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ASME Preventing turbine water damage ASME

Standard TDP-1
By Larry Kielasa, John Boyle and Ram G. Narula | Posted: Tuesday, September 1,
2009 12:00 am

ASME: Preventing turbine water damage - ASME Standard


TDP-1
Figure 3. Typical drain pot with redundant level elements
With the advancements in combined cycle, steam generation and co-generation
technology systems, ASME has published an updated version of its "Recommended
Practices for the Prevention of Water Damage to Steam Turbines Used for Electric Power
Generation - Fossil Fueled Plants," ASME TDP-1 2006. TDP-1 was originally published
in 1972 and subsequently revised in 1979, 1985 and 1998. The new standard was
rewritten to include combined-cycle configurations, multiple steam generator
configurations and cogeneration technologies. The standard also was revised to address
plant cycling and modern plant instrument and control systems. This article will
summarize the major changes included in the updated standard.
TDP-1 was initially developed in response to a rash of water induction incidents in the
1960s as power plants scaled up above 150 MW. TDP-1 now includes conventional steam
(Rankine) cycle and Combined-Cycle power plants. Nuclear power plants are covered
under TDP-2.

TDP-1 is a Recommended Practice and not a mandatory code - if you want the features
put forth in TDP-1 to be included in your design standard, it must be invoked your
contract.
Water induction damage
Water induction can damage steam turbines in several ways. The damage can be caused
by the impact of large slugs of water or by the quenching effect of cold water on hot
metal. The severity of water damage can vary from minor seal rubs all the way to
catastrophic damage to the turbine. Generally, water damage falls into the following
categories:
Thrust bearing failure
Damaged blades
Thermal cracking
Rub damage
Permanent warping distortion
Secondary effects
Secondary effects include items such as seal packing ring damage, pipe hangar and
support damage, damage to instrumentation and controls, etc.
Sources of water induction
Water can be inducted into a steam turbine from several sources. The following are some
of the most common sources of water:
Motive steam systems
Steam attemperation systems
Turbine extraction/admission systems
Feedwater heaters
Turbine drain system

Turbine steam seal system


Start-up systems
Condenser steam and water dumps (steam bypass)
Steam generator sources
Figure 1 shows the percentage of water induction incidents attributed to the most
common sources of water in conventional steam cycles. Although water induction into
the high and intermediate pressure turbines has historically been recognized as the most
damaging, experience has shown that water induction in low pressure turbines also can
cause significant damage and should be taken seriously.
Water induction can happen at any time; however the most common situations are during
transients such as start up, shut down and load changes. Figure 2 illustrates the
percentage of times various events contribute to water induction for a conventional steam
cycle. It is interesting that only 18 percent of water induction incidents occur when the
unit is at load.
TDP-1 concepts
TDP-1 offers guidance on how to identify systems that have the potential to allow water
to enter the turbine and to design, control, maintain, test and operate these systems in a
manner that prevents any significant accumulation of water. This is the first line of
defense in preventing turbine water damage.
However, it is recognized that malfunctions do occur, so TDP-1 offers recommendations
for preventing turbine damage that include: detection of the presence of water either in
the turbine or, preferably, external to the turbine before the water has caused damage;
isolation of the water by manual or, preferably, automatic means after it has been
detected; and disposal of the water by either manual or, preferably, automatic means after
it has been detected. The philosophy of TDP-1 has been, and will continue to be, that "no
single failure of equipment, device, signal or loss of electrical power should result in
water or cold steam entering the turbine."
What is new in TDP-1?

TDP-1 includes several new items that address recent industry experience. These include
the addition of combined-cycle units and the application of modern control systems and
technology to turbine water damage protection.
The updated standard addresses the following:
Combined-cycle configurations such as High Pressure, Intermediate Pressure and
Low Pressure drums on Heat Recovery Steam Generators (HRSG)
Cascading and direct turbine bypass systems
Recommendations for process steam lines associated with co-generation
configurations
Recommendations on superheat attemperation at the outlet of the final superheater
of HRSG
Additional clarification of system drain requirements, including the use of drain
flash tanks and pumped condensate drain tanks
Recommendations for draining side and axial turbine exhaust orientations into the
condenser
Integrated control systems (ICS), such as distributed control system (DCS), into closed
and open feedwater heater level instrumentation and controls and expanded on the control
and automation criteria for turbine water induction protection systems.
To facilitate the discussion of combined-cycle configurations, TDP-1-2006 introduces the
concept of motive steam. Motive steam systems are systems that supply steam to a steam
turbine for the primary purpose of power production or to an auxiliary turbine, such as a
boiler feed pump drive turbine. The committee introduced the concept of motive steam to
incorporate combined-cycle configurations: HP, IP and LP drums, in addition to the
existing conventional steam (Rankine) cycle configurations.
Motive steam systems include:
Main steam
Hot and cold reheat steam

