CATHOLIC

VICAR
APOSTOLIC
OF
THE
MOUNTAIN
PROVINCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND
JUAN VALDEZ, respondents.

court and dismissing the VICAR's application as to Lots 2 and 3,

the lots claimed by the two sets of oppositors in the land
registration case (and two sets of plaintiffs in the two cases now
at bar), the first lot being presently occupied by the convent and
the second by the women's dormitory and the sister's convent.

The principal issue in this case is whether or not a decision of the

Court of Appeals promulgated a long time ago can properly be
considered res judicata by respondent Court of Appeals in the present
two cases between petitioner and two private respondents.

On May 9, 1977, the Heirs of Octaviano filed a motion for

reconsideration praying the Court of Appeals to order the
registration of Lot 3 in the names of the Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano, and on May 17, 1977, the Heirs of Juan Valdez and
Pacita Valdez filed their motion for reconsideration praying that
both Lots 2 and 3 be ordered registered in the names of the
Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez. On August 12,1977, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the Heirs of Juan Valdez on the ground that there was "no
sufficient merit to justify reconsideration one way or the other ...,"
and likewise denied that of the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano.

Petitioner questions as allegedly erroneous the Decision dated August

31, 1987 of the Ninth Division of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CAG.R. No. 05148 [Civil Case No. 3607 (419)] and CA-G.R. No. 05149
[Civil Case No. 3655 (429)], both for Recovery of Possession, which
affirmed the Decision of the Honorable Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet in Civil Case No. 3607
(419) and Civil Case No. 3655 (429), with the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant, Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province to
return and surrender Lot 2 of Plan Psu-194357 to the plaintiffs.
Heirs of Juan Valdez, and Lot 3 of the same Plan to the other set
of plaintiffs, the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano (Leonardo Valdez, et
al.). For lack or insufficiency of evidence, the plaintiffs' claim or
damages is hereby denied. Said defendant is ordered to pay
costs. (p. 36, Rollo)
Respondent Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court's decision,
sustained the trial court's conclusions that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated May 4,1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, in the two cases
affirmed by the Supreme Court, touched on the ownership of lots 2 and
3 in question; that the two lots were possessed by the predecessors-ininterest of private respondents under claim of ownership in good faith
from 1906 to 1951; that petitioner had been in possession of the same
lots as bailee in commodatum up to 1951, when petitioner repudiated
the trust and when it applied for registration in 1962; that petitioner had
just been in possession as owner for eleven years, hence there is no
possibility of acquisitive prescription which requires 10 years
possession with just title and 30 years of possession without; that the
principle of res judicata on these findings by the Court of Appeals will
bar a reopening of these questions of facts; and that those facts may
no longer be altered.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideation of the respondent appellate
court's Decision in the two aforementioned cases (CA G.R. No. CV05418 and 05419) was denied.
The facts and background of these cases as narrated by the trail court
are as follows
... The documents and records presented reveal that the whole
controversy started when the defendant Catholic Vicar Apostolic
of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed with the Court
of First Instance of Baguio Benguet on September 5, 1962 an
application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Psu194357, situated at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet,
docketed as LRC N-91, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic
Church building, convents, high school building, school
gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. On
March 22, 1963 the Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2
and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto. After
trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its
Decision, dated November 17, 1965, confirming the registrable
title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez (plaintiffs in the herein Civil Case No.
3655) and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano (plaintiffs in the herein
Civil Case No. 3607) appealed the decision of the land
registration court to the then Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. No. 38830-R. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision,
dated May 9, 1977, reversing the decision of the land registration

Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition

for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his (its) application for registration of Lots 2 and 3,
docketed as G.R. No. L-46832, entitled 'Catholic Vicar Apostolic
of the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals and Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano.'
From the denial by the Court of Appeals of their motion for
reconsideration the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez, on
September 8, 1977, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review, docketed as G.R. No. L-46872, entitled, Heirs of Juan
Valdez and Pacita Valdez vs. Court of Appeals, Vicar, Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano and Annable O. Valdez.
On January 13, 1978, the Supreme Court denied in a minute
resolution both petitions (of VICAR on the one hand and the
Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez on the other) for lack of
merit. Upon the finality of both Supreme Court resolutions in
G.R. No. L-46832 and G.R. No. L- 46872, the Heirs of Octaviano
filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, a
Motion For Execution of Judgment praying that the Heirs of
Octaviano be placed in possession of Lot 3. The Court, presided
over by Hon. Salvador J. Valdez, on December 7, 1978, denied
the motion on the ground that the Court of Appeals decision in
CA-G.R. No. 38870 did not grant the Heirs of Octaviano any
affirmative relief.
On February 7, 1979, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the Court
of Appeals a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 08890-R, entitled Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano vs.
Hon. Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Vicar. In its decision dated May
16, 1979, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
It was at that stage that the instant cases were filed. The Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano filed Civil Case No. 3607 (419) on July 24,
1979, for recovery of possession of Lot 3; and the Heirs of Juan
Valdez filed Civil Case No. 3655 (429) on September 24, 1979,
likewise for recovery of possession of Lot 2 (Decision, pp. 199201, Orig. Rec.).
In Civil Case No. 3607 (419) trial was held. The plaintiffs Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano presented one (1) witness, Fructuoso Valdez,
who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in question
(Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano (Exh.
C ); his written demand (Exh. BB-4 ) to defendant Vicar for the
return of the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use
of the land at P10,000.00 per month. On the other hand,
defendant Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Benguet, Atty. Nicanor Sison, who testified that the
land in question is not covered by any title in the name of
Egmidio Octaviano or any of the plaintiffs (Exh. 8). The
defendant dispensed with the testimony of Mons.William
Brasseur when the plaintiffs admitted that the witness if called to
the witness stand, would testify that defendant Vicar has been in
possession of Lot 3, for seventy-five (75) years continuously and
peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.

In Civil Case No. 3655, the parties admitting that the material
facts are not in dispute, submitted the case on the sole issue of
whether or not the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court touching on the ownership of Lot 2, which in
effect declared the plaintiffs the owners of the land constitute res
judicata.
In these two cases , the plaintiffs arque that the defendant Vicar
is barred from setting up the defense of ownership and/or long
and continuous possession of the two lots in question since this
is barred by prior judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 038830-R under the principle of res judicata. Plaintiffs
contend that the question of possession and ownership have
already been determined by the Court of Appeals (Exh. C,
Decision, CA-G.R. No. 038830-R) and affirmed by the Supreme
Court (Exh. 1, Minute Resolution of the Supreme Court). On his
part, defendant Vicar maintains that the principle of res
judicata would not prevent them from litigating the issues of long
possession and ownership because the dispositive portion of the
prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. 038830-R merely dismissed their
application for registration and titling of lots 2 and 3. Defendant
Vicar contends that only the dispositive portion of the decision,
and not its body, is the controlling pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals. 2
The alleged errors committed by respondent Court of Appeals
according to petitioner are as follows:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner questions the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, when it clearly held that it was in
agreement with the findings of the trial court that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 4,1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, on the
question of ownership of Lots 2 and 3, declared that the said Court of
Appeals Decision CA-G.R. No. 38830-R) did not positively declare
private respondents as owners of the land, neither was it declared that
they were not owners of the land, but it held that the predecessors of
private respondents were possessors of Lots 2 and 3, with claim of
ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951. Petitioner was in
possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it
repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation
purposes. When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in
1962, it had been in possession in concept of owner only for eleven
years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten
years, but always with just title. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription
requires 30 years. 4
On the above findings of facts supported by evidence and evaluated by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, affirmed by this Court,
We see no error in respondent appellate court's ruling that said
findings are res judicata between the parties. They can no longer be
altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were
resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res
judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous
determination of issues without end.

