Case Digests Congress

Constitutional Law Case Digests
ALLOCATION OF DISTRICTS
Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections
that province automatically gains legislative representation

and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
558 SCRA 700 Political Law Municipal Corporation

Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM)
Population Requirement
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still

there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato

City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part
of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion
in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato
City and 8 other municipalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic

Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the
ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan
(Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the
exception of Cotabato City.
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be

created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially

stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City
(because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes
of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a
decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as
a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the
legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st
district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City
should be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was
winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan),
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local

government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
compliance with the criteria established in the Local

Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created,
should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note
further that in order to have a legislative district, there must
at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so Semas
contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot
validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first
creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally
possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested
solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are
barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units

province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power
to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to

Macias v. Comelec (G.R. No. 188078)
FACTS: Petitioners are 4 members of the House of
Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and
Bulacan & the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They
are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to
implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative
districts in the country. They alleged that their respective
provinces were discriminated because they were given less
representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is
unconstitutional and void because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be
furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days
prior to passage
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the
last census of the population
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of
inhabitants of the several provinces.
Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer)
contend that they
1. were merely complying with their duties under the statute
which they presume and allege to be constitutional
2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring
such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3
day requirement.
3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3
year requirement.
4. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR
is valid.
HELD: The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and
governor of the aggrieved provinces have the personality to
sue. The passage of the act did not conform to the printedform and the 3 day requirement, and that there is no
certificate of urgency from the President was received by the
HO. The requirement that the apportionment must be done
within 3 year following the last census is complied with. The

apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it
is not based on the number of inhabitants a province has.
Some provinces were given more representation despite the
inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court held that RA
3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is
therefore void.
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation
to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos
and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the
COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and
contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental,
other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of
Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km.,
which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be

created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there
is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed
new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in
the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of
Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political
units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would
be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken
as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting
view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units
affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of
the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an
area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by
the petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being
a patent nullity.

PARTYLIST
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13
parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House
of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were
party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at
least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should
the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the partylist seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution
vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In
the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives =

#district representatives/.80 x .20
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list

system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups
which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first

party/ # of votes of party list system
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of
concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats
for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat
limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted
to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This
intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with
the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from
the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the
public and the private respondents, as well as the members of
this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received.
Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall
be considered in the computation of additional seats. The
party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth
be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats
the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted
to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of
additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.

G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue
notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the
case rendered it justiciable.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully

the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to
determine compliance by the party lists.
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,
in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that
the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with
the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was
proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the
party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate

in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory
law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents

cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec
to determine proportional representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid
desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety

of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary
which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being
a trier of facts.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law
Legislative Department Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the
Constitution Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation
of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even
if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941
is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is
it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible
to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which
shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the partylist elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the
1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than
250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200
of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership
of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be
seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely
a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of
the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is
no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,

the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and
not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to

the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the
3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to

not more than three (3) seats.
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total

vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall

no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the twopercenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of
seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from
the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 partylists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats
available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used
in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
Example:
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x

(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so
2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it
has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total
of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the
votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed
and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized
until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from
RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified
and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,

concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution
precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must

use the following parameters:
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

Legislative Department Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified
by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines
set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list

system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections

provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in welldefined political constituencies. It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack welldefined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the

sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack welldefined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed,
as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in
order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that
the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers;
and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987

Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved
for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot,
they do not have the machinery unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat
in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted
that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others,
in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.
G.R. No. 192803
December 10, 2013
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN

RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS
ARARO PARTY-LIST,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
LEONEN, J:
NATURE:
On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on

Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers is the following:
Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20
=Number of seats available to party-list representatives .80
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the
May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by a partylist group that ran for the 2010 national elections. The
petitioner questions the validity of the formula used by the
Commission on Elections in determining and proclaiming the
winning party-list groups.
229__x .20 =57 .80
FACTS:
Number of votes of party-list
Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered

a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and
ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28)
party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirtyfive (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. The petitioner
questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
______________________________=
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the

Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were
spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not
counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million
(7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the
Commission on Elections erroneous interpretation.
7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to
petitioner ARARO)
The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009

applies the formula used in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and
their guaranteed seats, where:
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list

Total number of votes for party-list candidates
the Commission on Elections through the Office of the

Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes
should not be counted in determining the divisor. The
Commission on Elections argues that this will
contradict Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v.
COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It
asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of
voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list

candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast
any vote "for the party-list system."24
I. Whether the case is already moot and academic
II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used
in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups
that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
The third issue requires our determination of the computation
of the correct divisor to be used. The options are
HELD:
1. This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed
the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of
repetition yet evading review32 and for the guidance of the
bench, bar, and public.33
2. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even
lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law
for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor
injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the
argument in this Court.
3. The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent
that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause
attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor.
In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed
in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as
part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to
disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates.
However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in

the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to
the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably
made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters
prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor.
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only

those votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered
in the computation of the percentage of representation:
1. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
FALLO:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
proclaiming the qualified party-list groups is denied for being
moot and academic;
2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups,

as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC,
is MODIFIED
The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as

used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is
MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for
party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes
garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for
the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups
whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently
disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections
should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also
not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on
Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro,
respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate
of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended
the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547

votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective
office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May
15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy
actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification
of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of
choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in
the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
What is the Committees concept of residence for the

legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from
the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that
resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be
by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have
the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar
with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation,
which is to place through assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by
law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the
district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino
should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not
just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the
HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district
in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11,
10

