Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized
its crowning value when he wrote that "it is mans basic right for it is nothing less than to have
rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its reacquisition
may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the
applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of
the former Filipino citizen.
The Case
The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the
denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.
The Facts
The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years
old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By
derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds
citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for
one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID
on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan;
subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and
Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused
of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge
sheet which alleged:

1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and
was admitted as a balikbayan;
2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S.
Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10,
1994 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and
may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by
then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8
The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in
San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21,
1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an
outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one
count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9
The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29,
1996, in the following summary deportation order:
Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy
in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic]
respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal
charges has been issued against him, and that the respondents Passport No. 053854189 has
been revoked.
By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives
apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be
86461], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the
passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to
remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August
1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired.
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country.

10

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771.
Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation
may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no
notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to
admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is
married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his
derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father,
Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.

At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.

12

On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the
petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the
Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the
CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their
memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. 13Meanwhile,
the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP
20,000.00 cash bond. 14
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA
8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau. 15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had
not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA
8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization
when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his
Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in
Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the
compelling reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968.
Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16,
1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued
for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that after petitioner was
ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of
Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on June 13, 1996more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995.
The appellate court considered petitioners "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid
deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only
reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United
States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now
before us.
The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship
under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his
being an undocumented alien.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their
Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on
October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the
applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
supplied.)

17

(Emphasis

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship
by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a
natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization
when he was still a minor.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only
to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity,
and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had
renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to
repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the
law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a
naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children
of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:18 the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s)
who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be
of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a
child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to
undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children
cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he
was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative
naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is
entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to
political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of
his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of
minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due
to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by
economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his
parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due
to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of
repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he
can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to
follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for
repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to
process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285)
dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
Section 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the
Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General
of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.
Sec. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship
pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization
which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of
petitions.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5,
1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition
such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino
citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications
of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the
certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office
subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already
in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA
8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the
Court in Angat v. Republic. 22Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for
repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he
nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of
repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among
others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in
case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] naturalborn Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or
economic necessity should be specified." 23
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for
repatriation must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is
"merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a]
foreign country." 24
Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the
benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No.
725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63,
also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the
limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic necessity" in relation to natural-born
Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the
application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women
who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following
sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171,
to wit:
Ms. Domingo: x x x
From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I
observed that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.
The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no
work to be found in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who leave the country
for fear of their lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of

government. The third type is those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from
the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not
Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere.
Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of
choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for
themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being
proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of
Filipinos who leave their country. And the two typesthe economic and political refugeesare
the ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost
their citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people who left the
country because of political persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after
feeling that they should come back to the country and get back their citizenship and
participate as they should in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to
get their citizenship back because they are treated no different from any other class of alien. 26
From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248,
it is incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is
precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for
reasons other than political or economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act
of renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable
shifting of his political allegiance," and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through
naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic
necessity." 27
This argument has no merit.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political
act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged
by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine
citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates
that aside from economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country
because they have committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those
who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and
therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove
to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his
parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to
undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated
by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be
lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law
the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine
if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of

the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If
the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is
justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship;
therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not
shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law.
Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary
deportation:
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation
proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or
cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and
the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the aliens valid passport and
shall decide the case on the basis thereof.
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to
him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections
10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be 86461], 30 May
1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance,
the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be
immediately executory. 28
In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:
It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary
documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions
where in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status,
refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien]
has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are
examples. However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on
the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. x x x 29
Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became
an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot
bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Joaquin J. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary
(2003), Art. IV (Citizenship), Sec. 1, pp. 609-610.
1

Rollo, pp. 8-19.

Rollo, p. 22. Note: The year 1986 (from the CA Decision) is replaced with year 1968
based on the petition filed with the CA (rollo, pp. 27-36, at 32).
3

Based on petitioner Tabasas Affidavit of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance, and the
Certification of facts of his birth from the Office of the Civil Registrar in Numancia,
Aklan (rollo, pp. 37-40), petitioner was born on February 21, 1959, thus making him
around 9 years of age at the time he was naturalized as an American citizen. In the
pleadings filed before the CA and this Court, however, petitioner alleged that he was
4

naturalized as an American at the age of seven (7). This age is used in this Decision for
consistency.
5

Rollo, p. 32.

Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged

(1993), p. 608.
6

Supra note 3, at 20.

