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1 523-592

94 5

v.
v.
v.
v.

2001-021993-

94S.J.D., 1989
LL.M., 19841981
1978

524

525

177 181-1891988 9

239 244-245
3
11-171993 4

527 5555621997 7 1

207 211-2131998 10 1

1 211213-214

7 2000

526

36/03/31

336/12/25

56

3
4
5

53 7 2 41987 7
1 191

49 49/08/15

134 1341991
8 5 69 6

19-22

527

81992

9
10

11
12
1978 1

369 3742002 10 1

8
37/09/16

47/07/21

82/02/03

9
89/04/25
10

2 7

447
1997 4
221
1999 9
11

12 82/07/30

528

1997

92 13
14 15

1994 9 10

161999 2
17 7 6

18

13

36/03/31
14 46/12/13

15 86/07/21

16
1 2-71996 5

17 1999 7 9 4
18 30 4 99 13

13991441 1999 11

13 1

529

19

13
15
20
2003
10 1 2003 12 31
6
10 5 21
2007 12 31
22 4

2010 12 31 4
22

2001 10 5 23
69 1822003 10
19

20
21
22
23

1999
6-7
1999 7 26

7 2002 11
6-7
1999 7 26

724
2001 10

530

24

25
26
01/27/1984 27
24
724
25
725
26 7 369

32 43 58-592002 3

773
2002 7 1
27

111 111

531

28
constitutional
mandate29
1999 12

3031

3233
2003 12
1991 8
28

29

30
31
32
33

36
2

Verfassungsmssige Ordnung

Verfassungsorgantreue

Schlaich/Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5. Aufl.,


Rdnr. 471ff.

2002 10 5

2002 10 5

2002 10 9
91 10 4 26203
0910045276 0910008458

532

34

13 15

35

comparative constitutional law

34

35

7 343

41 1995 3

13 1 69 2001 3

98 49 65-662003 7

530

32 5 55
2003 9

533

constitutional review, judicial review of constitutionalityjudicial branch


unconstitutional
judicial review
judicial review
legality

36

legal positivism

v.
36

534

centralized review

decentralized review
37

1920 10 1

Oktoberverfassung

Bundesverfassungsgericht38
US
Supreme Court

39
40
policy making

37 See generally MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE 132-146 (1989).


contrle concentr
O.
Duhamel et Y. Mny, Dictionnaire constitutionnel, Paris, P.U.F., 1992, p. 227

179
1995 6 1 2

38 GG Art. 93

39 mixed
system ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE
LAW 263-326 (1989).
40 See, e.g., M. Cappelletti & J. C. Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European
Antecedents and Adaptation, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 121 (1966); ALLAN R. BREWERCARIAS, supra note 39, at 188.

535

41

v.
abstract versus
concrete review
cases or
controversies

42

review incidenter

review
principaliter43

case or controversy requirement44


41

All courts review model v. constitutional court review model, See C.


Neal Tate, Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy: Concepts and Overview,
in DONALD W. JACKSON & C. NEAL TATE (ed.), COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1992).

152
42 See Alec Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western
Europe, in DONALD W. JACKSON & C. NEAL TATE (ed.), supra note 41, at 42.
43 See ARNE MAVCIC, SLOVENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 19-20 (1995).
44

536

judicial power

subject-matter jurisdiction45
46
1
standing

2 right
timingripe

moot

political questions
4

advisory opinion
4
3

justiciability doctrineSee e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article


III: Perspectives on the Case or Controversy Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297
(1979).
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, 2, cl. 1.

selfregarding
46 See e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
163 (1987).

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968)

537

47

48

subjectives Verfahren
Verfassungsbeschwerde 49

objektive Verfahren

Normenkontrolle
47

133 162-1672000 2

1 269 See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL


JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 163-164 (1989).
48

Wilhelm Karl Geck


225 240
1982 11

3302003 9

49 2.4

538

a particular context

konkrete Normenkontrolle

abstrakte Normenknotrolle50

v.

a priori

a
posteriori51

policy making

50

51 C. Neal Tate, supra note 41, at 6;

contrle a
priori

contrle a posteriori See O. Duhamel et Y. Mny, Dictionnaire


constitutionnel, Paris, P.U.F., 1992, p. 230-231.

539

v.

advisory review
binding
review
inter partes
erga omnes effectAllgemeinwirkung
52

constitutional adjudication

doctrine of stare decisis53

retroactive effect, ex tunc, pro praeterito


prospective effect, ex nunc,
profuturo54

52 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

96-8 (1979); C. Neal Tate, supra note 41, at 6; A. MAVCIC, supra note 43, at 19-20.
53 See, e.g., Herry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1344 (1990)

See Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-8 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)M. FRANKLINE, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN LAW 21112, 295-319, 569-70 (1968).
54 A. R. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 39, at 93.