1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate
indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus
his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati
City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in
the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to
be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but
only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission
on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the
district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent
Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next
highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved

with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy
to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision
despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of
jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal
impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement
of Congressional candidates in newly created political
districts which were only existing for less than a year at the
time of the election and barely four months in the case of
petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of
the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place
candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is
a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was
executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a

domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be
better.
11

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established

her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938
to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in
St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School
still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a
voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in
an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of

Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile

because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency

requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her

marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested.
She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election

purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban

became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought them to Leyte;
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses

the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual

removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one,
and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence
and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
12

Torayno vs COMELEC GR No 137329 09 August 2000
Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis
Oriental for three terms until 1995 election and his certificate
of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he
executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City
which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental,
claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor
in the said city and stated that his residence for the preceding
two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio
Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo
failing to meet the residency requirement. Emano won the
mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for
annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its
decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional
residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution
affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of the people
of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the
principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed
through the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was
actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging
his duties as governor and even paid his community tax
certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to
prevent the possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of the community from seeing an
elective office to serve that community.
SPECIAL ELECTION
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO &

HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No.
NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005)
and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
(Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed
the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001
elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and
final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as
Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8,
2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill
the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001.
Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be
elected in that election. The resolution further provides that
the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the
COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected
Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired
term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of
3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan
ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and
taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying
for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend
that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of

the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881;
and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters
Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the
special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required
under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and
Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in
the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that
there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats,
irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining
order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment
on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's
standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters
because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally
disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal
injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be
nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy
pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
13

Ratio Decidendi:
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding
a special election but empowers some authority to fix the
time and place after the happening of a condition precedent,
the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a
nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in
relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is
whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of special
election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial
number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no
special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage
of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner
by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial
election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC
failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass
separately the votes cast for the special election. No such
requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory
under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the
date of election, if necessary, and state among others, the
office/s to be voted for.
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN.

FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN,
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in

conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said
resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no
mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former
Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend
the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the
senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before

the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that
Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for
the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda
for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S.
Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the
position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those
who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the
discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the
senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus
was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that
he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKASNUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the
Senate.
ISSUES:
1.
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the

petition?
2.
Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3.
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully

holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
4.
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of

discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section

16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed
in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also
invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
14

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is
well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the

Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator
Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that
the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not

provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically
for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them
or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal

affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that
he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners
present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The
specific norms or standards that may be used in determining
who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been
laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate
itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clearcut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority
leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been
shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.
whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and

despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of
the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely
abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the
members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the
Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or
15

QUORUM
Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco
83 Phil. 17 Political Law The Legislative Department
Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his
right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against
the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so
on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for
about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Mariano
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was
forced to open session. He however, together with his allies
initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised
by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies
and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as
being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn
the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered
and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in
voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his
chair and he was immediately followed by his followers.
Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be
made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in
order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Taada was
subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz
yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously
approved and was even recognized by the President of the
Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office
thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding
before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the

case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot
take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its
own president, which power should not be interfered with,
nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affects
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of each

House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not
mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members
constitute the House. There is a difference between a
majority of all the members of the House and a majority of
the House, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered
the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against
and one abstained.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what

will be the resolution?
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino

on March 14, 1949)
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator

Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving
the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators
from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less.
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC
take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind
themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or
wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional
quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24
senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined
and the other abroad but this does not change the number of
senators nor does it change the majority which if
mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of
24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when
Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in
a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation
of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there
two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting
such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session
as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There
were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
(including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume

jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with
the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum
upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become
a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any
new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election
16

as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue
from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such
formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators
of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos
persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional
processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco
group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity
with substantial justice and with the requirements of public
interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that
the majority of all the members of the National Assembly
constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said
provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to
read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to
do business, shows the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to base the majority, not on the number
fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual
members or incumbents, and this must be limited to
actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge
their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence
from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes
which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each
house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That
the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose,
and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the
words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by
the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution
which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of
the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by
Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to
require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the
United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate,

the actual members of the Senate at its session of February
21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted
a majority.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
Pacete vs The Secretary of Commission on Appointments
GR No 25895 23 July 1971
Facts: Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President as
municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office
on 11 September 1964. His appointment was made during
recess of Congress and was only submitted to COA in 1965
session and was unanimously confirmed on 20 May 1965. On
07 February 1966 the Secretary of Justice advised him to
vacate his post on the ground that his appointment was bypassed. Pacete clarified the matter with Commission on
Appointments.COA took no action and the Secretary of
Justice still moved to Pacete to vacate his post and withheld
his salaries.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for consideration with COA
without being acted on is a new one?
Decision: Petition granted. The constitutional requirement is
clear; there must be either a rejection by COA or nonaction
on its part. Pacetes confirmation became final and
irrevocable upon the adjournment of the Fifth Congress as no
rule of the Commission as to a motion for reconsideration
could have the forece and effect of defeating the
constitutional provision that an ad interim appointment is
effective until disapproved by COA or until next adjournment
of the Congress.
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA

8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the
Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is
thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it
17

was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but
only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but
only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11,
1924
Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino,

Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared
guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted
the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District
on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter
in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said
Mr. Alejandrino.
Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional
and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court:
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and
void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of
mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering
them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his
office as Senator
Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to
state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs.
Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.
Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a
branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the
demurrer must be sustained.
The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power
to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may,
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the
duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the
Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional
sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts
must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well
as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent,
do the courts restrain the other departments.
In view of the propriety of mandamus

Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to
their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary,
and to this extent at least the executive department may be
said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . .
. It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of
mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done,
by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be
determined."
In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House
Members
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The
Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine
representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the
Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives
"hold office until removed by the Governor-General."
(Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)
They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature.
However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either
House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly
behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member
for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then
included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two
Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the
power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General
by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct
hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the
two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General
alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
In view of effects of punishment
18

Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the
outraged dignity of the House without depriving the
constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible,
likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while
giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but
suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to
fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the
occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to
qualified expulsion or removal.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution

before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that the resolution
violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer
where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction
over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
In view of no remedy
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish
its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to
suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office
for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and
more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the allconclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess
the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any
particular action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the
petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is
not the repository of all wisdom and all power.
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution

enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been

violated?
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)

Sergio Osmea, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department
Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a
speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he
disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was
passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges
made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations
were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative Department

Suspension of a Member of Congress Violations of RA
3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the
then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization
of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal
and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive
Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of
disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were
allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other
criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this

information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago.
Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995,
a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the
suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension
of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple
or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in
19

the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that
is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower
House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is
quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of
RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the
Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage
the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the
CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the
public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he
has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the
word office would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can
she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records another evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of
the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right
to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of
the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal procedure.
De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February

2002
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as

Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S.
Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e)
of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the
prosecution filed a Motion To Suspend The Accused
Pendente Lite. In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker
to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply.
Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August
1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through
counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on
separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House
Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August
1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring
Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from
notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his
capacity as Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House
of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for

certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law

is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

(GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in
the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et

al., the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The
order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in
the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that
is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer

from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing
20

further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an
incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the
other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the
Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its
members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or
vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be

deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The
maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere
of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of
the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in
the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said
glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco
paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and
formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers
for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro
Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax
refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as

two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that
what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin
formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez
cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No.
2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to
the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood

and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of
end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde
appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction and
between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea
formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof.
reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished

product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea
formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress
during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent
the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the
enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts.
The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde

ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should
be construed as urea and formaldehyde.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It
is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
21

PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOURNAL
United States vs Juan Pons
34 Phil. 729 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of
the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April
5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered
5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs
authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on
record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not
being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine
actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and
dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were
charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and
introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons
appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved
while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in
session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was
passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session
of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28,
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals
of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a
law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date
of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals
in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive
on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals
of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a

coordinate and independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of
the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight
against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of
the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature
adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles
the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
JOURNAL ENTRY RULE VS ENROLLED BILL

THEORY
Herminio Astorga vs Antonio Villegas
Journal;When to be Consulted
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the
city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard
the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued
an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the
city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He
then filed a petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the
municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied
recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because
the said law was considered to have never been enacted.
When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower
house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate

which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator
Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill
was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations.
During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by the
Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and
was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the
President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later
found out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact
the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the
version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by
the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the
President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and
that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not
invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive
proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated
22

in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the
SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed
to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and
bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.
Enrique Morales vs Abelardo Subido
Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police
department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelors degree. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds
the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon
the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated
acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given
a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor
of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service,
approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but
rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the
said position. Instead, Subido certified other persons as
qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of

Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary
record, or has served in the police department of any city
with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person
who has served the police department of a city can be
qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when
the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version
was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation or police department of any city and has held
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years or any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city or who has served as officer of
the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which
was actually approved by Congress but when the bill
emerged from the conference committee the only change
made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales
went on to support his case by producing copies of certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him
was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and
can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill
being deliberated upon.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative

secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially
published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC
cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and
credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the
SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a
sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in
all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each
house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the
journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not
currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC
does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to
matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal,
the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of

the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter.
23

SALARIES
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA)
vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting

Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin
them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December
30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of
the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set
by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of
Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The
reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in
1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would
have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of
the members of the House who participated in the approval
of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require

that not only the term of all the members of the House but
also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period

before the increased compensation for legislators becomes
fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
expiration of the full term of the Senators and

Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular
form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the
intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible
components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
term in the singular, when combined with the following
phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now
Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of
office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased
compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
Benjamin Ligot vs Ismael Mathay
56 SCRA 823 Political Law Salaries of Representatives
Retirement
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span
from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his
second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain
other officials of the national government was enacted into
law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members
of Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased
under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but
the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take
effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a
claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,

appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the
basis therein provided in case of employees based on the
highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the
rates of pay as provided by law. The House of
Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco,
the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification.
The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed
the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was
not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for
members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed,
because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic
Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement
benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way
of increasing his compensation during his term of office and
of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly.
Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional
provision limiting their compensation and other
emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an
24

increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their
term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments
which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they
were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his
decision in the similar case of Ligots colleague, exCongressman Melanio Singson, Such a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.
FREEDOM FROM ARREST
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts
of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents
to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond

the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of
the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang
17 SCRA 876 Political Law Freedom of Speech and
Debate
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the
publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines.
Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
That such strategists have had collusions with communists
and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning
a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their
guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that
they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter
was said to have been published in newspapers of general

circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to
collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned
for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member
of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is
covered by the privileged communication rule and that the
said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by
privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the letter was
published and at the same time he, himself, caused the
publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress
or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by the lower court the said communication
is not absolutely privileged.
25

DISQUALIFICATIONS
Homobono Adaza vs Fernando Pacana, Jr.
135 SCRA 431 Political Law Congress Singularity of
Office/Position
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of
Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took
his oath of office and started discharging his duties as
provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr.
was elected vice-governor for same province in the same
elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana
filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP
elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984.
In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first
among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath
of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and
since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On
July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to
perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to
be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has
brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues
that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that
he remains to be the governor of the province until his term
expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within
the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great
Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold
the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously
be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the
Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and
lost can assume his original position and as such can, by
virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution

provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now
Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of
prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence
Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further
contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the
Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his
office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to
assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election
to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP.
697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on
May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides
that governors, mayors, members of the various
sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a
certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of
absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the
coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he
was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided
in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.