Id. at 20-21.

CA rollo, p. 95.

10

Supra note 3, at 21-22.

11

Supra note 5, at 27.

12

or 37 years old, see footnote no. 4 of this Decision.

13

Supra note 3, at pars. 2-4.

14

Rollo, p. 150.

15

Supra note 3, at par. 5.

Id. at 20-25 (penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez with Associate Justices
Pacita Caizares-Nye and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. [now a member of the Court]
concurring).
16

17

RA 8171, Sec. 1.

We quote the opinion of Father Joaquin Bernas in Tecson v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 & 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277, 385-386 regarding
the transmissive essence of citizenship as follows:
18

4.3 The operation of the core principle of transmissibility in blood relation finds
affirmation and, more significantly, continuity in the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions in which blood relationship becomes a principal derivation and
transmissibility of citizenship. All Constitutions embody this transmissive essence of
citizenship in blood relationship. In the determination as to who are citizens of the
Philippines, they have a common provision that those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines are citizens.
xxxx
4.8. The transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core principle of blood
relationship or jus sanguinis. On this account, the derivation of citizenship from a
person or the transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from a person or the
transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from the fact that he is the father. x x x

Pertinent portions of the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act
No. 8171 state:
19

RULE II
1. Said petition shall be in five (5) copies, legibly typed, and signed, thumbmarked
[sic], and verified by the petitioner, with his/her signed photograph in passport size
attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the following:
a. the petitioner's name and surname and any other name he/she has used or by
which he/she is known;
b. his/her present and former places of residence;
c. his/her place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her parents and
their residences (if still living), and the reasons for the Filipino citizenship of his/her
parents, if such is the fact;
d. the basis for her being a Filipino citizen at the time of her marriage, if the petitioner
is one who lost her Filipino citizenship by marriage, or if the petitioner is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, the basis why he/she was a Filipino citizen at birth;
e. the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in
case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of
natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter,
such political or economic necessity should be specified;
f. the reason/s why petitioner is seeking to reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation;
g. whether the petitioner is single, married or divorced, or his/her marriage had been
annulled. If married, petitioner shall state the date and place of his/her marriage, and
the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship, and residence of his/her spouses; if
widowed, the date and place of death of his/her spouse; and if his/her marriage had
been annulled or he/she had been divorced, the date of decree of annulment of
marriage or divorce and the court which issued the same;
h. his/her occupation, as well as the occupation of his/her spouse, in case the applicant
is married;
i. if the petitioner has children, the name, date and place of birth, and residence of
each of the children;
j. a declaration: (1) that petitioner is not a person opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing organized government; (2) that petitioner is not a person defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for
the predominance of their ideas; (3) that petitioner is not a person convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; or (4) that petitioner is not a person suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

k. a declaration that it is his/her intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to

renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the state or country of which
he/she is a citizen or subject.
The petition must be accompanied by:
a. duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate or other
evidences of his/her former Filipino citizenship;
b. duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's Alien Certificate of
Registration and his/her Native-born Certificate of Residence and Certificate of Arrival
or Re-entry Permit into the Philippines, if any;
c. duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certificate, if
married; or the death certificate of his/her spouse, if widowed; or the decree granting
petitioner a divorce, if she/he is divorced, or annulling his/her marriage, if such
marriage had been annulled;
d. duplicate original or certified photocopies of the birth certificates, the Alien
Certificates of Registration, and the Immigrant Certificates of Residence or Native-born
Certificates of Residence (if any) of petitioner's minor children, whenever applicable.
Every page of the petition, as well as all the pages of its annexes and supporting
documents and papers, must be signed by petitioner in addition to the signatures
thereof of the persons executing or issuing the same.
2. The petition shall be given a docket number and stamped, indicating the date of
filing. The Committee shall record the filing of all such applications in a record book in
chronological order.
RULE III
After receipt of the petition for repatriation, the Committee may call the petitioner for
interview, after which the Committee, if it believes in view of the facts before it that
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required for
repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 shall approve the petition. Within ninety (90)
days after being notified of the approval of his petition, petitioner shall take [an] x x x
oath of allegiance x x x
20

Supra note 2, at 12.

