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Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930

Author(s): Gabriela Recio


Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 2002), pp. 21-42
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875386
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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 34, 21-42 ? zoo2 CambridgeUniversity Press


DOI: Io.or17/Soozz226Xoioo6z89 Printed in the United Kingdom

21

Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition


and the Origins of the Drug Trade in
Mexico, 191o-9 3o*
GABRIELA RECIO
Abstract.EventhoughMexicohasbeenan importantplayerin the international
drugtrade,this country'shistoryin suchillegalventureshasbeeninsufficiently
studied.In an effortto beginto understand
how andwhenthe countrybeganto
be anactiveparticipant
in suchillicitmarkets,thisarticlefirstanalysesregulations
introducedin the United States regardingdrug and alcohol consumption,
marketingand productionand assessestheir impact on the Mexicanside.
in the narcoticstrade,the routes
Secondly,it arguesthatMexico'sparticipation
thathavedevelopedandtheMexicanstatesinvolvedin thistraffichaverootsthat
can be tracedto the beginningof the twentiethcenturyat least.

I. Introduction
In recent years the international community has been increasingly
concerned with the rise in volume of illegal drug trafficking.The wide
attention and media coverage that the issue has received might indicate
that it is a relativelyrecentproblem.However, the drug tradehas been the
subject of internationalconcern and debate for almost a century.In 1909
the first internationalconferenceon opium trafficand control was held in
Shanghai- under a joint British and US government initiative.1 This
meeting, attendedby delegates from thirteen differentcountries, marked
the beginning of a series of multilateralconferencesconvened in order to
eliminatethe manufacture,consumptionand tradeof opium, initially,and
in later years of morphine, cocaine and marihuana.2
In the last two decadesrelationsbetween Mexico and the United States
have been negatively affectedby drug-relatedproblems.On the one hand,
Mexico has been producing and exporting marihuana, heroin and
GabrielaRecio is a PhD candidateat El Colegio de Mexico.
* I would like to thank CarlosMarichal,Pablo Cotler and two anonymous refereesfor
their comments on earlierversions. All errors are, of course, entirely mine.
1

For a moredetailedaccountof the eventsthat led to the ShanghaiConferencesee

Antonio Escohotado, Historia de las Drogas, 2 (Madrid, i998), pp. 246-5 i.


2 Maria Celia Toro, Mexico's "War" on Drugs. Causesand Consequences
(Boulder, 1995), p.
5. The Hague Conference followed the Shanghai conference in 1911 see Escohotado,
Historia, pp. 257-6I and David F. Musto, La enfermedadamericana.Origenesdel control
antinarciticosen E.U. (Santa Fe de Bogoti, Colombia, I993), pp. 77-82.

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22

Gabriela
Recio

methamphetamineto its northern neighbour in increasing volumes.


Secondly, and more importantly,Mexicanterritoryhas been used as a key
transit route for drugs originating in other Latin Americancountries on
their final journey toward the US market. Although Mexico has
traditionallybeen an important drug producer, its principal role in the
internationaltraffickingarena has been that of distributor. It has been
estimated that by the mid-g99os approximately70 per cent of cocaine
entering the US marketsand roughly 30 per cent of the heroin and 80 per
cent of the marihuanaconsumed in the United States was provided by
Mexico.3
Although Mexico has been an importantparticipantin the history of
the drug trade,little is known regardinghow and when the countrybegan
to specialisein such illegal endeavours.This articleexplores the natureof
Mexico's involvement in the drug trade at the onset of the twentieth
century, arguing that the role Mexico has played as 'bootlegger', the
routes that have been developed and the states within the country that
have been heavily involved in this traffichave roots that can be tracedto
1910 at least.
Such an analysiswould not be complete if it did not discuss regulations
introducedby the United Statesregardingdrug and alcohol consumption,
marketingand production early in the twentieth century.The articlewill
examine the transformationof the drug market between 1900 and 1930,
by which time drug production and distributionwere totally prohibited
in the USA. By examiningdrug regulationchanges that occurredwithin
the United States between 1912 and 1928 and their effectson Mexico, we
can begin to understand how drug distribution networks geared to
supplying the US marketwith illegal substancesdeveloped in the latter.
2. How drugconsumption
anddistribution
becameillegal:changesin US policies

andregulations
In i900 opium and its derivatives (morphine and heroin), cocaine and
marihuanawere legal substancesthat could be purchased,sold and used
without any difficultyin the United States. These drugs could be bought
a Peter Andreas, 'The Paradox of Integration. Liberalizing and Criminalizing Flows
Across the U.S.-Mexican Border,' in Carol Wise (ed.), The Post-Nafta Political Economy.

MexicoandtheWesternHemisphere
(Pennsylvania,1998), p. 0o8.The Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) currently estimates that: a) two-thirds of the cocaine available in the

USA comes through Mexico; b) Mexico becamethe numberone supplierof heroin to

the USA in the 1970s, and today 29 per cent of the narcotic originates in Mexico; c)
from the 1930s to the 1960s Mexico supplied as much as 95 per cent of the marihuana
consumed in the USA.; and d) it is hard to quantify methamphetamine production in
Mexico and the USA, but according to the DEA it has seriously increased in the 199os.
This information can be obtained at www.usdoj.gov/dea/traffickers/mexico.

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andtheOrigins
US Prohibition
of theDrugTradein Mexico 23
or ordered by mail through differentstores. Additionally, their use was
not restrictedto reducingpain or counteringinsomnia.For example,until
1903cocainewas an active ingredientof the Coca-Colaformula,and Parke
Davis (the multinationalpharmaceuticalcompany, now part of Pfizer,
inc.) sold cigarettes,liquor, tablets and an injectableliquid based on coca
leaves. Similarly, Sears Roebuck's 1897 catalogue offered 'hypodermic
cases' that included a syringe, two needles, two morphine bottles and a
case for only
$I.50.4
Nevertheless, by this date several groups were alreadyindicating that
the use of certainmedications,such as morphine, could cause addiction.
The addictivenatureof these substanceshad become apparentpreviously
after the Civil War. Apparently,many injured soldiers had been treated
with morphine in order to reduce the pain caused by war injuries,
resultingin significantnumbersof militarymen addictedto the drug.5As
a result, the medical community began to publicise the habit-forming
propertiesof such medications.
By I895, around three percent of the population of the United States
was addicted to morphine.6The majority were high-income women known as habituds. These women were not considered outcasts nor
socially ostracised. On the contrary, they were believed to have a
physiological problem, which could be solved with certain medications.
Nonetheless, other groups of addictswere fearedby the majority:mostly
poor minoritiessuch as the Chineseand Mexicans(who lived mainlyin the
West) and the Blacks (mostly in the South).7
In the South, public perceptionregardingcocaine was linked to racist
prejudicesagainstblacks.It was believed that cocaine consumptionby the
black communitycould make them disregardthe barriersthat society had
established between different races.8 It was thought that 'cocaine
transformed hitherto inoffensive, law-abiding negroes into a constant
menace to the community ... sexual desires are increasedand perverted,
peaceful negroes become quarrelsome, and timid negroes develop a
degree of "Dutch courage" that is sometimes almost incredible.'9
Similarly,the West began an anti-Chineseand anti-opium campaign; in
1875,opium could not be smokedin the city of SanFranciscoand between
the years1877and i900, eleven westernstatesproclaimedanti-opiumlaws.
Correspondingly,the AmericanFederationof Labour(AFL) warnedin its
4 Eva Bertram,MorrisBlachman,Kenneth Sharpeand Peter Andreas,DrugWarPolitics.
ThePriceof Denial(Berkeley, 1996), p. 61.
5 Ibid.,pp. 62-3.
6
Ibid.,p. 61.
7 Ibid.,pp. 61-2.
8 Ibid., p. 64 and Escohotado, Historia, pp. 193-4.
9 E. H. Williams, 'The drug habit menace in the South', MedicalRecord,85, 1914, PP.

