1NC

Of

T
Domestic surveillance means the gathering of intelligence
about US citizens
Small 8
Matthew L. Small, Presidential Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Student at the United
States Air Force Academy, now serves as an Operational Analyst at the United States Air Force, 2008 (His
Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power During Times of National
Crisis, Paper Published by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Available Online at
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf, Accessed 07-11-2015, p. 2-3)
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is

first necessary to narrow the scope of the term domestic surveillance.

Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering . Intelligence, as it
is to be understood in this context, is information that meets the stated or
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and
narrowed to meet those needs (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic
surveillance is a means to an end ; the end being intelligence . The
intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the
acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive
Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an
overly broad concept.

Curtail means reduce

Merriam Webster (N.D.)
(Merriam Webster Dictionary, Online Dictionary, Curtail, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/curtail)//ghs-VA

to reduce or limit (something)

Violation the af doesnt actually reduce surveillance,

heres CX: the af doesn't actually reduce any
surveillance directly by any means there was no
specification of how the Gun Control Debate constituted
a form of surveillance
At best theyre FX-T, again heres CX: but it's efectual
means as a tool in debate and Cody Wilson's actual
method irl are a way to subvert the ideological barring
Vote neg
Limits and groundnot defending topical action explodes
research burdens which makes preparation and clash
impossible, which creates shallow debates that skirt the
question of operationalization of the affirmative method
in favor of creating self-serving biases
Topic education topicality is a question of the nature of
the conversations we have in debate tailored topic
research allows for debates about the operationalization
of the af

Cap K
Capitalism is regulated and under surveillance now
Raban 12
Ofer Associate Professor of Law, Elmer Sahlstrom Senior Fellow, University of Oregon., 2012, Capitalism,
Liberalism, and the Right to Privacy, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2069647, AB)
First, modern capitalism recognizes the legitimacy of regulations aimed at

correcting market failuresthose instances where the unregulated operation of

the free market produces economic inefficiencies . To give one obvious example,
sometimes a free market will produce a monopoly an economic actor having little or
no competition which can then single-handedly control output and prices.4 In such cases, the
state may legitimately intervene so as to bring about the competition that
failed to emerge on its own accord, and that is essential for economic
efficiency. The forced breakup of AT&Ts telephone monopoly in the 1970s was no doubt an
extreme form of government intervention in the economic sphere, but a
perfectly legitimate one. The alleged causes of market failures are numerous
and include, among other things, information costs and positive or negative
externalities (that is, the beneficial or detrimental effects of economic transactions on third parties).
Thus, when economic actors cannot be compensated for their products or services by the beneficiaries of
positive externalities (for example, the car-driving beneficiaries of a railroad system that reduces pollution
and traffic), or conversely, when actors are not forced to internalize costs to third

parties (say, the costs of pollution), undersupply or overuse may ensue. In such instances
the government may intervene so as to correct these distortions through
subsidies or penalties, or even by assuming the role of an owner and
distributor of goods and services (as in public goods and common resource goods

things like clean water or highways).5 Although economists often disagree as to what is or is not a market
failure, the validity of the concept as a basis for government regulation is, for

the most part, beyond dispute.6 Capitalism has come to recognize that a free
economy is not always self-correcting and that the invisible hand of the
market may sometimes itself need a guiding hand. Unlike the creation and enforcement
of a free economic sphere and the remedying of market failures, both of which are justified on the ground
that they promote economic efficiency, the last category of legitimate state intervention has different
concerns. It involves instances where the value of economic efficiency yields to

more important purposes or values, including moral values. Examples include

limitations on the number of working hours, minimum wage laws, prohibition on usurious interest rates,
taxation and transfer payments, and the prohibition on trade in human organs or in children for adoption.7
All these may arguably reduce economic efficiency, but even so are accepted for the sake of other,
noneconomic ends. Put differently, nonintervention has its limits because the importance of economic
efficiency does. In short, state interventions in the economy need to be justified as

(1) maintaining a free economic sphere where individuals can make free
economic choices; (2) addressing market failures; or (3) serving moral,
political, or social purposes that take priority (in specific contexts) over economic
efficiency. In the absence of any such justification, capitalism dictates a default position of
governmental noninterference in the economy.

But push[ing] away the States Surveillance

mechanisms means unregulated capitalism turns the
case
Connolly 2
Billy, market analysis, bafta award winner, The American model of unregulated capitalism - anything
goes, 7/1/2, http://www.scotsman.com/news/the-american-model-of-unregulated-capitalism-anythinggoes-1-610889, AB)
There is method in this madness. The CEOs of corporations are todays

merchant princes. The world is their oyster. They have fabulous salaries with massive
share options. If share prices are artificially inflated, they can unload them on the market and become

There is no restraint, no surveillance. This is the American

model of unregulated market capitalism. Anything goes. Decent human
society is incompatible with unrestrained freedom to do what you want. If
we were free to kill one another, social life would become impossible . A
civilised existence has to be protected. We need institutions to keep the
peace and protect citizens from abuse. In the latter part of the 20th century, this
was accepted in the West - with one exception. Economics . In that field, the
argument was reversed. Deregulate. Free trade. Free markets. No mention
of restraint. Life is damnable without restraint. The greedy have to be
restrained along with bullies and rapists and psychopaths, if the rest of us are to survive.
Proper regulations make life more free for the good and more difficult for
the bad. The same standards must apply in the economic life of humanity.
There is a mistaken assumption that global capitalism is homogenous. It
isnt. Economies are modified by the political culture of nations. The emergence of European capitalism
overnight billionaires.

broadly coincided with the breakthrough of liberal democracy. Social reform was in the air. Towards the end
of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, socialism made an impact not through revolution but by
reforms within the existing system. As Europe moved to the left after the Second World War, socialists and
social democrats in government enshrined in law the postwar consensus of the mixed economy, social
welfare, social justice and neo-Keynsianism. This consensus also embraced the parties of European
conservatism. American capitalism had a different culture. Red in tooth and claw with

a kind of frontiersman or cowboy culture. The conflict between American labour and the
bosses was bloody and vicious. The Pinkerton detective agency, so beloved of Western movies, was
actually an armed strike-breaking organisation. Workers on strike, in self defence, armed themselves.
Industrial struggles were replete with murders, assassinations, broken heads and hearts. Organised

crime infiltrated key labour unions and laundered its money on Wall Street.

The Kennedy family link with the Mafia was no one-off. Socialism never had a mass influence in the US,
though there were social democratic elements in Roosevelts New Deal. In the latter part of the 20th
century, the dominant ideological economic faction in America was the Chicago School led by Milton
Friedman, a fundamentalist free marketeer. He was Thatcher and Clintons economic guru. During the
years in opposition, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown spent a lot of time in the States sitting at the feet of the
Clintonites and became fully paid up advocates of unbridled free market capitalism. It is this
model, endorsed by Britains two governing parties, that

is threatening to undermine

American capitalism.

Well impact turn the afs disagreements with the law

government regulations are key to solve the crunch and
resource wars our evidence makes a timeframe
distinction between the ability of virtue terrorism to
solve warming and our alternative
Humphrey 7
(Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological
Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 20-21//um-ef)

If these changes are necessary - the downgrading, curtailment and

reconceptualisation of democracy, liberties, and justice, as well as the raising
to primacy of integrity and ecological virtue - how are the necessary changes
to come about? Value change represents the best 'long-term' hope but the
ecological crisis is not a 'long-term' problem . These changes have to be
introduced quickly and before there has been time to inculcate value shifts in
the population. The downgrading of rights and liberties has to be achieved
through policy and institutional change, even while the question of a long-term change of values is also
addressed. For both these tasks what is required ispolitical leadership and the institution
of the state. The immediate problem lies in the collective action problem that arises in respect of the looming ecological constraints
on economic activity and the potential collapse of the global commons. The end of the 'golden age' of material abundance, as we slide back
down the other side of 'Hubbert's pimple will bring about intense competition for scarce resources. To understand politics under these
circumstances, we have to turn back to Hobbes and Burke, the political philosophers who conceptualised life under conditions of scarcity, and
also to Plato, commended for his healthy mistrust of democracy. For Ophuls a crucial element of political philosophy is the definition of reality

political philosophy carries within it an ontological component which

sets out the foundations of political possibility. The contemporary West he sees
as defined by the 'philosophers of the great frontier' Locke, Smith, and Marx .
These are thepolitical philosophers of abundance. For Locke the proviso of always leaving 'as much
itself;

and as good' for others in appropriation could always be met even when there was no unappropriated land left, as the productivity of the land
put to useful work would always create better opportunities for those coming later. Smiths 'invisible hand' thesis was also dependent upon the

For Marx the

'higher phase' of communist society arrives 'after the productive forces
have... increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all
the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly' (Marx, 1970: 19). For Ophuls
these are all the political philosophies of abundance. Ecological crisis, however,
returns us to the Hobbesian struggle of all against all (Heilbroner, 1974: 89). With ecological
assumption that the material goods would always be available for individual to accomplish their own economic plans.

scarcity we return to the classical problems of political theory that 400 years of abnormal abundance has shielded us from (Ophuls, 1977:

Both liberalism and socialism represent the politics of this 'abnormal

abundance' and with the demise of this period we return to the eternal
problems of politics. Hobbes, then, is seen as the political philosopher of ecological scarcity avant la lettre. 'Hardin's "logic of
164).

the commons" is simply a special version of the general political dynamic of Hobbes' "state of nature"' (Ophuls, 1977; 148).