21

The Memorandum reactivating the Special Committee on Repatriation reads:

June 08 1995
MEMORANDUM
TO : The Solicitor General
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
The Director-General, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
You are hereby directed to immediately convene as the Special Committee on
Naturalization (SCN) created under Letter of Instruction No. 270 (11 April 1975), as
amended, for the limited purpose of processing applications pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 725 (1975) and related laws; which provide for a simplified procedure for
Filipino women, who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, and naturalborn Filipinos; to reacquire Philippine citizenship through an application for repatriation.
You are further directed to report, within thirty (30) days from the date hereof and on a
monthly basis thereafter, on the actions taken pursuant to this directive.
For strict compliance.
(Signed) Fidel V. Ramos
22

G.R. No. 132244, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 438, 448-449.

Special Committee on Naturalization, Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing

RA 8171, (1999) Rule II, (e).
23

24

Supra note 2, at 14.

25

The pertinent portions of the law are as follows:

Presidential Decree No. 725 (June 5, 1975)

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship by
marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the
law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
Constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of
Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after
the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and

WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1)
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2)
natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration.
xxxx
26

II Record, House 9th Congress 2nd Session 224-225 (August 4, 1993).

27

Supra note 14, at 152.

28

Rollo, pp. 71-72.

Id. at 73 (citing the Court En Banc Resolution, G.R. No. 86461, May 30, 1989, rollo,
pp. 38-39).
29

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his
answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was
"merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after
the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge
to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and
so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask
that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse
of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the
hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments
from the respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really
for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was
to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and
void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one
for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation
because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And
assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only
for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself
alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not
amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also
joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the
annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking
for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he
was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization
as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the
Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's
naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of
convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections
because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had
not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born
citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the
1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the
United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for
the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided
to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually
end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will
be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's
citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General,
who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him
after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the
decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret
the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been
filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the
aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and
the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915,
was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of
Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN

Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it
in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him
as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government
through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the
enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His
feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it
necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the
United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I
absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those
Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine
citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law
principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at
bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on
the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal
status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country
in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years
when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month
before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared
war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on
his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice
held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more
closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a
conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state.

No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is
not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us
is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws,
regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as
sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention
providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its
nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in
Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his
naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of
our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between
him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that
even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not
and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened
as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a
stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270
because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been
constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his
repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion
would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without
formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends
that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet
been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait
until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should
be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time

of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's

entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she
have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may
no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization
was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was
challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen
is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it
should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours,
for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is
ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected ViceGovernor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.
The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Cortes J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the
higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede
any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission
on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own
admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of
any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the
filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory
and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election
and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation
of election results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests
beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within
which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide
summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court
allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against
any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his
office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there
are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court
should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of
an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is
based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I believe
that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it
inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most
unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the
petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am
constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the
higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede
any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission
on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own
admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of
any province.

It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the
filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory
and jurisdictional. 1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election
and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation
of election results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests
beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within
which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide
summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court
allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against
any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his
office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there
are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court
should allow a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of
an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is
based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I believe
that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it
inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most
unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the
petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am
constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

Footnotes
Gutierrez, Jr.

1 Ferrer v. Gutierrez and Lucot, 43 Phil. 795 [1922]; and

Nisperos v. Araneta Diaz and Flores, 47 Phil. 806 [1925].
2 Section 253, Omnibus Election Code, B.P. Blg. 881.
3 Municipal Council of Masantol v. Guevarra, 44 Phil. 580
[1923].
4 Rule 66, Section 1, Rules of Court.
5 Rule 66, Section 2.
6 Section 253, Omnibus Election Code; See Casin v. Caluag, 80
Phil. 758 [1948].
7 Among them are corrupting voters or election officials with
money or other material considerations (Section 68, B.P. 881);
committing acts of terrorism to enhance one's candidacy (id);
over spending for election expenses (id); soliciting, receiving,
or making prohibited contributions (Sections 89, 95, 96, 97,
and 104 of B.P. 881); the use of a void certificate of candidacy
(Section 78, id); engaging in partisan political activity outside
of the campaign period (Section 80, id); destroying or defacing
lawful election propaganda (Section 83, id); using prohibited
forms of certificate election propaganda (Section 85, id);
unlawful use of mass media (Section 86, id); coercion by a
public officer of subordinates to campaign for or against a
candidate (Section 261-d, id); using threats and intimidation to
force a person to campaign or to prevent him from
campaigning for or against a candidate (Section 261 -e, id);
electioneering within the prohibited space around or inside a
polling place (Section 261 -k, id); use of public funds for certain
election purposes (Section 261 -u, id); and use of a void
certificate of candidacy (Section 78). Under Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, certain persons like ecclesiastics
and soldiers in the active service are disqualified from running
for elective municipal office.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 163256

