1 MALL LANDOWNERS ASSOC. OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

DAR
FACTS

Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions.
They will be subject to one common discussion and resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:

The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants. They question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27,
E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full
owners of the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310

Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental and Planters Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a
petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

Aug. 27, 1987 A motion for intervention was filed by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It was granted by
the court.

Sept. 10, 1987 A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et
al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744

Sept. 3 1986 The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small
landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of
violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation. Certificates of
Land Transfer were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay lease
rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and cancellation of these certificates.

Dec. 24, 1986 Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.

Feb. 17, 1987 A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been
acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which rendered his motion
moot.
ISSUES
1.
Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2.
Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the
measures
3.
Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution
4.
Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of
the Constitution
5.
Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill
should only have one subject, to be expressed in its title
6.
Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance
of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government.

7.
Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent
domain
8.

Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power

9.

Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated

10.
Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
11.
Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation

RULING
1.
YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
Nos. 228 & 229.
2.
YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the
Congress was formally convened and took over legislative power.
3.
NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal
purpose and therefore is not required to conform to the requirements.
4.

NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.

5.
NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its
contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title.
6.
NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other
words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
7.
It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of
just compensation unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of
property is not compensable.
8.
YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. As the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may
say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is
the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
9.
NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
10.
NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment,
other modes of payment shall be permitted as compensation. The court accepts the
theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, they find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the
areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The
other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also

not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other
properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount
of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of
our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations
and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We
are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the
entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That
is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall
decree today.)
11.
NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No.
27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

2 HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs.

CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:

SUMMARY: Mandaluyong City wanted to buy Suguitans lot for the expansion of
the city hospital. He refused, so the SP passed a resolution authorizing Mayor
Abalos to file an expropriation case. The RTC allowed the expropriation, and
Mandaluyong took possession of the property. On recourse by Suguitans heirs, the
SC set aside the expropriation order, holding that the exercise of the eminent
domain power by Mandaluyong was in contravention of the standards set by the
Local Government Code. Under 19 of this law, an ordinance is a requisite for the
valid expropriation of property by an LGU. Mandaluyong cannot get away with its
acts by citing the IRR because IRRs cannot prevail over the laws they are supposed
to implement. An ordinance is different from a resolution. What the delegating
statute and the procedural rules require is the grant of authority to expropriate in
the form of an ordinance.
DOCTRINE


The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. However, it
may be validly delegated to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. The
scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the
delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms
of the delegating law.
Courts have the duty of determining whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law. Courts have adopted a more
censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this
delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly
exercised by the national legislature.
REQUISITES OF VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER BY LGUs:
Ordinance, purpose must be for public welfare etc., just compensation, a valid but
unaccepted offer to buy [see ratio below].
Ordinance and resolution, distinguished: An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution
is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by
a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Original action for
expropriation before the Pasig RTC.
FACTS
October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City
(MANDA) issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then MAYOR
Benjamin ABALOS to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of
Alberto SUGUITAN.
o LOCATION: Boni Avenue cor. Sto. Rosario Sts., Mandaluyong City,
beside the Mandaluyong Medical Center.
o AREA & PARTICULARS: 414 m2, covered by TCT No. 56264 of the
Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. A 2-storey building stood
on the lot.
o PURPOSE OF EXPROPRIATION: Expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center
Mayor Abalos wrote Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy
his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.
March 13, 1995 - Manda filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasig
RTC.
Suguitan moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds
o (1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance
with law
o (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject
property
o (3) Manda seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of
just compensation
o (4) Manda has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the
property being expropriated
o (5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property is but a ploy of Mayor Abalos
to acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment
and opposition to the motion.
October 24, 1995 - RTC denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.
November 14, 1995 - Upon motion, RTC issued an order allowing Manda to
take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of
P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the lot based upon its
current tax declaration.

December 15, 1995 - Manda assumed possession of the subject property by

virtue of a writ of possession issued by the RTC on December 14, 1995.
July 28, 1998 - RTC granted the assailed order of expropriation. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the expropriation was valid (NO)