247-9. Quoted by Joseph F. Spillane,'Sale and control of cocaine in the US' in Paul
Gootenberg (ed.), Cocaine.GlobalHistories(New York, 1999), footnote z25,p. 45.

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24

Gabriela Recio

brochures against the Chinese, who were portrayedas assiduous opium


smokers. These leaflets reported that the Chinese had spread a mortal
habit among thousands of children in the United States and questioned
whether it was fair that 'Americans' be exposed to such an infection.'0
Such linking of ethnic groups and narcotics abuse was not only limited
to Chinese or Blacks: Mexicans were also labelled as avid marihuana
smokers. Furthermore,narcotics were not the only substance that was
attached to a specific group, since the Irish and Italians were clearly
associated with hard liquor drinking in the USA at the end of the
nineteenth century."1
'racist anti-vice' groups joined forces with other groups
By the 900oos

that were fighting prostitution and alcohol consumption and began to


lobby for drug and liquor control, inculcating a differentview towards
drug and alcohol consumption and commercialisationin United States
public opinion."2 By the beginning of the twentieth century a new
perception was emerging that drug consumption could not be morally
accepted and thereforeits use should be seriously restricted.In order to
protect its interest, in 1903 the PharmacistAssociation proposed that
opium and cocaine derivativesshould only be sold with an accompanying
medicalprescription.Both pharmacistsand the medicalprofessionwanted
to regulatethe use of drugs but were opposed to total prohibition.In this
regard, doctors insisted that both drug supply and prescriptionsusing
narcoticsshould be left to physicians.laThese conflictingviews led to the
formulationof the Pure Food and Drug Act in I906. This law established
that all patented medication containing narcotics in its formula should
indicate this informationon the label.14
Nonetheless, the anti-vice groups were not satisfied with the new
regulationsand sought stricterlaws, lobbying for total drug and alcohol
control on a nationalscale. Some measureshad been taken in the last two
decades of the twentieth century: in 1883 opium import duties were
raised,and in 1887 more restrictionswere imposed for those wanting to
import opium into the USA and Chinese immigrantswere forbidden to
import any sort of drugs. Finally, in 1890 it was decreed that only US
citizens were allowed to manufactureopium in its smokable form."5
10 Bertram et
al., Drug War, p. 64 and Escohotado, Historia, p. 18z. Probably the AFL was
more worried regarding the jobs that the Chinese were taking away from US citizens
and thus used the 'infection idea' to fight competition.
12 Bertram et al., Drug War, p. 72.
11 Escohotado, Historia, p. 236.
13 Bertram et al.,
War,
63
Drug
p.
Ibid. and Escohotado, Historia, pp. 145-8. Before the Pure Food and Drug Act almost
14
all pain medications contained opium or cocaine but consumers were unaware of this
fact. Bertram et al. indicate that once the companies were required to put labels in their
products, consumption was negatively affected.
15 Bertram et al., Drug War, p. 65 and Escohotado, Historia, p. 181.

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US Prohibition
andtheOrigins
of theDrugTradein Mexico 25
By the end of the nineteenthcentury,then, nation-wideprohibition of
opium consumption and distribution was not yet established. Nevertheless, these new regulationswere alreadyinducing the creationof black
marketsacross the country.
3. TheHarrisonNarcoticsTax Act andthe VolsteadAct: Prohibition
begins
One of the main reasons behind US support of the ShanghaiConference
was the fact that, once the war with Spainhad ended in 1898, the country
was facedwith the need to resolve opium addictionboth in the Philippines
and among US soldiers.16 Prior to 1898 the Spanish had established a
license system regarding opium sales in the Philippines, thus rendering
opium consumptionlegal in that country." To this effect, CharlesBrent,
the PhilippinesEpiscopal Bishop, convinced PresidentTheodore Roosevelt to summon an internationalconference,held in Shanghaiin
909.18
Following this conference,severalUS congressmenattemptedto prohibit
narcotic import and usage once and for all. Pharmacistsand physicians
proposed a stricter regulation but opposed a total ban."1
In 1914 the United States Congress approvedthe HarrisonAct, which
established three mandates for those who distributed or manufactured
drugs:20
i. All transactionsshould be registeredwith the FederalGovernment.
2. A sales tax was to be imposed on the sale of such substances.21
3. A medical prescriptionwas requiredto buy any drug.22
Initiallyit appearedthat this new law would finallylimit narcoticuse and
allow the medical profession to regulate its use. However, quite what
with
'writinga prescriptionguidedby his/her goodfaith and in accordance
meant
was
never
This
vacuum
professional
practice'
clearlydefined.2"
legal
Bertramet al., Drug War,pp. 65-6 and Escohotado, Historia,pp. 239-46. Escohotado
mentions that by the end of the war, opium consumption-previously restrictedto the
Chinese community- increased its use in all ethnic and social groups as well as in
women and adolescents.Furthermore,opium consumptionincreasedconsiderablyas a
result of a choleraepidemic in 19oz02.
Finally, this author indicatesthat the US military
also increased opium use since one soldier out of three was addicted. Escohotado,
Historia,p. z40.
17 By I86o there were 478 legally establishedpublic opium smoke houses. Additionally,
there were around
customers who individuallyconsumed around three grams
5,000
daily. Escohotado, Historia,
p. 242.
8s Bertramet al., Drug War,p. 65 and Escohotado, Historia,pp. z40-I and 243-6.
19 Bertramet al., Drug War,p. 66.
20 Ibid., p. 68.
21 With this regulationa new interestgroup appeared,since the TreasuryDepartmentwas
16

responsible for collecting this tax.


22
23

The law establishedthat only physicians- guided by good faith and in accordancewith
professionalpractice- were allowed to write prescriptions.
Musto, La enfermedad,p.