Appearance in Court
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as
directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats

rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And
during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de
Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties
confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued
that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as
the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself
from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an
Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him
to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI
shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and
in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of
IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman
must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body
under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He
bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is
clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he
instead presented himself as a party of interest which is
clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A
mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation.
What could not be done directly could not likewise be done
indirectly.
26

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts
of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral
Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations
Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are included.
G. R. No.175352: January 18, 2011
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and
SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners vs. RICHARD J.
GORDON,Respondent. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED
CROSS, Intervenor.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial
recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which ruled
that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that
the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is
a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the

Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC
to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation.
Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling,
which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating
the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the
issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue
of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not
be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have
ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute.
like government instrumentalities and GOCC. The PNRC is

regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as
opposed to local law regulating the other mentioned entities.
As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared
certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional.
However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no
mandate for the Government to create a National Society to
this effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui
generis in being a private corporation organized for public
needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither
private or governmental, hence it was within the power of
Congress to create.
HELD: Petition has merit.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
Political Law: It has been consistently held in

Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise judicial
restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality
where it is not the lis mota of the case.
In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute

was raised in the issue of standing. As such, the Court should
not have declared certain provisions of such as
unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui
generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the
Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating. First,
the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization
dedicated to assist victims of war and administer relief to
those who have been devastated by calamities, among others.
It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by
the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse
by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain.
Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the
mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva
Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with
international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a
National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not
Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate Electoral Tribunal

Electoral Tribunals Inhibition in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an
election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The
SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the
Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for
the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking
in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and
due process imperatively require the mass disqualification
sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification,
Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules
(Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature
- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
27

and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by
the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only
three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,
whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due
weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal
lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself
which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no

Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify
himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such;
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three JusticesMembers alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
BONDOC vs PINEDA
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall

each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
201 SCRA 792 Political Law HRET Removal of a

Member
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by

both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative
component herein cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito

Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep.
Jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc
even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed
that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the
election. This resulted to Camasuras expulsion from the
LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from
the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held
and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda
was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista
Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc
contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was
subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in

the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then
removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the
Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasuras
removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the
doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon
the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at
bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial
question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is
the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has
already been made, members of the tribunal have already
voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and
Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw
their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has
already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same
election since the issue has already become moot and
academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to
change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be
reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or
valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of
Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming
from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1
coming from the minority.
28

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
G.R. No. 150605
December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs

HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,
respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for

representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against
respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification
suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of
petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte
order, petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec
later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes
and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was
proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution
was however reversed and a new resolution declared

respondents proclamation as null and void. Respondent
made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution
publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the
office he won.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc,

the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter, that
petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its
(Comelecs) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the
office which merits recognition regardless of personal
judgment or opinion.
Issues:
Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral

Tribunal
GR 141489
29 November 2002;
1.
Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the

instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a
ministerial duty.
HELD:
1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that
the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with
finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the
disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual
basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not
take the seat in office since he did not represent the
electorates choice.
2.
Since the validity of respondents proclamation had
been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the
Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order
disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec
continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions
of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail
since respondents eligibility was not the issue.
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On
11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act,
national elections were held which included, for the first
time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups
and organizations whose nominees would become members
of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D.
Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta
Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list
groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5]
(APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka,
Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action
Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to
the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA
contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who
29

are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments
(CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the
11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the
CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET
and the CA were composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January
2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman
of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET.
The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo
to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform
to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct
the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels letter
to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On
the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an
Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On
2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against
the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under
the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET,
CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its
Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed
the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11
February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to
amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B.
Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as

Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA.
The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended
petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the
strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the
Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a
member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN
and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral
Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to
reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and partylist representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted
to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI
of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on
the House the authority to elect among their members those
who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for
House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members
would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers
respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions
are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion

of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA
is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional
rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere
with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of
powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone
to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the
HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation
that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House
from participating in the election of members of the HRET
and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from
seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it
appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in
the House at that time simply refrained from participating in
the election process. The party-list representatives did not
designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not
consider any party-list representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the
Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at
this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by
the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator
Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA
are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Daza v. Singson
30

FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House
of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats
in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.
Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment
in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this
development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by
withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set
of representatives consisting of the original members except
the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to
challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the
composition of the Commission on Appointments
HELD:
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system

represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall
not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect
at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected
as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution.
Disclaimer: I just copy pasted this from the actual paragraph
from the case in
toto, if youre going to make a case digest from this, please
make the necessary adjustments.
be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to

Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised
the House majority membership in the Commission on
Appointments to conform with the new political alignments
by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C.
Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was
retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the
Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado,
Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and
Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to
enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the
Commission on Appointments on the theory that their
election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
Coseteng vs Mitra (G.R. No. 86649)
1. WON the question raised is political.
Facts:
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on

Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of

the Constitution providing as follows:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in

representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna
Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under
the banner of KAIBA.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments

consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP

was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202
members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated
with the LDP, the House committees, including the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to
Held:
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in
Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that the legality,
and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission
on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is
justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature,
31

it would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There
shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve
Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall
the Congress from their submission. The commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House. There are
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79%
of the House membership (which may be rounded out to
80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,
which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the
LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in
the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque
Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There
is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership
in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis
of proportional representation of the political parties therein.
There is no merit in the petitioners contention that the House
members in the Commission on Appointments should have
been nominated and elected by their respective political
parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by

their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected
by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election
to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is
unassailable.
Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed
of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD
senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in
the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No.
of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would
produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDPLABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8
senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and
that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the
proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that
the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP,
one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in
determining a partys representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of
them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate

converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to
be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving
the latters representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in
the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it
is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership
in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1
seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which
has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a
seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with
each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.
Drilon vs De Venecia
FACTS:The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed
been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party
member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed
for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition, G.R. No.
183055, it fails.
The second petition filed by Senator Jamby
Madrigal in a summary tackle about the reorganization of
the membership of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all
actions of CA be held in abeyance as the same may be
construed as illegal and unconstitutional.
32