Competition over scarce resources leads to conflict , even when all those
involved realise that they would be collectively better off if they could cooperate, 'to bring about the tragedy of the commons it is not necessary that men be bad, only that they not be actively good' (Ophuls,
1977: 149). It is this Hobbesian struggle that may impose 'intolerable strains on the representative political apparatus that has been

Coercion is seen as the solution (and it is

and the
appropriate agent of this solution is the state. The transition from
abundance to scarcity will have to be centralised and expert-controlled , and
it is unlikely that 'a steady state polity could be democratic' (Ophuls, 1977: 162). As we shall
historically associated with capitalist societies' (Heilbroner, 1974: 89).

hoped, although as we have seen not for terribly good reasons, that this coercion can be agreed democratically),

see in the following paragraphs, this faith in the ability of the state to institute centralised controls that would be obeyed by its citizens is one
of the areas that has attracted fierce criticism from contemporary green political theorists.

The alternative is regulated capitalism this is the only

thing that can stop warming before we cross a tipping
point
Heskett 07
Professor, Harvard Business School (Jim, Will Market Forces Stop Global Warming?, Harvard Business
School, April 6, 2007, Accessed April 7, 2016, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/will-market-forces-stop-globalwarming)//AD
A number of you expressed the hope that the private sector can provide adequate response to a problem
that is either real or increasingly perceived to be so. Commenting that "Heating costs go up, the consumer
insulates," C. J. Cullinane concludes that "Industry and the individual consumer will have to be the driving
force for this change." Edward Hare comments that "Given history, government will most likely get things
wrong. A 'free' market will do betteralbeit more painfully to too many of the world's six billion
residents." More were skeptical of this view, suggesting that either subsidies

or taxes or both will be required to: (1) raise market prices for carbon-based
energy in developed countries, (2) encourage the development of new
innovations to lower the cost of energy worldwide to what is becoming
referred to as the "China price," or (3) a combination of both . As Nancy Sullivan
said, "Business will not do it without government. Government will not do it
without business ."
The discussion also turned to one of timing , with Chris McFadden teeing up the issue by saying,
"Global warming will not 'stop'until all accessible hydrocarbons have been consumed. Our present day efforts only affect

whatever change in markets and

innovation is contemplated will take place faster , for better or worse, with
government intervention . Mehmet Genc pointed out that "Markets can correct the
situation if these costs (of CO2 emissions) can be internalized, but
government has to help." But several suggested that government intervention has to occur on a global
rate, not the final inevitable steady state." Several concluded that

basis. As Ulysses U. Pardey put it, "When companies have to play by the same rules, then fair competition can take
placeterms and conditionsfor all concerned industries worldwide seems to be a must."

The one question that is within the realm of management is what role, if any, business leadership should
be playing in this debate? Should it be arguing for government to step aside and let free markets prevail?
Or should it be asking governments to set the rules of competition on CO2 emissions sooner rather than
later so that businesses can plan and react accordingly? What do you think?
Original Article
The debate over global warming appears to have passed a tipping point. We can debate just when it happened.
But it was probably sometime before Al Gore's film won the Academy Award. From now on, we can expect to be

long-term effects on those living in lowlying areas along coastlines, those attempting to grow crops in rapidly
shifting climates, those living along the equator as opposed to temperate
climes (being addressed by the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as this article hits the Internet), and
bombarded with almost daily news articles about its

even those getting ready to drill for oil in open water that the polar ice caps still cover. The list goes on and on. Within the
past few days, Thomas Friedman, the journalist and best-selling author of The World Is Flat, intimated in an interview with

he is particularly excited about what may happen when the

American business community and its ideas are unleashed on the problem .
We may get the gist of this in an upcoming article of his that, according to him, will be titled, " Green Is the New
Red, White, and Blue."
Whether or not you believe that humans are causing global warming or that
it is occurring at all is beside the point. The same was true on a much smaller and less lethal scale
with Y2K. But unlike Y2K, there is no date certain by which we will know whether we
have won or whether we were even fighting the right battle. There is going to be a lot
Tim Russert that

of money made or lost for a long time on the effort to combat global warming. It raises the question, of course, of whether
the free market has the patience for investments that may not pay out for many years. The end value may be huge (even
infinite?), but the discounted value of it may be modest.

One thing we do know. There is no question that when Americans put their
talent, effort, and money behind an idea, remarkable things happen faster
than anyone expected. Wind power (regardless of what you think of it) in Texas is a good
example. In 1999, under then-Governor George W. Bush, incentives were
put in place for the development of wind power with the goal of producing
2,000 megawatts of generating capacity in ten years. The goal was achieved
in five years. So Texas has renewed the incentives and raised the goal to 5,000 megawatts. I wouldn't bet against
that goal being exceeded as well. Or consider Shuji Nakamura, the Japanese developer
of light-emitting diodes that one day may provide energy-efficient sources of light. He moved to
the U.S. where people were most interested in his work , as documented in a new book,
Brilliant.

Extinction
Sharma 10
(Rajeev Sharma, journalist-author who has been writing on international relations, foreign policy, strategic
affairs, security and terrorism for over two decades, 2/25/2010, "Climate Change = War?" The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2010/02/25/climate-change-war/)

it is an often overlooked
fact that climate change has the potential to create border disputes that in some
cases could even provoke clashes between states . Throw into the mix three
nuclear-armed nations with a history of disagreements, and the stakes of
any conflict rise incalculably . Yet such a scenario is becoming increasingly
likely as glaciers around the world melt, blurring international boundaries.
For all the heat generated by discussions of global warming in recent months,

The chastened United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, still doesnt dispute that glaciers

The phenomenon is already pushing Europeans

and Africans to redraw their borders. Switzerland and Italy, for example, were forced to introduce
are melting; the only question is how fast.

draft resolutions in their respective parliaments for fresh border demarcations after alpine glaciers started melting
unusually quickly. And in Africa, meanwhile, climate change has caused rivers to change course over the past few years.

Many African nations have rivers marking international boundaries and are
understandably worried about these changing course and therefore cutting
into their borders. Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan are just some of
the African countries that have indicated apprehension about their
international boundaries. But it is in Asia where a truly nightmarish

scenario could play out between India, Pakistan and China nuclear
weapon states that between them have the highest concentration of glaciers
in the world outside the polar regions. A case in point is the Siachen Glacier
in the Karakoram range, the largest glacier outside the polar region, which
is the site of a major bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan.
According to scientific data, Siachen Glacier is melting at the rate of about
110 meters a yearamong the fastest of any glaciers in the world. The
glaciers melting ice is the main source of the Nubra River, which itself
drains into the Shyok River. These are two of the main rivers in Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir. The
Shyok also joins the Indus River, and forms the major source of water for
Pakistan. It is clear, then, why the melting of glaciers in the Karakoram
region could have a disastrous impact on ties between India and Pakistan.
French geologists have already predicted the Indus will become a seasonal river by 2040, which would unnerve Pakistan
as its granary basket, Punjab, would become increasingly drought-prone and eventually a desertall within a few

It takes no great leap of imagination to see the potential for conflict as

the two nations resort to military means to control this water source.
Meanwhile, glacier melting could also be creating a potential flashpoint
between India and China. The melting Himalayan glaciers will inevitably
induce changes to the McMahon Line, the boundary that separates India and
China. Beijing has already embarked upon a long-term strategy of throttling
of Indias major water source in the north-eastthe Brahmaputra River that
originates in China.
decades.

Case

Solvency
The af is radical individualism standing in solidarity
with Wilson is a straightforwardly predictable quest for
youthful celebrity where the af posits themselves as
the: Honey Boo Boo of the Second Amendment brigade,
where securing your personal liberty is a priori issue
#1. This neoliberalism par none means that they can
never solve for the abuses of capitalism because theyre
too busy trying to become internet folk heros than
solve material problems. Every argument about printing
your own gun is just the neoliberal drive for individualism
co-opting your af. Also, this specifically indicts Zizek.
Pugh 2010
Newcastle Postcolonial Geographer (Jonathan, The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis,
Relevance and the State, Globalizations, March-June, ebsco)
In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state,

some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the
new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not found at the state,
where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to
examine how in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also
tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over
capturing state power. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort
to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place
too much faith in this approach alone. Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember
that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the Right and
fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is

However, the European Elections of

2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide
shift to the Right (and far Right) in many placesin Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual,
Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite
accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals.

Obamas election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus
of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009;
Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left.

Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving

power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy
for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67)
concludes: In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a
rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the
radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the
solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face. So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the
rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some
from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will

Postcrisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandlers (2004, 2007, 2009a,

2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical
individual as a radical force , at the expense of wider representational
programmes for change. His central argument is that this leaves radicals
impotent . Chandler (2009a, p. 7879) says that many radicals argue that there is nothing passive or conservative
now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities.

about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests,
the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of

these new forms of protest are highly individualised and

personal ones there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement .
Al-Qaeda. I disagree;

It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet

wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness,
rather than attempts to engage politically with society . In one way, Chandlers
reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and
disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and
spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls social jazz), and not enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to
many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to sign up
to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political
programmes themselves that matter. So it is not Chandlers point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental
politics that concerns me here. It is his related pointthat there has been a flight into ethics, away from political
accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly
important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here
before. In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing

Unwilling to express their self-interests

politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make
statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an
unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in
hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power. Chandler argues that, just as
the institutions of power that mattered for themselves.

when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics
today. He says: In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation,
squeezed between the remnants of the ancien regime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their
ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German
bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy,
recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717) Today we are witnessing a

Fragmented, many radicals retreat into

abstract ethical slogans like another world is possible, global human
rights, or making poverty history. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of
renewed interest in ethics (Ladi, 1998; Badiou, 2002).

Kants cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around
environmental issues and human rights are admirable,

it is equally important to say that the turn

to ethics seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be
held accountable to it. For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be
accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics. Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj Zizek
(2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so

says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel
that we are unable to make a real difference through representational politics on a larger scale,
important to the Left in recent years. He

when it comes to the big political problems of life. Zizek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that we cannot ever predict
the consequences of our acts; that nothing we do will guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be
satisfactory. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense

These ways of thinking, deep in the

psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many
have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change
the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state,
or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant . It is better to try and raise ethical
of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005).

awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to
implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power

This is, as I have

already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing
the opportunity of the moment. Putting what I have just said another way,
there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times
ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different . Of
course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. But my point here is that
the Right and neo-liberal ideologues will not simply go away if the Left
adopt or raise awareness of alternative ethical lifestyles. The Right are
willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is
increasingly powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by
often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Ladi, 1998).

Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples,

But the 2008 crisis, and the

response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak
ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal
ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance.

economy. Another reason for this is because the ethical individual

contributes so much to neo-liberal societies themselves. To explain how, we must briefly

step back. The new social movements of previous decades have, in general, been effectively recuperated by the existing
system of capital, by satisfying them in a way that neutralised their subversive potential. This is how capital has
maintained its hegemonic position in post-Fordist societies. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) explain how capitalists

They say the new social

movements desire for autonomy, the ideal of self-management, the antihierarchical exigency, and the search for authenticity, were important in
developing post-Fordism. These replaced the hierarchical framework of the Fordist period with new forms
have worked with, rather than against, the characteristics of new social movements.

of networked control. And so, in this way, we see that the relationship between new social movements and capital has
been productive. In turn, and this is the important point I want to make about the present moment, clearly the stakes of
radical politics have now changed once more. As discussed earlier, it would now seem that post-Fordist society is actually

Without the neoliberal state, and

the publics subordination to its actions, it would not now exist in anything
like its present form. Our subordination to the state has stopped a postcrisis implosion of neo-liberalism. And this is of course where one of the
central characteristics of the ethical individual has been so productive.
Endemic individualism, so dominant in liberal societies, has been
recuperated by the ethical individual who is unwilling to seize the state. So
the salient point here is that the ethical individual is reflective of the
conservative forces in society today.
more hierarchical and controllable than many previously thought.

The afs politics are little more than Lifestyle magazines

version of anarchism refusal of political engagement
becomes a model for rich liberal boys to evade complicity
in violence. You should endorse the difficult and boring
labor of committed social transformation by voting neg
Bookchin 95
(Murray, great man, SOCIAL ANARCHISM OR LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM: AN UNBRIDGEABLE CHASM)

primitivist lifestyle anarchism allows no room for

social institutions, political organizations , and radical programs, still less
a public sphere, which all the writers we have examined automatically identify
with statecraft. The sporadic, the unsystematic, the incoherent, the discontinuous, and the
intuitive supplant the consistent, purposive, organized, and rational, indeed any
form of sustained and focused activity apart from publishing a 'zine' or pamphlet
or burning a garbage can. Imagination is counterposed to reason and
desire to theoretical coherence, as though the two were in radical
contradiction to each other. Goya's admonition that imagination without reason produces monsters is altered to leave the
Like the petty-bourgeois Stirnerite ego,

impression that imagination flourishes on an unmediated experience with an unnuanced 'oneness.' Thus is social nature essentially dissolved
into biological nature; innovative humanity, into adaptive animality; temporality, into precivilizatory eternality; history, into an archaic cyclicity.

A bourgeois reality whose economic harshness grows starker and crasser

with every passing day is shrewdly mutated by lifestyle anarchism into
constellations of self-indulgence, inchoateness, indiscipline, and incoherence. In the 1960s, the
Situationists, in the name of a 'theory of the spectacle,' in fact produced a reified spectacle of the
theory, but they at least offered organizational correctives, such as workers'
councils, that gave their aestheticism some ballast. Lifestyle anarchism, by
assailing organization, programmatic commitment, and serious social
analysis, apes the worst aspects of Situationist aestheticism without
adhering to the project of building a movement. As the detritus of the
1960s, it wanders aimlessly within the bounds of the ego (renamed by Zerzan the 'bounds of
nature') and makes a virtue of bohemian incoherence.
What is most troubling is that the self-indulgent aesthetic vagaries of lifestyle anarchism
significantly erode the socialist core of a left-libertarian ideology that once

could claim social relevance and weight precisely for its uncompromising
commitment to emancipation -- not outside of history, in the realm of the subjective, but within history, in the realm
of the objective. The great cry of the First International -- which anarcho-syndicalism and anarchocommunism retained after Marx and his
supporters abandoned it -- was the demand: 'No rights without duties, no duties without rights.' For generations, this slogan adorned the
mastheads of what we must now retrospectively call social anarchist periodicals. Today, it stands radically at odds with the basically egocentric

Where social anarchism called

upon people to rise in revolution and seek the reconstruction of society, the
irate petty bourgeois who populate the subcultural world of lifestyle
anarchism call for episodic rebellion and the satisfaction of their 'desiring
machines , ' to use the phraseology of Deleuze and Guattari.
The steady retreat from the historic commitment of classical anarchism to
social struggle (without which self-realization and the fulfillment of desire in all its dimensions, not merely the instinctive, cannot
be achieved) is inevitably accompanied by a disastrous mystification of
experience and reality. The ego, identified almost fetishistically as the locus of emancipation, turns out to be identical to
demand for 'desire armed,' and with Taoist contemplation and Buddhist nirvanas.

the 'sovereign individual' of laissez-faire individualism. Detached from its social moorings, it achieves not autonomy but the heteronomous
'selfhood' of petty-bourgeois enterprise.
Indeed, far from being free, the ego in its sovereign selfhood is bound hand and foot to the seemingly anonymous laws of the marketplace
the laws of competition and exploitation which render the myth of individual freedom into another fetish concealing the implacable laws of
capital accumulation.

Lifestyle anarchism, in effect, turns out to be an additional mystifying bourgeois

deception. Its acolytes are no more 'autonomous' than the movements of
the stock market , than price fluctuations and the mundane facts of bourgeois commerce. All claims to autonomy
notwithstanding, this middle-class 'rebel,' with or without a brick in hand, is entirely
captive to the subterranean market forces that occupy all the allegedly
'free' terrains of modern social life, from food cooperatives to rural
communes.
Capitalism swirls around us not only materially but culturally. As John Zerzan so
memorably put it to a puzzled interviewer who asked about the television set in the home of this foe of technology: 'Like all other people, I
have to be narcotized.'[37]

lifestyle anarchism

is a 'narcotizing' self-deception

That
itself
can best be seen in Max Stirner's
The Ego and His Own, where the ego's claim to 'uniqueness' in the temple of the sacrosanct 'self' far outranks John Stuart Mill's liberal pieties.
Indeed, with Stirner, egoism becomes a matter of epistemology. Cutting through the maze of contradictions and woefully incomplete
statements that fill The Ego and His Own, one finds Stirner's 'unique' ego to be a myth because its roots lie in its seeming 'other' society
itself. Indeed: 'Truth cannot step forward as you do,' Stirner addresses the egoist, 'cannot move, change, develop; truth awaits and recruits

The Stirnerite egoist , in

effect, bids farewell to objective reality , to the facticity of the social, and
thereby to fundamental social change and all ethical criteria and ideals
beyond personal satisfaction amidst the hidden demons of the bourgeois
marketplace. This absence of mediation subverts the very existence of the concrete, not to speak of the authority of the Stirnerite
everything from you, and itself is only through you; for it exists only in your head.'[38]

ego itself a claim so all-encompassing as to exclude the social roots of the self and its formation in history.
Nietzsche, quite independently of Stirner, carried this view of truth to its logical conclusion by erasing the facticity and reality of truth as such:
'What, then, is truth?' he asked. 'A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms in short, a sum of human relations, which

Nietzsche
contended that facts are simply interpretations; indeed, he asked, 'is it necessary to posit an
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically.' [39] With more forthrightness than Stirner,

interpreter behind the interpretations?' Apparently not, for 'even this is invention, hypothesis.' [40] Following Nietzsche's unrelenting logic, we
are left with a self that not only essentially creates it own reality but also must justify its own existence as more than a mere interpretation.
Such egoism thus annihilates the ego itself, which vanishes into the mist of Stirner's own unstated premises.