I5

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26

GabrielaRecio

allowed the Treasury Department, which was in charge of administering


the Harrison Act24 - to issue its regulations relating to the matter. Thus,
for example the Treasury specified more precisely what it meant: that the
physicianshouldprogressivelyreducedosesprescribedto addicts,and went further
by implementing programmes that were quite aggressive with different
groups. For example, doctors and pharmacists who prescribed 'drugs' to
persons and those found in possession of any narcotic were frequently
arrested.25 By 1921 the Narcotics Division employed 170 agents and had
already sent 1,583 doctors and pharmacists to prison.26 The attack on the
medical and pharmaceutical professions continued unabated for almost a
decade; it was not until 1930 that the Narcotics Division began to gear its
attention towards traffickers and bootleggers.27
By 1922 a range of different court rulings had transformed the Harrison
Act into a totally prohibitionist law. However, drugs were not alone in
the 'forbidden substance' category, since the 1919 Volstead Act had
already prohibited alcohol production and consumption. During those
years addicts began to be considered as criminals and traffickers replaced
physicians. Narcotics' markets had few restrictions at the end of the
nineteenth century, but by the early twentieth century became illegal
endeavours, producing millions of dollars in profits for those involved."
By the early 1920s an important interest group opposed to drug
consumption had developed within the Treasury Department, with some
sympathisers inside the State Department. This group not only started to
fight consumption inside the United States but also believed that the
problem could be solved by reducing production in the countries
responsible for supplying different narcotics. It was hypothesised that if
producer countries totally prohibited drug production, then prices would
become exorbitant hence leaving US consumers unable to purchase drugs.
Therefore, Mexico - which was a producer as well as distributor of
different drugs and liquors - came under systematic Treasury - as well as
State Department - surveillance during this prohibitionist phase. As
Nadelmann mentions,
throughout the 193os, a combination of drug enforcement agents, Treasury
agents, customs officialsfrom borderstations,and US consularofficialscontinued
to collect information on the smuggling of drugs across the [Mexican]border.
Their work often was undertakendiscreetly, even covertly, with the Mexican
governmentbeing kept in the darkabout many of the Americans'antismuggling
24

25

First, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue and, in


Division created as part of the Prohibition Unit.

Bertramet al., Drug War, p. 69.

27 David F. Musto, La enfermedad,p.


28

26
2

1920,

through a new Narcotics

Ibid., p. 73.

I5.

The case of Governor Cantti,discussed later, gives a rough idea of the income that
these illegal markets provided.

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US Prohibition
andtheOrigins
of theDrugTradein Mexico z27
activities.Indeed,even the consularofficialswere not alwaysnotifiedof the
agents'comingsand goings.29
in Mexico
4. Theeffectsof Prohibition
The new regulations imposed by the US government on alcohol
consumptionand productionas well as on drug consumption,import and
manufacturinghad profound consequencesin Mexico. Total prohibition
created black markets worth millions of dollars, and the long border
shared with the United States encouraged the expansion of liquor and
narcotic marketson the Mexican side.
Even though alcohol prohibition was repealedin the United Statesin
1933, it is importantto analysethe effectsof such prohibitionon Mexico.
Apparently, the Mexican states that were involved in smuggling this
product were not necessarily the same as were engaged in drug
production and distribution. In fact, there was a 'country' as well as
'state' specialisationin product manufactureand commercialisation.As a
result, Canadabegan by exporting liquors to the United States while
Mexico mostly specialisedin opium and marihuanadistribution."aWithin
Mexico the states that engaged in drug production and distributionwere
those in the Northwest (BajaCalifornia,"'Sonora,Chihuahua,Sinaloaand
Nayarit) (see Map I). The border states, however, were mostly involved
with alcohol trafficking, illegally distributing beers and attemptingwithout much success- to distil some beverages.
a) The VolsteadAct andits impacton Mexico
By 1915, the states of California and Arizona had prohibited the
establishmentof alcohol vending saloons. Even though Californiahad not
been declareda 'dry state', the Women's ChristianTemperanceUnion of
ImperialValley, California,was lobbying in favour of alcohol prohibition
and hoped that regulationswould be imposed and enforced promptly.32
29

Ethan A. Nadelmann,CopsAcrossBorders.TheInternationali.Zation
of U.S. CriminalLaw

Enforcement (Pennsylvania, I993), p. 96. It is interesting to note that Nadelmann's


analysis of the US-Mexico border from the end of the nineteenth century to the 19zo20s
does not mention any drug related problems. See his section 'Border Troubles', pp.
60-76.
30 Toro, Mexico's"War"; Bertram et al., Drug War, as well as the Records of the

Departmentof State (81z. I14/Liquors)of the WashingtonNational Archives indicate


that this was the case, although much of the whisky exported by Canadato the United
Statescame from Englandand Scotland.As is well known Mexico is not celebratedfor
its whisky production.
a31 At the time Baja Californiawas a territoryand comprised what now are the states of
Baja CaliforniaNorte and Baja CaliforniaSur.
32 Women's TemperanceUnion to CharlesH. Randall,House of Representatives,District
of California,

29

Nov. I915, Washington National Archives and Records, Records of

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28

GabrielaRecio

Sonora

jiiiiiii,
ii'ii
i ii~
iiii::i~
::i:::

Baja BajaChihuahua,
California

Territory
Durango

Sinaioa
Nayarit

Map I.The Northwestern Territory

The group's main concern was that the water that the Valley received
originatedclosely to the town of Mexicaliin the BajaCaliforniaterritory
on the Mexicanborder. Mexicali(see Map z), as the women pointed out,
was filled with numerous saloons that sold alcohol and could therefore
pollute the water that they drank. They therefore demandedthat if the
state of Californiawent 'dry', it should also includethe city of Mexicali."3
The secretary of state consequently instructed the person in charge
of Mexican Interests at Mexico City to discuss the matter with the
Mexican government.34
At the time, not only were people in the USA worried about alcohol
consumption. Some Mexican groups, including Venustiano Carranza
(president 1917-I920), were worried about alcoholism in Mexico.
Carranzaasked the lawyer Eduardo Fuentes to prepare a thorough
analysis of the problem and to propose concrete recommendationsin
order to solve it. Fuentes requested help on the matter from the US
government and a copy of US regulationsrelatingto alcohol production
and consumption prohibition.35Yet Carranzawas not the first revthe Department of State relating to internal affairs of Mexico
19910-929,

812.114/

33 Ibid.
Liquors/i. Hereaftercited as WNA with its respective number.
34 Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Charles Parker, 14 Dec. 19'5. WNA,
8I12.114/Liquors/I.It should be mentioned that Mexico was then going through one
of the most violent years of the Revolution (191 o0-920).
5* WNA, 812.II 4/Liquors/2. Carranzaas well as the 'sonorenses' who ruled Mexico in
the 1920s were concerned about the high volume of pulque consumption as well as
alcoholism in general.

