ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding
the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before
they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated,
in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete
equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into
this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business
operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng,
(private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car
repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the
equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB
Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces
of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per
centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since
petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third
party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was
Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan
at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall
deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of
Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would
lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After
the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check
and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check
matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking
with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated
July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the
aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as
they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15,
1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and
No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It
was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty
deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never
came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for
violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject
checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about
the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand
and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the
financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the
Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease"
value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used
by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to
purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he
had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As
the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment,
which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to
economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since
petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance.
Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose
operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is
irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty
deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated"
petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the
kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme
whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell
or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen,
who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that
they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme
designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in
issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question,
using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the
highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew
that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru
Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding
the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty

deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for
his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich
themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it
be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to
the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is
the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other
hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such
a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral
disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that
morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we
call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in
reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also
Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of
retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant
case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to
cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be
punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the
"potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the
petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the open
admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful
certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had
been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement by the terms of which the warranty
deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee and that as the lessor
L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it
may he assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations,
even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the
four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in
order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with
respect to the element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on account
or for value it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must
have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the
obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case
at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof
that there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant
had not adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to
cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the
petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be

produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an
officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her sideline. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from
the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident
from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is
a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in
cases ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal
intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of
public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether
they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When
viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks
were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as
they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
(1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment
and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to
intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so
deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits
payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued,
payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is
inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds
with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the
transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this
predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of
which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information that reads
as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the
latter on his right ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face and back, causing serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of his will, that is[,] by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo
Marquez which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." During the pre-trial conference, the defense
admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is a Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of
the incident, November 22, 2001 was the Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay. Trial thereafter ensued where the
parties presented their respective versions of the incident.
The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo
Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio
dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on
board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the
former. Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the
Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in settling
the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by dela Cruz and
brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner's
house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo
again apologized to petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came
out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then
shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face
and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get involved.
Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was
later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three
weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base
of Reynaldo's skull and exited at the back of his right ear. Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed
that on November 22, 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child. While driving,
he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just
went home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him.
Petitioner's brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not without threatening that they
would return to kill him. Petitioner thus asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back,
entered petitioner's yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but
Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back
twice.
On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered its Decision 2 finding
petitioner guilty as charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six ( 6) years [of] prision correccional, as minimum[;] to
ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as maximum.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4 dated August 16, 2007.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision5 dated February 27, 2009, the CA
affirmed in full the RTC's Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its
entirety.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution8 dated July 30, 2010.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner imputes upon the
CA the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS
NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE 1HE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY
SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIV A TE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED WITH AGUN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT THAT
THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN
FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSUL Y APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER WAS
PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT
WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGA Y OFFICIALS FROM INTERVENING
AND HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.10
Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.
The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to "appreciation of evidence" or factual errors which are not
within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already explained in Batistis v.
People11 that:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in
a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by
petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides,
viz:
Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall

raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Petitioner's assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of the evidence, are
evidentiary and factual in nature.12 The Petition must therefore be denied on this basis because "one, the petition for
review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of
facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting,
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,"13 which was not
shown to be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect when affirmed by the CA,14 as in this case. After all, the RTC "had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on
the stand and detect if they were telling the truth."15 "To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and
bindingness of the trial court's findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC,
particularly after their affirmance by the CA"16 as petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary
circumstance which merits a departure from the said doctrine.17
In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC 's ruling that petitioner is guilty of frustrated
homicide and not merely of less serious physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly stated by the CA:
In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is no intent to kill on
the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of whether the victim only
suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is sufficiently borne out, the crime
committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).
1wphi1