November 10, 2004

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying
petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another
resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the
May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered
voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due
course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was
not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country."
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter 1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June
25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of
Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of
Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. 2
On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer 3 stating, among others, that he did not commit
false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December
17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus,
petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run
as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three
days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the
required period.4 Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum5 subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this
case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He
found, thus:
xxx
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local
officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the
case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component
cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective position:]
xxx.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
xxx.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
xxx
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual
citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have
acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and
Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November
1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This

was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D.
DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under
Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his
Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171
specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration."
It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has
fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to
perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not
submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June
2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of
visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with
an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not
register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration
otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of
doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of
the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965).
xxx
Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after
being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is not
qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10
May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and
40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also
committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he
is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material
misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office,
which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. 6
In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the
findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby
disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due
course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the
May 10, 2004 elections.7

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following
documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus
entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of
Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered,
with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the
Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of
Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's
registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding
Identification Card as Filipino citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the
Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and
Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their records and for petitioner's reacquisition of
his former Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby
RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and
AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.8
The COMELEC en banc held, thus:
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the
decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence
referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to
the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the
case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the
evidence of the petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division)
the respondent's only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December
1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to
controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau
of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that
as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the
records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying,
that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation.
(page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the
evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the
petitioner.

Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the
record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion
for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex "2" Oath of Allegiance; b)
Annex "3" Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex "4" Certification
of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex "5" Letter addressed to the Local
Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on
Naturalization; and e) Annex "6" Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason
should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as
a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet
perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under
Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected
by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar,
dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was
registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR
nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he
was able to register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004.
The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1,
2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to
the Motion as Annex "3."
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement
under section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation
in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material
misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the
certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil.
778)9
On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The
petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their
behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March
22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering
the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his
favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper
proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC
Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the
COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from
running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
In its Comment,10 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information
relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioner's name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto,

Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said
municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy was never
implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioner's
opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the
instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
In his Reply,11 petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC
resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his
candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted.
Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his
Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the
same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the
Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of
Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.
Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with
the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004
elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino
citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as held in
Frivaldo v. Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation; and (2) whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the
COMELEC, First Division.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of
no practical use or value.12 Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 13
First Issue: Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171, 14 thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent
alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino
citizen to the repatriated citizen.

The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration."
Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of
Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on
February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore,
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for
a mayoralty position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must
be construed as "applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
his term." The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twentythree (23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995
the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the
purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in
Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement
is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e.,

persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted
but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time
of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. 16 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that "the
repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said
case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which
took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No.
725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's
repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:
xxx
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e., situations and transactions
existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit the greatest number
of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be
given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the
law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
xxx
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for
any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced
for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body
intended right and justice to prevail.17
Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the
same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's
application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997.
Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the
May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not
implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.

Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc

gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First
Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied
with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration,
when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc
correctly stated:
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the
decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence
referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to
the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the
case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the
evidence of the petitioners.19
It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens,
to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is
questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of
May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby
DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Tinga, JJ., on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1

COMELEC (First Division) Resolution, Rollo, p. 36.

COMELEC en banc Resolution, Rollo, p. 43.

Rollo, p. 73.

Supra, note 2.

Supra, note 3, at 87.

Supra, note 1, at 39-40.

Id. at 41.

Supra, note 3, at 47.

Id. at 44-47.

10

Id, at 106.

11

Id. at 112.

Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004; Garcia v.
Commission on Elections,258 SCRA 754, 757 (1996); Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76, 77
(1961).
12

Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, citing Brillantes,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004.
13

14

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171:

"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE
LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic
necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with an
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases.

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
SEC. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation."
15

257 SCRA 727 (1996).

16

Id. at 748-749.

17

Id. at 754-756.

18

Republic Act No. 8171 took effect on January 12, 1996.

19

Supra, note 3, at 44.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in
any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country

under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the
armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x
x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition
could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are
from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways
of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and
the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country,
is a natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." 10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from
its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant
has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3)
has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law, a former
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. 18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of
his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before
he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously
because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is
not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either
be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness
of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.
Panganiban, concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban

Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.