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US Prohibition
andthe Originsof the Drug Tradein Mexico
2

29

5
1. Tijuana(BC)
2. Tecate (BC)

11
8

3. Ensenada(BC)
4. Mexicali(BC)
5. Muleg' (BC)
6. CiudadJubrez(Chih)

7. Nogales (Son)
8. Culiachn(Sin)
9. Piedras Negras (Coah)
10. Matamoros (Tamps)
11. Progreso (Yuc)
Map z. Cities Involved in the Alcohol and Drug Trade

olutionary leader to ban alcohol consumption and production in Mexico;


Francisco Villa, in his home state of Chihuahua, had introduced such
measures much earlier."3
Even though Mexico and the USA were concerned about the
consumption and production of alcohol in their territories, important
differences also existed. Both countries wanted to solve the 'addictive'
nature of the problem, but the groups that proposed more stringent
regulations differed substantially in both nations. In the USA it was public
opinion, in the form of different pressure groups - such as the Women's
Christian Temperance Unions - that lobbied for more rigorous regulations.37 In contrast, in Mexico rules were imposed from top to bottom:
the president and the governors issued regulations with apparent lack of
several
public support.38 During the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920)
states prohibited liquor production and consumption. For example, the
state of Durango prohibited the sale and manufacture of alcohol and in
Mexico City all pulqueriaswere forced to close down by decree.39 Sanctions
36

37
38

Vice Consul of Durango to the Secretaryof State, 4 March 1916. WNA, 812.114,
Liquors/3.
The impactof public opinion in the USA is betterdescribedin Joseph F. Spillane,'Sale
and control of cocaine in the USA', in Paul Gootenberg (ed.), Cocaine.
It was only in 1919 when the MexicanNational Anti-Alcohol Leagueappeared.Mexico
City Consulateto the Departmentof State, April 19g9. WNA, 8Iz.I14/Liquors/9.
Durango Vice Consulto the Secretaryof State,4 MarchI916. WNA, 812.1 14/Liquors/
3.

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30

Gabriela
Recio

for violating alcohol prohibitiondifferedin kind, the most extremebeing


death in Chihuahuaand Sinaloa.40
Although the stategovernmentsissued laws prohibitingthe production
and sale of differentliquors, these were often disregardedby officialsdue
to their negative impact on fiscal revenues. The US consul at Durango
explainedthat anti-alcohollaws had not been enforced because no other
source had been found to compensate for the loss of fiscal income
generatedby alcohol sales.41Although some membersof Mexico's ruling
elites favouredanti-alcohollaws, they were reluctantto apply them due to
their inabilityto find alternativesources of fiscal revenue in the midst of
the Revolution.
Fiscal earnings were not the only reason why some governors were
unwilling to enforce these laws. On the other side of the border,
Prohibitionhad createdlucrativeblackmarkets,which could provide vast
amounts of money to those willing to participatein them. The governor
of the Baja Californiaterritory- Esteban Canti -42 is a case in point.
In March 1919, Cantuisent a US emissary to meet the head of the
Prohibition Movement in California. In these conversations, Cantu's
representativeexplainedthat
notwithstandingthe fact that the Governor is now receivingsomethinglike a half
million dollars annually from the "Drink" and its associated vices in Lower
California,with the prospectof largelyincreasedborderbusinessafterProhibition
is enforced in the United States, the Governor will gladly abolish the same on a
twenty-milezone borderingthe United Statesfor the paymentto him personally

of FourHundredThousandAmericanDollars.43

Cant6iproposed to establish a 'dry zone' not by decree but through a


popularelection within the territory.Furthermorehe guaranteedthat if an
agreementwere reachedthe dry zone would last two years, after which
40 Mazatlin Consulate to the Department of State. WNA, 812.I 14/Liquors and Treasury's
Department Customs Division to the Secretary of State, 29 March 19x7. WNA,
812.x 14/Liquors/6.
41 Durango Vice Consul to the Secretary of State, 4 March 1916. WNA, 812. i14/Liquors/
3.
42

According to Javier Garciadiego,Cantui'took advantageof Mexico's border with the


USA as well as the "dry" nature of the neighbouring state of California... granted
numerous concessions for the establishment of canteens, casinos ... although some
claim that he also gave concessions for brothels and opium smoke houses. In addition

to these sources, he had control over the state budget and over some custom houses.'
In 'Esteban Cantuiy la revoluci6n en el distrito norte de la Baja California(tan lejos
de Dios y tan cerca de ... )', 1979, Mimeo, p. 19, my translation.
4a Walter F. Boyle, Mexicali Consul, to the Secretary of State,
812. II4/Liquors/8.

28 March 1919. WNA,


It should be noted that in the same letter Boyle indicated that 'I

have the honor to inform you that with the advent of prohibition in the United States
that there is a possibility that the progressiveGovernor of Lower California may also
advocate a "a dry zone" on the border of the United States.' Italics are mine.

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US Prohibition
andtheOrigins
of theDrugTradein Mexico 31
negotiations would be resumed aimed at reaching a new monetary
agreement.44
The passing in 1919 of the Volstead Act in the United States had
differentconsequences in Mexico. As mentioned above, Californiaand
Arizona had prohibited saloons and casinos in their states prior to 1919,
stimulating the opening of these businesses on the Mexican side of the
border. After 1919, the saloon enterprisesin Mexico were booming and
alcohol trafficking into the United States had become even more
profitable.
By the 1920s much of the brewing and distilling factories in the USA
were closing down. Some, however, decidedto move theirentirefactories
to Mexico, as was the case of a new whisky plant inauguratedin the city
of PiedrasNegras, Coahuila,in 1920. The factory owners were Mexican
and US citizens who planned to sell their product in Mexico and other
Latin American countries.45 Apparently the Mexican consulate in
PiedrasNegras saw no dangerin the distillery'sbusiness,but the Treasury
Departmentthought otherwise. The latter was informed that a chain of
differentwhisky factorieswas being establishedalong the Coahuilaborder
and that these intended to send all production to the United States.46
TreasuryDepartmentassumptionsproved to be on the right track since,
in 1926, a second new distillery opened operations in Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua;the owners were from Colorado and expected to send all
production to their home state.47
In the yearsof 1922and 1923therewere severalprojectsby US brewery
owners from the state of California- to establisha breweryin the border
city of Nogales in Sonora.48Prohibition had seriously affected these
businessmenand they were trying to sell their factoriesor to relocatethem
entirelyto Mexico so that they could resumeproduction. Apparently,the
city of Nogales did not have a brewery,and these entrepreneurscalculated
yearly beer sales - from beer brought from different factories in
Hermosillo, Chihuahua and Monterrey-at $2o0,ooo pesos (approximately $125,ooo dollars). Consequently,the plan was to establish a new
breweryin Nogales to supplyexisting demand.49Similarly,in 1926 several
Ibid.Unfortunately,thereis no furtherinformationon whetherthe deal was carriedout
or not. However, Garciadiegoindicatesthat by 19zo20
Cantuihad been dismissed from
officeand was living in California.This might indicatethat the deal did not go through
as he expected. Garciadiego'Esteban Cantuiy la ... ', p. 35.
45 PiedrasNegras Vice Consul, 7 April 1920. WNA, 81r.6586.
46 Secretaryof Treasuryto the Secretaryof the State Department,22zJune 1922. WNA,
44

812.6586/2.