High pressure (HP) steam


Intermediate pressure (IP) steam
Low pressure (LP) steam
Admission steam
Motive steam systems do not include:
Extraction steam
Gland steam seal line
Recommendations for combined-cycle configurations
In this standard, a combined cycle is defined as a hybrid of the gas turbine (Brayton) and
steam (Rankine) cycles. Waste heat contained in the gas turbine exhaust is fed through an
HRSG that produces steam that is expanded through a condensing steam turbine to
produce power.
HRSG system configurations typically include as many as three steam drums, each with
level controlled by feedwater valve modulation and condensate or feed pump
recirculation, or similar method of controlling inflows. The same plant design
requirements that apply to other steam generators apply to HRSGs.
The use of attemperators external to the steam generator, downstream of the last
superheating (or reheating) element, is discouraged; however, it is recognized that under
some conditions it cannot be avoided. When this type of attemperator is required in the
motive steam line to control the temperature of the steam entering a steam turbine,
several additional features are recommended to provide adequate protection.
When a gas turbine cooling steam or power augmentation steam pipe is connected to a
motive steam line, this pipe should not be connected at or near the low point of the
motive steam pipe. If routing of this pipe creates a low point, a drain should be provided
from the pipe.
Turbine bypass systems
Turbine bypass systems should be provided with the same level of protection as motive
steam piping.

These should include drains and drain pots (if applicable) with power-operated drain
valves.
Attemperators in bypass systems that discharge to the cold reheat system (or any other
line connected back to the steam turbine) should be designed to the same requirements on
motive steam system attemperators. Non-return valves should be provided in the cold
reheat system to prevent the reverse flow of bypass steam into the steam turbine.
Designers should carefully consider the location, design and orientation of large steam
dumps (such as turbine bypasses) into the condenser.
Process (co-generation) steam
Process steam lines that are supplied from motive and extraction steam lines are a
potential source of water induction. Motive and extraction steam lines should be
protected from process steam lines with the following features:
Two power-operated block valves should be provided to isolate the motive steam
or extraction steam line from the process steam line. Any two of the following are
acceptable:

1. A pressure-reducing valve (control valve) with Fail-Closed capability (capable


of closing against the maximum reverse differential pressure)
2. A power-assisted non-return valve
3. A standard power-operated block valve
The designer should consider steam supply and process system upsets that might
result in cold steam admission to the motive/extraction steam line.
If an attemperator is required, it should be located downstream of the second
power operated block valve.
Recommendations for steam line drains
Drain location and types
There are three types of steam line drains:
Standard with power operated block valve

Drain Pot with power operated block valve


Drain Pot with redundant level elements and power operated block valve
Figure 4 shows a typical drain pot with redundant level elements. This configuration is
typically used in "high risk" areas. One change in this standard that is shown is the level
sensing device, which is labeled as a level element (LE). In past versions of the standard,
this device has been shown as a level switch.
In the revised version, the level element can be a level switch, a thermocouple or a
conductivity probe.
Drains should be installed at each low point in the motive steam piping. Drain Pots are
recommended at the following locations to enhance condensate collection:
Cold reheat line at first low point downstream of the steam turbine exhaust. (This
application requires redundant level elements.)
Motive steam lines that operate (admit steam to the steam turbine continuously)
with less than 100F (56C) superheat unless a continuous drain has been
provided. (This application requires redundant level elements.)
Motive steam lines with attemperators - e.g. attemperator in HP steam line. The
drain pot should be between the attemperator and the steam turbine. (This
application requires redundant level elements.)
Motive steam lines that are prone to water accumulation during operation, for
which large drain collection areas and/or water detection devices are desired.
Motive steam lines that will be under vacuum during steam turbine start-up and
shutdown.
Branches and legs that will be stagnant during various operating modes, unless a
continuous drain has been provided.
At the steam turbine end of long horizontal runs (more than 75).
Automatic drain control systems