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts of the victim's body at
which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used
to stab the victim in the latter's abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH
ED., P. 431).
It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the location of the wounds
plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the accused-appellant's objective is not merely to
warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor. Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any
of the two bullets surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the
accused-appellant even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x the bleeding victim. Indeed,
the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries
does not mean that the crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries.
After all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the resulting injury
but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger.18
The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also proper, there is a need to modify
the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages must be made in favor of the victim Reynaldo.
The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to Reynaldo due to the absence of
receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred from the incident. "Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the
actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases
where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is
convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss."19 Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo was
hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit as observed by the RTC there was no evidence
offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason thereof, Reynaldo is entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00. Aside from this, he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards of damages are
in accordance with settled jurisprudence.20 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on
the awarded damages to commence from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.21
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002 convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the crime of :frustrated

homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez
moral damages and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest at the legal rate 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such intent, the felony may
only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and external acts and conduct of
the offender before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on
the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo under the
judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in
Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten oclock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was
fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly
Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on
the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying,
"Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest
for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water.
While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left
face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and begging for
help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle
(backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors
immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for
about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two
days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic)
further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and aboutone (1)
cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular
line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the
victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube
toremove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong
City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexanders death without timely medical
intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,1997 at around
midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexanders
back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them.
They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latters face. 3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING

CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the
Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered topay the private complainant compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35
representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill,
the critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heatof anger during the fist fight between them; that he did not inflict the stabwounds,
insisting that another person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries
on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmedthe petitioners conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6
Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) noneof the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying
circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the
two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him and Alexander. He
claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he
only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he
should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to
characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intentto kill is the main
element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide
only if the intent to kill is competently shown.
1wphi1

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately
before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal
intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned
by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of

the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We
have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim.10
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to
the petitioners submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of
anger or as the result ofa fistfight between them. The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The
petitioners attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his
submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to beno doubt about the wound on
Alexanders chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and appellate courts on the
credibility of Alexanders testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy
witness sufficed to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when
the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always
regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus
strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the latter committed the
crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the petitioners mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was
contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating Alexanders statements. Under the circumstances, we
can only affirm the petitioners conviction for frustrated homicide. The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding,
we find the indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"12 fixed by the RTC erroneous
despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an
indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.13 The
maximum term is the penaltyproperly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum term is within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed. Conformably with
Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to
reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayorin its medium period from eight years and
one day to 10 years is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct
indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as compensatory damages
"representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven."15 We need to revise such
civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we
emphatically declared to be "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused,
and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to
recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery." We explained why in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120
of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended
its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now
do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves

seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final
reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to
by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby
fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of
such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts
should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should
prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex
delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules
of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved
or waived.17
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender committed violence that
nearly took away the victims life. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act for omission."18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in
crimes resulting in physical injuries.19 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees
thatP30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity
ofP30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.
In addition, the amounts awarded ascivil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per annumreckoned from
the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the
petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory
damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL G.R. No. 166326

RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cavite, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of thePhilippines. v.
Esmeraldo Rivera, et al.
[1]

[2]

On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one
RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his head and on the
different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic) away and the timely
response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April
1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning
Pilipino by the television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out
a living as a manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador
II, Dasmarias, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him
for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled
invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look
for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two
brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo
and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position,
Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael
continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted:Awatin sila! Awatin sila! Ruben
felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When
policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr.,
signed a medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the
parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple
abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left. The doctor declared that the
lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven
days. The doctor prescribed medicine for Rubens back pain, which he had to take for one month.
[4]

[5]

[6]

Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house
and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he went
out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each other. He
fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled
away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but
Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He
went home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.

Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front
of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged
the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother
Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was.
A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the
ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardos shirt and hair, and, in the process, Rubens head
hit the lamp post.
[7]

On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day
to eight (8) years of prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt the culpability of the accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and
severally, civil indemnity to the private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

[8]

The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their witnesses.
The accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004affirming, with
modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90,
is MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum
to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[9]

The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the
CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they
had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners
aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in
the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if
petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they
should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners intent to kill
Ruben:

On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound
inflicted and the kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben
Rodil in his testimony as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what
happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a
piece of hollow block xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit
with a hollow block by Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while
Dagol was hitting, Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow
block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the
brothers scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to
kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3)
brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already
fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and
proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and that it was only the
arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist from their concerted act of
trying to kill Ruben Rodil.
[10]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is
correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of
innocence raised by petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with petitioners
as the perpetrators. Their intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically
declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was
suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo Baby Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter,
his two brothers Ismael and Edgardo Dagul Rivera, coming from St. Peter
II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that
they saw Edgardo Dagul Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it
three (3) times. A careful review of their testimonies revealed the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners. In this case, the victim did not even have
the slightest warning of the danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his three-year old
daughter. He was caught off-guard by the assault of Esmeraldo Baby Rivera and the
simultaneous attack of the two other petitioners. It was also established that the victim
was hit by Edgardo Dagul Rivera, while he was lying on the ground and being mauled

by the other petitioners. Petitioners could have killed the victim had he not managed to
escape and had the police not promptly intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was
superficial and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not negate the
intent to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim
had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly
intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers
helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had
already fallen to the ground; that one of them picked up a cement hollow
block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and
that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist
from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.
[11]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove
by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim, the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes
against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location
and
number
of
wounds
sustained
by
the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
[12]

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent
of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as
Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of
petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the
head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated
wound and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if

Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance.
[13]

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

[14]

The Court in People v. Lizada elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
[15]

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detre for the law
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal
that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment
of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the
equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused
is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the

consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step
in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made. The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.
In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to
the offense.
[16]

In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling
the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the
middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
We reject petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission
of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was
walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no
chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the
three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. Even
if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel
it or defend himself, there would be treachery. Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim
because of the altercation between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being
conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.
[17]

[18]

[19]

The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day ofprision
mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder isreclusion perpetua to
death. Since petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by
two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2 of Article
61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. In the
absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the felony (other than the qualifying
circumstance of treachery), the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten
(10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision
mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that
petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months ofprision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL,

G.R. No. 151258

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL
ANTHONY
AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME
MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA,
PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS
KARL
B.
PEREZ,
RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, andRONAN DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FIDELITO DIZON,

- versus -

G.R. No. 154954

G.R. No. 155101

Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

GERARDA H. VILLA,

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA

II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN
RAMOS,
CRISANTO
CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO
ADRIANO,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
February 1, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10 February
1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts
of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and
tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which
became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or
association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of consent
and initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing
punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5] Within a year
of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the
University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan
ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of
the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle
in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as

immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission.
As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by
strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts
allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are
as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis
Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the
Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards
the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to
them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These
rites included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows
of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the
Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held
at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on
their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round,
in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and

proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny
received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground.
The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries
to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought
he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of
the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping
bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
Efren de Leon (De Leon)
Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
Michael Musngi (Musngi)
Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
Antonio General (General)
Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25.

Adel Abas (Abas)

26.

Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the
trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against
the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each
of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed
away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1.

Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,

Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.)
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

2.

Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of 30,000 as
indemnity.

3.

Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years ofprision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16]Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to
Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.[19]

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated
10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction
absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died
on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendithat served
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.[22]

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to
present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier
date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified
in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing
dates
and
in
fact
insisted
that
he
was
ready
to
present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and
were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the
official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so
Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.[24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the
Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have
resulted in Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr.
Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims
that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did
not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of
the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and
that he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes,
who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places
with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with
Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to
petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19
(Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there
could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet
been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been
upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since

the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally
liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The
said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal
liability
of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal
of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P.
Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon
(Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various
reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years
after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution
cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its
disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of due
process;
2.

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;

3.

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this
Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for
pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term personal
penalties refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary
penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the
criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33]However, civil liability based on
a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable
through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for
both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from
the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence
for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5thand 12 of October
1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain any postponement and that all the
accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down
the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when
required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that
his client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would
adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this
development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all times
down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August
1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks

later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on
the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993,
alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to
present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the
Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in
violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court
ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the
trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25
August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial
dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also
points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted
on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that
the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating
the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.
Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel This constitutional right
includes the right to present evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and
defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
[42]

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses

presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and
upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an
Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his
surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because
of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the Order,
we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court,Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his
right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been
deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived,
such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to
present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution,
Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case,
the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding
hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went
ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to
explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave
penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x
x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General
had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates;
and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court preassigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order
strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent
denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we
ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case
at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would substantially
prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to
decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law
to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing
of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of the
traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official
activity of the fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension and he
participated only after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice
to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for
the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties.