4 John W. Dye, Ciudad Julirez Consul, to the Secretary of State,

49

8I2.6586/14.
WNA, 812.6586/4.

48 WNA,

812.6586/4,

Iz

Feb. 1926, WNA

5 and 8.

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32

Gabriela
Recio

US entrepreneurswere granted a license in the state of Tamaulipas


to build a brewery in the city of Matamoros.50
Prohibition in the United Stateshad other importantconsequences.It
tremendously encouraged the expansion of the Mexican beer industry
during a dire economic period. By 1923 Consul Bowman in Mexico City
reported that this industry was second in importance within the
manufacturingsector.51The consul observed that this expansionwas due
to an increase in beer demand, but most importantlyto the absence of
US beer within the Mexican market. Prohibition left Mexican brewers
with no competition from imported US beers for more than a decade.52
The enforcement of this law from i919 to 1933 encouraged Mexican
brewers to begin exporting their products to other Latin American
markets which had once been supplied with US beers. The Asociaci6n
Nacional de Fabricantesde Cerveza(National Association of Beer Manufacturers)created in 1922, asked the Central Bank to help them with
their payment collection from abroad.53The US dry law also spurred
construction of new beer factories in Mexico. Apparently, the new
Modelo Brewery54in Mexico City, which had to stop construction in
1922 due to economic problems, resumedactivities due to the industry's
bright future.55Thus, a direct correlationexisted between the industry's
expansion and the imposition of the Volstead Act.
The effectsof the Volstead Act on public administrationcircles should
be analysedat federal as well as state level. The governments of Alvaro
Obreg6n (1920-24)

and Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-28)

supported the

establishmentof laws that would seriouslycontrol alcohol productionand


consumption. Indeed, several US anti-vice groups lobbied their government to recognise Obreg6n's administrationofficially.56The president
considered nationally prohibiting the planting of agavesto eliminate
pulque consumption throughout Mexico."5
At the state level, the situation was somewhat different.During the
Revolution strict laws were imposed regardingalcohol consumptionand
production. Conversely, by the 1920Slaws had graduallybecome more
50

52 Ibid.
51
WNA, 812.6586/7.
WNA, 812.6586/15 and 16.
5a Archivo Manuel G6mez Morin (AMGM), Memorandum by the Asociaci6n Nacional
de Fabricantes de Cerveza to Banco de Mexico, n.d., Vol. 310o,Exp. io85.
This brewery currently produces 'Corona' - which is among the ten highest selling
54
beers in the world.
55 WNA, 812.6586/7.
56 Obreg6n's governmentwas not recogniseduntil Sept. 1923. For example,the 'Federal
Bible Class of Douglas Arizona' asked that Obreg6n be recognized since he had
promised to impose a dry zone on the Mexican side. WNA, 812.II4/Liquors/I8.
5 Mexico City Consulate Report, 16 Dec. 2922. WNA, 812.114/Liquors/z27. This report
concluded that the roots of Mexico's backwardness would be eliminated if the above

policy were implemented.

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US Prohibition
andthe Originsof the Drug Tradein Mexico

33

permissive regarding alcohol purchases." This was probably due to the


fact that state governments were in need of income and important taxes
were collected from liquor production and consumption. The consul in
Ciudad Juirez, Chihuahua, indicated that anti-alcohol laws were quite
flexible and were not enforced.59 This flexibility was accompanied by an
increase in beer taxes as well as on the prices charged for issuing an
alcohol-selling license. One example of the importance of the brewing
industry in the country's fiscal revenues is that by 1925 brewers
contributed roughly 27 per cent of total taxes obtained from the
manufacturing sector.60
Finally, liquor smuggling increased considerably during the I9zos.
Most of this illegal traffic was handled by land, but maritime routes on the
Pacific as well as the Gulf Coast were also important. The consul in
Progreso, Yucatin, indicated that Perez Island served as a storage place
for liquors in transit that were finally transported by vessels from Florida
to the United States.61 On the Pacific coast the port of Ensenada served
as an important base for all the liquor in transit to the Western United
States. The consul in that city reported in 1924 that US demand was quite
considerable since most of the liquor that arrived in the city was rapidly
shipped to US markets."6
b) The Harrison Act and its impact on Mexico
The drug trade in Mexico has long been the focus of investigation of
Mexican as well as United States government agents. Collaboration
between the two countries to attempt to regulate the traffic can be traced
to the beginning of the twentieth century. By 1912 - two years before the
Harrison Act was passed - the Consul at Chihuahua was already working
together with special agents of the Treasury Department in El Paso,
Texas, and with the Governor of Chihuahua to capture opium shipments
that had originated in the port of Manzanillo, Colima.63
By i916 the Treasury Department had begun exerting pressure on
Mexico through the State Department to prohibit smoking opium
"5 This can be observed in the laws emitted by the states of Sonora, Coahuila,Durango,
San Luis Potosi, Chihuahuaand the Baja CaliforniaTerritory. In WNA, 812.114/
59 WNA, 81z.x
Liquors.
I4/Liquors/23.

so Calculatedwith AMGM,Memorandum
respectoa los impuestosque gravana la
industria cervecera, 19 Dec. 1924, Vol. 309, Exp. 1084, and Enrique Cirdenas, La
haciendapiblicay la politica econdmica(Mexico, 1994), Cuadro A.z6.

ConsulGaylordMarshto Secretary
of State,io Aug. 1921.WNA,812.1II4/Liquors/2 5.
6x
62
Consul Leighton Hope, 28 April 1924. WNA,
8iX2.TI4/Liquors/39.

63

Consul Lechter to Secretary of State, 9 Jan. 1912. WNA, 8I2.II4/Narcotics/I.

The

consul also indicatedthat Ming Wo, a Chineseresidentin CiudadJuirez (Chihuahua),


had receivedby mail an opium packageworth $8,oo000
pesos. Wo was laterarrestedsince
opium smoking was prohibited in that state.

