large-scale armed groups has not
brought peace, however. Acts of violence are still
relatively common, and respond to various motives,
including personal vendettas, political radicalisms
of all kinds, and even cynical maneuvering^ to weaken
contending government factions, and may on occasion
be designed to embarrass Videla himself.
Under these conditions, official and unoffi­
cial abuses are common. Armed Forces units hunt down
suspected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes
imprisoned or killed under circumstances difficult
to ascertain. Homes of detainees are often looted,
and torture is fairly common during the first days
of detention. We have been told repeatedly that excesses
of the security personnel have been punished, but
there is no public record of it.
i

—SECRET—•
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

■ .-No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8
o&wAa4i

Economic performance has improved under the Junta.
Foreign currency reserves now exceed $3 billion, inflation
has been reduced, a balanced budget may be possible in 1978,
serious distortions in relative pricers have been corrected
and record level crops' and exports were reached in 1976-77.
On the negative Bide, the government has not been able
to force inflation below 150%, and wage restraints have
reduced real income by 40%. As a result, consumption has
decreased, and worker dissatisfaction is increasing. Strikes
for higher salaries have rocked the country in recent weeks
and more unrest is likely.
Problems or not, Argentina's international economic
position is improving steadily. Exports should reach $4.5
billion this year, compared to imports of about $4 billion,
including more than $700 million from the US. Interestingly,
while the Argentine-US trade balance will be some $400 million
in our favor this year, Argentina's balance with the Communist
countries in 1976 was almost as much in its favor, and may
lead to some pressure to increase Argentine purchases from
the Soviet Union.
Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation
have led to considerable new interest and some new
activitity by foreign investors. US ^investment now
stands at $1.4 billion and loans by US banks to
Argentina exceed $3 billion.
The military dominate the Argentine political
scene: Armed Forces officers act as governors, mayors
and managers of nationalized companies. With the excep­
tion of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, civilians are
excluded from major decision-making positions.
Internal military rivalries are endemic. President
Videla mediates pragmatically among military factions,
but cannot impose his will. Several "hard-line" Army
generals remain in key command positions even though
their retirement would relieve right wing pressures
on the President. The politically adroit but unscrupulous
Navy Junta member, Admiral Massera, who is associated
with the Navy's hard-line human rights practices,
takes advantage of every opportunity to embarrass
Videla and boost his own chances for the Presidency.
The Junta has not committed itself to restoring
civilian rule, but consultations between prominent
citizens and military leaders are taking place. Meanwhile,
political party activities are suspended, and the

-SfiefWT—
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

■ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8
OCiUACii.'

-ZJZ-

powerful labor unions are largely under the control
of military interventora.
Argentina's international actiyity has been
limited by concentration on its own chaotic internal
politics and by a general disinclination to identify
closely with the problems of the Third World. However,
Argentina does have an exceptionally able diplomatic
service which could help build better understanding
between the DCs and LDCs in international fora.
As noted above, the U.S. is the country which
presents the most significant challenges for the
Argentines. They are deeply disturbed by our condi­
tioning of weapons sales and IFI loans on their human
rights performance, and may be on the verge of
making basic decisions to reduce their ties to us.
Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear
technology, and probably has the capacity to produce
a nuclear explosion within the next two years. The
Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations
and may hope that cooperation on that front might
strengthen our relations and diminish tensions on
other.fronts, including human rights.
The historic rivalry with Brazil continues (e.g.
the dispute over rights to Parana River water.)
There is, however, no great tension now. An April
U.K. international arbitration decision awarding
ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile raised
nationalist sentiments in-Argentina, (already resent­
ful of the British presence in the Falkland Islands.
The Argentine Navy has increased its patrols in
the area, but the other elements in the GOA seem
more inclined toward negotiation. The Wavy ..
apprehended nine.Russian and Bulgarian fishing
boats in October, but the seizures do not seem
to have had a lasting impact on Argentiue-Soviet
relations.
III.

Key IssueB
1.

Human Rights

U. S. Objective:
To convince the Argentines that
better relations are dependent upon their making human
rights improvements, i.e., (a) releasing or affording
due process to detainees, and (b) ending torture and "dis­
appearances."

SECRET
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

■ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

-SBGMTCT
' -$-■
Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the
human rights violations which have taken place were
a result of a bloody civil war, that official violations
were an unfortunate but necessary part of the fight
against terrorism, that such violations are being
gradually brought under control, and that a full return
to the rule of law will take time.
Essential Factors: U. S. reactions to Argentine
human rights violations have severely strained our rela­
tions. The Argentines claim not to understand why we
have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine IFI
loans. They believe that we overemphasize official
violations and underestimate the terrorist actions
which triggered - them.
"...
Hundreds of members of the Armed* Forces and innocent
civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The
military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have re­
acted brutally.
Many terrorist activists and suspects
have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions
and obtain information is commonplace. Military authorities
have frequently allowed off-duty security personnel
to terrorize leftist sympathizers and human rights
advocates not involved in the bloodletting.
Supreme Court writs of habeas corpus concerning
the disappeared are often ignored by the government.
A group of "Mothers of the Plaza" assemble weekly
in downtown Buenos Aires to petition for information
about disappeared family members. We have received
a letter signed by 178 of them aBking for your intercession
with the Argentine government.

«
«

The State of Siege provisions of the Constitution
enable the government to detain prisoners without
charges or set trial dates. President Videla pledged
to President Carter to try to resolve,the cases of
the 4,000 prisoners held under these provisions by
Christmas, but there has has been little progress.
A recently reinstated "right of option", which would
allow political prisoners to choose exile instead
of jail, has resulted in the release of only a few
prisoners.
There is considerable U. S. public and Congressional
interest in the fate of Argentine political prisoners
and the disappeared: five members of the Senate Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote you asking your inter■fi-BCRET -

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

■SECRET--

-6-*

,

.

vention on behalf of jailed newspaper*editor, Jacobo
Timerman, and some 25 Congressmen have expressed interest
in the Deutsch family. (These cases are covered in
the Background Paper on Human Rights.) Congressman
Harkin has asked that you inquire'about the application
of the right of option. A U.S. human rights group
has just given us an unverified'list containing the
names of 7,500 people they claim have disappeared
or have been detained in Argentina.
Points to be Made
— Incidences of prolonged detention, disappearances and
torture strain our relations with Argentina. We do not wish
to tell Argentines how to run their country, but we feel
compelled to express our concern.
— President Carter was heartened by President Videla's
desire to resolve the status of political detainees by
Christmas; we know that it is difficult to process 4,000
individual cases, but we hope that they yill soon be
decided.

— We were encouraged by the decision to restore
the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will
allow many detainees to be freed from prison.
— We are especially concerned about the fate of Jacobo
Timerman and the Deutsch family. Both cases have aroused
great interest in the U.S., as did the detention of
the AP reporter Serrat.
— The government should clarify what has happenned
to individuals who have disappeared without explanation.
We know some may be victims of terrorists, but the
security forces appear to have been involved in many
instances.
— A public accounting of all prisoners held
by the government would help resolve questions
about disappearances and would considerably improve
Argentina's world image.
— We still frequently hear reports of torture,
especially during the first days of detention. We
understand that the fight against terrorism has been
brutal, but torture of prisoners is not acceptable
under any circumstances. Torture should be for­
bidden and future cases tried in the courts.
■BBCRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

• No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

-72.

Terrorism

0. S. Objective; To remind the Argentines that we, too,
abhor terrorism but that we cannot condone counterterrorist
measures that violate human rights.
Argentine Objective; To focus U.iS. thinking on
terrorism as a prime violator of human rights, and
as the origin of what most Argentines privately consider
"shameful" conditions of internal disorder.
Essential Factors: The Argentines contend that U.S.
concentration on human rights violations by government
authorities has forced attention away from terrorism,
which they say also violates human rights and is the
real threat to Western civilization. They have forcefully
pressed a campaign in international organizations
to combat terrorism. This was the principal theme
in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the UNGA in
October and a major concern of Deputy Foreign Minister
Allara during his calls at the Department in early
November. The Foreign Minister will have especially
strong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor,
Admiral Guzzetti, was almost killed by an assassin
in May.
A recent upsurge in terrorism in Argentina heightens
their concern; two Armed Forces officers‘were assassinated,
three businessmen were killed, and the office of the Labor
Minister and the home of a Chrysler executive have been
bombed in the last month.
*

Points to be Made
— Terrorist attacks against government officials
and innocent civilians are deplorable. We wish
to express our sympathy to these men and their families.
—. We are 'as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the
actions of the international terrorists. We cannot, however,
condone counterterrorist actions that violate human rights and
due legal process.
3.

Ratification of Treaty of Tlatelolco

U. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty
of Tlatelolco, bring its nuclear program under fullscope
safeguards, defer reprocessing and forego nuclear
explosions.
(
SfieSBT--- -

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

’No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8
—O—

Argentine Objectives; To complete its nuclear fuel cycle
in order to have greater energy independence, to become a
nuclear technology exporter and to maintain cooperative
ties with the U.S.
«
Essential Factors: Argentina is now proceeding apace
to construct a reprocessing plant which in two years
could produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to
support a nuclear explosive capability. Argentina,
which is by far Latin America's leading nuclear state,
views nuclear technology as a source of both energy
and international status.
It was the first to have
a research reactor (1958), the first and so far only
state to operate a power plant (1974), and is a major
exporter of technicians under IAEA programs..
If Argentina were to defer its reprocessing plans,
accept fullscope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions,
we would consider the transfer of sensitive heavy
water technologies. Failure to defer reprocessing
could scuttle the chances of establishing a Latin
American nuclear-free zone and lead to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The President
has approved a long-range nuclear strategy involving
both Argentina and Brazil which is outlihed in the background
papers, but a key immediate objective! of our foreign policy
and your trip is to get Argentina to ratify the Treaty of
Tlatelolco now.
Points to be Made
— The United States is determined to do all it can to
halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
— Ambassador Smith is available to brief your
officials on our efforts to achieve a new SALT agreement
and a Comprehensive Test Ban.
— It is not our policy to dissuade Argentina or any
nation from acquiring nuclear technology. On the contrary,
if steps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such
technology, we have indicated to your government a readiness
to assist you in the sensitive field of heavy water.
(
1

— Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course,
involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urqent
world study is conducted on how to reiprocess in a safer
manner.

