Is Nuclear Deterrence Defensible

in the 21st Century?

STEFAN MRVALJEVIC
Lund University

Introduction
The world has changed sharply in the last two and a half decades in aftermath of the Cold War.
The security threats and ideological conflict that characterized the Cold War period were quickly
replaced by a plethora of new, vastly different challenges pertinent to a world of increased
interdependence. Economic, societal, environmental, political and military challenges that we
face in the 21st century are diverse and complex, and include issues such as environmental decay,
global pandemics, terrorism, internal conflicts and perhaps most alarming, the risk of nuclear
proliferation, or worse nuclear annihilation.
Nuclear weapons are perhaps the largest imminent threat to the continued survival of human
civilization on Earth (Robock and Toon, 2010), and despite the relative stability the post-Cold War
timeframe has offered, their presence is still very much felt in the international arena. Risk of
nuclear proliferation in states such as Iran and North Korea is on the top of the agenda of the UN
and the international community at large, (Kampani, 2002) while terrorist groups such as Daesh
have publicly stated they intend to acquire fission material needed to create a nuclear dirty
bomb. However, the ominous fact that worlds major military powers, to this day, have their
entire arsenals pointed at each other in a stand-offish posture aptly called nuclear deterrence,
is perhaps the most worrisome.
At the center of the theory of nuclear deterrence lies the idea that in order to prevent war, a
nation state must be able and willing to retaliate against an aggressor with tremendous force,
causing enough damage to the attacker that would nullify any gains aggressor would make.
(Waltz, 1990, Brodie, 1959) As early as 1960s, American and Soviet policy makers came to
understand that nuclear weapons provide both their countries with an ability to destroy each
other, and possibly the world, in case of an aggression against one another. This has led many
historical and contemporary writers to attribute the absence of direct conflict between Soviet
Union and United States to the terrifying presence of nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer, 1989)
The proponents of nuclear deterrence, who argue that nuclear weapons serve the interest of
peace and stability by providing a far-too-horrible scenario in case of armed conflict, usually give
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the following arguments in favor of the atom. They are centered on the key idea that nuclear
states do not go to war with each other, are safe from conventional attack and that nuclear
warheads generally promote stability rather than instability (Waltz, 1981, 1990).
Those who find the idea of deterrence ineffective and obsolete, or find the presence of nuclear
weapons a threat on its own call into question the basic postulates of deterrence. They ask the
question whether nuclear weapons truly contributed to absence of major war between Soviet
Union and Unites States, or other nuclear capable states, or were other plausible reasons
overlooked. Furthermore, they question the efficacy of city attacks in retaliation and deterrence
capability of nuclear weapons that target civilians. Finally, they criticize the ability of nuclear
weapons to deter conventional attacks and their usefulness in small-scale conflicts.
In this paper I will try engage with some of the most prominent critics of nuclear deterrence, as
well with some of its defenders. My main claim is that nuclear deterrence, understood in the
Cold War-era sense of mutually assured destruction with huge arsenals and doctrine of firststrike use against conventional threats is of limited use in the modern world. On the other hand,
abolishing nuclear weapons suddenly would not produce more security, but less. I will argue
against ending nuclear deterrence by showing that examples and claims often cited as the
reasons it does not work or is not feasible in the 21st century do not hold up to closer scrutiny.
As dangerous as it inherently is, nuclear deterrence still provides the least bad answer to the
question of stability or absence of conflict.
In the following, I will first need to define deterrence to avoid misunderstanding of the term.
Moving on, I will analyze the classical realist arguments on nuclear deterrence and then engage
with more critical-minded authors who are in favor abolishing nuclear deterrence. Finally, I will
conclude with the brief summary of the main points and ideas.

What is Nuclear Deterrence?