This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key
facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not
have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the
criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this
case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these
were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious,
capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended
with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number
of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution
and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay,
the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to
the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal
or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double
jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following
factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.

xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the
delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy
trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of thecase
were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order
of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from
the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order
requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the
case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the
same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there
was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied
with. It appears, however, thateven until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
disposal of the trial courtbecause the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting
the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period
of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo.Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January
29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the
court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x
x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De
Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the
case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of
the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition
of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and inCervantes vs.

Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it
must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for
a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060
that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records
that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon,
and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accusedEscalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again
be charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of
reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in
the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional
right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order
to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a)

there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him
or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts,
will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has
several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.
It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater
penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of
mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the
review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law;
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or
a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of
(1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According
to the Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private
complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the
theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed
to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86]The Solicitor General also assails the finding that

the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of
Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that
grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ
of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny
the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave
abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug,
the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the
fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by
the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in
nature. However,by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means
to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To
do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where
the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness
or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla,
CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent,
the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v.
De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama,
Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied
and citations included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of
the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity

or medical attendance required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of
that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries,
because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries
and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused were found to have inflicted more than the usual
punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the
NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites.[100]Considering that the CA found
that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is
a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty
in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of
a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable
felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of
felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be
held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that
the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only
logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an

allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition
in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles
263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the courta quo found
that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were
guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries
they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the
conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were
liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or
to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven
by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically
strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how
our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to
make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the
nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose
between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical
penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with
reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened
with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the
crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the
actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent is the predominant consideration.[111]Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed
by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,intelligence,
and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power

to choose between two things.[115] The second element,intelligence, concerns the ability to
determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and
an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to
the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the moving power that
impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to
produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term felonious means,inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional
felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done willfully,
maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase
coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an
element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury
inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed
without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however,
due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful
act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is
inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony
of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132]Furthermore, the victims
death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted
from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.[134]

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations
ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazingcan be
traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities
worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in
ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient
Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a
tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty
to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to
join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular
chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the program,
neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn
chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade
point average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for
their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters
require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte
stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as
prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate,
applicant or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is generally
placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or
other similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate,
degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century
ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society namedKataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a
small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities
or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] TheKatipunans ideology was brought home to
each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought to a
dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They were made to go
through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem

that they were also made to withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngiand to endure
a matalas na punyal.[155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunerowas made to sign
membership papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or
drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during
his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured
during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It
required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected
mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of
Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to
the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly
onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in
pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members
subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the
nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back
with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which active members
of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity
members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168]The hazing included
the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine,
feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and
kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter,
and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores
for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated
as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the

pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the
pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of
stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture,
psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered
injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other
initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks
for more than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The
pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four
nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on
his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176]During the last two days of
the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through
which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some
organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process
enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures
the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professionalnetworking opportunities; and
the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the
military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that
Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that
Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an
injury to his [or her] person therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of
theCommittee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008,

all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing
laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even
the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony
in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three
years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a
Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As
an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls
under the category of serious bodily injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it
becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed
seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not
more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious
bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted
of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five
years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a
felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In
Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or
both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was
no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,
wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no
anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a
contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have
theanimus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer
disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found
that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict
physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had
apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers
parking space had been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the
accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand
in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death
of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts,
that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine
the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what to
expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity
and their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van and
we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be
the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us
inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay
ka and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were
the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of
the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there
any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging
others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta
atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas pa yan, kayangkaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not
really pin point who uttered those words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say
that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so
that would in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me.
So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on was
Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa
and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family
have his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he
said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol
Express, he kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn
justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father
stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were
within hearing distance when that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villas
father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny
Villas turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and he
kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also
thataccusations made by Dizon you or your family had his brother killed,
can you inform this Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations
that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in
particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family
who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I