&£CR££

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

I

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

'~=9=~

»

— We accept and support Argentina's expectation
that its Latin American neighbors should also
make sacrifices on behalf of safe nuclear technologies.
— What we ask now, therefore, is that Argentina take
a bold step on behalf of continental security and mpve
now to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
— We were heartened by President Videla's conversa­
tion with President Carter, and President Videla's com­
mitment to consider Argentine ratification of the Treaty
of Tlatelolco.
— Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty
would give dramatic impetus to Latin America's efforts
to create a nuclear free zone, and would demonstrate
Argentina's dedication to peace.

I

4.

P. S.-Argentine. Military Relations

P. S. Objectives: To assure the* Argentines that we
want a good military relationship, but to get them to
understand that this depends on their human rights
performance.

Argentine Objective; To inform us that it val­
ues its military ties to the U. S., but that without a
clarification of P.S. arms policies, particularly on
spare parts, Argentina will be forced to reorient
its military procurements and relationships.

I

Essential Factors: P. S.-Argentine military relations
have deteriorated sharply'as a result of P. S. actions taken
to disassociate the P. S. from the GOA's human rights
violations. As a result of our strictures, Argentina
has refused all military sales financing for fiscal
year 1978. We will not request funds from the Congress
for fiscal year 1979. In addition, Congress has prospectively
banned military training and arms sales as of October
1, 1978 unless human rights conditions improve. Already,
the Department has been refusing almost all Argentine
military requests.
t

While our policy has little real military significance
for Argentina, our actions have damaged relations
with the armed forces who run the country. Argentina
dropped out of PNITAS fleet exercises this year. Pritil
substantial progress is made on human rights considerations—
release or the affording of due process to detainees,
and the ending of torture and disappearances — Argentina
can expect our military relations to remain paralyzed.
uSJEfiRET-- -

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

-16Points to be Made
— The United States values its military relations
with Argentina and regrets the circumstances which
have led to the current situation regarding military
sales and training.
— Our willingness to provide equipment is directly
related to internal security policies. Given the present
situation in Argentina, it is virtually impossible for the
Administration to justify military Bales to Argentina.
— We hope earnestly that the restoration of due
process in Argentina will pemit us to develop more normal
military relationships.
— This would permit us to advise the Congress of a
changed situation and to recommend abrogation of the law
which will prohibit military transfers to Argentina after
October lr 1978.
5.

Argentina and the International Financial
Institutions
_

U.S. Objectives; To explain to the* Argentines that
we cannot support their loan requests, except those which
meet basic human needs, until they demonstrate substantial
human rights improvements.
Argentine Objective; To persuade the U.S. to vote
"yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IPIs.
Essential Factors: In June we abstained instead of
voting *rio'? on one loan and told the Argentines that
this was due to improvements in their human rights situation.
We added, however, that it would be difficult for us
to support their loan requests in the IFIs. They held
back loans until October when they submitted a $36
million gas pipeline project to the IDB. We voted
"no", and informed the Argentines that without human
rights improvements we would vote "no" on future loans
not clearly meeting basic human needs. (We have since
voted "yes" on a potable Water loan in the IDB that
met our basic human needs criteria, but decisions
on two more Argentine loan requests in the IDB,
$60 million for science and technology development
and $50 million for electrical transmission lines,
have been delayed until after your visit.)
The Argentines claim, somewhat disingenuously,
to be confused by our voting record in the IFIs. They
ask how we could abstain on a loan in June and now,
-afiCRET—

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

■No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

^-TT='7
after significant improvements in human rights have
taken place, vote "no".
Points to be Hade
— We do not seek to intervene in the internal
affairs of other societies; but we believe that no
member of the United Nations can claim that violations
of internationally sanctioned human rights are solely
its own affair.
t
— .We will continue to use our vote in the
to promote human rights and hope that conditions
Argentina will permit us to take a more positive
in the World Bank and IOB when future loans come

IFIs .
in
stance
up.

(If raised) Eximbank is encouraged by Argentine
progress on economic questions and this is revelent
to the Bank's decisions. However, Exim is required by law
to consider human rights factors in passing on all loans.

6.

North-South Issuss

U.S. Objectives: To encourage Argentina to use its
influence within the G-77 on issues where our
interests overlap.
Argentine Objective; To e.ncourage the U. S. to
cooperate with Argentina on economic issues affecting
middle-income developing countries.
%

Essential Factors; Although outfwardly supportive
of Third World positions on North-South issues, Argentina
has been quietly but energetically arguing against many
G-77 proposals. Along with other large Latin American
countries, Argentina is concerned about important
aspects of the New International Economic Order, and
increasingly sees itself as a potential "swing" country
between DC's and LDC's.
Argentina believes that the UNCTAD Integrated Program
for Commodities favors Africa and Asia.
It is not a major
exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. * Last September,
it opposed the African countries' demand for an immediate LDC
pledge of financial support for the rapid creation of the
Common Fund to finance the Program. Argentina feels that
any generalized debt moratorium for all LDC's would jeopardize
the Latin American region's vitally important credit stand­
ing with private lenders.

■SECRET -

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

~n~
As a middle-income country, however, Argentina
has strongly criticized bur "basic human needs strategy”
as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCa.
Points to be Made;
— The United States appreciates the constructive,
moderate position Argentina has taken an many economic
questions in the international fora. We hope they will con­
tinue to use these fora to speak out constructively on issues
of importance to the world community as a whole.
— Argentina is a country with strong ties to both
the G-77 and the developed countries; we look forward to
working with the Argentines in seeking practical solutions
to North/South issues. '
f
— We look forward to cooperating closely with
the Argentines in the MTN- negotiations, and would
be interested in exchanging views on ways in which
developing countries can become more involved in inter­
national economic decisions generally.
— Our support for the basic human meeds
approach is not designed to supplant programs to
develop infrastructure and productivity, which are
obviously essential to meet basic human meedB
in all developing countries
7.

U. S. - Argentine Mixed Commission

U. S. Objective; To be receptive to Argentine requests
for closer economic consultations.
Argentine Objective. To reactivate the- U.S.-Argentine
Mixed Commission on Economic Relations.
Essential Factors; A U.S-Argentfine ISixed Economic
Commission was established in 1966, but as moribund. The
Argentines proposed its reactivation when Assistant Secre­
tary Todman visited Buenos Aires in August and we have since
agreed to meet with the Argentines in Washington at an
unspecified date, possibly in January.
We consider a consultative group useful, but
would prefer to organize it at. a relatively low level,
e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoid the appearance
of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time.

■Bfi€RET—

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

.’No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

-rrjrt
The Argentines may wish to use a reactivated
Commission to consider ways to improve their negative
trade balance with the U.S. — some $400 million in
1977. Our restrictions on beef imports and countervailing
duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters
may also be raised by the Argentines in the Commission.
(Although the incidence of hoof and mouth disease in Argentina
limits raw beef trade, we did import some $100 million
worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef in 1976). On
our side, the Commission could be used to raise investment
disputes: Deltec International (a major meat producer) has a
claim pending in the Argentine courts.
Points to be Made:
— The U. S. views the Economic Commission as a use­
ful instrument to achieve shared economic interests.
Our health restrictions against Argentine beef
are not a device to deny access to U, S. markets. We
welcome discussions with Argentina regarding health and
sanitation matters.
I
The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation
of the GOA in providing information relevant to pending
countervailing duty cases and is taking that information
into consideration in making its decision.
8.

Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition

U. S. Objective:
for cooperation.

(If raised)

To consider Argentine proposals

Argentine Objective: To discuss the establishment of
a U.S.-Argentine Commission on Malnutrition.
Essential Factors: The Argentines finest suggested this
Commission during the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister's
visit earlier this month. They seemed undecided about what
they want the group to do and gave the impression that they
may have included it on the agenda to divert attention from the
harder issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.
Points to be Made:
The U. S. will listen with interest to Argentine
proposals on a Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition.
— We would like to cooperate with Argentina to
alleviate malnutrition in the hemisphere.
#i nrtnnmj

•xj ISvJnci j.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

-6B0RBT
-149.

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries

U. S. Objectives; To encourage greater technology
i
development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination
against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that
//
IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology
available, regardless of origin. .
//

:

I

Argentine Objective: To foster greater utilization of
Argentine technology by other LDCs through multilateral
agreements.
Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on
Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries will be
held at Buenos Aires from August 30 to September 12, 1978.
The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a con**
ference, which it hopes will help promote greater use of
technology developed in advanced LDCs like Argentina.
Points to be Made

i

— We will attend the Buenos Aires Conference with
the goal of cooperating with LDC's 'to enhance use of tech­
nology available in their countries.
— We hope to work with Argentina to direct the
Conference toward that goal.
f
— We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify
use of LDC technology for its own sake at the expense of
superior technology available elsewhere.
10.