RATIO
Suguitan: Manda may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain
by means of an ordinance as required by LGC 19 and not by means of a
mere resolution. The resolution mentioned in Art. 36 of the IRR is for
purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief executive to
file the expropriation case in court and to represent the local government
unit in such case, but does not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under 19 of the Code.
Manda: Exercise of eminent domain power was valid and legal. Pursuant to
Art. 36, Rule VI of the LGCs IRR, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for
the filing of expropriation proceedings. A "resolution" empowering the City
Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings [is sufficient] and thereafter
when the court has already determine[d] with certainty the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an
Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungsod appropriating funds for the
payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation.
SC: LGU power of eminent domain comes from legislative delegation. It is
therefore subject to the same limitations as if the power was being exercised
by the legislature itself. The exercise by the LGUs has been guarded even
more closely by the courts. The nature of the LGUs eminent domain power
must be analyzed.
NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate
private property to particular uses to promote public welfare.
It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the
primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the
general welfare.
The right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government
without the necessity for constitutional recognition. Constitutional provisions
on eminent domain do not serve as grants of power but as checks on an
otherwise unlimited power. Among these checks are the just compensation,
due process and equal protection clauses.
The power of eminent domain must be exercised with great circumspection,
being an infringement on the cherished constitutional right of property.
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila: The exercise of the right of
eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents,
is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that
the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When
the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning
of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent
is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be
watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the
government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the
right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the
substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the
exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. (Dillon; Tenorio v.

Manila Railroad)
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. However, it
may be validly delegated to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.
Of course the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily
narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in
strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
DELEGATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER TO LGUs IN THE LGC; DUTY OF
COURTS
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units is 19 of RA 7160.
Although the legislature has granted the power to LGUs, courts still have the
duty of determining whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised
in accordance with the delegating law.
Courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as
compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the national
legislature.
REQUISITES OF VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER BY LGUs
(Mun. of Paraaque v. VM Realty)
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under 9, Art. III
of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
CASE AT BAR: Manda expropriated Suguitans property on the basis of a
mere resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is
clear and free from ambiguity. 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a
resolution.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
ORDINANCE
Law
General and permanent in character
Requires 3rd reading

RESOLUTION
Declaration
of
the
lawmaking
bodys
sentiment or opinion on a specific matter
Temporary
3rd reading not required unless provided for
by a majority of all Sanggunian members

Manda: An ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has
determined the amount of just compensation.
SC: Untenable. Ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint
with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent
domain is already being exercised.
Expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages (ROC 67)
1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit
2 POSSIBLE RESULTS: Dismissal of the action or issuance of order of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more
than three commissioners.
Although the determination and award of just compensation is indispensable

to the transfer of ownership, it is but the last stage of the expropriation

proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint.
An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving
the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised
its power of eminent domain.
As soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to
enter upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with
the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated (LGC 19).
Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing
its local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary
prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not
only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to
which the defendant is entitled.
NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN LGC & LGC-IRR
Manda: A resolution is enough under the LGC-IRR. Art. 36 (a), Rule VI
provides that if the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use,
purpose, or welfare through purchase, it may expropriate said property
through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings.
SC: This has been settled in Mun. of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty: 19 of RA
7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to
implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and
cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere
oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Art. 32, Rule VI
thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the
chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.
SC remains aware of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy,
but judicial sanction cannot be granted to a LGU's exercise of its delegated
power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such
power.
Manda is not precluded from enacting the necessary ordinance and thereafter
reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied with all
other legal requirements.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. RTC order reversed and set aside.
3SAGUITAN VS. MANDALUYONG CITY
FACTS:
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in
Agusan
del
Sur
passed
Resolution
No.
43-89,
Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One
(1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by
Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports
Facilities.
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio
C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still
available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center.
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a
Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC
, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the

Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with
the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the governments best
interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property
the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipalitys motion to take
possession
of
the
land
o that the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to declare the resolution invalid
leaves
it
effective.
o that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances
and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under the old LGC
o that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in
Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three
buildings on the subject property.
ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD:
YES.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It
is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the
State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the
national legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there
must be just compensation

The Municipality of Bunawans power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Section
9
of
said
law
states:
Section 9.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER OF THE

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS
AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR;
DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS
BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE
THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigans disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an
infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although
pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining,
the Courts pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant early
jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. The only ground upon which a
provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is
when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the
council or president making the same. Absolutely no other ground is recognized by
the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of
a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (boards) disapproval of

any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that
such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers
conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative
functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course
of executive authority. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of
Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 4389 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the
condemnation of petitioners property.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to