Senator Jamby Madrigal petitions to
REORGANIZE the membership of the CA is based upon the
OBSERVATIONS that she herself observe in the list of
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS membership that
there are certain POLITICAL PARTIES acquire a seat of
membership in CA held a position which supposedly are not
allowed in the provision of the constitution , moreover, she
added to estopped the intention of the committee request
that "all actions of the Commission be held in ABEYANCE" .
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall

rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are

correct.
Wherefore,the Motion with Leave of Court to

Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 180055 is Granted. The
Petition is Withdrawn. The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 is
Dismissed.
HELD: No.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS
Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party

concerned.
151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One

Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
HELD: Senator Madrigal contention has been dismissed due

to the guidelines she ignored.Petitioner has no standing to file
the petition .Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort. Each House of Congress
has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the
composition of its own contingent to the CA.The
extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the
relief of a TRO are not available to the Petitioner.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of
the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act

Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the
movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the
movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if
videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a
30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that
it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross
receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of
the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the
VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the
VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government
agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall

embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which
a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of
the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through
the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title.
As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the
VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek
assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation
of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the
authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies
concerned being subject to the direction and control of the
[VRB].
Bara Lidasan vs Commission on Elections
21 SCRA 496 Political Law Effect if Title Does Not
Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later,
Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,
was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios
located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del
Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the
Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]
33

Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precincts for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be
nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the
law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating
Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios
from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which
includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to
be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional
mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the
defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the
full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province
of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected
by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for
it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own
province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not
Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators.
They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975
or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue,
Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates
their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality

girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out
with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he
earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that
Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which
reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid
exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la
Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due
process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue,
Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord
84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be
said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable
end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S.

ABALOS, ET AL.
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until
the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City
to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now
in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by
invoking their right as tax payers and residents of
Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of
Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of
Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675
and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution
regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the
number of members of the Congress to 250 and
reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed
the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1)
saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."
34

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise
provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the
legislature to increase the number of the members of the
congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the
Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the
legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for
lack of merit.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO APPROPRIATION OF LAWS
Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba
148 SCRA 208 Political Law Transfer of Funds Power
of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the
Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph
1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices
and agencies of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates
the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177
is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be

passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly
overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose
of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.
It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation
of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one
department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
There is no transfer from one department to another here.
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and

P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),
by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the
New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than
the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.
HELD:
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of

the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow
that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it
the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
35

objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by
its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a
matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an
amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to
education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
The pork barrel system was temporarily

discontinued when martial law was declared.
It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for
Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP
started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to
cover not only public works project or hard
projects but also covered soft projects such as
those which would fall under education, health and
livelihood.
BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET

AL. (G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL. (G.R. NO.
208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R.
NO. 209251) NOVEMBER 19, 2013
After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the

restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the Mindanao Development Fund
and the Visayas Development Fund.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed

Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The
CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure
and other priority community projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President,

released directly to implementing agencies subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities. Senators and congressmen could identify
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
The term pork barrel, a political parlance of

American-English origin, refers to an appropriation
of government spending meant for localized projects
and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.
In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being

representatives of the people, also became involved
in project identification.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found

in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision,
release of funds and realignment of unexpended
portions of an item or appropriation were subject to
the approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
any kind of project from hard projects such as

roads, buildings and bridges to soft projects such
as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that

the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities
identified by individual legislators. This was also
the first time when the Vice-President was given an
allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from 19941996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases
made from the funds.
Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form

of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School
Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among
others.
The allocations for the School Building Fund were

made upon prior consultation with the representative
of the legislative district concerned and the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and
when these appropriations were to be spent.
In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and

replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa
Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a
provision requiring prior consultation with members
of Congress for the release of funds.
36
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund

(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the
district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense
category except personal services and other
personnel benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu
concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a
particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. This was
retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the
formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF
projects was introduced.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be

identified as implementing agencies. Legislators
were also allowed identify programs/projects
outside of his legislative district. Realignment of
funds and release of funds were required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation

probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released

the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the
PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900

million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL

SOCIAL FUND
The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to

include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund
(PSF).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund

under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on
March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of

PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed
and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff and is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with

respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.
In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It
also contained a provision on realignment of funds
but with the qualification that it may be allowed
only once.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo

Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the
form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the

nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis
regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the

consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous
decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
37
presents a situation of exceptional character and is a

matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a
practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems
constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the
public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other

Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of
legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d)
accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local
autonomy.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
The present case is not barred by the ruling in

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa
case was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to
Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases involve a more

holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and
(b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article,
including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment.
Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with

inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering
that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a
form of legislative power thereby lodged in
Congress. This power cannot be exercised by
individual members of Congress and the authority to
appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has
already been passed.
The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty

vs. Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does
not also bar judgment on the present case because it
was dismissed on a procedural technicality and
hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in

the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
The case is ripe for adjudication since the

challenged funds and the laws allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational and
thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.
The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel

System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of the government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of
judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the

PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The
President does not have constitutional authority to
nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being

taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the

unconstitutional usage of public funds.
The moot and academic principle cannot stop the

Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution,
(b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system
As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters

of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
38

even admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before the
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL

PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive

and the Legislative Departments has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including project

identification, fund release, and fund realignment
are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the
executive department.
Legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities and
the regulation and release of funds in violation of
the separation of powers principle.
Any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
That the said authority to identify projects is treated
as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition
covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.
Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the
legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could,

after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative

identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item
veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a)

accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF
to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative

identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then
operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible
item which may be subject to the Presidents power
of item veto.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative

powers has
been violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers postenactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in
Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised

only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
The legislators are individually exercising the power

of appropriation because each of them determines
(a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and
(b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79

Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents

accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself
or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given postenactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
39

observers when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation
law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said

legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization
violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress
to intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government, because it renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that

the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se
would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a

matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on

this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates

constitutional principles on local autonomy
The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is

based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities
of the district the legislator represents.
The allocation/division limits are clearly not based

on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political

dynasties is not self-executing.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,

which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a selfexecuting provision.
Since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the

constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.
This concept of legislator control underlying the

CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated toassist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions
should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that
have no law-making authority except only when

acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL

PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No.

1869 are valid appropriation laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under Section

29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law, it is enough that (a) the provision of
law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount
of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose.
Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law

because it set apart a determinable amount: a
Special Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and
receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from
any and all sources.
It also specified a public purpose: energy resource

development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid

appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
40

[PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
It also specified a public purpose: priority

infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No.

1869 constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers.
The phrase and for such other purposes as may be

hereafter directed by the President under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used.
This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use
the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that
the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard
of the delegating law.
The law does not supply a definition of priority

infrastructure development projects and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same.
The delimitation of a project as one of

infrastructure is too broad of a classification since
the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M.

VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,
Petitioners,
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of

six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
(Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs.
Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and
three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery,
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some
of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the
heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies,
and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged
before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition

seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that
the Court issue a TRO against respondents
41

UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
2.
Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the

constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all
other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2.
Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law.
HELD:
1.
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The postenactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This
violates the principle of separation of powers. Congressrole
must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:
(1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development

projects was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL
SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES
WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed

facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines was
declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT
CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE
MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE
LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF
PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT
WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.
Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers
Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead
of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens
under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
42

economy as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order

292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds

from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the
GAA.
Issues:
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada

made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the
DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It
turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws
particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money

shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered
as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to
the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive
and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable

national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar
because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of
funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed
by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however,
such transfer or realignment should only be made within
their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for
the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were
within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because
they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was
being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under
the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
43

But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on

various grounds.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used

as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively

in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec.
24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass
3 readings as required by the Constitution.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the

legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The
DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone.
The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of
the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not
be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO TAX LAWS
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455,
August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter

or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and

26(2) of the Constitution
does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a

substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did
not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done
on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can
be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.
Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City and
Constantino Rosas
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To
begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and
not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor
G.R. No. 144104
June 29, 2004
FACTS:
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a

parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the
aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the
Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a canteen,
medical professionals whom use the same as their private
clinics, as well as to other private parties. The right portion
of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the
Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts
paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical
services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside
44

from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives
annual subsidies from the government.
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes

amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a
charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim.
When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the
same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was
affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are
used exclusively for charity.
ISSUE:
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property
that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. (strictissimi juris)
Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as
regards to:
Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from

realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying
clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial
purposes.
income and gift taxes for all donations,

contributions, endowments and equipment and
supplies to be imported by authorized entities or
persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung
Center of the Philippines for the actual use and
benefit of the Lung Center; and
taxes, charges and fees imposed by the
Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment
purchases (expression unius est exclusion
alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).
HELD:
Tan v Del Rosario
The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable

institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose
its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply
because it derives income from paying patients, whether outpatient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from
the government, so long as the money received is devoted or
used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the
persons managing or operating the institution.
Facts:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or

the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which
amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant
to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it

allegedly violates the following provisions of the
Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the

Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . .
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded

their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general
professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of
HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being
merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for
the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice
of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the
full text of the title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged
In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21
and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended.
Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by

public respondents.
45

6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for

violating due process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only

when there is a clear contravention of inherent or
constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No
such transgression is so evident in herein case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal

protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,
(3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and
future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally
well to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the

legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system
towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of
individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the
present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court
does not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their

authority in promulgating the RR
and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating

measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or

after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal
footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of
professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general
professional partnership.
Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary (1992)
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the

enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the

President to Tax
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as

follows:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued

Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other
oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443
increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO
475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that
crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO
475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix

within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing

increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
JOHN HAY V. LIM (TAX)
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to

enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not
assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress

to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific
limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In
this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized
the President ot issue the said EOs.
Issue: Whether the tax exemptions and other financial

incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under Section 12 of
RA 7227 are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.
NO.
46

It is the legislative branch which has the inherent power not
only to select the subjects of taxation but also grant
exemptions. Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the
Constitution is crystal clear: "No law granting tax exemption
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress."
state cannot be stripped of this most essential power by

doubtful words and of this highest attribute of sovereignty by
ambiguous language."
Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions

of the Constitution, which has full power to exempt any
person or corporation or class of property from taxation.
Public respondents' argument that tax exemptions are