Malvinas/Falkland Islands

U. S. Objective; To urge negotiations aimed at
a peaceful settlement and avoidance of incidents,
while staying out of the middle of this ArgentineU. K. question.
Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the
return of the U. K. held Malvinas Islands to Argentina.
(The Argentines would prefer you use the name Malvinas.)
EBBential Factors: The Malvinas have been governed by
the U. K. since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations
will take place in New York in December, but there is
basic disagreement on a date. The Argentines want them
now but the U. K. is thinking of an end-of-century turnover.
The negotiations are complicated by the 2,000 inhabitants'
SfieRET-

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8
-15-

unwillingness to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility
that large oil deposits may exist in the area.
We have consistently urged both parties to seek
a solution through negotiation. The Argentines,
however, may be thinking of other tactics: Deputy
Foreign Minister Allara told Assistant Secretary Todman
in early November that an "incident" was possible
so long as the matter remained unsettled. The Argentines
urged that we pressure the British to return the Malvinas
to Argentina. The British have asked that we urge
restraint on the Argentines to permit* an evolutionary
approach.
Points to be Made?
(In view of Argentine interest and the UK request,
we believe you could profitably take the lead in
raising this issue.)
The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can
work out a suitable agreement on the Malvinas.
-- Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would
only make the future of the islands more difficult to resolve.

t

.SBratET

I
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

No ObjectiorTTo UecldSSinudliui! in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-6-6
up.partmem oj dime
PAGE 81
ACT.CN ARA-14

SUE'iSS (4937

12 or 92

2721232

9271

.sc-bb cire-ib cssc-sa pm-bs 1-01 inr-lb
L-03 NSAt-BB 'iLC-fS PA-Bl SP'Ci SS-19 ICA-ll
14-09 it:r-0i rast-ja aid-bs eb-:» /dj; w
...................................997972 2722071 /73
P 2720171 J'J1. 7|
FN AMEBRASS* BUENOS A'PES
70 SECSTATE UASHCC PRIORITY 6281
.Mrs

tJl 9 t I 11 E A 7 I 4 k 6E6TI0M 2 OF 2 1UE.10S SIRES 4937
1.
EARL * THL'4'341 PCRNI'IG Cl. K'SSIhGER NET VITH OR. iSRGE
LUTS EDASES, NOTED ARSE7ITI HE POET AMU WRITER. THIS PROMPTED
MUCH NEWS CQVErocE. LATER IN Oft' KISSINGER MID FM1ILY
DEPARTED UI'H I'.i'IISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINET DC HOI TO OVER­
NIGHT AT AN ESTAIiCIA IFARNI. THIS HAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT.

B'JENOS 04937

• itLLliKAl/l
II OF 92

272123Z

j CONCEPT OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT HUNAN RIGHTS I'l LA.
HE SAIC HE UOJIG WAIT AlOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS P*TURK TO
,. I US BEFORE SPEAK.IIG OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY UMH
ENBASSI PERSON’>FL. THEY WERE GCOC GLESTS AN3 MACE III*Y
EFFORT TO GiVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT EMISSARIES CF
OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMIN I STRAY,ON.
NY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATEO H!3» PRAISE
FOR IRGEHTINA'S ACTION IN ViriHG OUT TERRQRISH AII3 nIS
STRESS OH THE "IPORTRNCE OF ARGENT I HA NAY HAVE GONE TO SCHE
CSHSIOERAELE ECEIIT TO HIS HOSTS’ HEADS. DESPITE HIS
OISCLAiHEAS THAT THE NETHODS USED III FIGHTING TERACRISN RUST
NOT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOrE DANGER THAT ARGENTINES
MAY USE YISSINGFA-S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION
FOR HARDENING THE1R HUHAH RIGHTS STANCE.
CASTRO

S.1 CN HIS RETURN FROM THE FIRM. -XlSSiNGER SPOKE TO ENSASSY
PERSONNEL. hE CAVE A PEP TALKS TO ARE RICAN FOREIGN SERVICE
PERSONNEL AS HELL AS LOCALS. HI NARRATEO 50RE OF HI5
EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUR3A0US APPROACH
WAS WELL RECEIVED 8T ».L.

bOS REVIEWED 03-Jun-2D10: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

IB. ON FRIDAY EVENING R RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EMBASSY
RLSICLIICE HONOR'NG KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO
HUNOREO PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL
REPRESENTED.
11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTEN3ED A DINNER GIVEN
BY MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS
COMPOSES OF BA! HERS, ECONOMISTS AN3 III3U5YRIRLISTS. THE MAIN
DISCUSSION CONCERNEO MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND
OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERN LACK OF POLITICAL
STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMEO TO IE THE MAIN CONCERN OF
THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROM THE DINNER.
12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED III AH OFT TNE RECORD
PRESS COIN EVENLY AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY HE TIBER OF ARGENTINE
COUNCIL ON INTERNAnC'iAi RELATIONS. TNIS GROUP IS COMPRISED
OF FOB"EH FOREIGN MINISTERS, UNO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE
PUBLIC AS THE "ELITE GROUP" ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OR. KISSINGER
GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TALK. IE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO
CUESTiOi: BUT TnAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
ARGENTINA'S HISTORY. ESPECIALLY, ANE3UCAU3. LACKED FAMILIARITY
W T1 ARGENTINA'S EXFERIflt!Ol riiKTJJlt.UJliniUW.- HE EXPLAINED
n; His DP III1 OH GOA naD DONE all OUTSTANDING JOB III WIPING
CJY TFVRSRIST FORCES, BUT ALSO CAUTIONED THAT METHODS 'JSfcO
"n"f\SITING "TE’HOTTS” BUST MOT BE PERPETUATED. jE EXPLAINED
A rOVEMEUT *CWARDS 'iSRNAICY MUST TAKE'PLSCE IF DEMOCRATIC
IDEALS ARE TO PREVAIL.
13. OR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED III A QUESTION AND AIISUEH
PERIOD WITH O'/E OF ARGENTINR'SPOPUIAA NEWS COMHEIITERS.
DURING THE mTt»mcu_«M:ciim» ci-irtn yrapBRiHr; IT-Bf fluY
OF THE GREATEST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RiMIS^- HE SAID IT WAS
UNFORTUNATE fiSTjIT .Sqift'nmTUHlia kwa'i rights was
BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAiNST ITS F«IElkOS.
COMMENT: THE X'SSINSER FAMILY ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME >U
ROSARIO, WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC.
IHDICAT'ONS
ARE HE WAS WELL RECEIVED B* THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTEN3E0
TWO OTHER GAMES IN BUENOS AIRES AS’A GUEST OF PRESIDENT
ViOELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526

Authority NLr-iiN-yigi-i-k--^
nara_£L£L_ Qsto —llli*---------

COVENAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT.
COMMENT: OR. AiSSHiSER TOLB THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT
CRITICIZE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SO LONS AS HE WAS OVER­
SEAS. HE SPC*E HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY
TO THE AMBASSADOR, BUT FElT HE WOL'lQ SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE

No ObjectionTo TJeclassiticatibb

in hull
t

2Q13/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-6-6

No Objection To Dedabbifiidtiun in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-7-4-

Afghanistan
May 19, 1977

IDA Agricultural Bank - $12 million

The Committee recommended that a demarche be made to the GOA Unking
our support for their loans In the International financial institutions
to human rights considerations.
Argentina
May 19, 1977

IBRD - $100 million
IFC - $ 7 million
IDB Gas Pipeline - $35 million
IDB Petro-chemlcal Program - $83
IDB Urban and Rural Potable Water - $40 million

The Committee agreed that Secretary Blumenthal should ask Econonty
Minister Martinez de Hoz, when he sees him on June 1 at the Annual
IDB meeting in Guatemala to postpone an upcoming $100 million industrial
credit loan 1n the IBRD. He will also inform the Minister that, because
of human rights considerations, we may have problems with other loans
in both the IDB and the IBRD and that we would like to avoid a
confrontation on them by having them delayed until a more propitious
time. It was also agreed that the U.S. Executive Directors 1n the IDB
and IBRD would indicate to their colleagues that the U.S. was seeking
a delay on consideration of these loans.
June 9, 1977
The.Committee was appraised that despite U.S. urging, the Argentines had
refused to withdraw the $100 million loan In the World Bank. Another
small $7 million loan was scheduled to come up for consideration at the
same time. The Committee agreed that the U.S. s'hould abstain on these
two World Bank loans and make a statement alt the Bank Board meeting
explaining our action. The rationale for not deciding to vote no was
that a graduated approach was considered to be more likely to obtain
positive results from the Argentines. It was agreed that the U.S. Bank
Director could let other Bank Directors know a few days In advance that
we would not be supporting this loan.
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13528
Authority

CONriDLNTIAL

NABA

Dato

nn\il£----

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-7-4-3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

DECLASSIFIED
E .0 . 13526
Authority AJL£
NARA— £/=•
D*tn 7 / 9lUm

'ACOBINI CHARLES
QOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RFl farf im cin i 1
^ fi
’7 BUENOS AIRES 4638 '

H
VTTnNFTDT'iNT IflL__
-IQOWSNWin:
3AGE 01
BUENOS e4638 01 07 02 222034Z
ICTION ARA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00
10-13 ( ISO ) V
------------------051032 230357Z /64
R 221858Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1040
JC-Q-NFIDENT I—ir~Tr"SECTI ON 1 07 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, E7IN
SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS
REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS A3RES 4483
SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN
BUENOS AIRES (RE7TEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN
WASHINGTON (RE7TEL A), ARGENTINE 077ICIALS ANNOUNCED A
NUMBER 07 ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN
RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE
07 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST
1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS,
POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES
OF, A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN
THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE
GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR
ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
END SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z
1. AS NOTED IN REFTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S)
PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY
FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA
OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN
RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE
LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE.
AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED
JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS.
2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS
NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS
CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY
THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY "IMMEDIATELY
TO VERIFY THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED.
(MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS
LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM
DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.)
""ffUNl J.DENT1 A-4--/
' PAGE
' 1