60555; 26 October 1983

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land
situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority
"to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in
Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for
the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined
geographic areas with potential tourism value, specifically for the construction of a
sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field,
baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course,
children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback riding for the use
of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented by Gloria Ardona)
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Anastacio C. Cabilao,
Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by Jose Cabilao) Modesta Cabilao, Heirs of
Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and
Prudencia Mabini, Antonio Labrador and Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and
Marcelina Sabal, Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and Gregoria
Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca E.
Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas and Victoria Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno,
Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Maximina
Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In Representation of
Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima Cabilao, Estrella
Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro, Josefina and
Marites, All Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by Francisca Borres),
Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio Labrador, Heirs of
Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio Gabisay), Pacifico Labrador, Demetrio
Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora
Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia Gabunada, Heirs of Buenaventura
Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C.
Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada
(Represented by Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a common
allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the
Constitution; alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has
such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land
as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat
is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance
(CFI), that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.The Philippine Tourism
Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an

amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take
immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of
possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing
a sports complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be
considered taking for public use.
Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly provide for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to
transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the
expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the
provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police
power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private
property is concerned. The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a
nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns
and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to
take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of
scarce public land or limited government resources. There can be no doubt that
expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads, bridges,
ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric
power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office
buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been
discarded. The Philippine Tourism Authority has stressed that the development of
the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and
other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing,
water and electric facilities, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) better living standards. The Courts dismissal of the petition is, in part,
predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a
resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
5. Mun. of Paranaque v V.M. Realty Corporation
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the
Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty
Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant
to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an
offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which

the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the
subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to
15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a)
the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private
respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court
dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as
the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an
ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body,
the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the
previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160
prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
6 BELUSO VS. PANAY, CAPIZ, AUGUST 7, 2006
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No.
95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on April
14, 1997 by the respondent Municipality of Panay before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 18 of Roxas City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that
the taking is not for public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it
is politically motivated because petitioners voted against the incumbent mayor and
vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the land sought to be
expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but their
signatures were forged or they were misled into signing the same. The trial court
denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and declared that the expropriation in this
case is for "public use" and the respondent has the lawful right to take the property
upon payment of just compensation.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming that they were
denied due process when the trial court declared that the taking was for public
purpose without receiving evidence on petitioners claim that the Mayor of Panay
was motivated by politics in expropriating their property and in denying their Motion
to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners; and that
the trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the
affidavits of persons denying that they signed a petition addressed to the municipal
government of Panay. Then CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari. It held that the petitioners were not denied due process as they were
able to file an answer to the complaint and were able to adduce their defenses
therein; and that the purpose of the taking in this case constitutes "public use".
Issue: Whether the Municipal Government of Panay exercise the power of Eminent
Domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law under the
existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments.
Decision: The petition is granted.

Rationale: The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local

government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a
mere resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution
that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice.
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property;
and the reason for this is settled: A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of
all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.] 7160 categorically requires that the
local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such
expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional
policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an
LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the
very law giving it such power.
7 FILSTREAM INTL VS. CA
Facts: Filstream filed ejectment suit before MTC against occupants on the grounds
of termination of contact and non-payment of rentals. MTC decided in favor of
Filstream. This was appealed in RTC and CA and both upheld existing decision.
During the pendency of ejectment proceedings, City of Manila approved Ordinance
7813 authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation,
purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land that covers properties of
Filstream. City of Manila filed complaint for eminent domain to expropriate
Filstream properties. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent
domain as well as a motion to quash the writ of possession on the ground of no
valid cause of action, the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use
and maneuver to circumvent the ejectment suit, violation of the constitutional
guarantee against non-impairment, price offered was too low violating just
compensation. RTC denied the petition and declared the property condemned in
favor of City of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not Filstream was deprived of due process on the ground of
non-compliance with priority in expropriation?
Decision: There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment
in favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from
the properties.

The City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain
within its jurisdiction specifically in pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
program.
Very clear from the provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of
priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a

means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to
be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are
the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due
process when their property is expropriated for public use.
RA 7279 Uran Development Housing Act of 1992
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet
been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.
8 LAGCAO VS. CA
Facts: Facts: Cebu City government sold lot 1029 to petitioners. But when
petitioners tried to occupy the lot, squatters were already occupying it. They led
an ejectment case against the squatters. RTC armed the MTCCs decision and
issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. But the mayor of Cebu City
asked the court to temporarily suspend the demolition to give the city enough time
to relocate the squatters. But during the suspension, city council issued ordinance
1843 which authorized the mayor to expropriate petitioners lot for socialized
housing purposes.
Issue: May the city of Cebu validly expropriate petitioners lot?
Ruling: Sec. 19 of RA 7160 grants the power of eminent domain to local
government units. But their exercise of it must not contravene the Constitution or
pertinent laws. But in expropriating the petitioners lot, no reason was given as to
why their lot was singled out. The necessity that impelled the council to choose the
lot was also not given. 1843then deprives petitioners of their property for the
convenience of a few without perceptible benet to the public, thereby violating
sec. 1, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution. In addition, RA 7279, which citys basis for
expropriating the lot for purposes of urban land reform and housing, requires that
expropriation of privately-owned lands should only be used as a last resort. But city
did not show that they exhausted all the other means of acquiring lands. And there
was no evidence that the city oered to buy the lot. But compliance with such
conditions are mandatory to protect owners of lands from tyrannical violation of due