Similarly divested of history, society, and facticity beyond its own

'metaphors,' lifestyle anarchism lives in an asocial domain in which the ego,
with its cryptic desires, must evaporate into logical abstractions. But reducing the ego
to intuitive immediacy anchoring it in mere animality, in the 'bounds of nature,' or in 'natural law' would amount to ignoring the fact that
the ego is the product of an ever-formative history, indeed, a history that, if it is to consist of more than mere episodes, must avail itself of
reason as a guide to standards of progress and regress, necessity and freedom, good and evil, and yes! civilization and barbarism. Indeed,

an anarchism that seeks to avoid the shoals of sheer solipsism on the one
hand and the loss of the 'self' as a mere 'interpretation' one the other must
become explicitly socialist or collectivist. That is to say, it must be a social
anarchism that seeks freedom through structure and mutual responsibility,
not through a vaporous, nomadic ego that eschews the preconditions for
social life.
Stated bluntly: Between the socialist pedigree of anarcho-syndicalism and anarchocommunism (which have never denied the importance of
self-realization and the fulfillment of desire), and the basically liberal, individualistic pedigree of lifestyle anarchism (which fosters social

ineffectuality, if not outright social negation), there exits a divide that cannot be bridged unless we completely disregard the profoundly
different goals, methods, and underlying philosophy that distinguish them. Stirner's own project, in fact, emerged in a debate with the
socialism of Wilhelm Weitling and Moses Hess, where he invoked egoism precisely to counterpose to socialism. 'Personal insurrection rather
than general revolution was [Stirner's] message,' James J. Martin admiringly observes [41] a counterposition that lives on today in lifestyle
anarchism and its yuppie filiations, as distinguished from social anarchism with its roots in historicism, the social matrix of individuality, and its
commitment to a rational society.
The very incongruity of these essentially mixed messages, which coexist on every page of the lifestyle 'zines,' reflects the feverish voice of the

If anarchism loses its socialist core and collectivist goal, if it

drifts off into aestheticism, ecstasy, and desire , and, incongruously, into
Taoist quietism and Buddhist self-effacement as a substitute for a
libertarian program, politics, and organization, it will come to represent not
social regeneration and a revolutionary vision but social decay and a
petulant egoistic rebellion. Worse, it will feed the wave of mysticism that is
already sweeping affluent members of the generation now in their teens
and twenties. Lifestyle anarchism's exaltation of ecstasy, certainly laudable in a radical social matrix but here unabashedly
squirming petty bourgeois.

intermingled with 'sorcery,' is producing a dreamlike absorption with spirits, ghosts, and Jungian archetypes rather than a rational and
dialectical awareness of the world.
Characteristically, the cover of a recent issue of Alternative Press Review (Fall 1994), a widely read American feral anarchist periodical, is
adorned with a three-headed Buddhist deity in serene nirvanic repose, against a presumably cosmic background of swirling galaxies and New

a graphic
cries out: 'Life Can Be Magic When We Start to Break Free' (the A in Magic is circled) to
which one is obliged to ask: How? With what? The magazine itself contains a deep ecology essay by
Age paraphernalia an image that could easily join Fifth Estate's 'Anarchy' poster in a New Age boutique. Inside the cover,

Glenn Parton (drawn from David Foreman's periodical Wild Earth) titled: 'The Wild Self: Why I Am a Primitivist,' extolling 'primitive peoples'
whose 'way of life fits into the pre-given natural world,' lamenting the Neolithic revolution, and identifying our 'primary task' as being to
''unbuild' our civilization, and restore wilderness.' The magazine's artwork celebrates vulgarity human skulls and images of ruins are very
much in evidence. Its lengthiest contribution, 'Decadence,' reprinted from Black Eye, melds the romantic with the lumpen, exultantly
concluding: 'It's time for a real Roman holiday, so bring on the barbarians!'
Alas, the barbarians are already here and the 'Roman holiday' in today's American cities flourishes on crack, thuggery, insensitivity, stupidity,
primitivism, anticivilizationism, antirationalism, and a sizable dose of 'anarchy' conceived as chaos. Lifestyle anarchism must be seen in the
present social context not only of demoralized black ghettoes and reactionary white suburbs but even of Indian reservations, those ostensible
centers of 'primality,' in which gangs of Indian youths now shoot at one another, drug dealing is rampant, and 'gang graffiti greets visitors
even at the sacred Window Rock monument,' as Seth Mydans reports in The New York Times (March 3, 1995).
Thus, a widespread cultural decay has followed the degeneration of the 1960s New Left into postmodernism and of its counter'culture into

For timid lifestyle anarchists, Halloween artwork and

incendiary articles push hope and an understanding of reality into the everreceding distance. Torn by the lures of 'cultural terrorism' and Buddhist ashrams,
lifestyle anarchists in fact find themselves in a crossfire between the
barbarians at the top of society in Wall Street and the City, and those at its
bottom, in the dismal urban ghettoes of Euro-America. Alas, the conflict in which they find
themselves, for all their celebrations of lumpen lifeways (to which corporate barbarians are no strangers
these days) has less to do with the need to create a free society than with a brutal
war over who is to share in the in the available spoils from the sale of drugs,
human bodies, exorbitant loans -- and let us not forget junk bonds and
international currencies.
New Age spiritualism.

The law isnt bad rejecting the state means we cant

solve their impacts
Edkins 07
(Jenny Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Whatever Politics, in Giorgio
Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, Ed. Calarco and DeCaroli, 2007, p. 84)
What is crucial here is whether the alternative Agamben proposes is radical enough. Does it
entail a refusal of the machine, or merely a reinstatement of it with a different "definition" of what it means to be human?

Agamben does seem to reject Heidegger's problematic separation of Dasein, as a being

that can see the open, from the animal, poor in world, that cannot.45 Ultimately,
Agamben appears to be arguing that any negation of the machine cannot be
accomplished on a philosophical plane, but only in terms of practice. In the
end, practice or human action, not philosophy, is what counts. Ontology and philosophy
are to be considered only to the extent that they are political operators and,
specifically, biopolitical weapons in the service of the anthropological machine of
sovereignty. In order to try to stop the biopolitical machine that produces bare life ,
what is needed is human action, "which once claimed for itself the name of
In The Open,

'politics'" (SE, 88). It is because there is no necessary articulation "between

violence and law, between life and norm," that it is possible to attempt to interrupt or
halt the machine , to "loosen what has been artificially and violently linked "
(SE, 87). This opens a space for a return not to some "lost original state" but to
human praxis and political action (SE, 88).

The jargon of exception is depoliticizing and ignores

social reforms
Huysmans 8
(Jef Professor of Security Studies at the Open University, The Jargon of ExceptionOn Schmitt, Agamben
and the Absence of Political Society, in International Political Sociology, Volume 2, Issue 2, June 2008,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00042.x/abstract)

Agambens conception of the exceptionbeing-the-rule for reconfiguring conceptions of politics in a biopolitical age comes at a serious cost,
though. It inserts both a diagnosis of our time and a conceptual apparatus for
rethinking politics that has no place for the category that has been central to
the modern democratic tradition: the political significance of people as a multiplicity of
Deploying the jargon of exception and especially

social relations that condition politics and that are constituted by the mediations of various objectified forms and

Even if one
would argue that Agambens framing of the current political conditions are
valuable for understanding important changes that have taken place in the twentieth century and
that are continuing in the twenty first, they also are to a considerable extent depoliticizing .
Agambens work tends to guide the analysis to unmediated, factual life. For example,
processes (for example, scientific knowledge, technologies, property relations, legal institutions...).

some draw on Agamben to highlight the importance of bodily strategies of resistance. One of the key examples is
individual refugees protesting against their detention by sewing up lips and eyes. They exemplify how individualized
naked life resists by deploying their bodily, biological condition against sovereign biopolitical powers (for example, Edkins

such a conception of bodily, naked

life is not political. It ignores how this life only exists and takes on political
form through various socioeconomic, technological, scientific, legal, and other
mediations. For example, the images of the sewed-up eye- lids and lips of the individualized and biologized
and Pin-Fat 2004:1517). I follow Adorno and others, however, that

refugees have no political significance without being mediated by public media, intense mobilizations on refugee and
asylum questions, contestations of human rights in the courts, etc. It is these mediations that are the object and

Reading the politics of exception as the central lens

onto modern con- ceptions of politics, as both Agamben and Schmitt do, erases from the concept of politics a
rich and constitutive history of sociopolitical struggle s, traditions of thought linked to
this history, and key sites and temporalities of politics as well as the central
processes through which individualized bodily resistances gain their sociopolitical
significance .
structuring devices of political struggle.

Liberalism
No biopolitics impact --- democracy checks
Dickinson 4
(Edward R. Professor of History at UC Davis, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our
Discourse About Modernity, in Central European History, Volume 37, Issue 1, March 2004,
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?
fromPage=online&aid=2758180&fileId=S0008938900002776)
And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and
psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the

continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the

practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable . Both are instances
of the disciplinary society and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy

And it is
certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective . But that
analysis can easily become superficial and misleading , because it
obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in
the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only
formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all,
with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example.

it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic

that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic
again,

that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a
discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce

there are
political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of
biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany.
Democratic biopolitical regimes require , enable, and incite a degree of selfdirection and participation that is functionally incompatible with
authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of
biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear,
historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies,
and to have generated a logic or imperative of increasing liberalization .
health, such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again,

Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable
message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90
Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are
characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people
that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might
fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of liberty, just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or

totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for

our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social
engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and
Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of
manipulation. At the very least,

power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century

totalitarian states; these systems are not opposites, in the sense that they are two alternative ways of
organizing the same thing. But they are two very diferent ways of
organizing it. The concept power should not be read as a universal
stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all
political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively the same .

Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective
subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, tactically polyvalent. Discursive elements (like the various elements
of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the
democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible
constellations of power in modern societies create multiple modernities, modern societies with quite radically differing
potentials.91

Biopolitics is good it supports life, liberty and the

pursuit of happiness
Ojakangas 5
(Mika Professor of Political Thought at the University of Jyvaskyla, Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power:
Agamben and Foucault, in Foucault Studies, Number 2, p. 26-27,
http://dferagi.webs.ull.es/d/social2/docs/Foucault.3.pdf)
In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form
of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing peoples lives. The effectiveness of bio-power can be
seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the
demand of justice. In bio-political societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less
the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of
biological danger to others.112 However, given that the right to kill is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the biopolitical societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio-political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is
entirely bio-political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present-day

European societies have

abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very right to kill that has
been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because
of the deployment of bio-political thinking and practice. For all these reasons,
Agambens thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the
fundamental bio-political paradigm of the West , has to be corrected.113 The
bio-political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but,
rather, the present-day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the biopolitical society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish social-democrat. Although this figure is an object and a
product of the huge bio-political machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the
fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest crime against the machinery. (In bio-political societies, death is not only
something to be hidden away, but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most shameful thing of all.114) Therefore, he is not exposed to an
unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the

bio-political
machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its
material spiritual capacities, to live healthily , to live long and to live
happily even when, in biological terms, he should have been dead long ago.115 This is because biopower is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power
over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the
condition of all life individual as well as collective that is the measure of the success of
bio-power.

State Inevitable
The state intervening in your life is inevitable, so its only
a question of if we make it better
Nozick 74
Professor, Harvard University, Ph.D., Princeton, Fullbright Scholar, Oxford, (Robert, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, pages 14-17, published 1974, Blackwell publishing)//AD

People sometimes now do take their disputes outside of the state's legal
system to other judges or courts they have chosen, for example, to religious courts. 5 If all parties to a dispute find

some activities of the state or its legal system so repellent that they want nothing to do with it, they might agree to forms
of arbitration or judgment outside the apparatus of the state. People tend to forget the possibilities of acting
independently of the state. (Similarly, persons who want to be paternalistically regulated forget the possibilities of
contracting into particular limitations on their own behavior or appointing a given paternalistic supervisory board over
themselves. Instead, they swallow the exact pattern of restrictions a legislature happens to pass. Is there really someone
who, searching for a group of wise and sensitive persons to regulate him for his own good, would choose that group of
people who constitute the membership of both houses of Congress?) Diverse forms of judicial adjudication, differing from
the particular package the state provides, certainly could be developed. Nor do the costs of developing and choosing
these account for people's use of the state form. For it would be easy to have a large number of preset packages which

what drives people to use the state's system of justice is

the issue of ultimate enforcement. Only the state can enforce a judgment
against the will of one of the parties . For the state does not allow anyone else to enforce another
system's judgment. So in any dispute in which both parties cannot agree upon a
method of settlement, or in any dispute in which one party does not trust
another to abide by the decision (if the other contracts to forfeit something of enormous value if he
doesn't abide by the decision, by what agency is that contract to be enforced?), the parties who wish their claims
put into effect will have no recourse permitted by the state's legal sys rem other than to use that
very legal system. This may present persons greatly opposed to a given state
system with particularly poignant and painful choices . (If the state's legal system
parties could select. Presumably

enforces the results of certain arbitration procedures, people may come to agree--supposing they abide by this
agreement-without any actual direct contact with what they perceive to be officers or institutions of the state. But this
holds as well if they sign a contract that is enforced only by the state.) Will protective agencies require that their clients
renounce exercising their right of private retaliation if they have been wronged by nonclients of the agency? Such

retaliation may well lead to counterretaliation by another agency or individual, and a

protective agency would not wish at that late stage to get drawn into the messy affair by having to defend its client
against the counterretaliation. Protective agencies would refuse to protect against counterretaliation unless they had first
given permission for the retaliation. (Though might they not merely charge much more for the more extensive protection
policy that provides such coverage?) The protective agencies need not even require that as part of his agreement with the
agency, a client renounce, by contract, his right of private enforcement of justice against its other clients. The agency
need only refuse a client C, who privately enforces his rights against other clients, any protection against
counterretaliation upon him by these other clients. This is similar to what occurs if C acts against a nonclient. The
additional fact that C acts upon a client of the agency means that the agency will act toward C as it would toward any

This reduces intra- agency

private enforcement of rights to minuscule levels. Initially, several different
protective associations or companies will offer their services in the same
geographical area. What will occur when there is a conflict between clients of different agencies? Things are
nonclient who privately enforced his rights upon any one of its clients (see Chapter 5).

relatively simple if the agencies reach the same decision about the disposition of the case. (Though each might want to
exact the penalty.) But what happens if they reach different decisions as to the merits of the case, and one agency
attempts to protect its client while the other is attempting to punish him or make him pay compensation? Only three

One of the
agencies always wins such battles. Since the clients of the losing agency are ill protected in conflicts
with clients of the winning agency, they leave their agency to do business with the winner. 6 2. One agency has
its power centered in one geographical area, the other in another . Each wins the
possibilities are worth considering: I. In such situations the forces of the two agencies do battle.

battles fought close to its center of power, with some gradient being established. 1 People who deal with one agency but
live under the power of the other either move closer to their own agency's home headquarters or shift their patronage to

In neither of these
two cases does there remain very much geographical interspersal. Only one
protective agency operates over a given geographical area . 3 The two agencies fight
the other protective agency. (The border is about as conflictful as one between states.)

evenly and often. They win and lose about equally, and their interspersed members have frequent dealings and disputes
with each other. Or perhaps without fighting or after only a few skirmishes the agencies realize that such battling will
occur continually in the absence of preventive measures. In any case, to avoid frequent, costly, and wasteful battles the
two agencies, perhaps through their executives, agree to resolve peacefully those cases about which they reach differing
judgments.

They agree to set up, and abide by the decisions of, some third judge

or court to which they can turn when their respective judgments differ . (Or they
might establish rules determining which agency has jurisdiction under which circumstances.) 8 Thus emerges a
system of appeals courts and agreed upon rules about jurisdiction and the
conflict of laws. Though different agencies operate, there is one unified
federal judicial system of which they all are components . In each of these cases, almost
all the persons in a geographical area are under some common system that
judges between their competing claims and enforces their rights. Out of
anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection
associations, division of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and
rational self-interest there arises something very much resembling a minimal state or a group of
geographically distinct minimal states. Why is this market different from all other markets? Why would a virtual monopoly
arise in this market without the government intervention that elsewhere creates and maintains it? 9 The worth of the
product purchased, protection against others, is relative: it depends upon how strong the others are. Yet unlike ocher

maximal competing protective services cannot

coexist; the nature of the service brings different agencies not only into
competition for customers' patronage, but also into violent conflict with
each other. Also, since the worth of the less than maximal product declines
disproportionately with the number who purchase the maximal product,
customers will not stably settle for the lesser good , and competing
companies are caught in a declining spiral. Hence the three possibilities we have listed.
goods that are comparatively evaluated,

Baudrillard
Hyperreality theory is wrong
Hobbs 07
(Mitchell, Lecturer and PhD Candidate (Sociology and Anthropology), The University of Newcastle,
Australia, REFLECTIONS ON THE REALITY OF THE IRAQ WARS: THE DEMISE OF BAUDRILLARDS SEARCH
FOR TRUTH?, Fall, 2007, http://www.tasa.org.au/conferences/conferencepapers07/papers/379.pdf)
As has been noted by Barry Smart (2000) (and others), Baudrillards theorising, which has its roots in neo-Marxism,
eventually led him to the proposition that if current sociological critique was incapable of ascertaining truth because
reality was being superseded by de-contextualised images (or, rather, signs), then a new system of social inquiry was
needed, one capable of breaking out of the endless cycle of simulacra and the intellectual inertia brought about by the

Baudrillard sought to employ a fatal

strategy or fatal theory, where he could highlight the deceptions of hyperreality by pushing them into a more real than real situation, to force them
meta-physical dead end of capitalism. To this end,

into a clear over-existence which is incompatible with that of the real (Baudrillard cited in Smart, 2000:464).