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638
-CONFIDENTW~
3. AS FOR SPECIFIC CASES, THREE OF THE NAMES WERE FAMILIAR—
DAVID DIVINSKY AND HIS WIFE ANA MARIA MILER, BOOK PUBLISHERS
LISTED AS RELEASED FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY FOR SUBVERSIVE
CRIMES? AND JUAN CARLOS ROUSSELOT, LISTED AS RELEASED FROM
CUSTODY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES. AS OF JUNE 16, NEITHER MILER NOR
BlVINSKY HAS YET BEEN RELEASED ACCORDING TO FAMILY FRIENDS. WE
ARE TRYING TO VERIFY THESE CASES AS POSSIBLE, INDICATORS AS TO
USUAL FATE'OF LISTED PERSONS. SINCE THE LISTS BEGAN BEING
PUBLISHED WEEKLY IN JANUARY, WE HAVE VERIFIED AND REPORTED ■
SEVERAL ACTUAL RELEASES, ALTHOUGH MANY EMBASSY SOURCES,
INCLUDING VISITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS GROUPS, CLAIM THAT THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS LISTED REMAIN
IN-DETENTION. (THIS COULD RESULT PARTIALLY FROM DEFIANCE OF
INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDERS, AND PARTLY FROM BUREAUCRATIC ,
INCOMPETENCE OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY PRISON AUTHORITIES.)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z
PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAM? (WHO HOSTED
PATRICIA DERIAN'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOLD EMBOFF
ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED WITH '
WESTERKAMP'S SON IN SIERRA CEICA PRISON WHOSE NAME HAS APPEARED
TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF PERSONS
NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS NEVER
INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND HIS STATUS
AS A DETAINEE UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN FACT
REMAINED UNCHANGED FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.
(CONFIDENTIAL
*
t

-1. J)
K.*.i'02 VIi‘:
,

Hcaa

but
:.’Om

JJ

i/3 :

Cl’2

0-IS

l-U

"

( IBC
IEfc-S.‘

ii..' ij/ V !• V - J ?
s;

CGJ' 5,1 Li. '/. J. I VP

in**? sum mruuam

SHua* VP'1 P.S ‘ IKJV

v ^iCiioK
A u c £,u cii ViLi',i e.'.K .. JS^S
t.l-;'22A rlli/Cg Yiv;..2
i' SSJL&tS Hir. A A
2

Vi-'/.CnUCFD V

P) V/D Vx’tVec'.-^CB Y‘.V
IV.
lvba wrajiiszs de kgs i*
(hj .-IilViCc Vlrig
‘ (C) iLEUGc VIB*2

, ’
i-OPC

i**i/iy
M VI’c
*
LiJl

j

oi. s uny/.oc vibzg

)'l----------------«SISSS

SSKS4S
**sIV“&€ VID-fc? VCDV- {>0, OKB-&T LHc'I-SS
r-SS /SVi-LR /cC-Lc LY-^J
kY’
c-U
lh~**
IEy"tS
CI^-W fcODE-fcA

PfliNCE £vf:f<e

AA, r:;r.KC£ VIf LL
1VCGPIK1 CKVPTI’2

■'

CT

OL CF

co/5.iDr;<Livr

SSS6SJS

«

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

JACOBI NX CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638
CONFIDENTIAL
PACE 01
BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z
ACTION ARA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00
10-13 ( ISO ) V
------------------051019 230354Z /64
R 221858Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1041
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638
4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 ^SUBVERSIVE CASES
HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES
PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL.
(WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS
WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND
SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS OR
INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBOFFS, WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
5. PRESIDENT VIDELA'S REPORTED INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORITIES
TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL
OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A
COMMISSION CHAIRED BY INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY TO REVIEW
THE SUSPENSION LAST APRIL. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMISSION'S
DELIBERATIONS AT THAT TIME, LEGISLATION WAS PASSED TO EXTEND
THE SUSPENSION FOR ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT
IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MEAN THE
OPTION WILL BE CONSIDERED MORE FAVORABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR
WILL ACTUALLY BE REINSTATED BEFORE THE PRESENT 150 DAYS SUSPENSION
IS UP IN SEPTEMBER.
6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, AND CIRCULATION OF
THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
«
PAGE 02
BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z
WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT’IN
OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES.” THE DECREE FURTHER
PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE JULY ISSUE AND
"ANY OTHER THAT ATTEMPTS TO REPLACE IT." THE BAN DOES NOT,
HOWEVER, AFFECT THE MAGAZINE'S ADMINISTRATIVE OR PUBLISHING
CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT TERM SUSPENSION
DOES LITTLE TO UNDO THE STRIDENT ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC OF THE
APRIL CABILDO, ISSUE NO. 7. IT WAS THIS WHICH PROMPTED PROTESTS
BY JEWISH GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OCCASIONED LOCAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631). '
7. COMMENT: THIS FLURRY OF STATEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS
WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U-S.
VOTE ON TWO LARGE BANK LOANS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS
COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16
FLATLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTIONS WERE
CONFIDENTIAL
/
PAGE

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

No Objection To Declassification in

Fyll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3

JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638
-GONFTDENTIAL—
"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM ABROAD AND
IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMMAGE OVERESEAS". (NO OTHER PAPER HAS
COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENTS TO DATE.)
OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING MORE TRAN
WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WHETHER SOME
NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD.
OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVIDENCE” —MUCH LIKE
OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B—IS THAT THE
INITIATIVE IS HOLLOW FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, BUT INTERESTING
AND-ENCOURAGING IN WHAT IT DEMONSTRATES ABOUT RISING ARGENTINE
BURFACRATIC SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN
RIGHTS POSITION.
CHAPLIN
OPNFIDEN-T4ALt

PICKIr. i.
I X I £ Ji X. l\ Ji i u>* «.

. . n
i
ua
ririjjwriEio
,* x- u v r,amoi owir(tf;£r.u/ un Uinz:
IK 1HE LKE22 CS
;i!ur/cr/c >.?a; :«x.lk helobli
♦UKO-il HVWie OB COfcfc r A,L\j»A ’ Vc A EE I E£ A OE IRIS I ivr«2 VM>
(AUK It 8 2
12 fcVMDLI' LCAK) tM.LVL 7.L IX BHZ26
LV225;;•) VW
CV3 5.2
LC SBZCIVr w iriiv hA COQE12 WVrllVr'
flVAV BESS! BinWDiL- iC ILi EELioVr CO/.KJ 2 (AI IK 3S1 8SfcJE/C.*c
*m IHi I/.lEPIOr' W1KI2_HA 21VliX-^J. 1HYL M- A 2flAAF.HEIAI C V2i2
•C 0 ►! h I Li }: V, 1 I V r 2EC1I0A S Gi S iiIjK/9 2 V1>E2 4GL8
J,0 cH.Cr.IVIt.
eciHI'C
f,W Y*tVBVc£A PiiErfOL' VIBES
K 5S,T&?-SS TO/ 11
-GPJ&J3
SS&2P*S \G,J
IC-JS
( 1LJ ) A
2b-t.S 2C-Ic- na;v-&t: v iD-^t tfcrv-eo 0FL-5I J.H27-&S
V:-M
IKF-Sl
r-53 X2VF-RC P.BC-SS a V-5.J L
LCDl-RR i-w-rw
I/.E0
CC 1-SI
IcO-SS
Ei-&1
DFV-LS
CIVE-SG

L

g*.pEiCf :./.i

VCilCH

VEV-If

bi'Jl &J

S*GGS

R5 OI &S

SSSSG7S

COXUCFXj.IVr
BGEKQ2 VIHE2 *G28

COHElLiXlIYr

IVCCilXI GhVHri-2
No Objection To Declassification in Full

2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

No Objection To DSCtaasificationin Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1
tlLUHL I

l ••wvm .

j

telegrams

Department of State
DOS REVIEWED 18-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL
PAGE I!
ACTION ARA-IS
INFO

GUAXEU B3MS

B1 OF (2

0111132

SS-W ISO-BO SP-IZ DHA-BZ H-BI I NR-05
I
kSCl-RB GlAE-BR S50-88 ;RRF-S» /B3S 0
.................................. 2120*32 02S533 /Si S
0 IlliUZ JUN 11
' FM AUEU5A5ST GuA’ll'ALA
FC SECSTATF WAS»-5C 1 WED I ATI 6232
TRIAS DEPT lUULDlAlE

OCT-41
RSC-05

mil Mfcrio'i 1 of 2 Guatemala i**s
1 IMOlS
IREASURf FOR PE TIN BRIDGES
E.O. 1 1652 COS
TAGS: CCON, (FIX. SHUU. Cl
SUBJ: SECRETARY ELUUENYWtl'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGE'lTlKR
REF:

GUATEM 434(6

<12!