As plant structures become more complex and a larger number of drains are involved,
plants are adding automatic controls to simplify operation. Any automatic control system
used to control steam line drain valves identified in this Standard should be designed so
that the system has a means of initiating automatic valve actuation and a separate means
of verifying the appropriateness of the automatic action. If an inappropriate action is
taken, an alarm should be provided. For example, if a drain valve is closed automatically
based on a timer, something other than the timer - such as a level element that would
alarm if water were still present in the steam line - should be used to verify that the timer
initiation was appropriate.
Condensate drains tanks
A typical condensate tank is shown in Figure 5. Critical issues include vent sizing,
redundancy of controls and redundancy of pumping equipment, including independent
power supplies. The following recommendations apply:
The cross-sectional area of the drain tank vent should be large enough to make
certain that the tank internal pressure, with all simultaneous drains open, will be
lower than that of the lowest pressure drain into the tank under all operating
conditions, including start-up and shutdown.
When the drain tank is connected to the condenser, the drain tank should provide
separation of entering condensate and steam from the drain source(s). The vent
line to the condenser should be large enough so that the tank pressure will be less
than the source pressures of all drains connected to the tank under all conditions.
Under startup and shutdown conditions, some of the drains might be close to
condenser pressure.
The tank drain line should be sized for the maximum service conditions. When a
drain pump is required, it should be actuated automatically based on drain tank
level. If a drain pump is required and its failure could possibly lead to water
entering the turbine, redundant drain pumps (supplied with power from separate
power sources) should be furnished, each controlled by an independent level
controller actuated automatically based on drain tank level. Independent level
signals indicating a high-high alarm condition in the tank should be provided in
the control room.

Connections for incoming drains on the tank should be located above the
maximum water level in the tank.
Axial or side turbine exhaust
Avoid discharging high-energy bypass steam into the area between the condenser
hotwell and the tube bundle
Locate the curtain spray and bypass sparger a safe distance from the condenser
tube bundles to allow a sufficient reduction in kinetic energy, so that high-energy
steam does not reach areas above and below the tube bundles and cause a
recirculation backflow with entrained water toward the turbine.
Determine an incidence angle of high-energy steam jets that will avoid reflected
velocity vectors toward the turbine exhaust.
Integrated control systems (ICS)
In the standard, an integrated control system (ICS) is defined as, "a control system
featuring multiple processors, input/output (I/O) modules and memory storage
interconnected through a communication network and equipped with redundant power
supplies. Normally, a distributed control system (DCS) or redundant programmable logic
controllers (PLCs) will meet this requirement."
The minimum ICS features to meet the reliability and redundancy needs addressed in this
standard are:
Dual processors
Uninterruptible power supply
I/O associated with redundant plant equipment, and that instruments should not be
connected to the same I/O cards.
Outputs that fail to know position during processor or internal communication
failure.
Conclusion

TDP-1-2006 was revised to include recent experience, modern instrumentation and


technology and combined-cycle systems. The overriding philosophy remains constant:
"No single failure of equipment, device or signal, or loss of electrical power, should result
in water or cold steam entering the turbine."
The Committee is currently working on TDP-2 for nuclear power plants. Look for it in
the near future.
This article was published with permission of the ASME Power Division. For more
information, visit www.asme.org.
Larry Kielasa is presently retired after serving 38 years with DTE Energy. During his
career, Kielasa served in a variety of engineering and management roles. He is a past
chair of the ASME Power Division, and is the current vice president of Financial
Operations at ASME and chairman of the ASME Turbine Water Damage Prevention
Committee. He has a bachelor's degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of
Michigan and a master's degree in Administration from Central Michigan University.
You may contact him by e-mailing editorial@woodwardbizmedia.com.
John Boyle is a senior engineering technical specialist at FM Global, a business property
insurer, where he works with companies in the power generation industry to help protect
their facilities from property-related risks. He is a member of the ASME Turbine Water
Damage Prevention Committee. He has a bachelor's degree in Engineering Science and
a master's degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of Rhode Island. You may
contact him by e-mailing editorial@woodwardbizmedia.com.
Ram G. Narula has more than 48 years of experience in the power industry, including 37
years with Bechtel Power Corporation, where he is vice president and chief technology
officer. He is a Fellow of the ASME International and the Vice Chair of the ASME
Turbine Water Induction Prevention Committee. Narula served on the ASME Codes &
Standards Board of Directors for 8 years. He has a B.S. degree in Mechanical
Engineering, an M.S. degree in Nuclear Engineering, and an M.B.A. degree. He has
published more than 100 technical papers and traveled to more than 60 countries. You
may contact him by e-mailing editorial@woodwardbizmedia.com.