Baudrillard was seeking to push

our thinking of this event beyond the orthodox political economic
approach, in order to draw attention to the simulated nature of the
news media and to the antithetical consequences of this seemingly
endless use and reproduction of images and simplistic narratives
deprived of socio-historic contexts. 2.2 BRIDGING THE REALITY GULF: FROM BAUDRILLARD TO
Accordingly, by claiming that the Gulf War did not take place,

KELLNER Although Baudrillards work on simulation and simulacra is valuable in highlighting the relationship
between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to

his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of

the contemporary mass media. For instance, as media theorist and researcher Douglas
Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, Baudrillard does not help readers
understand events such as the Gulf War, because he reduces the actions of
actors and complex political issues to categories of
simulation and hyper-reality, in a sense erasing their concrete
determinants. Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including the
Gulf Wars, sees Baudrillards theory as being one-dimensional, privilege[ing] the form of media
technology over its content, meaning anduse (Kellner, 1989:73). In this regard,
Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of
the news media, nor the cultural practices involved with the production
of news (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism that
be de-contextualised,

undermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Although Kellner
(2003:32) believes that Baudrillards pre-1990s works on the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign,
simulation and simulacra, and the implosion of [social] phenomenon are useful and can be deployed within critical social
theory, he prefers to read Baudrillards later, more controversial and obscure, work as science fiction which anticipates

to understand war and its relationship with the

media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond
Baudrillards spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although
our culture is resplendent with images, signs and narratives,
circulating in a seemingly endless dance of mimicry (or, rather, simulacra),
there are observable social institutions and practices
producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solid might melt into air (Marx and
Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for
sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social
inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected
by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. Images and narratives can be
traced back to their sources: whether they lie in Hollywood fantasies or
government spin. In short, by assessing the veracity of competing
the future by exaggerating present tendencies. In order

texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its

antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of
myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed
explanations of diferent events, the social sciences can
acquire an understanding of the truthfulness of media
representations; of the authentic in a realm bewildered by
smoke and mirrors. As long as there are competing media voices
on which to construct a juxtaposition of truths, sociologists can,
to a certain extent, force the media to grapple with their own disparate
reflections.

Valid, descriptive theories of the world are an essential

prerequisite to emancipatory critique epistemic
decolonization is impossible without reclaiming the
concept of objectivity.
Jones 04
(August 2004, Branwen Gruffydd, PhD in Development Studies from the University of Sussex, Senior
Lecturer in International Political Economy at Goldsmiths University of London, From Eurocentrism to
Epistemological Internationalism: power, knowledge and objectivity in International Relations, Paper
presented at Theorising Ontology, Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism,
University of Cambridge, http://www.csog.group.cam.ac.uk/iacr/papers/Jones.pdf)

The rejection of positivism which is a central element of recent critiques of mainstream IR has tended to extend
to rejection of the notion and possibility of science itself. Science, often written in quotation marks science, is
seen as inherently part of the project of Enlightenment-modernity , a mode of
technical instrumental knowledge which is necessarily a means of control
and domination of both society and nature 22 . An important component of the critique of the
positivist orthodoxy is exposure of its coincidence with the interests of the powerful . Dominant
ideas and methods which rest on claims of value-free scientificity and neutrality are shown to mask or legitimise the
interests of the powerful and the exercise of power and domination . The very claim to be able to produce value-free, neutral
scientific truth is rejected in a world of inherently conflicting interests. Instead, the illusion of objectivism must be replaced with the recognition that knowledge is always
constituted in reflection of interests (Ashley 1981: 207).

There are two kinds of conflation which are embedded within this critical stance. The
first conflates the contents of natural scientific knowledge with the uses to which it is
put in society. Much scientific knowledge, in both natural and social sciences, has indeed been
produced by and in the explicit interests of the powerful, an integral part of the construction and maintenance
of unequal and oppressive social orders, and the administration of accumulation and imperialism. But it is important not to
conflate the contents of knowledge with its social conditions of production
and use . When scientific knowledge is developed for and utilised in the service of oppression or
commercial profit as opposed to the increased satisfaction of human needs ,
the oppression results from social forces, not from the cognitive properties of
scientific knowledge 23:
Even assuming all the results of a research project are objectively true, the area chosen for investigation may be determined by contentious ideological assumptions or
practical interests. Thus it is likely that drug companies have concentrated on artificially synthesized drugs to the detriment of research into those occurring naturally in

In a world
where science was funded with a view to satisfying human needs and
conserving planetary resources, quite different discoveries might be made
neither more or less objective than the findings of modern science, but
useful for different purposes. (Collier 1994: 180; see also Collier 1979).
The second conflation reduces scientific method to a positivist approach ,
equating positivist social science with social science per se with technical instrumentality. It is often asserted that the problem
with positivist IR is that it applies the method of natural sciences or the scientific method
to the study of social phenomena 24 . This is a mischaracterisation of the real
nature of the problem, which is that positivism first misunderstands the method of natural
plants; and it is certain that military might and commercial profit are the chief determinants of which secrets of nature get uncovered.

science, and then applies these misunderstood methodological principles to the study of social phenomena (Bhaskar 1997). Recognition of this enables us to
retrieve the possibility of a particular form of social inquiry which can be called scientific or objective from abandonment along with positivism 25 .

A positivist understanding of scientific inquiry rests on a Humean notion of cause as

constant conjunction between empirical variables or events , and explanation as the discovery of
empirical regularities and correlations. When such empirical regularities are discovered they can be used to make predictions. This assumes an empiricist ontology and
epistemology: the world consists only of that which is available to direct experience, and the only source of knowledge is through direct sensory experience.

Critiques of positivism are correct to question these assumptions about knowledge and the world, but they are not
correct in equating this with scientific method. Positivism consists of philosophers misunderstanding of the actual
practice of natural science. The practice of experiment is central to the method of some natural sciences. A scientific
experiment involves establishing closure: creating an artificial environment where the external and internal conditions are controlled so as to isolate particular features and

causal properties and necessary ways-ofare real because they have the capacity to bring about change, given appropriate conditions and inputs,
but are not empirical they cannot be seen, only the effects of their operation
can be seen. This non-positivist, philosophical realist theory of science ,
epistemology and ontology is very different from the positivist misunderstanding of scientific method and explanation. Scientific
theories and the discovery of natural laws refer to real properties and causal powers of structured entities, not
empirical events and regularities (Bhaskar 1997).
What are the implications of this non-positivist theory of science for social inquiry? The fact of human
reflexivity rules out the possibility of experiment and prediction in social
inquiry, because it is impossible to establish closure in the social world 26 . Ideas are causally efficacious: through informing
mechanisms. This enables scientists to discover about aspects of reality which are not empirical : the
operating of specific mechanisms in nature which

social action ideas have causal efficacy in codetermining or influencing what actually happens, including (usually as an unintended outcome) the reproduction of social

This means that ideas are part of the object of social inquiry, as is foregrounded by all variants of so-called reflexive approaches in International
Relations (Keohane 1988). When we study society part of what we study includes the ideas that are held in that society. But we also study other aspects of
relations.

society which are irreducible to ideas or individuals real but non-empirical structures of social relations, historically-specific socially-produced material conditions, and so
on.
This non-positivist theory of knowledge and the world gives rise to a notion of objectivity which does not entail the positivist commitment to value-free neutrality.
Philosophical realism holds that the world consists of natural and social objects or entities which exist and have particular properties and causal powers independently of
what, if anything, is known about them 27 . Knowledge about different aspects of the material and social world can be non-existent, partial, more or less adequate, more or
less right or wrong. This informs a notion of objectivity which refers to what is the case, regardless of what is thought or believed to be the case:

The first and central use of the word objectivity is to refer to what is true
independently of any subject judging it to be true . To say that it is an
objective fact that the Earth is the third planet from the Sun is to say that
this is so whether or not anyone knows or believes it, or even is able to
formulate the statement. To say that kindness is an objective value is to say that it is a value, whether or not anyone judges it to be a value;
it would be a value even if the whole of society regarded it as a culpable weakness and it was only practised shamefacedly as a private foible. (Collier 2003: 134-5).

It is
possible to acknowledge that knowledge is always inherently fallible and
socially constructed while retaining a notion of the objective reality which
ideas are about. This allows commitment to judgemental rationality the possibility of judging between different ideas on the basis of their relative
This notion of objectivity does not entail a belief that human beings can acquire absolute truth and certain knowledge about either social or natural phenomena.

adequacy, in terms of their relation to objective reality 28 . In social inquiry objectivity does not imply some form of external position of independence outside society 29 .
All knowledge is socially produced; but all knowledge is also about something which exists independently of the knowledge about it. (This is the case even for knowledge
about ideas).