1. ERROR IN APPLYING LAW OF THE CASE AND RES JUDICATA;

2. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT
LOTS 2 AND 3 WERE ACQUIRED BY PURCHASE BUT WITHOUT
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED;
3. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS' CLAIM IT PURCHASED
LOTS 2 AND 3 FROM VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO WAS AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION THAT THE FORMER OWNERS WERE VALDEZ AND
OCTAVIANO;
4. ERROR IN FINDING THAT IT WAS PREDECESSORS OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE IN POSSESSION OF LOTS
2 AND 3 AT LEAST FROM 1906, AND NOT PETITIONER;
5. ERROR IN FINDING THAT VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO HAD FREE
PATENT APPLICATIONS AND THE PREDECESSORS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ALREADY HAD FREE PATENT APPLICATIONS
SINCE 1906;
6. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER DECLARED LOTS 2 AND
3 ONLY IN 1951 AND JUST TITLE IS A PRIME NECESSITY UNDER
ARTICLE 1134 IN RELATION TO ART. 1129 OF THE CIVIL CODE
FOR ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF 10 YEARS;
7. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA G.R. NO. 038830 WAS AFFIRMED BY THE
SUPREME COURT;
8. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830
TOUCHED ON OWNERSHIP OF LOTS 2 AND 3 AND THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS WERE IN
POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
IN GOOD FAITH FROM 1906 TO 1951;
9. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 MERELY AS BAILEE BOR
ROWER) IN COMMODATUM, A GRATUITOUS LOAN FOR USE;
10. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS A POSSESSOR AND
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH WITHOUT RIGHTS OF RETENTION AND
REIMBURSEMENT AND IS BARRED BY THE FINALITY AND
CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830. 3

An examination of the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 4, 1977,

First Division 5 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, shows that it reversed the trial
court's Decision 6 finding petitioner to be entitled to register the lands in
question under its ownership, on its evaluation of evidence and
conclusion of facts.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not meet the
requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over
Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years
possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the
absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of
the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase
and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by
petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary
evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases were never
mentioned in the application for registration.
By the very admission of petitioner Vicar, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by
Valdez and Octaviano. Both Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent
Application for those lots since 1906. The predecessors of private
respondents, not petitioner Vicar, were in possession of the questioned
lots since 1906.
There is evidence that petitioner Vicar occupied Lots 1 and 4, which
are not in question, but not Lots 2 and 3, because the buildings
standing thereon were only constructed after liberation in 1945.
Petitioner Vicar only declared Lots 2 and 3 for taxation purposes in
1951. The improvements oil Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 were paid for by the Bishop
but said Bishop was appointed only in 1947, the church was
constructed only in 1951 and the new convent only 2 years before the
trial in 1963.
When petitioner Vicar was notified of the oppositor's claims, the parish
priest offered to buy the lot from Fructuoso Valdez. Lots 2 and 3 were
surveyed by request of petitioner Vicar only in 1962.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house
was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent
were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but
when they allowed its free use, they became bailors
in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to
return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean
adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in
trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of
petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation

purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could

not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because
of the absence of just title.
The Court of Appeals found that the predecessors-in-interest and
private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership in
good faith from 1906; that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee
in commodatum; and that the adverse claim and repudiation of trust
came only in 1951.
We find no reason to disregard or reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R. Its findings of fact have become
incontestible. This Court declined to review said decision, thereby in
effect, affirming it. It has become final and executory a long time ago.
Respondent appellate court did not commit any reversible error, much
less grave abuse of discretion, when it held that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R is governing, under the
principle of res judicata, hence the rule, in the present cases CA-G.R.
No. 05148 and CA-G.R. No. 05149. The facts as supported by
evidence established in that decision may no longer be altered.
WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition
is DENIED for lack of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CAG.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene
that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels
and many women and children were victims of crossfire between
government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened about
this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlenes
older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where
Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why
she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125.
Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting
Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted
the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and
settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a
document she executed on July 21, 1986. 3 The document reads:
I, MERCEDES VIA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, having been
born on the 29th day of January, 1923, now actually residing at 8021
Lindbergh Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., wishes to
convey my honest intention regarding my properties situated at Palm
Village Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, and hereby declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build
their house therein and stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned
real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in
harmony and must avoid bickering with one another;

SO ORDERED.
MERCEDES MORALIDAD, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610, to wit:
1. Decision dated September 27, 2001, 1 affirming an earlier decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City which reversed that of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, Branch 1, in an
action for unlawful detainer thereat commenced by the petitioner
against the herein respondents; and
2. Resolution dated February 28, 2002, 2 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land located in Davao City
and registered in the name of petitioner Mercedes Moralidad under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-123125 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao City.
In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and
Manila. While teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of
furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While
schooling, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic
Archdiocese, which she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she
worked at the Mental Health Department of said University for the next
seventeen (17) years.
During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend
her two-month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being
single, she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of
her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister,
Rosario.