540

55

56
55

56

356 1985 5

135 2003
28 3 67 2003
1 88
98

541

1.

casescontroversies 57
case and controversy requirement
standing
right timing for judicial review
political questions
advisory opinion

58

17
28 4 3 2003 4
31

70
57 U.S. CONST. art. III, 2, cl. 1.
58 47 140-154

542

2.

rule of four

543

certioriari59

supremacy of the constitution


60
3.

4.
59 See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme

Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1988)Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 975 (1957).
28 U.S.C.
1257 (3) (1994) 1988

See LAURENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 12 (1992)


See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 143 (1971).

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.


See also L. Favoreu, P. Gaia, R. Ghevontian, J.-L. Mestre, O. Pfersmann, A. Roux et
G. Scoffoni, Droit Constitutionnel, Paris, Dalloz, 2000, p. 231.
60
L. Favoreu, P.
Gaia, R. Ghevontian, J.-L. Mestre, O. Pfersmann, A. Roux et G. Scoffoni, Droit
Constitutionnel, op. cit., p. 231.

544

inter partes
erga omnes effect61

62 doctrine of
stare decisis

1.

Hans Kelsen
63

61 56

62

1930
56 139

63
1928
C. Eisenmann La
justice constitutionnelle et la Haute Cour constitutionnelle dAutriche, Paris, L. G.
D.J.
G. Vedel, Avant-propos l& rdition de
la thse de Charles Eisenmann, La justice constitutionnelle et la Haute Cour
constitutionnelle dAutriche, Paris, Economica et P.U.A.M, 1986, p. VIII.

545

64

65

66
2.

64 48 319
65

contrle abstrait
O. Duhamel et Y. Mny,
Dictionnaire constitutionnel, Paris, P.U.F., 1992, p. 231
722001 7

66 48 330

546

67

Conseil constitutionnel
68

le
tribunal des conflits

69

70

71 72 73
67
la thorie de la loi-cran
68

69
70

71

72
73

contrle concentr O. Duhamel et Y. Mny,


Dictionnaire constitutionnel, Paris, P.U.F., 1992, p. 227

195-2012001 7

547

1999 Nouvelle-Caldonie
lois du pays7475
3.

74

75
1.

2.

3.

4.

548

76

La loi,
expression de la volont gnrale77

78

76

77 R. Carr de Malberg, La loi, expression de la volont gnrale, Paris, Economica,

1984, 228 p.
78

C.C. n 85-187, 25 janvier 1985, loi


relative ltat durgence en Nouvelle-Caldonie 37
2
dlgalisation

549

79
4.

80

1.

Bundesverfassungsgericht81

82

79

80 56 3
81 Gericht


(Verfassungsorgan), Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, Das
Bundesverfassung-sgericht, 5. Aufl., Rdnr. 25ff.
82

550

Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz

Staatsgerichtshof83

84
2.

85 Enumerationsprinzip
83 48

315 H. Kelsen
C. Schmitt 5 123
2003 6
Hulmut Steinberger,
Historical Influence of American Constitutionalism upon German Constitutional
DevelopmentFederalism and Judicial Review, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 189
(1997); C. Simons, Grundrechte und Gestaltungsspielraum Eine rechtsvergleichende
Untersuchung zum Prfungsintrumentarium von Bundesverfassungsgesicht und USamerikanischem Supreme Court bei der Normenkontrolle, S.46ff. (Berlin:Duncker
und Humblot, 1999).
84
1948 1956
Louis Favoreu

Louis Favoreu Louis


Henkin/Albert J. Rosental
35 1997 11
85

1.
2.
3.

551

86

4.

5.

6.

6a.
a

7.

8.

8a.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.
15.
300
1971 10 6a8a 11a

86 48 327

552

87

88
Verfassungsstreitigkeit

objektive Verfahren89

Verfassungsbeschwerde
90
91
1Organstreit

92

87

88 Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 3ff. und 12.


89 , Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr.

115ff.
90 Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 263
445 :

2441999 5
91 48 327
1
435 439-444
92 Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 74.

553

93

94
95
2abstrakte Normenkontrolle
96

97
98

93

94
95
96

97
98

Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr.78.


Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O.,
Rdnr. 77 18

Vgl. Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 122.

554

3konkrete Normenkontrolle

99

Richtervorlage

100

101
4Verfassungsbeschwerde
a a

102

103

99

19 67 2000 6
100
101 Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 156.
102

103 Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 186.

555

104

104 Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr. 197, 263ff.

556

95
105

3.

106
4.

Rechtskraft
Bindungswirking

Gesetzeskraft

105 Alec Stone, supra note 42, at 46

1951 9 7 2000 12 31 132,002 126,962


3,288
5 1,747
96.18% 129,542
124,620
3,179 2.6% 96.2%
2,460 2,342 83
35 2000 4,831
4,705 97.4% 26
1 2 2 6
Peter Badura/Horst Dreier (Hrsg.), Festschrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht,
2. Band, Anhang, S.931ff.
106 prventive Normenkontrolle
Vgl.
Schlaich/Korioth, a.a.O., Rdnr.121.