The common-sense view pervading recent discussions of epistemology, ontology and methodology in IR asserts that
objectivity implies value-free neutrality. However, objective social inquiry
has an inherent tendency to be critical , in various senses. To the extent that objective
knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than
other ideas, such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly)
of those ideas . 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only)
manifest its criticalness through self-claimed labels of being critical or
siding with the oppressed, but through the substantive critique of
prevailing ideas . Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of
criticism: explanatory critique . The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is
elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the
world, and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology .
This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies, thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and
particular ideological conceptions.

the reproduction
of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful, whereas
In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests,

transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak. Because ideas
inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the
reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social practice), or in informing
social action aimed at transforming social relations . This is why ideas cannot be neutral . Ideas which
provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society, the causes of unequal social conditions, and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful, will tend to help
secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations

ideas which are

false are ideological and, in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and
avoid attempts at radical change, are in the interests of the powerful. An account which is objective will
contradict ideological ideas, implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. The criticism here arises not, or not
only, from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful, nor from a prior normative stance
of solidarity with the oppressed, but from exposing the flaws in dominant
ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of
social conditions 31 .
A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to
truth and objectivity, because true ideas are in the interest of the
oppressed, false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors . In other words, the best
way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare ones
commitment to objective inquiry 32 . As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it:
It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the
dominant groups , who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society
works, or from the standpoint of ordinary people, who have nothing to lose
from truthful analyses of their predicament.
The philosophical realist theory of science , objectivity and explanatory
critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between
knowledge and power . Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our
ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory
social change, we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of
which provides a better account of objective social reality . This will
inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which , by virtue of their flawed account of the social world,
serve the interests of the powerful.
produce concrete conditions of inequality and exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. In this sense,

Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui, James Gathii, Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni,
Jacques Depelchin, Hilbourne Watson, Robert Vitalis, Sankaran Krishna, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . Their work provides critiques of central categories, theories and
discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history, including assumptions about sovereignty, international society, international law, global
governance, the nature of the state. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical
trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples, and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local
social conditions. Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa,
the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World, both past and present during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. Their work reveals
how racism, violence, exploitation and dispossession, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and
contemporary doctrines of international law, sovereignty and rights, and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations
and international history.

Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social

reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object, not its
subject . As Collier argues, The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one, not a social one. (Collier 1979: 60). So, for example, in
the work of Grovogui, Gathii and Depelchin, the general perspective and knowledge
of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins
of the authors. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of
mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African, but on the greater
adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary
production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. The criteria for
choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about), not from the relation between the ideas and their
subjects (who produced them). It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about
the world lies in what they say about the world, not whose ideas they are.

Vote neg to say no to Baudrillard

Merrin 01
(William, Prof. of School of Cultural Studies, Leeds Metropolitan University, To play with phantoms: Jean
Baudrillard and the Evil Demon of the Simulacrum Economy and Society Volume 30 Number 1 bb)

The power of the simulacrum , therefore, may prove to be greater than

Baudrillard realized. On a personal level this is certainly the case. In a candid 19845 interview he reveals

that his courtship of its demon became an unlivable experience: I stopped working on simulation. I felt I was going totally
nuts (1993a: 105). The simulacrum, however, could not be so easily disposed of. Despite his desire to cast off this yoke
of simulacres and simulation (1993a: 184), the simulacrum has thrived, becoming an idea popularly and irrevocably

It has, appropriately, exerted its simulacral power to appear in the popular

imagination as the real philosophy of Jean Baudrillard, eclipsing his critique , and
identified with Baudrillard.

all other aspects of his work and career. Journalistic commentary and student texts are typical here in identifying the
simulacrum as Baudrillards sole approved project. Thus the problem of finding Baudrillards flat is turned into an obvious
and banal hook by one interviewer, who takes the opportunity to enquire whether Baudrillard himself . . . might be a
simulacrum: Does he really exist? (Leith 1998: 14). More importantly for Baudrillard, however, is the simulacral efficacy of
doubling the theoretical strategy of employing simulation which, quite naturally, has a simulacral effect. The theory of
simulation Baudrillard did not believe in has now been realized: as the Japanese interviewer makes clear, the simulacrum

once it is true, the

simulacrum becomes a commonplace, robbed of its capacity to arouse the
worlds denial and thus its critical force : if there is nothing beyond the simulacrum then it is not
has become reality. Volatized in, and as, the real, its victory is the concepts defeat:

even open to question but is simply our absolute banality, our everyday obscenity (Zurbrugg 1997: 11). Hence
Baudrillards emphasis upon the theoretical challenge of the simulacrum. Once realized, unless as Baudrillard hopes it

Opposing Baudrillard with

the simulacrum with its success is, therefore, the most effective means of critique. For
his work is not wrong, but too true: the simulacrum has become reality and this is his end ;
can itself be reversed against simulation, then this critical function is lost.

the game is over. It is, therefore, in the hyperdefence of Baudrillard that we find a means of leaving him behind. With his

If we want him to survive, we must condemn him as a

nihilistic proponent of the simulacrum and oppose him with an outraged,
vituperic, moral appeal to reality , as Kellner and Norris do; thereby restoring his work to life. For, if it

success, Baudrillard disappears.

is only in its contradiction that it can live as a provocation and diabolical challenge, then once it is true this ends. Kellner
and Norris, therefore, may yet prove to be Baudrillards greatest defenders. Baudrillard, of all people, should have
anticipated his disappearance, for the simulacrums demonic power rests also in its attraction for, and hold over,
humanity. Aristotle, for example, recognized this, writing of this instinctive pleasure of imitation in man, the most
imitative of living creatures (1997: 5), while Nietzsche also speaks of the delight in simulation and of its effects in
exploding as a power that pushes aside ones so-called character, ooding it and at times extinguishing it (1974: para.
361). One courts this demon, therefore, at ones own risk, as it captivates and overwhelms our personality. As the author
of the Psalms cautioned the makers and worshippers of idols, they that make them are like unto them: so is everyone
who trusteth in them (Barasch 1992: 20). The efficacy of simulation and the danger of disappearance are key themes in
Roger Caillois influential essay on animal mimicry and the mimetic instinct no less powerful in insects than in man
(Caillois 1984). The instinct of mimesis parallels primitive magic, Caillois says, though it is a mimetic spell which is too
strong for those who cast it. For the insects it is a spell which has caught the sorcerer in his own trap (1984: 27) Phylia,
for example, browse among them- selves, taking each other for real leaves (1984: 25). So, Caillois argues, simulation
absorbs the simulator, leading to their mimetic assimilation to the surroundings with a consequent psychasthenic loss
of distinction, personality, and also, in a thanatophilic movement, the loss of the signs of life itself (1984: 28, 30).
Simulation, therefore, nally overwhelms the simulator: as Caillois warns in the epigram which opens his article, Take

So Baudrillards game has the

same result. If the simulacrum has been realized; if simulation is now our
everyday banality, then Baudrillard is condemned to a lifeless
disappearance as a sorcerer trapped by his own magical invocation,
absorbed by his own simulation. Baudrillard may not believe in the ghost of the simulacrum, but he
care: when you play with phantoms, you may become one (1984: 17).

himself becomes this very ghost. His game with phantoms ends, as Caillois knew it would, with his own phantasmatic
transformation, with his apparitional disappearance. But this is only fitting, for in the pact with the devil it is always your
soul that is the stake.

Impact Framing
Default to consequentialism key to ethics
Gvosdev 05
St. Antonys College Rhodes Scholar PhD, 2005 (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review of
International Affairs, 25.1, project muse)

the morality of a foreign policy action

is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must
weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at
hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium,
As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn,

its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible
to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americansmore
apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the worldneed always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be
no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudencewhich Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realismshould not be confused with expediency.

it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek
solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau
Rather, it takes as its starting point that

concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp

under the
concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former
distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible

Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists
felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those
calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concludedcorrectly, as it turned outthat the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and
treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the
various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this
plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multiethnicitythat different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not
accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of

the belief that "high-flown words

matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led
U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and
resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for
decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a
practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of
thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accordshailed as a triumph of American diplomacycreated
Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism,"

a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia
requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S.
policymakers, academics and journalistscreating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnianot worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But

As a result of holding out for the "most moral"

outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a
workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable
conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly . In the end, the final settlement was very
close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposedand the one that had also been roundly condemned
on moral grounds.
aspirations were not matched with capabilities.

Scenario planning is good, worst-case thinking isnt bad,

and we dont link to the 2ACs inevitable K of util
Clarke 6
Lee, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University, Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in
the Popular Imagination, 2006, p. ix-xi

People are worried, now, about terror and catastrophe in ways that a short time ago would have
seemed merely fantastic. Not to say that horror and fear suffuse the culture, but they are in the ascendant. And for good reason. There
are possibilities for accident and attack, disease and disaster that would
make September 11 seem like a mosquito bite. I think we have all become more
alert to some of those possibilities, and it is wise to face them down. The idea of worst cases isnt
foreign to us. We have not , however, been given enough useful insight or guidance , either
from academics or political leaders, regarding how to do that. In this book I look the worst full in
the face. What I see is frightening but enlightening. I believe that knowing a thing
permits more comfort with that thing. Sometimes the comfort comes from greater control. Sometimes it

which proffers a way forward, toward greater

safety. There is horror in disaster. But there is much more, for we can use calamity to glean wisdom, to find hope. Tragedy is
with us now as never before. But that does not mean we need be consumed
with fear and loathing. We can learn a lot about how society works, and fails to work, by looking at the worst. We can learn about the
comes from knowing the enemy, or the scary thing,

imagination, about politics, and about the wielding of power. We can learn about peoples capacities for despair and callousness, and for
optimism and altruism. As we learn, our possibilities for improvement increase. Worst Cases is about the human condition in the modern world.
Some say that September 11 changed everything. Thats not true. But it did imprint upon our imaginations scenes of horror that until then had
been the province of novels and movies. We now imagine ourselves in those images, and our wide-awake nightmares are worse than they