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34

GabrielaRecio

imports. Mexico had signed the InternationalOpium Convention, which


had agreed to ban imports of such substances (Chapter 2, Article 7).
Nevertheless, Treasury Department reports indicated that Mexico
continued to import the drug through the port of Ensenada in Baja
California.The TreasuryDepartmentwas concernedsince it had evidence
that Mexico imported crude opium, converting it into the smoking
version and later exporting it to the United States.64That same year the
Departmentalso reportedthat EstebanCantui,governorof BajaCalifornia,
had given a concessionto David Goldbaum- who representeda syndicate
of Chinese opium dealers- for the handling of smoking opium. 5 The
TreasuryDepartmenttherefore continued to urge the State Department
that it should continue to press Mexico to officiallyban all drug imports
into its territory.
Cantui:therent-seeker
i) Governor
Governor Canttinot only obtained a considerableincome from alcohol
smuggling, but his earnings were also vastly increased by opium
trafficking.It seems that Cantui'sinvolvement in drug smuggling was
associated with his authority as governor to issue different types of
licenses and concessions. For example,in the case of Goldbaum'slicense
allowing him to sell and commercialise opium smoking, Cantudhad
charged a fixed fee of $45,000 and monthly instalmentsof $Io,ooo.66It
appears that this was one out of many licenses that the Governor had
granted since the Treasury's Department special agents reported that
these had also been given to Chinesecitizens.67Clearly,Cantuihad fruitful
drug dealings; as Governor he single-handedly prohibited opium
consumptionand trade,thus legally allowing him to seize such substances.
According to TreasuryDepartmentagents, confiscateddrugs were sold
by the governor or resold to the originalowners at a much higher price.68
The State Department correspondence suggests that in the period
1916-I920 all opium related trafficwas circumscribedto Baja California
and in some way or another involved the Cantuifamily.69In terms of
64

Assistant Secretaryof the TreasuryDepartmentto the Secretaryof State, 16 March

65

1916. WNA, 81z.II4/Narcotics/6.


Several letters in WNA,
and 13.
812.I14/Narcotics/i2
The correspondence does not mention if the quantities were in pesos or dollars. Agent

66

Johnson to the Collector of Customs (Los Angeles),

29

Sept. 1916. WNA,

812. I 14/Narcotics/12.

67
69

Collector (Los Angeles), IzOct. 1916. WNA,


Report of the Customs Deputy
68

WNA, 812.II4/Narcotics/Iz,
13 and 15.
8Iz.II4/Narcotics/I3
WNA, 8x2.114/Narcotics/
5. It was also reported that the Governor was addicted to
morphine and that this explained his protection to the opium industry. Office of the

Collector, U.S. Customs Service, TreasuryDepartment,to the Secretaryof State, 26


Dec. 1917. WNA, 812.1I4/Narcotics/19.

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US Prohibition
andtheOrigins
of theDrugTradein Mexico 35
describing the opium market that developed in those years in the Baja
California territory, it can be reasonably established that opium was
imported through the EnsenadaPort and later consumed locally as well
as exported to the United States.Opium was not commerciallyplantedin
Mexico and was therefore imported from Liverpool, Geneva and
Germany."7The cargo ships travelled from Europe through the Panama
Canaland had stopovers at Corinto in Nicaragua; SalinaCruz, Oaxaca;
Manzanillo,Colima; Mazatlin, Sinaloa; and finally arrivedin Ensenada,
Baja California." Once the opium arrivedin Baja California,Cantuisold
the merchandiseto the Chinese in the city of Los Angeles.72
Some studies have evaluated Cantui'sterm in office as a by-productof
the autonomy from central government in Mexico City that he enjoyed.
These indicate that the distance separatingthe Baja Californiaterritory
from centralMexico, as well as the lack of transportationsuch as railways
explain the territory'slack of involvement during the Revolution. It is
also mentionedthat Cantuiwas able to obtain resources(which proceeded
from cotton as well as canteens) within the territory and thus was
relatively free to make decisions compared to other Governors at the
time.73The correspondenceanalysed so far suggests that the origin of
Canti's income derivedmainlyfrom vice-relatedoperationsand that this,
in conjunctionwith the territory'sisolation, probablyallowed him greater
freedom during his term in office. The Governor even affirmedthat his
government would gladly prohibit the opium tradeonce he could obtain
alternativeresourcesthat would compensatethe loss incurredfrom such
a lucrative business."
Lastly, it should be mentioned that Cantd- and Mexicansin generalwere not alone in the drug traffickingbusinessof the time. It also involved
US citizens, Chinese,Rumanians,Palestinians,Spaniards,French, Greeks
and Japanese." The involvement of so many nationalitiesas well as the
distribution routes in the opium traffic indicate that narcotic illegal
marketshave for a long time been internationalin character.It also points
to the fact that Mexico and the United States- as supplierand consumer
respectively- were alreadyplaying an importantpart in such a lucrative
internationalmarket from the beginning of the twentieth century. As
Gootenberg mentions 'drugs as commodities or illicitly, have never
respected national borders, which in part is what building prohibition
70

71
7

WNA, 81z.114/Narcotics/16 and 61.


16 and 72.
72 WNA, 812.114/Narcotics/Is.
WNA, 812.I14/Narcotics/i5,
Garciadiego, 'Esteban Cantniy la ...' and Joseph Richard Werner 'Esteban Cantti y la
Revoluci6n Mexicana en Baja California', Historia Mexicana, 30: 1, (July-September,
1980).
4 WNA, 812.11 4/Narcotics/o20.
This can be observed in WNA, 812.114/Narcotics.

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36

GabrielaRecio

walls is all about, and one reason why their builders also move to
internationalise them.'76
ii) The z92os: The beginningsof drugproductionin Mexico and the
professionalisationof trafficking
The 1920s saw the emergence of more stringent laws regarding drug
consumption and commercialisation in the United States. Rigorous laws
were imposed on a national and state level in Mexico and it was in this
decade that traffickers became planters in several states. Smugglers took
the offensive and began planting opium in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa,
Nayarit, Chihuahua and Durango. Along with planting, the northwestern77 territory consolidated itself as the most important drug
distribution network in the country whose principal market was the
United States.
During the decade the Mexican government established that special
permits should be obtained in order to import marihuana and opium into
the country. It was also ruled that drug stores should record all
transactions that involved these substances in special books.78 In addition,
in I920 the government published the 'Disposicionessobre el comerciode
productosquepuedenser utiliZadospara fomentar vicios que degeneranla razay
sobreel cultivodeplantas quepuedenser empleadasconel mismofin. " The first
stipulation established that:
A permit issued by the Health Departmentis necessaryin order to introduce to
Mexico opium, morphine,heroin and cocaine; a permit is also needed to import
by-productsof such drugs that could lead to addiction. Such permits would be
granted to drugstores that have a licensed pharmacistin their premises.80
Provision five prohibited cultivating and marketing marihuana but the
sixth established that 'opium poppies as well as extraction of its byproducts could only be handled with a Health Department permit.'81 At
the state level, similar laws were imposed. For example, in 1923 Yucatin
Governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto established under decree 308 that
whoever engaged without a state permit in trading marihuana, opium,
76 Paul Gootenberg, 'Cocaine: the hidden stories,' in Gootenberg, Cocaine, p. 8.

78

81

This corridorwas servedby the PacificRailwayand joinedthe statesof Jalisco,

Nayarit, Sinaloa and Sonora. The state of Chihuahua and the Territory of Baja
California were also part of this corridor.
This ruling was very similar to the ones imposed on drug stores in the USA by the

HarrisonLaw.WNA, 812.I14/Narcotics/66, 68 and 72.

Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, 15 March 1920. It can be translated as: Provisions


regarding the trade of products that can be used to encourage vices which degenerate
mankind (or race) and on the planting and harvesting of plants that can be used for that
purpose.
80 Ibid., author's translation.
Fines ranging from $100oo
to $45,000ooopesos were imposed on those who infringed the
law. Ibid.

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andthe Originsof theDrug Tradein Mexico


US Prohibition

37

ether, heroin, morphine, cocaine and other chemical products that could
be hazardous to health would be sentenced to seven years in prison.82
Thus, in those years the US consuls continuously sent the State Department lists including the names of companies as well as people that
had been allowed by the Mexican government to trade with such
substances.83

Not only the states were addressing the drug-smuggling issue, in 1921
the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior launched an intense campaign,
informing its readers about drug trafficking operations that were taking
place in different border states. The article indicated that several customs
employees in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and Ciudad Juairez, Chihuahua,
were involved in drug smuggling. It also mentioned that a man had been
captured because he had introduced a kilogram of heroin from the United
States for his personal use. The newspaper disapproved of the way that the
authorities had handled the case, since after spending only five days in jail
and paying a small fine, the man had been set free.84 This article is
interesting in that it illustrates how some groups in Mexico were already
concerned about the drug problem, while others saw no harm in
consuming heroin.
That same year Excelsior widely supported the anti-drug campaign that
the city was carrying out. The newspaper reported on how police raids
were being launched in different coffeehouses suspected of selling drugs.85
Police arrests took place in border towns as well; in the city of Ciudad
Juairezmorphine, cocaine, heroin, marihuana and opium worth $300,000
dollars had been the result of police seizures. What stands out in this
police operation is that even though most of the drugs were destroyed, a
third of them were sent to state hospitals so that they could be properly
handled.86
Some authors have claimed that the current United States government
war on drugs has for some years been focused mainly on attacking the
supply side, while the demand side problem has been seriously ignored.87
Yucatin to the Secretary of State, 12 Feb. 1923. WNA,
812.114/Narcotics/62.
8 and March I923.
83 Authorised narcotics dealers in Guadalajara, Jalisco and Guerrero,
12
WNA, 812.II14/Narcotics/65 and 66.
84 Translation of the Excdlsior newspaper article 'Contraband Along the Frontier', 20
Feb. i923. George Summerlin, Embassy of the United States to the Secretary of State,
21 Feb.i923. WNA,
812.I 14/Narcotics/63.
85 George Summerlin, Embassy of the United States to the Secretary of State, 8 June
1923. WNA, 812.114/Narcotics/73.
It is interesting to
86 Consul John Dye, 24 March 1923. WNA, 812.1 4/Narcotics/67.
82 Consul of Progreso,

note that more than two thirds of the drugs that were seized consisted of marihuana
which according to the consul could yield two million cigarettes. At the time the
market value of a marihuana cigarette in the USA was two cents.
87

Such as Toro, Mexico's"War", and Bertramet al., Drug War.

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38

GabrielaRecio

Table i. Drug consumption


and smugglingarrests by nationalityin Baja
California,Mexico(1922 and1923)
Consumption Smuggling

US
Chinese
Mexican
Spanish

44%

7%

32%
21%

38%
50%

0%

4%

French
0%
Total number of arrests
418
Source: Calculatedfrom WNA, 812z.114/Narcotics/76.

1%
141

The correspondenceanalysedthus far indicatesthat, as earlyas the 1920s,


the Treasuryand State Departmentsconsideredthat the 'drug problem'
could be solved if the drug producer countries could be controlled.
Moreover, this view received backing from different pressure groups,
since they had been lobbying the Secretaryof State to impose severe
restrictions on those countries illegally exporting drugs to the United
States. These groups viewed consumersas innocent and helpless victims
that were being poisoned and killed by those countries that allowed the
production of differentdrugs. According to this view, if the producer
country did nothing to prevent drug production then the United States
should impose severe sanctions in order to protect its citizens.88
It is interesting to note that not only the United States government
focused on solving the 'supply side' of the drug problem; Mexico, had
adopted a similar strategy at both federal and state level. Nevertheless,
it seems that the US strategy was somewhat incomplete since drug
consumption was climbing among its own citizens." Even though
Table i only indicates drug arrests (dealing with consumption and
trafficking)in one territory and in a small period of time, it gives us a
glimpse of how citizens of differentcountries were participatingin this
illegal market early in the twentieth century. The table indicates that in
those years almost half of those arrestedfor drug consumption charges
were United States citizens, while 50o per cent of those arrested on
traffickingcharges were Mexican. The numbers hint at some form of
specialisation: Mexicans were traffickers and US citizens were consumers. The arrests involving Chinese citizens are interesting since
consumption and trafficking arrests were more or less in the same
proportion.
88

89

William Hunneman (from Brookline, Mass.) to the Secretary of State, 8 May 1923.
WNA, 812. I14/Narcotics/71.
A rough indication of the above is that by 1928 one third of the total 7700 inmates in
US prisons had been arrested for violations of the Harrison Act. Musto, La enfermedad,
p. 214.

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US Prohibition
andtheOrigins
of theDrugTradein Mexico 39
Early measures should have been taken to fight both sides of the
problem in such a way that coordinatedpolicies by both countries could
have been made more effective in curtailing drug trafficking and
consumption. Nevertheless, the United States decided to deal with the
problem by implementing the Harrison Act. This new prohibitionist
atmosphere, as well as the lucrative black markets that resulted from
these, induced traffickersto take more aggressive measures.Thus in the
1920s opium began to be plantedin the statesof Sonora, Sinaloa,Nayarit,
Chihuahuaand Durango and by the end of the decade the northwestern
region had consolidated itself as the most important distribution drug
network whose final marketwas the United States.
In 1923 the consul in Ciudad Juairezreported that marihuanaseized
during a police raid had been planted in the property of a rich local
merchant.90In 1924 the Federal Narcotics Control Board reported that
opium poppies were being planted in the Sonoran towns of Caborca,
Oquitoa and Pitiquito as well as in the city of Mazatlin in Sinaloa.
Apparently most of these fields were in the experimental stage and
researchwas been carriedout to see if the land was suitable for opium
production."9Only four years later opium was planted regularlyin these
towns and the fieldswere spreadingto the fertileYaqui and Mayo Valleys
in southern Sonora.92
Another region that became appropriatefor opium planting was the
areaextending from the city of Culiacin, Sinaloa,to the city of Tamazula
in Durango (just a few kilometreseast from Culiacin).In this territorythe
planting and manufacturewas handled by a group of Chinesewho were
later arrestedand sent to Mexico City for trial.93 Not only the Chinese
were involved in this illegal market; some state public employees in
northern Sinaloaplayed an importantrole in such a lucrativebusiness.94
Consul John Dye, 24 March 1923. WNA, 812.1 14/Narcotics/67. It is probable that
marihuana had already been planted in Mexico prior to this decade, but there is no
evidence to that effect.
91 L. G. Nutt to the Departmentof State, 29 Nov. 1924. WNA, 812.1 I4/Narcotics/94.
90

One acre of poppy plants at the time renderedaround two pounds of refined opium.