process. Thus, 1843 is invalid because it violates the Constitution, RA 7160, and RA
7279.
9 ANTONIO V GERONIMO 2005
DOCTRINE: Expropriation has no binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation
proceeding has been instituted.
FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC by Alexander Catolos
(private respondent), who alleged that he was the registered owner of four (4)
parcels of land.
Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land
without requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would
immediately vacate the same in the event that the former would need the
premises. However, when private respondent did notify petitioners of his need to
use the premises, petitioners refused to vacate the land even after demand.
The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent and was issued a writ of
demolition on March 1994. As partial demolition began, the
On 28 March 1994, a writ of demolition was issued. However as the partial
demolition began, on June 20 1995, the Mayor of Antipolo passed a resolution to
acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public
purposes/socialized housing.
The Sangguniang Bayan informed respondent court of the expropriation and the
fact that the funds required for the same have already been included in the 1996
budget, and requested that the demolition be held in abeyance BUT the demolition
still went on. The Sanggunian filed a Motion to Stay the execution of the demolition
due to the supervening events (passage of the resolution for expropriation).
ISSUE: Whether a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can
suspend the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case.
RULING: NO. As a general rule For a Sangguniang Bayan can exercise power to
expropriate but the following requisites should concur:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan in this case cannot be
considered as an ordinance.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local
chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a

fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA
7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with
that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtful interpretation."

10LAGUNA LAKE DEV. AUTHORITY

FACTS: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through
Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the
said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law
gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as
the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns
and municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails
over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law,
while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general
law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for
the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to
the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing
permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the
Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
11 REPUBLIC V DAVAO CITY
FACTS:
On August 11, 2000, The City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of NonCoverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI.
ISSUES:

(1) Is an LGU like Davao exempt from the coverage of PD 1586?

(2) Is the project entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC)?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with
powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation
shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative
RULING:
(1) NO, IT IS WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586. Found in Section 16 of the
Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people's right to a
balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim
exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with
governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the
environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
(2) YES.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the
projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is
clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or
within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but
to issue the Certificate of Non- Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the
performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued
by the trial court in the case at bar.
12 POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA
FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching,
rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal
leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution
statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts
to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand,
seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents
into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately
to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar,
however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial
Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that
appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ
of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order
allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of
Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper
remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable
injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger
issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board
moved for reconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a
petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner
asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the
Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution
Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In
addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal
authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment
when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents
or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the
reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided
prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant
life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board
made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within
the lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are
permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's
petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial
court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due
course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution,
as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the
right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ
of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
13 RAMOS VS. CA
FACTS: This case is about the legality of a municipality's hiring of private counsel to
file a suit in its behalf. The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, through the law firm
of Cruz Durian & Academia (now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday), sued in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan Marciano Domingo, Leonila Guzman, Maria C.
Ramos and Consorcio Cruz for the recovery of its 74-hectare fishpond (Civil Case
No. 5095-M).
In paragraph 19 of the complaint it was alleged that the municipality had obligated
itself to pay Cruz Durian & Academia as attorney's fees not less than twenty
percent of the amount to be recovered by the plaintiff (p. 44, Rollo).
The provincial fiscal of Bulacan and the municipal attorney of Hagonoy entered their
appearance as counsel for the municipality with the manifestation that its private

counsel would be under the control and supervision of those officials.

Notwithstanding that appearance, Domingo and Maria C. Ramos (lessee and
sublessee of the fishpond) moved to disqualify the Cruz law firm from serving as
counsel of the municipality.
The trial court denied the motion. It found that Angel Cruz, the head of the law
firm, volunteered to act as counsel for the municipality because he desired to serve
his native town.
ISSUE: Can a municipality hire a legal counsel on his behalf?
RULING: Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, as complemented by
section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law is clear in providing that only the provincial
fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a municipality in its lawsuits. That
provision is mandatory. Section 1683 states that, the provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any
court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court
or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal
district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of
any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of
the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or
other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its
council.
The legislative intent to prohibit a municipality from employing private counsel in its
lawsuits is further implemented by section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Republic
Act No. 2264, which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal
division or office of a municipality, "shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and
perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the
council" The municipal attorney is paid out of municipal funds (Sec. 4, Republic Act
No. 5185, Decentralization Act of 1967). He can represent the municipality even
without the fiscal's collaboration (Calleja vs. Court of Appeals, L-22501, July
31,1967,20 SCRA 895).
Thus, that the appearance in the aforementioned case of Cruz Durian Agabin
Atienza & Alday as counsel for the municipality of Hagonoy is contrary to law. The
municipality should be represented by its municipal attorney and by the provincial
fiscal of Bulacan.
14 ALINSUG VS. RTC
FACTS: Zonsayda L. Alinsug, had been a regular employee of the municipal
government of Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a permanent
appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator of the same municipality. She absented herself from work to attend to
family matters. She had asked permission from the personnel officer but not from
the mayor. Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one
month and one day commencing on 24 June 1992 for "a simple misconduct which
can also be categorized as an act of insubordination." The order also stated that the
suspension "carries with it forfeiture of . . . benefits such as . . . salary and PERA
and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity." Zonsayda filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, in San Carlos City, a petition, for
"injunction with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction" against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer. Mayor