II OF IZ

8113132

DE HOI IF HI SAW A WAY TO UOVE FROM EXTRA LEGAL LfTHCOS OF CON­
TROL TO THE NORMAL LEGAL PROCESS IN HAHOLIN! TERRORISTS.
MART INEZ DE HCZ SAID THAT WHILE ARGENTINA AZU'RES b.S. TFAOITlCNS
ANO LAWS ANA CITED THE COMMON HlSTCRT. THE PRESENT SITUATION
IS HIGHLY a/nCRI'A. STEMMING in part BY INHIBITION of THE JUDICIARY
TO SENTENCE TERRORISTS BECAUSE OF FEAR 0* RETRIBUTION AC A'.‘.SI
THEMSELVES ANO THE IP FAMILIES.
THE POLICE BECAME DISCOURAGED MEN
TERRORISTS BROUGHT TO TRIAL WERE AlWATS SET FREE. ThUS. A P0L1CT
OF TARING NO PRISONERS WAS ADOPTED. LIKEWISE. YOUNG "ILITART
OFFICERS 10i!» MATTERS INTO THE IN OftN NATOS. MARTINEZ DE KOZ
SAID PEES ID!NT ViCElA IS CCL»JITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN FIGHTS.
CONSIDERABLE PROCRESS HAS SEEN MADE IN A PING OUT THE TWO MAIN
TERRORIST CROUPS AND HE ANTICIPATES GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT Ik
RESTORING NjAIAk RIGHTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.
ROSTER

GUATEMALA 3416, BRlOCEt-B■TYNER TELECON

AS PER REOUEST BY I'D, PETE* BRIDGES THERE FOLLOWS MEUCOY CF
SfCRETARY BLUUEMHAl'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINE MlklSTER
OF T.CGHOU* MARTINEZ DE HC2:
'MEMORANDUM OF CONTERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
ARGENTINA: JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE H02. MINISTER OF ECONOMY
JLLOOlFO CEXAR DIZ. PRESIDENT OF TNE CENTRAL BANS
DANTE SIMONE. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF
U. S.
MICHAEL BLUKENThRL, SECRETARY OF TREASURY
C. FRED BERGSTfN. ASSISTANT SECPE’APr OF TREASURY
ARNO.D NACHUANOFr, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY
RICHARD ARELLANO, DIPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
< EDWARD BITTNER, OFFICE OF DEVELOPING I.MiCNS FINAHGE. TSEASURT
TIME AND PLACE: MAY 31, 137? - U.S. CHANCERY. GUATEMALA

1 SUBJ:

>•

t

BILATERAL MEETING KITH ARGENTINA

MARTINEZ DE H02 SAiO HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN
PLRSONALLY TO SFCRETARY BlUHEhTHAL THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT
ARGENTINA HAS MkOE SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VIOELA. kE BEGAN
EY GIVING A DEI A KID DESCRIPTION CF THE POLITICAL MACHINATIONS
LEADING UP TO THE Hill TART TAKEOVER IN MR I3’6, EMPHASIZING
THAT THE MIL HART RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED POWER WHEN FERON'S WIFE HAD
IOST CC'ilAOL OF THE POLITICAL Si Tail ON AND THE ECONOMY HiO REACHED
■ROC* 8DTI0M'. HE SA'D NE ACRE EC TO BE MINISTER OF ECC'.'GVY ONLY
IF HE HAO THE COLOlHE POLITICAL BACYlflS OF THE MILITARY AND IF
HE WOULD HAVE CONTROL O/ER ALL UIN,STORES INVOLVING THE ECONCUV.
THE MILITARY INHERITED A LEGACY OF TERRORIST CFGAN'12AT IONS WHICH
PFRCN HAD BACKED IN ORDER TO OPPOSE 'HE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS,
BUT WHICH ULTIMATELY GOT OUT OF CONTRCl.
MARTINEZ DE HD2 REITEREATED THE ECONOMIC FRCGRESS WHICH HAS
BEEN MADE L'N:(> HIS LEAOEPShiP, GIFECTr.C G'JF AHEM I ON TO BOOH
WITH CHARTS SHOWING INTER ALIA OECRE<SE IN UNEMPLOYMENT.
DECREASE IN MONflA'-T EXPANSION. I'lCPEASL III ACRIC'J.TU'Al FRODLCTIt’:. ENERC' PPSC'JCTION ATS EFFORT SH^LIINTS. REDUCTION III
GCVERUVEM DEFICIT. DECLINE IN RATE OF INFLATION. ANO IMPROVE­
MENT IN EXTEK'iAt SECYCR. HE SAIC HE WAS ABLE TO CCNVItiCE THE
POPulATlO'l A'OuT T«[ N'CESSiTY OF A CECREASED GROHTH IN «EAL WAGES
AS THE PRICE (OR ACHIEVING STABILITY.
BLUUE.V'HAl SAID HE ADUIPED T»E PPCGRESS IN T».E ECONOMY W“iC“
HAO BEEN UADr A'.D 'JkOEPS’ANgS THE POul'ICAl SITUATION S'EV'llG
rpOM the TERFGP.iM iNhER'TE: Fv;.v FfEvifui CCVEPNVfNTS. -f CITED
THE FACT THAT THE SE'fCIF COPCPA'IDS WITH WH.CH HE PPEiIVjSlY HAO
B'f'l ASSOC l A TEC. ICS’ THR-E E"!11'?S *C T“E TERPCMSTS. '.EvERThELESS. ThE U.S. iS VERT CCilCtV.EO ASCOT CUE PFCCESS CF lAw
AN j Th* CE'.E'Al FRC’ECTION GF NUUA'i P lGa'S. he A5VEP UASTINEZ

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority
NARA_SL£l_— Date ~vW\H-----

►No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1'^»wv-^

./
/

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1
OUUItL I
i iiuuiii i ii w

Department of State
PACE 21
AC 11 ON AIA-BS
INFO

0

c:r-l!
RSC-Di

GUAIEil 23US

(2 Or >2

>110322

............ I12P4SZ

GUAUK B3US 02 OF BZ 1111322

flSS

CONGRESS'S POSITION FIRMLY TO MARTINEZ OE HOZ SUBSEQUENT
TO THE A. ATT til'S BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY BUMENTHAl. U.S.
EXECUTIVE C - FT E C TCR RALPH jUXSAN UADE THE SAVE CASE ON A
DIFFERENT OCCASION TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ.
ROSIER

5S-1I ISO-IB SP-02 0HA-R2 H-e: INR-15
NSCE-ll ClAE-BD SSC-BN iNRE -PI /IIS 11

iiittw jl*i n

TELEGRAM

IZSI6I /St s

Ml AMLM3ASSY SuATEUALA
1C SICSTSIl WJSljC IMMEDIATE 6233
TRIAS CEP 1 IVVIC'AIE
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 CUATEUAEA 3ttS
LIUDIS
TREASl'RT FOR FIT It PIIDCES

I

BlliMENTHAL SAID THAT WHILE « ARE UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S
PROBLEM ANO lit COh'I WISH 10 INTERFERE INTERNALLY. THE. CARTER
ADMINISTRATION MUST IF CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
THE NAPKIN AMENDMENT REOUIRES US TO VOTE (GAINST LOANS IT THE III
FOR COUNTRIES HITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT 'N THE CASE 0F THE
HE For. THE BADILLO MENOI-'ENT. WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE
WOULD {XTtHO THIS LAW TO OTHER iFl'S.
WHILE HUMPHREY
AMEfyOUiNT W9U1D PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBIL IT?. THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS
A MAHER OF ITS OKI POLICY ANO CONVICTION. COMMITTED TO THE
ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED. THEREFORE, THAT IT
MIGHT EE ADVISEABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR
LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.
.MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA IS COMMITTED TO
RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO
LOANS IN THE PIPELINE FOR 101 CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD IE HELD
UP. BUT KF IS CONCERNED AIOUT A SUP KILL ION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT SANK MUCH IS BEING CONSIDERED ST THE IBRD. HF_
EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ARCEHTINA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS
S3ri Mill 191 QUOTA WITH THE IBRD IT THE ICAN WERE DELAYED TO THE
hrxi FISCAL TEAR. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAH MIGHT GET
IHROUGH THE -REEOr LOOFHOlE ON THE GROUNDS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION.
BLUMENTHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IBID LOAH IS VEIT
LIKELY TO PILSENT PROBLEMS FOR US.
MARTINEZ Dt H02 BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE ANO ASKED TWO
WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS GF THE TERRORISTS.
ARElIANO SAID THERE IS NO WAT OF RATIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS.
IN RESPONSE TO RlUHEHTHAl'S CUE ST I Oil ABOUT ASSERTIONS OF
ANTI-SEMI!ISM IN ARGENTINA. MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS HO SUBSTANCE
TO THF CHARGES.

f

BlUMFNTHAl S«ID HE BELIEVES THAT THE U. S. POSITION IS CLEAR.
WE HOPE TO SEC IUPVOyEUENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS MADE QUICKLY AND WOULD
LIKE 1C BE INFORMED CONCERNING PROGRESSIVE.
RIUUEIiTHAl REITERATEC U.S. OPPOSITION TO A'.T INCREASE IN
SALARY FDN 101 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ASKED FOR ARGENTINA'S
SUPPORT.
MART INF Z DE H92 AGREED TO DISCUSS SALARV ISSUE WITH ORTIZ MENA
WITH THI 09JECllVE OF HAViNC IT PUT A5I5E. «E THEN BROUGHT UP THE
POSSIBILITY CF IKTAI BE’h'G ELIMINATED. CN TRANSFORMED. SINCE
INTAl IS THE CULT INTERNATIONAL ORCAVZATlSN LOCATED IN ARGENTINA
MART INEZ DE HOZ IS AHXlCUS THAT IT REMAlH THERE IN SOME FORM.
BERCSIEN SAID THAT AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN HIS ISB
MIEIING SPEECH, THE U.S. WISHES TD STUOl T"E FUTURE OF INTAL.
MARTINEZ DE HOZ TH*'IFED THE SECRETARY FOR BE'hG AHE TO SPEAK
FPA.Nf.LY AECIil THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA.
AS Nfl'jRTLD PEFTEl CC.'iCPESSWN EASILLO EX’.A,I,ED

SKftff
?—"Y

JIIIMJM
V*

**"No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1r*YWy ^

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3i r

DENTIAL
□OS REVIEWED 21-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL)

United States - Argentine Relations
The human rights situation in Argentina bedevils
our relations. This memorandum reviews our interests
in Argentina, discusses the question of terrorism and
human rights violations, and reports on steps we have
taken to promote human rights'. Thi's latter category
includes the use of our voice and vote in the interna­
tional financial institutions, a subject which the
Argentine Minister of Economy Burely will raise with
you.
United States Interests
- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights
are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We
seek an end to such abuses and restoration of legal
processes.
- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most
advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America
and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and pre­
sumably unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity.
(The
Department is currently considering possible strategies
to inhibit this trend.)
- Petroleum: The U.S. Geological Service has esti­
mated that Argentina's vast continental shelf may con­
tain more than double existing proved reserves in the
t
Western Hemisphere.
- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the
production of grains and meat.
- Economic: U.S. private investment stands at $1.4
billion; our banks are owed $3 billion; and we have a
$250 million trade surplus.
(Prospects for greater trade
and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals
and agricultural fields.}
- Scientific: Argentina is important to our
Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar
resources.
- International Influence: Argentina is an almost
wholly literate, generally Belf-sufficient industrial
and cultural leader in Hispanic America.
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority ^
NARA

Deto

|No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-31

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3

CONFIDENTIAL

......