In 1927 a pound of opium was valued at $500 pesos (approximately $227 dollars).

92 Department of State to the Treasury Department,


i2 May 1928. WNA, 8Iz.i x4/
9

Narcotics/132.
It is not indicatedwhether those that were arrestedwere Chinese citizens or Mexican
citizens of Chinese origin. The governments of Obreg6n (1920-24) and Calles
(1924-28) sustainedstrictand racist-inclinedpolicies towardsthis ethnic group. As was

also the case in the United States,in Mexico the Chinesewere accusedof contaminating
society with their vices. Durango Consul to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1925.
WNA, 812.xI4/Narcotics/98.
94 Mazatlin Consul to the Secretary of State, 2i April 1925. WNA, 812. II4/Narcotics/
100.

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Gabriela Recio

40

This suggests that the opium illegal business was expanding and that
poppy crops were spreading along several northwestern states. For
example, there is evidence that in the 1920s the state of Nayaritwas also
producing opium and sending it to the United States,95and in the city of
Mulege in southern Baja California,the drug started to be planted in
1927.96 Even though Mexico already had experience in planting and
sending such drugs to the United States,the countrywas not self-sufficient
in production; to judge from the reports on opium seizures, the drug
entered Mexico illegally quite frequently."
There is evidence to suggest that the role that certaincities playedin the
drug smuggling markets was constantly changing, a fact that brings to
mind contemporarytrendsin the drug businessin Mexico and elsewhere.
Whetheror not a city or town was more permissivetowardsdrug planting
and smuggling dependedmainlyon the governor'sand mayor'stolerance,
as well as on the differentstate and federal controls imposed at various
times. For example, early in the 1920s the city of Mexicali played an
importantrole in drug smuggling into the United States;however, by the
end of the decade, Tijuanahad replacedit in importanceand the city of
Tecatealso began to play a significantrole. However, the city of Ensenada
always played a key position as a gatheringpoint for drugs coming from
other parts of the country and the world, probablyon account of it being
a port. Most of the drugs arriving in the port only made a stopover on
their final route to the United States markets.98
This indicates that traffickerschanged their modusoperandiwhenever
certainroutes becamemore restrictedfor their operations.This ability to
quickly rearrangedistribution routes suggests that different means of
transportationwere crucialin smooth day-to-dayoperations. As already
mentioned, much of the drugs came from Europe through the Panama
Canal,with differentstopovers along the MexicanPacificCoast. Once the
merchandisereachedMexico it was transportedto the United Statesby sea
and land. There is also evidence that the Southern-PacificRailway was
95 Mazatlin Consul to the Secretaryof State, 7 March 1927. WNA, 812.114/Narcotics/
112.

96 GuaymasConsul to the Secretaryof State, 23 Dec. 1927. WNA, 812.1I14/Narcotics/

I26.
For example, in 1926 fifty kilograms of opium and morphinewere found on board a
French vessel in the port of Veracruz.VeracruzConsul to the Secretaryof State, 18
Feb.I926. WNA, 812.i I4/Narcotics/107.
98 MexicaliConsulto the Secretaryof State, 24 April 1925. WNA, 812.1 14/Narcotics/98.
Not only men participatedin.these illegal markets. Sadie Stock, who was considered
one of the greatestdrug traffickersin the northwesternregion of the United States,had
her operationscentre in Ensenada. Stock had alreadybeen arrestedin San Diego for
drug possession, but had been releaseddue to a technicality.
9

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US Prohibition
andtheOrigins
of theDrugTradein Mexico 41
unlawfullyused to transportdrugs through the states of Nayarit, Sinaloa
and Sonora." Apparently the train's newspaper vendors handled this
illegal business without the company'sknowledge. The railwaycompany
decided to personallyhandle the newspapersales once the Departmentof
State communicatedto the company their suspicions through its Consul
in Mazatlan.100Finally, it should be said that drug traffickinginto the
United States was becoming such a profitablebusiness that technological
innovations in transport,such as aviation, were also employed by various
smugglersas earlyas the 1920s in orderto transportdrugs to the northern
market.1"'This technological innovation seriously hinderedthe security
measures that the United States had been able to establish along the
Mexican border in order to curb drug smuggling. The emergence of air
shipments prompted the implementationof a new series of measuresto
stop drugs from enteringthe United States.Severalconsuls also advanced
their ideas about how to solve the problem. First, they recommended
assigning secret agents on both sides of the border to provide more
accurate information on the location of drug plantations as well as
differentroutes that the traffickerswere using. Second, they suggested
that more personnel should be hired to patrol and supervisethe borders.
Finally, they indicatedit would be very useful if Mexico and the United
States shared 'convict lists' so that better quality information could be
obtained.102However, it seems that harsher measures produced more
sophisticatedanswers from drug traffickersand planters and resulted in
profitableblack marketsthat have been impossible to eliminate.
f. Conclusion
Whethera country decides to ban (or for that matterpermit)narcoticand
liquor distribution and production, the consequences are hard felt not
only by its citizens but also by those living in adjacent countries.
However, little is known about how regulatory changes imposed in
the 9zo20s
in the United States affectedMexico once prohibition was put
into practice.
This articlehas exploredMexico's participationin the drug and alcohol
trade once its northern neighbour implemented the Volstead and the
HarrisonActs. It suggests that the country entered these illegal markets
early in the twentieth century, mostly as a result of the new anti-vice
regulationsthat the United States implementedduring the 1920s. These
99 Mazatlin Consul to the Secretary of State, 7 March 1927. WNA, 81z.II4/Narcotics/
00ooWNA,

x112.

o101Mazatlin
112.

8I2.114/Narcotics/I

5.

Consul to the Secretary of State, 7 March 1927. WNA,

8iz2.I4/Narcotics/

102o Ibid.

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42

GabrielaRecio

stricter regulations - which Mexico also carried through - resulted in the


creation of very profitable black markets.
Illicit operations enticed drug traffickers in Mexico to explore the
possibilities of opium planting in the country's northwestern territory and
also encouraged them to rearrange distribution channels on the Mexican
side in a more efficient manner. Although, alcohol prohibition was only
in effect between 1919 and 1933, it is interesting to observe how in this
period Mexico also began manufacturing whisky to be exported to the
United States and Mexican beer factories had an important boost in their
activities.
Finally, and more importantly, what emerges as striking is the
longevity of Mexican drug distribution channels. The Mexican states that
now play an important role in drug trafficking began their activities in this
trade around 1916. The northwestern states of Mexico have approximately
ninety years' experience of developing and improving channels to
distribute drugs into the United States.

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