3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and
may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the
undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own;
5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned
properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in
greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in
standing.
xxx xxx xxx
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the
Philippines to stay with the respondents on the house they build on the
subject property. In the course of time, their relations turned sour
because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her
suggestions and attempts to change certain practices concerning
matters of health and sanitation within their compound. For instance,
Arlenes eldest son, Myco Pernes, then a fourth year veterinary
medicine student, would answer petitioner back with clenched fist and
at one time hurled profanities when she corrected him. Later, Arlene
herself followed suit. Petitioner brought the matter to the local
barangay lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, harassment,
threat and defamation against the Pernes Family. Deciding for
petitioner, the lupon apparently ordered the Pernes family to vacate
petitioners property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of
the house they built thereon. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree
on the amount, thus prolonging the impasse between them.
Other ugly incidents interspersed with violent confrontations meanwhile
transpired, with the petitioner narrating that, at one occasion in July
1998, she sustained cuts and wounds when Arlene pulled her hair, hit
her on the face, neck and back, while her husband Diosdado held her,
twisting her arms in the process.
Relations having deteriorated from worse to worst, petitioner, on July
29, 1998, lodged a formal complaint before the Regional Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao, charging the respondent spouses, who
were both government employees, with conduct unbecoming of public
servants. This administrative case, however, did not prosper.

Then, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City
an unlawful detainer suit against the respondent spouses. Petitioner
alleged that she is the registered owner of the land on which the
respondents built their house; that through her counsel, she sent the
respondent spouses a letter demanding them to vacate the premises
and to pay rentals therefor, which the respondents refused to heed.

Indeed, this is a substantive right given to the defendants by law, and

this right is superior to the procedural right to [sic] plaintiff to
immediately ask for their removal by a writ of execution by virtue of a
decision which as we have shown is erroneous, and therefore invalid.
(Words in brackets supplied),
and accordingly dismissed petitioners appeal, as follows:

In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the property

in question, building their house thereon and maintaining the same as
their residence with petitioners full knowledge and express consent. To
prove their point, they invited attention to her written declaration of July
21, 1986, supra, wherein she expressly signified her desire for the
spouses to build their house on her property and stay thereat for as
long as they like.
The MTCC, resolving the ejectment suit in petitioners favor, declared
that the respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis--vis
the house they built on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as
a valid excuse for not complying with the demand to vacate. To the
MTCC, respondents continued possession of the premises turned
unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to vacate, such possession
being merely at petitioners tolerance, and sans any rental.
Accordingly, in its decision dated November 17, 1999, 4 the MTCC
rendered judgment for the petitioner, as plaintiff therein, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein plaintiff
and against the defendants, as follows:
a) Directing the defendants, their agents and other persons acting on
their behalf to vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession
thereof to plaintiff;
b) Ordering defendants to pay P2,000.00 a month from the filing of this
complaint until they vacate premises;
c) Sentencing defendants to pay the sum of P120,000.00 5 as
attorneys fees and to pay the cost of suit.
Defendants counterclaim are hereby dismissed except with respect to
the claim for reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses which
should be litigated in an ordinary civil actions. (sic)
Dissatisfied, the respondent spouses appealed to the RTC of Davao
City.
In the meantime, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal. The motion was initially granted by the RTC in its Order of
February 29, 2000, but the Order was later withdrawn and vacated by
its subsequent Order dated May 9, 2000 6 on the ground that
immediate execution of the appealed decision was not the prudent
course of action to take, considering that the house the respondents
constructed on the subject property might even be more valuable than
the land site.
Eventually, in a decision 7 dated September 30, 2000, the RTC
reversed that of the MTCC, holding that respondents possession of
the property in question was not, as ruled by the latter court, by mere
tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent. It further
ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on reimbursement of
improvements introduced is inapplicable since said provision
contemplates of a lessor-lessee arrangement, which was not the
factual milieu obtaining in the case. Instead, the RTC ruled that what
governed the parties relationship are Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code, explaining thus:
Since the defendants-appellees [respondents] are admittedly
possessors of the property by permission from plaintiff [petitioner], and
builders in good faith, they have the right to retain possession of the
property subject of this case until they have been reimbursed the cost
of the improvements they have introduced on the property.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is