- 2 Political Violence and Human Rights
The Argentine military inherited an almost impos­
sible situation when they took over the government of
Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and-inflation were
rampant. Even the Peronist Parliament and unions stood
aside to permit the military to do their job. Now,
well over a year later, the military have largely
accomplished their initial security goals but are not
moving to restore legal forms and political peace. On
the contrary, they are polarising society. The govern­
ment refuses to acknowledge the names of thousands of
political prisoners; torture, disappearances, prolonged
periods of incommunication, summary executions, intimida­
tion of lawyers, journalists and foreign refugees are
undeniable. While not directly attributable to the
government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However
battered, the terrorists, who are a mixture of anarch­
ists and Marxists, continue to murder military per­
sonnel, policemen and businessmen but at a reduced rate.
Notwithstanding, President Videla's aircraft was almost
blown up upon takeoff earlier this year, and Foreign
Minister Guzzetti very narrowly survived an assassina­
tion attempt, last month.
Promoting Human Rights
The United States raised the question of human rights
with the Argentine military even before their welladvertised coup in March 1976. Since then we have
pressured Argentina progressively, unfortunately with
little to show in return.
(Historically, Argentina has
been the Latin American state least susceptible to our
influence.)
- In February 1977 the Secretary announced that 1978
military sales credits were being halved as a result of
the human rights picture. Argentina reacted by turning
down the balance. Before then, we had advised the Argen­
tines that $36 million in 1977 credits could not be
signed as a result of the human rights situation.
- Commercial arms purchases with direct applicability
to internal security are now denied routinely. Other
munitions licenses are also being held up although we
have not yet decided how extensively to restrict commerical arms purchases.
- A $700,000 grant military training program has
survived Congressional efforts to eliminate it although
this program's demise seems likely in 1979.
JCONFTDENTTSL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3

-GQNFI DENT IAIT

- 3 - In the international financial institutions,
since September, Argentina has tried to keep loans out
of the Inter-American Development Bank which might
trigger a negative vote under the Harkin Amendment.
In March we raised our human rights concerns orally in
the World Bank before voting for a $105 million highway
project.
Most recently we have been faced with the problem
of how to vote on $265 million in five loans soon to
come up for Argentina in the Inter-American Development
Bank and the World Bank. This issue was raised by
Secretary Blumenthal with Minister Martinez de Hoz on
May 31. The Secretary said the Administration is as
a matter of its own policy and conviction committed to
the advancement of human rights. He suggested that it
might be advisable for Argentina to postpone applications
for loans until it could show a definite improvement in
human rights. Martinez stated that this might be possi­
ble in the case of two Inter-American Bank loans, but he
was anxious to move ahead on a $100 million World Bank
project. The Secretary noted that the World Bank loan
was particularly difficult for us (because it may be
hard to argue that it benefits the needy).
Suggested Talking Points
Martinez de Hoz may well make a plea for greater
understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and
raise the question of our votes in the international
financial institutions. You might wish to:
— Compliment the Minister for his achievements to
date in restoring Argentine economic stability (notably
through the raising of foreign capital and promotion of
Argentine agriculture).
— Inquire about the health of the former Foreign
Minister who is now recovering from an assassination
attempt.
-- Ask why it has not been^possible for the govern­
ment to begin to restore legal processes after it has
acknowledged publicly that it has all but finished the
guerrillas.
— Note the Administration's overall commitment
to human rights and the great difficulty we are en­
countering with respect to Argentine projects in the
international financial institutions.
■CONFIDENT IMT

Mn Oh'Rotinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3

eONP-IBENTIAfc
- 4 -

— Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion
that it would be helpful if Argentina deferred loan
projects in the financial institutions that do not
clearly benefit the neediest sectors of society.

t

CONFIBSNTIAL

|No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : NLC-7-21-5-22-2

4lL\t

' V
t

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Warren Christopher, Acting

Panama Canal.
I met with Jafck Murphy today to
discuss plans for gaining House approval of the
implementing legislation. Murphy said the crucial
vote would probably occur on a motion by George Hansen
to recommit the Murphy bill to committee, or on a
substitute Hansen bill which would contravene the
treaties.
We had a good talk, and (I hope) established a
basis for working more closely together in subsequent
stages.
Murphy urged us to undertake a major educa­
tional campaign to convince House members, particularly
Republicans, that the treaties cannot be overturned
and that the Hansen approach would jeopardize efficient
operation of the Canal.
Ed Derwinski's excellent piece
on the Op Ed page of the POST today, entitled "Panama:
from No to Yes," should be helpful with Republicans.
Bill Rogers has been asked by Panama President
Royo to come to Panama to provide counsel on the
implementing legislation.
I gave Bill our appraisal
of the legislative situation this afternoon.
It will
be good to have his wise and calming counsel available
to the Panamanians.
THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL
MATERIAL

RDS 2/3
eat rev ev, completed

4/18/99

(Christopher, Warren)
Authority
NARA

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : NLC-7-21-5-22-2

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Dato

---------

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : NLC-7-21-5-22-2

w

- 2 -

•-secret

Southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army force was
deployed to southern Lebanon today. Haddad's artil­
lery continued to shell UN positions in protest until
about 7:00 p.m. our time. A Norwegian UN soldier
was killed and another wounded in today's shelling.
An American officer serving as a IjN observer was
briefly held by Haddad's forceB and released only
after Israeli intervention.

At the UN, work is continuing on Waldheim's
report to the Security Council on the implementation
of UN resolutions on Lebanon. We understand Begin's
decision to cooperate with UNIFIL is likely to soften
criticism of Israel in the report. The possibility
of Security Council action will depend on whether the
shelling resumes tomorrow.
The Shah. A campaign remains in progress to
change our position with respect to the Shah's ad­
mission to the U.S. John McCloy, following up con­
versations with Cy and Zbig and a long letter to me,
is continuing to call influential people throughout
the country. We understand that McCloy's effort con­
tinues to be stimulated by Henry Kissinger and by the
efforts of Ardeshir Zahedi.
The Shah has turned down PanamaWe are awaiting
a response to an inquiry
t
to
President Lopez Portillo oh behalf of "the" Shah-.
Our belief that we must encourage the Shah to go
elsewhere, at least for the time being, is further
strengthened by Khomeini's verbal attacks on American
influence and the withdrawal of two-thirds of the
Iranian guard force from our Embassy compound. A new
evaluation has just come in from Tehran confirming
our assessment that the safety of official and un­
official Americans would be jeopardized if the Shah
comes here.
Argentina - I saw Ambassador Castro today to
discuss the recent significant improvements in the
human rights situation in Argentina. In the first
months of 1979, the Argentines have almost eliminated
the abductions by official security units which had
occurred at a rate of almost 50 per month in 1978.

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : NLC-7-21-5-22-2

25X1

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/2* : NLC-7-'31-5-22-2

3

They appear to be investigating the few reports of
recent abductions that have been received.
The
Argentine Supreme Court is also beginning to play a
more active role in pressing the regime for informa­
tion on missing persons. We believe these and other
encouraging developments are partly attributable to
our policy of pressing firmly for improvements and
to the anticipated visit of the Inter-American Com­
mission on Human Rights (now scheduled for late next
month).
U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism.
U.S. participants in six of the eight-working groups have
now had organizational meetings and are preparing
for meetings with their Mexican counterparts in
April and May.

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : NLC-7-21-5-22-2

t

No

Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21-1-15-3>T

DOS REVIEWED 09-Apr-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
f

November 22, 1978
t

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Warren Christopher, Acting

tO.C.

GuyanaThe Guyanese Ambassador called on me
today to express the condolences of his government
and people, and to pledge full cooperation.
In thank­
ing him, I asked that his government reconsider its
decision not to permit an FBI team to assist in the
investigation in Guyana.
I noted the FBI's statutory
responsibility in cases of assassination of public
officials, as well as the possibility of other crimes
under U.S. law, and I assured him the FBI team would
work in a cooperative and sensitive manner in Guyana.
]Jc promised to contact his government.
Rhodesia. Nyerere and Khama have reacted favor­
ably to Callaghan's proposal for a Cledwyn Hughes
mission to see whether conditions favor a call by
Callaghan for an all-parties meeting in London early
next year.
Nyerere said the mission is the proper
way to proceed and that it would fit well with other
similar exploratory efforts.
Both the Rhodesians
and the South Africans have also indicated their
readiness to receive the Hughes mission.
In response
to a UK request, Andy Young has agreed to delay his
travel to Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia
by a week in order not to conflict with Hughes.
This
will enable him to reinforce Hughes' presentation and
to take an independent sounding of Front Line
reactions.

DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13528
Authority

r>rf»ni
iTf^rSnri

NARA_££_-- Data—H\aAaU

iNn Ohier.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/^/2^^^^^^^^^

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21-1-15-3

- 2
Nicaragua. There has not yet been any definitive
response tothe plebiscite proposal presented to both
sides by the mediation team. While Samoza's initial
reaction was not positive, he did not reject the pro­
posal and told his Cabinet that "we are beginning a
new process of negotiation."
The opposition coalition (I’AO) issued a communi­
que saying that the mediation has not achieved its
fundamental objectives for democratization of the
countryr but adding that they would respond later to
the plebiscite proposal.
OAS.
The Permanent Council met today to begin
consideration of the Costa Rican charge that Nicaragua
violated its frontier yesterday^ Costa Rica is push­
ing for an OAS fact-finding team, a commission of
observers on its side of the frontier, and the return
of a Costa Rican prisoner and the bodies .of two killed.
Nicaragua maintains the violation was into its own
territory and is welcoming a fact-finding group and
the concept of a border force.
In preliminary con­
sultations, agreement was reached to name the Domini­
can Republic, Grenada and Uruguay to the fact-finding
team.
Angola.
In further discussions with Dick Moose
and Don McHenry in Luanda today, the Angolans related
Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibia settlement
and left no doubt that removal of South African forces
from their southern border is their basic security
objective. The Angolans said they feel Cuban forces
in Angola should not intervene in Zambia, Rhodesia
or Namibia and told Moose there is no flow of Cubans
from Angola to Zambia.
Argentina. We have no confirmation of last
nightk s report that Argentina is about to occupy three
islands in the Beagle Channel a^ea. Ambassador Castro
reports that positions have probably hardened in recent
days among the Argentine military but that there are
no indications of imminent military action. Ambassa­
dor Landau in Santiago tells us the Chileans do not
appear unduly concerned and have not taken additional
military readiness moves. We are considering at what
stage wo might wish to take the situation to the OAS,
preferably in conjunction with other governments.

j^eEeRET

No Objection To Declassification in hull 2U12/11/23 : NLD-7-21-1-15-3,

t DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Warren Christopher, Acting CO-C,

Guyana. The Guyanese Ambassador called on me
today to express the condolences of his government
and people, and to pledge full cooperation. In thank­
ing him, I asked that his government reconsider its
decision not to permit an FBI team to assist in the
investigation in Guyana. I noted the FBI's statutory
responsibility in cases of assassination of public
officials, as well as the possibility of other crimes
under U.S. law, and I assured him the FBI team would
work in a cooperative and sensitive manner in Guyana.
He promised to contact his government.
Rhodesia. Nyerere and Khama have reacted favor­
ably to Callaghan's proposal for a Cledwyn Hughes
mission to see whether conditions favor a call by
Callaghan for an all-parties meeting in London early
next year. Nyerere said the mission is the proper
way to proceed and that it would fit well with other
similar exploratory efforts. Both the Rhodesians
and the South Africans have also indicated their
readiness to receive the Hughes mission. In response
to a UK request, Andy Young has agreed to delay his
travel to Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia
by a week in order not to conflict with Hughes. This
will enable him to reinforce Hughes' presentation and
to take an independent sounding of Front Line
reactions.

SECRET
iNn Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21-1-15-:

No Ubiection lo ueciassmcation in hull i'Uii'/'iWJ : NLU-f-2‘i-'Mi>-3|*

«

i

uifivnu I —

- 2 Nicaragua. There has not yet been any definitive
response to the plebiscite proposal presented to both
sides by the mediation team. While Somoza's initial
reaction was not positive, he did not reject the pro­
posal and told his Cabinet that "we are beginning a
new process of negotiation."
The opposition coalition (p’AO) issued a communi­
que saying that the mediation has not achieved its
fundamental objectives for democratization of the
country, but adding that they would respond later to
the plebiscite proposal.
OAS. The Permanent Council met today to begin
consideration of the Costa Rican charge that Nicaragua
violated its frontier yesterday.
Costa Rica is push­
ing for an OAS fact-finding team, a commission of
observers on its side of the frontier, and the return
of a Costa Rican prisoner and the bodies of two killed.
Nicaragua maintains the violation was into its own
territory and is welcoming a fact-finding group and
the concept of a border force. In preliminary con­
sultations, agreement was reached to name the Domini­
can Republic, Grenada and Uruguay to the fact-finding
team.
Angola.
In further discussions with Dick Moose
and Don McHenry in Luanda today, the Angolans related
Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibia settlement
and left no doubt that removal of South African forces
from their southern border is tlieir basic security
objective. The Angolans said they feel Cuban forces
in Angola should not intervene in Zambia, Rhodesia
or Namibia and told Moose there is no flow of Cubans
from Angola to Zambia.
Argentina■ We have no confirmation of last
night1s report that Argentina is about to occupy three
islands in the Beagle Channel area. Ambassador Castro
reports that positions have probably hardened in recent
days among the Argentine military but that there are
no indications of imminent military action. Ambassa­
dor Landau in Santiago tells us the Chileans do not
appear unduly concerned and have not taken additional
military readiness moves. We are considering at what
stage we might wish to take the situation to the OAS,
preferably in conjunction with other governments.

SEGRtT
iNr^hifir.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21 -1-15-31

No Objection i u uyuiyyyiiKjanun in hull wznmi : NLU-b-4-b-n-^j^

IMpartment of State
page

s:

B-EH05 14937

II OF 17

272116Z

6277

W

BUENOS 84937

TELEGRAM

81 OF 82

-

2721161

m>-i4

THEN. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VI DEL A HE GAVE HIS FULL
SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER Oil HIS AFRICAN POLICY.

NFC

OCT-11 ISO-18 ClAE-RB D0DE-I3 PH-85 H-Bl INR-IG
.-83 NSIE-II NSC-85 PA-81 SP-IZ SS-1S ICA-11
HA-85 MCT-81 TRSE-B8 A10-85 El-81 /887 W
.................................... 157531 272717! /73
P 272I12Z JUN 71
FN ANENBASST IUEN0S AIRES
TO SECSTATE VASHDC PRIORITY 6213

6.

'

HUNAN RIGHTS WERE DISCJSSEO BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT
WAS UNFORTUNATE MARY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS
A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT *1c||ICf"* ***
NOT AWARE OF ASSENT I RE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST
TENWRisiT m LHPHA5IHU IHAI TlEkORISH WAS NOT SOLELY OF
ARGENTINE*ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT NAD BEGONE AN INTERNATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 IUEN0S AIRES 4937

CONCEPT. UJUIH6ER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN
COMBATTING.TERRORISM HUpHE Ai SO, STRESSES THAT TACLLCS-USEO

E.O. 11652: GOS
TASS: OVP
SUBJECT HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO AROENTINA

II. JIF EATING-TERROR I STS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENT INA-TOOAY.

SUMMARY: FROfl ARRiVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS
FAMILY SENE WELL RECEIVED IT ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA
LA.0 OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. OR. KISSINGER SPOKE
to DIVERSIFIED GROUPS—FROfl RANKERS TO GAUCHOS.
IN HOST

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEENEO RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.
HE TENSED UP C’iLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD
CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.

INSTANCES, HE CDHPLI RENTED GOA FON DEFEATING TERORISTS IUT
HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEN THEN ARE NOT
JSTIFIAILE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINSER PURLICLY AFFIRMEO
HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A
FEW EXCEPTIONS.

pOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj

H BA EARLY
1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE ANO SON ARRIVED
WEDNESDAY HORNING (JUNE 211. HE WAS NET AT THE AIRPORT BY
A FONOFF REP WHO DOGOED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER
WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW
WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS
FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN ANO NOT
A SPOKESMAN FOR USG.
2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT
VIDELA, COL. MALLEA GIL IINTERPRETERI AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO
AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA
PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET
WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADORS ARRIVAL.
IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIJIA1 AT 1388 LUNCH WAS -SERVtft.
3.
KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DUR'NG PRIVATE
SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY
VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER IS TO HOW TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED
WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.
,4
IT luich, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VlEUS Ok LATIN
‘“ERICA. FARMER -FCRFYIRY RFSPnHDFH THAT HOW MORE THAN EVER
'■'>5 TIME TD BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN
tiEH^SPHERE. HE IQDED uMI * OF ACTION AMONG jHL LX~~EMlRLfS

;(~»Eou.HF3~'iralCaBeO*!! countrtes"heTojurv'ive.. he
STRESSED that CURING Hl7 TENURE IS"S£CIIETa1(V OF STATE, LATIN
AMERICA WAS NOT -.IS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE
BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE HOW. KISSINGER POINTED
OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY
ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF~A«£flTIDN TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A
DELIBERATE ACT DH ANYBODY'S PART.
fTTHfe-UHI A FACT THAT
WITH TUt RFT**!fF*~,Mt u"aln “*rTM>MUV “FfiLFQT fhsuF
5

jrfsS'iiGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AHERICAU MAY RE NEXT

RUgllTTNS-CPBrTlgHEinirr HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN
AFIN(AIT iS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICJ
HE ““T^Tff- "1** nrHT |,,°TFa «"■ HIS ANNAPOLIS SPEECH.
K SSI.MGER STRESSED HIS SUPflim UP HUH milUITEN'R-nUlflON

Authority

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
~~
~~U~

NARA_£JL_ DEto_Z»A3bk_

PC.iCY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIR­
CRAFT TO HlD-EAS’ERN JOtfflTflES. KISSINGER SAID IT 1
n6CMjNABLE THAI A Wth HAWAII FO THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS"
INVINCIBLE
SlNdf WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLOIERS MARtH
FROM SOUTH TO kORV IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APPLAUD

CONFIDENT Ht
iNn Obifir.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-11-21

v- ■-

No Objection 10 ueciassmcation in hull zurznzni : NLU-b-4-b-n-^

IMpartment of State V TELEGRAM

_
I

PAGE 01
ACT 101 AAA-14
INFO

BUENOS 14937

02 OF 12

272123Z

1271

CCT-01 130-83 CIAE-00 OO3E-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
l-BJ NSAE-EB HSC-B3 PA-01 SP-02 SS-1S ICA-’l
HA-08 MCT-01 TASE-18 AID-09 E8-88 /0I7 W

................................... 037572
P 272R12Z JUN 71
FH AHEHSASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE UASiOC PRIORITY 8284

2722072 /73

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937
3. EARLY THURSDAY HORNING OR. KISSINGER NET WITH DR. JORGE
LUIS BORGES. NOTED ARGENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROMPTED
NUCH NEWS COVERAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FAHILY
DEPARTED WITH HiNISTER OF ECONOHY HART INEZ DE HOI TO OVER­
NIGHT AT AN ESTANCIA EFARHI. THIS WAS HOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT.