Ponsica and the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the petition, through private
practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, alleging that the petitioner had not exhausted
administrative remedies and that her suspension was in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their
official capacities?
HELD: The appointment of a legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and
city governments and optional for the municipal government. Section 481, Article
11 of Title V of the Local Government Code, paragraph (i) states one of the
functions of the legal officer :
(i)
Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party: Provided, that in actions or proceedings where a component
city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent
the adverse party.
Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the
provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. This
provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v. The Auditor General
where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney
is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be
disqualified to serve and represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code
as legal basis, the Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which enumerated
instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular
municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is
vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and
when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily
involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.
15 ENRIQUEZ VS. GIMENEZ
Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership and
control over all existing government-owned waterworks systems. However, Bauan
Batangas passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local
waterworks to the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.
Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be
brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act.
Given this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to commence
an action challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.
The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorneys
fees, which the Auditor General disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan had
no authority to engage the services of a special counsel
Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a
special counsel
Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the
various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality
in any court except when he is disqualified by law, which in this case he is not. A
fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by

law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special
attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to
appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined
to handle and prosecute its case in court.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and
mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in
audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.
16
RAMOS VS CA
FACTS: The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the services of the law
firm of Cruz Durian &Academia (now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday) in a
case for land recovery against Maria C. Ramos et al

Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered their

appearance assupervising counsel in the case for land recovery

Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from serving as counsel for the
municipality

Trial court denied motion to disqualify since it found that private counsel only
wanted to serve his native town

Ramos assailed said order by a petition for certoriari with the Court of
Appeals, who sustained the ruling of the trial court, thus the case is appealed
to the Supreme Court

ISSUE
WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel to represent LGU is
correct
RULING: Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes, Where language is plain, subtle
refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial
theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so
much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is
inconsiderable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the
English languages found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the legislature ought
to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings
which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring
until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
givenstatute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its
'interpretation and construction
.There are two specific laws prohibiting private counsels representing the
government- Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code states
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal
district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in
the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is

disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a

special attorney may be employed by its council.

17 MUN. OF PILILLA
Facts: The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine
Petroleum Corporation (PPC) to pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business
taxes and other fees. The judgment was affirmed by the SC and became final and
executor. The case was remanded to the RTC for execution.
In connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of PPCs gross sales for the
purpose of computing its business taxes. PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC
to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla received from it P11.5M as full satisfaction
of the judgment as evidenced by the release and quit claim documents executed by
the said mayor. The RTC issued an order denying Atty. Mendiolas motionfor
examination and execution of judgment.
Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the total
liability amounted to P24.2M while the amount received by the mayor was only
P12.7M. He asserted that the mayor cannot waive the balance of the judgment over
which his law firm had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services and
attorneys fees amounting to more than P12M. The RTC, however, denied his MR.
A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the
CA for appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty.
Mendiola to represent the municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having
been filed by a private counsel in violation of the law and jurisprudence but without
prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality thru the proper
provincial or municipal legal officer.
Atty. Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the decision of the CA.
Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in
court for and in behalf of the municipality of Pililla
Held: No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in
the name of the Municipality of Pililla.
1. Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.
Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province or any municipality or municipal district
thereof in any court except (a) in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested
in the SC or (b) in cases where the municipality or municipal district is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the provincial fiscal is
disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council.
Hence, only the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory.
The municipalitys authority to employ a private lawyer is limited
only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it. For this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial
fiscal was disqualified must appear on record.
2. The fiscals refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for
employing the services of private counsel.

Unlike a practicing lawyer who has a right to refuse employment, fiscal

cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for
by law without violating his oath of office.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle
and prosecute its case in court.
3. The legality of a private counsels representation can be questioned at any
stage of the proceedings.