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Reliability of a process, but which process?

Belief B may be products of different


processes in different people. Different processes influences other processes. S1s
noetic (and psychological) structure may make his belief B be formed by an
unreliable process, while S2s not. Example: musical expertise in identifying
chords.

For any irreducible phenomenological class, we are, in principle, unable to provide


non-circular epistemic grounds for the veridicality of that class?
Classes demarcated this way? boundaries marked by inability to provide noncircular epistemic grounds?

Generality problem also applies to processes with respect to their hopefulness?


What relation do the two reliability and hopefulness have?
Ontology of processes some processes have parts that have nothing to do with
belief formation, e.g. the process of forming a perceptual belief on Friday. That the
belief was formed on a Friday has nothing to do with the process of forming that
belief. But what does has nothing to do with mean? It cant be literal the belief
was formed on a Friday after all.
But doesnt this presuppose that we have some idea of what the correct process is?
How does the notion of reliability appear in everyday life? Suppose Tom is often
wrong regarding historical information. We have a defeater for his reliability
regarding history. But suppose he tells us about the history of X, and that he learned
about this from an authority on X. Then we have a defeater-defeater for his
reliability regarding X.
So the more we learn about the process, the more accurately we can say which
correct type the process belongs to.
But what does correct mean in correct type? It cannot mean having the
properties which correspond to the type, since this still leaves us with many types.
So we need another notion of correctness here. But what could that be? Carving
the process at its joints? What does this metaphor mean?
Firstly, such a metaphor assumes there are joints to carve. That is, nature has a
definite structure which cannot be carved arbitrarily. Unless the proponent of the
generality problem thinks nature isnt like this, we can assume for the sake of
discussion that nature does have such a structure.

Secondly, whatever is carved must be something with dispositions/powers/modal


reality. Otherwise, the process type only has one instantiation the one were
considering.
(Indeterminacy of matter -> generality problem?)
Suppose we can identify the correct type. Can we then check whether it is reliable?
But we must ask reliable in what contexts/environments? Is this a descriptive or
normative matter (the question of contexts)?
Tautology process types are reliable in environments they are reliable in. This
doesnt tell us how to distinguish between truth-conducive and non-truth-conducive
environments.
Second-order generality problem? -> Each environment where a particular process
type is located instantiates many types. But which is the correct type?
A different interpretation of reliability is needed? Why? Because construing
reliability in the above terms is unworkable; unusable for epistemic purposes.
Or do we do away with reliability all together? Should we create an error-theory for
reliability? In place of reliability, the experience of trustworthiness, but what is the
object of trust here? A person? But maybe we can only trust others if we trust
ourselves?
But surely reliability-talk is useful sometimes! For example, calculators are reliable.
How do we account for this? <- We have independent means of checking its
reliability. We believe they are reliable based on testimony.
Independent means This implies the (assumed) existence of a standard of truth.
(In the case of calculators: a priori intuition?)