REVERSED and declared invalid. Consequently, the motion for
execution pending appeal is likewise denied.
Counter-claims of moral and exemplary damages claimed by
defendants are likewise dismissed. However, attorneys fees in the
amount of fifteen thousand pesos is hereby awarded in favor of
defendants-appellants, and against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610.
On September 27, 2001, the CA, while conceding the applicability of
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code to the case, ruled that it is still
premature to apply the same considering that the issue of whether
respondents right to possess a portion of petitioners land had already
expired or was already terminated was not yet resolved. To the CA, the
unlawful detainer suit presupposes the cessation of respondents right
to possess. The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the
parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that
respondents right to possess had already ceased. On this premise, the
CA concluded that the ejectment suit instituted by the petitioner was
premature. The appellate court thus affirmed the appealed RTC
decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is
hereby denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the petitioners complaint
for Unlawful Detainer is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
With the CAs denial of her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution
of February 28, 2002, petitioner is now before this Court raising the
following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING
PREMATURE WHICH DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING ARTICLES 448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.
The Court rules for the petitioner.
The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted
between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with
the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked
title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other
unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioners
kin. The Court, however, cannot go along with the CAs holding that the
action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of
prematurity.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following
wise:

ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy
anothers property. 9 It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property
of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi, 10 with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to
alienate the same. 11
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986,
supra, made known her intention to give respondents and her other
kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can
also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to
build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as
they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or
income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioners
"nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser
percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The
established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to
use the property but also granted them, among the petitioners other
kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore,
with the CAs ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner
and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease
contract between the parties.
However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is the
resolution of the next issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct may be
deemed to have been extinguished or terminated. If the question is
resolved in the affirmative, then the respondents right to possession,
proceeding as it did from their right of usufruct, likewise ceased. In that
case, petitioners action for ejectment in the unlawful detainer case
could proceed and should prosper.
The CA disposed of this issue in this wise:
xxx Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides xxx

(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly

appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the
fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the
usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the
usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986
constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the
usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may
enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof.
Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose
thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose
constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph
wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins
who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an
atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering
with one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious
relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable
condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from
the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of
my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may
exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any
of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the
bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among
kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the
petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action
for unlawful detainer to prosper, the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove
that defendants [respondents] right to possess already expired and
terminated. Now, has respondents right to possess the subject portion
of petitioners property expired or terminated? Let us therefore
examine respondents basis for occupying the same.
It is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized respondents o
occupy portion of her property on which their house may be built. Thus
"it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their
house therein and stay as long as they like." From this statement, it
seems that petitioner had given the respondents the usufructuary
rights over the portion that may be occupied by the house that the
latter would build, the duration of which being dependent on how long
respondents would like to occupy the property. While petitioner had
already demanded from the respondents the surrender of the
premises, this Court is of the opinion that the usufructuary rights of
respondents had not been terminated by the said demand considering
the clear statement of petitioner that she is allowing respondents to
occupy portion of her land as long as the latter want to. Considering
that respondents still want to occupy the premises, petitioner clearly
cannot eject respondents. 12
We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter. The term or
period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the
bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of
the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances
whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished.
For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of
extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:

From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there

were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct
may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the
resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct,
namely, the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on
July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum,
respondents own evidence before the MTCC indicated that the
relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost an
irretrievable level." 13 There is no doubt then that what impelled
petitioner to file complaints before the local barangay lupon, the Office
of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully
and harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice versa.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the
petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she
was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are
enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been
terminated.
To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents
respecting the property in question is one of owner and usufructuary.
Accordingly, respondents claim for reimbursement of the
improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of
the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and
principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice
Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter:
If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579
and 580. In case like this, the terms of the contract and the pertinent

provisions of law should govern (3 Manresa 215-216; se also

Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil. 449). 14 (Emphasis ours.)
By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have
the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have
introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct
such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may
deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he
shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however,
remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without
damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have
made on the property against any damage to the same.
Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered
to vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule
on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary
might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his
property. 15 The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the
improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the
petitioners property.
Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the
respondent spouses to use and enjoy the fruits of her property for quite
a long period of time. They opted, however, to repay a noble gesture
with unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore, they really cannot
begrudge their aunt for putting an end to their right of usufruct. The
disposition herein arrived is not only legal and called for by the law and
facts of the case. It is also right.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the decision of the MTCC is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that
all of respondents counterclaims are dismissed, including their claims
for reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TELMO VS BUSTAMANTE
For our consideration is a Petition [1] for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section
27, paragraph 3 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6770). Subject of the Petition is the Decision [2] dated October 13, 2005
and the Order[3] dated March 17, 2006 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman forLuzon.
This case arose from the Verified Complaint [4] filed by
respondent Luciano M. Bustamante before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon against petitioner Guillermo Telmo, Municipal
Engineer of Naic, Cavite, Danilo Consumo, Barangay (Brgy.)
Chairman, Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, and Elizalde Telmo, a private
individual.
The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a
real property of 616 square meters in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite,
known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde
Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land
denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back
of respondents lot. When his lot was transgressed by the construction
of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for sale the
remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said they
would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the
roads 10-meter easement.