"inherent" in the term "special economic zone" stands the
concept on its head and cannot be accepted. The tax exempt
character of an SEZ proceeds from the statutory provisions
expressly conferring such exemptions, not vice versa. The
tail does not wag the dog.
The Constitution may itself provide for specific tax

exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances
providing for exemption from local taxes, but otherwise, it is
only the legislative branch which has the power to grant tax
exemptions, its power to exempt being as broad as its power
to tax.
There is absolutely nothing in RA 7227 which can be
considered a grant of tax exemption in favor of public
respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax
exemptions and other incentives in Section 12 (the only
provision in RA 7227 which expressly grants tax exemptions)
are clearly the business enterprises located within the Subic
SEZ.
Consequently, respondents' arguments for a liberal
construction of RA 7227 in favor of tax exemptions and
incentives to business enterprises in the John Hay SEZ must
necessarily fail. As the Court, speaking through Justice
Mendoza in the recent case of PLDT v. city of Davao, has
occasion to stress:
"Along with the police power and eminent domain,
TAXATION is one of the three necessary attributes of
sovereignty. Consequently, statutes in derogation of
sovereignty, such as those containing exemption from
taxation, should be strictly construed in favor of the state. A
Necessarily, respondents' arguments, dependent as they are

on a liberal construction of tax exemptions, also fail.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO APPELATE JURISDICTION

OF THE SUPREME COURT
Teresita Fabian vs Aniano Desierto
295 SCRA 470 Political Law Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Court
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Appeal from Decisions of
Quasi-Judicial Bodies
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business
with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to
do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano
Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to

the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision
is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides
that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is
valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of
RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it
states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated
therein is to be exercised over final judgments and orders of
lower courts, that is, the courts composing the integrated
47

judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies
or agencies.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and

26(2) of the Constitution
But what is the proper remedy?

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.
PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455,
August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter

or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively

in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec.
24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass
3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To
begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and
not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor
does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did
not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done
on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can

be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R.

No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation
Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted
by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to
them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of
bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented
the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law,
and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO.
7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETYFOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994).
On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1.
Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this
debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and
48

Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special

provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
2.
Special provisions which authorize the use of income
and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs),
Held:
3.
Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract)
ratio for road maintenance.
4.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of
medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A.
No. 6675).
5.
The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the
appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special
Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the
prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire
Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which
states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
6.
New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use
savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme
Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and
(f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are
The veto power, while exercisable by the

President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There
is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of
validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an
attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal
of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no
undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund
for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund
policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D.
No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission;
E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2
of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which
can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by

administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of
medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being
directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation
item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of
Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President
must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress
for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or
legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative
veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because
the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of
the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for
by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on
the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts
(Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the
Government itself. The veto of said special provision is
therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
49

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find
anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to
the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much
less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law
is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested in another law considering
that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and
there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be
amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain
provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there
is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until
the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether
they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig
Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an
Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec
16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the
Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is
limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore,
she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when
the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill,
she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would
be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided
for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has
the President the power to veto `provisions of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise
of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and
rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are
beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89)
and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate
provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose
of the Presidents veto power.
Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e.
Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the time
of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws
provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges,
justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to
standardize retirement benefits among government officials.
However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House
Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government
officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a
petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust
their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never
repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of
those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of
Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due
to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never
repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the
General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress
allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner:
Congress made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment;
included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in
different brances of the government; among such obligations
is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the
judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which
provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the
judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the
GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired
judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the
veto made by the President. The President was represented
by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that
portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to
the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president
has no power to set aside and override the decision of the
50

Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is

unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does
not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same
item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained
the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive
must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In
this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the
general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion
which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not
veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.
FACTS:
Miller vs Mardo GR No 15138 31 July 1961

Facts: Republic Act 991 provided that the reorganization
plan drafted by Department of Labor and Employment and
submitted it to the president for approval shall deemed as
approved by the Congress after its adjournment unless in the
meantime, Congress by resolution disapproved the plan and
assailed its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative
inaction is valid?
Decision: The contemplated procedure violates the
constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate
actions of each house. It is contrary to the settled and wellunderstood parliamentary law which requires that the two
houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations,
and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be
submitted to the separate determination of the other.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of

public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved
for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have
no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall

be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION
Jean Arnault vs Nazareno
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required

before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the

acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the
witnesses called to be examined by the special committee
created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer
who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation,
Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative,
at the same time invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing
Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by
revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a
writ of Habeas Corpus
51

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who
refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in
aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose
penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness
who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be
detained during the term of the members imposing said
penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate
the witness right to due process of law.
ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS
Citation: G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955
Ponente: Labrador
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one

Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong
deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied
with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The
title of the resolution states:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL,
AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO
CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS
CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION
AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA,
RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE
PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate,

and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that ,
were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and
authority of the Senate to conduct investigations would
become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by
any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
xxx
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner

Arnault and ordered his release.
ISSUE:
Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in
contempt as a punitive measure.
FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault
against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was
incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding
Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a
person with whom he transacted business in relation to a
government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are
described in the companion case Arnaultvs.
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to
hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply
with an order in a legislative inquiry.
xxx
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of

the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he
was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and
since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment
long since become final, upheld the power and authority of
the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody,
detention, and confinement, said power and authority having
been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully
justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the
information which he had withheld and continues
contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements

made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senateimposed incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the

findings of the Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt

or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive
measure.
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner
incarcerated.
52

1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to
review the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted
resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner has failed and
refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person
to whom he gave the amount of P440,000 and that the
situation of petitioner has not materially charged since he
was committed to prison, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them.
The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review
such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the
questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista
and Tambobong deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action

that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the
right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the
exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with
their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the
legislative process. The Judicial department has no right or
power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the
legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in
the ascertainment of truth and in the application and
interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial
process, because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by
the Constitution. The only instances when judicial
intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has
been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when
there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.
2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or

incarcerate him as a punitive measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the

confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the
petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that
the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly
punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in
the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and
contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's
dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant

witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said
power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge
and information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge
and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? The legislative department should not
be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with
which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the

defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is
not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a
manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere
exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is,

reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the
petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the

petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody
of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.
Jose Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The
Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his
wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly
enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people.
That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office
and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others,
control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the
country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines
and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege
speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a
motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred
to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the
Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa
refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly
prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise
refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent
a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and
that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege
hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant
53

disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be
granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The
speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In
other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law
in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really
in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take
judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita
Legislative Branch Question Hour Constitutionality of
E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the