We must name, analyze, and talk about the beast. Thats our best hope, as a
society, to come to terms with the evil, the human failings, the aspects of nature,
and just plain chance that put us in harms way. Of course, talking about the worst
can be a way to scare people into accepting programs that have other ends,
and that they might not otherwise accept. The image of a nuclear mushroom cloud, for
example, can be used to justify war because the possibility is so frightening that we would do almost anything to prevent
it. The dark side of worst case thinking is apparent even at the level of personal relationships.
Unleavened by evidence or careful thought it can lead to astonishingly poor
policy and dumb decisions. No organizational culture can prevent or guard against it. The only
response that will effectively mute such abuses is one that is organized and
possessed of courage and vision. So warnings that the worst is at hand should be inspected
closely, particularly if they call for actions that would serve ends the speaker cannot or does not freely acknowledge. I acknowledge my
used to be.

ends in this book. For better or worse, I always have. Worst Cases is a book full of stories about disasters. But it is not a disaster book. It is a
book about the imagination. We look back and say that 9/11 was the worst terrorist attack ever in the United States, that the Spanish Flu of
1918, the Black Death, or AIDS was the worst epidemic ever, or that the 1906 San Francisco earthquake was the Great Earthquake. Nothing

we
construct possible futures of terror and calamity: what happens if the nations power grid goes
inherent to the events requires that we adorn them with superlatives. Peoples imaginations make that happen. Similarly,

down for six months? what if smallpox sweeps the world? what if nuclear power has a particularly bad day? what if a monster tsunami slams

There are those who say we shouldnt worry

southern California? These too are feats of imagination.

about things that are unlikely to happen. Thats what your pilot means in saying, after a turbulent cross-country flight, Youve just completed

that the probability of a nuclear power plant

is vanishingly small. Or that the likelihood of an asteroid striking the earth is one in a million, billion, or trillion.
There is similar advice from academics who complain that people are unreasonable because
their fears dont jibe with statistics. Chance, they reckon, is in our favor. But chance is often
against us . My view is that disasters and failures are normal, that, as a colleague of mine puts it,
things that have never happened before happen all the time . A fair number
of those things end up being events we call worst cases . When they happen
were given opportunities to learn things about society and human nature that are usually obscured. Worst
case thinking hasnt been given its due , either in academic writings or in
social policy . Were not paying enough attention to the ways we organize
society that make us vulnerable to worst cases. Were not demanding
enough responsibility and transparency from leaders and policy makers. I am not an alarmist, but I am alarmed. Thats
the safest part of your trip. We hear the same thing when officials tell us
melting down

why I wrote Worst Cases. It is also why my tone and language are not technical. I am a sociologist, but I wrote Worst Cases so that
nonsociologists can read it.

Your Authors
Their authors are full of it their Timms card speaks for
itself (my highlighting yellow):
He spoke with great confidence and at great speed , the speed perhaps
lending his speech an air of deceptive profundity ; often, Wilson came
across as a man who has mastered the art of speaking very quickly while
saying very little. At one point he cited Jean Baudrillard, the French

philosopher of simulation and hyperreality best known for his 1991

book The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, as an inspiration. Listening to
this, it was hard not to feel, as The New York Times reporter Nick Bilton
suggests in Click. Print. Gun., that Wilsons project is a straightforwardly
predictable quest for youthful celebrity with Wilson himself as the Honey Boo
Boo of the Second Amendment brigade. Amid the babble of Poststructuralism 101 references (Theres a guy named Michel Foucault; I
recommend that you read him some time, Wilson had counseled
Beck), a suspicion emerged: Here is a man who speaks of Baudrillard with
the zeal of someone flush from first contact with the Wikipedia entry on
postwar French philosophy. But scan the internet and you see that Wilson cannot
be dismissed so lightly. Or can he? In onevideo, he labels himself,
borrowing from the work of Slovenian philosopher-iconoclast Slavoj
Zizek, as a virtue-terrorist. Its one thing to drop a name; its another to
have genuine, deep knowledge of an intellectual school that goes beyond the
superficially impressive. Just as anyone with a 3D printer can make
themselves a gun, anyone with access to google can style themselves a
Zizekian virtue-terrorist. The democracy of the internets a bitch .

Baudrillard is meaningless
Sokal and Bricmont 98
Actual scientists who do real things with actual stuff (Alan and Jean, Fashionable Nonsense Postmodern
Intellectuals Abuse of Science, Picador, pages 152-153)//AD

The last paragraph is Baudrillardian par excellence. One would be hard

pressed not to notice the high density of scientific and pseudo-scientific
terminology 194inserted in sentences that are, as far as we can make out,
devoid of meaning .
These texts are, however, atypical of Baudrillards oeuvre, because they allude (albeit in a confused
fashion) to more-orless well-defined scientific ideas. More often one comes across sentences like these:
There is no better model o f the way in which the computer screen and the mental screen o f our brain are
interwoven than Moebiuss topology, with its peculiar contiguity o f near and far, inside and outside, object
and subject within the same spiral. It is in accordance with this same model that information and
communication are constantly turning round upon themselves in an incestuous circumvolution, a
superficial conflation o f subject and object, within and without, question and answer, event and image,
and so on. The form is inevitably that o f a twisted ring reminiscent o f the mathematical symbol for
infinity. (Baudrillard 1993, p. 56)

As Gross and Levitt remark, this is as pompous as it is meaningless .195

In summary, one finds in Baudrillards works a profusion of scientific
terms, used with total disregard for their meaning and, above all, in a
context where they are manifestly irrelevant.196 Whether or not one
interprets them as metaphors, it is hard to see what role they could play,
except to give an appearance of profundity to trite observations about
sociology or history. Moreover, the scientific terminology is mixed up with a
nonscientific vocabulary that is employed with equal sloppiness. When all is

said and done, one wonders what would be left of Baudrillards thought if
the verbal veneer covering it were stripped away.19

Zizeks psychoanalysis is more applicable to toenails than

politics
Allen, 13
M.D. (David, Where Psychoanalysts Went Wrong, Psychology Today, November 25, 2013, Accessed
December 21, 2015, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/matter-personality/201311/wherepsychoanalysts-went-wrong)//AD
When I posted a mild criticism of one aspect of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), some commenters and one blogger
who wrote a rebuttal acted like I was questioning the word of God. That attitude is a true sign of disingenuous

proponents also argue as if everything they do has

been scientifically proven, which is obvious baloney . CBT is currently the
argumentation. Many CBT

predominant psychotherapy treatment paradigm taught to clinicians-in-training in psychology graduate schools. However,
when I first received psychotherapy training in the mid 1970s, by far the predominant school of psychotherapy was

analysts exaggerated the validity of

the scientific evidence for psychoanalytic theory, and made
grossly inflated claims about the efectiveness of psychoanalytic
treatment. Its theory was applied to everything, even to
schizophrenia, although by then it was pretty clear to most of
us that they were completely wrong about that condition . Im
psychoanalysis. Just like the CBT industry does now,

surprised analysts did not try to treat ingrown toenails with

psychoanalysis . Analysts also protected their turf back in the day, and very arrogantly. As a trainee, if
you criticized any aspect of analytic theory, you were told in no
uncertain terms that you needed to go into psychoanalysis yourself , so
you could find out why you were resistant to analytic theory.
In other words, the only reason you were questioning the
theory was because you were neurotic!

Theyre basically Charles Manson the best way to solve

the K is to refuse to listen to it
Dufresne 04
Professor at Northern Ontario Medical School (Todd, Psychoanalysis Is Dead ... So How Does That Make
You Feel?, LA Times, February 18, 2004, Accessed December 21, 2015,
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/18/opinion/oe-dufresne18)//AD

the theory of the unconscious, which has also seen better

days. We all agree that Freud did not "discover" the unconscious, and are sophisticated enough to see
that it has a history that long predates him: as the devil that
possessed Christians; as the mesmerism and hypnosis that invoked
the split, double and multiple personalities of the 18th and
19th centuries; and as the theme of " doubling" that informed
much Victorian literature and, today, still informs the dumbest plot
lines in Hollywood and in psychotherapy. Now connect the dots.
In each iteration of the unconscious, some anointed medium -priest, quack or analyst -- claims special access to the darkest,
scariest reaches of our minds. For a certain price, he or she
can cure you of this demon. Of course, as with exorcism, the
psychoanalytic "cure" hinges upon belief in mysterious entities
such as the unconscious. For with belief we are back in the realm of
Then there is

placebo effect. True, that's not nothing. But the cult-like

exigencies of psychoanalysis dictate that normal human
suggestibility be exploited for the cause of conversion. As Karl Kraus
put it many years ago, psychoanalysis itself became the poison it purports to cure .
Another way to put it is that it is psychoanalysis itself that has infected the Western
soul with penis envy, Oedipal conflicts, death drives and so on.
For these ideas are not given to, and cannot be found in, the world . They must be
created . Consequently, the death of psychoanalysis is itself the only
cathartic event psychoanalysis was ever designed to deliver . In
suggestion and, at its best, the

psychoanalysis was laughable, and then it was ponderable. Then, unfortunately, it was
tragic -- for patients and for Western culture in general. Now psychoanalysis is just

the beginning,

laughable again. This is a good thing. At last we are in a position to do justice to Freud.