Nuclear deterrence is a contested concept whose meaning changed over the decades, and holds
entirely different meanings in different temporal and national contexts(Oren and Solomon
2013).In American military history, deterrence meant something quite different during the
massive retaliation policy era of Eisenhower, than it did during the early 2000s. To help us
navigate the complexity of finding the right definition, let us take a look at some of the most
commonly accepted in academia and policy circles.
In the essence, deterrence theory is based on principle that a credible threat of force can be used
to dissuade a potential enemy to refrain from conducting aggressive actions. (Huth, 1999, Brodie
1959). The major component of the concept is the ability to retaliate against an aggression with
such tremendous force, that any potential benefit an enemy would have by attacking would be
lost. In nuclear strategy, this ability to retaliate is based in the capacity to conduct a second-

strike, which means that a country is able to unleash sufficient amount of destructive force even
after it has been subjected to a nuclear (or conventional) attack.
First conceptual problem with nuclear deterrence definition is that nuclear weapons are
sometimes used interchangeably with deterrence, thus we can speak of intercontinental nuclear
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as land or sea based deterrents (Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich, 2009).
Nuclear weapons have become de facto synonymous with deterrence, and no matter what their
purpose or what they do, they are considered as such (Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich, 2009). For
constructivist authors, deterrence is whatever nuclear weapons do and the meaning of the word
can be overstretched greatly to mean vastly different things (Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich,
2009). Without mentioning whom or what is being deterred, the word can refer to either nuclear
deterrence or conventional deterrence, and to either retaliatory or first strike attack (Kristensen,
Norris and Oelrich, 2009). Indeed, for a good portion of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union
both considered first strike attack to be a deterrent.
Realist authors such as Kennetz Waltz claim that in pure form it means to strike back against an
aggressor hard enough to outweigh any gain aggressor hoped to realize (Waltz, 1990). The key
idea, according to Waltz, is that deterrence depends on what one can do, not what one will do
(Waltz, 1990:733).
Waltz provides a thoughtful insight on the logic of deterrence by differentiating it from defense.
In essence, nuclear deterrence serves to prevent wars rather than win them, which is a thought
often overlooked in contemporary debates on deterrence. For Waltz, for a deterrence to be
successful, the probable hurt need only outbalance the probable gain (Waltz, 1990).
Other authors place mutually assured destruction (MAD) or city attacks in the center of
deterrence. According to Doyle (1999), nuclear deterrence theory based on the principle of MAD
is a product of haphazard strategic thinking that was considered least bad a way to contain
USSR, and found it a paradoxical situation for which later thinkers had to find justification
(Doyle 2009:9).
Without overstretching the definition, we can safely say that there are many ways to look at
deterrence, but the essence of the meaning can be expressed as the discouragement of the
initiation of military aggression by the threat (implicit or explicit) of applying military force in
response (Harrington de Santana 2009:326). Military force, in this scenario, comes in the shape
of nuclear warheads capable of unleashing destruction on a horrifying scale.

Nuclear Deterrence and its Critics

It is a well-known claim in contemporary international relations that nuclear deterrence between
Soviet Union and United States prevented a direct military conflict between the two nations.
Proponents of nuclear deterrence have found matching examples of lasting peace between
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China and USSR, India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea (due to American extended
deterrence nuclear umbrella) etc, and have contributed it to deterrence. Indeed, even though
these countries engaged in a multitude of covert, false-flag, proxy and terror acts against each
other, they have abstained from entering into direct military conflict. Deterrence is often credited
with dissuading conventional threats and promoting regional stability. The example of India and
Pakistan come to mind, which fought three major wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971, but after India
acquired nuclear weapons in 1974, despite occasional conflicts, cover-ops and incidents, the two
had avoided a direct military conflict since that time.
The question whether nuclear deterrence indeed mattered so much, or if at all, has been asked
since the concept itself was established, but in the recent years has attracted even more
attention from historians, policy makers and other scholars. Furthermore, there are several
strong arguments that nuclear deterrence not only matters little, but that its existence threatens
the very security of states which still use it (Robock and Toon, 2010)
I will focus here on two authors whose articles have attracted a lot of attention in academia, but
also in policy circles. The seminal work Myth of Nuclear Deterrence (2008) by Wade Wilson and
Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (2009) by James Doyle. They both offer insightful commentary
into the nature and purpose of nuclear deterrence.