,

BUENOS 04137

02 OF 02

272123Z

CONCEPT UF ATTEMPTUULTO INBISMSKT WHAN EIGHTS IN I A.
HE SAID,IE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER Hlj RETURN TO
US BEFORE SPEAKING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WIT?
ehbassyIersonnel.
they were good guests aho hade every
EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT EHISSARIES OF
OPPOSITKH TO CURRENT US ADHINISTRATION.
NY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE
FOR ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN WIPING OUT TERRORISH AND HIS
STRESS Ok THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA HAY NAVE GONE TO SORE
CONSIDERABLE EXTENT TO HIS HOSTS' HEADS. DESPITE HIS
DISCLAIMERS THAT the P.ETHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISH MUST
ROT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOKE DANGER THAT ARGENTINES
NAY USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION
FOR HARDENING THE'R HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE.
CRSTRO

9. CX HIS RETURN FROM THE FARH, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY
PERSONAL. HE GAVE A "EP TALKS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE
PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOME OF HIS
EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUMOROUS APPROACH
WAS WELL RECEIVED BY ALL.

I

10. 011 FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS OIVEN AT EMBASSY
RESIDENCE HONORING KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO
HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE VELL
REPRESENTED.

t
,

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTERDEO A DINNER GIVEN
BY HIH'STER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ OE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS
COMPOSED OF BATHERS, ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN
DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND
OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL
STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN CONCERN OF
THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROM THE DINNER.
12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED IN AN OFF THE RECORD
'RESS CONFERENCE AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY MEMBER OF ARGENTINE
COUNCIL DN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GROUP IS COMPRISED
OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE
PUBLIC AS THE 'ELITE GROUP' ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OR. KISSINGER
SAVE Ah OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS HO
CUESTIO'i BUT THAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
ARGENTINA'S "I STORY. ESPECIALLY, Rf"'-«"« 1 ftCKED FAMILIARITY
W-TH-AKSENTIHt'S FXPtRlEHEt ill FfGHfrimi Tfmim.—(tf-EXPLAINEO
US HIS OPINION GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING
jut TERRfimV FORCES, BUT-ALSO UAUIIWEITTpAT mEtHODS UStO
T7i riGWIHlt' Tt.BROR ISM-MUST HOY HE PERPETOATED. ~"E ‘EXPLAINED
A MOVEMENT TOWARDS iioiMALlY MUST TAKE PLACE IF DEMOCRATIC
.DEALS ARE TC PREVAIL.
13. DR. KISSiIIGER ALSO APPEARED IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER
PERIOD WITH ONE OF ARGENT INA'SPOPULAR NEWS COMMENTERS.
DURING THE INTERVIEW
JUPWaigTs IMF flfc’F
OF THE GREATEST VIOLATOR «
K'HP----- HP-SAID IT WAS
UNFORTUNATE THAT IN SOME ITLIARLtb MWAH RIGHTS VAS
BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FRIENDS.~~
COMMENT:

THE K'SSINGZR FAMILY‘ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN

ROSARIO. WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC.
INDICATIONS
ARE HE VAS UELu RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED
TWO OTHER GAMES 'N BUENOS AIRES AS'A GUEST OF PRESIDENT
VIDELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY
COVERAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT.
COMMENT; DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT
CRITIC.ZE THE CARTER ADHINISTRATION SO LO’iO AS HE WAS OVER­
SEAS. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY
TO THE AMBASSADOR, RUT FELT *E WOULD SHEAH JUT-JUUIUSI-THE

JHMFIDENTI4
Ino Obiar.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-11-2

No Objection Io Ueclassitication in hull 2U1 2/11/23 : NLU-B-24-B-2-U
^
OtPAhlMI Nl :)i 'JB-

AMnA5"AJOK *M 1 /.r:.;r
VSASMUi

jDOS REVIEWED 05-Apr-2012{ DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLJ

""coRn&swgiAL__

TO:

February 28, 1979

OES - Assistant Secretary of State Pickering

Tom:
I would like to add a further thought to
my earlier memo of today on heavy water production
technology sales to Argentina. Ambassador Castro’s
recent reports thaL Argentina omitted mention of
reprocessing in its twenty year nuclear energy
master program may also be a significant element
worthy of analysis in a review of our position.

Gejrar^'Smi th

-rnnrTmrTiiTTnT.
GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q.13520
Authority
NARA EF___ Dato —---------

iNn Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-6-24-6-2-01

no

_

uojection 10 ueciassmcanon in -un zui tiu/Lim :

___

_

________

inla,-^4-»‘i-j-i

i-a

*____

pos REVIEWED 29-Jun'-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

DRAFT
__ SECIU3T (Entire Text)
DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: REFER TO OSD

MBtORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

OSD REVIEWED 18-Jan-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION:

From:

Warren D. Christopher

Subject:

Steps to Improve U.S.-Argentine
t

Relations

■'.Pursuant to your instructions* the Inter-Agency
Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan
of action for 198(1, which I am submitting for your
■ ■ r?

approval.
+ '

I.

*» • ■
'

'■ i


'

OBJECTIVES

K

■ *■*

Our principal objective^will be improve our relationships so as to foster'Argentina*a identification with
the West; to seek assistance on appropriate East-West
issues (e.g. grains): to foster increased sensitivity
among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation
concerns: to encourage further specific
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.13526
Authority
MAH ft

£■?____DfltO

~*l\°liU<---------

Nn Ohiartinn Tn nedassifiratinn in -nil 2013/02/04 : Nl. 0-24-91 -3-11 -9

i\o uujecuori

iu

uuuassmuaiiuM m -un ^uio/u^/uh .

inlu-^h-si-o-i

i-a

-2-

improvement in current human rights practices (e.g.
due process for all persons suspdcted of subversion
t

or terrorism); and thus to contain Soviet political
and economic influence.

We also wish to encourage

continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal Mediation
of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial
limits in the Beagle Channel a dispute that very nearly
led to war between the two countries in late 1978.
Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a
constructive role with respect to developments in
Central America and in other Hemispheric issues.

*• .II.

ACTIONS
1980
1
i FOB
1 1
» '

t

1.

* •

.
*

.*

The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and
economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's
visit to Buenos Aires in January.

We contemplates

—A visit by the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs to Buenos Airesl possibly about August 1

Nn Ohinr.tinn Tn Dpr.lassifinatinn in -nil 7013/07/04 1 Nl C-74-91-3-11-9

no

uojection i o ueciassmcaiion in -un ^U'U/U4/U4 : NLU-^-yi-j- i i-y

-3-

—A meeting of the 0.8.-Argentine Mixed Economic
Commission in October, the D.3.

delegation to be

chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs.
t

—Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric
issues, with the first round of such talks to be held
during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs.

2.

nuclear Relations

We want to Jceep open the dq$r for such cooperation
as Argentina may desire for l\:s nuclqar program, as
a way to maintain Influence for the longer-term.
In particular, we should try to meet our commitment
to provide highly and moderately enriched fuel for
Argentina's research program.

We should:

—Try to resolve promptly, in accordance with
U.S. lav, the remaining safeguards issues to permit

t

Nn Ohinr.tinn Tn Hfidassifinatinn in rnll P013/0P/04 ' Nl C-?4-91-3-11-9

no uojection 10 ueciassmcation in

-un zu ij/u^/u<i : NLU-^-yi-j-ri-y

-4-

delivery of the reBearch fuel and the licensing of

U.S. components;

—once this is done, undertake a review of the

advisability of modifying U.S. policy to facilitate
greater participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's
nuclear program.

(The principal'case currently at

issue is an export license permitting the sale of
a high-pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

3.

Human Rights

We would continue the dialogue on human rights
with Argentine leaders, through’Ambassador Castro
and dvrlng the visit by the Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs.

In these consultations we

will attempt to obtain assurances that:
t

—the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which
encompasses a call for- further improvements by Argentina
and which maintains the integrity of the OAS Commission
on Human rights;

Nn Ohip.r.tinn Tn Hfinlassifinatinn in -nil ?f)13/n?/04 ■ Nl C-?4-91-3-11-9

No Objection lo ueclassitication in -uli wwzm : NLU-^-yi-a-n-y
-5-

t

— there be no nev disappearancea, (i.e., extralegal abductions of persons suspected of association
with terrorism or subversion, Including persons believed
to be active terrorists);

—all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive
activities be processed through normal judicial channels
thus ensuring due process to such detainees; and

—there be substantial progress in advance of
the OASGA,' in reducing the numbeV of political prisoners
f

held without charges through release, trial, or exile
(during his recent .visit. Ambassador Smlthft»B assured
that half of thepe prisoners—1,300 at the time—would
be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

-

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting

of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed
in OR fora, and concluded that this should not be
a central requirement for improving our bilateral
relationship.
i

Nn Dhinntinn Tn nanlassifinatinn in —nil

3/07/94 1 Nl C-74-91-3-11-9

No UDjection i o ueciassmcauon in -un zv i j/u^/uh ;

i-j-

i i-a

-6-

4.

Military Relatione
He will begin to rebuild1 relations through increased

contact and consultations, while stressing that further
progress on human rights will be essential to the
more fundamental improvement in relations (Including
a modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment,
as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting),
we plan tox

—begin periodic security consultations with
Argentina} the fi£s*t round, to be held this year in

t
Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in
the South Atlantic!

—invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make
a return visit to Washington later in the year to
discuss global defense issues!

—invite Argentina to send a guest Instructor
to the P.S. Army School of the Americas.

(The Executive

Branch will consult with members'of Congress on this
t
initiative.)

Nn Ohinrtinn Tn HfinlaRRifinatinn