Footnote
1

1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution;
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960).
3

Said provision reads:

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least

twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
5

Rollo, p. 36.

Id., at 69.

Id., at 13.

Article IV, Section 1.

TOLENTINO, COMMETARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.
9

10

1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.

During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the
applicants was undertaken by special committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270,
dated April 11,1975, as amended.
11

12

Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less
than ten years;
(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government and well as with
the community in which he is living;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal languages; and
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the learning of his petition
for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

13

Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:

(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance
of their ideas;
(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;
(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not
less than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;
(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is
at war, during the period of such war;
(h) He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

14

Section 1, R.A. 530.

15

Section 2, C.A. No. 63.

An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936).
16

1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in
a foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A.
No. 63);
17

2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No.
63);
3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the
application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);
4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
perpetually al faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of
which he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).

18

See note 13.

19

Sec 4, C.a. No. 63.

20

Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).

21

Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 (1960).

22

Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 (1995).

23

Ibid.

24

314 SCRA 438 (1999)

25

Id., at 450.

26

Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law, p. 165 (1995)

27

See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.

28

The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

29

Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral
Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress.
Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to
Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1 Article IV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the
Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen,
in accordance with Section 22 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States
Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an
American citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1
(4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines
and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the
benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in,
the Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and
registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same
day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro
C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that
the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a
person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority
on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International
Law.5 He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of
certain condition."6 Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common
usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship;
x x x."7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It
is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again."8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his
becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status
upon repatriation. To rule otherwise that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen would not
be consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to

naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same
as the with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant
x x x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims
to be a natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born,
because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized
citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the
Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would
properly fall under the second category (naturalized).11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in
which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino
citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born
citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who
are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III
of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be
considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one
does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship. 13 Thus, under
the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. 14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include
"[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof,"
meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens
are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent being clearly and
concededly not naturalized is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they
naturally reacquire theiroriginal classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In
the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost
citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen,
nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET

Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress.
I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether
the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings,
simply because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for
that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of
Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications their respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that the
power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they
remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond
judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors
of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate
a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no
less than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier
explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of
the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At
best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But
an interpretation made in good faith and grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be
the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate
the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its
exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of
the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship.
Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial
decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's actions
on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental
law.20 Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusion of public respondent, we
cannot ipsofacto attribute to it "grave abuse of discretion." Verily, there is a line between
perceived error and grave abuse.21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law."22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its
Decision upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be
condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.

4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails

Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the
people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with
fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and
unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives.
The votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those of all
his opponents combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved
in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of
the people.24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must
be so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through
the ballot.25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount
considerations in election controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's
choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. 27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will
in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the
issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority.
To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote." 28
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards
globalization.29 Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned
upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their
citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for
citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for
themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills, knowhow and capital.
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who
want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense
of the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire
their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign
countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should
welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining
Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino
is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about
eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after
serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their
representative in Congress.

I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law
bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's
prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnote
1

"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

xxx

xxx

x x x"

"Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. x x x."
2

"Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in
any of the following ways and/or events:
3

xxx

xxx

x x x"

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: x x x ."
4

Sec. 1 thereof provides:

"Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired U.S.
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides of last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

1995 ed.

Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)

Webster's Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, 1993 ed.

Webster's, ibid., defines reacquire as "to acquire again", and acquire as "to get as
one's own."
8

Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd v.
Thaye, 143 US 135.
9

Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 1999

ed., p. 354. See also 14 CJS S1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d aliens and Citizens, s1411.
10

11

See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.

12

Supra.

13

Assailed Decision, p. 8.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., p. 9.

16

Sec.17, Art. IV. (Emphasis ours.)

Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936).
17

Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990;
and Morrero v Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520,
December 22, 1997.
18

19

Co. v. HRET, ibid.

20

Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.

21

Ibid.

22

Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

23

"The following were the results of the election:

Teodoro C. Cruz

80,119

Antonio E. Bengson III

53,448

Alberto B. Zamuco

11,941

Manuel R. Castro

622

Mariano A. Padlan

171"

(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)

24

Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.

25

Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.

26

Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.

27

Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.