Does Deterrence Actually Work?

Wilsons main argument states that the core of nuclear deterrence is actually the capacity to
destroy cities (Wilson 2008:422) and that nuclear deterrence is said to work is because leaders
of nuclear states would find it pointless and too costly to utilize such weapons, at a cost of their
own cities being destroyed in retaliation. Arguing against that claim, Wilson claims that
proponents of nuclear deterrence are wrong to assume that destroying cities would cause the
other side to surrender. History shows us, he tells us, that leaders care little about civilian
casualties and that city attacks and high casualties, even with nuclear weapons would not
militarily decisive (Wilson 2008).
What he does, in fact, is reduce the entire deterrence theory to the notion of city destruction,
and uses several historical examples to show that city attacks and destruction are, in fact, not
decisive. Quoting city destructions of Genghis Khan and sacking of city of Magdeburg in the Thirty
Years' War, Wilson concludes that there are almost no instances, however, despite thousands
of years of war, in which a citys destruction led to its countrys surrender(Wilson 2008:428).
Wilsons example do in fact prove that in these cases city destruction did not engender surrender,
but does not show us how it relates to the issue of nuclear deterrence. The examples from premodern history are hardly relevant in the world where even a limited nuclear deterrent can lay
waste to an entire country. A single Chinese ICBM Dong-Feng 5, with a yield of 5 Mt could kill
up to 5 million people in New York in a matter of hours, with many more casualties due to
radiation, societal breakdown and lack of food, medicine and sanitation. Deterrence proponents
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do not talk about destroying cities, they talk about threatening to do so with credible force. As
Culp (2012) points out, it would not be wise to confuse surrender and not attacking in the first
place.
More importantly, Wilson misunderstands the basic principle of nuclear deterrence. Waltz
explains that nuclear weapons eliminate the need for defense and war-fighting (Waltz 1990:732),
as they follow an entirely different logic. The goal of deterrence, according to Waltz, is not to win
a war, but to prevent one, and that no country gains by destroying anothers cities and then
seeing a comparable number of its own destroyed in return is obvious to everyone (Waltz
1990:733). Deterrence is precisely that the ability to retaliate in such a way that the aggressor
loses any chance to gain anything, a scenario apparently lost in medieval comparisons.
Other authors, like Doyle, downplay the significance deterrence played in preventing a major war
between United States and Soviet Union. Doyle claims that deterrence did not work in the first
place because neither side had even wanted to engage the other (Doyle 2009:14). He argues
Rather than contributing to war-avoidance, it appears that the strategy of nuclear deterrence
was largely irrelevant to deterring a major USSoviet or NATO Soviet war. Neither side ever saw
an advantage in initiating such a conflict in the first place (Doyle 2009:15). Reading this argument
closely reveals that the same logic could be used to in fact give credence to nuclear deterrence,
rather than disprove it. Neither side saw advantage in initiating such a conflict because there
were none any advantage that could possibly be attained would be offset by the damage done
by nuclear deterrent. Military strategy usually implies finding a way to overcome your enemys
defenses, find a weakness or seize an opportunity. Nuclear weapons eliminate such
contemplations by making it too costly to strategize a winning move (Waltz, 1990)
Another alternative explanation for absence of war is offered by Doyle by asking the question
whether the long peace period experienced after World War two is in fact logical conclusion of
a substantial historical process, one which already had precedence in history (Doyle 2009:14).
He, somewhat anachronically ponders the question whether major war was avoided due to shifts
in the political orientation of national governments, growing economic and cultural
interdependence.(Doyle 2009:14), rather than due to deterrence. This is a very optimistic
argument, however it is not based on facts. The long peace period experienced after World War
two, for those outside the center of the world system was indeed as bloody as any other period
in history. Numerous proxy wars fought on the periphery in places like Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, Congo, Yemen, Dominican Republic an others clearly pit United States/NATO against
Soviet Union throughout the duration of the Cold War. The ideological conquest for world
domination between the two superpowers was indeed cold only in the center where both sides
calculated that the risk is too high. To call this a period of peace, would be an insult for millions
of people who died as a result of foreign interference and power politics of two superpowers.
Further, Wilson states that The psychology of terror that is supposed to work in nuclear
deterrences favor actually creates the circumstances for unremitting Resistance (Wilson
2008:422). What he means is that, rather than dissuade an enemy, nuclear attack is likely to
5