The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005,

respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A in the presence of the
Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon
respondents lot. Petitioner then uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal
engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo makakapagtayo ng anuman sa
lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building permit.
On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his
lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their
men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following day,
respondents relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the
destruction of the concrete poles. Consumo told them that he would
not record the same, because he was present when the incident
occurred. Consumo
never
recorded
the
incident
in
the barangay blotter.
Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not
receive
any
just compensation
from the government
when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the
Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of
the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust
acts of the Telmos and Consumo.Respondent charged the latter
criminallyfor violation of Article 312[5] of the Revised Penal Code and
Section
3(e)[6] of
Republic
Act
No.
[7]
3019 and administrativelyforviolation of Section 4
(a)[8], (b)[9], (c)
[10]
, and (e)[11] of Republic Act No. 6713.[12]
In his Counter-Affidavit,[13] petitioner denied having uttered
the words attributed to him by respondent, and claimed that he only
performed his official duties in requiring an application for a building
permit before any structure can be erected on government
property. He said that respondent insisted on enclosing with barbed
wire and concrete posts the lot that already belonged to the national
government, which had now been converted into a national road. He
also alleged that if he allowed the enclosures erected by the
respondent, other residents would be denied ingress to and egress
from their own properties.
In his own counter-affidavit, Consumo denied collusion with
petitioner in not recording in the barangay blotter the subject
incident. He explained that on May 10, 2005 at around 5:00 p.m., he
was summoned by petitioner to intercede, because the respondent and
his men were fencing the subject property. Consumo obliged,
personally saw the fence being built, and observed that even the trucks
owned by petitioner were enclosed therein. When he asked
respondent if he had the necessary permit and the
proper barangayclearance to do so, respondents lawyer, Atty. San
Gaspar, replied that there was no need for the permit and clearance
since respondent was just fencing his own property. Thus, Consumo
could not prevent the ongoing fencing, but told respondent and
company to wait for petitioner to decide the matter.
Consumo further alleged that after putting up the fence,
respondent and his companions left without waiting for the arrival of
petitioner. When petitioner arrived, he explained to the people present
that the property enclosed by respondent is owned by the government
and that no one is allowed to construct any fence without a permit from
him, as the Municipal Engineer, or from any building official of the local
government of Naic, Cavite. Consumo said that the residents affected
by the fence constructed by respondent were the ones who pulled out
the concrete posts in order to provide access to the national
road. These residents included the petitioner, whose trucks used for
delivering sand and hollow blocks were enclosed and also denied
access.
In his Counter-Affidavit,[14] Elizalde Telmo denied having
encroached, occupied or taken possession of respondents
property. He claimed that, on May 10, 2005, he was merely an
onlooker to the altercation between petitioner and respondent. He said
that petitioner, his brother, insisted that respondent could not enclose
the property in question unless the latter obtains a building permit from
the Office of the Municipal Engineer/Building Official, since it appeared
that the subject property was no longer a property of respondent but
was converted into government property by virtue of the 30-meter road
set-back imposed by the Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Naic,
Cavite. Elizalde Telmo stated that he did not offer any resistance to the
fencing of the property in question. He observed, though, that when

they learned that petitioner was arriving at the place, respondent and
his companions just left the vicinity.
Later, petitioner and respondent filed their respective
position papers[15] upon the directive of the Graft Investigating and
Prosecuting Officer. Their position papers reiterated the allegations
made in their respective affidavits earlier submitted.
In the Decision[16] dated October 13, 2005, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner and Danilo Consumo
administratively liable, but dismissed the charge against Elizalde Telmo
for lack of jurisdiction over his person, he being a private
individual. The dispositive portion of the Decision states
WHEREFORE, premises
the
undersigned
investigator
recommends the following, to wit:

considered,
respectfully

paragraph two (2) of the National Building Code, to order the removal
of the concrete posts. Petitioner likewise claims that Section 23 of
Revised Philippine Highway Act (Presidential Decree No. 17)
[23]
mandated him to remove respondents concrete posts. Petitioner
concludes that since he merely performed his official duties in
removing the concrete posts erected by petitioner from the property,
which is already owned by the government, he must be absolved of
any administrative liability.
Instead of filing his comment on the petition, respondent
manifested through counsel that he is no longer interested in pursuing
this case, submitting therewith his Affidavit of Desistance [24] dated
December 5, 2007. Respondent alleged in the affidavit that the
administrative charges he lodged against petitioner were brought about
by a misunderstanding between them, which differences have already
been settled. Consequently, this case should now be dismissed.
We disagree.

(1)

That the administrative complaint

against respondent Elizalde Telmo
be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;

(2)

That respondent Guillermo Telmo be

meted
the PENALTY
OF
FINE
EQUIVALENT TO SIX (6) MONTHS
SALARY for violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6713; and

(3)

That respondent Danilo

meted
the PENALTY
EQUIVALENT TO THREE
HONORARIA for violation
of Republic Act No. 6713.

Consumo be
OF
FINE
(3) MONTHS
of Section 4

SO DECIDED.[17]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [18] wherein he
elaborated that he just performed his official duties when he summarily
removed the concrete posts erected by respondent to enclose the
property.
In the Order[19] dated March 17, 2006, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied the Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.

The desistance of the complainant does not necessarily

result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint because the
Court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when
executed as an afterthought.[25] It should be remembered that the issue
in an administrative case is not whether the complaint states a cause
of action against the respondent, but whether the public officials have
breached the norms and standards of the public service.[26] Considering
that petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he summarily removed the
concrete posts erected by respondent, allegedly within the parameters
of his authority as Municipal Engineer of Naic, Cavite, it is only proper
that this case be decided on its merits rather than on the basis of the
desistance of respondent.
It cannot be denied that respondents property was taken by
the National Government thru the Department of Public Works and
Highways when it constructed the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. What
is not clear from the records of this case is whether respondents
property was taken as part of the national road itself or only as part of
the right-of-way easement therefor. We observe that the re-survey
plan[27] of his property attached by respondent to his complaint and the
survey plan[28] of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road submitted by
petitioner appear to be different. Nevertheless, it is evident from the
sketch plans that respondent could not enclose his property because it
is now being used by the National Government. Therefore, whatever
cause of action respondent may have in his claim for just
compensation for the taking of his property, the same should be lodged
against the National Government.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:

A. THE
HONORABLE
DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN HE DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO
VALID TAKING OF RESPONDENTSLOT BY
MEANS OF EXPROPRIATION.
B. THE
HONORABLE
DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN HE DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED BY THE MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OR BY THE COURT TO ABATE PUBLIC
NUISANCE OR NUISANCE PER SE.
C. THE
HONORABLE
DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON ERRED WHEN HE
METED THE PENALTY OF FINE EQUIVALENT
TO SIX (6) MONTHS SALARY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713.[20]
In essence, petitioner contends that the property claimed
and enclosed with concrete posts by respondent was validly taken by
the National Government through its power of eminent domain,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 113, as amended by Executive Order
No. 253, creating the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. In this context,
petitioner contends that the concrete posts erected by respondent
were a public nuisance under Article 694 (4)[21] of the Civil Code, more
particularly a nuisance per se, which may be summarily abated under
Article 699 (3)[22] of the same Code. Petitioner says that as the
Municipal Engineer, he is also the Building Official of Naic, Cavite; and
thus, it was well within his authority, pursuant to Section 214,