North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise
sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the
said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements
were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in
the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is

alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part.
To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour.
The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of
the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in
aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
54

was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to
each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded
to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive

Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as
that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as
a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are

valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum
Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
55

Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon
504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation
public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May
8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo
Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons
Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by
Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of
inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered
more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive

with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.
Romulo Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of

Public Officers
549 SCRA 77 Political Law Constitutional Law The
Legislative Department Inquiry in aid of legislation
Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with

Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband

Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the
other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several
high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the
SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by thepresidential communications privilege.
56

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of
the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Garcillano vs HR Committees on Public Information

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Senate Rules of Procedure
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation
between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano
surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the
elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject
to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House.
In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation
emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred
to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed
by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to
prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are
alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit and stop
the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped

conversation.
the publication of these rules when they first opened their

session.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.
OVERSIGHT
HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record

cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in
Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The
issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has
become moot and academic. The second petition must be
granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue
with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
G.R. No. 166715
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that [l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.
With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for
August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly

AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R.
ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary
of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity
as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents
from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
FACTS:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board).
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
57

status. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR
and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year,
as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion
to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted
amount of tax revenue.
dismiss BIR and BOC personnel if the President sets

an unrealistic and unattainable target.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a

congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Respondents comment:
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation.
They question the petition for being premature as

there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners
have not asserted any right or claim that will
necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction.
They assert that the allegation that the reward

system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation
and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
They contend that:
By establishing a system of rewards and incentives,

the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the
system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
The fixing of revenue targets which has been
delegated to the President without sufficient
standards will therefore be a ground in order to
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not RA 9335 constitutional?
2.
Whether or not the limitation of the scope of the

system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection?
3.
Whether or not the law unduly delegates the power

to fix revenue targets to the President?
4.
Whether or not the creation of the congressional

oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers?
RULING:
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of

RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the
BOC because the functions they perform are distinct
from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a
sufficient standard that will guide the executive in
the implementation of its provisions.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal

rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial adjudication. It means that there is a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for
judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that
can be redressed by a favourable decision of the Court.
Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight

committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the
fulfilment of the legislative policy and serves as a
check to any over-accumulation of power on the
part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
In this case, petitioners fail to assert any specific and

concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse
effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal
stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves.
1.
YES. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong

presumption of constitutionality. To justify its
58

nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but
also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers
may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept
of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.
2.
NO. In United States v. Matthews, the U.S. Supreme

Court validated a law which awards to officers of
the customs as well as other parties an amount not
exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures
in violation of the laws against smuggling.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by
law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their
zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed
their revenue targets.
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity
of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union,20 this Court declared:
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of

the class.
With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. Both the BIR and the
BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform
the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane
and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.
3.
NO. Two tests determine the validity of delegation

of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays
down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative policy
and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide

the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue

collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for
a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in
the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the

President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
4.
YES. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of
approving the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR,
BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the
said IRR.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision

of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows
Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with
the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be
struck down as unconstitutional.
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the
unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other
provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law
unconstitutional? NO.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is
declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this
Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of
invalidity shall remain in force and effect.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of
the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision
from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in
59

force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently
of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining
provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid
law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to
Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in
force and effect.
ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
PIMENTEL vs CONGRESS (Joint Committee of Congress
to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-President
in the May 10, 2004 Elections
[G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]
EN BANC R E S O L U T I O N
Facts:
Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment

declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint
Committee. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of
a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease
and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant
to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die(w/o date
fixed) on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last
regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the
said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001
to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner
goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon
the expiration of ... Congress.
ISSUE: WON the Joint Committee performing election
canvass even after the termination of congress session is
constitutional.
RULING: Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene
once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next
regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the
present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon
the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both
Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner
does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular
annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess
before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the

power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII provides that "[t]he term of office
of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7
provides that "[t]he Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years.
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June
30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present
legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal
existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have
come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular
sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its nonlegislative functions. In fact, the joint public session of both
Houses of Congress convened by express directive of
Section 4, Article VII to canvass the votes for and to
proclaim the newly elected President and VP has not, and
cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus
officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its
authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its nonlegislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly
elected President and VP, its existence as the National Board
of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to
which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and
canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not
become functus officio.
60

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that province automatically gains legislative representation

558 SCRA 700 Political Law Municipal Corporation

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local

compliance with the criteria established in the Local

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units

Constitutional Law Case Digests

within 3 year following the last census is complied with. The

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be

Constitutional Law Case Digests

determination of total number of party-list representatives =

people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first

Constitutional Law Case Digests

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety

Constitutional Law Case Digests

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Constitutional Law Case Digests

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x

Constitutional Law Case Digests

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections

well-defined political constituencies must belong to the

Constitutional Law Case Digests

G.R. No. 192803

December 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN

On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on

229__x .20 =57 .80

Number of votes of party-list

Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered

The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the

The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009

Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list

the Commission on Elections through the Office of the

Constitutional Law Case Digests

However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in

Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only

2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups,

The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as

Constitutional Law Case Digests

Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547

What is the Committees concept of residence for the

Mr. De los Reyes

Constitutional Law Case Digests