promote more resistance, comparing the effect of nuclear blasts with contemporary terrorism.
To demonstrate that nuclear weapons are weapons of terror and indiscriminate killing, and by
offering comparisons to terrorism he goes on to conclude most leaders would interpret nuclear
attacks against cities not as sophisticated signaling or as demonstrations of resolve, but as the
first in a series of attacks intended to annihilate the entire country (Wilson 2008:431)
Threating to deter an enemy with nuclear if he attacks you first hardly qualifies as terrorism. For
a deterrent to work, it should not be used (Waltz, 1990). The largest issue with the argument,
however, is presupposing that any nuclear activity is aimed at complete annihilation of the
enemy. The deterrence theory is based on the principle of proportionality, not complete
destruction of the enemy, and by choosing to use the most extreme, Cold War-era interpretation
of deterrence one where nuclear holocaust is the only response Wilson constructs a straw
man that he easily tackles. The question how threat of nuclear retaliation creates conditions for
unremitting resistance comparable to threat of terrorism, when the formers only policy goal is
to dissuade the attack in the first place is not answered.

Deterrence Track Record What Deterrence Can or Can Not Do

The final argument Wilson brings to light is that nuclear deterrence has a poor track record in
preventing conflicts (Wilson 2008:433). He writes that there is little evidence Soviet Union and
United States were ever on the brink of war that was successfully prevented by nuclear
deterrence (Wilson 2008:433). Furthermore, he finds that nuclear superiority of the US prior to
1949. did not yield a big diplomatic advantage over the Soviet Union. He continues the argument
by concluding that despite having nuclear weapons, it did not prevent the United States from
losing in Vietnam, or the Soviet Union to embarrass itself in Afghanistan. Finally, he argues,
nuclear weapons did not even protect United Kingdom from Argentina in the Falklands War, nor
Israel in 1973 Yom Kippur conflict. (Wilson 2008: 430-436)
While it very hard to prove in what amount nuclear deterrence contributed to absence of conflict
between United States and Soviet Union, it is highly unlikely that it did not have significant
impact. There were occasions that the two sides were on the brink of war, in 1948. during the
Berlin airlift was one hallmark example. The ideological conflict was intense for the better part
of the Cold War, and both sides routinely engaged in espionage, proxy warfare, covert operations
and other hostile activities, yet never sparked a direct conformation. A worthy question to ask, if
not for the nuclear deterrent, what was the decisive reason for abstinence of war? (Culp,
2012:62)
The example of India and Pakistan gives a scenario of two countries which had been hostile since
they both became independent countries in 1947. The two sides fought a bloody war in 1947,
then again in 1965 and 1971, most often in the Kashmir region which remains contested.
Additionally, India fought a costly war against China in 1962, which it lost. After 1974, India had
6