557

107

108

107

205 2002 9

108 56 119-120

558

109

109 48 366-

367 35 95-97

559

Normenkontrolle
110abstrakte Normenknotrolle111

112

110

1 16
1998 6

207 211 1999 1 1


53 35
111

112 82 6

46 2 21
1995 2

560

113

114
115

113

37/06/15

48 375

2.
114
285 3011998 9
110 16 53
35
115

Richtervorlage

561

116

117

116
Organstreit

48 367

46 2 1 382001 4
56 120

117
107 307

562

563

118

119

120

118 a a

119
37 143 166
1 11-13
2003 4 56 120
120
56 120

564

1.

43-451988

565

2.

121

3.
121

566

122

context

122

672

48
376

567

123
124
125

126
123

124
125
126

568

127

95

3
128 90

//

127 1920-29
1919

Ernst Benda/Eckart Klein, Verfassungprozessrecht, 2. Aufl., 2001,


Rdnr.1ff.
128 Alec Stone, supra note 42, at 46.

569

129
130

37/09/16~47/07/21

47/07/21

47/09~56/09
56/10~65/09
65/10~74/09
74/10~83/09
51 7313183/10~92/09
80132

129 Id.
130

211 215-219
2003 10 2
131 47 215-216304
132 485-486
1998 9

570

82/02/03133

134

84/01/20
133

475 477
1987 4 6
134

571

135
136

93/02/06 14 137
3

institutional incentives138

139

135

11994 6
136
137
138

139

1
384392471475476477509517545551554
558559572

218224251455457483535

572

140

141

140
73-74

141

573

142
143

kiss

144
145

142
171
143 90 533 91/01/29
144 1998

2003

145
1 81 89-90
2 475
477

574

Doctrine of Separation of Powers

146

146

47 183 202

575

147

148

149

147 47 141-145
148

149
47 1 31-35
42

48 429
56 19

576

150

151

152Carl

Schmitt

153

Landfried 154

150 47 171179
151 Alec Stone, supra note 42, at 45 (Abstract review therefore functions to extend

what would otherwise be a concluded legislative processreferrals in effect


require the court to undertake a final reading of a disputed bill or law)

152 Id., at 54-5 ([I]t is crucial to note that when constitutional judges are engaged in
abstract review, their decision-making processes are closer to legislative decisionmaking processes than when they are applying a code, or even the constitution, to
decide disputes arising from concrete litigation. That is, in abstract review
processes, the lawmaking function of these courts is far more important than is
dispute-resolution. Moreover, the dispute at hand is primary partisan-political,
rather than judicial.).
153 See Carl Schmitt, Das Reichsgericht als Hter der Verfassung, in Verfassungsrechtliche
Aufstze 63 (1958).

577

155

judiciary government

107-1081996
48
345-346
154 See C. Landfried, The Impact of the German Constitutional Court on Politics and
Policy-Outputs, in GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 20 (4): 522-541 (1985); C.
Landfried, Legislation and Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (C.
Landfried ed.) (Nomos Verlag, 1988).
155
73

578

156

157

prima facie constitutionality

156

L. Favoreu, Modle amrican et


modle europen de la justice constitutionnelle, A.I.J.C., Vol IV, 1988, p. 57.
157

87 115-1171999 3
56 130

579

580

2002
1
158
2

159

3
158

159

581

5
certiorari

7
160

1
2

160

582

2.1

2.2

2.1
2.2
161 15

161 2.2

583

162
163
164

165
162 47 154-171 157

115-117 56 130
98 55 2003 7
163 314325328419461499520
162 55
164

165

2982003 8 8
145 81

48 2002 2

584

2
166

3167

166 2002
158
159
167

585

168

169

1
170

standards of judicial review

168 149
36-37
169

170

586

171
2172

173

174

171
59/08/31

91/01/25

5354
5 23 2003 12 2004 1
172

173 149
36-37
174

587

175

176177

178

175

176

1982
See A. R. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 39, at 268.
177

149 36-40
178 Milo E. Rowell
See David J. Danelski, Documenting the Establishment of
Judicial Review: Japan and the United States, in DONALD W. JACKSON & C. NEAL
TATE (ed.), supra note 41, at 18.

588

179

180
181

179 145 81
180

242
295362374395410434477

839 2002
181
48 332

589

182

183

182
183
2003 5

20,040
18,832 268
262

82 91



268
5,201
9,194
5,192

262
4999
8548
4837

453
20,040
20,308
448

18832

19094

590

staff

591

21 105 60
15
13 15 0

592

593

594

595

596

NA

NA

597

v.
v.

v.

v.

112

598

10/01/2003~12/31/2007 01/01/2008~12/31/2010 01/01/2011~

1
5
6
10

1
15
1
1
1

1.

2.

3.

1.

2.

3.

599