CONOS, KARL SEBASTIEN D.

2015

February 26,

CASE STUDY: ABBEYSTEAD EXPLOSION

5ChE-C

1. Summarize the main causes of the disaster and human errors involved.
The main cause of disaster:
Accumulation of methane from tunnel
Human errors:
Design did not cater for possible accumulation of dangerous gases by provision of proper venting to
atmosphere from the valve house
Presence of public in an unsafe environment
Violation of the operating rules (tunnel was left empty of water)
Management error
Latent error at the design stage
2. Make a HAZOPS (Hazard and Operability Study) to identify all possible hazards. What are the possible corrective
or preventive actions which might have been carried out to reduce the likelihood of the error or other failure?

Numb
er

Guid
e
Wor
d

Element

Deviatio
n

Possibl
e
Causes

Conseque
nces

Safegua
rds

No

Consultati
on with
the
designers
.

No
consultatio
n with the
designers
in
assessing
the safety

Presence
of
methane
in the
system
might be
possible.

Sudden
compression
of methane
and
pressure
build-up in
the system

Consult
with the
designers
in
assessing
in the
safety of

Comme
nts

Actions
Require
d

Actions
Assigne
d to

Identify
any
hazard
mitigation
or safety
required.

Engineer
/
Designer

No

Proper
knowledg
e in
methane.

of the
installation
particularl
y where
significant
voids may
be formed
in the
system.
The fact
that
methane
is soluble
in water
and
increasingl
y so above
in ambient
temperatu
res should
be widely
publicized
throughou
t the civil
engineerin
g
profession
and
incorporat
ed in
profession
al training
courses.

Methane
is
soluble
in water
and that
it can be
given of
by
ground
water
entering
workings
.

due to the
rushing
water might
result in an
explosion.

installatio
n.

A build-up of
methane is
possible due
to a nonoperational
17-day of
the system.

Consult a
more
professio
nal with
proper
training
of safety
in the
field of
chemical
engineeri
ng.

Chemical
hazards
should
also be
incorporat
ed in
other
profession
al training
courses.

All
professio
nal
training
courses.

No

Regular
sufficient
tests
carried
out.

No

Air or gas
discharge
vent.

No
sufficient
tests
carried out
at
frequent
intervals
to
establish
the
presence
or
otherwise
of
flammable
gases
using
instrument
s able to
provide a
quantitativ
e reading.
Systems
conveying
water
should be
designed
that any
air or gas
discharged
should be
vented to
a safe

Unknown
build-up
of
flammab
le gases
in the
system
due to a
17-day
break of
the
system.

Flammable
gases when
compressed
might
results to
explosion.

Gas
trapped
in the
system
and
pressuriz
ed due
to
sudden
water
entry.

Flammable
gases when
compressed
might
results to
explosion.

Sufficient
tests
should be
carried
out at
frequent
and
regular
intervals
to
determin
e if
theres a
build-up
of
flammabl
e gases
in the
system
and other
potential
hazards.
Vents for
air or gas
discharge
should be
installed
in
systems
conveyin
g water.

Tests
should be
carried
out at
frequent
and
regular
intervals.

Engineer
/
Operator

Installatio
n of air or
gas
discharge
vent.

Designer

More

Knowledg
e on
hazards.

As
well
as

Proper
design
location
of
pipeline
system.

place in
the open
air.
More
knowledge
of the
hazards
that may
arise
should be
present in
the
operators
minds.
Qualitative
increase in
design of
pipelines.

A risk
indicatio
n (blue
glowing
light in
the
system)
might be
unknown
to an
operator.
Location
of
pipelines
might
afect
the
system.

That blue
glow and
intense
build-up of
heat inside
the room in
an
indication of
an explosion
will happen.

More
knowledg
e about
the
hazards
that may
arose in a
water
pipeline
system.

Engineer
/
Operator

Water
leaking into
the tunnel
from the
surrounding
rock was
rich in
dissolved
methane
and leaked
into the
tunnel which
served as a
sealed
chamber
into which
methane
gas
accumulate

Double
checking
of water
system
locationsto-be
before
installatio
n.

Designer

d.