tested its first nuclear weapon there were no major conflicts between India and any of its
neighbors. The case is interesting because the conditions that led to conflict remained the
unstable Kashmir region and continued hostility with Pakistan did not subside, yet the two states
never went to war again using conventional forces (Khan, 2009). The conflict in 99 over the town
of Kargil was a cover-ops infiltration by Pakistani military and intelligence who were acting as
indigenous rebels, a ruse quickly understood by India and the international community. Finally,
that conflict was words away from massive frontline combat with thousands of tanks, artillery
pieces and millions of soldiers involved that characterized previous conflicts, and neither sides
military crossed the LoC (line of control) on the border.
The claim that United States did not exercise enough diplomatic superiority in the years when
they were the only nuclear power (1945-1949) can be explained by a plethora of reasons
unrelated to deterrence theory. United States and Soviet Union, at the time, were still in the
process of creating a post-war order in which they both had a large stake. Furthermore, Soviet
Union, even without the nuclear weapons was in this time the largest conventional military in
the world. Finally, Soviet Union at the time was still considered a non-enemy, and as it had great
influence in China, it was not a force that could or would be intimidated by nuclear weapons.
To suggest that nuclear weapons equal deterrence and that they are a perfect solution for any
diplomatic problem, foreign policy adventure, proxy war or regional conflict would be unfair.
(Culp, 2012) Kenneth Waltz claimed that nuclear deterrence serves to deter large threats, not
smaller ones (Waltz, 1990) It hardly tells us anything about efficacy of nuclear deterrence to use
examples when nuclear states invaded another country, significantly weaker and often engaged
in asymmetric warfare. Wilson mentions that Soviets could not find use for its nuclear arsenal in
Afghanistan (Wilson 2008:435) which seems painfully obvious the Soviets in Afghanistan were
fighting in a rugged, mountainous terrain against a guerrilla Mujahedeen, an asymmetric warfare
campaign for which nuclear weapons were not made at all. Same could be said about adventures
of United States in Vietnam and Iraq. To claim that nuclear deterrence fails because imperial
forces could not win their foreign policy adventures against asymmetric enemy shows
misperception of the role of nuclear deterrence.
The efficacy of nuclear deterrence to deter conventional attacks has been called into question,
giving the example of Yom Kippur war in 1973. when Israel was on the brink of defeat by
combined Syrian and Egyptian attack, and was considering to use the nuclear weapons. The
example does not support the claim for several reasons. Firstly, Israels policy of not confirming,
nor denying the presence of its nuclear weapons, although it is widely believed it does possess a
certain amount, was even more pronounced in the 70s. The leaders of Egypt and Syria could
have known, but might not have known as well, that Israel has a nuclear deterrent. The historical
evidence is not clear on the subject. (Culp, 2012:64). Furthermore, the logic of nuclear deterrence
demands that threat of retaliation is obvious, evident and powerful enough to dissuade the
aggressors. The proof that leadership of Egypt and Syria were aware of nuclear retaliation if they

attack, and then decided it is worthy to risk it to attain a certain military or political gain, would
be needed to claim deterrence failed Israel.

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence today still presents a credible theory that explains the absolute absence of
direct military conflict between nuclear states, both in history and in contemporary international
relations. While by no means a perfect system, nuclear weapons have proven to be effective at
deterring both nuclear and conventional threats, while counter examples of deterrence failures
have not held up to closer scrutiny. Despite the variety of theories that Soviet Union and United
States avoided conflict, one of nuclear deterrence, in authors view, still remains the most
credible. The claim that city destruction has not led to surrender in history hardly shows that
credible threat of nuclear deterrence does not work.
Comparisons with terrorism in order to show that nuclear attacks would create resistance rather
acquiescence ignores the fundamental logic of deterrence fear of retaliation seeks to dissuade
attackers, not influence policy. Finally, nuclear deterrence serves to primarily deter other nuclear
states from attacking first, conventional defense remains a secondary purpose, one which also
holds up to scrutiny. Nuclear deterrence should not be confused with general usage of nuclear
weapons, or conventional ones for that matter. Nuclear weapons serve to prevent wars, rather
than win them, and in this role it is hard to say that they were not successful.

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