knew that it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing
about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir.And another incident
was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court
and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and
I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung
pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there
was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards
to what to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked
at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no
thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body
but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning
body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat,
terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is
this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for
the killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did
not believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into
quitting the initiation, this is correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things
was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation
by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run
on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only
on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a
neophyte, was also administered by another master on the other neophyte,
this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon
and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused were just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members
during their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that
Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional
felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced
above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no

participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It wasBoyet Dizon [who]
stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while saying, [T]his
guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we find that the
CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of
witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to
psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed,
and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto,Yari ka, Recinto,
Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin,
or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of
the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing
the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including
those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila
Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so
that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation
and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and madeup.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact,
during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina
spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on
why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the
Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit
to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or
playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte
stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside
after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards
the inside portion of the building these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted
to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public
hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead to
psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not
even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other
as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte,
Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true and that
[Dizon] was just making it up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of
Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed
toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x
x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar
as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to
injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since
all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and
death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus.
As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate
and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does
not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her
students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for
slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the

means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any
malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law,
petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v.
Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady
of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of
water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side
with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by expelling through those means
the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim.
Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability for murder
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held
criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain
on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v.
Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts
of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled
that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury
was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement
of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their
first night, they were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol
Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at
the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and
to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals.
When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes
were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who
were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular
duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order
that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or round;
to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they
needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before the rites, he
asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny

would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233]The CA found as
follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the
initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before
admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they
wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a
week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that
he knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden paddle would be
used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed, there can be no
fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious
intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case.
Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical
pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was
that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second night
were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with
the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated
in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the
paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were
predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries,
which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the
neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of traditional initiation; there is no
proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that
Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality
of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted
may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the
method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 AntiHazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the
Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge
would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or
serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,
fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in
these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without
being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition?
Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment
of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered
crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive
hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because
these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person
or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization,
the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these
specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files
a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is
the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called hazing. Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that
acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is
need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay
magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa
iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: Huwag
ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa
inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished
Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove
the intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries,that resulted in
the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the
accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation
where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the
basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there
is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What
are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized
because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they
conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it
stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill
or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, We
did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do
not have any intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with
the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a
difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a
person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there
is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion
of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However,
the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into
another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the
phrase without consent for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept
that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot
of concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter,
it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing
or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of
no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he
joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of
the victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was
consent on the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished
Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores,
traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals
when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They
can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the
mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may
even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with
the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he
allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was
done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will
be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim
allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the
defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical
injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going
to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will
collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The
Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the
point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing.
We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will
not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle
of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an
amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala
prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique

as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an
inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents
would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a simpleobiter dictum, the
statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through
physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered
an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be
resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against
the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being
no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of
his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the
danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast,simple imprudence or
negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage
ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued?
If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of
the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.[247] If,
on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in
order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care
is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that
may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant
effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of
the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In
the present case, the victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was
deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the
blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and
capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple
hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating
that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee
blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze
out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce
death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other
organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the
lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that there
was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest
or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual
death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by
the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were
punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs,
and thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their
faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny,
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death
of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The
relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the
deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually
by themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going
to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries
marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?

Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for
us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the
same manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more
humane in human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in
part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking
during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered
that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the
process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the
cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in
the
end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation
rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the presence of
alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the
fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits
to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing
as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing
and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish
kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail
himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270]Another initiate did not
give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not
have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity
entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the
hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were
barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law
been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the
crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272]Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing

laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable
doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny
Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his
death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of
the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability
from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only
with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of50,000
as civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly
and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the
victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CAs award of
indemnity in the amount of 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not
interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of
the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount
of 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner
Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The
appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined
and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day

ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny
Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the
finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is
herebyAFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewiseAFFIRMED.
Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is
hereby
dismissed,
and
the
criminal
case
against
Artemio
Villareal
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law
to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers'
quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087,
was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along
the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered
by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent
bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door,
and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very
dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events,
it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior
to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with
his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest
house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped
at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino
and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his
way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was
being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling
and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or
the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who,
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but
one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which
he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Ishamvs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination
as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well
as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting
the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm
and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or
another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say
that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con
malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included
in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no
crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no
act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law,
folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May
31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects
of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can
be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in
its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto
in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful"
as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word
"willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a
little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the
word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and

signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and
cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with
the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It
is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done
by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times
of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down.
But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from
his neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an
evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering
one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in
nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of
necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the
intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is
clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and
77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to
be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here

isIgnorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb.,
625; Reg.vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say,
the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to
him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according
to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and
he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief,
and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be
he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew
the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide
or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption
of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by
law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of
the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the
degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a
pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and
that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that
the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his
wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending
to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the
stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the
floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left
the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon
as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting
from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his
father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he
be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found
that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational
necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal
Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by
the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in
his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than
fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that
they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for
the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc."
(Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code?
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of
the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack,
and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown
against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" because of which, and
observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man
be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites
of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds
that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal

responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to
twelve months ofprision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted
the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote
spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and
family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty
of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the
case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice
or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who
assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced
to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article
61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.

JOHN ERIC LONEY, G.R. No. 152644

STEVEN PAUL REID and
PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 10, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution
dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling
of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed
against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez (petitioners).
The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and
Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At
the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out
of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),[5]Section 8[6] of
Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Section
108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942),[9] and Article
365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.[11]
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were
duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations
which constitute legal excuse or justification.

The Ruling of the MTC

In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling on
petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x.
The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners motion,
the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 (Consolidated Order), granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to mine tailings which were
precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single
fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the
same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements
constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In
both instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were
allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the
three (3) special laws.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking
into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the
three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining
Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law
(PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation
of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code;
and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x
are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for
[v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be
maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation
of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic]
damage to property.[13]

The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997.
In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on
the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942
as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for
that offense. After making of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the
arraignment and ordered the entry of not guilty pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent
filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents appeal was
raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondents appeal
consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94

In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but denied
petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch
94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no
absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are
separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same
with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the
pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the
accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction
that
A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x.
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different
from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not although they stemmed from a single act.[15]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted
with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984,
RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC proceed from and are based on a single act or incident
of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the duplicitous
nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16]Petitioners further
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and
RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC.[17]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The
appellate court held:

The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened
the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple
prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with respect to the variances in
the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the
case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under
Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section.
xxx
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the
Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which
are national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which
the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each
crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to
any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial
courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.[18]

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution
of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING
THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT(R.A. 7942) AND

REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D.
1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR
INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERSTHRU
DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND
MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT AN ACCUSED
SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE
NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR
OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION,
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]

The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenesPeople
v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense.[21]
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing
of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.[23]Here, however,
the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only
one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from and
are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of
mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges
since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident
might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying
the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the
same act are not the same
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.[28]However, for
the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with one
offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA
7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were
charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of
mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit
from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for
violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the
absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental
Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage
to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual
pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must
be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was
no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable.It does not
follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an
essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on
the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the
previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or
causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the
terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.Moreover, the offenses punished by special law
are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in
se.[29]

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in sefelony (such as
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes
(such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is

criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.

People v. Relova not in Point

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes
this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement
in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common
set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had
been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the
offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges
was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against
multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] isnot the
same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both
from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that it
must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense

charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception
to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single
act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the
Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall
under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for
the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001and
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section
27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information
dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R.
Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public
School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully
decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred
ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159)
precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419,
008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a
difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except
petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total
of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused
Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person
to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the
minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the following as
errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL
SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO
BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL
BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE
REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS
THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR
INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and
conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private
complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which
falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita?
Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261
and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases
the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification
and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due
to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a
limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to
punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes
received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless
the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were
sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the Statement of
Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the
Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused Viray
in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of
electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed to
appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each
Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of
Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all
the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was
handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the
column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the
number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was
raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total
of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for
private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the
number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC)
No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which
was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise
admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind,
preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the
COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV
(Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As
chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic

entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but
also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of
Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable
under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has
consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on
the matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in
canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters.
The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the
municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and
statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed
to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the
error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.