28

Ibid

See Pacifico A. Agabin, "Globalization and the Judicial Function," Odysey and Legacy:
The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by
Atty. Antonio M. Eliciano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998
ed. See also Artenio V. Panganiban, "Old Doctrines and New Paradigms," a lecture
delivered during the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series, on February 13, 2001.
29

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced
that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and, therefore, must be
disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities of
citizens have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral issues resolved by this

Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their
representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the constitutional requirement
of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is
qualified to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status
as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino
parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the
United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service
for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern
District of California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an
American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine
Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and
issued him an Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18,
1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States.
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor
for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring
himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate
Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second
District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representative
Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he
should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and
supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his
natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected
representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C.
Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof
be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of
the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the
same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds
that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renuciation of such citizenship on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore
his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen
of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House
of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:
"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth"
contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a
definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution
does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at
one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the
benefits, privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his
citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking
him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent
maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic
of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent
and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he
has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense,
but more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as
Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 2 the Supreme Court traces the grant of
natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March
23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of
the United States and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could
become citizens of the United State under the laws of the United State, if residing
therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11 th of April, of
parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country
are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine
Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental law, we were referred to as
"people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and
not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even nonexistent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it
became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under
either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to
resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born
subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature.
Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law
directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even
at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was
conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been
born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he
subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition
of natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens
enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of
citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen,
then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born
citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO,
OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES,
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He
had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with
the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American
citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation
and constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the
people who adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used according to their plain,

natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious
to the common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed,
neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not
phrased in general language which may call for construction of what the words imply.
In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of
the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present
in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition
according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of
these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results
in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a
simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned
can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a
citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice
A.R. Melo:8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the
tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA
473, s amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express and
unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and
exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis
that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to
perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable
him to reacquire his citizenship. willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one
who is able to claim citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to
obtain such status. Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also cover
those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution
to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution
is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of

allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the
government directly involved and given the dedicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973
Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV
thereof, is meant to refer to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship,' and to those '
who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that
where the laws speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is only room for application. The
phrase 'from birth indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship and this
citizenship should be continuous, constant and without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a
member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman.
Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such position can
be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified
by the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of
the United States) guide and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more
narrow and bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable to the
President and Vice Persident.10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be
elected to the National Assembly.11Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution was amended did
natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed
Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court. 14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of
being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime
Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of
the Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the cabinet must be naturalborn citizens.16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the
members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. 17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear
intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the
meaning and import of natural born citizen and citizenship in general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less that the
constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural born
Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a constitutional
amendment. Clearly respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been
restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he
cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born
Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.

Footnote
1

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

23 Phil 315 (1912).

Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninetynine and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provision of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.
3

Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Lim Teco vs. Collector, 24 Phil 84; (1913) United
State vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917).
4

Roa vs. Collector of Customs, ibid.

31 SCRA 413 (1970).

Member of the HRET.

Chairman, ibid.

This refers to the 1935 Constitution as adopted by the Philippine Constitution

Convention on February 8, 1935, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March
23, 1935 and ratified by Filipino voters in a plebiscite held on May 14, 1935.
9

10

Section 3, Article VIII. 1935 Constitution.

11

Section 2, Article VI, ibid.

The 1935 Constitution was amended by Resolution Numbered Seventy-three,

adopted by the Second National Assembly on the 11 th day of April 1940, and approved
by the President of the United Sates on December 2, 940.
12

13

Section 4 and 7, Article VI, 1935 Constitution, as amended.

14

Section 6 and 8, Article VIII, ibid.

This refers to the 1973 Constitution as approved by the Filipino people in a

referendum held between January 10, 1973 and January 15, 1973 and which became
effective on January 17, 1973.
15

Section 2, Article VII; section 4, Article VIII; Section 3 and 4, Article IX; Section 3 (1)
and (2), Article X; Section 1 (1) Article XII-B, Section 1(1), Article XIII-C; Section 1(1)
Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.
16

17

Section 8, Article XI; and Section 17(2), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume
the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is
a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines;
and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of
the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume
the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose
in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with
the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before
this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a
certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and
ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited
to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of
law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who

becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he
must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to
the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Footnotes
As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 0716912 duly signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.
1

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C.
No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.
2

Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.

Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

Id.

Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.

Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.

Section 17, id.

10

Sections 18 and 19, id.

In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re

Atty. Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.
11

12

Section 139, RA 7160.

Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for Members of the IBP).
13

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No.
L-23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.
14

15

See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII.

16

In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902).

17

Section 2, RA 9225. Emphasis supplied.

18

Section 5(4), id.