While it is settled that respondent does not have the legal

right to enclose the property, we should now determine whether
petitioner indeed performed his official functions properly.
First. Petitioner claims that his act of summarily removing
respondents concrete posts was authorized under the National
Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096).The provision he cites
correctly pertains to Section 215, which reads
Sec. 215. Abatement of Dangerous
Buildings.When any building or structure is found
or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or
demolition depending upon the decree of danger
to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to
further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
To better understand this provision, we refer to Section 214
of the same law, which defines what are dangerous and ruinous
buildings or structures susceptible of abatement. It provides
Sec. 214. Dangerous and Ruinous
Buildings or Structures. Dangerous buildings are
those which are herein declared as such or are
structurally unsafe or not provided with safe
egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are
otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in
relation to existing use, constitute a hazard to
safety or health or public welfare because of

inadequate
maintenance,
dilapidation,
obsolescence, or abandonment, or which
otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or
the community to an intolerable degree.
A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily
show that they do not apply to the respondents situation. Nowhere was
it shown that the concrete posts put up by respondent in what he
believed was his and his co-owners property were ever declared
dangerous or ruinous, such that they can be summarily demolished by
petitioner.
What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even
fall within the scope of the provisions of the National Building
Code. The Code does not expressly define the word
building. However, we find helpful the dictionary definition of the word
building, viz:
[A] constructed edifice designed usually
covered by a roof and more or less completely
enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling,
storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or other
useful structure distinguished from structures not
designed for occupancy (as fences or monuments)
and from structures not intended for use in one
place (as boats or trailers) even though subject to
occupancy.[29]
The provisions of the National Building Code would confirm
that building as used therein conforms to this definition. Thus, applying
the statutory construction principle ofejusdem generic,[30] the word
structure should be construed in the context of the definition of the
word building. The concrete posts put up by respondent on the
property are not properly covered by the definition of the word building
nor is it embraced in the corresponding interpretation of the word
structure.
Second. Petitioner contends that respondents concrete
posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se, which may be the
subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings. Again,
we disagree.
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts summarily
removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of
persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and
summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an
inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to
and from the national road.
Third. Petitioner likewise maintains that his authority to
perform the assailed official act sprang from Section 23 of the Revised
Philippine Highway Act. He posits that this provision is particularly
implemented by Department Order No. 52, [32] Series of 2003 of the
Department of Public Works and Highways for the Removal of
Obstructions and Prohibited Uses within the Right-of-Way of National
Roads.
Department Order No. 52 directs all District Engineers to
immediately remove or cause the removal of all obstructions and
prohibited uses within the right-of-way of all national roads in their
respective jurisdictions. These obstructions and prohibited uses
include, among others, all kinds of private, temporary and permanent
structures, such as buildings, houses, shanties, stores, shops, stalls,
sheds, posts, canopies, billboards, signages, advertisements, fences,
walls, railings, basketball courts, garbage receptacles, and the
like. The Department Order requires the District Engineers to issue
notices to the concerned persons to remove the obstructions and
prohibited uses within the right-of-way, and shall follow through prompt
compliance with these notices and full implementation of the Order. It
further provides that appropriate sanctions will be taken against those
who fail to comply with its provisions.
Gauging the action of petitioner based on the guidelines set
by Department Order No. 52, from which he claims his authority, we

cannot but conclude that petitioner went beyond the scope of his
official power because it is the concerned District Engineer of the
Department of Public Works and Highways who should have ordered
respondent to remove the concrete posts. The petitioner failed to show
that he was duly authorized by the District Engineer to implement the
Department Order in Naic, Cavite. More importantly, even assuming
that petitioner had been duly authorized to order the removal of the
concrete posts of respondent, he failed to prove that he issued the
required notice to respondent to remove the said structures before he
did the removal himself. Note that petitioner, in fact, admitted in his
pleadings that he summarily removed the said posts.
The Revised Philippine Highway Act and Department Order
No. 52 do not expressly provide for the administrative sanction to be
taken against public officials violating their provisions. Hence, we must
refer to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. We believe that the administrative offense committed by
petitioner through the questioned act was only Discourtesy in the
Course of Official Duties, which is a light offense under Rule IV,
Section 52 of the said Rules. The penalties imposable for such an
offense are a reprimand for the first offense, a suspension from 1 day
to 30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from public service for
the third offense. Since this appears to be petitioners first offense, his
action warrants only a REPRIMAND.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 13, 2005 and the
Order dated March 17, 2006 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon finding petitioner Guillermo M. Telmo, Municipal Engineer of
Naic, Cavite, administratively culpable for violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6713, imposing upon him the penalty of fine
equivalent to his six 6-month salary, must be MODIFIED. Guillermo M.
Telmo is instead found administratively guilty of DISCOURTESY IN
THE
COURSE
OF
OFFICIAL
DUTIESand
is
hereby REPRIMANDED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.